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SSL Secure Socket Layer
-
architecture and services
sessions and connections
SSL Record Protocol
SSL Handshake Protocol
key exchange alternatives
analysis of the SSL Record and Handshake Protocols
SSL vs. TLS
What is SSL?
SSL Secure Socket Layer
it provides a secure transport connection between applications
(e.g., a web server and a browser)
SSL was developed by Netscape
SSL version 3.0 has been implemented in many web browsers
(e.g., Netscape Navigator and MS Internet Explorer) and web
servers and widely used on the Internet
SSL v3.0 was specified in an Internet Draft (1996)
it evolved into RFC 2246 and was renamed to TLS (Transport
Layer Security)
TLS can be viewed as SSL v3.1
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SSL architecture
SSL
SSL
Handshake
Handshake
Protocol
Protocol
SSL
SSLChange
Change
Cipher
CipherSpec
Spec
Protocol
Protocol
SSL
SSL
Alert
Alert
Protocol
Protocol
applications
applications
(e.g.,
(e.g.,HTTP)
HTTP)
Architecture and services
SSL
SSLRecord
RecordProtocol
Protocol
TCP
TCP
IP
IP
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SSL components
SSL Handshake Protocol
negotiation of security algorithms and parameters
key exchange
server authentication and optionally client authentication
SSL Record Protocol
Architecture and services
fragmentation
compression
message authentication and integrity protection
encryption
SSL Alert Protocol
error messages (fatal alerts and warnings)
SSL Change Cipher Spec Protocol
a single message that indicates the end of the SSL handshake
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Sessions and connections
Sessions and connections
an SSL session is an association between a client and a server
sessions are stateful; the session state includes security
algorithms and parameters
a session may include multiple secure connections between the
same client and server
connections of the same session share the session state
sessions are used to avoid expensive negotiation of new
security parameters for each connection
there may be multiple simultaneous sessions between the same
two parties, but this feature is not used in practice
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Session state
session identifier
arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify the
session
peer certificate
X509 certificate of the peer
may be null
compression method
cipher spec
Sessions and connections
bulk data encryption algorithm (e.g., null, DES, 3DES, )
MAC algorithm (e.g., MD5, SHA-1)
cryptographic attributes (e.g., hash size, IV size, )
master secret
48-byte secret shared between the client and the server
is resumable
a flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new
connections
connection states
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Connection state
server and client random
random byte sequences chosen by the server and the client for every
connection
server write MAC secret
client write MAC secret
server write key
client write key
initialization vectors
secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the server
secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the client
secret encryption key for data encrypted by the server
Sessions and connections
secret encryption key for data encrypted by the client
an IV is maintained for each encryption key if CBC mode is used
initialized by the SSL Handshake Protocol
final ciphertext block from each record is used as IV with the following
record
sending and receiving sequence numbers
sequence numbers are 64 bits long
reset to zero after each Change Cipher Spec message
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State changes
operating state
pending state
currently used state
state to be used
built using the current state
operating state pending state
at the transmission and reception of a Change Cipher Spec message
Sessions and connections
party A
(client or server)
the sending part of the
pending state is copied
into the sending part
of the operating state
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Chang
e
party B
(server or client)
Ciphe
r Spe
c
the receiving part of the
pending state is copied
into the receiving part
of the operating state
SSL Record Protocol processing overview
fragmentation
compression
