CASE DOCTRINES

IMPORTANCE OF THE LAWYERS OATH (1996, 2003 Bar Exams)

The lawyers oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at all times
weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer' oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the administration of justice will undoubtedly be fairer, faster, and easier for everyone concerned. [In re: Al
C. Argosino, 270 SCRA 26]

By taking the lawyers oath a lawyer becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Good moral character
includes, at least, common honesty. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw . [Olbes v. Deciembre, 457
SCRA 341]

Nature of a Lawyers Oath: The lawyers oath is not mere facsimile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred
trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. (Sebastian v. Calis, Adm. Case No. 5118, September. 9, 1999)
PRACTICE OF LAW
It is any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill . (Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA
210 [1991])

The practice of law is not a natural property or constitutional right but a mere privilege. It is not a right
granted to anyone who demands it but a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. More specifically, it is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. (In Re: Ozaeta, 92 SCRA 1)
The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities . (In re Edillion 84
SCRA 568)

The LEGISLATURE, in the exercise of its POLICE POWER may, however, enact laws regulating the
practice of law to protect the public and promote the public welfare. But it MAY NOT pass a law that will
control the SUPREME COURT in the performance of its function to decide who may enjoy the privilege of

Center for Legal Education and Research | 1

practicing law and any law of that kind is unconstitutional as an invalid exercise of legislative power (In re:
Cunanan, 94 Phil 534)

Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the
individual members of the Committee on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a Deputy
Clerk of Court. He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees
to the Bar. (In re: Lanuevo, AC No. 1162, August 29, 1975)
General Rule: All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice
their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Exception: where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself. (People v Maceda GR No.
89591-96, Jan 24, 2000)

ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE

Retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. (Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay, BM No. 1678, December 17,
2007)

It is improper for a person, as member of the Sharia Bar, to use the title Attorney. Only members of the
Philippine Bar, who have obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully passed the
bar exams, been admitted to the IBP and remain members in good standing are authorized to practice
law and thus use the title. Meling was suspended from membership in the Philippine Sharia Bar . (In the
Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling, BM No. 1154, 431 SCRA 147, June 08, 2004)

Passing the Bar exam is not the only qualification to become an attorney at law. Taking the prescribed
courses of legal study is equally essential. Where it is found that the requirement was not complied with,
the one who has been admitted to the bar after successfully passing the bar may be stricken of record on
the ground that his admission was obtained under false pretenses. (Diao v. Martinez, AC No. 244, March 29,
1963)

Persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full fledged members of the Philippine Bar. The title of
Attorney is reserved to those who are admitted to the IBP and remain members thereof in good
standing. (Alawi v. Alauya, AM SDC-97-2-P, Feb 24, 1997)
In the course of the examination in Criminal Law, had possession of the piece of paper containing notes
on the durations of penalties and that he knew it is contrary to the rules to bring notes and books inside
the examination room. It thus results that he knowingly violated Section 10, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which pertinently provides that Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or
notes into the examination rooms. Amparos impression that the notes had no material use to him is
correct, in the sense that they bore no reference to any question asked in the examination in Criminal Law
even so he committed an overt act indicative of an attempt to cheat by reading the notes. His refusal to
surrender the paper containing the notes when first demanded; his eventual surrender of it only after he
was informed that he would be reported; and the facts that the notes pertained to Criminal Law and the
examination then in Criminal Law, all these override and rebut his explanation that he merely read the
notes to find out what they were as he had forgotten about them.
A continuing requirement, good moral character is not only a condition precedent for the admission to the
legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity (Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998).

Center for Legal Education and Research |2

A lawyer has committed a breach of trust in issuing a bouncing check which amounted to deceit and
violation of the lawyers oath. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a
person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter
upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in
serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. The loss of moral character of a
lawyer for any reasons whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment, because it is important
that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality. Any
wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it is professional or nonprofessional justifies disciplinary action.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. Her conduct not
only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister
character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession (Grande v. Atty. De
Silva, AC No.4838, July 29, 2003)

Rule 139-A requires that every member of the IBP shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership and if non-payment covers a period of 1-year,default
shall be a ground for removal of the delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter
whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked
by respondent does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues. (Santos, Jr.
vs. Atty. Llamas AC No. 4749, January 20, 2000)

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This
requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the SC.
Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the
IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allow exemption from payment of membership dues. At most,
as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. (Letter of Atty Arevalo Jr. requesting exemption from
payment of dues, BM 1370, May 9, 2005)

Restrictions in the Practice of Law by the Members of the Legislature

A lawyer-member of the Legislature is prohibited from appearing as counsel before any court of justice,
electoral tribunals or quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. What is prohibited is to personally appear
in court and other bodies. The word appearance includes not only arguing a case before any such body
but also filing a pleading on behalf of a client as by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer. (Ramos
v. Maalac, 89 Phil 27)

Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of a firm name under the
signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to a signing of a nonqualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally of agency, and because he
will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial body in violation of the constitutional restriction.
He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly (In re: David 93 Phil 461)
Restrictions in the Practice of Law of the Members of the Sanggunian (Sec 90 RA 7160 LGC)

Center for Legal Education and Research |3

They shall not:

1.

Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
2.
Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
3.
Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
4.
Use property and personnel of the government EXCEPT when the member concerned is
defending the interest of the government.
Under Republic Act 7160, the following are the elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Governor, Vice Governor and members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan for provinces;

Mayor, Vice Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod for cities;
Mayor, Vice Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities; and
Punong Barangay, members of the Sangguniang Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
for barangays.

While certain local elective officials are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice
their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the Punong Barangay and
members of the Sangguniang Barangay. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession However, he
should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by
the Civil Service Regulations. (Wilfredo Catu v. Atty. Vicente Rellosa, AC No. 5738, Feb 19, 2008)
Restrictions in the Practice of Law by Retired Justices/Judges
As a condition of the pension provided under Republic Act 910, no retiring judge of a court of record or
any city or municipality judge during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel
before any court in:
a. Any civil case wherein the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse
party;
b. Any criminal case wherein an officer or an employee of the government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office; or
c. Collect any fees for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse
to the government, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers (Section 1, RA
910).

APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYER IN COURT

May a non-lawyer appear in court?
General Rule: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear and handle cases in court.
Exceptions:
a. Before MTC a party may conduct his case or litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court)
b. Before any other court a party may conduct his litigation personally. But if he gets someone to aid
him, that someone must be an authorized member of the Bar (Sec. 34, Rule 138). He is bound by the

2012 BAR OPS |4

same rules in conducting the trial of his case. He cannot after judgment, claim that he was not
properly represented.
c. In a criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not
available, the judge may appoint a non-lawyer who is:
(1) A resident of that province;
(2) Of good repute for probity and ability to defend the accused (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court)
d. Student Practice Rule A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law schools clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court may appear, without compensation, in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school (Section 1 Rule 138-A). The student shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the IBP duly accredited by the law school
(Section 2, Rule 138-A) (2006 Bar Exams).

e. Before the NLRC non-lawyers may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or any
Labor Arbiter if they:
(1) represent themselves;
(2) represent their organization or members thereof (Article 222, PD 442 Labor Code).
f.

Before a Cadastral Court a non-lawyer may represent a claimant (Section 9, Act No. 2259)

g.

Any person appointed to appear for the Government of the Philippines in accordance with law
(Section 33, Rule 138 Revised Rules of Court).

Case: Kanlaon Construction and private respondents case were assigned before two labor arbiters. The
Engineers as co-defendant, without written authority to represent Kanlaon Construction, admitted the
complaints against them. By virtue of such admission, the labor arbiters adjudicated the case in favor of
the private respondents.
Can an engineer represent a co-defendant in a case before the labor arbiter?
No. The appearance of the engineers on behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It
was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named
co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and
declaration the engineers made before the arbiters could not bind the petitioner.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the engineers were authorized to appear as representatives of
petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent
Commission. Petitioners liability arose from the engineers alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay
amounts to an offer of compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of the
petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly established by
evidence. (Kanlaon Construction v. NLRC, GR No. 126625, September 18, 1997)
Limitations on Appearance of Non-Lawyers before the Courts
a. He should confine his work to non-adversary contentions: He should not undertake purely legal work,
such as the examination or cross-examination of witnesses, or the presentation of evidence;
b. His services should not be habitually rendered; and
c. He should not charge or collect attorneys fee (PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., L-23959,
November 1971)

May a Party Represent Himself?

Center for Legal Education and Research |5

Civil Cases An individual litigant has the right to conduct his litigation personally.

Criminal Cases In grave and less grave offenses, an accused who is a layman must always
appear by counsel; he CANNOT conduct his own defense, as his right to counsel MAY NOT BE
WAIVED without violating his right to due process of law.
Even the most intelligent of educated men may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in
the rules of procedure and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he did not know how to establish his innocence. Where an accused was not duly
represented by a member of the bar during trial, the judgment should be set aside and the case
remanded to the trial court for a new trial (People v. Santocildes, Jr., GR No. 109149, December 1999)

By a Juridical Person A juridical person must always appear in court through a duly licensed
member of the bar, except in the municipal trial court where it may be represented by its agent or
officer who need NOT be a lawyer.

Partnership with a non-lawyer is VOID. In the formation of partnership for the practice of law, no
person should be admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not a member of the legal
profession duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline.
(Pro Se, Sec 34 Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court)
Maderada filed charges against Judge Mediodea for gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave
misconduct for failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule of Summary Procedure in a civil case. On
the other hand, respondent Judge Mediodea maintained that Maderada, in appearing as counsel on her
own behalf as well as her co-plaintiff, failed to secure authority from the Court.
Can Maderada appear as counsel for herself and her co-plaintiff even if she is not a lawyer?
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate
their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away
from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in
propria persona or to self-representation. Clearly, in appearing for herself, the complainant was not
customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the
aforementioned case, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Obviously, she was
already defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued
that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give
complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are
two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for
the latter without permission from the Court. (Maderada v. Judge Mediodea, AM No. MTJ-02-1459, Oct 14 2003)
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf before the
RTC as the plaintiff in a civil case for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a 4 th year law student, anchors
his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court
and conduct his litigation personally.
Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence as well as to satisfy the
requirements/conditions under Rule 138 A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

2012 BAR OPS |6

Did respondent Court act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant?
Yes. From the clear language of Rule 138-A, Law Student Practice Rule, the contention of petitioner has
merit.
The law recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The
Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant
may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the
risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance.
Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of his case. He
would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is law student and must, therefore be
subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the
basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a
law student may appear in courts, while the latter allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party
representing himself. (Cruz v. Mijares et al GR No 154464, September 11, 2008)
May a Corporation Practice Law?
No. It is a well-settled rule that a corporation cannot engage in the practice of law. It may, however, hire
an attorney to attend to and conduct its own legal business or affairs. But it cannot practice law directly or
indirectly by employing a lawyer to practice for it or to appear for others for its benefit.
Reasons:
1. The nature of the privilege and the confidential and trust relation between client and attorney.
2. A corporation cannot perform the conditions required for membership in the Bar, such as the
possession of good moral character, and other special qualifications e.g. the taking of an oath and
becoming an officer of the court subject to its discipline, suspension and removal.
3. The relation of trust and confidence cannot arise where the attorney is employed by a corporation to
practice for it as his employer and owing to it at best a secondary and divided loyalty to the clientele
of his corporate employer.
4. The intervention of the corporation is destructive if that confidential and trust relation and is obnoxious
to the law.
Who are Authorized to Represent the Government?
Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government
of the Philippines or any of its officials shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to
appear in any case in which said government has an interest, direct or indirect (Section 33, Rule 138, RRC).
The Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.
What are the possible actions that the Solicitor General may undertake in the discharge of his duties?
The Solicitor General, in his discretion, may pursue any of the following actions:

Center for Legal Education and Research |7

a. Prosecute or not to prosecute;

b. Abandon a prosecution already started; or
c. Take a position adverse to the People of the Philippines in a criminal case or to that of a government
agency or official, when he believes that justice will be served by taking a different stand.

