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TodayisTuesday,November29,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.173473December17,2008
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,appellee,
vs.
BETHTEMPORADA,appellant.
DECISION
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
BeforeusforreviewistheFebruary24,2006Decision1oftheCourtofAppeals(CA),affirmingwithmodification
theMay14,2004Decision2oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofManila,Branch33,convictingaccusedappellant
Beth Temporada of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended,andfive(5)countsofestafaunderArticle315,par.(2)(a)oftheRevisedPenalCode(RPC).
Theantecedents,asfoundbytheappellatecourt,areasfollows:
From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita
Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant Beth Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and
Tours Corporation (ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants
RogelioLegaspi,Jr.astechnicianinSingapore,andSoledadAtle,LuzMinkay,EvelynEstacioandDennis
Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. The accused and appellant were then holding office at Dela
Rosa Street, Makati City but eventually transferred business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After
complainantshadsubmittedalltherequirementsconsistingoftheirrespectiveapplicationforms,passports,
NBI clearances and medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different dates, collected and
received from them placement fees in various amounts, viz: a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. 57,600.00 b)
from Dennis Dimaano P66,520.00 c) from Evelyn Estacio P88,520.00 d) from Soledad Atle
P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay P69,520.00. As none of them was able to leave nor recover the
amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal complaints against accused and appellant
before the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto
Mangalindan,Jr.filedsix(6)Informationsagainsttheaccusedandappellant,oneforIllegalRecruitmentin
LargeScaleunderArticle38(a)oftheLaborCodeasamended,andtherestforfive(5)countsofestafa
underArticle315paragraph2(a)oftheRevisedPenalCode.
TheInformationforlargescaleillegalrecruitmentreads:
CriminalCaseNo.02208371:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M. MIRANDA, BETH
TEMPORADA,NENITACATACOTANandJOJORESCOxxx.
That in or about and during the period comprised between the months of September 2001 and
January2002,inclusive,intheCityofManila,Philippines,thesaidaccused,representingthemselves
to have the power and capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyforafee,recruitandpromiseemploymenttoREGELIO
A. LEGASPI, JR., DENNIS T. DIMAANO, EVELEYN V. ESTACIO, SOLEDAD B. ATTE and LUZ
MINKAY without first having secured the required license from the Department of Labor and
Employmentasrequiredbylaw,andchargeoracceptdirectlyorindirectlyfromsaidcomplainant[s]
the amount of PH57,600.00, PH66,520.00, PH88,520.00, PH69,520.00, PH69,520.00, respectively,
asplacementfeesinconsiderationfortheiroverseasemployment,whichamountsareinexcessof
orgreaterthanthatspecifiedinthescheduledofallowablefeesprescribedofthePOEAandwithout
reasons and without fault of the said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to
reimbursethemtheexpensestheyincurredinconnectionwiththedocumentationandprocessingof
theirpapersforpurposesoftheirdeployment.
Contrarytolaw."
Except for the name of private complainant and the amount involved, the five (5) Informations for estafa
containsubstantiallyidenticalavermentsasfollows:
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CriminalCaseNo.02208372:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M. MIRANDA, BETH
TEMPORADA,NENITACATACOTANandJOJORESCOxxx.
That in or about and during the period comprised between November 23, 2001 and January 12,
2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestationsandfraudulentrepresentationswhichtheymadetosaidROGELIOA.LEGASPI,JR.,
prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that they have the
power and capacity to recruit and employ ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., as technician in Singapore
andcouldfacilitatetheprocessingofthepertinentpapersifgiventhenecessaryamounttomeetthe
requirements thereof, induced and succeeded in inducing said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., to give
and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P57,600.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and representations said accused well knowing that the same were
falseandfraudulentandweremadesolelyforthepurposeofobtaining,asinfacttheydidobtainthe
amountofP57,600.00,whichamount,onceintheirpossession,withintendtodefraud,theywillfully,
unlawfullyandfeloniouslymisappropriated,misappliedandconvertedthesametotheirownpersonal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR. in the aforesaid
amountofP57,000.00PhilippineCurrency.
Contrarytolaw."
Theotherfour(4)Informationsforestafainvolvethefollowingcomplainantsandamounts:
1.DENNIST.DIMAANO

P66,520.00

2.EVELYNV.ESTACIO

P88,520.00

3.SOLEDADB.ATLE

P69,520.00

4.LUZT.MINKAY

P69,520.003

Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the other accused remained at large. Upon arraignment,
appellantpleadednotguiltyandtrialonthemeritsensued.Afterjointtrial,onMay14,2004,theRTCrendered
judgmentconvictingappellantofallthecharges:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused Beth Temporada BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING the said accused, as principal of the
offenses charged and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment and the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
yearsandtwo(2)monthsofprisioncorrectionalasminimum,tonine(9)yearsandone(1)dayofprision
mayor, as maximum for the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr. the
indeterminatepenaltyoffour(4)yearsandtwo(2)monthsofprisioncorrectionalasminimumtoten(10)
years and one day of prision mayor as maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants,
DennisDimaano,SoledadB.AtteandLuzT.Minkayandtheindeterminatepenaltyoffour(4)yearsand
two(2)monthsofprisioncorrectionalasminimum,toeleven(11)yearsandone(1)dayofprisionmayoras
maximumfortheestafacommittedagainstEvelynEstacio.
Theaccusedisalsoorderedtopayjointlyandseverallythecomplainantsactualdamagesasfollows:
1.RogelioA.LegaspiJr.

P57,600.00

2.DennisT.Dimaano

66,520.00

3.EvelynV.Estacio

88,520.00

4.SoledadB.Atte

66,520.00

5.LuzT.Minkay

69,520.00

SOORDERED.4
In accordance with the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,5 this case was referred to the CA for intermediate
review.OnFebruary24,2006,theCAaffirmedwithmodificationtheDecisionoftheRTC:
WHEREFORE,withMODIFICATIONtotheeffectthatinCriminalCasesNos.02208373,02208375,&02
208376,appellantissentencedtosuffertheindeterminatepenaltyofsix(6)yearsofprision correccional
maximum,asminimum,toten(10)yearsandone(1)dayofprisionmayormaximum,asmaximumandin
CriminalCaseNo.02208374,sheissentencedtosuffertheindeterminatepenaltyofeight(8)yearsand

