50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the

1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.
Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other
cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the
said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued
that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free
election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC
justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the
president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there
being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it
is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution.
The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left
to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had
shown such acquiescence.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections case digest (Consti-1)

Occena vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further
than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon
A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers.
The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the
Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed,
respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973
Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,

dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this
Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote
of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even
be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest
that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With
such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also
be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts
were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that.
What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a
positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors
Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring
what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also
sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot
be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this
character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since
then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point
is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

PLANAS VS. COMELEC

49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the
president issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On
November 29, 1972 the Convention approved its proposed constitution. The next day
the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people for ratification or rejection the
proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification. On December
7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No.
73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the
Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of free and open debate on the
proposed constitution. On December 23, the president announced the postponement of
the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the
petitioners filed for an urgent motion praying that the case be decided as soon as
possible.

ISSUES:
1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed
constitution?
HELD:
The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of
cases decided by the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the
1935 Constitution which expressly provides for the authority of the Court to review
cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself was declared moot and
academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment as long as it
is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus Cogens.

Aglipay v. Ruiz - A case digest

GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested
Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the
Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater
part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be
prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held / Ruling:
There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and

Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we

were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in
weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step
taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official
act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without
pronouncement as to costs.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the

BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and
the Cordilleras
COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General
Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE:
Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.

FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23,
1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was
reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990.
Allegations of Sanidad:
1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press
2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press
bause of its penal provsions in case of violation
Responses of COMELEC
-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the

press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and
regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646
-Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning
for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against
the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null
and void and unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons:
1. It has no statutory basis
2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression
for no justifiable reason
3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students
-vsErmita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator
National Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr.

-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in
which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in
compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening
one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the

constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the
Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of
other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and of the
Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands would be
prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the
citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy
sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool
to demarcate the countrys maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC
emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided
under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a longtime negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for
the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the
treatythe role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522
resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA
9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime
space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is
consistent with the Philippines sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part

of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated
that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the
legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been
claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other
hand they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the
nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance
with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions
delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal
waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the
right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to
nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines
exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal
or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with
its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles
of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies
concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside
the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit
its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If
the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine
the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in
order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for
its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in

the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the countrys
case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36409

October 26, 1973

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M.
Lantin and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit
from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the

very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process, 1 a contention she would
premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo. 2 If such a ground were far
from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she would deny the
applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was constructed
within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the wellsettled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in
effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise
therein administrative jurisdiction. To state the proposition is to make patent how much it
is tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be affirmed with
the sole modification that she is given thirty days from the finality of a judgment to obtain
a permit, failing which, she is required to demolish the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: The accused
bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one
in its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she
was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayors office, as well as by her
neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not necessary for the construction
of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the
City Engineers Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the
Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the
accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for
interrogation. After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscals Office. 3 The City Court of
Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964
and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The
Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of
violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of
P200.00 and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on
constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of
her dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution of
January 29, 1973, noting the constitutional question raised, certified the case to this
Court.
There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law for
the stand taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are devoid of
authority to require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v. Municipality of
Cebu, 4 decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much too

late in the day to contend that such a requirement cannot be validly imposed. Even
appellant, justifiably concerned about the unfavorable impression that could be created
if she were to deny that such competence is vested in municipal corporations and
chartered cities, had to concede in her brief: If, at all; the questioned ordinance may be
predicated under the general welfare clause . 5 Its scope is wide, well-nigh all
embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals, public safety, and the
well being and good order of the community. 6
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exercise
is violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned, or at the very
least, its applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is
settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process question may
indeed be raised in view of what for her is its oppressive character. She is led to such a
conclusion, relying on People v. Fajardo. 7 A more careful scrutiny of such a decision
would not have led her astray, for that case is easily distinguishable. The facts as set
forth in the opinion follow: It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of
defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines
Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: 1.
Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. 2. A fee of
not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each
repair permit issued. 3. [Penalty]-Any violation of the provisions of the above, this
ordinance, shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than
P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the
discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies
any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or
house. . Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired,
he and his son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent
municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on
a parcel of land registered in Fajardos name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek . On January 16, 1954, the request was
denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view
or beauty of the public plaza . On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their
request for a building permit , but again the request was turned down by the mayor.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. 8
Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A
conviction therefore for a violation thereof both in the justice of the peace court of Baao,
Camarines Sur as well as in the Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this