2012 BAR OPS |8

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or
out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct themselves according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Being
also servants of the Law, attorneys are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others. The least they can do in that regard is to refrain
from engaging in any form or manner of unlawful conduct (which broadly includes any act or omission
contrary to law, but does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad enough to
include such element). (De Leon vs Castelo, AC No. 8620, January 12, 2011)
All attorneys, as officers of the Court, shall act with the highest standards of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness. They are also expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves
exemplars worthy of emulation by others. The least they can do in that regard is to refrain from engaging
in any form of unlawful conduct which broadly includes any act/omission contrary to law, but does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad enough to include such element . (Jessie R.
De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011)

Dishonesty disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. (In re: Judge Quitain, JBC
No. 013, August 22, 2007)

Deceitful conduct fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon
another who is ignorant of the fact (Code of Professional Responsibilities, Annotated, PhilJA)
Immoral conduct immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To justify
suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. (Mary Jane Abanag, vs. Nicolas B. Mabute, A.M. No. P-112922 April 4, 2011)

Grossly immoral conduct - so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be

reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency. (Advincula vs. Macabata, AC No. 7204, March 7, 2007)
For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly
immoral.
Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between
a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where
no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action. (Abanag vs Mabute, A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011)
Moral turpitude

Center for Legal Education and Research |9

The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on
the circumstances attending the violation of the statute. (In re Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera, AC
No. 6052, December 11, 2003)

Some Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude

When lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances, not the mere fact of their
conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession (Soriano vs. Dizon, AC No. 6792,
January 25, 2006)

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude, depending on the degree of the crime committed,
taking into account all the surrounding circumstances. (IRRI vs NLRC, GR No. 97239, May 12, 1993)
Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued
checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in
continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully
adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn.
There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation, as proved by the
fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Bilang 22, he did not pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Tarog vs Ricafort, AC No. 8523, March 15, 2011)
Lawyers are required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending
money to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her
education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have
never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was
authorized to sell the property and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the
open deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only
complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics perception as well. Her actions constitute
gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court. (Tan vs Gumba, AC No. 9000, October 5, 2011)
Aside from giving adequate attention, care and time to his clients case, a lawyer is also expected to be
truthful, fair and honest in protecting his clients rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his
oath as a lawyer. (Nemesio Floran and Caridad Floran vs Atty. Roy Prule Ediza A.C. No. 5325, October 19, 2011)
A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client, which will involve defiance of the laws,
which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act, which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 10

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. (Donton vs. Tansingco, AC No. 6057, June 27, 2006)
With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true
consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction,
respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful
purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property
sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act
clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Not only did respondent
assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of
respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such
illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does
not deserve considering its nature and purpose. (Caalim-Verzonilla vs Pascua, AC No. 6655, October 11, 2011)
A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man's cause.
Ambulance Chasing - the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment (Linsangan vs. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September 4, 2009)
Defrauding of injured persons having proper causes of actions, but ignorant of legal rights and court
procedures, by means of contracts which retain exorbitant percentages of recovery and illegal charges for
court costs and expenses and by settlement made for quick returns of fees and against the just rights of
the injured persons. (Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co 247 NW 97)
A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.
Counsels may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes
beyond merely presenting their clients respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if
not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court
and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.
The Court finds that both counsel in this case fell short of what was expected of them, despite their
avowed duties as officers of the Court. (Sa Si III vs NLRC, GR No. 104599, March 11, 1994)
A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
(Khan Jr. vs Simbillo, AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003)

A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 11

A lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program in order to solicit legal business. (Khan Jr. vs Simbillo, AC No. 5299, August
19, 2003)

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number; and
special branch of law practiced. (Linsangan vs. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September 4, 2009)

In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading, or assumed name shall be used. The continued
use of the name of deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.
Use of Name of a Foreign Law Firm is Unethical
Respondents use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated
with the firm they could render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises
and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie, being
an alien law firm, is not authorized to practice law in the Philippines. (Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie et al.,
Case No. 2131, May 10, 1985)

Death of a Partner Does Not Extinguish the Client-Lawyer Relationship with the Law Firm
The Court found no merit in petitioners contentions that the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas terminated the
Client-Lawyer relationship. Petitioners counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES
and not merely Atty. Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship
between said firm and petitioner. (BR Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs CA, GR No. L-41862, February 7, 1992)
Note: The new rule is in effect an abandonment of the ruling laid down in the case of In Re Sycip Ozceta,
92 SCRA 1.
A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCA-TION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW
SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
This duty carries with it the obligation to be well informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with
legal developments, recent enactment and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 12

basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of the Bar. Worse, they may become susceptible
to committing mistakes. (Dulalai Jr. v. Cruz, A.C. No. 6854, April 27, 2007, citing Santiago v. Rafanan)
THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE
OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task
have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office (Huyssan v. Gutierrez, AC No. 6707, March 24,
2006)

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by the SC as a member of
the Bar. (Vitriolo vs. Dasig, AC No. 4984, April 1, 2003)
Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves
full-time to the work of their respective offices. In this instance, respondent's admission that he accepted
money from the complainant confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and
the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still
a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
(Ramos vs. Imbang, AC No. 6788, August 23, 2007)

The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action.
The interest of the prosecutor is not to win a case but to see that justice is done. He should present
evidence in their true and proper significance. (Suarez vs Platon, 69 Phil. 556)
The Court, opting to brush aside technicalities, granted new trial to the convicted accused on the basis of
proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and
probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. (Cuenca vs CA, GR No. 109870,
December 1, 1995)

Restrictions Against Using Public Office to Promote Private Interest

Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. (Vitriolo vs Dasig,
AC No. 4984, April 01, 2003)

Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 13

as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. By
taking advantage of his office and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the
benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. (Ali vs Bubong, AC No. 4018, March
8, 2005)

Respondents act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latters pending application
for visas is violative of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interest. (Huyssen vs Gutierrez, AC No. 6707, March 24,
2006)

The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails the employment of deceit not
becoming a member of the bar. It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent,
even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a matter of
policy, only limited to official purposes. As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent
clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Re: Resolution of the Court
dated 1 June 2004 In G.R. No. 72954 against Atty. Victor C. Avecilla,

A.C. No. 6683)

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
There are therefore two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first interpretation,
intervention includes participation in the proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or
little influence. Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has the
power to influence the subject proceedings. We hold that their second meaning is more appropriate to
guide the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility on the light of its
history. (PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, et al., GR No. 151809-12, April 2005.)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
The basic postulate of the IBP is that it is nonpolitical in character and that there shall be neither lobbying
nor campaigning in the choice of the IBP Officers. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote
did not uphold the honor or the profession nor elevate it in the publics esteem. (In Re: Election of the IBP,
178 SCRA 398 (1989)

Payment of IBP Dues

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the unification of the entire lawyer population requiring
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the SC. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues which, the SC, in order to foster the
States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require to be shared
by all the subjects and beneficiaries the lawyers. The fee is a regulatory measure not barred by the
Constitution. The only limitation is that the regulation should not impose an unconstitutional burden. The
public interest far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member. The compulsory nature of payment of

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 14

dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains, regardless of the extent of practice of
a lawyer. (Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr. BM 1370, May 9, 2005)
A declaration in the application to take the bar that one is single when, in fact, one had contracted
marriage prior to the application is in violation of Rule 7.01 even if the marriage, in the belief of the
applicant, is void ab initio and is awaiting judicial declaration of nullity. (Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Bar Matter No. 491)

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried
adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal, AC No. 6313, September 2006)
Counsels act of filing multiple complaints against the complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member
of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trial whether in a lawyer
or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary.
(Saburnido v. Madrono, AC No. 4497, September 2001)

A lawyer must avoid scandalous conduct. He is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or the keeping of mistress but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 1989)
Courtesy to Fellow Lawyers
A lawyer who rudely interrupts his fellow lawyer while the latter was making representations in behalf of
the other party is in violation of the Canon. (Bugaring vs Espanol, GR No. 133090, January 19, 2001)
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against
Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned
to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition for annulment of
judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the
MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the
said decisions were null and void ab initio. Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent
has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed
wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty.
Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself. (Que vs Revilla, AC No. 7054, December 4, 2009)
Any undue ill-feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward
each other. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their clients, their office does not permit
violation of the laws or any manner of fraud or chicanery (Reyes v. Chiong, Jr., AC No. 5148, July 2003).
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of
the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 15

notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. (In Re Clemente M. Soriano, GR No. L-24114, June 30,
1970)

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not
steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services. Again, the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labianos connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers
legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR . (Linsangan vs Tolentino, AC No. 6672,
September 4, 2009)

Unauthorized Practice of Law

The unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority
constitutes indirect contempt, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. (Tan vs. Balajadia, GR
No. 169517, March 14, 2006)

A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if
the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. (Aguirre vs Rana, BM 1036, June 10,
2003)

Assistance to Unauthorized Practice of Law

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented
herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. Busmente claimed that he was totally
unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office
to inquire about its status. Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit submitted by
Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides. The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in
Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso. (Noe-Lacsamana vs
Busmente, AC No. 7269, November 23, 2011)

A lawyer is prohibited from taking as partner or associate any person who is not authorized to practice law
to appear in court or to sign pleadings. Whether such person is knowledgeable in the law is immaterial.
A lawyer, who is under suspension from the practice of law is not a member of the Bar in good standing.
More so, a lawyer whose authority to practice has been withdrawn due to a change in citizenship or
allegiance to the country. (Pineda)
Lawyer cannot delegate his authority without clients consent even to a qualified person.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The
trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be
held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262,
but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend
himself. (People vs Maceda, G.R. Nos. 89591-96, January 24, 2000)
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could
not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot,
even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without
permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 16

from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel
under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice. (Zeta vs. Malinao, AM No. P-220, December 20, 1978)
A review of the records supports respondent's claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer
to the public. No evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty. Aquino.
Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally
practice law. (Tan vs. Balajadia, GR No. 169517, March 14, 2006)
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She also admitted that
the first two are not lawyers but are paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as
senior partners because they have investments in her law office. That is a blatant misrepresentation
(Cambaliza v. Tenorio, AC No. 6290, July 11, 2004)

The respondent violated Rule 9.02 of the CPR by openly admitting he divided the Php70,000 to other
individuals as commission/referral fees. Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except for the instances provided in the rule. (Lijauco vs. Terrado, AC No. 6317,
August 31, 2006)

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal
advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon
complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to
him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to
impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, which she was doing everything to reclaim
the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latters
help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was
willing to share some of her earnings with complainant. Clearly, respondents act is shocking, as it not
only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but also toyed with decency
and good taste. (Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez, A.C. No. 8243)
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the bar that he will do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. (Young v. Batuegas,
AC No. 5379, May 2003).

