FULL TEXT CASE 16

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 135560-61. January 24, 2001.]
PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BONIFACIO SAN AGUSTIN y ROSLIN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
On the night of July 1, 1997, Jessebelle San Agustin, twelve years old, was lying
inside her room when her father Bonifacio San Agustin suddenly barged in. He
then sexually assaulted her. After violating Jessebelle, Bonifacio left with a threat
that if she reported her experience to anybody, he will kill her and her siblings.
Every night thereafter during that month of July, 1997, Bonifacio would force
Jessebelle to submit to his carnal embrace. The forced coupling would usually
take place at around 11:00 p.m. Bonifacio likewise raped Jessebelle every night
of August 1997. However, in September 1997, Bonifacio would sexually abuse
her only on Saturdays and Sundays, as he was then working in Imus, Cavite and
came home only on weekends. Jessebelle's last sexual intercourse with
Bonifacio took place on September 15, 1997. She told her older brother's live-in
partner and her friend about her experience at appellant's hands. Her problem
was referred to the DSWD which assisted her in filing the complaints.
For ravishing her own daughter, accused-appellant Bonifacio San Agustin was
convicted of two counts of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death.

Hence, this automatic review.

Accused-appellant assailed the credibility of the victim contending that the
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the victim's testimony as to the dates when
the rapes allegedly took place cast doubt on her reliability and veracity.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications.
Allegations of the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not
decisive in a prosecution for rape. First, the precise time of the commission of the
rape is not an element of the crime. Second, the precise time or date of the rape
has no bearing on its commission. Hence, the exact time the rape was committed
is a detail of minor significance.
Errors or inconsistencies as to the exact time or date or day of the week when the
rape was consummated do not impair the credibility of the complaining witness,
for as long as there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the assailant. In the case at bar, the Court found that the
victim's narration of the incidents accords with human experience and the normal
course of events of this nature.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the qualifying circumstances of
age and relationship of the victim to the accused must specifically be alleged and
proved. In this case, the victim's age, while alleged in the information, had not
been proven adequately. Hence, accused-appellant was guilty only of two (2)
counts of simple rape and the proper penalty imposed on him was reclusion
perpetua for each count. As to the amount of damages, the :Court modified the
same.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; LONE
TESTIMONY OF OFFENDED PARTY IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT IF
CREDIBLE. In rape trials, the issue, more often than not, is the credibility of
the victim. Since the participants are usually the only witnesses in the trial of

crimes of this nature, the conviction or acquittal of the accused would virtually
depend on the credibility of the complainant's testimony. Hence, the testimony of
the offended party should not be received with precipitate credulity. But when a
rape victim's testimony is straightforward, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, then it deserves full credit. If found credible, the declaration of
facts given by the offended party alone would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IMPAIRED BY INCONSISTENCIES AS TO EXACT TIME OR
DATE THE RAPE WAS CONSUMMATED. Inconsistencies in the testimony of
witnesses that refer only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance of the declaration, its weight, or its veracity. Errors or inconsistencies
as to the exact time or date or day of the week when the rape was consummated
do not impair the credibility of the complaining witness, for as long as there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailant. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, error-free testimonies
cannot be expected when one is relating the details of a harrowing experience.
Mistakes by the victim as to the exact day of the week are matters which can be
expected to happen when the victim is recounting her traumatic experience in
open court and in the presence of other people. Far from demolishing the veracity
of her account, complainant's mistakes buttress, rather than erode, her credibility
for it is a clear showing that her testimony has not been tailored or custom-built
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH FINDINGS OF
TRIAL COURT THEREON. Note also that the trial court found the victim's
testimony "credible in its entirety as it was given in a straightforward and
convincing manner." Absent any fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which may have been overlooked or misconstrued as to impeach the findings of
the trial court, this Court will not interfere with the trial court's findings on the
credibility of witnesses. For it is the trial court which has the vantage to decide on
the question of credibility of witnesses having heard and observed their
demeanor during the trial. Her narration of the incidents accords with human
experience and the normal course of events of this nature.

4. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; TO PROSPER,' REQUISITES OF TIME AND PLACE MUST

BE STRICTLY MET; REQUISITES WANTING IN CASE AT BAR. For alibi to
prosper as a defense, one must not only prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed but must also show that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis. The requirements of time
and place must be strictly met. In the present cases, both requisites are wanting.
First, appellant offered nary a scintilla of proof to show that he was actually in
Imus, Cavite on July 1, 1997 and September 15, 1997 when the rapes happened.
As already stated, appellant cannot rely upon the testimony of Eva de Jesus on
this score. A careful reading of her testimony in court would show that nowhere
did Eva claim that she personally saw him much less accompanied him, in Cavite
on both dates. All that she knew was that appellant was supposed to be a
construction worker in Cavite, and this led her to believe that he was at the
construction site on the days of the alleged offenses. As pointed out by the trial
court, appellant's alibi cannot be considered in his favor, since the place where
he was supposed to be is only five (5) hours travel time away from the locus
criminis. If appellant got off from work in Cavite at 5:00 P.M., it would not be
physically impossible for him to be in his Laguna house by 10:00 P.M.. Recall that
complainant testified that in September 1997 she was usually raped by appellant
at around 11:00 P.M. of a Saturday or Sunday, which is really close to midnight
and early Monday, Thus, appellant's alibi miserably failed to satisfy the two (2)
requisites for the defense of alibi to prosper.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE AND UNEQUIVOCAL
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED BY RAPE VICTIM ABSENT ILL-MOTIVE ON
HER PART. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and
unequivocal identification of appellant by private complainant as her rapist.
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellant's
defense of denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law

6. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; EXACT TIME AND DATE OF COMMISSION OF

CRIME ARE NOT DECISIVE IN PROSECUTION THEREOF. Allegations of
the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not decisive in a
prosecution for rape. First, the precise time of the commission of the rape is not
an element of the crime. Second, the precise time or date of the rape has no
bearing on its commission. Hence, the exact time the rape was committed is a
detail of minor significance.
7. ID.; ID.; DEATH PENALTY LAW QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGE
AND RELATIONSHIP OF VICTIM TO ACCUSED MUST BE SPECIFICALLY
ALLEGED AND PROVED TO WARRANT IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY.
Under Republic Act No. 7659, the imposition of the death penalty in rape cases
becomes mandatory when the offended party is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. The qualifying circumstances of age and relationship
of the victim to the accused must specifically be alleged and proved.
8. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO PROVE VICTIM'S MINORITY BARS ACCUSED'S
CONVICTION FOR RAPE IN ITS QUALIFIED FORM. Note, however, that
other than the admission by appellant, the records are bare of any other proof,
documentary or otherwise, submitted by the prosecution to show the victim's
minority. In fact, complainant herself is not too sure as to her exact age or as to
when her mother died, as shown in complainant's testimony:... We conclude that
the victim's age, while alleged in the information, has not been proven
adequately. The failure of the prosecution to present the victim's birth certificate
or similarly acceptable proof of her age as a minor bars appellant's conviction for
rape in its qualified form. He is guilty only of 2 counts of simple rape, and the
proper penalty is not death but only reclusion perpetua for each count.
9. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; CIVIL INDEMNITY AND MORAL DAMAGES;
AWARDED TO RAPE VICTIM; AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
REDUCED. On the damages awarded, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of simple rape are

in accord, with present jurisprudence. However, the exemplary damages should

be reduced to P25,000.00 for each count of rape. The rationale behind
exemplary damages is to provide an example or correction for the public good
and not to enrich the victim. The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
provides a deterrent against sexual abuse of young women by their fathers.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J :
p

On automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, Branch 28 in Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6680 and SC-6682, convicting
appellant Bonifacio San Agustin y Roslin @ "Bony" of two (2) counts of qualified
rape committed against his daughter, Jessebelle 1 San Agustin. Appellant was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death for each count.
The instant cases stemmed from two (2) informations for rape filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. In Criminal Case No. SC-6680, the indictment
reads:
That on or about July 1, 1997, in the municipality of Victoria, province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused while conveniently armed with a fan knife, prompted
with lewd design(s) and by means of force, violence, and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with his own daughter JESSEBELLE SAN AGUSTIN, a
twelve (12) years old girl, against her will and (without her) consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Except as to the date of the alleged rape, the information in Criminal Case No.
SC-6682 was similarly worded. The rape complained of in Criminal Case No. SC6682 allegedly took place on September 15, 1997.
On December 2, 1997, appellant was arraigned in both cases. With the
assistance of counsel de oficio, he pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
Appellant waived pre-trial, and a joint trial of the two cases ensued.
Private complainant testified that on the night of July 1, 1997, she was lying
inside her room in the upstairs portion of the San Agustin house at Purok 2,
Banca-Banca, Victoria, Laguna when appellant suddenly barged in. Without
further ado, he proceeded to remove her underwear, mashed her breasts, and
fingered her vagina She could not do a thing as appellant had a knife beside him.
Appellant then mounted and deflowered her, causing her excruciating pain as his
penis entered her organ. After appellant had spent his lust, he threatened to kill
complainant and her siblings if she reported her experience to anybody. She had
no problem recalling that her first sexual contact with appellant took place on July
1, 1996, as it was her cousin Sunshine's birthday.
Every night thereafter during that month of July 1997, appellant would force her
to submit to his carnal embrace. The forced coupling would usually take place at
around 11:00 P.M. As a result of her experience, complainant was wounded in
her private parts. She felt pain each time she would urinate.
The victim further testified that appellant likewise raped her every night of August
1997. However, in September 1997, appellant would sexually abuse her only on
Saturdays and Sundays, as he was then working in Imus, Cavite and came home
only on weekends. Complainant averred that her last sexual intercourse with
appellant took place on September 15, 1997.
Complainant declared that she told her older brother's live-in partner, a
certain Ate Ana and her friend, one Abigail, about the experience at appellant's
hands. Her problem was referred to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), which assisted her in filing the appropriate complaints.
The DSWD also took custody of the victim.