MAC computation
padding
encryption
SSL Record Protocol message:
SSL Record Protocol
type
version
length
application data
(compressed fragment)
MAC
padding
p.len
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Header
type
the higher level protocol used to process the enclosed fragment
possible types:
change_cipher_spec
alert
handshake
application_data
version
SSL version, currently 3.0
SSL Record Protocol
length
length (in bytes) of the enclosed fragment or compressed
fragment
max value is 214 + 2048
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MAC
MAC = hash( MAC_wr_sec | pad_2 |
hash( MAC_wr_sec | pad_1 | seq_num | type | length |frag ))
similar to HMAC but the pads are concatenated
supported hash functions:
MD5
SHA-1
SSL Record Protocol
pad_1 is 0x36 repeated 48 times (MD5) or 40 times (SHA-1)
pad_2 is 0x5C repeated 48 times (MD5) or 40 times (SHA-1)
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Encryption
supported algorithms
block ciphers (in CBC mode)
RC2_40
DES_40
DES_56
3DES_168
IDEA_128
Fortezza_80
stream ciphers
SSL Record Protocol
RC4_40
RC4_128
if a block cipher is used, than padding is applied
last byte of the padding is the padding length
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SSL Alert Protocol
each alert message consists of 2 fields (bytes)
first field (byte): warning or fatal
second field (byte):
fatal
unexpected_message
bad_record_MAC
decompression_failure
handshake_failure
illegal_parameter
close_notify
no_certificate
bad_certificate
unsupported_certificate
certificate_revoked
certificate_expired
certificate_unknown
SSL Alert Protocol
warning
in case of a fatal alert
connection is terminated
session ID is invalidated no new connection can be established within
this session
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SSL Handshake Protocol overview
client
server
client_hello
server_hello
certificate
server_key_exchange
certificate_request
server_hello_done
certificate
SSL Handshake Protocol
client_key_exchange
certificate_verify
Phase 1: Negotiation of the session ID, key
exchange algorithm, MAC algorithm, encryption
algorithm, and exchange of initial random numbers
Phase 2: Server may send its certificate and key
exchange message, and it may request the client
to send a certificate. Server signals end of hello
phase.
Phase 3: Client sends certificate if requested and
may send an explicit certificate verification
message. Client always sends its key exchange
message.
change_cipher_spec
finished
change_cipher_spec
Phase 4: Change cipher spec and finish handshake
finished
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Client hello
client_version
client_random
session_id
the highest version supported by the client
SSL Handshake Protocol / Phase 1
current time (4 bytes) + pseudo random bytes (28 bytes)
empty if the client wants to create a new session, or
the session ID of an old session within which the client wants to create the
new connection
cipher_suites
list of cryptographic options supported by the client ordered by
preference
a cipher suite contains the specification of the
key exchange method, the encryption and the MAC algorithm
the algorithms implicitly specify the hash_size, IV_size, and key_material
parameters (part of the Cipher Spec of the session state)
exmaple: SSL_RSA_with_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
compression_methods
list of compression methods supported by the client
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Server hello
server_version
min( highest version supported by client, highest version supported by
server )
server_random
current time + random bytes
random bytes must be independent of the client random
SSL Handshake Protocol / Phase 1
session_id
session ID chosen by the server
if the client wanted to resume an old session:
server checks if the session is resumable
if so, it responds with the session ID and the parties proceed to the finished
messages
if the client wanted a new session
server generates a new session ID
cipher_suite
compression_method
single cipher suite selected by the server from the list given by the client
single compression method selected by the server
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Supported key exchange methods
SSL Handshake Protocol / Phase 1
RSA based (SSL_RSA_with...)
