TORTS AND DAMAGES

EMPLOYERS
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers,
tavern
keepers
and
proprietors
of
establishments. In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and
any other persons or corporations shall be civilly
liable
for
crimes
committed
in
their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special
police regulation shall have been committed by
them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the
restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein,
or for the payment of the value thereof, provided
that such guests shall have notified in advance
the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn;
and shall furthermore have followed the
directions
which
such
innkeeper
or
his
representative may have given them with respect
to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other
persons. The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties.
184 Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA and
Kapunan| Fernan
G.R. No. 75112, October 16, 1990 |190 SCRA
485
FACTS
Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year
old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was
struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner
Filamer and driven by its alleged employee,
Funtecha as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along
Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the
evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the
accident, Kapunan was hospitalized for a total
of twenty days.
Evidence showed that at the time of the
accident, the jeep had only one headlight
functioning and that Funtecha only had a
student drivers permit, having persuaded Allan
Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the

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wheels to him.
Kapunan instituted a criminal case against
Funtecha alone for serious physical injuries
through
reckless
imprudence.
He
then
commenced a civil case for damages naming
as defendants Filamer and Funtecha. Also
included was Agustin Masa, director and
president of Filamer Christian Institute. Allan
Masa was not impleaded as co-defendant.
The trial court rendered judgment finding not
only Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but
also Allan Masa, a non-party. On appeal, the
Appellate Court affirmed the trial courts
decision in toto
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N FILAMER IS LIABLE AS FUNTECHAS
EMPLOYER?
Petitioner: It cannot be held responsible for the
201ortuous act of Funtecha on the ground that
there is no existing employer-employee
relationship between them.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO, FILAMER IS NOT LIABLE
Art. 2180 provides that xxx Employers shall
be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
In disclaiming responsibility, Filamer has
invoked Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the
Labor Code which reads:
o Sec. 14 Working scholars. There is no
employer-employee
relationship
between
students on the one hand, and schoolson the
other, where students work for the latter in
exchange for the privilege to study free of
charge
Under the just-quoted provision of law,
Filamer cannot be considered as Funtechas
employer. Funtecha belongs to that special
category of students who render service to the
school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha
worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five
days a week. He was assigned to clean the
school passageways from 4-6am with sufficient
time to prepare for his 7:30 am classes. He was
not included in the company payroll.
Even if we were to concede the status of an
employee
on
Funtecha,
it
has
been
satisfactorily shown that at the time of the
accident, he was not acting within the scope of
his supposed employment. Taking the wheels
of the Pinoy jeep was not within the ambit of

TORTS AND DAMAGES

the janitorial
employed.

services

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for

which

he

was

185 Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC|

Gutierrez
G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992 |
FACTS
Funtecha was a working student, being a
part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an
employee even if he was assigned to clean the
school premises for only two (2) hours in the
morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha
requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was
allowed, to take over the vehicle while the
latter was on his way home one late afternoon.
The place where Allan lives is also the house
of his father, the school president, Agustin
Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where
Funtecha was allowed free board while he was
a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to
Funtecha only after driving down a road,
negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and
viewing that the road was clear.
According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving
truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that
they had to swerve to the right to avoid a
collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as
if something had bumped against the vehicle,
but they did not stop to check. Actually, the
Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian,
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his
lane in the direction against vehicular traffic,
and hit him.
Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his
advice to swerve to the right. At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had
only one functioning
headlight.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of
the school president where both Allan and
Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the
interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job
demands that he drive home the school jeep so
he can use it to fetch students in the morning
of the next school day.
In learning how to drive while taking the
vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride.
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep

was intended by the petitioner school.