On September 17, 1997, Dr. Emelita Pempengco of the Laguna Provincial

Hospital examined private complainant at the request of the police. The
examination disclosed a healed hymenal laceration at the four o'clock
position. 3 Dr. Pempengco testified it was possible that the laceration had been
caused when a hard object such as an erect male organ had been inserted in the
victim's vagina. 4
To exculpate himself from the grave charges against him, appellant raised the
defense of denial and alibi. Appellant vehemently denied raping his daughter on
July 1, 1997 and September 15, 1997. He declared that he was in Brigandala,
Imus, Cavite on those dates, working as a laborer in a construction site and
would only come home monthly. To corroborate his alibi, appellant presented his
sister and neighbor, Eva de Jesus. Eva declared that on the said dates her
brother was working in Cavite and could not have raped complainant. Eva also
claimed that complainant erred in saying she was raped on July 1, 1997, which
complainant claimed was her cousin Sunshine's birthday. Eva averred that as
Sunshine's mother, she very well knew that the daughter's birthday is March 5
and not July 1. Eva likewise declared that complainant could not have been raped
on September 15, 1997 because that night complainant slept over at her (Eva's)
house.
However, appellant and his witness failed to convince the trial court of his
innocence. On August 28, 1998, the trial court adjudged him guilty, concluding as
follows:
WHEREFORE:
Under Criminal Case No. SC-6680, this Court finds the accused
BONIFACIO SAN AGUSTIN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AS PRINCIPAL OF CONSUM[M]ATED RAPE defined and punished
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and hereby
sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH and to pay

the private offended party JESSEBELLE SAN AGUSTIN the following

sums:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
50,000.00 as moral damages and
50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-6682, this Court finds the accused
BONIFACIO SAN AGUSTIN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AS PRINCIPAL OF CONSUM[M]ATED RAPE defined and punished
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and hereby
sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH and to pay
the private offended party JESSEBELLE SAN AGUSTIN the following
sums:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
50,000.00 as moral damages and
50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of both the instant suits.
SO ORDERED. 5

In refusing to credit appellant's defense, the trial court observed that as per
appellant's own admission, the average travel time between his place of work in
Imus, Cavite and his residence in Victoria, Laguna was only five (5) hours.
Hence, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene as he
could leave Imus after his work for the day ceased at 5:00 P.M. and easily be at
Victoria by ten o'clock in the evening. It pointed out that the victim asserted that
she was usually ravished at eleven o'clock in the evening.
Capital punishment having been imposed, the cases were elevated to this Court
for automatic review.

SIcCEA

In his brief, appellant assigns as errors the following:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE

TRIAL

COURT

GRAVELY

ERRED

IN

COMPLETELY

DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND DENIAL OFFERED

BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 6

The issues for our resolution are: (1) Is complainant's testimony credible and
sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction? (2) Is appellant's defense of denial
and alibi worthy of credence?
Appellant points out that private complainant averred she was raped only on
Saturdays and Sundays inasmuch as the appellant was working in Imus, Cavite.
However, July 1, 1997 is a Tuesday while September 15, 1997 is a Monday.
Since neither of the two dates when the rapes allegedly took place are Saturdays
nor Sundays, appellant claims the victim's truthfulness is placed in serious doubt.
Appellant further points out that the victim claimed she was sure the first rape
took place on July 1, 1997 because July 1 is the birthday of her cousin,
Sunshine. But it turned out the correct birthday of Sunshine is March 5. Appellant
stresses that these inconsistencies and material discrepancies in private
complainant's testimony cast doubt on her reliability and veracity. Thus, he
concludes it was error for the trial court to sustain appellant's conviction.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the inconsistencies
pointed out by appellant are minor matters. The OSG asks us to note that the
victim here is a thirteen (13) year-old barrio lass who only reached Grade II. She
could not be expected to give an error-free testimony particularly where specific
dates are concerned. On the contrary, according to the OSG, complainant's

minor inconsistencies strengthen her credibility as they show that she was relying
upon her memory alone and her testimony is neither coached nor rehearsed.
In rape trials, the issue, more often than not, is the credibility of the victim. Since
the participants are usually the only witnesses in the trial of crimes of this nature,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused would virtually depend on the credibility
of the complainant's testimony. Hence, the testimony of the offended party should
not be received with precipitate credulity. 7 But when a rape victim's testimony is
straightforward, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, then it
deserves full credit. If found credible, the declaration of facts given by the
offended party alone would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. 8
Appellant claims the error-ridden testimony of complainant cannot overturn the
presumption of innocence in his favor. Note, however, that appellant's assertion
that private complainant claimed she was raped only on Saturdays and Sundays
is inaccurate. A scrutiny of complainant's testimony shows that complainant was
reflecting only to the rapes allegedly committed in September 1997.
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q: How about in the month of September (stress supplied), do you recall
if your father inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: Only on Saturdays and Sundays, sir.
Q: Why only on Saturdays and Sundays?
A: Because he was working in Cavite, sir.