the secret key (pre-master secret) is encrypted with the servers public
RSA key
the servers public key is made available to the client during the exchange
fixed Diffie-Hellman (SSL_DH_RSA_with or SSL_DH_DSS_with)
the server has fix DH parameters contained in a certificate signed by a CA
the client may have fix DH parameters certified by a CA or it may send an
unauthenticated one-time DH public value in the client_key_exchange
message
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (SSL_DHE_RSA_with or
SSL_DHE_DSS_with)
both the server and the client generate one-time DH parameters
the server signs its DH parameters with its private RSA or DSS key
the client may authenticate itself (if requested by the server) by signing
the hash of the handshake messages with its private RSA or DSS key
anonymous Diffie-Hellman (SSL_DH_anon_with)
both the server and the client generate one-time DH parameters
they send their parameters to the peer without authentication
Fortezza
Fortezza proprietary key exchange scheme
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Server certificate and key exchange msgs
certificate
required for every key exchange method except for anonymous DH
contains one or a chain of X.509 certificates (up to a known root CA)
may contain
public RSA key suitable for encryption, or
public RSA or DSS key suitable for signing only, or
fix DH parameters
SSL Handshake Protocol / Phase 2
server_key_exchange
sent only if the certificate does not contain enough information to
complete the key exchange (e.g., the certificate contains an RSA signing
key only)
may contain
public RSA key (exponent and modulus), or
DH parameters (p, g, public DH value), or
Fortezza parameters
digitally signed
if DSS: SHA-1 hash of (client_random | server_random | server_params) is
signed
if RSA: MD5 hash and SHA-1 hash of (client_random | server_random |
server_params) are concatenated and encrypted with the private RSA key
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Cert request and server hello done msgs
certificate_request
sent if the client needs to authenticate itself
specifies which type of certificate is requested (rsa_sign,
dss_sign, rsa_fixed_dh, dss_fixed_dh, )
SSL Handshake Protocol / Phase 2
server_hello_done
sent to indicate that the server is finished its part of the key
exchange
after sending this message the server waits for client response
the client should verify that the server provided a valid
certificate and the server parameters are acceptable
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Client authentication and key exchange
certificate
sent only if requested by the server
may contain
public RSA or DSS key suitable for signing only, or
fix DH parameters
SSL Handshake Protocol / Phase 3
client_key_exchange
always sent (but it is empty if the key exchange method is fix DH)
may contain
RSA encrypted pre-master secret, or
client one-time public DH value, or
Fortezza key exchange parameters
certificate_verify
sent only if the client sent a certificate
provides client authentication
contains signed hash of all the previous handshake messages
if DSS: SHA-1 hash is signed
if RSA: MD5 and SHA-1 hash is concatenated and encrypted with the private key
MD5( master_secret | pad_2 | MD5( handshake_messages | master_secret | pad_1 ) )
SHA( master_secret | pad_2 | SHA( handshake_messages | master_secret | pad_1 ) )
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Finished messages
SSL Handshake Protocol / Phase 4
sent immediately after the change_cipher_spec message
used to authenticate all previous handshake messages
first message that uses the newly negotiated algorithms, keys,
IVs, etc.
contains the MD5 and SHA-1 hash of all the previous
handshake messages:
MD5( master_secret | pad_2 | MD5( handshake_messages | sender | master_secret | pad_1 ) ) |
SHA( master_secret | pad_2 | SHA( handshake_messages | sender | master_secret | pad_1 ) )
where sender is a code that identifies that the sender is the client
or the server (client: 0x434C4E54; server: 0x53525652)
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SSL Handshake Protocol / Cryptographic computations
Cryptographic computations
pre-master secret
if key exchange is RSA based:
generated by the client
sent to the server encrypted with the servers public RSA key
if key exchange is Diffie-Hellman based:
pre_master_secret = gxy mod p
master secret (48 bytes)
master_secret = MD5( pre_master_sec | SHA( A | pre_master_sec | client_random | server_random )) |
MD5( pre_master_sec | SHA( BB | pre_master_sec | client_random | server_random )) |
MD5( pre_master_sec | SHA( CCC | pre_master_sec | client_random | server_random ))
keys, MAC secrets, IVs
MD5( master_secret | SHA( A | master_secret | client_random | server_random )) |
MD5( master_secret | SHA( BB | master_secret | client_random | server_random )) |
MD5( master_secret | SHA( CCC | master_secret | client_random | server_random )) |
key block :
client write MAC sec
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server write MAC sec
client write key
server write key
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Key exchange alternatives
SSL Handshake Protocol
RSA / no client authentication