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla
breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to 'do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but
restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to 'never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law . (Maligaya vs Donorilla Jr., AC No. 6198, September 15,
2006)

Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling, which was
affirmed, by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. To permit
lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to
defeat one of the purposes of the State the administration of justice . (Sebastian vs Bajar, AC No. 3731,
September 27, 2007)

Respondents negligence is compounded by his attempt to have this tribunal believe the story of how his
draft, stored in a magnetic diskette, mysteriously disappeared and how the absence of such file in his
diskette led him to believe that the same was already filed in court. In his Answer, he even tried to depict
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 17

himself as a conscientious lawyer by stating that he was actually mulling on the procedural steps he
would undertake regarding complainants case when instead he received a copy of this complaint for
disbarment. Such story, as observed by the IBP, is not only outrageous but is contemptuous as it makes a
mockery of the Court. (Perea vs Almadro, AC No. 5246, May 02, 2006)
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
A lawyers language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of legal profession. (Tiongco v. Aguilar,
January 25, 1995)

Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever
moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
(Barandon Jr. vs. Ferrer Sr., AC No. 5768, March 26, 2010)

The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual
integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used
improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification. Submitting
pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against the NLRC and attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. (Ng vs. Alar, AC No.
7252, November 22, 2006)

A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case.
Notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in
their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a "court of
technicalities" for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of
Appeals of protecting, in their view, "an incompetent judge." In explaining the "concededly strong
language," Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the case
shows its "impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity" and such
dismissal "smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of
the appellate court." We remind them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court
of Appeals and judicial officers; abstain from offensive language before the courts; and not attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the record. (Asean Pacific Planners et al vs. City of Urdaneta et al, GR No.
162525, September 23, 2008)

The respondents, in stating their plea, filed a motion for reconsideration but in its substance a complaint
against the judge and its decision. Moreover, respondents also instituted two cases filed intended as
leverage against the judge for rendering unfavorable judgment against respondents. Administrative
remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the
aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that
the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the
judge is administratively liable. (Lacurom vs Jacoba, AC No. 5921, March 10, 2006)
The Court held that Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated
12 November 2002 allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 5144 to be released on bail. Respondent
likewise violated the same Rule when he submitted himself to an interview with Tony Consing. It is the
duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his
duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 18

taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions, which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances
against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so,
precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained. (Re: Atty. Bagabuyo, AC No. 7006,
October 9, 2007)

Duty of Lawyer to Assist In the Speedy Administration of Justice

An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Any
dilatory tactics of the defense counsel should not be tolerated (People v. Jardin, 124 SCRA 167).
A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and the
facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its preference. He should also be
ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies.
Respondents failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, especially in the light of the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and
was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to prepare his evidence. Ineluctable
conclusion that respondent could not present evidence because there really was none to justify his
nonpayment. (Vda. De Espino v. Presquito, AC No. 4762, June 28, 2004)
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
The court frowns on lawyers practice of repeatedly seeking extensions to file pleadings and thereafter
simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation of manifestation
for their failure. The same rule applies more forcefully to motion for continuance. Postponement is not a
matter of right but a sound judicial discretion (Edrial v. Quilat G.R. No. 133625, September 6, 2000).
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any
and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. (Vaflor-Fabroa vs. Paguinto, AC No. 6273, March 15, 2010)
A lawyer shall not unduly delay a cause, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of forms and technicalities in procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust. (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil 318)
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. He should not forget that he is an
officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12
of the same Canons. Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of
justice contravenes such lawyer's duty. (Bugaring vs Espanol, GR No. 133090, January19, 2001)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 19

A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
This Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the
latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag. The respondent tried to coach his client or
influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him . (Sambajon vs Suing, AC
No. 7062, September 26, 2006)

A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
It was highly inconsiderate for the prosecutor and the defense counsel to trade quips at the precise time
Rowena was reliving her harrowing experience. Courts are looked up to by the people with high respect
and are regarded as places where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts are settled and justice solemnly
dispensed. Levity has no place in the courtroom during the examination of the victim of rape, and
particularly at her expense (People vs. Nuguid G.R. 148991, January 21, 2004).
A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a.

On formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an

instrument, and the like; or

b.

On substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of

justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly ecessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed
out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could
not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does
not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents. Second, paragraph (b) of
Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this
instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated
purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting
them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a
public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The investigation is
advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. Nonetheless, we deem it
important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which
he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client.
Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice,"
the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases. (Santiago
vs Rafanan, AC No. 6252, October 5, 2004)

A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for,
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
A self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the
courtesy and respect due the judges station, is the only proper foundation for cordial, personal and
official relation between bench and bar (Lantoria v. Bunyi, AM No. 1769, June 1992).
A lawyer should not see the judge in his chamber and talk to him about a case pending in his court; and
the judge should not allow it to happen, without committing a misconduct, except the lawyers of both
parties are present or upon request of the judge for both lawyers to see him in his chamber . (Austria vs.
Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 20

It is not, however, incumbent on a lawyer to refuse professional employment in a case it may be heard by
a judge who is his relative, compadre or former colleague in office. The responsibility is on the judge not
to sit in a case unless he is both free from bias and from the appearance thereof. (Bautista vs. Rebnueno,
81 SCRA 535)

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in
the courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally, they are to be condemned.
(Pineda)
Test whether a public statement is contemptuous: When the character of the act done has direct tendency
to obstruct the discharge of official duty (Toledo, Newspaper Co. v. US, 407 US 1186)
Respondent's statements In the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily,
which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon
13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Re: Atty. Bagabuyo, AC No. 7006, October 9, 2007)
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For despite the pendency of the
civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing,
televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products. (Foodsphere, Inc vs Mauricio Jr., AC No. 7199, July 22, 2009)
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Test whether a public statement is contemptuous: When the character of the act done has direct tendency
to obstruct the discharge of official duty (Toledo, Newspaper Co. vs. US, 407 US 1186)
THE LAWYER AND HE CLIENT
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The Court held that a lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. (Dominador P. Urbe vs. Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta; A.M. No. 99-634 [2002])

In accepting the cause of a person who is unable to pay his professional fees, he shall observe
the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
A lawyer is bound to attend the clients cause with all due diligence and zeal and utmost fidelity even if his
services are rendered gratuitously (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473)
In conferring with a prospective client, the lawyer shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether
the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall
forthwith inform the prospective client.
In case of conflict of interests of a lawyer and a client, the lawyer shall give preference to the clients
interest. (Sta. Maria vs. Tuason, 11 SCRA 562)
The essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege communication:

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 21

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought

(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived. (Hadjula vs. Atty. Madianda A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007)
Conflict of Interest
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him. (Elesio C. Pormento Sr.Vs.Atty.Alias A. Pontevedra A.C. No. 5128 March 31, 2005)
The Court found guilty the respondent on the reason that while he is acting as complainants counsel, the
former prepared the Answer to the Amended Complaint of the other party from which the complainant
filed an action. (Lolita Artezuela vs. Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo; A.C No. 4354, April 22, 2002)
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after
the relation of attorney and client has terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client
precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the
same case or in a different but related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client
against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly,
to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. (A.C. No. 5439
January 22, 2007 Clarita J. Samala, Vs. Atty. Luciano D.Valencia)

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not make the
prohibition inoperative. (Pormento vs. Pontevedra A.C. 5128, March 2005)
A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect
the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters
that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. (A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006ruthie LimSantiago vs .Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio)

The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it
is his duty to oppose it for the client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client. (Santos vs. Beltran, A.C. 5858, December 2003)
The honors of the profession requires that on matters of law, it is the client who should yield to the lawyer
and not the other way around (RCPI vs. FCWF, 65 SCRA 82)
A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
The highly fiduciary and confidential relations of attorney and client requires that the lawyer should
promptly account for all the funds received or held by him for the clients benefits (In re: Barrberger, 49 Phil
962)

The Court ruled that in failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by the complainant as
evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent the latter also violated the rule that

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 22

lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.
(Dominador P. Urbe vs. Atty. Alberto C. Magulta; A.M. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002)

If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client. (Eduardo P. Meneses Vs. Atty. Rodolfo P. Macalino A.C. No. 6651 February 27, 2006)
Attorneys Lien vs. Charging Lien
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such
funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned
immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in
violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross
violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. (Suzette Del
Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano A.C. No. 6903 April 16, 2012)

A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his clients money for himself by the mere fact alone that
the client owes him attorneys fees. 17 The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation
of the general morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyers unjustified withholding of money belonging to
his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. (Francisco Rayos, Vs. Atty. Ponciano
G. Hernandez G.R. No. 169079 February 12, 2007)

The lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a
personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution. (Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al.,)
A charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client.
(Ampil vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al)

Charging lien is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or
for delivery of real property as in the instant case. (Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al)
Charging lien does not attach to the property in litigation. (Bacolod-Murcia Milling)
A lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own
benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. (Nazaria S. Hernandez (Deceased), Substituted By Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr., Vs. Atty. Jose C. Go A.C.
No. 1526 January 31, 2005)

Betrayal of Trust and Confidence:

The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and use of confidence. It was
respondents closeness to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust and confidence in
him that made possible his intimate relationship with Liza. When his concern was supposed to be
complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter. Moreover, he
availed of complainants resources by securing a plain ticket from complainants office in order to marry
the latters daughter in Hong Kong. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even
had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is legal. Clearly, Respondent has crossed the
limits of propriety and decency. (Cojuangco, Jr. vd. Palma, 438 SCRA 306)
Good moral character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not
to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 23

life, his all. He is bound to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client,
their relation being highly fiduciary in nature. (Cordon vs. Balicanta, A.C. 2797, October 4, 2002)
A lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own
benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. Considering the depravity of the lawyers offense, he deserves the extreme penalty of
disbarment. (Hernandez, Jr. vs. Go, AC 1526, January 2005)
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
infidelity to the clients cause. Every case accepted by the lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill
and competence, regardless of importance. (Rollon vs. Atty. Naraval, AC 6424, March 2005)
A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a
family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not
just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not justify
neglect in handling ones case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he
can efficiently handle. (Suzette Del Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano A.C. No. 6903 April 16, 2012)
The client is bound by the acts of his counsel, even his mistake and negligence. In Producers Bank of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, we held that litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect
that all they need to do is sit back, relax and wait the outcome of their case. (Tan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 133805,
June 29, 2004)

Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause
of the client. (Edquibal vs. Ferrer, AC 5687, February 2005)
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. He has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. Rule 18.03 of the
Code also provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence shall
render him liable. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint
against a lawyer, especially in this case where the lawyer admitted his misconduct. (Parinas vs. Paguinto
July 13, 2004, A.C. No. 6297, [2004])

No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his
client. However, once he agrees to take up the cause of client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. (Cuizon vs. Macalino, July 7, 2004, Adm.
Case No. 4334 [2004])