Therefore, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking
over the steering wheel was one done for and
in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope
of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the
scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of
raising the presumption of liability of an
employer, includes any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at
the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Filamer is liable as Funtechas
employer.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes, Filamer is liable
There is evidence to show that there exists in
the
present
case
an
extra-contractual
obligation arising from the negligence or
reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
other(s) who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over (him)."
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner
Filamer. He need not have an official
appointment for a driver's position in order that
the petitioner may be held responsible for his
grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that
the act of driving at the time of the incident
was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the
fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or
was not acting within the scope of his janitorial
duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its part
either in the selection of a servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him. The
petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha
and Allan.
An employer is expected to impose upon its
employees the necessary discipline called for in
the performance of any act indispensable to
the business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not
shown that it has set forth such rules and
guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles
if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the
driver and son of the Filamer president from

TORTS AND DAMAGES

authorizing another employee to drive the
school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has
failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or
warned its employees against the use of its
vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The actual driver of the school jeep, Allan
Masa, was not made a party defendant in the
civil case for damages. As far as the injured
pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was
concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one
driving the vehicle and presumably was one
authorized by the school to drive. For the
purpose of recovering damages under the
prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the
plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were
able to establish the existence of employeremployee relationship between Funtecha and
petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha
was engaged in an act not for an independent
purpose of his own but in furtherance of the
business of his employer. A position of
responsibility on the part of the petitioner has
thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
Valenzuela vs. CA| Kapunan
G.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996 | 362 SCRA
56
FACTS
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24,
1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was
driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No.
FFU 542 along Aurora Blvd. with a companion,
Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction
of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she
noticed she had a flat tire and stopped at a
lighted place to solicit help if needed. She
parked along the sidewalk, about 1. feet away,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the
car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of
her car when she was suddenly bumped by a
1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant
Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because
of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant and then
fell to the ground. She was pulled out from
under defendants car. She was brought to the
UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was
found to have a traumatic amputation, leg,
left up to distal thigh (above knee). She was
confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days
and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
The expenses for the hospital confinement (P

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120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg
(P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the
car insurance.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was
negligent. He said he was travelling at 55 kph;
considering that it was raining, visibility was
affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light.
He testified that he was driving along the inner
portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards
the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was
suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake
Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the
opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with
full bright lights.
Temporarily blinded, he swerved to the right to
avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and
bumped plaintiffs car, which he did not see
because it was midnight blue in color, with no
parking lights or early warning device, and the
area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his
defense that the left rear portion of plaintiffs
car was protruding as it was then at a
standstill diagonally on the outer portion of
the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18,
Answer). He confirmed the testimony of
plaintiffs witness that after being bumped the
car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit
another
car
parked
on
the
sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent,
as she was not a licensed driver.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Alexander Commercial Inc. can be
held solidarily liable with Li
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No
Although the Li was an employee of
American, no proof was adduced as Li claimed,
that he was out late that night on a social call
in the exercise of his functions as assistant
manager
Castilex v. Vazquez| Kapunan
G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999
FACTS
Between 1:30 to 2:00 am , Romeo Vazquez
was driving a motorcycle while Benjamin Abad
was driving a pick-up owned by CAstilex.
Instead of going around the Rotunda, he made
a shortcut. He traversed against the flow of
traffic. As a result thereof, the pick-up collided
with the motorcycle resulting in the severe
injuries of Vazquez. While in the hospital,
Vazquez died.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

ISSUES
W/N
should
caused

& ARGUMENTS
as employer of Abad, Castilex
be held liable for the damage
by its employee

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Castilex is not Liable.
Under Article 2180, Employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry. In
order for this paragraph to apply, it must be
shown that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned tasks. Here it was not
sufficiently proven that such was the case.
It is the obligation of the plaintiff to prove
that the employee is not acting within the
scope of its duty. Jurisprudence provides that,
an employer who loans his motor vehicle to an
employee for the latter's personal use outside
of regular working hours is generally not liable
for the employee's negligent operation of the
vehicle during the period of permissive use,
even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used
by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental
benefit to the employer. Even where the
employee's personal purpose in using the
vehicle has been accomplished and he has
started the return trip to his house where the
vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that
he has not resumed his employment, and the
employer is not liable for the employee's
negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip.
In this case, Abad did some overtime work at
the petitioner's office, and after he went out to
grab some dinner. It was when he left the
restaurant that the incident in question
occurred. Abad was engaged in affairs of his
own or was carrying out a personal purpose not
in line with his duties at the time he figured in
a vehicular accident.
Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA|
Makalintal
G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 | 16 SCRA
448
FACTS
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station
in Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground

