TodayisWednesday,August03,2016
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.167571November25,2008
LUISPANAGUITON,JR.,petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICE,RAMONC.TONGSONandRODRIGOG.CAWILI,respondents.
DECISION
TINGA,J.:
ThisisaPetitionforReview1oftheresolutionsoftheCourtofAppealsdated29October2004and
21March2005inCAG.R.SPNo.87119,whichdismissedLuisPanaguiton,Jr.'s(petitioner's)petition
forcertiorariandhissubsequentmotionforreconsideration.2
Thefacts,asculledfromtherecords,follow.
In1992,RodrigoCawili(Cawili)borrowedvarioussumsofmoneyamountingtoP1,979,459.00from
petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson),
jointlyissuedinfavorofpetitionerthree(3)checksinpaymentofthesaidloans.Significantly,allthree
(3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18
March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the
account.PetitionermadeformaldemandstopaytheamountsofthechecksuponCawilion23May
1995anduponTongsonon26June1995,buttonoavail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counteraffidavit.6 Tongson claimed
thathehadbeenunjustlyincludedaspartyrespondentinthecasesincepetitionerhadlentmoneyto
Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili
andinappreciationofhisservices,hewas
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associateinfact,hehimselfhadfiledseveralcriminalcasesagainstCawiliforviolationofB.P.Blg.
22.Tongsondeniedthathehadissuedthebouncedchecksandpointedoutthathissignaturesonthe
saidcheckshadbeenfalsified.
Tocountertheseallegations,petitionerpresentedseveraldocumentsshowingTongson'ssignatures,
whichwerepurportedlythesameasthethoseappearingonthechecks.7Healsoshowedacopyof
anaffidavitofadverseclaimwhereinTongsonhimselfhadclaimedtobeCawili'sbusinessassociate.8
Inaresolutiondated6December1995,9CityProsecutorIIIEliodoroV.Larafoundprobablecause
only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the
propercourt.Inaletterresolutiondated11July1997,10afterfindingthatitwaspossibleforTongson
to cosign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submittedduringthepreliminaryinvestigation,ChiefStateProsecutorJovencitoR.Zuodirectedthe
CityProsecutorofQuezonCitytoconductareinvestigationofthecaseagainstTongsonandtorefer
thequestionedsignaturestotheNationalBureauofInvestigation(NBI).
Tongsonmovedforthereconsiderationoftheresolution,buthismotionwasdeniedforlackofmerit.
On15March1999,AssistantCityProsecutorMa.LelibetS.Sampaga(ACPSampaga)dismissedthe
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution.Inherresolution,11ACPSampagaheldthatthecasehadalreadyprescribedpursuantto
ActNo.3326,asamended,12whichprovidesthatviolationspenalizedbyB.P.Blg.22shallprescribe
after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)year period started on the date the checks were
dishonored,oron20January1993and18March1993.ThefilingofthecomplaintbeforetheQuezon
CityProsecutoron24August1995didnotinterrupttherunningoftheprescriptiveperiod,asthelaw
contemplatesjudicial,andnotadministrativeproceedings.Thus,consideringthatfrom1993to1998,
more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover,
ACPSampagastatedthattheorderoftheChiefStateProsecutortoreferthemattertotheNBIcould
nolongerbesanctionedunderSection3,Rule112oftheRulesofCriminalProcedurebecausethe
initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP
SampagafoundthatTongsonhadnodealingswithpetitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16
PetitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationoftheDOJresolution.On3April2003,17theDOJ,this
timethroughthenUndersecretaryMa.MerceditasN.Gutierrez,ruledinhisfavoranddeclaredthat
the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
interruptedtherunningoftheprescriptiveperiodcitingIngcov.Sandiganbayan.18Thus,theOfficeof
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against
Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an
information20chargingpetitionerwiththree(3)countsofviolationofB.P.Blg.22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsiderationfiledbyTongson,ruledthatthesubjectoffensehadalreadyprescribedandordered
"thewithdrawalofthethree(3)informationsforviolationofB.P.Blg.22"againstTongson.Injustifying
itssuddenturnabout,theDOJexplainedthatActNo.3326appliestoviolationsofspecialactsthatdo
notprovideforaprescriptiveperiodfortheoffensesthereunder.SinceB.P.Blg.22,asaspecialact,
doesnotprovidefortheprescriptionoftheoffenseitdefinesandpunishes,ActNo.3326appliestoit,
and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court
ruledthattheproceedingsreferredtoinActNo.3326,asamended,arejudicialproceedings,andnot
theonebeforetheprosecutor'soffice.