It could not apply to Case No. SC-6680 involving the rape committed on July 1,
1997.

Allegations of the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not
decisive in a prosecution for rape. 10 First, the precise time of the commission of
the rape is not an element of the crime.

11

Second, the precise time or date of the

rape has no bearing on its commission.

12

Hence, the exact time the rape was

committed is a detail of minor significance. 13

Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses that refer only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of the declaration, its weight, or its
veracity. 14 Errors or inconsistencies as to the exact time or date or day of the
week when the rape was consummated do not impair the credibility of the
complaining witness, for as long as there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the assailant.

15

As the Solicitor General

correctly points out, error-free testimonies cannot be expected when one is

relating the details of a harrowing experience. Mistakes by the victim as to the
exact day of the week are matters which can be expected to happen when the
victim is recounting her traumatic experience in open court and in the presence of
other people. Far from demolishing the veracity of her account, complainant's
mistakes buttress, rather than erode, her credibility for it is a clear showing that
her testimony has not been tailored or custom-built. 16
Note also that the trial court found the victim's testimony "credible in its entirety
as it was given in a straightforward and convincing manner."

17

Absent any fact or

circumstance of weight and influence which may have been overlooked or

misconstrued as to impeach the findings of the trial court, this Court will not
interfere with the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses. For it is the
trial court which has the vantage to decide on the question of credibility of
witnesses having heard and observed their demeanor during the trial.

18

Her

narration of the incidents accords with human experience and the normal course
of events of this nature. Thus, with specific reference to the offense subject of
Case No. SC-6680:
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q: What did he do to you on that night of July 1, 1997 inside your house?
A: "Ginapang po ako ng papa ko" he removed my panty, kissed me,
(mashed) my breast and held my vagina.
Q: What else did he do to you?

A: He placed himself on top of me and inserted his penis into my vagina.

Q: Was he able to easily insert his penis into your vagina?
A: No, sir.
Q: Was he able to actually insert his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that he was able to insert his penis inside
your vagina?
A: I felt the pain, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Tell us if your father (did) any body movement at the time his penis
was inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell us what body movement did he do.
A: (Witness demonstrating up and down movement).

19

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Q: During all the time your father was abusing you for the first time, what
was your feeling?
A: It was painful, Your Honor.
Q: What is painful?
A: My vagina, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know the reason why your vagina was painful?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What caused the pain in your vagina?

A: Because of what my papa inserted into it.

ATTY. DE RAMOS:
Q: You mentioned that when your father inserted his penis into your
vagina, it was so painful, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And according to you the first time your father inserted his penis was
on July 1, 1997?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you crying when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell the court how you cried.
A: I cried softly only because I was afraid that if my father will hear my
cry he might kill me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And according to you your father moved his body upward and
downward on top of you, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your father was doing that movement for quite a time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you crying during that time?
A: Yes, sir, I cried during the first thrust.
Q: But you were not crying when your father was doing that movement?
A: No more, sir.
Q: Why were you not crying?
A: There was already (a) wound, sir.

Q: There was (a) wound in your vagina?

A: Yes, sir. 20

Complainant's testimony is rendered even more convincing as it is supported by

medico-legal

findings

of

"healed

hymenal

laceration

o'clock

position." 21 Recall that Dr. Pempengco testified that it was possible that such
hymenal laceration was caused by the insertion of an erect male organ in the
victim's vagina. 22 Clearly in our view, the prosecution has presented evidence
sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in appellant's favor, insofar
Case No. SC-6680 is concerned.
Further, with regard to Case No. SC-6682, appellant points out that while his alibi
may be weak, it was nonetheless corroborated by complainant herself when she
testified that her father was working in Cavite and violated her only on Saturdays
and Sundays. Thus, appellant argues that since the alleged rape of September
15, 1997, subject of Case No. SC-6682, took place on a Monday, it was highly
improbable for said rape to have occurred. He concludes it was error for the trial
court to have disregarded his alibi altogether. There is, however, no showing it
was improbable that a sexual encounter beginning 11 P.M. of Sunday could last
till past midnight (or early Monday).
The Office of the Solicitor General counters that appellant failed to present any
evidence nor any witness to corroborate his allegation that he was working in
Cavite when the rapes occurred. This failure further weakens his already fragile
defense. The testimony of appellant's sister, Eva de Jesus, cannot be deemed
corroborative, since she was not with appellant in Cavite on material dates
alleged. Her testimony was not based upon her personal knowledge, but only on
mere presumptions.