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one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporalminimum,asmaximum,theappealeddecisionisAFFIRMEDinallotherrespects.6
BeforethisCourt,appellantascribestheloneerrorthatthetrialcourtgravelyerredinfindingherguiltyofillegal
recruitmentandfive(5)countsofestafadespitetheinsufficiencyoftheevidencefortheprosecution.
We affirm the Decision of the CA, except as to the indeterminate penalties imposed for the five (5) counts of
estafa.
Article13(b)oftheLaborCodedefinesrecruitmentandplacementthusly:
ART.13.Definitions.xxx
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing,hiringorprocuringworkers,andincludesreferrals,contractservices,promisingoradvertisingfor
employment,locallyorabroad,whetherforprofitornot:Provided,Thatanypersonorentitywhich,inany
manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitmentandplacement.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid
licenseorauthorityrequiredbylawtoenablehimtolawfullyengageinrecruitmentandplacementofworkers(b)
the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article
13(b)oftheLaborCode,oranyoftheprohibitedpracticesenumeratedunderArticle34ofthesaidCode(now
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042) and, (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individuallyorasagroup.7
In the case at bar, the foregoing elements are present. Appellant, in conspiracy with her coaccused,
misrepresented to have the power, influence, authority and business to obtain overseas employment upon
payment of a placement fee which was duly collected from complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Dennis Dimaano,
Evelyn Estacio, Soledad Atle and Luz Minkay. Further, the certification8 issued by the Philippine Overseas
EmploymentAdministration(POEA)andthetestimonyofAnnAbastraAbas,arepresentativeofsaidgovernment
agency,establishedthatappellantandhercoaccuseddidnotpossessanyauthorityorlicensetorecruitworkers
foroverseasemployment.And,sincetherewerefive(5)victims,thetrialcourtcorrectlyfoundappellantliablefor
illegalrecruitmentinlargescale.
Appellant insists that she was merely an employee of ATTC and was just "echoing the requirement of her
employer." She further argues that the prosecution failed to prove that she was aware of the latters illegal
activities and that she actively participated therein. In essence, she controverts the factual findings of the lower
courts.
Thecontentionisuntenable.
Anemployeeofacompanyorcorporationengagedinillegalrecruitmentmaybeheldliableasprincipal,together
with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.9 Appellant
activelytookpartintheillegalrecruitmentofprivatecomplainants.RogelioLegaspitestifiedthatafterintroducing
herself as the General Manager of ATTC, appellant persuaded him to apply as a technician in Singapore and
assuredhimthattherewasajobmarkettherefor.InadditiontotheplacementfeeofP35,000.00whichhepaidto
accusedBernadetteMiranda,healsohandedtheamountofP10,000.00toappellantwho,inturn,issuedhima
receiptforthetotalamountofP45,000.00.Upontheotherhand,SoledadAtleandLuzMinkay,whoappliedas
factory workers in Hongkong through coaccused, Emily Salagonos, declared that it was appellant who briefed
them on the requirements for the processing of their application, and assured them and Dennis Dimaano of
immediatedeploymentforjobsabroad.Forherpart,EvelynEstaciotestifiedthatasidefromtheplacementfeeof
P40,000.00thatshepaidtocoaccused"Baby"Roblesinconnectionwithherpurportedoverseasemployment,
shealsogaveappellantP10,000.00forwhichshewasissuedareceiptfortheamountofP5,000.00.
The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an indispensable participant and effective
collaboratorofhercoaccusedintheillegalrecruitmentofcomplainants.AsaptlyfoundbytheCA:
Without doubt, all the acts of appellant, consisting of introducing herself to complainants as general
manager of ATTC, interviewing and entertaining them, briefing them on the requirements for deployment
and assuring them that they could leave immediately if they paid the required amounts, unerringly show
unityofpurposewiththoseofhercoaccusedintheirschemetodefraudprivatecomplainantsthroughfalse
promises of jobs abroad. There being conspiracy, appellant shall be equally liable for the acts of her co
accusedevenifsheherselfdidnotpersonallyreapthefruitsoftheirexecution.Wequotewithapprovalthe
trialcourtsfindingsonthematter:
"xxx It is clear that said accused conspired with her coaccused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles,
Bernadette M. Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, and Jojo Resco in convincing complainants xxx to apply
foroverseasjobsandgivingcomplainantsSoledadAtle,LuzMinkayandDennisDimaanoguarantee
that they would be hired as factory workers in Hongkong, complainant Rogelio Legaspi, as
TechnicianinSingaporeandEvelynEstacioasqualitycontrollerinafactoryinHongkong,despitethe
factthattheaccusedwasnotlicensedtodoso.
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It should be noted that all the accused were connected with the Alternative Travel and Tours
Corporation(ATTC).AccusedBethTemporadaintroducedherselfasATTCsGeneralManager.Saod
accused was also the one who received the P10,000.00 given by complainant Rogelio Legaspi, Jr.
andtheP10,000.00givenbycomplainantEvelynEstacioaspaymentfortheirvisaandplaneticket,
respectively."10
Consequently, the defense of appellant that she was not aware of the illegal nature of the activities of her co
accusedcannotbesustained.Besides,evenassumingarguendothatappellantwasindeedunawareoftheillegal
natureofsaidactivities,thesameishardlyadefenseintheprosecutionforillegalrecruitment.UnderTheMigrant
WorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995,aspeciallaw,thecrimeofillegalrecruitmentinlargescaleismalum
prohibitumandnotmaluminse.11 Thus, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary and the fact alone
thattheaccusedviolatedthelawwarrantsherconviction.12
Intheinstantcase,wefindnoreasontodepartfromtherulethatfindingsoffactofthetrialcourtonthecredibility
ofwitnessesandtheirtestimoniesaregenerallyaccordedgreatrespectbyanappellatecourt.Theassessmentof
credibilityofwitnessesisamatterbestlefttothetrialcourtbecauseitisinthepositiontoobservethatelusiveand
incommunicableevidenceofthewitnessesdeportmentonthestandwhiletestifying,whichopportunityisdenied
totheappellatecourts.13Further,thereisnoshowingofanyillmotiveonthepartoftheprosecutionwitnessesin
testifyingagainstappellant.Absentsuchimpropermotive,thepresumptionisthattheywerenotsoactuatedand
theirtestimonyisentitledtofullweightandcredit.
Section7(b)ofR.A.No.8042prescribesthepenaltyoflifeimprisonmentandafineofnotlessthanP500,000.00
normorethanP1,000,000.00forthecrimeofillegalrecruitmentinlargescaleorbyasyndicate.Thetrialcourt,
therefore,properlymetedthepenaltyoflifeimprisonmentandafineofP500,000.00ontheappellant.
Anenttheconvictionofappellantforfive(5)countsofestafa,we,likewise,affirmthesame.Wellsettledistherule
that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code may, for the same acts, be separately
convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.14 The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffereddamageorprejudicecapableofpecuniaryestimation.15Thesameevidenceprovingappellantscriminal
liabilityforillegalrecruitmentalsoestablishedherliabilityforestafa. As previously discussed, appellant together
with her coaccused defrauded complainants into believing that they had the authority and capability to send
complainants for overseas employment. Because of these assurances, complainants parted with their hard
earnedmoneyinexchangeforthepromiseoffutureworkabroad.However,thepromisedoverseasemployment
nevermaterializedandneitherwerethecomplainantsabletorecovertheirmoney.
While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that the CA erroneously
computed the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviated from the doctrine laid down in People v.
Gabres16 hence its decision should be reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The
reversal of the appellate courts Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate
penaltiesimposedbythetrialcourtbecausethemaximumterms,asdeterminedbythelatter,wereerroneously
computedandmustnecessarilyberectified.
TheprescribedpenaltyforestafaunderArticle315,par.2(d)oftheRPC,whentheamountdefraudedexceeds
P22,000.00, is prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the
penaltynextloweroranywherewithinprisincorreccionalminimumandmedium(i.e.,from6monthsand1day
to4yearsand2months).Consequently,theRTCcorrectlyfixedtheminimumtermforthefiveestafacasesat4
years and 2 months of prisin correccional since this is within the range of prisin correccional minimum and
medium.
Ontheotherhand,themaximumtermistakenfromtheprescribedpenaltyofprisincorreccionalmaximum to
prisinmayorminimuminitsmaximumperiod,adding1yearofimprisonmentforeveryP10,000.00inexcessof
P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the
prescribedpenaltyofprisincorreccionalmaximumtoprisinmayorminimum is not prisinmayorminimum as
apparentlyassumedbytheRTC.Tocomputethemaximumperiodoftheprescribedpenalty,prisincorreccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6517 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the
maximum period of prisincorreccionalmaximum to prisin mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years.18 The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
monthsand21daysto8years,atthediscretionofthecourt.19
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the
differenceshallbedividedbyP10,000.00.Anyfractionofayearshallbediscardedaswasdonestartingwiththe
case of People v. Pabalan20in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in
favor of the accused. The doctrine enunciated in People v. Benemerito21 insofar as the fraction of a year was
utilized in computing the total incremental penalty should, thus, be modified. In accordance with the above
procedure,themaximumtermoftheindeterminatesentencesimposedbytheRTCshouldbeasfollows:
InCriminalCaseNo.02208372,wheretheamountdefraudedwasP57,600.00,theRTCsentencedtheaccused
toanindeterminatepenaltyof4yearsand2monthsofprisincorreccionalasminimum,to9yearsand1dayof
prisinmayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be
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addedtothemaximumperiodoftheprescribedpenalty(oraddedtoanywherefrom6years,8monthsand21
daysto8years,atthediscretionofthecourt).Thelowestmaximumterm,therefore,thatcanbevalidlyimposed
is9years,8monthsand21daysofprisinmayor,andnot9yearsand1dayofprisinmayor.
InCriminalCaseNos.02208373,02208375,and02208376,wheretheamountsdefraudedwereP66,520.00,
P69,520.00,andP69,520.00,respectively,theaccusedwassentencedtoanindeterminatepenaltyof4yearsand
2monthsofprisincorreccionalasminimum,to10yearsand1dayofprisinmayorasmaximumforeachofthe
aforesaidthreeestafacases.SincetheamountsdefraudedexceedP22,000.00byP44,520.00,P47,520.00,and
P47,520.00,respectively,4yearsshallbeaddedtothemaximumperiodoftheprescribedpenalty(oraddedto
anywherefrom6years,8monthsand21daysto8years,atthediscretionofthecourt).Thelowestmaximum
term,therefore,thatcanbevalidlyimposedis10years,8monthsand21daysofprisinmayor,andnot10years
and1dayofprisinmayor.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02208374, where the amount defrauded was P88,520.00, the accused was
sentencedtoanindeterminatepenaltyof4yearsand2monthsofprisincorreccionalasminimum,to11years
and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P66,520.00, 6
years shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
monthsand21daysto8years,atthediscretionofthecourt).Thelowestmaximumterm,therefore,thatcanbe
validlyimposedis12years,8monthsand21daysofreclusintemporal,andnot11yearsand1dayofprisin
mayor.
Responsetothedissent.
In the computation of the indeterminate sentence for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code(RPC),theCourthasconsistentlyfollowedthedoctrineespousedinPabalanandmorefullyexplainedin
Gabres.ThedissentarguesthatGabresshouldbereexaminedandabandoned.
WesustainGabres.
I.
TheformulaproposedintheDissentingOpinionofMr.JusticeRubenT.Reyes,i.e.,themaximumtermshallfirst
becomputedbyapplyingtheincrementalpenaltyrule,andthereaftertheminimumtermshallbedeterminedby
descending one degree down the scale of penalties from the maximum term, is a novel but erroneous
interpretationoftheISLinrelationtoArticle315,par.2(a)oftheRPC.Underthisinterpretation,itisnotclearhow
the maximum and minimum terms shall be computed. Moreover, the legal justification therefor is not clear
because the meaning of the terms "penalty," "prescribed penalty," "penalty actually imposed," "minimum term,"
"maximumterm,""penaltynextlowerindegree,"and"onedegreedownthescaleofpenalties"arenotproperly
setoutandare,attimes,usedinterchangeably,looselyanderroneously.