Petitionerthusfiledapetitionforcertiorari25beforetheCourtofAppealsassailingthe9August2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's
failuretoattachaproperverificationandcertificationofnonforum
shopping.TheCourtofAppealsalsonotedthatthe3April2003resolutionoftheDOJattachedtothe
petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
resolution,attachingtosaidmotionanamendedVerification/CertificationofNonForumShopping.27
Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the
formalrequirementswouldnotpersewarrantareconsiderationofitsresolution.Besides,theCourtof
Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantialtorequireconsideration.28
Intheinstantpetition,petitionerclaimsthattheCourtofAppealscommittedgraveerrorindismissing
hispetitionontechnicalgroundsandinrulingthatthepetitionbeforeitwaspatentlywithoutmeritand
thequestionsaretoounsubstantialtorequireconsideration.
TheDOJ,initscomment,29statesthattheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrindismissingthepetitionfor
noncompliancewiththeRulesofCourt.ItalsoreiteratesthatthefilingofacomplaintwiththeOffice
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violationofB.P.Blg.22.ItarguesthatunderB.P.Blg.22,aspeciallawwhichdoesnotprovideforits
ownprescriptiveperiod,offensesprescribeinfour(4)yearsinaccordancewithActNo.3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to
petitionerandtheState,violatedtheirconstitutionalrighttospeedydispositionofcases.30
Thepetitionismeritorious.
Firstonthetechnicalissues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a
matterofspeculation.HepointsoutthatthisCourthasheldinanumberofcasesthatadeficiencyin
theverificationcanbeexcusedordispensedwith,thedefectbeingneitherjurisdictionalnoralways
fatal.31
Indeed,theverificationismerelyaformalrequirementintendedtosecureanassurancethatmatters
which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadingsoractonthemandwaivestrictcompliancewiththerulesinorderthattheendsofjustice
maybeserved,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent
verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification
requirement.
PetitioneralsosubmitsthattheCourtofAppealserredindismissingthepetitiononthegroundthat
therewasfailuretoattachacertifiedtruecopyorduplicateoriginalofthe3April2003resolutionof
theDOJ.Weagree.Aplainreadingofthepetitionbeforethe
CourtofAppealsshowsthatitseekstheannulmentoftheDOJresolutiondated9August2004,33a
certifiedtruecopyofwhichwasattachedasAnnex"A."34Obviously,theCourtofAppealscommitted
agrievousmistake.
Now,onthesubstantiveaspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that
the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that
sustainingtheDOJ'sandtheCourtofAppeals'pronouncementswouldresultingraveinjusticetohim
sincethedelaysinthepresentcasewereclearlybeyondhiscontrol.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
ViolationsofSpecialActsandMunicipalOrdinancesandtoProvideWhenPrescriptionShallBegin,is
thelawapplicabletooffensesunderspeciallawswhichdonotprovidetheirownprescriptiveperiods.
Thepertinentprovisionsread:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribeinaccordancewiththefollowingrules:(a)xxx(b)afterfouryearsforthosepunished
byimprisonmentformorethanonemonth,butlessthantwoyears(c)xxx
Sec.2.Prescriptionshallbegintorunfromthedayofthecommissionoftheviolationofthelaw,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicialproceedingsforitsinvestigationandpunishment.