DcaECT

For alibi to prosper as a defense, one must not only prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed but must also show that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis. 23 The
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. In the present cases, both
requisites are wanting. First, appellant offered nary a scintilla of proof to show

that he was actually in Imus, Cavite on July 1, 1997 and September 15, 1997
when the rapes happened. As already stated, appellant cannot rely upon the
testimony of Eva de Jesus on this score. A careful reading of her testimony in
court would show that nowhere did Eva claim that she personally saw him much
less accompanied him, in Cavite on both dates. All that she knew was that
appellant was supposed to be a construction worker in Cavite, and this led her to
believe that he was at the construction site on the days of the alleged offenses.
As pointed out by the trial court, appellant's alibi cannot be considered in his
favor, since the place where he was supposed to be is only five (5) hours travel
time away from the locus criminis. If appellant got off from work in Cavite at 5:00
P.M., it would not be physically impossible for him to be in his Laguna house by
10:00 P.M.. Recall that complainant testified that in September 1997 she was
usually raped by appellant at around 11:00 P.M. of a Saturday or Sunday, which
is really close to midnight and early Monday. Thus, appellant's alibi miserably
failed to satisfy the two (2) requisites for the defense of alibi to prosper.
Furthermore the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by private complainant as her rapist. Categorical and
consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellant's defense of
denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. 24
Given the evidence presented in this case, we find that the trial court did not err
in holding the appellant guilty of the offenses charged. But was capital
punishment correctly imposed on him for each of the two counts of rape?
Under Republic Act No. 7659, the imposition of the death penalty in rape cases
becomes mandatory when the offended party is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. The qualifying circumstances of age and relationship
of the victim to the accused must specifically be alleged and proved.

25

In

sentencing appellant to death by lethal injection for each count of rape, the trial
court observed that "it has been alleged and proved that in both cases it involved
accused-father BONIFACIO SAN AGUSTIN against daughter-complainant
JESSEBELLE SAN AGUSTIN who was merely thirteen (13) years old at the time
the offense(s) were committed." 26 It went on to point out that "that the age of
Jessebelle was 13 years old was confirmed and acknowledged by the accused . .
. as could be gleaned from his testimony." 27
The testimony of appellant relied upon by the court a quo concerning the victim's
age reads:
COURT:
Q: How about your wife?
A: She is already dead, Your Honor.
Q: When did she die?
A: In 1966, Your Honor.
Q: So since 1966 up to the present you are living with your six children?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What are the ages of your six children? From the eldest to the
youngest.
A: My eldest child is Mario, 19 years old; Ricky Boy, going to be 16 years
old; Randy, about 14 years old, Dyesebel [Jessebelle], 13 years
old, Roque, 8 years old and Jennifer, 5 years old.

28

Note, however, that other than the foregoing admission by appellant, the records
are bare of any other proof, documentary or otherwise, submitted by the
prosecution to show the victim's minority. In fact, complainant herself is not too
sure as to her exact age or as to when her mother died, as shown in
complainant's testimony:

TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q: Do you remember when you were born?
A: I was born on August 25, 1993, sir.
Q: Are you sure you are (sic) born in 1993 or 1983?
A: It is only now that I came to know that I was born on this date, it is that
woman who knows, sir.
Q: So you do not know the year you were born?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: Is your mother still living?
A: She is already deceased, sir.
Q: Can you recall in what year did she die?
A: I can't remember, sir.
Q: For how many years is she already dead?
A: For four years, sir. 29

We conclude that the victim's age, while alleged in the information, has not been
proven adequately. The failure of the prosecution to present the victim's birth
certificate or similarly acceptable proof of her age as a minor bars appellant's
conviction for rape in its qualified form.

30

He is guilty only of 2 counts of simple

rape, and the proper penalty is not death but only reclusion perpetua for each
count.
On the damages awarded, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of simple rape are in accord with
present jurisprudence. 31 However, the exemplary damages should be reduced to
P25,000.00 for each count of rape. The rationale behind exemplary damages is
to provide an example or correction for the public good and not to enrich the
victim. The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages provides a deterrent
against sexual abuse of young women by their fathers. 32

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, Branch 28, dated August 28, 1998, in Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6680 and
SC-6682, finding appellant Bonifacio San Agustin y Roslin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the sentence in each case is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jessebelle San Agustin, for each count of
rape the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

|||

(People v. San Agustin y Roslin, G.R. Nos. 135560-61, [January 24, 2001],
403 PHIL 93-112)

FULL TEXT CASE 17

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118985. June 14, 1999.]
COCA COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC., VICTORIANO HENSON
and

VICTOR

AQUINO, petitioners, vs.