Forpurposesofthisdiscussion,itisnecessarytofirstclarifythemeaningofcertaintermsinthesensethatthey
will be used from here on. Later, these terms shall be aligned to what the dissent appears to be proposing in
ordertoclearlyaddressthepointsraisedbythedissent.
TheRPCprovidesforaninitialpenaltyasageneralprescriptionforthefeloniesdefinedthereinwhichconsistsof
a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article
24922oftheRPC,theprescribedpenaltyforhomicideisreclusintemporal which ranges from 12 years and 1
day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances which
when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict.
This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is
committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty
under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court
chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed" on a
convict,i.e.,theprisontermhehastoserve.
Concretely,inU.S.v.Saadlucap,23apreISLcase,theaccusedwasfoundguiltyofhomicidewithaprescribed
penalty of reclusin temporal. Since there was one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstancesinthiscase,theimposablepenaltyisreclusintemporalinitsmaximumperiod,i.e.,from17years,
4monthsand1dayto20years.Thecourtthenhadthediscretiontoimposeanyprisontermprovideditiswithin
said period, so that the penalty actually imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusintemporal,24whichisasinglefixedpenalty,withnominimumormaximumterm.
With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of a minimum and maximum term
calledtheindeterminatesentence.25Section1oftheISLprovides
SECTION1.Hereafter,inimposingaprisonsentenceforanoffensepunishedbytheRevisedPenalCode,
oritsamendments,thecourtshallsentencetheaccusedtoanindeterminatesentencethemaximumterm
ofwhichshallbethatwhich,inviewoftheattendingcircumstances,couldbeproperlyimposedunderthe
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribedbytheCodefortheoffensexxx.
Thus,themaximumtermisthatwhich,inviewoftheattendingcircumstances,couldbeproperlyimposedunder
the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the preISL regime became the maximum term
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undertheISLregime.Upontheotherhand,theminimumtermshallbewithintherangeofthepenaltynextlower
to the prescribed penalty. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime, then the
maximum term would be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusintemporal and the minimum term could be
anywhere within the range of prisinmayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the penalty next lower to
reclusin temporal. Consequently, an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisin mayor as minimum to 17
years,4monthsand1dayofreclusintemporalasmaximumcouldhavepossiblybeenimposed.
Ifweusetheformulaasproposedbythedissent,i.e.,tocomputetheminimumtermbasedonthemaximumterm
aftertheattendingormodifyingcircumstancesareconsidered,thebasisforcomputingtheminimumterm,under
thisinterpretation,istheimposablepenalty26ashereinabovedefined.ThisinterpretationisatoddswithSection1
oftheISLwhichclearlystatesthattheminimumoftheindeterminatesentenceshallbe"withintherangeofthe
penaltynextlowertothatprescribedbytheCodefortheoffense."Consequently,thebasisforfixingtheminimum
termistheprescribedpenalty,27andnottheimposablepenalty.
InPeoplev.Gonzales,28theCourtheldthattheminimumtermmustbebasedonthepenaltyprescribedbythe
Codefortheoffense"withoutregardtocircumstancesmodifyingcriminalliability."29TheGonzalesrulingthatthe
minimum term must be based on the prescribed penalty "without regard to circumstances modifying criminal
liability"isonlyarestatementofSection1oftheISLthattheminimumtermshallbetakenfromwithintherange
ofthepenaltynextlowertotheprescribedpenalty(andfromnowhereelse).30
Further,thedissentproceedsfromtheerroneouspremisethatitssocalled"regularformula"hasgenerallybeen
followedinapplyingtheISL.Toreiterate,accordingtothedissent,the"regularformula"isaccomplishedbyfirst
determiningthemaximumtermafterconsideringalltheattendingcircumstancesthereafter,theminimumtermis
arrivedatbygoingonedegreedownthescalefromthemaximumterm.Aspreviouslydiscussed,thisessentially
means,usingthetermsasearlierdefined,thattheminimumtermshallbetakenfromthepenaltynextlowerto
theimposablepenalty(andnottheprescribedpenalty.)Inmoreconcretetermsandusingthepreviousexample
ofhomicidewithoneordinaryaggravatingcircumstance,thiswouldmeanthattheminimumtermforhomicidewill
nolongerbebasedonreclusintemporal(i.e.,theprescribedpenaltyforhomicide)butreclusintemporalinits
maximumperiod(i.e.,theimposablepenaltyforhomicidewithoneordinaryaggravatingcircumstance)somuch
sothattheminimumtermshallbetakenfromreclusintemporalinitsmediumperiod(andnolongerfromprisin
mayor) because this is the penalty next lower to reclusin temporal in its maximum period. The penalty from
which the minimum term is taken is, thus, significantly increased. From this example, it is not difficult to
discern why this interpretation radically departs from how the ISL has generally been applied by this
Court.Thedissents"regularformula"is,therefore,anythingbutregular.
Infine,the"regularformula"espousedbythedissentdeviatesfromtheISLandestablishedjurisprudenceandis,
thus,tantamounttojudiciallegislation.
II.
There is no absurdity or injustice in fixing or "stagnating" the minimum term within the range of prisin
correccionalminimumandmedium(i.e.,from6monthsand1dayto4yearsand2months).Preliminarily,itmust
beemphasizedthattheminimumtermtakenfromtheaforementionedrangeofpenaltyneednotbethesamefor
every case of estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P12,000.00. In People v. Ducosin,31 the Court
provided some guidelines in imposing the minimum term from the range of the penalty next lower to the
prescribedpenalty:
Wecomenowtodeterminethe"minimumimprisonmentperiod"referredtoinActNo.4103.Section1of
saidActprovidesthatthis"minimumwhichshallnotbelessthantheminimumimprisonmentperiodofthe
penaltynextlowertothatprescribedbysaidCodefortheoffense."32Wearehereuponnewground.Itisin
determiningthe"minimum"penaltythatActNo.4103confersuponthecourtsinthefixingofpenaltiesthe
widestdiscretionthatthecourtshaveeverhad.Thedeterminationofthe"minimum"penaltypresentstwo
aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum
imprisonmentperiodandsecond,thebroadquestionofthefactorsandcircumstancesthatshouldguide
thediscretionofthecourtinfixingtheminimumpenaltywithintheascertainedlimits.
xxxx
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty, namely, the
considerations which should guide the court in fixing the term or duration of the minimum period of
imprisonment.KeepinginmindthebasicpurposeoftheIndeterminateSentenceLaw"toupliftandredeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness" (Message of the GovernorGeneral, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3,
1933),itisnecessarytoconsiderthecriminal,first,asanindividualand,second,asamemberofsociety.
Thisopensupanalmostlimitlessfieldofinvestigationandstudywhichitisthedutyofthecourttoexplore
ineachcaseasfarasishumanlypossible,withtheendinviewthatpenaltiesshallnotbestandardizedbut
fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the
socialorder.
Consideringthecriminalasanindividual,someofthefactorsthatshouldbeconsideredare:(1)Hisage,
especiallywithreferencetoextremeyouthoroldage(2)hisgeneralhealthandphysicalcondition(3)his
mentality, heredity and personal habits (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and
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criminal record if any) (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral (6) his proclivities and
aptitudesforusefulnessorinjurytosociety(7)hisdemeanorduringtrialandhisattitudewithregardtothe
crimecommitted(8)themannerandcircumstancesinwhichthecrimewascommitted(9)thegravityof
theoffense(notethatsection2ofActNo.4103exceptscertaingravecrimesthisshouldbekeptinmind
inassessingtheminimumpenaltiesforanalogouscrimes).
Inconsideringthecriminalasamemberofsociety,hisrelationship,first,towardhisdependents,familyand
associates and their relationship with him, and second, his relationship towards society at large and the
State are important factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the
socialorganizationagainstthecriminalactsofdestructiveindividualsbutalsoinredeemingtheindividual
for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualizetheadministrationofourcriminallawtoadegreenotheretoforeknownintheseIslands.With
theforegoingprinciplesinmindasguides,thecourtscangivefulleffecttothebeneficentintentionofthe
Legislature.33
Admittedly, it is possible that the court, upon application of the guidelines in Ducosin, will impose the same
minimumtermtoonewhocommitsanestafainvolvingP13,000.00andanotherinvolvingP130million.Infact,to
a lesser degree, this is what happened in the instant case where the trial court sentenced the accused to the
same minimum term of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional in Criminal Case Nos. 02208372, 02
208373, 02208375, 02208376, and 02208374 where the amounts defrauded were P57,600.00, P66,520.00,
P69,520.00, P69,520.00 and P88,520.00, respectively. However, there is no absurdity and injustice for two
reasons.
One,whileitispossiblethattheminimumtermimposedbyacourtwouldbethesame,themaximumtermwould
be greater for the convict who committed estafa involving P130 million (which would be 20 years of reclusion
temporal) than the convict who swindled P13,000.00 (which could be anywhere from prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).34 Assuming that both
convictsqualifyforparoleafterservingthesameminimumterm,theconvictsentencedtoahighermaximumterm
wouldcarryagreater"burden"withrespecttothelengthofparolesurveillancewhichhemay be placed under,
andtheprisontermtobeservedincaseheviolateshisparoleasprovidedforinSections635and836oftheISL.
UnderSection6,theconvictshallbeplacedunderaperiodofsurveillanceequivalenttotheremainingportionof
the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of Pardon and
Paroles. Further, the convict with the higher maximum term would have to serve a longer period upon his re
commitmentinprisonincaseheviolateshisparolebecausehewouldhavetoservetheremainingportionofthe
maximum term, unless the Board of Pardon and Paroles shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the said
convictasprovidedforinSection8.
Although the differences in treatment are in the nature of potential liabilities, to this limited extent, the ISL still
preserves the greater degree of punishment in the RPC for a convict who commits estafa involving a greater
amount as compared to one who commits estafa involving a lesser amount. Whether these differences in
treatmentaresufficientinsubstanceandgravityinvolvesaquestionofwisdomandexpediencyofthe
ISLthatthisCourtcannotdelveinto.
Two, the rule which provides that the minimum term is taken from the range of the penalty next lower to the
prescribedpenaltyis,likewise,applicabletootheroffensespunishableundertheRPC.Forinstance,theminimum
term for an accused guilty of homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance visvis an accused guilty of
homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances would both be taken from prisin mayor the penalty
next lower to eclusion temporal. Evidently, the convict guilty of homicide with three ordinary aggravating
circumstancescommittedamoreperverseformofthefelony.Yetitispossiblethatthecourt,afterapplyingthe
guidelinesinDucosin,willimposeuponthelatterthesameminimumtermastheaccusedguiltyofhomicidewith
one generic mitigating circumstance. This reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis to most of the other
offenses punishable under the RPC. Should we then conclude that the ISL creates absurd results for these
offensesaswell?
In fine, what isperceived as absurd and unjust is actually the intent of the legislature to be beneficial to the
convict in order to "uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness."37 By the legislatures deliberate design, the range of
penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains fixed and only the range of penalty from which the
maximumtermistakenchangesdependingonthenumberandnatureoftheattendingcircumstances.Again,the
reason why the legislature elected this mode of beneficence to a convict revolves on questions of wisdom and
expediency which this Court has no power to review. The balancing of the States interests in deterrence and
retributivejusticevisvisreformationandreintegrationofconvictstosocietythroughpenallawsbelongstothe
exclusivedomainofthelegislature.
III.
People v. Romero,38 De Carlos v. Court of Appeals,39 Salazar v. People,40 People v. Dinglasan41 and, by
analogy,Peoplev.DelaCruz42donotsupporttheformulabeingproposedbythedissent.
TheinstantcaseinvolvesaviolationofArticle315,par.2(a)oftheRPC.43Thepenaltyforsaidviolationis