case, on the contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps
aware of such a crucial distinction, she would assert in her brief: The evidence showed
that even if the accused were to secure a permit from the Mayor, the same would not
have been granted. To require the accused to obtain a permit before constructing her
house would be an exercise in futility. The law will not require anyone to perform an
impossibility, neither in law or in fact: . 9 It would be from her own version, at the very
least then, premature to anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an
ordinance which certainly lends itself to an interpretation that is neither oppressive,
unfair, or unreasonable. That kind of interpretation suffices to remove any possible
question of its validity, as was expressly announced in Primicias v. Fugoso. 10 So it
appears from this portion of the opinion of Justice Feria, speaking for the Court: Said
provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila
is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of
a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit
which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latters reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view
to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must
adopt the second construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to
mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but
only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public
places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. 11 If, in a
case affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to assembly, this Court could
construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid offending against a
constitutional provision, there is nothing to preclude it from a similar mode of approach
in order to show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance requiring a permit.
Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement in the Fajardo
opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context, considering the admitted oppressive
application of the challenged measure in that litigation. So much then for the contention
that she could not have been validly convicted for a violation of such ordinance. Nor
should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate twice, once from the City Court
and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The reason is obvious. Such ordinance
applies to her.
2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel
concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the
only thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with
controlling and authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval bases
of a foreign country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases may be

cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of

sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. 13 As was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: By the
Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a
matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated
its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty,
the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of
such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not
granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact
of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the
treaty. 14 There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: Nothing is better
settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern
therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of
its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive.
If it were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty. 15 Then came this paragraph
dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: It is to be admitted any state may, by its
consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may
thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, is
the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal selfdetermination and self-restriction. A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the
exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. 16 The opinion was at pains to
point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights,
not its disappearance. The words employed follow: Its laws may as to some persons
found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not
precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such
areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of
the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. 17
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted and
unjustified, from what is settled and orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of
plausibility to the contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were
otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason as a matter of comity, courtesy,

or expediency becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely

domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national security, the MilitaryBases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed becomes a
mockery and an illusion. Nor does appellants thesis rest on less shaky foundation by
the mere fact that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national
government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called
administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation. Within the limits of its territory,
whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual
authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national
government, not to an alien country. What is even more to be deplored in this stand of
appellant is that no such claim is made by the American naval authorities, not that it
would do them any good if it were so asserted. To quote from Acierto anew: The
carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting
parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by the treaty comes within the
United States jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is a matter
about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words, the rights granted to
the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and cannot be raised by the
offender. 18 If an accused would suffer from such disability, even if the American armed
forces were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege, what is there for appellant to take hold
of when there is absolutely no showing of any alleged grant of what is quaintly referred
to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough, to make
manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is AFFIRMED insofar as it
found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is
required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a
period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required
permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring
demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13250

October 29, 1971

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent.
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin,
(O.S.G.) for petitioner.
Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or
at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international
personality, must be satisfied for a foreign country to fall within the exemption of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for adjudication. The
Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus reversed the
action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos
Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira,
liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the
transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish
national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her
death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the
assumption that the need for resolving the principal question would be obviated,
referred the matter back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged
law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section
122. Then came an order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation
of Tangier that would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not
until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision. When the petition
for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an
element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was held by
this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the foreign country

possess an international personality to come within its terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to

affirm.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background
facts as follows: This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de
Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing
against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal
properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano
Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for
short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a
resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time
of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the
Philippines. 3 Then came this portion: On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a
provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria
Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment
for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48 and
P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner .
On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed wherein intangible personal
properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted from taxes. On
November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for
estate and inheritance taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84,
respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 . In a letter dated January 11, 1956,
respondent denied the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is
not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent
demanded the payment of the sums of P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise
penalties . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the
following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the
claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the
25% and 5% ad valorem penalties . However, respondent denied request, in his
letter dated May 5, 1956 and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent
premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which
was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent
demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a
total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges,
interests and compromise penalties. 4
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute
between the parties regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical

correctness of the deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with
the reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that
Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122. In ruling against
the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: In
fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression foreign country, used in the last
proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of
that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of
international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of
our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such
taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our
Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of
Section 122 of our Tax. Code. 5
Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly
submitted, but as above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question, this Court,
on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the question of reciprocity and sent back
the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive
portion of such resolution reads as follows: While section 122 of the Philippine Tax
Code aforequoted speaks of intangible personal property in both subdivisions (a) and
(b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to bienes muebles situados en Tanger, bienes
muebles radicantes en Tanger, movables and movable property. In order that this
Court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal
tax exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time
being, going into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is
[remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or proof on
whether or not the words `bienes muebles, movables and movable properties as used
in the Tangier laws, include or embrace intangible person property, as used in the Tax
Code. 6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence
submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits
of laws of Tangier to the effect that the transfers by reason of death of movable
properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including furniture and personal effects as well as
of securities, bonds, shares, , were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to the
payment of any death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the deceased or
his heirs and legatees. It was further noted in an order of such Court referring the
matter back to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the
case on September 9, 1963. Respondent presented no evidence. 7
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: That no tax shall be collected under this Title in
respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax

or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines
not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer
taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned
by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country. 8 The only obstacle
therefore to a definitive ruling is whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner
the acquisition of internal personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being
considered a foreign country. Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in
the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is
required in line with Pounds formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an
organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by
common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general
welfare. 11 Correctly has it been described by Esmein as the juridical personification of
the nation. 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on
its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it
and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a
territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area
a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order
and to enter into international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international
law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner
has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of
this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was
specifically held by us: Considering the State of California as a foreign country in
relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that
the Ancillary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the inheritance tax on the
intangible personal property found in the Philippines. 17 There can be no doubt that
California as a state in the American Union was in the alleged requisite of international
personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 18

What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to
the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion
of the Court by the then Acting Chief Justice Bengson who thereafter assumed that
position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 19 As was
therein noted: The Board found from the documents submitted to it proof of the laws
of Liechtenstein that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes
on intangible property of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the
Board declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or
inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtenstein when
he passed away. 20 Then came this definitive ruling: The Collector hereafter named
the respondent cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court,
holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident
foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the
principle mobilia sequuntur personam. Such property is admittedly taxable here.
Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene
would be concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our
Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such that demand
reciprocity as in this case. And the exemption must be honored. 21
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30,
1957 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs.

00 Phil. 468 Political Law Two-fold Function of the Government Constituent vs

Ministrant Functions
Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court
in Manila. During the pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the
parties, National Coconut Corporation or NACOCO, requested said stenographers for
copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Bacani et al complied with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to
said counsel their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation
paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcripts at the rate of
P1 per page.
However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said
amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice. It was expressed

that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees
in question. Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the
purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO set up as a defense
that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers
fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.
HELD: No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the
status of being part of the government because they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it
was organized with the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States and of providing Facilities for
the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products , a
function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry,
it was, however, given a corporate power separate and distinct from our
government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far
as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections
2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518 the law creating NACOCO). It may sue and be
sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an
entity different from our government.
The Supreme Court also noted the constituent functions of the government.
Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature. According to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, they are as
follows:
1. The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from
violence and robbery.
2. The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and
children.
3. The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
4. The determination of contract rights between individuals.
5. The definition and punishment of crime.
6. The administration of justice in civil cases.

7. The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.

8. Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external
danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
On the other hand, ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way of
advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. The most important
of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and
safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles to
consider whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions
are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private
capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things
which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is
any private individual or group of individuals.

