LABOR CASES FOR FINALS

CASE 1: Sarmiento vs. Tuico, G.R. No. 75271-73, June 27,1988

FACTS:

Asian Transmission Corporation (ACT) terminated the services of Sarmiento,

vice-president of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU) for allegedly
carrying a deadly weapon in company premises. BATU filed a notice of strike, claiming
that ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. When the conciliatory conference
failed to settle the dispute, ATC filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the matter or to certify the same to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The MOLE did the latter on the ground that the
impending strike impending strike would prejudice national interest. It also enjoined
the management from locking out the employees and the union from declaring a strike.
MOLE then directly assumed jurisdiction and enjoined the company to accept all
returning workers (return-to-work order). This decision was set aside but later re-
adopted in a resolution, ordering the company to reinstate the employees on payroll
immediately. ATC challenged the resolution through certiorari.

Meanwhile, three criminal complaints were filed against petitioning workers by

an officer of ATC and by the Philippine Constabulary. They were charged with staging an
illegal strike, barricading ATC’s gates and preventing entry of workers through
harassment and force (violation of the Labor Code, coercion). Judge Tuico issued a
warrant of arrest and committed them to jail. The petitioners moved for the lifting of the
warrant and referral of the charges to the NLRC. Later they moved for the dismissal of
the criminal cases on the ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the
NLRC.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the NLRC
pending determination of the legality of the strike
2. Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of certain
persons involved in the strike may be validly restrained

RULING
1. YES. Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides that when a labor dispute is likely to cause
strikes adversely affecting national interest, the Minister of Labor and Employment shall
assume jurisdiction over the dispute or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. This shall have the effect of enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout, and all striking or locked out employees shall immediately
return to work and the employer shall readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. ACT is an export-oriented enterprise
that generates millions of dollars per year and employs 350 workers. Disruption in
operations will cause delay in exports, possible cancellation of contracts with foreign
importers, and will hamper the government’s economic recovery program and will
affect the livelihood of 350 families. Furthermore, the return-to-work order confers an
obligation, not a mere waivable right.
When the remaining workers refused to comply with the order and defiantly picketed to
prevent resumption of operations, they forfeited their right to be readmitted. They
abandoned their positions and could be validly replaced. The return-to-work order is
enforced pending the determination of the legality/illegality of the strike to maintain
the status quo. Otherwise, strikers can claim their strike is legal and cause a standstill in
the company operations while retaining their positions and claiming money for work
not done. The order only benefits those who actually return to work (payment for work
done).

2. YES. As a general rule, the prosecution of criminal offenses is not subject to injunction.
Here, the injunction is justified on the ground of prematurity. The acts complained of
are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceeding. The first two complaints are
captioned with violations of the Labor Code and the third relates to the alleged acts of
coercion committed in blocking access to ATC premises. The cases should be suspended
until the completion of the NLRC proceedings. Circular No. 15 (series of 1982) and
Circular No. 9 (1986) in relation to BP 227 indicate that fiscals and government
prosecutors are required to secure clearance from the MOLE or the Office of the
President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation related
to a labor dispute, including coercion, physical injuries, assault, etc. Here, no such
clearance was obtained before the criminal cases were filed.

Case 2: Cercado vs. UNIPROM Inc., G.R. No. 188154, Oct. 13,2010
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes A. Cercado (Cercado) worked as ticket seller for UNIPROM, Incn at
Fiesta Carnival, then was promoted as a cashier then a clerk typist. UNIPROM instituted
an Employees Non-Contributory Retirement Plan which provides that any participant
with twenty (20) years of service, regardless of age, may be retired at his option or at
the option of the company. However, it amended the said plan and reserved the option
to the employees qualified.
UNIPROM implemented a company-wide early retirement program which included
petitioner, who, at that time, was 47 years old, with 22 years of continuous service to
the company. She was offered an early retirement but she rejected the same.
UNIPROM nonetheless pursued its decision and Cercado was no longer given any work
assignment.
Cercado filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA), alleging
that UNIPROM did not have a bona fide retirement plan, and that even if there was, she
did not consent thereto.
For its part, respondent UNIPROM averred that Cercado was automatically covered by
the retirement plan when she agreed to the companys rules and regulations, and that
her retirement from service was a valid exercise of a management prerogative.
LA ruled in favor of Cercado, and this was affirmed by the NLRC. But the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the decision.
Cerdao moved for a reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the instant recourse.