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ARTICLE315.Swindling(Estafa).Anypersonwhoshalldefraudanotherbyanyofthemeansmentioned
hereinbelowshallbepunishedby:
1st.Thepenaltyofprisincorreccionalinitsmaximumperiodtoprisinmayorinitsminimumperiod,ifthe
amountofthefraudisover12,000pesosbutdoesnotexceed22,000pesos,andifsuchamountexceeds
thelattersum,thepenaltyprovidedinthisparagraphshallbeimposedinitsmaximumperiod,addingone
yearforeachadditional10,000pesosbutthetotalpenaltywhichmaybeimposedshallnotexceedtwenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin
temporal,asthecasemaybe.xxx
In contrast, Romero, De Carlos, and Salazar involved violations of Article 315 of the RPC as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 168944 because: (1) the funds defrauded were contributed by stockholders or
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public, (2) the amount defrauded was greater than
P100,000.00,and(3)theestafawasnotcommittedbyasyndicate.Section1ofP.D.No.1689provides
Sec.1.AnypersonorpersonswhoshallcommitestafaorotherformsofswindlingasdefinedinArticle315
and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the
swindling(estafa)iscommittedbyasyndicateconsistingoffiveormorepersonsformedwiththeintention
ofcarryingouttheunlawfulorillegalact,transaction,enterpriseorscheme,andthedefraudationresultsin
the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
generalpublic.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusin
temporal to reclusin perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the prescribed penalty is reclusin temporal to reclusin perpetua, the minimum terms were taken from
prisinmayor,whichisthepenaltynextlowertotheprescribedpenalty.45Ascanbeseen,thesecasesinvolveda
different penalty structure that does not make use of the incremental penalty rule due to the amendatory law.
Thus,thecomparisonofthesecaseswithGabresisimproper.
Meanwhile, in Dinglasan, the felony committed was estafa through bouncing checks which is punishable under
Article315par.2(d)oftheRPCasamendedbyRepublicAct(RA)No.488546
Sec. 1. Section Two, Paragraph (d), Article Three hundred fifteen of Act Numbered Thirtyeight hundred
andfifteenisherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
"Sec. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneouslywiththecommissionofthefraud:
"(d)Bypostdatingacheck,orissuingacheckinpaymentofanobligationwhentheoffenderhadno
fundsinthebank,orhisfundsdepositedthereinwerenotsufficienttocovertheamountofthecheck.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three(3)daysfromreceiptofnoticefromthebankand/orthepayeeorholderthatsaidcheckhas
beendishonoredforlackorinsufficiencyoffundsshallbeprimafacieevidenceofdeceitconstituting
falsepretenseorfraudulentact."
andP.D.No.81847
Sec. 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be
punishedby:
1st. The penalty of reclusintemporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but not exceed
22,000pesos,andifsuchamountexceedsthelattersum,thepenaltyprovidedinthisparagraphshallbe
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed
reclusinperpetuaxxx(Emphasissupplied)
Here, the prescribed penalty of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum was increased to
reclusintemporalbytheamendatorylaw.Consequently,thepenaltynextlowertoreclusintemporalisprisin
mayorfromwhichtheminimumtermwastaken.Thisisthereasonforthehigherminimumterminthiscaseas
comparedtoGabres.Infact,DinglasanisconsistentwithGabres
Since the face value of Check No. 029021, for which appellant is criminally liable for estafa, exceeds
P22,000, the penalty abovecited must be "imposed in its maximum period, adding 1 year for each
additionalP10,000."PursuanttoPeoplevs.Hernando,G.R.No.125214,Oct.28,1999,anindeterminate
sentence shall be imposed on the accused, computed favorably to him. In this case, the indeterminate
sentenceshouldbecomputedbasedonthemaximumperiodofreclusintemporalasmaximum,whichis
from17years,4months,and1dayto20years.Theminimumperiodofthesentenceshouldbewithin
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thepenaltynextlowerindegreeasprovidedintheRevisedPenalCode,i.e.,prisinmayor,which
is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment. Considering that the excess of the fraud
committed,countingfromthebaseofP22,000,isonlyP4,400,whichislessthantheP10,000statedinP.D.
818,thereisnoneedtoaddoneyeartothemaximumpenaltyabovecited.48(Emphasissupplied)
AsinGabres,thepenaltynextlower(i.e.,prisinmayor)wasdeterminedwithoutconsideringinthemeantimethe
effectoftheamountdefraudedinexcessofP22,000.00ontheprescribedpenalty(i.e.,reclusintemporal).
Finally, Dela Cruz involved a case for qualified theft. The prescribed penalty for qualified theft is two degrees
higher than simple theft. Incidentally, the penalty structure for simple theft49 and estafa is similar in that both
felonies (1) requires that the prescribed penalty be imposed in its maximum period when the value of the thing
stolenortheamountdefrauded,asthecasemaybe,exceedsP22,000.00,and(2)providesforanincremental
penaltyof1yearimprisonmentforeveryP10,000.00inexcessofP22,000.00.Itshouldbepointedout,however,
that the prescribed penalty for simple theft is prisinmayor minimum and medium while in estafa it is lower at
prisincorreccionalmaximumtoprisinmayorminimum.
Being two degrees higher, the prescribed penalty for qualified theft is, thus, reclusin temporal medium and
maximum, while the minimum term is taken from the range of prisin mayor maximum to reclusin temporal
minimum,whichisthepenaltynextlowertoreclusintemporalmediumandmaximum.Thepenaltynextlowerto
the prescribed penalty is determined without first considering the amount stolen in excess of P22,000.00
consistentwithGabres.Infact,DelaCruzexpresslycitesGabres
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. Since the
penalty prescribed by law is reclusintemporal medium and maximum, the penalty next lower would be
prisinmayorinitsmaximumperiodtoreclusintemporalinitsminimumperiod.Thus,theminimumofthe
indeterminatesentenceshallbeanywherewithinten(10)yearsandone(1)daytofourteen(14)yearsand
eight(8)months.
The maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into consideration the attending
circumstances,couldbeproperlyimposedundertheRevisedPenalCode.Sincetheamountinvolvedin
the present case exceeds P22,000.00, this should be taken as analogous to modifying
circumstancesintheimpositionofthemaximumtermofthefullindeterminatesentence,notinthe
initial determination of the indeterminate penalty. (citing Gabres) Thus, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty in this case is the maximum period of reclusin temporal medium and maximum,
whichrangesfromeighteen(18)years,two(2)months,andtwentyone(21)daystotwenty(20)years,as
computedpursuanttoArticle65,inrelationtoArticle64oftheRevisedPenalCode.50(Emphasissupplied)
Clearly,noneofthesecasessupportstheDissentingOpinionsthesisthattheminimumtermshouldbe
computedbasedonthemaximumterm.Quitethecontrary,DinglasanandDelaCruzareconsistentwith
Gabres.
IV.
The argument that the incremental penalty rule should not be considered as analogous to a modifying
circumstancestemsfromtheerroneousinterpretationthatthe"attendingcircumstances"mentionedinSection1
oftheISLarelimitedtothosemodifyingcircumstancesfallingwithinthescopeofArticles13and14oftheRPC.
Section1oftheISLisagainquotedbelow
SECTION1.Hereafter,inimposingaprisonsentenceforanoffensepunishedbytheRevisedPenalCode,
oritsamendments,thecourtshallsentencetheaccusedtoanindeterminatesentencethemaximumterm
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
undertherulesofsaidCode,andtheminimumwhichshallbewithintherangeofthepenaltynextlower
tothatprescribedbytheCodefortheoffensexxx(Emphasissupplied)
TheplaintermsoftheISLshowthatthelegislaturedidnotintendtolimit"attendingcircumstances"asreferringto
Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature intended that the "attending circumstances" under the ISL be
limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it could have simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits other
modifyingcircumstancesoutsideofArticles13and14oftheRPCtobetreatedas"attendingcircumstances"for
purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasirecidivism under Article 16051 of the RPC. Under this
provision,"anypersonwhoshallcommitafelonyafterhavingbeenconvictedbyfinaljudgment,beforebeginning
to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony." This circumstance has been interpreted by the Court as a special
aggravatingcircumstancewherethepenaltyactuallyimposedistakenfromtheprescribedpenaltyinitsmaximum
periodwithoutregardtoanygenericmitigatingcircumstances.52Sincequasirecidivismisconsideredasmerelya
specialaggravatingcircumstance,thepenaltynextlowerindegreeiscomputedbasedontheprescribedpenalty
withoutfirstconsideringsaidspecialaggravatingcircumstanceasexemplifiedinPeoplev.Manalo53andPeople
v.Balictar.54
The question whether the incremental penalty rule is covered within the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances"undertheISLwasansweredintheaffirmativebytheCourtinGabreswhenitruledthereinthat
theincrementalpenaltyruleisanalogoustoamodifyingcircumstance.
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Article315oftheRPCpertinentlyprovides
ARTICLE315.Swindling(Estafa).Anypersonwhoshalldefraudanotherbyanyofthemeansmentioned
hereinbelowshallbepunishedby:
1st.Thepenaltyofprisincorreccionalinitsmaximumperiodtoprisinmayorinitsminimumperiod,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximumperiod,addingoneyearforeachadditional10,000pesosbutthetotalpenaltywhichmay