Theprescriptionshallbeinterruptedwhenproceedingsareinstitutedagainsttheguiltyperson,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
WeagreethatAct.No.3326appliestooffensesunderB.P.Blg.22.AnoffenseunderB.P.Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
yearorbyafine,hence,underActNo.3326,aviolationofB.P.Blg.22prescribesinfour(4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discoverythereof.Nevertheless,wecannotupholdthepositionthatonlythefilingofacasein
courtcantolltherunningoftheprescriptiveperiod.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigationofcriminaloffenseswasconductedbyjusticesofthepeace,thus,thephraseologyinthe
law,"institutionofjudicialproceedingsforitsinvestigationandpunishment,"39andtheprevailingrule
atthetimewasthatonceacomplaintisfiledwiththejusticeofthepeaceforpreliminaryinvestigation,
theprescriptionoftheoffenseishalted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was
approvedon4December1926atatimewhenthefunctionofconductingthepreliminaryinvestigation
ofcriminaloffenseswasvestedinthejusticesofthepeace.Thus,theprevailingruleatthetime,as
showninthecasesofU.S.v.Lazada42andPeoplev.Joson,43isthattheprescriptionoftheoffense
istolledonceacomplaintisfiledwiththejusticeofthepeaceforpreliminaryinvestigationinasmuch
asthefilingofthecomplaintsignifiesthe
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our
declarationinPeoplev.ParaoandParao45thatthefirststeptakenintheinvestigationorexamination
of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.46Subsequently,inPeoplev.Olarte,47weheldthatthefilingofthecomplaintintheMunicipal
Court,evenifitbemerelyforpurposesofpreliminaryexaminationorinvestigation,should,anddoes,
interrupttheperiodofprescriptionofthecriminalresponsibility,evenifthecourtwherethecomplaint
or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
representtheinitialstepoftheproceedingsagainsttheoffender,48andhence,theprescriptiveperiod
shouldbeinterrupted.
InIngcov.Sandiganbayan49andSanrioCompanyLimitedv.Lim,50whichinvolvedviolationsofthe
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No.
8293),whicharebothspeciallaws,theCourtruledthatthe
prescriptiveperiodisinterruptedbytheinstitutionofproceedingsforpreliminaryinvestigationagainst
theaccused.InthemorerecentcaseofSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionv.InterportResources
Corporation,etal.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by
the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another
speciallaw,isequivalenttothepreliminaryinvestigationconductedbytheDOJincriminalcases,and
thuseffectivelyinterruptstheprescriptiveperiod.
ThefollowingdisquisitionintheInterportResourcescase53isinstructive,thus:
Whileitmaybeobservedthattheterm"judicialproceedings"inSec.2ofActNo.3326appears
before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in setup
wherebytheinvestigationofthechargeforpurposesofprosecutionhasbecometheexclusive
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
executiveorjudicialincharacter:executivewhenitinvolvestheinvestigationphaseandjudicial
when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
shouldbesufficienttotollprescription.54
Indeed,toruleotherwisewoulddeprivetheinjuredpartytherighttoobtainvindicationonaccountof
delaysthatarenotunderhiscontrol.55Aclearexamplewouldbethiscase,whereinpetitionerfiled
hiscomplaintaffidaviton24August1995,wellwithinthefour(4)yearprescriptiveperiod.Helikewise
timelyfiledhisappealsandhismotionsforreconsiderationonthedismissalofthechargesagainst
Tongson.Hewentthroughtheproperchannels,withintheprescribedperiods.However,fromthetime
petitionerfiledhiscomplaintaffidavitwiththeOfficeoftheCityProsecutor(24August1995)uptothe
time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active
prosecutionofthecaseasearlyas24August1995,onlytosuffersetbacksbecauseoftheDOJ'sflip
floppingresolutionsanditsmisapplicationofActNo.3326.Aggrievedparties,especiallythosewho
do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's
delayingtacticsorthedelayandinefficiencyoftheinvestigatingagencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint
affidavitbeforetheOfficeoftheCityProsecutoron24August1995signifiedthecommencementof
the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
periodfortheoffensestheyhadbeenchargedunderB.P.Blg.22.Moreover,sincethereisadefinite
finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impedimenttothefilingoftheinformationagainstpetitioner.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheresolutionsoftheCourtofAppealsdated29October
2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of
Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDEREDtoREFILEtheinformationagainstthepetitioner.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
CONCHITACARPIOMORALES PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice
ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice
ATTESTATION
IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecase
wasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,andtheDivisionChairperson'sAttestation,itis
herebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethe
casewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
Footnotes
1Rollo,pp.1127.
2Id.at2829.TheresolutionswerepennedbyAssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillo,with
AssociateJusticesRomeoA.BrawnerandMagdangalM.DeLeon,concurring.
3Id.at3031ComplaintAffidavit.
4Id.
5AnActPenalizingtheMakingorDrawingandIssuanceofaCheckWithoutSufficientFundsor
CreditandforOtherPurposes.
6Rollo,pp.3540.
7Id.at4552AffidavitofAdverseClaim,AffidavitofWithdrawalofAdverseClaim,Complaint
Affidavit.
8Id.at4546.
9Id.at5355.
10Id.at5657.
11Id.at5862.
12ActtoEstablishPrescriptionforViolationsofSpecialActsandMunicipalOrdinancesandto
ProvideWhenPrescriptionShallBegin.
13Rollo,pp.5960.
14Id.at60Nevertheless,itappearsthatareinvestigationofthecasewasconductedforthe
purposeofreferringthequestionedsignaturesofTongson.However,petitionerwasunableto
presentthecorrespondingdocuments,particularlytheoriginalcopiesthereof,thatcouldbe
referredtotheNBItorebutTongson'sdefenseofforgery.
15Id.
16Id.at6365.
17CArollo,pp.5969.
18G.R.No.102342,3July1992,211SCRA277.
19Rollo,pp.6676.
20DocketedasI.S.No.9512212.
21PerletteroftheOfficeoftheClerkofCourt,MetropolitanTrialCourtofQuezonCitydated10
July2003,informingpetitionerofthefilingoftheinformationcharginghim"forviolationof
B.P.Blg.22((3)counts),andrequiringhimtopayfilingfees.Id.at77.
22Id.at7883.
23Rollo,p.79.
24Supranote18.
25CArollo,pp.216.
26Rollo,p.28.
27CArollo,pp.7986.
28Id.at29.
29Id.at106126.
30Id.at130140.
31Id.at19.CitingShipsideIncorporatedv.CourtofAppeals,20February2001,352SCRA334,
andCommissionerofInternalRevenuev.LaSuerteCigarandCigaretFactory,4July2002,384
SCRA117.
32Sps.Hontiverosv.RTC,Br.25,IloiloCity,368Phil.653,666(1999).
33CArollo,p.2.Thethirdparagraphofthepetitionreads:
ThisisaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule65ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.Petitioner
seekstheannulmentoftheResolutionoftheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)dated9August
2004,whichwasrenderedinexcessofjurisdictionofwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackorexcessofjurisdiction.
34CArollo,pp.1721.Petitionerthuscompliedwiththerequirementthatthepetition"shallbe
accompaniedbyaclearlylegibleduplicateoriginalorcertifiedtruecopyofthejudgment,order,
resolution,orrulingsubjectthereof."(Rule46,Sec.3oftheRevisedRulesofCourtofthe
Philippines)
35Supranote18.
36338Phil.1061(1997).
37Rollo,p.22.
38Id.at23.
39ActNo.3326,Sec.2.
40Peoplev.Joson,46Phil.509(1924).
41SeeConcurringOpinion,Tinga,J.SecuritiesandExchangeCommissionv.Interport
ResourcesCorporation,etal.,G.R.No.135808,6October2008.
429Phil.509(1908).
4346Phil.380(1924).
449Phil.509,511(1908).
4552Phil712(1929).
46Id.at715.
4719Phil.494(1967).
48Id.at500.
49338Phil.1061(1997).
50G.R.No.168662,19February2008,546SCRA303.
51Supranote39.
52PresidentialDecreeNo.178.
53ConcurringOpinion,Tinga,J.inSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionv.InterportResources
Corporation,etal.,supranote39.
54Id.
55Peoplev.Olarte,19Phil.494,500(1967).
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