JOSE

S. ROQUE, respondent.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners.
Victor W. Galang for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
In 1971, Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. hired respondent as a route helper, and in
1980, he was promoted to acting salesman. In 1982, respondent was reassigned
by petitioner Henson, his supervisor, to his former position due to the

accumulation of unremitted collections, a fact respondent denied. Due to this

incident, petitioner Henson initiated an administrative investigation and as a result
of such investigation, petitioner Coca-Cola ordered the summary dismissal of
herein respondent. Thereafter, petitioner Henson filed a criminal case for estafa
against respondent but was acquitted of the crime charged for failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Because of the acquittal, respondent, filed with
Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija a complaint for damages
against petitioner. After trial on the merits the court a quo ruled in favor of the
respondent and ordered herein petitioner to pay the respondent the amount of
P506,500.00 as actual damages representing salaries for four years of which the
respondent was deprived of, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and cost of suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision but substantially reduced the amount of damages awarded. Both
parties filed motions for reconsideration. Respondent questioned the reduction of
damages while petitioner claimed that the case was properly cognizable by the
labor arbiter and not the regular courts. Both motions were denied. Hence, this
petition for review.
The Court found petitioner's contentions without merits. Particularly, the Court
ruled that under the amendatory law, not every claim of an employee against an
employer

is

cognizable

by

the

labor

arbiter.

Contrary

to

petitioner's

contention, Republic Act 6715 did not overturn earlier decisions of the Court
drawing the line on which cases are within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and
those cognizable by the regular court. In the instant case, respondent claimed for
unpaid salaries and other benefits due to an employee. In addition, he claimed
damages basically on the sufferings, humiliations and embarrassments that he
and his family experienced during the pendency of the criminal case that
petitioner Coca-Cola initiated against him for estafa. Since resolving the issue
calls for the application of civil laws, the case is properly cognizable by the
regular courts. Anent the issue of damages, the Court ruled that the finding of
petitioner's bad faith in dealing with respondent necessarily entitled the latter to
moral and exemplary damages but should be reduced to P50,000.00 for moral
damages and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages. The award of P50,000.00 as

actual and compensatory damages must be deleted because there was no basis
for this award. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the challenged decision but
modified the amount of damages awarded.

SaCIAE

SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; JURISDICTION OF
THE LABOR ARBITER; NOT EVERY CLAIM OF AN EMPLOYEE AGAINST AN
EMPLOYER IS COGNIZABLE BY THE LABOR ARBITER; CASE AT BAR.
Under the amendatory law (R.A. No. 6715), not every claim of an employee
against an employer is cognizable by the labor arbiter. Contrary to petitioners'
contention, R. A. No. 6715, which amended the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter,
did not overturn earlier decisions of this Court drawing a line on which cases are
within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and those cognizable by the regular
courts. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, decided on August 10, 1994,
after the effectivity ofR.A. No. 6715, we said: "Not every dispute between an
employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC
can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The
jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is
limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, or other labor statutes, or their
collective

bargaining

agreements."

In

the

instant

case,

respondent Roque claimed for unpaid salaries and other benefits due to an
employee. In addition, he claimed damages basically on the sufferings,
humiliations and embarrassments that he and his family experienced during the
pendency of the criminal case that Coke Bottlers initiated against him for estafa.
Since resolving the issue calls for the application of civil laws, the case is properly
cognizable by the regular courts.
2. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; ACTUAL DAMAGES; TO BE RECOVERABLE,
MUST NOT ONLY BE CAPABLE OF PROOF, BUT MUST BE ACTUALLY
PROVED WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY; CASE AT BAR.

The additional P50,000.00 awarded as actual and compensatory damages must

be deleted. There is no basis for this award. True, indemnification for damages
comprehends not only the loss suffered, or actual damages ("damnum
emergens") but also the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, or
compensatory damages ("lucrum cessans"). To justify a grant of actual or
compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable
by the injured party, the actual amount of loss." "One is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has adequately
proved. Damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Speculative damages
are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of damages."
3. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2208 OF THE
CIVIL CODE, ATTORNEY'S FEES MAY BE RECOVERED WHEN EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES ARE AWARDED; CASE AT BAR. As regards the award of moral
damages, we modify the decision of the Court of Appeals by reducing the amount
to P50,000.00. There is enough showing that respondent Roque and his family
experienced physical sufferings, mental anguish and fright as a result of the
oppressive conduct of the petitioners. However, moral damages, though
incapable of pecuniary estimation are awarded to compensate the claimant for
actual injury, and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of the
defendant. Under the circumstances, we reduce the amount to a fair, just and
reasonable award.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., dissenting:
CIVIL LAW; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; THERE COULD BE NO CASE OF
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IF THE ACCUSED WAS ACQUITTED FOR
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. SinceRoque's acquittal was based on the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, there could then be
no case for malicious prosecution, much less under the Chapter on Human
Relations of the Civil, there being no showing of a violation of Article 19 of the

Civil Code. Bad faith is the only element relied upon the courts below, which is
not the whole of Article 19. Neither can petitioner be held liable for damages
under Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. In the former, the defendant must
wilfully or negligently cause damage to another in a manner contrary to law.
Article 21 involves causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. There is no finding that petitioner had so
acted in the ways mentioned in both Articles.