Not to handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

The counsel must constantly keep in mind that his action or omissions, even malfeasance and
nonfeasance would be binding to his client, Verily a lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost
prudence and responsibility in representation. (Fernandez vs. Atty. Novero, AC 5394, December 2002)
Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio was suspended for six months and sternly warned against a repetition of
the same offense. The penalty stemmed from Atty. Mauricios receipt of P56,000.00 to handle his clients
cases but rendered no service at all. (Dalisay vs. Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, AC 565, April 2005)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 24

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to
mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only thus that the trust and faith in the
counsel may remain unimpaired. (Alcala vs. De Vera, 56 SCRA 30)
Failure to appeal to CA despite instructions by the client to do so constitutes inexcusable negligence on
the part of the counsel. (Abiero vs. Juanino, AC 302, February 2005)
A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to the end, his clients success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics (Maglasana vs. People, 190 SCRA 306)
To employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
A lawyer should use his efforts to restrain and to prevent his client from doing those things which he
himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to the conduct toward the court, judicial officer, witness
and suitor and if the client persists in such wrong doing, the lawyer should terminate their relation.
(Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel G.R. L-27072, January 1970)

Advocacy within the bounds of the law permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or
rules which is favorable to his client. But he cannot knowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing laws (Millare vs. Atty. Montero AC 3283, July 13, 1995)
Not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. In short, a lawyer
is not a gun for hire. (Millare vs. Atty. Montero AC 3283, July 13, 1995)
A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
The expiration of the retainer contract between the parties during the pendency of the labor case does not
extinguish the respondents right to attorneys fees. (Uy vs. Gonzales AC 5280, March 2004)
Not accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other
compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone other than the
client without the full knowledge and consent of the client.
To secure the fidelity of the lawyer to his clients cause and to prevent a situation in which the receipt of
him of a rebate or commission from another with the clients business may interfere with full discharge of
his duty to his client. In short, there should be no room for suspicion on the part of the client that his
lawyer is receiving compensation in connection with the case from third persons with hostile interests.
(Reports of the IBP Committee)

EXCEPTION: A lawyer may receive compensation from a person other than his client when the latter has
full knowledge and approval thereof. (Rule 138, Sec. 20 e)
A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 25

With regard to professional fees, the proper time to deal with this delicate issue is upon the
commencement of the lawyer-client relationship. A lawyer is entitled to the protection of the courts
against any attempt on the part of the client to escape payment of legitimate attorneys fees. However,
such protection must be sought at the expense of truth. (Silva Vda. De Fajardo vs. Bugaring, A.C. No. 5113,
October 7, 2004)

Courts have the power to determine their reasonableness based on quantum meruit and to reduce the
amount thereof if excessive. (NS Builders Construction Inc, et al. vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 148753)
Contingent Fees
In cases where contingent fee are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all
circumstance of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that, under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked
to charge only fair and reasonable fees. (Roxas vs. De Zuzuaregul, et al., AC 152072, January 31, 2006)
To adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him,
from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the client.
For a communication to be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching (People v. Sandiganbayan, 275
SCRA 520).

The communication must be intended to be confidential (Uy Chico vs. Union Life Association Society, 29 Phil
163, 1915).

Waiver of the privilege cannot be made partially. A waiver in part is a waiver in whole for a client may not
remove the seal of confidentiality for his advantage and insist that it be privileged as to so much as makes
to the disadvantage of his adversary (Orient Ins. Co. v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919, 1930).
Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause,
the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should
withdraw from the active management of the case (PNB v. Uy Teng Piao 57 Phil 337, 1932).
The disclosure and the lawyers opinion thereon create an attorney-client relationship, even though the
lawyer does not eventually accept the employment (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 1949).
A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the
court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new
attorney is recorded in the case. (De Juan vs. Baria III, Adm. Case No. 5817, [2004])
The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his
withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client
as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of
hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record
(Orcino v. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773, September 1997).

An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the
court after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that the name of the new
attorney is recorded in the case. (Venterez vs Cosme, A. C. No. 7421, October 10, 2007)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 26

WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL
A lawyer who accepts public office ceases, by operation of law, to engage in private law practice and
becomes disqualified from continuing to represent a client in those cases which the law prohibits him from
doing so or requires his entire time to be at the disposal of the government. His qualification to public
office operates to ruminate the existing attorney-client relationship (Omico Miniing & Industrial Corp.
v.Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285, 1965).

Relationship of attorney-client does not terminate formally until there is withdrawal of record.
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot
just do so and leave complaint in the cold protected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition
for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of
his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not
terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. (Orcino vs. Gaspar, AC 3773, September 1997)
DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. The power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a
reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired. (Buado, et al. vs. Layag, A.C. No. 5182,
[2004])

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity that renders him unfit
to continue to be an officer of the court. (Vda. De Espino vs. Presquito, A.C. No. 4762, [2004])
Administrative complaints for disbarment are referred to the IBP for formal investigation by the Court after
an evaluation by it of the pleadings submitted. An ex-parte investigation may only be conducted when the
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. (Sitaca vs. Palomares, Adm. Case No. 5285, [2004])
The fact that the complainant manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the instant
administrative case since he and Olegario have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would not
render this case moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of
its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its
investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or
pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither
can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary
power. The Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public interest
is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as the
various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be
frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties as in the instant case. (Fernando
P. Chan Vs. Joven T. Olegario A.M. No. P-09-2714 December 6, 2010)

The lawyer was granted only conditional pardon. Such conditional pardon merely relieved him of the
penal consequences of his act but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment. Such pardon does not
reach the offense itself. Hence, it does not constitute a bar to his disbarment. (In re: Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661
[1962])

Mere intimacy between a lawyer and a woman with no impediment to marry each other who voluntarily
cohabited and had two children, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as
to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the bar. (Arciaga vs.
Maniwang, 106 SCRA 591)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 27

A lawyer who is directed to do something, such as to surrender records, to appear as counsel de oficio, to
comment on a matter pending in court, may be disciplined for willful disobedience of the order. (Santos vs.
CA, 198 SCRA 806)

The court may require applicant for reinstatement to enroll in and pass the required fourth year review
classes in a recognized law school. A previously disbarred lawyer who is given absolute pardon by the
President is not automatically reinstated, he must still file a petition for reinstatement with the SC (Cui vs.
Cui, supra; In re: Rusiana AC 270, March 1974)

Notarial Practice

Under Section 1(a) of Act 2103, a notary public taking the acknowledgment in a document or instrument is
mandated to certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that
he is the same person who executed it and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. To
acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assert, to admit; and before means in front
or preceding in space or ahead of. A party acknowledging must appear before the notary public. Xxx. A
notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed making the acknowledgment will
enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. A notary public is
enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The function of a notary public is, among
others, to guard against any illegal deed. (Cabanilla vs. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6139, Nov. 11, 2003)

By respondent's reckless act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that the
vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what were stated therein, he has undermined the
confidence of the public on notarial documents and he thereby breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Aquino vs. Manese, A.C.No. 4958, Apr.
3, 2003)

There can be no question as to the right of the court to discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as
notary public, has been guilty of misconduct, e.g. for taking an acknowledgment to a contract between a
husband and wife which sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose. (Panganiban vs. Borromeo September 9,
1933)

Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office.
Xxx there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial
witnesses in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the
same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. The Notarial Law then in force required the
exhibition of the residence cerficate upon the notarization of a document or instrument. By having allowed
decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the
exhibition of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses. Defects in the observance of the
solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. (Manuel Lee vs. Atty. Regino Tamabago, A.C. No.
5282, Feb. 12 2008)

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Xxx. For this reason
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 28

notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.
(Vda. De Rosales vs. Ramos, A.C. No. 5645, July 2, 2002)

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained
in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not
hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public
confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code
which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. (Heirs of the
late spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva vs. Atty. Salud Beradio, A.C. No. 6270, January 22, 2007)

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.
That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories to the instrument. For
then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity
of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted. (Villarin vs. Sabate, A.C. No. 3224, February
9, 2000)

While respondent explains that he sincerely believed that when no notary public is available, the
Municipal Trial Courts may act as ex-officio notary public, provided the fees shall be for the government,
such is not enough to exonerate him from liability. The rule is that municipal court judges may notarize
only documents connected with the exercise of their official duties. His acts do not fall under the
exception because at the time of his notarization of the Deed of Sale, there was a notary public in Dulag,
Leyte. (Vicente Batic vs. Judge Victorio Galapon Jr., AM No. MTJ-99-1239, July 29, 2005)
JUDICIAL ETHICS
The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may go to obtain relief for the grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot have justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without
such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation . (In Re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949])
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts.
Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the peoples respect for, and confidence
in, the administration of justice is to be avoided . (Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165 [1969])
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance.
For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA
578 [1970])

OBLIGATIONS OF JUDGES IN GENERAL

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 29

The observance of the Canon of Judicial Ethics does not end at the close of office hours nor is limited
within the performance of his official duties. The Canon of Judicial Ethics commands that a judges
behavior, official or otherwise, should be free from the appearance of impropriety in all activities and
should be beyond reproach. (P/SINSP. Omega Jireh D. Fidel vs. Judge Felix A. Caraos, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1224.
December 12, 2000)

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT

SEPTEMBER 5, 1989
INDEPENDENCE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair
trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and
institutional aspects.
Influence of Government Officials
A judge acted improperly when she rendered rulings based on directives she received from a government
official. (Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462)
Public Opinion
The media depicted the accused as guilty even though proceedings in the case were ongoing. This media
influence led to widespread public belief in the suspects guilt, despite the fact that he had not yet been
subjected to a preliminary investigation. The Supreme Court ordered the suspension of the trial and
directed the conduct of a preliminary investigation. (Go vs. Court of Appeals (206 SCRA 165)
Judges are required to rule fairly regardless of public clamor (Libarios vs. Dabalos A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July
11, 1991)

A judge found the defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
However, he sentenced the accused with reclusion perpetua instead of the death, as unequivocally
required by RA 7659. A court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined
instances. (People vs. Veneracion, 249SCRA244(1995)
In Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog, a judge acted improperly when she rendered rulings based on
directives she received from a government official. In her defense, the respondent judge claimed that at
that time, the country was then under a revolutionary government, and to promote peace she made
certain rulings acting on the pressure of the government official. The Supreme Court ruled that:
Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice removed from
the national official mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the telephone
is a patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law and a revelation of
her weak moral character. By her appointment to the office, the public has laid on respondent their
confidence that she is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any
person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in her office. Regrettably, respondent has dismally failed to exhibit these qualities required of those
holding such office. (A. M. No. R-351-RTJ, September 26, 1986, 144 SCRA 462. Note: The foregoing was
consolidated with the following cases, namely: (i) Liwayway Samson vs. Hon. Antonia Corpuz-Macandog, A. M. No.
359-RTJ, September 26, 1986; (ii) Victoria Torres v. Hon. Antonia Corpuz-Macandog, A. M. No. R-621-RTJ,

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 30

September 26, 1986; (iii) Esperanza Lazaro v. Hon. Antonia Corpuz-Macandog, A. M. No. R-684-RTJ, September 26,
1986; (iv) Jesus Alba v. Hon. Antonia Corpuz-Macandog, A. M. No. R-687-RTJ, September 26, 1986; and (v)
Designation of Acting Judge in Branch CXXI, RTC Caloocan City, A. M. No. 86-4-9987-RTC, September 26, 1986)