Sevilla vs. CAFACTS:

A contract by and between Noguera and Tourist World Service (TWS), represented by Canilao, wherein
TWSleased the premises belonging to Noguera as branch office of TWS. When the
branch office was opened, it was runby appellant Sevilla payable to TWS by any airline
for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Sevilla, 4% was togo to Sevilla and 3% was
to be withheld by the TWS.Later, TWS was informed that Sevilla was connected with
rival firm, and since the branch office was losing, TWS considered closing down its
office.On January 3, 1962, the contract with appellee for the use of the branch office
premises was terminatedand while the effectivity thereof was January 31, 1962, the
appellees no longer used it. Because of this, Canilao, thesecretary of TWS, went
over to the branch office, and finding the premises locked, he padlocked the
premises.When neither appellant Sevilla nor any of his employees could
enter, a complaint was filed by the appellants against the appellees. TWS
insisted that Sevilla was a mere employee, being the branch manager of its branch
office and thatshe had no say on the lease executed with the private respondent,
Noguera.
ISSUE:
W/N ER-EE relationship exists between Sevilla and TWS
HELD:
The records show that petitioner, Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private
respondent TWS. In thef i r s t p l a c e , u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t o f l e a s e , s h e
ha d bo und her sel f in s olidum a s an d fo r r ental pa ym en ts ,
a n arrangement that would belie claims of a master-servant relationship. That does not make her an
employee of TWS,since a true employee cannot be made to part with his own
money in pursuance of his employers business, or otherwise, assume any liability
thereof.In the second place, when the branch office was opened, the same was run
by the appellant Sevilla payableto TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the

effort of Sevilla. Thus, it cannot be said that Sevilla was underthe control of TWS. Sevilla in
pursuing the business, relied on her own capabilities.It is further admitted that Sevilla was
not in the companys payroll. For her efforts, she retained 4% in commissions
from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to TWS. Unlike an employee, who earns
a fixed salary,she earned compensation in fluctuating amount depending on her booking
successes. The fact that Sevilla had been designated branch manager does
not make her a TWS employee. It appears that Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent
herself, and she acquired an interest in the business entrusted toher. She also had
assumed personal obligation for the operation thereof, holding herself
solidary liable for thepayment of rentals.Wherefore, TWS and Canilao are jointly and
severally liable to indemnify the petitioner, Sevilla.

U.S. vs. Dorr (Case Digest)

SEPTEMBER 9, 2014MISSDENNIEIDEA LEAVE A COMMENT
G.R. 1051 May 19, 1903
U.S. v. Dorr

FACTS:
1. Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of writing,
publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against the Government of the U.S.
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in violation of Section
8, Act 292 of the Commission.
2. The alleged libel was published in Manila Freedom issue dated 06 April 1902
as an editorial issue.
3. The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to important
Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity).
The following are part of the article:

the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over
a set of men who should be in jail or deportedxxxthis kind of foolish work that the
Commission is doing all over the Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning
down the men who have during struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.

The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos who are
alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character.

it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil
Commission are rotten and corruptxxx.

4. Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense against it.
However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the policy of the CC,
the complaint in question cannot be regarded as having a tendency to produce
anything like what may be called disaffection or a state of feeling incompatible
with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
5. There is a question as how the term the Insular Government of the Phil.
Islands, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as the existing law and
institutions of the Islands or the aggregate of the individuals by whom the
government of the Islands is administered?

ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the Art. 292
for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government of the Phil.
Island?

RULING:
1. In modern political science, the term government is defined as the institution
or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rulesxxxthe government is the aggregation of authorities
which rule a society (administration).[1]
2. On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term government is used in
an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing political

system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines that it is in this sense that
the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under consideration.
3. Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of Insular of the Government of the Phil.
Islands is the government as a system, however, the article in questions
attacks the government as the aggregate of public officials who run it.
4. The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the
governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced
in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of men who are
entrusted with the administration of the government which the writer wants to
bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and private morals and
wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not constitute any seditious
tendency being apparent to be in violation of Art. 292.
Respondents are acquitted.