DECISION

PARDO, J :
p

What is before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 reducing substantially the amount of damages awarded to
petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, 2 as follows:

cdrep

"Accordingly, the defendants are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
following:
1. P12,500.00 representing his unpaid salaries for services rendered
from June 20, 1982 up to September 15, 1982;
2. P50,000.00 representing actual and compensatory damages;
3. P300,000.00 as moral damages;
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. P50,000.00 for attorney's fees and other miscellaneous expenses; and
6. to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED." 3

The facts of the case are not disputed.

In

1971, Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.,

Inc.

(Coke Bottlers,

for

brevity)

hired

respondent Jose Roque as a route helper. In 1980, he was promoted to acting

salesman.

In

June

1982,

Coke Bottlers Supervisor

Victoriano

Henson

reassigned Roqueto his former position as route helper due to the accumulation
of unremitted collections, a fact that Roque denied. Supervisor Henson initiated
an administrative investigation of Roque without giving him an opportunity to be
heard or to be represented by counsel. As a result of such unilateral investigation,
in October 1982, Coke Bottlers ordered the summary dismissal of Roque.

prcd

On March 23, 1983, Victoriano Henson filed with the City Fiscal, Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija, a criminal case for estafa against Roque. During the
preliminary investigation, Roque was unable to present evidence because the
fiscal sent notices to the wrong address.
On August 26, 1983, the City Fiscal filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29, Nueva Ecija, an information against Roque for
estafa. After due trial, the court rendered a decision 4 dated September 15, 1988,
acquittingRoque of the crime charged for failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On June 1, 1989, Jose S. Roque filed with the Regional Trial Court, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, a complaint for damages against Coke Bottlers. He
contended that for seven (7) years while the estafa case was being tried, he and
his entire family suffered tremendously and miserably, forcing them to the brink of
poverty, and causing them embarrassment and humiliation. 5

In its decision dated January 20, 1992, the trial court ruled in favor of Roque, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE,

judgment

is

hereby

rendered

condemning

the

defendants to pay jointly and severally the following amounts to the

plaintiff, to wit:

1. P506,500.00 as actual or compensatory damages representing

salaries for four (4) years of which plaintiff was deprived due to his
illegal dismissal, unrealized optional retirement benefits, unpaid
salaries, attorney's fees and other litigation expenses;
2. P1,000,000 as moral damages;
3. P50,000 as exemplary damages; and
4. costs of suit." 6

On February 3, 1992, Coke Bottlers filed a motion for reconsideration. However,

on February 11, 1992, the trial court denied the motion. 7
In due time, Coke Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Upon motion of plaintiff Roque, the trial court issued a writ of execution pending
appeal dated March 18, 1992, 8 which was partly enforced. Roque received the
sum of P506,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages, subject to the final
resolution of the appeal. 9
On August 24, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted in the opening paragraph of this opinion.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the decision. Roque questioned
the

reduction

of

the

damages

awarded

to

him

by

the

trial

court.

Coke Bottlers claimed that the case was properly cognizable by the labor arbiter
and not the regular courts.
On January 11, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied both motions for
reconsideration stating that no new and substantial reasons were raised to
warrant a reversal or modification of the decision. 10
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners raise the following issues:

prcd

1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, Nueva Ecija, has

jurisdiction over the case considering that the complaint is in

the nature of a claim for damages arising from and by virtue

of an employer-employee relationship;
2. Whether or not the petitioners were denied their right to due
process of law;
3. Whether or not the lower court erred in awarding damages for
malicious prosecution;
4. Whether or not the lower court erred in awarding actual
damages considering the same has no legal or evidentiary
basis;
5. Whether or not the lower court erred in granting respondent's
motion of execution pending appeal.
We shall now go over the issues in seriatim.
In the first assigned error, petitioners aver that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. They maintain that claims for actual, moral
and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relationship are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter, under Art. 217 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R. A. No. 6715. They contend that the amendment to
the Labor Code cured the earlier confusion as to the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the regular courts regarding claims for damages. According to
petitioners, all claims for damages by an employee against an employer fall
squarely within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. They argue that the
cases 11 relied upon by the Court of Appeals in deciding the jurisdictional issue
have been overturned by R.A. No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989.
They assert that the claim for damages arose from acts attributable to the
employer, while respondent was still an employee of the company. Hence, the
action for damages arose from an employer-employee relationship.

dctai

The petitioners' contentions are without merit. Even under the amendatory law
(R.A. No. 6715), not every claim of an employee against an employer is
cognizable by the labor arbiter. Contrary to petitioners' contention, R.A. No. 6715,

which amended the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter, did not overturn earlier
decisions of this Court drawing a line on which cases are within the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter and those cognizable by the regular courts. In Georg Grotjahn
GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, 12 decided on August 10, 1994, after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6715, we said:
"Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters
that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can be resolved
by reference to the Labor Code, or other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreements."