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penaltieswhichmaybeimposedandforthepurposeoftheotherprovisionsofthisCode,thepenalty
shallbetermedprisinmayororreclusintemporal,asthecasemaybe.xxx
Under Gabres, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is the prescribed penalty55 for estafa
when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 is effectively
consideredasaspecialaggravatingcircumstanceinthesensethatthepenaltyactuallyimposedshallbetaken
from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating circumstances.
Consequently, the penalty next lower in degree is still based on the prescribed penalty without in the meantime
consideringtheeffectoftheamountdefraudedinexcessofP22,000.00.
What is unique, however, with the aforequoted provision is that when the amount defrauded is P32,000.00 or
more, the prescribed penalty is not only imposed in its maximum period but there is imposed an incremental
penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. This incremental penalty rule is a special rule applicable to
estafaandtheft.Inthecaseofestafa,theincrementalpenaltyisaddedtothemaximumperiodoftheprescribed
penalty(ortoanywherefrom6years,8monthsand21daysto8years)atthediscretionofthecourt,inorderto
arriveatthepenaltyactuallyimposed(i.e.,themaximumterm,withinthecontextoftheISL).
This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any obstacle to interpreting it as
analogoustoamodifyingcircumstance,and,hence,fallingwithintheletterandspiritof"attendingcircumstances"
for purposes of the application of the ISL. Under the wording of the ISL, "attending circumstances" may be
reasonablyinterpretedasreferringtosuchcircumstancesthatareappliedinconjunctionwithcertainrulesinthe
CodeinordertodeterminethepenaltytobeactuallyimposedbasedontheprescribedpenaltyoftheCodefor
the offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially meets this standard. The circumstance is the amount
defrauded in excess of P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty actually
imposed.Atitscore,theincrementalpenaltyruleismerelyamathematicalformulaforcomputingthepenaltyto
be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as starting point. Thus, it serves the same function of
determining the penalty actually imposed as the modifying circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the
RPC,althoughthemannerbywhichtheformeraccomplishesthisfunctiondifferswiththelatter.Forthisreason,
the incremental penalty rule may be considered as merely analogous to modifying circumstances. Besides, in
caseofdoubtastowhethertheincrementalpenaltyrulefallswithinthescopeof"attendingcircumstances"under
theISL,thedoubtshouldberesolvedinfavorofinclusionbecausethisinterpretationismorefavorableto
theaccusedfollowingthetimehonoredprinciplethatpenalstatutesareconstruedstrictlyagainsttheStateand
liberallyinfavoroftheaccused.56Thus,eveniftheDissentingOpinionsinterpretationisgratuitouslyconceded
as plausible, as between Gabres and the dissents interpretation, Gabres should be sustained since it is the
interpretationmorefavorabletotheaccused.
V.
The claim that the maximum term should only be one degree away from the minimum term does not make
sensewithinthemeaningof"degrees"undertheRPCbecausetheminimumandmaximumtermsconsist
ofsinglefixedpenalties. At any rate, the point seems to be that the penalty from which the minimum term is
takenshouldonlybeonedegreeawayfromthepenaltyfromwhichthemaximumtermistaken.
Asageneralrule,theapplicationofmodifyingcircumstances,themajoritybeinggenericmitigatingandordinary
aggravatingcircumstances,doesnotresulttoamaximumtermfixedbeyondtheprescribedpenalty.Atmost,the
maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is taken
from the prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in this limited
sense,thedifferencewouldnaturallybeonlyonedegree.Concretely,inthecaseofhomicidewithoneordinary
aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken from reclusintemporal in its maximum period which is
withintheprescribedpenaltyofreclusintemporal,whiletheminimumtermistakenfromprisinmayorwhichis
thepenaltynextlowertoreclusintemporalhence,theonedegreedifferenceobservedbythedissent.
Incomparison,undertheincrementalpenaltyrule,themaximumtermcanexceedtheprescribedpenalty.Indeed,
atitsextreme,themaximumtermcanbeashighas20yearsofreclusintemporalwhiletheprescribedpenalty
remains at prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere within prisin correccional
minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental
penaltyruledeviatesfromtheaforestatedgeneralrule.57
However, it is one thing to say that, generally, the penalty from which the minimum term is taken is only one
degreeawayfromthepenaltyfromwhichthemaximumtermistaken,andcompletelyanotherthingtoclaimthat
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thepenaltyfromwhichtheminimumtermistakenshouldonlybeonedegreeawayfromthepenaltyfromwhich
themaximumtermistaken.
Theonedegreedifferenceismerelytheresultofageneralobservationfromtheapplicationofgenericmitigating
andordinaryaggravatingcircumstancesintheRPCinrelationtotheISL.NowheredoestheISLrefertotheone
degree difference as an essential requisite of an "attending circumstance." If the application of the incremental
penalty rule deviates from the onedegree difference, this only means that the law itself has provided for an
exceptionthereto.Verily,theonedegreedifferenceisamereconsequenceofthegenericmitigatingandordinary
aggravatingcircumstancescreatedbythelegislature.Thedifficultyofthedissentwiththedeviationfromitsso
calledonedegreedifferenceruleseemstoliewiththeinabilitytoviewthese"attendingcircumstances"asmere
artifacts or creations of the legislature. It does not make sense to argue that the legislature cannot formulate
"attending circumstances" that operate differently than these generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating
circumstances,andthat,expectedly,leadstoadifferentresultfromtheonedegreedifferenceforitwouldbeto
saythatthecreatorcanonlycreateonespecieofcreatures.Further,itshouldbereasonablyassumedthatthe
legislature was aware of these special circumstances, like the incremental penalty rule or privileged mitigating
circumstances,atthetimeitenactedtheISLaswellastheconsequenteffectsofsuchspecialcircumstanceson
theapplicationofsaidlaw.Thus,foraslongastheincrementalpenaltyruleisconsistentwiththeletterandspirit
of"attendingcircumstances"undertheISL,thereisnoobstacletoitstreatmentassuch.
VI.
Muchhasbeensaidabouttheleniency,absurdityandunjustnessoftheresultunderGabrestheneedtoadjust
theminimumtermoftheindeterminatepenaltytomakeitcommensuratetothegravityoftheestafacommitted
thedeterrenceeffectofastifferimpositionofpenaltiesandahostofothersimilarreasonstojustifythereversal
ofGabres.However,alltheserelatetopolicyconsiderationsbeyondthewordingoftheISLinrelationtotheRPC
considerationsthatifgiveneffectessentiallyseektorewritethelawinordertoconformtoonenotion(outofan
infinitenumberofsuchnotions)ofwisdomandefficacy,and,ultimately,ofjusticeandmercy.
This Court is not the proper forum for this sort of debate. The Constitution forbids it, and the principle of
separationofpowersabhorsit.TheCourtappliesthelawasitfindsitandnotashowitthinksthelawshouldbe.
Not too long ago in the case of People v. Veneracion,58 this Court spoke about the dangers of allowing ones
personal beliefs to interfere with the duty to uphold the Rule of Law which, over a decade later, once again
assumesmuchrelevanceinthiscase:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
requiredbylawtoexercisethedutiesoftheiroffice,thelawbecomesmeaningless.Agovernmentoflaws,
notofmenexcludestheexerciseofbroaddiscretionarypowersbythoseactingunderitsauthority.Under
this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personalbeliefs.59
VII.
Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna proposes an interpretation of the incremental penalty rule based on the phrases
"shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be" and "for the purpose of the other
provisionsofthisCode"foundinthelastsentenceofsaidrule,viz:
ARTICLE315.Swindling(Estafa).Anypersonwhoshalldefraudanotherbyanyofthemeansmentioned
hereinbelowshallbepunishedby:
1st.Thepenaltyofprisincorreccionalinitsmaximumperiodtoprisinmayorinitsminimumperiod,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximumperiod,addingoneyearforeachadditional10,000pesosbutthetotalpenaltywhichmay
beimposedshallnotexceedtwentyyears.Insuchcases,andinconnectionwiththeaccessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor orreclusin temporal, as the case may be. x x x
(Emphasissupplied)
While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be sustained because in construing penal statutes, as
between two reasonable60 but contradictory constructions, the one more favorable to the accused should be
upheld, which in this case is Gabres. The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent treatise on statutory
constructioninthiswise:
It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the
government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom
penaltiesaresoughttobeimposed.Thissimplymeansthatwordsaregiventheirordinarymeaningand
thatanyreasonabledoubtaboutthemeaningisdecidedinfavorofanyonesubjectedtoacriminal
statute.Thiscanonofinterpretationhasbeenaccordedthestatusofaconstitutionalruleunderprinciples
ofdueprocess,notsubjecttoabrogationbystatute.