In performing judicial duties, Judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of
decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
The discretion of the Court to grant bail must be based on the Courts determination as to whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may be exercised only after the evidence has been
submitted at the summary hearing conducted pursuant to sec. 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules. Respondents
admission that he granted bail to an accused upon the request of a Congressman, despite his belief that
the evidence of guilt against said is strong, is indeed reprehensible. (Tahil vs. Elsma, 64 SCRA 378 [1975])
Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency.
In Sabitsana Jr. vs. Villamor, the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) wrote a letter to a
lower court judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) judge seeking to influence him to hear a case and
even intimating that he issue an order of acquittal. The High Court ruled that a judge who tries to influence
the outcome of a litigation pending before another court not only subverts the independence of the
judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality. The interference in the
decision-making process of another judge is a breach of conduct so serious as to justify dismissal from
service based only on a preponderance of evidence. (Sabitsana Jr. vs. Villamo, A.M. No. 90-474, October 4,
1991, 202 SCRA 445)

Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
It should be noted that when a judge is related to one of the parties within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, his disqualification is MANDATORY. (Hurtado vs. Judalena, 84 SCRA 41)
Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that favors in the
future may be asked from respondent Judge of eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has
pending cases in his sala may well arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of
the litigants in the impartiality of the judge. (Padilla vs. Zantua 237 SCRA 670)
In Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto, a judge did not act independently of the Local Government Unit (LGU)
when she downsized her staff at the MTC and asked the city to re-employ the laid-off workers without
diminution of compensation or disadvantage with regard to location of work assignment. The Supreme
Court ruled that the respondent judge had acted improperly in not informing the Court (through the Office
of the Court Administrator) of the need to streamline her court and of its personnel needs, instead asking
the LGU to employ those who were displaced due to her downsizing.
The High Court cited Bagatsing vs. Herrera, explaining that judicial independence is the reason for
leaving exclusively to the Court the authority to deal with internal personnel issues, even if the court
employees in question are funded by the local government. Because a reasonable person could conclude
that the LGU maintained some influence over the MTC judge, under the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
respondent judges actions created an improper connection with an executive/administrative body the
LGU. (Alfonso vs. Alonzo-Legasto A.M. MT J-94-995, September 5, 2002, 388 SCRA 351)
Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular
parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 31

In Tan vs. Rosete, respondent judge was suspended by the High Court for gross misconduct. The Court
ruled that [r]espondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of
his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours
violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. The Supreme
Court ruled that respondent judges actions constitute gross misconduct, which is punishable under Rule
140 of the Revised Rules of Court . (Tan vs. Rosete A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004 (formerly A.M.
OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ), 437 SCRA 581)

Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to
maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Judges are the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice. (Arban vs. Borja, 143 SCRA
634 [1986])

The active participation of respondent judge, being merely a nominal or formal party in the certiorari
proceedings, is not called for. xxx Under Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order
is challenged in an appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in the proceeding
unless expressly directed by order of this Court. It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and
defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose order or decision is at issue. Xxx
Respondent's folly did not stop there. When complainant filed a motion for respondent's inhibition, he
hired his own lawyer. Xxx. Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need not only
be just but must be perceived to be just and completely free from suspicion or doubt both in its fairness
and integrity. (Macalintal vs. The, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 623)
The above Sections are intended to serve as catch-all provisions for all other acts that would guarantee
the independence of the judiciary, but which may not have been covered in the specific instances
mentioned in the earlier provisions.
GOOD JUDGES - those who have: mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and
coordinate with the other two departments of the government. (Borromeo vs. Mariano (41 Phil. 322)
Judges should embrace their independence and guard it against threats of erosion.
As held in Dimatulac, et. al. vs. Villon, et. al., (297 SCRA 679 [1998]): A judge should always be imbued
with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice. He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious
crusade.
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
Judges must be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty because they are the visible representation
of the law and justice. (Rural bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc. vs. Cartagena, 84 SCRA 128 [1978])
The judges must also keep themselves abreast with the law and the latest jurisprudence (Chin vs. Gustilo,
247 SCRA 175).

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 32

Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue; it is a necessity. (Fernandez vs. Hamoy, 436
SCRA 186 [2004])

The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be proven by substantial evidence,
which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. (Alfonso vs. Juanson, A.M. No. RTJ-92-904
December 7, 1993)

A Regional Trial Court Judge, after having engaged a lawyer in a heated discussion during the hearing of
a case, lost his temper, banged his gavel in a very forceful manner, unceremoniously walked out of the
courtroom and came out of his chamber carrying a gun in plain view of the lawyers and others present in
the courtroom. In finding the said judge guilty of grave misconduct and in ordering him dismissed from the
service, the Court held: xxx Respondent judge appears to have a valid explanation for carrying a gun, but
such explanation cannot be taken as satisfactory for his having chosen to carry the same in plain view of
the complainant and other lawyers inside the courtroom when he came out of his chambers on his way to
the stairs. Taken in the light of what had just transpired, the actuation of respondent judge was not an
innocent gesture, but one calculated to instill fear in or intimidate complainant. Xxx. Respondent judge's
behavior constitutes grave misconduct. It is a serious violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
required that a "judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach." Xxx. certainly, one who lives by the uncivilized precept of
"might is right," is unworthy of an office entrusted with the duty to uphold the rule of law. (Romero vs. Valle)
With regard to professional integrity, judges have been PENALIZED for:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Demanding and/or accepting bribes (Tan vs. Rosete, 437 SCRA 581);
Altering orders (Rallos vs. Gako, 328 SCRA 324);
Delay in rendering decisions (Fernandez vs. Hamoy, 436 SCRA 186);
Sexual harassment of employees (Dawa vs. De Asa, 292 SCRA 703); and
Ignorance of the law (Macalintal vs. Teh, 280 SCRA 623).

A judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of competence and integrity his robe
represents, but also that he wears one in the first place. (Chan vs. Majaducon, 413 SCRA 354)
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or principle in
the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he
holds, or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judges dismissal is in order. (Macalintal vs. Teh, 280 SCRA
623)

There is no doubt in the Courts mind that there is a very special relationship between Sol and Modesto.
Though it started as relations before Sols marriage, it developed into an extra-marital affair. It must,
however, be stressed that Juanson is not charged with immorality or misconduct committed before he
was appointed to the judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, the court finds the evidence for Norbert
insufficient to prove that Juanson and Sol continued their extra-marital affair. Since Norberts narration
was only treated as narration and not put into evidence, they are considered as proof that Sol made
statements, but not proof that the facts revealed are true. As such, the acts of sexual intercourse admitted
by Sol cannot be deemed proven. There is no direct and competent evidence against Juanson that he
had illicit sex with Sol. The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be proven by
substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. Also, it may be that
Juanson has undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have
completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is a public trust. Nevertheless,
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 33

considering their prior relationship, Juanson and Sols meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of
either its continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. Juanson
became indiscreet, he encumbered to the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint
Sol when she asked for his legal advice. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct as
appearance of impropriety. (Alfonso vs. Juanson)
The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce
the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before
them should have confidence in their impartiality. (Sibayan-Joaquin vs. Javellana, 368 SCRA 503 [2001])
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decision, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity. (Rallos vs. Gako, 328 SCRA 324)
A judge must not only be honest but also appear to be so; not only be a good judge, but also a good
person. (Dawa vs. De Asa, 292 SCRA 703)
Calanog established an intimate, albeit immoral, relationship with Castillo although Calanog is a married
man. Calanog behaved in a manner not becoming of his robes and as a model of rectitude, betrayed the
peoples high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general. The
circumstances show a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of Calanog by failing to avoid
situations that make him suspect to committing immorality and worse, having that suspicion confirmed. A
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals. Calanog also committed a grave injustice when he took
advantage of Castillos state of material deprivation and helplessness when he persuaded her to be his
mistress. He used the brute force of his position of power and authority. (Castillo vs. Calanog)
Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
Judges should not be lenient in the administrative supervision of employees. As an administrator, the
judge must ensure that all court personnel perform efficiently and promptly in the administration of justice.
(Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462)

The Supreme Court explained: Oftentimes leniency provides the court employees the opportunity to
commit minor transgressions of the laws and slight breaches of official duty ultimately leading to vicious
delinquencies. The respondent judge should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his
employees. He should realize that big fires start small. His constant scrutiny of the behavior of his
employees would deter any abuse on the part of the latter in the exercise of their duties. Then, his
subordinates would check that any misdemeanor will not remain unchecked. The slightest semblance of
impropriety on the part of the employees of the court in the performance of their official duties stirs ripples
of public suspicion and public distrust of the judicial administrators. The slightest breach of duty by and
the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and employees detract from the dignity of the
courts and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary. (Buenaventura vs. Benedicto (38 SCRA 71)

IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 34

Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
Because allegations of bias are quite serious, the person bringing the allegation must prove bias sufficient
to require inhibition (also called Recusal or Disqualification) with clear and convincing evidence. Bare
allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. (Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. vs. Dimaculangan,
425 SCRA 376)

A judges conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice before it can be stigmatized as
biased and partial. (Cruz vs. Iturralde, 402 SCRA 65)
As long as decisions made and opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the
evidence presented, the conduct observed by the magistrate, and the application of the law, such
opinions even if later found to be erroneous will not sustain a claim of personal bias or prejudice on
the part of the judge. (Gochan vs. Gochan, 398 SCRA 323)
The concern is not only with the judges actual decision but the manner in which the case is decided. A
judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity. (Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66)
It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to appear impartial. (People vs. Nuguid, 426
SCRA 63)

Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of
the judiciary.
This provision is designed to maintain and improve public confidence in the entire judiciary as an impartial
dispenser of justice.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record
that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out
of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is
not impaired. (Pimentel vs. Salonga, 21 SCRA 160 [1967])
It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to ask questions from witnesses, if only to clarify what
may appear to be vague points in the narration. Questions designed to avoid obscurity in the testimony
and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. (Paco, et. al. vs. Quilala, et. al. 413 SCRA 364
[2003])

In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an advocate for either party. It is also
improper for the judge to push actively for amicable settlement against the wishes of the complainant. A
judges unwelcome persistence makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of favoritism. (Montemayor vs.
Bermejo, 425 SCRA 403 [2004])

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon
the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At
times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create
confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence,
the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest
integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 35

can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system. (Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25, 1996)
Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on
which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, them make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair
the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise
that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
A judge was disqualified from trying a criminal case because he met with the complainants in chambers
and advised them to settle with the accused because their case was weak. (Martinez vs. Giorenella, 65
SCRA 245)

A judge was commended by the Supreme Court when he voluntarily recused himself from presiding over
a civil case because he had expressed an opinion in a previous case that might have led one of the
parties to doubt his impartiality. (Palag vs. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776)
A judges act of recusing himself from presiding over a case was upheld by the Supreme Court. While in
private practice, the judge had expressed an opinion concerning an issue that would unduly benefit one of
the parties. (Gutierrez vs. Santos (2 SCRA 249)
However, the Supreme Court has recently held that judges and justices are not disqualified from
participating in a case simply because they have written legal articles on the law involved in the case.
(Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 403 SCRA 1)

Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that
they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to,
instances where:

However, men of the Bench are not without imperfections. A judge too, experiences the "tug and pull of
purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals".
Especially for Filipinos, whose sense of gratitude is one trait which invariably reigns supreme over any
and all considerations in matters upon which such tender sentiment may somehow inexorably impinge.
The circumstances before Judge Masadao are not ordinary ones. Thus, this is one certain circumstance
where a case could well be heard by another judge and where a voluntary inhibition may prove to be the
better course of action. Judge Masadao's actuations are within the terms of Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule
137 of the Revised Rules of Court. (Query Of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, on the Conflicting Views of Regional Trial Court Judges Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal
Case No. 4954-M, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987)

A judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The respondent alleged that since there was no
objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear
violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a
mere verbal consent much. less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed
by them and entered upon the record. (Lorenzo vs. Marquez, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 36

The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
A judge may validly disqualify himself due to his bias and prejudice. (People vs. Gomez (20 SCRA 293
[1967])

Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed. (Soriano vs. Angeles, 339 SCRA 366 [2000])
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not sufficient for a judge to inhibit, especially when the charge
is without basis. It must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. (Gochan vs. Gochan, 398 SCRA 323
[2003])

Bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion
on the merits on some basis other than the evidence presented . (Aleria, Jr. vs. Velez, 298 SCRA 611 [1998])
A judge who exhibits actions which give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, has no choice but to
inhibit. (Garcia vs. Burgos, G.R. No. 124130, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 546) The fact alone that the
judge is a next-door neighbor of the complainant in a case is also not a ground for disqualification. (Choa
vs. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-063, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 371)

Mere divergence of opinion between a judge and a party's counsel as to applicable law and jurisprudence
is likewise not a ground for disqualification. (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, January 31, 1996,
252 SCRA 641)

Even reasons of strained personal relationship, animosity and hostility between a judge and party or
counsel are not grounds for disqualification. (Villapando vs. Quitain, Nos. L-41333, 41378-41, January 20, 1977,
75 SCRA 24)

Not Grounds for Disqualification:

1. The mere filing of an administrative case against a judge is not a ground for disqualification on the
ground of bias and prejudice. (Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569)
2. The fact alone that the judge is a next-door neighbor of the complainant in a case is also not a ground
for disqualification. (Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371)
3.

Mere divergence of opinion between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable law and
jurisprudence is likewise not a ground for disqualification. (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 641)

4. Even reasons of strained personal relationship, animosity and hostility between a judge and party or
counsel are not grounds for disqualification. (Villapando vs. Quitain, 75 SCRA 24)
The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;
A judge may be disqualified if he was formerly associated with one of the parties or their counsel. (Bautista
vs. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535)

A judge was disqualified for notarizing the affidavit of a person to be presented as a witness in a case
before him. (Mateo vs. Villauz, 50 SCRA 18)
The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the
matter in controversy;

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 37

A municipal judge who filed complaints in his own court for robbery and malicious mischief against a party
for the purpose of protecting the property interests of the judges co-heirs, and then issued warrants of
arrest against the party, was found guilty of serious misconduct and ordered dismissed from the bench
before he was able to recuse himself. The Supreme Court held that his subsequent inhibition from the
cases which he filed in his own court does not detract from his culpability for he should have not taken
cognizance of the cases in the first place the evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the
denial of a party of his right to due process. (Oktubre vs. Velasco, 434 SCRA 636)
The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
An Associate Justice of the C.A. refused to inhibit himself from reviewing the decision in a case which he
had partially heard as a trial judge prior to his promotion, on the ground that the decision was not written
by him. The SC upheld his refusal, but nevertheless commented that he should have been more prudent
and circumspect and declined to take on the case owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court
has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be
susceptible to bias and prejudice. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283)
The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or
to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
Example of Violation:
1. A judge was fined for presiding over a petition for correction of a birth record where the petitioner was
the judges daughter. (Villauz vs. Mijares, 288 SCRA 594 [1998])
2. A preliminary injunction issued by a judge in favor of his sister before inhibiting himself was found
reprehensible. (Hurtado vs. Judalena, 84 SCRA 41 [1978])
3. A judge improperly presided over the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint wherein the
complaining witness was his nephew. (Perez vs. Suller (249 SCRA 665 [1995])
4. An MTC judge was dismissed for taking cognizance of a criminal lodged by his brother, and issuing a
warrant of arrest. (Garcia vs. De La Pena, 229 SCRA 766 [1994])
The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.
There is no distinction between direct and indirect interest. Strict compliance with the rules on
disqualification is required. (Marfil vs. Cuachon, 107 SCRA 41)
The petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of the judgment. (Government vs. Heirs of
Abella, 49 Phil 374)

A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose
on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers
independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is
immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement,
signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
A decision to disqualify himself is not conclusive and his competency may be determined on application
for mandamus to compel him to act. Judges decision to continue hearing a case in which he is not legally
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 38

prohibited from trying notwithstanding challenge to his objectivity may not constitute reversible error. The
filing of an administrative case against a judge does not disqualify him from hearing a case. The court has
to be shown other than the filing of administrative complaint, act or conduct of judge indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter being branded as the stigma of being biased or partial. (Lorenzo
v. Marquez (1988))

PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Judicial ethics cases decided before the adoption of this new Code were often decided on the grounds
that improper acts tended to dilute public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the courts. (Dy
Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapuzar, 102 SCRA 493 [1981])

The community holds judges to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and other
persons not invested with public trust. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Estacion, Jr., 247 SCRA 503 [1995])
The High Court held in a number of instances that acts done by a judge which are not illegal may still
violate the Code of Judicial Ethics. (Macariola vs. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77)
Some examples include:
1. Censure of a judge who heard cases on a day when he was supposed to be on official leave (Re:
Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Edmundo T. Acua, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1981, July 28, 2005);

2. And of another judge who heard a motion while on vacation, in his room dressed in a polo jacket
(Ignacio vs. Valenzuela, 111 SCRA 12 [1982]); and
3. In another case, the Court stated that even if there was no clear evidence of sexual congress
between a judge and one of his subordinates, photos showing the two of them coming out of a hotel
together was enough to give rise to the appearance of impropriety that the Code strongly warns
against (Liwanag vs. Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501, March 14, 2005).
4. Under Philippine law, even a joking remark made by a judge to a litigant suggesting that the litigant
prove he harbored no ill feelings towards the judge was improper. (Co vs. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501,
March 14, 2005)
5.
6.

As was the admonition by a judge, after conducting a marriage ceremony, that the bride and groom
should sexually satisfy each other so that they will not go astray. (Hadap vs. Lee, 114 SCRA 559 [1982])
The Court gave a reprimand with warning to Judge Dojillo for sitting beside the counsel for Dojillos
brother in the hearing of an election protest filed by the latter. The Court was not convinced by
Dojillos defense that he intended only to give moral support. As a judge, Dojillo should have known
family concerns are only secondary to preserving the integrity of the judiciary as a whole. (Vidal vs.
Dojillo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591, July 14, 2005)

As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
This requires judges to ensure not only that their conduct is above reproach, but also that it is perceived
to be so by a reasonable observer. (Dulay vs. Lelina, Jr., 463 SCRA 269)
While judges are only human, their acceptance of the judicial position means that more is expected from
them than from ordinary citizens, as their acts, both public and private, color the publics perception of the
judiciary as a whole. (Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Edmundo T. Acua, [A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891. July
28, 2005)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 39

Judges are thus held liable for acts that, if committed by any other person would not necessarily be
deemed improper, including the use of intemperate language (Fidel vs. Caraos, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1224,
December 12, 2002) and succumbing to states of inebriation during parties (Lachica vs. Flordeliza, 254
SCRA 278).

The Supreme Court rebuked judges who made sexually suggestive advances to women, including inviting
ladies to go with the judge and his companions to the beach, writing letters asking a married woman to
come to the judges sala after five oclock in the evening (Hadap vs. Lee, 114 SCRA 559 [1982]), and
assigning a female stenographer to the judges chambers (Ritual v. Valencia, 85 SCRA 313 [1978]).
Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who
practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
A judge is commanded at all times to be mindful of the high calling of a dispassionate and impartial arbiter
expected at all times to be a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely
personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals. (Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005)

To maintain IMPARTIALITY, judges to REFRAIN from:

1.
2.

Inviting counsel for one side into their chambers after or prior to sessions in court without disclosing to
the other counsel the reason for such meetings (Martinez vs. Gironella, G.R. No. L-37635, July 22, 1975);
Being aggressive in demeanor towards a lawyer appearing before them (Royeca vs. Animas, G.R. No.
L-39584, May 3, 1976);

3. Making public comments, or allowing court staff to make comments, on pending cases (Geotina vs.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 26310, September 30, 1971).
4.

Eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has cases pending in his or her sala (Padilla vs.
Zantua, Jr., 237 SCRA 670 [1994]; Omana vs. Yulde, A.M. MTJ-01-1345, August 26, 2002)

Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family
represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
A judge violated the rule on compulsory disqualification when he handled a case in which a relative within
the second degree of consanguinity was a party. (Garcia vs. De La Pena, 229 SCRA 766)
Examples of Violation of this Rule:
1. When the judge did not recuse herself in a criminal case where the accused was her brother-in-law,
regardless of the fact that it was only after the case had been submitted for decision that the accused
became her brother-in-law. (Ubarra vs. Mapalad, 220 SCRA 226)
2. A judges failure to recuse himself when his son-in-law appeared as additional counsel in a case he
was trying (Ortiz vs. Jaculbe, Jr., 461 SCRA 361);
3. Failure of the judge to recuse in the preliminary investigation of a criminal case where his wife was
the complaining witness (Sales vs. Calvan, 428 SCRA 1).
4. Were the judge in a preliminary investigation did not recuse himself despite the fact that the counsel
for the accused was the counsel for the judges family in a pending civil case. (Yulo-Tuvilla vs. Balgos,
288 SCRA 358)
Even when judges do not intend to use their position to influence the outcome of cases involving family
members, it cannot be denied that a judges mere presence in the courtroom (Vidal vs. Dojillo, A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1591, July 14, 2005) or even writing letters to an administrative body conducting an investigation

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 40

pursuant to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions (Perez vs. Costales, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1876, February 23,
2005) tend to give rise to the suspicion that influence is being used.
Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to receive
clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.
The rationale for this section is the same as that of Section 3.
The high tribunal held that it was inappropriate for a judge to have entertained a litigant in his house
particularly when the case is still pending before his sala. (J. King and Sons vs. Hontanosas, 438 SCRA 264)
Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner
as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.
In the exercise of their civil liberties, they should be circumspect and ever mindful that their continuing
commitment to upholding the judiciary and its values places upon them certain implied restraints to their
freedom. (Sison vs. Caoibes, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771, May 27, 2004)
Examples of Violation of this Rule:
1.