Issues:
1) whether UNIPROM has a bona fide retirement plan?
2) whether petitioner was validly retired pursuant thereto?

The petition is meritorious.

1. No.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement
between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain
age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former.

Article 287 of the Labor Code, pegs the age for compulsory retirement at 65 years, while
the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. An employer is, however,
free to impose a retirement age earlier than the foregoing mandates, as a management
prerogative.

It is axiomatic that a retirement plan giving the employer the option to retire its
employees below the ages provided by law must be assented to and accepted by the
latter, otherwise, its adhesive imposition will amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law. In various jurisprudence cited, the retirement plans in issue
were the result of negotiations and eventual agreement between the employer and the
employees. The plan was either embodied in a CBA, or established after consultations
and negotiations with the employees bargaining representative. The consent of the
employees to be retired even before the statutory retirement age of 65 years was thus
clear and unequivocal.

Unfortunately, no similar situation obtains in the present case. In fact, not even an iota
of voluntary acquiescence to UNIPROMs early retirement age option is attributable to
petitioner. The assailed retirement plan of UNIPROM is not embodied in a CBA or in any
employment contract or agreement assented to by petitioner and her co-employees. On
the contrary, UNIPROMs Employees Non-Contributory Retirement Plan was unilaterally
and compulsorily imposed on them.

2. No. Implied knowledge, regardless of duration, cannot equate to the voluntary

acceptance required by law in granting an early retirement age option to an employer.
The law demands more than a passive acquiescence on the part of employees,
considering that an employers early retirement age option involves a concession of the
formers constitutional right to security of tenure.
 We reiterate the well-established meaning of retirement in this jurisdiction: Retirement
is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to
sever his or her employment with the former.

Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit,

voluntary, free, and uncompelled. Only the implementation and execution of the option
may be unilateral, but not the adoption and institution of the retirement plan containing
such option. For the option to be valid, the retirement plan containing it must be
voluntarily assented to by the employees or at least by a majority of them through a
bargaining representative.

We disagree with the CAs conclusion that the retirement plan is part of petitioners
employment contract with respondent. It must be underscored that petitioner was
hired in 1978 or 2 years before the institution of UNIPROMs retirement plan in 1980.
Logically, her employment contract did not include the retirement plan, much less the
early retirement age option contained therein.

We also cannot subscribe to respondents submission that petitioners consent to the

retirement plan may be inferred from her signature in the personnel action forms. It
should be noted that the personnel action forms relate to the increase in petitioners
salary at various periodic intervals. Moreover, voluntary and equivocal acceptance by an
employee of an early retirement age option in a retirement plan necessarily connotes
that her consent specifically refers to the plan or that she has at least read the same
when she affixed her conformity thereto.

Hence having terminated petitioner merely on the basis of a provision in the retirement
plan which was not freely assented to by her, UNIPROM is guilty of illegal dismissal.

CASE 3: Milan vs. NLRC and Solid Mills Inc., G.R. No. 202961, Feb. 4,2015
Doctrine: An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the
employee’s return of its properties.

Facts:

Petitioners are employees of Solid Mills and they are represented by their collective
bargaining agent, NAFLU. Petitioners and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village,
a property owned by Solid Mills, this was out of liberality and for the convenience of
employees and it was under the condition that the employees would vacate the property
anytime the company deems it fit.

In September 2003, petitioners were informed that effective October 10, 2003, Solid Mills
would cease its operations due to serious business losses. This was recognized by NAFLU
and in their memorandum of agreement, they agreed for a grant of separation pay less
accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits, vacation leave benefits, and 13th month pay
to the employees.

After SMI sent the petitioners their individual notices to vacate the SMI Village. The
employees were also required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release and
quitclaim before their vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, and separation pay
would be released. Petitioners refused to sign the documents and demanded to be paid their
benefits and separation pay.

Petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-payment of separation
pay, accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay.

Petitioner’s contention: The accrued benefits and separation pay should not be withheld
because their payment is based on company policy and practice; 13th month pay is based
on PD 851.Their possession of Solid Mills property is not an accountability that is
subject to clearance procedures. They had already turned over to Solid Mills their
uniforms and equipment when Solid Mills ceased operations.

