Andal vs Macaraig

FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal
and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of
donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis
in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm.
Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime
in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias father
until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral.
On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1,
1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born
within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was
seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes
absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable;
and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt
violation of prison regulations. Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than the
husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and
wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the
owner of the parcel land.

Macadangdang vs. CA

FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967 she
allegedly had intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the
affair, she and her husband separated in 1967.
October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) she gave
birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on
December 24, 1967.
April 25, 1972 Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Rolando.
February 27, 1973 lower court dismissed the complaint.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor
Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration
was filed but it was denied.
ISSUE:

WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the
spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. YES

HELD:

In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on
the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified but not the veracity of
the states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship
(Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but
it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the
certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and
statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by
proof recognized by law.
The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the court
of appeals that Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony
of the wife which is self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence.
Judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of
evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.
Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress
Art. 257: Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception
of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her
husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if
it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband.
For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case
During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there
was no concrete or substantial proof that was presented to establish physical
impossibility of access between Elizabeth and Crispin.
Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is
still the possibility of access to one another.
The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse and seven
months from the separation of the spouses.
Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate
child of the spouses. (note the baby was not premature). This presumption becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access
between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child.
The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual
union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception.
In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of
the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not disproved.

Policy of law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of
the husband at the time of the conception was not impossible and there is the
presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and legitimate even though
the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception.

JANICE MARIE JAO VS CA

FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against
Perico V. Jao. Jao denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was
in due course conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not
have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for
reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared the child the
offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could have
been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no
showing of irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention
and reversed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to
prove paternity.
RULING:
Yes. SC denied the petition for review.
Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test.
Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping
tests has been recognized as early as the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity
was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests
stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father
of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that the child must have
been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert
cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his
opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and
circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is
the father of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three
decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother
and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents;
but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the
mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly
be that of the alleged father.
In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove nonpaternity has already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood
tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were
drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question of
paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood
grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with

the mother within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the
competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject
such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.

De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon

Facts:
Jinkie and Jacqueline are the legitimate children of spouses Danilo and Carolina.
However, they were acknowledged as an illegitimate children by Juan in a notarized
document. Juan died.
Issue:
Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from
him.
Ruling:
No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having been first
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo and Carolina in a
valid marriage.