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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
-
Art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors
of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law (Caltex Phil. vs Palomar, 18 SCRA 247)
The art of seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to
a given state of facts (Justice Martin)
That branch of law dealing with the interpretation of laws enacted by a legislature
(American Jurisprudence)
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION, DISTINGUISHED
INTERPRETATION
-
the process of discovering the true meaning of the legislature
courts will resort to interpretation WHEN it endeavors to ascertain the meaning of a
word found in a statute, which when considered with the other words in the statute ,
may reveal a meaning different from that apparent when the word is considered
abstractly or when its given its usual meaning
limited to exploring the written text
the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense which their
author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea
which the author intended to convey Dr. Lieber
CONSTRUCTION
-
the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct
expression of the text from elements known and given in the text
courts go beyond the language of the statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids
in order to determine whether a given case falls within the statute
the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of
the text, from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in the
spirit, though not within the letter, of the text Black
SITUS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Judicial Department
-
under the principle of checks and balances, courts may declare legislative measures or
executive acts unconstitutional
DUTY OF THE COURTS TO CONSTRUE AND INTERPRET THE LAW ; REQUISITES
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
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1.)There must be an actual case or controversy.
- meaning, a case brought to the court by party litigants to hear and settle their disputes
- if there is no case or controversy, there is no way for the court to construe or interpret a
law
2.)There is ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy.
- meaning the law involved is susceptible of two or more interpretations
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Hermeneutics
-the science or art of construction and interpretation
Legal Hermeneutics
- is understood to be the systematic body of rules which are recognized as applicable to the construction
and interpretation of legal writings.
Classification of the different kinds of interpretation (Dr. Lieber Hermeneutics)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Close interpretation
Extensive interpretation
Extravagant interpretation
Free or unrestricted interpretation
Limited or restricted interpretation
Predestined interpretation
Philippine Jurisdiction
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Literally
Strictly
Liberally
Prospectively
Retrospectively
SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Constitution
Statutes
Ordinances
Resolutions
Executive Orders
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
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Department Circulars
WHERE THE LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE,
THERE IS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION, VACILLATION, OR
EQUIVOCATION, THERE IS ROOM ONLY FOR APPLICATION.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
CHAPTER I
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,
MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
G.R. NO. 102858. JULY 28, 1997
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
Records show that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Sec. 23(1) of P.D. 1529 requiring the applicants to
publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The initial hearing was
published only in the Official Gazette.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, in
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive
the trial court of its authority to grant the application.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
Statute/s subject of construction:
P.D. 1529 (Sec. 23(1) )
requires the applicants to publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines
ISSUE:
WON the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents in the absence of
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD:
No. The petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
CHAPTER I
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The
said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a
statute. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold
that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have
mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority
to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF
INTERPRETATION. IT MUST BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF WHO MAY
BE AFFECTED, EVEN IF THE LAW MAY BE HARSH OR ERRONEOUS.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
CHAPTER I
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
VS.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 84240, MARCH 25, 1992
FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children.
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate
Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, but like the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration was
also dismissed.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized (and acknowledged) natural children as
their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception.
Statute/s subject of construction:
ARTICLE 992 OF THE CC
- An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.
Diaz vs IAC
- Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
successionab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by
the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
CHAPTER I
ISSUE:
WON Article 992 of the CC can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
HELD:
No. The petition is devoid of merit. Petition dismissed.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is
also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo,
165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]).
The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110
Phil. 42).
And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be
strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.
Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
CHAPTER I
THE FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO APPLY
THE LAW.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22301 ; August 30, 1967
FACTS:
Defendant Mapa was charged and convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition (violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by
Republic Act No. 4).
His sole defense (with proper documentary exhibits) is that he is duly appointed secret agent
of the then Governor of Batangas dated June 2, 1962 and at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, he had a confidential mission to proceed to Manila, Pasay and
Quezon City.
Statute/s subject of construction:
Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic
Act No. 4
ISSUE:
WON the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
HELD:
No. Judgment affirmed.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
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The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, it shall be unlawful for any
person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition.
The next section provides that firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors or marines (of the AFP), the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails, are not covered when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such, he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the
law.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
S TAT C O N
CHAPTER I
THE DUTY OF THE COURTS IS TO APPLY THE LAW DISREGARDING
THEIR FEELING OF SYMPATHY OR PITY FOR THE ACCUSED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS
PATRICIO AMIGO
G.R. NO. 116719, JANUARY 18, 1996
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the RTC-Davao City
and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh as a
penalty and pleads for sympathy.
HELD:
Decision affirmed.
Courts are not forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of the court is to apply, disregarding
their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused.
Dura lex sed lex.
The remedy is elsewhere clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the
legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court cannot but apply the law.
S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
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S TAT U T O RY C O N S T R U C T I O N R E V I E W E R
BY: S A R A H K R I S T I N D E G U Z M A N , 2 0 1 4