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storage, right at the opening of the receiving
truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted
The fire then spread to and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal
properties and effects inside them.
The owners of the houses, among them
petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the
station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of
operation).
ISSUES:
W/N Caltex is solidarily liable
HELD AND RATIO:
Yes, based on the contract between Boquiren
and Caltex, the latter had an extensive control
over Boquiren, the control was such that
Boquiren was virtually and employee.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP VS CA
GR NO 104658
FACTS:
Clarita Camacho (private respondent) was the
operator of a gasoline station in Baguio City
where she sells Shell products.
To determine if the sales losses she incurred in
the past months were due to pipeline leakages,
she requested petitioner to conduct a hydropressure test on the underground storage
tanks.
Certain Jesus Feliciano came to the private
respondents station with a job order from the
petitioner to perform the test.
Due to the negligence of contractor Feliciano,
the water from the tank where they are
conducting the test was transferred to the tank
where gasoline is sold, this occurrence led to
complaints being filed against the private
respondent.
ISSUES:
W/N PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR THE
NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BY MR. FELICIANO
HELD AND RATIO:
NO, for an employer to be liable ER-EE relation
must be proved, certain factors must be
determined 1. The manner of selection and
engagement of the putative employee 2. The
mode of payment of wages 3. The presence or
absence of power to control the putative
employees conduct.
Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is
responsible for his own acts and omissions. As
he alone was in control over the manner of how
he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test,
he alone must bear the consequences of his
negligence.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Cerezo vs. Tuazon| Carpio
G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004 | 426 SCRA
167
FACTS
A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided
with a tricycle.
Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for
Damages against Foronda, the bus driver, Mrs.
Cerezo, the owner of the bus line, and Atty.
Cerezo her husband.
Summons was never served against Foronda,
and thus, the Court never acquired jurisdiction
over him.
Tuazon failed to show that the business
benefitted the family pursuant to Art. 121(3) of
the Family Code, hence Atty. Cerezo was not
held liable and Mrs. Cerezo was held to be the
only one liable.
Instead of an appeal, Mrs. Cerezo filed an
action for relief of judgment. When such was
denied, the Cerezo spouses filed certiorari
before the CA. And subsequently, certiorari
before the SC.
One of Mrs. Cerezos contentions is that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over Foronda
whose negligence was the main issue and that
he was an indispensible party whose presence
was compulsory.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Mrs. Cerezo may be held to be
solely liable as the employer with the
negligent employee impleaded in the
case.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes, Mrs. Cerezos liability is not only
solidary but also primary and direct, as an
employer
The same negligent act may produce civil
liability arising from a delict under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to
an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may
choose between the two remedies. An action
based on a quasi-delict may proceed
independently from the criminal action.
Tuazon chose to file an action based on quasidelict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that
Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising due care and
diligence in the supervision and management
of her employees and buses, hired Foronda as
her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of
Forondas recklessness, gross negligence and
imprudence, aggravated by Mrs. Cerezos
lack of due care and diligence in the selection
and supervision of her employees, particularly

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Foronda.
Art. 2180 states that Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
An employers liability based on a quasi-delict
is primary and direct, while the employers
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda
is not an indispensable party to the case. An
indispensable party is one whose interest is
affected by the courts action in the litigation,
and without whom no final resolution of the
case is possible.
The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Where there is a solidary obligation on the part
of debtors, each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda
is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect
damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES
AMERICAN FORWARDERS

VS.

PHIL.

FACTS Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck

[owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along the
national highway at Pampanga, and the truck
bumped the PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan.
As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and
the bus was damaged and could not be used
for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings
amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders. PRBL
and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages
against Phil-American Forwarders, Balingit, and
Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not
Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the
complaint against him be dismissed on the
ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no
cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the
complaint against Balingit, on the ground that
he is not the manager of an establishment as
contemplated in NCC 2180.
ISSUE AND HOLDING WON the terms
"employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the
reckless operation of which allegedly resulted
in the vehicular accident from which the
damage arose.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