Ruling of the LA: In favour of petitioners. SMI illegally withheld the benefits and separation
pay since these were vested to them by law and contract. Petitioners’ possession should not
be construed as petitioners’ “accountabilities” that must be cleared first before the release
of benefits. Their possession “is not by virtue of any employer-employee relationship.” It is a
civil issue, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Solid Mills appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.

Ruling of the NLRC: Reversed the decision of the LA. Petitioners’ failure to vacate SMI’s
property, SMI was justified in withholding their benefits and separation pay. SMI granted
the petitioners the privilege to occupy its property on account of petitioners’ employment
thus it also has the prerogative to terminate such privilege. The termination of Solid Mills
and petitioners’ employer-employee relationship made it incumbent upon petitioners to
turn over the property to Solid Mills.

NLRC denied the MR filed by petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC decision. Petitioners raised the
following errors on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. WON the NLRC has the jurisdiction to preliminarily determine the issue relating to
property rights arising from employee employer relamtionship.
2. WON the payment of benefits and other monetary claims be held in abeyance
pending the compliance of accountabilities, specifically the failure to turn over the
occupancy of the SMI Village by the employees.

Ruling:

1. YES. The NLRC may determine preliminarily the rights over a property if it is
necessary to determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employee
 employer relationship. Stated in Art. 217, “the Labor Arbiter, in his or her original
jurisdiction, and the National Labor Relations Commission, in its appellate jurisdiction,
may determine issues involving claims arising from employer-employee relations.”

As a general rule, therefore, a claim only needs to be sufficiently connected to the labor issue
raised and must arise from an employer-employee relationship for the labor tribunals to have
jurisdiction.

The return of its properties in petitioners’ possession by virtue of their status as employees
is an issue that must be resolved to determine whether benefits can be released
immediately. The issue raised by the employer is, therefore, connected to petitioners’ claim
for benefits and is sufficiently intertwined with the parties’ employer-employee
relationship. Thus, it is properly within the labor tribunals’ jurisdiction.

2. YES. Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the employee is a
standard procedure among employers, whether public or private. Clearance
procedures are instituted to ensure that the properties, real or personal, belonging
to the employer but are in the possession of the separated employee, are returned to
the employer before the employee’s departure.

GR: Employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees. (Art. 116 –
prohibition on withholding of wages and kickbacks; Art. 100 – prohibition on the
diminuition of benefits; Art. 113 – prohibition on wage deduction, with the exception #3
that “in cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment.”)

Respondent Solid Mills and NAFLU, the union representing petitioners, agreed that
the release of petitioners’ benefits shall be “less accountabilities.”

“Accountability,” in its ordinary sense, means obligation or debt. The ordinary meaning of
the term “accountability” does not limit the definition of accountability to those incurred in
the worksite. As long as the debt or obligation was incurred by virtue of the employer-
employee relationship, generally, it shall be included in the employee’s accountabilities that
are subject to clearance procedures. Petitioners’ possession of the SMI Village properties
should, therefore, be included in the term “accountability.” Solid Mills allowed the use of its
property for the benefit of petitioners as its employees. Petitioners were merely allowed to
possess and use it out of respondent Solid Mills’ liberality. The employer may, therefore,
demand the property at will.
The return of the property’s possession became an obligation or liability on the part of the
employees when the employer-employee relationship ceased. Thus, respondent Solid Mills
has the right to withhold petitioners’ wages and benefits because of this existing debt or
liability.

Withholding of payment by the employer does not mean that the employer may renege on
its obligation to pay employees their wages, termination payments, and due benefits. The
employees’ benefits are also not being reduced. It is only subjected to the condition that the
employees return properties properly belonging to the employer. This is only consistent
with the equitable principle that “no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the
expense of another.”

Case 4: MERALCO vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, Oct. 5,2010

Facts:
Respondent is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
An anonymous letter was posted at the door of MERALCO imputing respondent’s disloyalty
to the company and calling for her to leave. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the
lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
In light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against
respondent from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise safety and
security, she was ordered transferred to another MERALCO Sector.
Respondent appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her
concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer
amounted to a denial of due process. She further requested for the deferment of the
implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners for the latter’s unlawful act and
omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or
information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning
threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty
and security, correctible by habeas data.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
(2) Whether or not the issuance of the writ is within the parameters expressly set forth
in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
Held:
(1) No. RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
It is evident that respondent's reservations on the real reasons for her transfer — a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one's employment — are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Respondent suspects that
her transfer to another place of work betrays the real intent of management and could be a
punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
(2) No. The issuance of the writ is not within the parameters expressly set forth in the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant
to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person's right to life, liberty, and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.
However, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent's right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life,
liberty or security. To argue that petitioners' refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondent's safety amounts to a violation of her right
to privacy is at best speculative.