A judge was admonished for the appearance of engaging in partisan politics when he participated
in a political rally sponsored by one party, even though he only explained the mechanics of block
voting to the audience. (Macias vs. Araula, A.M. No. 1895-CFI July 20, 1982)
2.
The judge was reprimanded for using expletives like putris and putang ina, even though they
were not directed to any particular individual. (Re: Judge Edmundo Acua, 464 SCRA 250)
3.
The judge displayed unbecoming behavior by sarcastically commenting upon a complainants
ability to read English and using phrases such as moronic attitude, stupid, and putang ina mo to
describe the complainant. (Seludo vs. Fineza, 447 SCRA 73)
A Judges official conduct should be free from impropriety or any appearance thereof. His personal
behavior in the performance of official duty, as well as everyday life, should be beyond reproach. High
ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in
the judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved. Moral integrity is more than a
virtue; it is a necessity in the Judiciary. (Vistan vs. Nicolas (1991)
Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial interests and shall make
reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.
This section of the New Code of Judicial Conduct should be read in conjunction with Section 7 of the
Republic Act 6713, which prohibits certain personal fiduciary and financial conflicts.
A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with
lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. (Catbagan vs. Barte, 455 SCRA 1 [2005])
Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or
those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to
convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the
performance of judicial duties.
Examples of Violation of this Rule:

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 41

1. The respondent judge took advantage of his position as a Makati Regional Trial Court judge by filing
in the Makati court a collection case in which he and his wife were the complainants. (Javier vs. De
Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-89-380, December 19, 1990)

2. Filiing a case for estafa in his own sala and who assisted in the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against the accused was held guilty of serious misconduct. (Vistan vs. Nicholas, 201 SCRA 524)
3. Making phone calls to the station commander on behalf of a family friend who had been detained,
and asked her bailiff to look into the status of the car that had been left in the parking lot when the
friend had been arrested. (Manansala III vs. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1916, May 10, 2005)
4. Posting advertisements for restaurant personnel on the court bulletin board, using his court address
to receive applications for such position, and of screening applicants in his court, constitute
involvement in private business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of family
business. (Dionisio vs. Escano, 302 SCRA 411)

Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC Revised
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, June 6, 2006)

Examples of Breach of Confidentiality

1. When a judge released a draft of her decision to a party, that conduct was found to be not just a
simple breach of confidentiality but a scheme to make the party negotiate for increases in the
monetary awards to be given by the judge. (Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corp. vs. Katalbas-Moscardon,
247 SCRA 145)

2. The judges act of personally furnishing a party copies of orders issued, without passing them through
the court docket, was considered to be highly irregular, giving rise to the suspicion that the judge was
partial to one of the parties in the case. (Co vs. Calimag, 334 SCRA 20)
3. It is improper for a judge to allow his wife to have access to court records which are necessarily
confidential, as this practice may convey the impression that she is the one who can influence the
judges official functions. (Gordon vs. Lilagan, 361 SCRA 690)
4. Where respondent appellate justice announced on television that he lost a confidential draft of an
order and publicly asked the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate, he was held by the
Supreme Court to have been guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge. (In Re: Justice Anacleto Badoy, 395
SCRA 231 [2003])

Personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a
judge under the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court (took effect Jan. 1,
1964). But paragraph 2 of said section authorizes the judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, to
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other than those mentioned in par. 1.
Before 1964, a judge could not just voluntarily inhibit himself from a case. But in cases decided in 1961
and 1962, a judge was allowed to inhibit for fear that an opinion expressed by him in a letter as counsel
might influence his decision and for being related to a counsel within the 4th civil degree. In 1967, a judge
was allowed to voluntarily disqualify himself on grounds other than those mentioned in par. 1 of cited
section. Pimentel v. Salanga: Judge should make a careful self-examination whether to disqualify himself
or not in a case before him. He should exercise his discretion in a way that peoples faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice
against him. Judge should be commended for heeding SC ruling in Geotina v. Gonzales: A judge, sitting
on a case must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duties of
rendering a just decision and of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 42

as to his integrity. Mater, Jr. v. Hon. Onofre Villaluz: Outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably
erode trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. If such causes appear and prove difficult to resist, it is
better for judge to disqualify himself. That way, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved; even
more important, ideal of an administration of justice is lived up to. (Umale vs. Villaluz (1973))
Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may:
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law,
the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office
or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

In dealing with the media, the Philippine Judicial Academy suggests that a judge or court should avoid
acrimonious debate with reporters and the public, for a knee-jerk reaction from the court or judge may
only provoke negative follow-up reports and articles. (Philippine Judicial Academy, Manual Guide for the
Judiciary in Dealing with Media, approved by the Supreme Court on February 2006)

In the landmark case of In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano (A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC,
October 5, 1988), a judge sought the Courts permission to accept membership in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee, an administrative body. The Court denied his request, ruling that allowing the
judges membership would be a violation of the constitutional provision on the discharge by members
of the judiciary of administrative functions in quasi-judicial or administrative agencies . (Article VIII
Section 12, 1987 Constitution)

Under Subsection (c), a judge may not engage in private business without the written permission of the
Supreme Court. (Borre vs. Moya, 100 SCRA 314 [1980])

By his acts, respondent clearly facilitated the employment of the three young women as GROs. Our
present society considers their work as morally wrong. By facilitating the employment of the three in a
night club as such, he was placing the then impressionable minors directly on a path of moral decay. He
was exposing them to a seedy world where the practice of offering one's flesh in exchange for money was
thrust right in front of their faces.

Furthermore, by his careless acts, respondent opened himself to the charges of white slave trade and
violation of RA 7610. Such acts are unacceptable, because "no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the judiciary so indispensable in
an orderly society cannot be preserved." In sum, his actions show conduct unbecoming his office. Judge
Francisco D. Villanueva is found GUILTY of immorality and conduct unbecoming a judge. (National Bureau
of Investigation vs. Villanueva, 370 SCRA 1 [2001])

Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
This prohibition is based on the inherent incompatibility of the rights, duties and functions of the office of
an attorney with the powers, duties, function of a judge . (Carual vs. Brusola, 317 SCRA 54 [1999])
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 43

The Court found him guilty of illegally engaging in the practice of law despite his disqualification as a
municipal judge and of failure to return promptly the amount deposited with him. The Court therein held
that "(W)hile the Court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money
deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold that by his actuations, respondent placed his honesty and
integrity under serious doubt", and meted upon him the penalty of six (6) months' suspension from office
"with the warning that commission of other acts unbecoming of a Judge will warrant a more severe
penalty from the Court. (Dia-Annonuevo vs Bercacio A.M. No. 177-MTJ, Nov. 1975)
Philippine courts not only prohibit judges from overtly representing clients as counsel of record (Candia
vs. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 52 [1977], holding that a judge who acted as counsel for both parties, with
opposing interests in a parcel of land within his jurisdiction, acted in pursuit of his own interests and must
be dismissed), but also from acting more subtly in a way more befitting an advocate than a judge. For
example a judge may not meet with a complainant to give him advice (Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 570).
The due process requirement of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge is denied the accused when the
court assumes the dual role of magistrate and advocate by asking many questions of an accused.
(Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332)

While municipal judges can administer oaths or execute certificates on matters related to their official
functions, they cannot notarize private documents. (Tabao vs. Asis, 252 SCRA 581)
Judges Assigned to Municipalities and Circuits May Act as Notaries Public Provided That:
1. All notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal
treasurer; and
2. certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in
such municipality or circuit. (Doughlas vs. Lopez, Jr., 325 SCRA 129)
Otherwise, the act of a judge in notarizing a pleading in a case which is not pending in that judges sala
(Elert vs. Galapon, Jr., 336 SCRA 566), or in notarizing private documents (Villareal vs. Diongzon, 345 SCRA
341), constitutes unlawful practice of law in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as implemented by
SC Circular 1-90.
Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing
the interests of judges.
Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or
favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection
with the performance of judicial duties.
This section should be read in conjunction with Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713 which prohibits public
officials from soliciting or accepting gifts.
Thus, aside from constituting serious misconduct (Liban vs. Villacete, 237 SCRA 397 [1994]), the act of
demanding and receiving money or property from a litigant violates this provision of the Act (Legaspi vs.
Garrete, 242 SCRA 679).

Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or
authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
This section complements the previous section and assures that what the judge cannot do directly, may
not be done indirectly through the use of employees or staff members. The High Court held that a judge
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 44

allowing his bailiffs son to store attached property at his house constitutes misconduct. (Agpalasin vs.
Agcaoili, 330 SCRA 250)

While Sections 13 and 14 cover instances where the judge is clearly the recipient of money or property
from litigant before his court (Ompoc vs. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-86-11, September 27, 1989), the sections are
likewise relevant to cases where the transaction between the judge and interested parties is less obvious.
Example of Violations:
Where the judge had periodically borrowed from court funds to pay for a variety of personal expenses
including his childrens tuition and medical expenses incurred for his parents illness. He had also used
evidence submitted to the Court such as guns and ammunition for his own protection. (In Re: report on
the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the MTC in Cities, Koronadal City, A.M. No. 02-9-233-MTCC, April 27,
2005)

Where the judge allowed his daughters to accept a business partnership offered by persons with pending
cases before his court. (Dulay vs. Lelina, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516, July 14, 2005)
Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift,
award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award
or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
EQUALITY
Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from
various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like
causes.
Judges should not yield to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudice matters. (Castillo vs.
Judge Juan, G.R. Nos. 39516-17, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 124)

They have a duty to ensure that the minority status of the accused plays no part in their decisions. (People
vs. Orvillas, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 659)

Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants that the judicial system is fair and just. (Castillo vs. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975])
Neither should judges insult witnesses in the hallway or in pleadings filed before the Supreme Court. (Sy
vs. Judge Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1808, October 15, 2003)

Judges may not use derogatory or condescending language in their judgment when dealing with a rape
complaint. (Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Gironella, A.M. No. 2440-CFI, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 1)
Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or
prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
When a judge accepts and occupies a high office in the administration of justice, he is responsible for
ensuring that his conduct, even in private arenas, reflects the dignity of the judicial office. (Candia vs.
Tagabucha, A.M. No. 528-MJ, September 12, 1977)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 45

Judges should avoid private remarks, hasty conclusions, or distasteful jokes that may give even
erroneous impressions of prejudice and lead the public to believe that cases before them are being
prejudged. (Castillo vs. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124)
A judge should avoid being seen in public with litigants because it may give adverse parties the
impression that the judge is partial. (Fonacier-Abao vs. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538)
Examples of Violation:
The Supreme Court reprimanded a judge who rode in the defendants car to make an inspection. The
judge aggravated the impropriety and demonstrated bias by taking an active part in the inspection,
making unwarranted observations, and directly contradicting the witness to the point of maliciously
distorting facts. (Cabreana vs. Avelino, A.M. No. 1733-CFI, September 30, 1981)
A judge who advises a claimant to settle her claim and overtly pressures her to accept the proposal of the
employer creates the suspicion that the judge is biased in favor of the employer. (Retuya vs. Judge
Equipilag, A.M. No. 1431-MJ, July 16, 1979)

When a judge advised an accused of the best course of action at arraignment, it appeared that the judge
was taking sides with the accused. This behavior may create the impression that the sentence meted out
to the accused is in colorful vernacular lutong macao. (Espayos vs. Lee, A.M. No. 1574-MJ, April 30,
1979)

Rule 137 1 of the Rules of Court expressly states that no judge shall sit in any case which he has been
counsel (for a party) without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record. The prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence but includes as well
cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done in the
criminal case. For almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing
and of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for the defense. The failure of Judge
Rojas to observe these elementary rules of judicial conduct betrays his interest in the case which he
allowed to prevail over his sworn duty to administer the law impartially without any fear or favor. (In re
Judge Rojas (1998)

Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the
parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any
irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
They should not be quick to interrupt a presentation by counsel, and instead show restraint. (Ysasi vs.
Fernandez, 26 SCRA 409)

While judges may properly intervene in a trial to promote expeditious proceedings, prevent unnecessary
waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or to clear up obscurities (People vs. Larraaga, 421 SCRA
530 [2004]), the propriety of these queries is determined by whether the defendant was prejudiced by
such questioning (People vs. Guambor, 420 SCRA 677).
There is undue interference where the judges participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or
bolster a case for one of the parties. (Ty vs. Banco Filipino Savings & mortgage Bank, 422 SCRA 649 [2004])
Judges must also be concerned with the publics impression of the judiciary. When judges of the same
court fight with each other, slap their personnel in public, or commit acts of sexual harassment, the image
of the judiciary is impaired. (Navarro vs. Tormis, 428 SCRA 37)
Judges should not make insensitive and sarcastic comments in rape cases or use vulgar language in
solemnizing marriages even off the record. Such comments demean respect for the entire judiciary and
people begin to doubt the moral standards of judges and their capacity and fitness to dispense justice.
(Hadap vs. Lee, 114 SCRA 559)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 46

This is also true of judges who resort to vilification of parties through the use of arrogant, intemperate and
undignified language. (Royeca vs. Animas, 88 SCRA 180)
It is disconcerting when courts that are expected to be paradigms of equality display any gender or racial
insensitivity or bias. The effect is the same when the insensitive act or comment is made by a lawyer
appearing in the court and the judge does not admonish the lawyer for the insensitivity. (People vs. Bores,
348 SCRA 638)

Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence, direction or
control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant
ground.
They should ensure that clerks and other personnel faithfully perform the functions assigned to them as
well as observe at all times high standards of public service and fidelity. (Menzon vs. Perello, 428 SCRA 355)
All personnel involved in the dispensation of justice should conduct themselves with a high degree of
responsibility. (Mataga vs. Rosete, 440 SCRA 217)
Belligerent behavior has no place in government service, where personnel should act with self-restraint
and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. (Misajon vs. Feranil, 440 SCRA
315)

Judges and clerks of court must therefore take proper action against the misdeeds of employees. While
the traditional value of pakikisama often fosters harmony and good relationships in the workplace, it
cannot be allowed to frustrate or prejudice the administration of justice. (Lacuron vs. Magbanua, 395 SCRA
589)

The conduct and behavior of court personnel must always be beyond reproach and therefore they should
refrain from the use of language that it is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise
improper. (Marbas-Vizcarra vs. Soriano, 400 SCRA 16)
Any misbehavior, whether true or only perceived is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of
justice. (Rugor vs. Ligot, 416 SCRA 255)
The men and women who work in the judiciary must always act with propriety as the image of the court is
reflected in the conduct of its personnel. (Aquino, Jr. vs. Miranda, 429 SCRA 230)
Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by
words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally
relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
The SC opined that the frightful experience of being questioned about rape committed against children
requires the highest degree of tact, patience and diplomacy. Thus, excessive queries to a 6-year old child
as to whether she remembered step-by-step the sexual intercourse at the hands of the accused were
unnecessary and inappropriate. (People vs. Bores, 348 SCRA 638, 646-647)
The action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and turning him about was
unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every
witness is entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice. Against such conduct the appellant had the
right to protest and to demand that the incident be made a matter of record. That he did so was not
contempt, providing protest and demand were respectfully made and with due regard for the dignity of the
court. (In re Aguas (1901))
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 47

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the
performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but
also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.
Respondent judge's continued silence as to the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite repeated written
queries from one of the parties, his failure to reply to the tracers of the Office of the Court Administrator,
and his willful disobedience and disregard to our show-cause resolutions constituted grave and serious
misconduct affecting his fitness and the worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office. Once
again, we hold with great emphasis that: ...The Judge is the visible representation of the law of justice.
From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law ..." How can the respondent judge
expect others to respect the law when he himself cannot obey orders as simple as the show cause
resolution? Moreover, it is not enough that the complaining litigant was eventually appeased by the turn of
circumstances. What is more important is whether or not in the course of the judicial process, judicial
norms have been maintained. It is with this end in view that we stress diligence and efficiency attendant to
the discharge of a judge's function in the present Code of Judicial Conduct.
Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the said Code provides that: A judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management and facilitate the performance of
the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
In the instant case, respondent judge even impeded the speedy disposition of cases by his successor on
account of missing records of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and disorderly system in the recording
of cases assigned to his sala. Proper and efficient court management is as much the judge's responsibility
for the Court personnel are not the guardians of a Judge's responsibilities. With respect to the inventoried
4 criminal cases without prisoners and four 4 civil cases missing, we find no justification for the failure to
present them to the Deputy Court Administrator when required and their absence from the place where
court records are stored. A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are
intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight
records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true
professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial
office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites attached
to said office must be weeded out. Lastly, the report on the physical inventory of the records of the cases
in RTC, Branch 14, Lagawe, Ifugao, which was respondent judge's last assignment before his suspension
revealed that a total of 35 cases submitted for decision have remained unresolved beyond the 90- day
reglementary period. We have consistently held that failure to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Longboan vs. Polig (1990))
Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal
qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this
purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control,
to judges.
Service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end. (State
Prosecutor v. Muro, 236 SCRA 57; Rao vs. Imbing, 231 SCRA 57)

Judges are perceived as the visible representation of the law, an intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests. (Impao vs. Makilala, 178 SCRA 541)
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 48

The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges. (Espiritu vs.
Javellanos, 280 SCRA 579)

As advocates of justice and visible representation of the law, the public expects judges to be conversant
with the developments of law and jurisprudence and proficient in their application or interpretation of it.
(Almonte vs. Bien, 461 SCRA 218). It is imperative that judges be well-informed of basic legal principles.
In the absence of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice, incorrect rulings do not
constitute bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice, incorrect rulings do not
constitute misconduct and may not give rise to a charge of gross ignorance of the law. (Cruz vs. Iturralde,
402 SCRA 65, 73-74)

Thus, judges are not liable for every erroneous order or decision; otherwise the judicial office becomes
unbearable and they will be the objects of endless harassment. (Dantes vs. Caguia, 461 SCRA 236)
Good faith and absence of malice or corruption are sufficient defenses to charges of ignorance of the law.
(Chan vs. Lantion, 468 SCRA 37)

The Supreme Court admonished good faith of fallible discretion inheres only within the perimeter of
tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles
evident and basic as to be beyond possible margin of error. (Poso vs. Mijares, 387 SCRA 485, 507)
To constitute gross ignorance o the law, an error or irregularity on the part of the judge in the application
or interpretation of the law must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. (Duduaco vs. Laquindanum, 466 SCRA 428)
The Supreme Court provided the following guideline in Maguiran vs. Grageda (451 SCRA 15):
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against
Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies are prerequisites for the
taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative
liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
In a court resolution, the SC stated that no judge can be held to account for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith. However, his act remains unjustified. While the court does not require
perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who
are selected to fill the positions of administrators of justice. Respondent judge has sincerely evinced a
humble repentance and prays for a reconsideration of the resolution. Thus, we feel that he has been
sufficiently punished for his administrative infraction. (In re Judge Baltazar Dizon (1989))
As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Yet it is highly
imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles. They are called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and to keep themselves abreast of the latest laws, rulings
and jurisprudence affecting their jurisdiction. Even in the remaining years of his stay in the judiciary, he
should keep abreast with the changes in the law and with the latest decisions and precedents. Although a
judge is nearing retirement, he should not relax in his study of the law and court decisions. (Abad vs. Bleza,
A.M. No. 227-RTJ, October 13, 1986).

Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international law,
including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.
C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 49

As to conventional or treat law, the Constitution in Section 21, Article VII prescribes that when at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate concur in a treaty or international agreement, it may become
part of Philippine domestic law. This means that the treaty becomes binding as domestic law even though
it is also a source of international obligations. (Guerreros Transportation Services, Inc. vs. Blaylock
Transportation Services Employees Association Kilusan, G.R. L-41518, June 30, 1976)

Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.
The essence of the judicial function is expressed in Section 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay. This principle
permeates the whole system of judicature, and supports the legitimacy of the decrees of judicial tribunals.
A delay of three years in the transmission of court records to the appellate court, where a period of 30
days is required, is inexcusable. (Pantaleon vs. Gudez A.M.No. RTJ-00-1525, Jan. 2000)
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
Example of Violation:
The respondent judge was guilty of committing acts unbecoming of a judge and abuse of authority when
he shouted invectives and threw a chair at the complainant, resulting in wrist and other injuries to the
complainant. (Briones vs. Ante, Jr., 380 SCRA 40)
The respondent judge was found guilty of serious misconduct and inefficiency by reason of habitual
tardiness. He was fined and suspended for judicial indolence. (Yu-Asensi vs. Villanueva, 322 SCRA 255)
A delay of three years in the transmission of court records to the appellate court, where a period of 30
days is required, is inexcusable. (Pantaleon vs. Gudez, 323 SCRA 147)
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a
magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge.
A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over
his domain. Such an image is evoked the actuations of respondent judge in this case.
The Court goes on to stress that government service is people oriented.
Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.
Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with selfrestraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. (Rodriquez vs.
Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519)

Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
By issuing orders indefinitely postponing the hearing of election protest, the judge in De la Cruz vs. Pascua
(359 SCRA 568 [2001]) manifested inefficiency in the disposition of an election protest case and thus overtly
transgressed basic mandatory rules for expeditious resolution of cases.

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 50

A judge neglected his duty when he failed to exercise extra care in ensuring that records of the cases and
official documents in his custody were intact. The Supreme Court reiterated that judges must adopt a
system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business. (Beso vs. Daguman, 323 SCRA 566)

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES
The general rule is that a judge is not liable administratively, civilly or criminally when he acts
within the legal powers and jurisdiction. He may not be held liable for every erroneous order or
decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment.
The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
An impeachable officer who is a member of the Philippine Bar cannot be disbarred without first being
impeached. (Jarque vs. Desierto, 250 SCRA 11)
Before a civil or a criminal action against a judge for violation of Articles 204 and 205, Revised Penal
Code, can be entertained, there must first be a final and authoritative judicial declaration that the
decision or order is indeed unjust. The pronouncement may result from either: (a) an action for certiorari
or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of judgment; or (b) an administrative proceeding in
the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. (De Vera vs.
Pelayo, 335 SCRA 281)

If the decision rendered by the judge is still on appeal, the judge cannot be disqualified on the ground of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. (Abad vs. Blaza, 145 SCRA)
Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by
reasonable interpretation. (In re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107)
Effects of resignation/retirement of a judge when there is a pending administrative case against
him:
The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he should still be answerable. The withdrawal or recantation of the
complaint by the administrative charges does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the case. (Atty.
Molina vs. Judge Paz, AM. No. RTJ-01-1638, December 2003)

The acceptance by the President of respondent's courtesy resignation does not necessarily render the
case moot or deprive the SC of the authority to investigate the charges. The Court retains its jurisdiction
either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications.
(Pesole vs. Rodriguez, AM No. 755-MTJ, Jan. 1978)

C e n t e r f o r L e g a l E d u c a t i o n a n d R e s e a r c h | 51