Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan
City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his
recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting
on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14,
1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.[1] At least 29.30% of the
registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by
law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this
time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction,
docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary
restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.[2]
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled
the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public
respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor
Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the
latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter
filed a reply.[3]
Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner
insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,
petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where
the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains

that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be
had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do
not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment.[4] The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective
local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his
term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular
local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision
of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set
by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by
petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.[5] An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.[6]
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.[7] Thus, the interpretation of Section
74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be
in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x
x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x[8]
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against
the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the
office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office
than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in
keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same
having been scheduled on May 1997.[9]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996,
enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the
majority and separate concurring opinions.
Davide, Jr., Please see separate concurring opinion.
[1] COMELEC Resolution No. 95-3345, September 5, 1995
[2] RTC, Cabanatuan City, Order dated December 20, 1995; Rollo, p. 28.
[3] Rollo, pp. 64-66.
[4] Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464, 467.
[5] Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617, 627.
[6] Id. at p. 628.
[7] PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674.
[8] People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.

[9] Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 5; See: Evardorne v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464.