server sends its encryption capable RSA public key in
server_certificate
server_key_exchange is not sent
client sends encrypted pre-master secret in client_key_exchange
client_certificate and certificate_verify are not sent
or
server sends its RSA or DSS public signature key in
server_certificate
server sends a temporary RSA public key in server_key_exchange
client sends encrypted pre-master secret in client_key_exchange
client_certificate and certificate_verify are not sent
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Key exchange alternatives contd
SSL Handshake Protocol
RSA / client is authenticated
server sends its encryption capable RSA public key in
server_certificate
server_key_exchange is not sent
client sends its RSA or DSS public signature key in
client_certificate
client sends encrypted pre-master secret in client_key_exchange
client sends signature on all previous handshake messages in
certificate_verify
or
server sends its RSA or DSS public signature key in
server_certificate
server sends a one-time RSA public key in server_key_exchange
client sends its RSA or DSS public signature key in
client_certificate
client sends encrypted pre-master secret in client_key_exchange
client sends signature on all previous handshake messages in
certificate_verify
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Key exchange alternatives contd
fix DH / no client authentication
server sends its fix DH parameters in server_certificate
server_key_exchange is not sent
client sends its one-time DH public value in client_key_exchange
client_ certificate and certificate_verify are not sent
SSL Handshake Protocol
fix DH / client is authenticated
server sends its fix DH parameters in server_certificate
server_key_exchange is not sent
client sends its fix DH parameters in client_certificate
client_key_exchange is sent but empty
certificate_verify is not sent
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Key exchange alternatives contd
ephemeral DH / no client authentication
server sends its RSA or DSS public signature key in
server_certificate
server sends signed one-time DH parameters in
server_key_exchange
client sends one-time DH public value in client_key_exchange
client_certificate and certificate_verify are not sent
SSL Handshake Protocol
ephemeral DH / client is authenticated
server sends its RSA or DSS public signature key in
server_certificate
server sends signed one-time DH parameters in
server_key_exchange
client sends its RSA or DSS public signature key in
client_certificate
client sends one-time DH public value in client_key_exchange
client sends signature on all previous handshake messages in
certificate_verify
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Key exchange alternatives contd
anonymous DH / no client authentication
server_certificate is not sent
server sends (unsigned) one-time DH parameters in
server_key_exchange
client sends one-time DH public value in client_key_exchange
client_certificate and certificate_verify are not sent
anonymous DH / client is authenticated
SSL Handshake Protocol
not allowed
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SSL vs. TLS
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Miscellaneous changes
version number
for TLS 1.1 the version number is 3.2
cipher suites
TLS doesnt support Fortezza key exchange and Fortezza
encryption
padding
variable length padding is allowed (max 255 padding bytes)
MAC
TLS uses the latest version of HMAC
the MAC covers the version field of the record header too
certificate_verify message
TLS vs. SSL
the hash is computed only over the handshake messages
in SSL, the hash contained the master_secret and pads
more alert codes
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TLS vs. SSL
New pseudorandom function (PRF)
P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash( secret, A(1) | seed ) |
HMAC_hash( secret, A(2) | seed ) |
HMAC_hash( secret, A(3) | seed ) |
where
A(0) = seed
A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1))
PRF(secret, label, seed) =
P_MD5(secret_left, label | seed) P_SHA(secret_right, label | seed)
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P_hash illustrated
seed
secret
HMAC
A(1)
||
secret
seed
secret
HMAC
A(2)
HMAC
||
secret
seed
secret
HMAC
A(3)
HMAC
||
TLS vs. SSL
secret
seed
HMAC
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Usage of the new PRF
finished message
PRF( master_secret,
client finished,
MD5(handshake_messages) | SHA(handshake_messages) )
cryptographic computations
pre-master secret is calculated in the same way as in SSL
master secret:
PRF( pre_master_secret,
master secret,
client_random | server_random )
key block:
TLS vs. SSL
PRF( master_secret,
key expansion,
server_random | client_random )
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Recommended readings
SSL v3.0 specification, available on-line at
http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/index.html
D. Wagner, B. Schneier, Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol, 2nd
USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1996.
The TLS protocol v1.0, available on-line as RFC 2246
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