Case 5: Paguio vs. PLDT Comp. Inc., G.R. No. 154072, Dec. 3,2002

Facts:
Paguio was appointed Head of PLDTs Garnet Exchange where he reports to
respondent, Santos. At about this time, PLDT implemented a performance assessment
program which Paguio criticized for being unfair. Despite Paguio’s complaints, the
assessment program continued, so he elevated the matter to Ferido, the First Vice
President. Santos then furnished petitioner with a blank assessment sheet with instruction
to rate petitioner’s own performance. Petitioner gave himself an outstanding rating based
on Garnets performance, but Santos reduced it.
Santos issued a memorandum reassigning petitioner. Protesting the said transfer,
petitioner asked Ferido for a formal hearing on the charges against him and for the
deferment of his re-assignment. As no immediate action was taken by respondent Ferido,
petitioner elevated the matter to Perez, Senior Executive VP and COO of PLDT.
Ferido affirmed the transfer of Paguio stating that the reassignment is based on Santos’
well-founded conclusion that petitioner is not a team player and cannot accept decisions of
management. Perez affirmed the action taken by Ferido and explained to petitioner that his
transfer was not in the nature of a disciplinary action that required investigation,
confrontation, and evaluation and that the same was not done in bad faith.
Paguio filed a complaint for illegal demotion and damages against respondents. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but upon appeal to NLRC, LA’s decision was reversed
and petitioner was awarded P384,000.00 representing salary increase on the ground that
on account of petitioner’s transfer, he was assigned a functionless position which deprived
him of the opportunity to get promoted or to be entitled to wage increase.
PLDT filed certiorari in the Court of Appeals and CA upheld the NLRC decision with
modification, deleting the salary increase award.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to salary increase during his demotion.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner bases his right on the fact that, throughout his employment until his
illegal transfer, he had been consistently given by the company annual salary increases on
account of his above outstanding performance. This particular award which petitioner is
seeking is not based on any wage order or decree but on an employees performance during
a certain period. Petitioner likens his claim to that for backwages in illegal dismissal cases.
Backwages are granted on grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their
illegal dismissal from work. They are a reparation for the illegal dismissal of an employee
based on earnings which the employee would have obtained, either by virtue of a lawful
decree or order or by rightful expectation. The outstanding feature of backwages is, thus,
the degree of assuredness to an employee that he would have had them as earnings had he
not been illegally terminated from his employment.
 Petitioners claim, however, is based simply on expectancy or his assumption that. His
claim is tantamount to saying that he had a vested right to remain as Head of the Garnet
Exchange and given salary increases simply because he had performed well in such
position, and thus he should not be moved to any other position where management would
require his services.

Case 6: Michael Press vs. Galit, G.R. No. 153510, Feb. 13,2008
FACTS:

Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine

operator, whose work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Mondays to Saturdays, and
he was paid PhP230 a day. During his employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times,
totaling to 6,117 minutes, and was absent without leave for a total of nine and a half days.

On February 22, 1999, respondent was ordered to render overtime service in order
to comply with a job order deadline, but he refused to do so. The following day, respondent
reported for work but petitioner Escobia told him not to work, and to return later in the
afternoon for a hearing. When he returned, a copy of an Office Memorandum was served on
him, as follows:

To : Mr. Nicasio Galit

From : ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA
Re : WARNING FOR DISMISSAL; NOTICE OF HEARING

This warning for dismissal is being issued for the following offenses:

(1) habitual and excessive tardiness

(2) committing acts of discourtesy, disrespect in addressing superiors

(3) failure to work overtime after having been instructed to do so

(4) Insubordination - willfully disobeying, defying or disregarding company authority

The offenses you’ve committed are just causes for termination of employment as provided
by the Labor Code. You were given verbal warnings before, but there had been no
improvement on your conduct.

Further investigation of this matter is required, therefore, you are summoned to a hearing
at 4:00 p.m. today. The hearing will determine your employment status with this company.