NO. RATIO Those terms do not include the
manager of a corporation. It may be gathered
from the context of NCC 2180 that the term
"manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is
used in the sense of "employer". Hence, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
imposed on Balingit as manager of PhilAmerican Forwarders, in connection with the
vehicular accident in question, because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.
JAYME vs APOSTOL
G.R. No. 163609
November 27, 2008
FACTS:
Fidel Loano, an employee of the Municipality of
Koronadal, borrowed the pick-up truck owned
by Rodrigo Apostol from its current possessor
Ernesto Simbulan to ferry Mayor Miguel of
Koronadal to Buayan Airport. The pick-up
accidentally hit a minor, Marvin C. Jayme, who
was crossing the National Highway. The
intensity of the collision sent Marvin 50 meters
away from point of impact, a clear indication
that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at
the time of the accident. Despite medical
treatment, Marvin died six days after the
accident.
Marvins parents filed a complaint for damages
with the RTC against the driver, the mayor, the
owner of the pick-up, Simbulan and the
Municipality of Koronadal (now City), pointing
out that the proximate cause was Lozanos
negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle.
And that applying the doctrine of vicarious
liability or imputed liability, Mayor Miguel
should be liable for his employees negligent
acts. On the other hand, Apostol and Simbulan
averred that Lozano took the pick-up without
their consent. Mayor Miguel and Lozano
pointed that Marvins sudden sprint across the
highway made it impossible to avoid the
accident.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Marvins
parents,
absolving
Simbulan
and
the
Municipality of Koronadal from liability. Fidel,
Rodrigo and Mayor Miguel are ordered jointly
and severally liable to pay Marvins parents
damages. In his appeal, Mayor Miguel claims
that the real employer of Lozano was the
Municipality of Koronadal and not him. The CA
granted his appeal and dismissed the case.

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ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal mayor be
held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of
the driver assigned to him, which resulted in
the death of a minor pedestrian.
RULING: NO. PETITION DENIED.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a
person is not only liable for one's own quasidelictual acts, but also for those persons for
whom one is responsible for. This liability is
popularly known as vicarious or imputed
liability. To sustain claims against employers for
the acts of their employees, the following
requisites must be established: (1) That the
employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the
service to be rendered in accordance with
orders which the employer has the authority to
give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of
the employee was on the occasion or by reason
of the functions entrusted to him.
Significantly, to make the employee liable
under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it
must be established that the injurious or
tortuous act was committed at the time the
employee was performing his functions.
Indeed, it was the Municipality of Koronadal
who is the lawful employer of Lozano at the
time of accident. Though Mayor Miguel, also an
employee of the municipality, loaned Lozano
to drive him to the airport, the Municipality of
Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer.
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed
against a fellow employee although the person
may have the right to control the manner of
the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an
employer-employee relationship establishing
vicarious liability, the driver's negligence
should not be attributed to a fellow employee
who only happens to be an occupant of the
vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant
may have over the driver is not sufficient by
itself to justify an application of the doctrine of
vicarious liability.
Sps. Mamaril vs The Boys Scout of the
Philippines GR No. 179382
Principle:
Vicarious liability lies with the true
employer and not the employers client.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed
by
the
security
guards
attaches to the employer agency, and
not to the clients or customers of such

TORTS AND DAMAGES

agency.
Facts: Spouses Benjamin Mamaril and Sonia P.
Mamaril are jeepney operators. They would
park their six passenger jeepneys every night
at the Boy Scout of the Philippines compound
for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit.
However, one of the vehicles went missing and
was never recovered. BSP had contracted with
AIB for its security and protection. Cesario Pea
and Vicente Gaddi were assigned by AIB
Security to secure the BSP compound. One
night a male person who has the key of the
vehicle
took
the
lost jeepney
out
of
the compound and was never recovered. The
Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages
against BSP, AIB and the two security guards.
Issue: Whether or not the Boy Scout of the
Philippines is not liable for the lost vehicle
owned by the Spouses due to the negligence of
the security guards assigned by AIB to BSP
under the Guard Service Contract?
Ruling: It is undisputed that the proximate
cause of the loss of the Sps. Mamarils vehicle
was the negligent act of the security guards in
allowing unidentified person to take the vehicle
but there is nothing that point negligence on
the part of BSP for it to be liable. The two
security guards are employees of AIB and
where thus assigned by AIB to BSP in pursuant
of the Guard Service Contract between them.
There is no employer-employee relationship
between the security guard and BSP. The
negligence of the security guard cannot be
attributed to BSP but rather to its true
employer AIB. Liability for illegal or harmful
acts committed by the security guards attaches
to the employer agency, and not to the clients
or customers of such agency. As a general rule,
a client or customer of a security agency has
no hand in selecting who among the pool of
security guards or watchmen employed by the
agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of the guards cannot, in
ordinary course of events, be demanded from a
client company whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards. The fact that
a client company may give instruction or
direction to the security guards assigned to it,
does not, by itself render the client responsible
as an
employer
of
the security
guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
omission.