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Therulethatpenalstatutesshouldbestrictlyconstruedhasseveraljustificationsbasedonaconcernfor
the rights and freedoms of accused individuals. Strict construction can assure fairness when courts
understandittomeanthatpenalstatutesmustgiveaclearandunequivocalwarning,inlanguagepeople
generally understand, about actions that would result in liability and the nature of potential penalties. A
numberofcourtshavesaid:
therulethatpenalstatutesaretobestrictlyconstruedisafundamentalprinciplewhichinour
judgment will never be altered. Why? Because the lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and
subjectsofmakingunmistakablyclearthoseactsforthecommissionofwhichthecitizenmaylosehis
lifeorliberty.Therefore,allthecanonsofinterpretationwhichapplytocivilstatutesapplytocriminal
statutes, and in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction] . The burden lies on the
lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their power, it is their duty to relieve the situation of all
doubts.
xxxx
Additionally,strictconstructionprotectstheindividualagainstarbitrarydiscretionbyofficialsandjudges.As
onejudgenoted:"thecourtsshouldbeparticularlycarefulthatthebulwarksoflibertyarenotoverthrown,in
ordertoreachanoffenderwhois,butperhapsoughtnottobe,shelteredbehindthem."
Butalso,foracourttoenforceapenaltywherethelegislaturehasnotclearlyandunequivocally
prescribeditcouldresultinjudicialusurpationofthelegislativefunction.Onecourthasnotedthat
the reason for the rule is "to guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not
withinthecontemplationofthelegislature."Thustherulerequiresthatbeforeapersoncanbepunishedhis
casemustbeplainlyandunmistakablywithinthestatutesoughttobeapplied.And,so,whereastatuteis
opentomorethanoneinterpretation,itisstrictlyconstruedagainstthestate.Courtsfurtherrationalizethis
applicationoftheruleofstrictconstructiononthegroundthatitwasnotthedefendantinthecriminalaction
whocausedambiguityinthestatute.Alongthesesamelines,courtsalsoassertthatsincethestatemakes
thelaws,theyshouldbemoststronglyconstruedagainstit.61(Emphasissuppliedcitationsomitted)
Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable interpretations, the
constructionwhichwouldimposealessseverepenaltywasadopted.62
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with respect to the indeterminate penalties
imposedonappellantforthefive(5)countsofestafa,towit:
(1)InCriminalCaseNo.02208372,theaccusedissentencedtoanindeterminatepenaltyof4yearsand2
months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor as
maximum.
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02208373, 02208375, and 02208376, the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminatepenaltyof4yearsand2monthsofprisincorreccionalasminimum,to10years,8months
and21daysofprisinmayorasmaximumforeachoftheaforesaidthreeestafacases.
(3)InCriminalCaseNo.02208374,theaccusedissentencedtoanindeterminatepenaltyof4yearsand2
monthsofprisin correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusin temporal as
maximum.
Inallotherrespects,theDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsisAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice

MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJustice

CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice

ADOLFOS.AZCUNA
AssociateJustice

DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA

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11/29/2016

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

G.R.No.173473

RUBENT.REYES
AssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice
ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
DecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
1CArollo,pp.121136.PennedbyAssociateJusticeRebeccadeGuiaSalvador,withAssociateJustices

AmelitaG.TolentinoandAuroraSantiagoLagman,concurring.
2PennedbyHon.ReynaldoG.Ros.
3CArollo,pp.121124.
4Id.at12526.
5G.R.Nos.14767887,July7,2004,433SCRA640.
6CArollo,p.135.
7Peoplev.Gamboa,G.R.No.135382,September29,2000,341SCRA451,458.
8Exhibits"A,""L,"and"L1."
9Peoplev.Cabais,G.R.No.129070,March16,2001,354SCRA553,561.
10CArollo,pp.910.
11Supranote7at462.
12Id.
13Peoplev.Guambor,G.R.No.152183,January22,2004,420SCRA677,683.
14Peoplev.Ballesteros,G.R.Nos.116905908,August6,2002,386SCRA193,212.
15Id.at213.
16335Phil.242(1997).
17ARTICLE65.RuleinCasesinWhichthePenaltyisNotComposedofThreePeriods.Incasesinwhich

thepenaltyprescribedbylawisnotcomposedofthreeperiods,thecourtsshallapplytherulescontainedin
theforegoingarticles,dividingintothreeequalportionsthetimeincludedinthepenaltyprescribed,and
formingoneperiodofeachofthethreeportions.
18Peoplev.Saley,G.R.No.121179,July2,1998,291SCRA715,753754.
19Id.at755.
20331Phil.64(1996).
21332Phil.710,730731(1996).
22ARTICLE249.Homicide.Anypersonwho,notfallingwithintheprovisionsofarticle246shallkill

anotherwithouttheattendanceofanyofthecircumstancesenumeratedinthenextprecedingarticle,shall
bedeemedguiltyofhomicideandbepunishedbyreclusintemporal.
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233Phil.437(1904).
24Id.at440.
25Thepenaltyisconsidered"indeterminate"becauseaftertheconvictservestheminimumterm,heorshe

maybecomeeligibleforparoleundertheprovisionsofActNo.4103,whichleavestheperiodbetweenthe
minimumandmaximumtermindeterminateinthesensethatheorshemay,undertheconditionssetoutin
saidAct,bereleasedfromservingsaidperiodinwholeorinpart.(Peoplev.Ducosin,59Phil.109,114
[1933])
26Intheotherportionsofthedissentthough,thereisalsotheimpressionthatthebasisisthepenalty

actuallyimposedashereinabovedefined.Whetheritistheimposablepenaltyorpenaltyactuallyimposed,
thedissentsinterpretationcontravenestheISLbecausetheminimumtermshouldbefixedbasedonthe
prescribedpenalty.
27SeeAquinoandGrioAquino,TheRevisedPenalCode,Vol.1,1997ed.,pp.772773Padilla,Criminal

Law:RevisedPenalCodeAnnotated,1988ed.,pp.211214.
2873Phil.549(1941).
29Id.at552.
30ThedissentcitesseveralcasestoestablishthatGonzaleshasnotbeenfollowedincasesoutsideof

estafa.Anexaminationofthesecasesrevealsthatthisassertionisinaccurate.
1.Sabangv.People,G.R.No.168818,March9,2007,518SCRA35Peoplev.Candaza,G.R.No.
170474,June16,2006,491SCRA280Peoplev.Concepcion,G.R.No.169060,February6,2007,
514SCRA660Peoplev.Hermocilla,G.R.No.175830,July10,2007,527SCRA296Peoplev.
Abulon,G.R.No.174473,August17,2007,530SCRA675.
Gonzaleswasappliedinthesecases.
2.Peoplev.Miranda,G.R.No.169078,March10,2006,484SCRA555Garcesv.People,G.R.No.
173858,July17,2007,527SCRA827belongstotheclassofcasesinvolvingaccessoriesand
accomplicesaswellasthefrustratedandattemptedstagesofafelony.
Strictlyspeaking,thesecasesdonotdeviatefromGonzales.Here,theprescribedpenaltyforthe
principalandconsummatedstage,respectively,shouldbemerelyviewedasbeingloweredbythe
propernumberofdegreesinordertoarriveattheprescribedpenaltiesforaccomplicesand
accessoriesaswellasthefrustratedandattemptedstagesofafelony.Inturn,fromtheseprescribed
penalties,theminimumtermisdeterminedwithoutconsideringinthemeantimethemodifying
circumstances,asinGonzales.
3.Garcesv.People,G.R.No.173858,July17,2007,527SCRA827belongstotheclassofcases
involvingprivilegedmitigatingcircumstances.
Thesecasesare,toacertainextent,anexceptiontotheruleenunciatedinGonzales.Here,the
prescribedpenaltyisfirstreducedbythepropernumberofdegreesduetotheexistenceofa
privilegedmitigatingcircumstance.Asthusreduced,thepenaltynextlowerindegreeisdetermined
fromwhichtheminimumtermistaken.Totheextentthattheprivilegedmitigatingcircumstance,asa
modifyingcircumstance,isfirstappliedtotheprescribedpenaltybeforethepenaltynextlowerin
degreeisdetermined,thesecasesdeviatefromGonzales.However,thisinterpretationisbasedon
thespecialnatureofaprivilegedmitigatingcircumstanceaswellastheliberalconstructionofpenal
lawsinfavoroftheaccused.Iftheprivilegedmitigatingcircumstanceisnotfirstappliedtothe
prescribedpenaltybeforedeterminingthepenaltynextlowerindegreefromwhichtheminimumterm
istaken,itmayhappenthatthemaximumtermoftheindeterminatesentencewouldbelowerthan
theminimumterm,orthattheminimumandmaximumtermwouldbothbetakenfromthesame
rangeofpenaltyabsurditiesthatthelawcouldnothaveintended.Thesespecialconsiderations
whichjustifiedadeviationfromGonzalesarenotpresentintheinstantcase.Aswillbeshownlater,
GabresisareasonableinterpretationoftheISLinrelationtoArticle315,par.2(a)oftheRPC,and
anycontraryinterpretationwouldbeunfavorabletotheaccused.
3159Phil.109(1933).
32ThiswordingofActNo.4103waslateramendedtothecurrentwording"minimumwhichshallbewithin