(SGD) ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA

Manager

On February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from employment. The

employer, through petitioner Escobia, gave him his two-day salary and a termination letter
averring that Galit was dismissed due to the following offenses: (1) habitual and excessive
tardiness; (2) commission of discourteous acts and disrespectful conduct when addressing
superiors; (3) failure to render overtime work despite instruction to do so; and (4)
insubordination, that is, willful disobedience of, defiance to, or disregard of company
authority.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No.
IV. Then, the labor arbiter rendered a decision finding that complainant was illegally
dismissed.

The petitioners elevated the case to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit.

Not satisfied with the ruling of the NLRC, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA. On November 14, 2001, the CA rendered its judgment affirming with
modification the NLRC’s Decision.

Then, petitioners asked for reconsideration but was denied.

Persistent, petitioners instituted the instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondent’s tardiness can be considered condoned by petitioners.

2. Whether or not the charge of insubordination is meritorious.

3. Whether or not the due process was observed.

HELD:

1. No, the respondent’s tardiness cannot be considered condoned by petitioners.

Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect of duty. Lack of initiative, diligence, and

discipline to come to work on time everyday exhibit the employee’s deportment towards
work. Habitual and excessive tardiness is inimical to the general productivity and business
of the employer. This is especially true when the tardiness and/or absenteeism occurred
frequently and repeatedly within an extensive period of time.

The mere fact that the numerous infractions of respondent have not been
immediately subjected to sanctions cannot be interpreted as condonation of the offenses or
waiver of the company to enforce company rules. A waiver is a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal right or privilege. It has been ruled that "a
waiver to be valid and effective must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him." Hence, the management prerogative to discipline employees and impose
punishment is a legal right which cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived.
 Also, it is incumbent upon the employee to adduce substantial evidence to
demonstrate condonation or waiver on the part of management to forego the exercise of its
right to impose sanctions for breach of company rules.

In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any evidence to show waiver or
condonation on the part of petitioners.

Also, the petitioners in the case at bar did not impose any punishment for the
numerous absences and tardiness of respondent. Thus, said infractions can be used
collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal.

Respondent is admittedly a daily wage earner and hence is paid based on such
arrangement. For said daily paid workers, the principle of "a day’s pay for a day’s work" is
squarely applicable. Hence it cannot be construed in any wise that such nonpayment of the
daily wage on the days he was absent constitutes a penalty.

2. Yes, the charge of insubordination is meritorious.

For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must
concur: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by
a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge.

In the present case, there is no question that petitioners’ order for respondent to
render overtime service to meet a production deadline complies with the second requisite.
Art. 89 of the Labor Code empowers the employer to legally compel his employees to
perform overtime work against their will to prevent serious loss or damage.

In the present case, petitioners’ business is a printing press whose production

schedule is sometimes flexible and varying. It is only reasonable that workers are
sometimes asked to render overtime work in order to meet production deadlines.

The fact that respondent refused to provide overtime work despite his knowledge
that there is a production deadline that needs to be met, and that without him, the offset
machine operator, no further printing can be had, shows his wrongful and perverse mental
attitude; thus, there is willfulness.

Respondent’s excuse that he was not feeling well that day is unbelievable and
obviously an afterthought. He failed to present any evidence other than his own assertion
that he was sick. Also, if it was true that he was then not feeling well, he would have taken
the day off, or had gone home earlier, on the contrary, he stayed and continued to work all
day, and even tried to go to work the next day, thus belying his excuse, which is, at most, a
self-serving statement.

After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that respondent unjustifiably refused to

render overtime work despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his offenses against
petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he was a difficult employee. His refusal to render
overtime work was the final straw that broke the camel’s back, and, with his gross and
habitual tardiness and absences, would merit dismissal from service.

3. No, the due process was not observed.

The Court held in Agabon v. NLRC:

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity
to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a
notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under
Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of
Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his
separation.

Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices
before his employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of
their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment
is being terminated. Not to be taken lightly of course is the hearing or opportunity for the
employee to defend himself personally or by counsel of his choice.