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
Partnership

Partnership or every partner is liable for

torts committed by one of the partners
acting within the scope of the firm
business,
though
they
do
not
participate in, ratify, or have knowledge
of such torts.

Partners are liable as joint tort-feasors.

Vicarious
common
superior.

Liability is entirely imputed and the

partnership cannot obviously invoke
diligence
in
the
selection
and
supervision of the partner.

liability is similar to the

law rule on respondeat

Spouses
Absolute community of property

The absolute community property shall

be for liabilities incurred by either
spouses by reason of crime or quasidelict
in
case
of
absence
or
insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse. (Article 94 Family
Code)

Payments shall be considered advances

to be deducted from the share of the
debtor spouse upon liquidation of the
community.

Conjugal partnership of gains

GENERAL RULE: Pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon the husband or wife are not chargeable
against the conjugal partnership but against the
separate properties of the wrongdoer.
EXCEPTION: Conjugal partnership should be
made liable:

When the profits have inured to the

benefit of the partnership, or

If one of the spouses committed the

tort while performing a business or if
the act was supposed to benefit the
partnership.

Regime of separation of property

Each spouse is
responsible
his/her separate obligation.

for

TORTS AND DAMAGES

REGISTERED OWNER RULE
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the person who
is the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for
any damages caused by the negligent operation
of the vehicle although the same was already
sold or conveyed to another person at the time of
the accident. The registered owner is liable to the
injured party subject to his right of recourse
against the transferee or the buyer.
Although the rule is usually applied to common
carriers, the rule had already been extended by
the Supreme Court to quasi-delict cases involving
private vehicles. The registered owner rule had
been applied to cases involving enforcement of
liability against an employer under Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code even if the employer is not
engaged in business.
Although the rule is usually applied to common
carriers, the rule had already been extended by
the Supreme Court to quasi-delict cases involving
private vehicles. The registered owner rule had
been applied to cases involving enforcement of
liability against an employer under Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code even if the employer is not
engaged in business.
DUAVIT v COURT OF APPEALS
May 18, 1989
FACTS:
The jeep being driven by defendant Sabiniano
collided with another jeep, which had then
2 passengers on it. As a result of the collision
the passengers of the other jeep suffered injury
and the automobile itself had to be repaired
because of the extensive damage.
A case was filed against Sabiniano as driver
and against Duavit as owner of the jeep.
Duavit admitted ownership of the jeep but
denied that Sabiniano was his employee.
Sabiniano
himself
admitted
that
he
took Duavits jeep from the garage without
consent or authority of the owner. He testified
further that Duavit even filed charges against
him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did
not push through as the parents of Sabiniano
apologized to Duavit on his behalf.
TC found Sabiniano negligent in driving the
vehicle but absolved Duavit on the ground that
there wasno employer-employee relationship
between them, and that former took the
vehicle without consent or authority of the
latter.
CA held the two of them jointly and severally