In the instant case, respondent Roque claimed for unpaid salaries and other
benefits due to an employee. In addition, he claimed damages basically on the
sufferings, humiliations and embarrassments that he and his family experienced
during the pendency of the criminal case that Coke Bottlers initiated against him
for estafa. Since resolving the issue calls for the application of civil laws, the case
is properly cognizable by the regular courts.
In his second assignment of error, petitioners claim a denial of due process. This
is also devoid of merit. The trial court observed that petitioners repeatedly failed
to appear both in the pre-trial hearings and the trial itself, without justifiable
reasons.

"The

essence

of

due

process

is

the

opportunity

to

be

heard." 13 Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side, but
they chose to ignore them. They can not very well claim that they were denied of
a right they had chosen to waive. Assuming arguendo that such right was denied,
petitioners subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's
decision. "Any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration."14

cdtai

In the third assignment of error, petitioners aver that the appellate court erred in
awarding damages to respondent due to malicious prosecution. The argument is
not tenable. Both the trial and appellate courts ruled that petitioners were liable

not due for malicious prosecution but for non-observance of conduct required of
every individual in human relations.

15

The trial court found petitioners to have

acted in wanton and gross bad faith and injustice in manipulating the dismissal of
respondent Roque, and in later on instigating a baseless criminal action against
him, thereby subjecting him and his family to penury. 16
In awarding damages to respondent, both the trial and appellate courts invoked
Articles 19, 21 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The finding of
petitioners' bad faith in dealing with respondent Roque necessarily entitles the
latter to moral and exemplary damages. 17
However, regarding the amount of P12,500.00 that the Court of Appeals awarded
as actual damages, there is no question that respondent Roque rendered
services from June 20, 1982 to September 15, 1982 and that his compensation
therefor was not paid. Thus, it is a matter of justice for petitioners to pay for
respondent's services duly rendered. The award of amounts representing
retirement and other benefits, including bonuses and pensions, is, indeed,
speculative and can not be granted. To be recoverable, actual damages must be
pleaded and proven in court. The award must be based on evidence presented,
not on flimsy, remote, speculative and insubstantial proof. 18
The additional P50,000.00 awarded as actual and compensatory damages must
be deleted. There is no basis for this award. True, indemnification for damages
comprehends not only the loss suffered, or actual damages ("damnum
emergens") but also the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, or
compensatory damages ("lucrum cessans"). 19 "To justify a grant of actual or
compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable
by the injured party, the actual amount of loss."

20

"One is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has adequately
proved. Damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Speculative damages
are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of damages." 21

As regards the award of moral damages, we modify the decision of the Court of
Appeals by reducing the amount to P50,000.00. There is enough showing that
respondent Roque and his family experienced physical sufferings, mental
anguish and fright as a result of the oppressive conduct of the petitioners.
However, moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation are awarded
to compensate the claimant for actual injury, and are not meant to enrich
complainant at the expense of the defendant. 22 Under the circumstances, we
reduce the amount to a fair, just and reasonable award.
As regards exemplary damages, "there can be no question that the entitlement to
moral damages having been established, exemplary damages may be
awarded . . . even though not so expressly pleaded in the complaint nor
proved." 23Pursuant to Art. 2208, Civil Code of the Philippines, attorney's fees
may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded.

24

An award of

P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees is just and reasonable.

Anent the fifth assignment of error, the Court of Appeals has noted that the grant
of execution pending appeal was properly raised in the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. No. 27750, decided on August 25, 1992.

25

The Court of Appeals held

that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal. That decision is final and constitutes "the law of the case." In
fact, that decision was the basis of partial payment made by CokeBottlers, which
was properly evidenced by a receipt. 26
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. CV No. 37438, with modification, as follows:

"Accordingly, the defendants are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to

pay plaintiff the following:
1. P12,500.00

representing

the

unpaid

salaries

of

Jose

S. Roque for services rendered from June 20, 1982 up to

September 15, 1982;

2. P50,000.00, as moral damages;

3. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
4. P50,000.00 for attorney's fees and other litigation expenses;
and
5. to pay the costs."

SO ORDERED.

prcd