In King of Kings Transport v. Mamac, the court had the occasion to further elucidate
on the procedure relating to the twin notice and hearing requirement, thus:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the
specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every
kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to
prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at
least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an
opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer,
gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the
complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their
explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts
and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A
general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should
specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among
the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct
a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to:
(1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present
evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against
them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a
 representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing
could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers

shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered;
and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

In addition, if the continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the
life or property of the employers or of other employees like theft or physical injuries, and
there is a need for preventive suspension, the employers can immediately suspend the
erring employees for a period of not more than 30 days. Notwithstanding the suspension,
the employers are tasked to comply with the twin notice requirement under the law. The
preventive suspension cannot replace the required notices. Thus, there is still a need to
comply with the twin notice requirement and the requisite hearing or conference to ensure
that the employees are afforded due process even though they may have been caught in
flagrante or when the evidence of the commission of the offense is strong.

On the surface, it would seem that petitioners observed due process (twin notice
and hearing requirement): On February 23, 1999 petitioner notified respondent of the
hearing to be conducted later that day. On the same day before the hearing, respondent was
furnished a copy of an office memorandum which contained a list of his offenses, and a
notice of a scheduled hearing in the afternoon of the same day. The next day, February 24,
1999, he was notified that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael Press had been
terminated.

A scrutiny of the disciplinary process undertaken by petitioners leads the court to

conclude that they only paid lip service to the due process requirements.

The undue haste in effecting respondent’s termination shows that the termination
process was a mere simulation—the required notices were given, a hearing was even
scheduled and held, but respondent was not really given a real opportunity to defend
himself; and it seems that petitioners had already decided to dismiss respondent from
service, even before the first notice had been given.

Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain to see that there was
merely a general description of the claimed offenses of respondent. The hearing was
immediately set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999—the day respondent received the
first notice. Therefore, he was not given any opportunity at all to consult a union official or
lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense.

Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, it can be inferred that
respondent, without any lawyer or friend to counsel him, was not given any chance at all to
adduce evidence in his defense. At most, he was asked if he did not agree to render overtime
work on February 22, 1999 and if he was late for work for 197 days. He was never given any
real opportunity to justify his inability to perform work on those days. This is the only
explanation why petitioners assert that respondent admitted all the charges.
 In the February 24, 1999 notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified
respondent’s dismissal by citing his admission of the offenses charged. It did not specify the
details surrounding the offenses and the specific company rule or Labor Code provision
upon which the dismissal was grounded.

CASE 7: ADELINO FELIX v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and REPUBLIC

ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION (November 17, 2004)

Facts:
Petitioner Adelino Felix was hired by the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation as a
Cadet Engineer. Sometime in 1992, Felix was offered a chance to train and qualify for the
position of Assistant Manager but he declined and waived the opportunity to the one who
was next-in-line. By Felix's claim, he was asked by certain officers of the company to resign
and accept a separation package, failing which he would be terminated for loss of
confidence.
Felix, however, refused to resign and accept separation benefits, drawing the
officers of the company to, by his claim, start harassing him. Thus, he was not given work
and another employee, Mr. Elmer Tacata, was assigned to take over his post and function.
Unable to withstand the manner by which he was being treated by the company, Felix,
through his lawyer, warned the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation about the illegality of its
actions. Felix attributed the company's harassment against him to his being a member of the
supervisory union then being formed. The Republic Asahi Glass Corporation subsequently
terminated Felix’x services for loss of trust and confidence.
Felix thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Felix's
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed Felix's quoting extensively from the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter, dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the decision, but it was denied in a resolution. The Court of Appeals
likewise dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the company’s loss of trust and confidence is founded on facts
established by substantial and competent evidence
Held:
No. The petition is impressed with merit.
The rule is that high respect is accorded to the findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, more so in the case at bar where both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC share the
same findings. The rule is not however, without exceptions one of which is when the
findings of fact of the labor officials on which the conclusion was based are not supported
by substantial evidence. The same is true when it is perceived that far too much is
concluded, inferred or deducted from bare facts adduced in evidence.
The employer’s evidence, although not required to be of such degree as that
required in criminal cases i.e. proof beyond reasonable doubt, must be substantial it must
clearly and convincingly establish the facts upon which loss of confidence in the employee
may be made to rest. In the case at bar, the company failed to discharge this burden.
Felix was hastily dismissed by ASAHI as the former was not given adequate time to
prepare for his defense but was peremptorily dismissed even without any formal
investigation or hearing. It is settled that where the employee denies the charges against
him, a hearing is necessary to thresh out any doubt. The failure of the company to give
petitioner, who denied the charges against him, the benefit of a hearing and an investigation
before his termination constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due process.