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical
assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac
car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car
provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it
to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place
within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at P17,912.34 and that his
income tax would be P2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he
sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale
took place in foreign soil since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside
the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by
nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income
tax?
HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern
therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of
its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the
Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagans assertion. The Base has not
become foreign soil or territory. This countrys jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not
excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that
the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases this is just a matter of comity, courtesy

and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his
income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US
source hence taxable.
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
Carpio, J.
Facts:
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates
t h e N i n o y A q u i n o International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under
Executive Order No. 903
(MIAAC h a r t e r ) , a s a m e n d e d . A s s u c h o p e r a t o r , i t a d m i n i s t e r s t h e l a n
d , i m p r o v e m e n t s a n d equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the
Office of the Government CorporateCounsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to
the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the
exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21of its Charter. Thus,
MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it
receivedFinal Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and buildings.At the
instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No. 061,pointing
out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to
showproof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA
Charter is the proof thatMIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus,
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque
from imposing real estate tax on, levying against,and auctioning for public sale the
airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of
time.Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt
from realestate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the
principle thatthe government cannot tax itself as a justification for exemption, since the
airport lands andbuildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by
the Republic of thePhilippines. On the other hand, the City of Paraaque
invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, whichexpressly withdrew
the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and controlledcorporations
(GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC.It asserts that an international airport is not
among the exceptions mentioned in thesaid law. Meanwhile, the City of
Paraaque posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of
the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduledpublic auction,
MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the auctions a l e .
The Co ur t is sue d a TR O on th e da y of th e auc ti on sa le, ho we ve r,
t h e s a m e w a s received only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estatetax?
Held:
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed
bylocal governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax

any real propertyowned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be
read in relation
with Sec.1 3 3 ( o ) o f t h e L G C , w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e e x e r c i s e o
f t h e t a x i n g p o w e r s o f l o c a l governments shall not extend to the
l e v y o f t a x e s , f e e s o r c h a r g e s o f a n y k i n d o n t h e National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities.
VELMONTE VS BALMONTE170 SCRA 256Facts:Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano
Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of
theopposition members of (the) BatasangPambansa who were able to secure a clean
loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs.Imelda Marcos" and also to "be
furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.
Expenses inconnection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious
legal implications, President & General Manager FelicianoBelmonte, Jr. referred the
letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it
is his opinion"that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIShas a duty to its customers
to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach
thisconfidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not
having yet received the reply of the GovernmentService and Insurance System (GSIS)
Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure
toreceive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our
desiredobjective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte,O
swaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, LeoObligar, Jun Gutierrez, Rey
naldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed
a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke theirright to
information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of
the names of the BatasangPambansa membersbelonging to the UNIDO and PDP
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to
furnish petitioners with certifiedtrue copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for
thesubject information.Issue:Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the formerFirst Lady
Imelda Marcos toBatasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDPLaban politicalparties.Held:The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government
and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programsfor the benefit of
the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b)
and 46of PD 1146, asamended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions,premiums, interest and

other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the

obligations which theRepublic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage itsresources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and
regulations. Thus, one of the
reasonsthat prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as amended) was the n
ecessity "to preserve at all times the actuarialsolvency of the funds administered by the
Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano
Belmontehimself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure thatthese funds are
managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the
insured governmentemployees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriatedfunds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks
with the greatest degreeof fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum,
the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the publicoffice held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern. Still, Belmontemaintains that a confidential relationship exists between the
GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentialityrestricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law
granting the GSIS the privilegeof confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the
present petition. His position is apparently based merely onconsiderations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and
not what thelaw should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of the government,and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon75 Phil 113Feria, J.FactsThe respondent
judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceeding of
civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of
thePhilippines. He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had
the effectof invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the
courts of the saidgovernments. He also argued that the said governments during the
Japanese occupation were notde facto governments.IssueWhether or not the
governments established in the Philippines under the names of PhilippinesExecutive
Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupationor
regime were de facto governments.HeldThe Supreme Court held that the Philippine
Executive Commission which was organized byOrder No. 1 by the Commander of the
Japanese forces, was a civil government established by themilitary forces of occupation
and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The sourceof its authority
comes from the Japanese military, it is a government imposed by the laws of war.The

same is true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently established and organized
as asovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people,
was, in truth andreality, a government established by the Japanese forces of
occupation.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO(G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986)FACTS:
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
1 announcingthat she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquinogovernment assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed througha direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New ArmedForces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realmof politics where only the people are the judge.The Court further held
that:1.The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entirecountry;
2.
It is not merely a
de facto
government but in fact and law a
de jure
government; and
3.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.