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
liable.
ISSUE:
Won the owner of a private vehicle which
figured in an accident can be held liable under
Article2180 of the CC when the said vehicle
was neither driven by an employee of the
owner nor taken with the consent of the latter.
HELD:
NO
In Duquillo v Bayot (1939), SC ruled that an
owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an
accident involving a vehicle if the same was
driven without his consent or knowledge and
by a person note mployed by him. This ruling is
still relevant and applicable, and hence, must
be upheld.
CAs reliance on the cases of Erezo v Jepte and
Vargas v Langcay is misplaced and cannot be
sustained. In
Erezo v Jepte case , defendant Jepte was held
liable for the death of Erezo even if he was not
really the owner of the truck that killed the
latter because he represented himself as its
owner to the Motor Vehicles Office and had it
registered under his name; he was thus
estopped
from
later
on denying
such
representation. In Vargas, Vargas sold her
jeepney to a 3rd person, but she did not
surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the
corresponding AC plates. So when the jeepney
later on figured in an accident, she was held
liable by the court. Holding that the operator of
record continues to be the operator of vehicle
in contemplation of law, as regards the public
and 3rd persons.
The circumstances of the above cases are
entirely different from those in the present
case. Here in petitioner does not deny
ownership of vehicle but denies having
employed or authorized the driver Sabiniano.
The jeep was virtually stolen from the
petitioners garage.
Decision and resolution annulled and set aside.
Equitable Leasing Corp v Lucita Suyom et
al | Panganiban
GR NO. 143360, September 5, 2002 |
FACTS
June 4, 1991: Equitable Leasing Corp had a
lease agreement with for a Fuso Road Tractor
with Ecatine (as the lessee), who according to
the agreement will eventually own the tractor,
upon full payment by Edwin Lim of Ecatine.
December 9, 1992: Lim completed the

TORTS AND DAMAGES

payment, and thus a Deed of Sale was drawn
between Ecatine and Equitable, however the
deed was not registered in the LTO.
July 17, 1994: the said Tractor, driven by Raul
Tutor, employee of Ecatine, rammed into the
house cum store of Myrna Tamayo in Tondo
Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed, 2
died while 4 more were injured.
Tutor was charged and convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide and multiple
physical injuries in the MTC.
Upon verification with the LTO, Equitable was
found to be the registered owner of the tractor.
Equitable then received a complaint for
damages, but they denied liability claiming the
tractor was already sold to Ecatine back in
1992.
RTC and CA held: Equitable is liable, hence
this appeal.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Equitable remains liable based on
quasi-delict for the negligent act of a
driver who was not the employee of the
petitioner
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
EQUITABLE IS LIABLE
The negligent employees civil liability is
based on Art 2176 (NCC) and/or Art 100 (RPC),
while employers liability is based on Art 103 of
the RPC: where employers are held subsidiary
liable for felonies committed by their
employees in the discharge of latters duties.
This liability attaches when the convicted
employee turns out to be insolvent.
Art 2176 in relation to 2180, an action
predicated on quasi-delict maybe instituted
against the employer for an employees act or
omission. This liability for the negligent
conduct of a subordinate is direct and primary
(meaning SOLIDARY), with the possible defense
of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. In the case at bar,

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
Tutors criminal liability has been established,
but since Tutor cannot be found, the victims
recourse is to file damage claims against
Tutors employer. Unfortunately for Equitable,
they are the registered owners of the tractor
and jurisprudence provides, the registered
owners are deemed to be the employer of the
erring driver and thus civilly liable. The sale
between
Ecatine
and
Equitable,
being
unregistered, will not bind/prejudice, a third
person, in this case the victim-respondents.
Equitable cannot use the defense that Tutor
was not his employee. As to a third person, the
registered owner is the employer, and Ecatine,
although the actual employer of Tutor, is
deemed to be merely an agent of Equitable.
Non-registration is the fault of the petitioner,
thus they cannot escape liability to prejudice
the rights (to damages) of the respondents.
Side note: (on Moral Damages) The SC also
justified that there was causal connection
between the factual basis of the respondents
claim and Tutors wrongful act. (3 element to
sustain a claim on quasi-delict: a)damage
suffered by the plaintiff b)fault or negligence of
the defendant c)causal connection between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damage incurred by the plaintiff) This case
falls squarely under 2219(2) which provides for
payment of moral damages in cases of quasidelict. Moral damages are paid to alleviate the
moral suffering/mental anguish caused by the
act or omission of the defendant. Having
established the liability of Tutor and the
Equitable as an employer, respondents have
successfully shown the existence of the factual
basis for the award (injury to plaintiffs) and its
causal connection to the tortious acts of Tutor.
No proof of pecuniary loss is needed to justify
the moral damages. The amount of indemnity
will be left to the discretion of the court.