therangeofthepenaltynextlowertothatprescribedbytheCodefortheoffense"byActNo.4225.
33Supranote31at116118.
34Similarly,intheinstantcase,themaximumtermimposedontheaccusedincreasedastheamount

defraudedincreasedinthevariouscriminalcasesfiledagainstherasaconsequenceoftheincremental
penaltyrule.
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35Sec.6.EveryprisonerreleasedfromconfinementonparolebyvirtueofthisActshall,atsuchtimesand

insuchmannerasmayberequiredbytheconditionsofhisparole,asmaybedesignatedbythesaid
Boardforsuchpurpose,reportpersonallytosuchgovernmentofficialsorotherparoleofficershereafter
appointedbytheBoardofIndeterminateSentenceforaperiodofsurveillanceequivalenttotheremaining
portionofthemaximumsentenceimposeduponhimoruntilfinalreleaseanddischargebytheBoardof
IndeterminateSentenceashereinprovided.Theofficialssodesignatedshallkeepsuchrecordsandmake
suchreportsandperformsuchotherdutieshereunderasmayberequiredbysaidBoard.Thelimitsof
residenceofsuchparoledprisonerduringhisparolemaybefixedandfromtimetotimechangedbythe
saidBoardinitsdiscretion.Ifduringtheperiodofsurveillancesuchparoledprisonershallshowhimselfto
bealawabidingcitizenandshallnotviolateanyofthelawsofthePhilippineIslands,theBoardof
IndeterminateSentencemayissueafinalcertificateofreleaseinhisfavor,whichshallentitlehimtofinal
releaseanddischarge.
36Sec.8.WheneveranyprisonerreleasedonparolebyvirtueofthisActshall,duringtheperiodof

surveillance,violateanyoftheconditionsofhisparole,theBoardofIndeterminateSentencemayissuean
orderforhisrearrestwhichmaybeservedinanypartofthePhilippineIslandsbyanypoliceofficer.In
suchcasetheprisonersorearrestedshallservetheremainingunexpiredportionofthemaximum
sentenceforwhichhewasoriginallycommittedtoprison,unlesstheBoardofIndeterminateSentence
shall,initsdiscretion,grantanewparoletothesaidprisoner.
37Supranote31at117.
38G.R.No.112985,April21,1999,306SCRA90.
39G.R.No.103065,August16,1999,312SCRA397.
40G.R.No.149472,October15,2002,391SCRA162.
41G.R.No.133645,September17,2002,389SCRA71.
42383Phil.213(2000).
43Estafacommittedbyusingfictitiousname,orfalselypretendingtopossesspower,influence,

qualifications,property,credit,agency,businessorimaginarytransactions,orbymeansofothersimilar
deceits.
44EffectiveApril6,1980.
45SeeArticle61oftheRPC.
46EffectiveJune17,1967.
47EffectiveOctober22,1975.
48Supranote41at80.
49ARTICLE309.Penalties.Anypersonguiltyoftheftshallbepunishedby:

1.Thepenaltyofprisinmayorinitsminimumandmediumperiods,ifthevalueofthethingstolenis
morethan12,000pesosbutdoesnotexceed22,000pesosbutifthevalueofthethingstolen
exceedsthelatteramount,thepenaltyshallbethemaximumperiodoftheoneprescribedinthis
paragraph,andoneyearforeachadditionaltenthousandpesos,butthetotalofthepenaltywhich
maybeimposedshallnotexceedtwentyyears.Insuchcases,andinconnectionwiththeaccessory
penaltieswhichmaybeimposedandforthepurposeoftheotherprovisionsofthisCode,thepenalty
shallbetermedprisinmayororreclusintemporal,asthecasemaybe.xxx
50Supranote42at227228.
51ARTICLE160.CommissionofAnotherCrimeDuringServiceofPenaltyImposedforAnotherPrevious

OffensePenalty.Besidestheprovisionsofrule5ofarticle62,anypersonwhoshallcommitafelony
afterhavingbeenconvictedbyfinaljudgment,beforebeginningtoservesuchsentence,orwhileserving
thesame,shallbepunishedbythemaximumperiodofthepenaltyprescribedbylawforthenewfelony.
Anyconvictoftheclassreferredtointhisarticle,whoisnotahabitualcriminal,shallbepardonedatthe
ageofseventyyearsifheshallhavealreadyservedouthisoriginalsentence,orwhenheshallcompleteit
afterreachingsaidage,unlessbyreasonofhisconductorothercircumstancesheshallnotbeworthyof
suchclemency.
52SeePeoplev.Perete,111Phil.943,947(1961).
53G.R.No.L55177,February27,1987,148SCRA98,110.
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54G.R.No.L29994,July20,1979,91SCRA500,511.

Thedissentarguesthattheuseofquasirecidivismasanexampleofan"attendingcircumstance"whichis
outsidethescopeofArticle14oftheRPCisinappropriatebecausequasirecidivismissuigeneris.The
argumentisofftangent.ThepointissimplythatquasirecidivismisnotfoundunderArticle14oftheRPC
yetitistreatedasan"attendingcircumstance"forpurposesoftheapplicationoftheISLinrelationtothe
RPC.Hence,thereare"attendingcircumstances"outsidethescopeofArticles13and14oftheRPC.For
thesamereason,theincrementalpenaltyruleisaspecialruleoutsideofArticle14which,aswillbe
discussedlateron,servesthesamefunctionasmodifyingcircumstancesunderArticles13and14ofthe
RPC.SeealsoReyes,L.B.,TheRevisedPenalCode,14thed.,1998,p.766.
55ThecommonthreadintheRPCistofixtheprescribedpenaltyasthestartingpointfordeterminingthe

prisonsentencetobefinallyimposed.Fromtheprescribedpenalty,theattendingcircumstancesarethen
consideredinordertofinallyfixthepenaltyactuallyimposed.Further,thedesignationofaprescribed
penaltyismadeinindividualarticles,orprescribedpenaltiesareindividuallydesignatedinseparate
paragraphswithinasinglearticle.UnderArticle315,thepenaltyforestafawhentheamountdefraudedis
overP12,000.00butdoesnotexceedP22,000.00andwhensuchamountexceedsP22,000.00islumped
withinthesameparagraph.Thus,thepenaltyofprisincorreccionalmaximumtoprisinmayorminimum
maybereasonablyconsideredasthestartingpointforthecomputationofthepenaltyactuallyimposed,
andhence,theprescribedpenaltywhentheamountdefraudedexceedsP22,000.00.Aswillbediscussed
shortly,theamountdefraudedinexcessofP22,000.00maythenbetreatedasaspecialaggravating
circumstanceandtheincrementalpenaltyasanalogoustoamodifyingcircumstanceinordertoarriveat
thepenaltyactuallyimposedconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheISLinrelationtotheRPC.
56Peoplev.Ladjaalam,395Phil.1,35(2000).
57Casesinvolvingprivilegedmitigatingcircumstanceswould,likewise,deviatefromthisgeneralrulesince

themaximumtermwouldbetakenfromapenaltylowerthantheprescribedpenalty.Seenote13.
58G.R.Nos.11998788,October12,1995,249SCRA244.
59Id.at251.
60TheaforesaidphrasesarebroadenoughtojustifyMr.JusticeAzcunasinterpretation,however,theyare

vagueenoughnottoexcludetheinterpretationunderGabres.Thesaidphrasesmaybesoconstrued
withoutbeinginconsistentwithGabres.(SeeArticles90and92oftheRPC)
613SutherlandStatutoryConstruction59:3(6thed.)
62Id.citingBuzzardv.Commonwealth,134Va.641,114S.E.664(1992).
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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