It bears emphasis that the matter of determining whether the cause for dismissal is
justified on the ground of loss of confidence cannot be left entirely to the employer.
Impartial tribunals do not only rely on the statement made by the employer that there is
loss of confidence unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated. At all events, even if all
the allegations are true, they are not of such nature to merit the penalty of dismissal given
the 14 years in service of Felix. Dismissal is unduly harsh and grossly disproportionate to
the charges. This rule on proportionality that the penalty imposed should commensurate to
the gravity of the offense has been observed in a number of cases.
There being no basis in law or in fact justifying Felix’s dismissal on the basis of loss
of trust and confidence, his dismissal was illegal.

CASE 8: Merin vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 171790, Oct. 17,2008

Petitioner was contracted by Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation (GSM) for and
in behalf of its foreign principal, IMC Shipping, Co., Pte. Ltd., as an ordinary seaman on board
the vessel MT Selandang Permata for 10 months. Barely 3 months after he boarded the
vessel, petitioner was repatriated by the master of the vessel. Petitioner allegedly refused to
receive his termination letter. After his arrival in Manila, he inquired from GSM the reason
for his dismissal, but allegedly none was given to him by his local employer.

It appears that petitioner had committed several infractions while on board the vessel. At
one time, he allegedly failed to report for work after he drank too much alcohol at a party.
He apologized for the incident, and even submitted a letter of apology to the master of the
vessel. In another instance, the master of the vessel found petitioner sleeping in the crews
smoke room. When roused from his slumber, the master of the vessel noticed that he had
bloodshot eyes and was in fact intoxicated.

On the same day, petitioner inquired from the Chief Officer if he would be repatriated due to
the incidents. He claimed that he had strong connections with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), warning that should he be repatriated, the ship agent
would be held liable. This conversation was recorded in the ships logbook.

The following day, the master of the vessel received a letter-complaint from the vessels
bosun and petitioners immediate superior, narrating previous incidents of petitioners’
refusal to obey his instructions without justifiable reasons. The bosun also related that
petitioner threatened to harm him when he learned of his impending repatriation.
Petitioner was repatriated the following day.

Petitioner filed a claim for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Antonio A. Cea who, issued a decision
declaring petitioner’s repatriation illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the labor arbiters decision.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied for lack of
merit by the NLRC. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Issue: 1. WON the dismissal is with just cause

2. WON the dismissal was done with due process.

SC:
The petition is unmeritorious.

1.) The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of
employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring
employee. The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken singly and separately.
Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of
aspects of character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While it
may be true that petitioner was penalized for his previous infractions, this does not and
should not mean that his employment record would be wiped clean of his infractions. After
all, the record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that
should be meted out since an employees’ past misconduct and present behavior must be
taken together in determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed
upon petitioner, he continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable behavior on
board. Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one
who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It has the right to dismiss such an employee
if only as a measure of self-protection. We find just cause in petitioners termination.

2.) The manner of his dismissal, however, is another matter. Records show that petitioner’s
employer failed to observe the procedure prescribed in the POEA Standard Employment
Contract, which requires for a written notice of the charges and the time and place for a
formal investigation, a hearing of the charges, and a written notice of the penalty. Petitioner
was repatriated without the requisite notices and hearing. Such failure, however, does not
affect the propriety of his dismissal. In Agabon v. NLRC, we ruled that when the dismissal is
for just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it
illegal, or ineffectual. However, it warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages. Conformably with the Agabon case, the proper amount for nominal damages
would be of P30,000.00.

CASE 9: Royal Plant Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers-Cebu Plant, G.R. No. 198783, April
15,2013

Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a domestic corporation engaged in

the manufacture, sale and distribution of softdrink products. It has several bottling plants
all over the country, one of which is located in Cebu City. Under the employ of each bottling
plant are bottling operators. In the case of the plant in Cebu City, there are 20 bottling
operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while there are 12-14 bottling operators who
man its Bottling Line 2. All of them are male and they are members of herein respondent
Royal Plant Workers Union (ROPWU).
In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with chairs upon their
request. In 1988, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 1 followed suit and asked to be
provided also with chairs. Their request was likewise granted. Sometime in September
2008, the chairs provided for the operators were removed pursuant to a national directive
of petitioner. This directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of
petitioner for bottling operators, wherein every bottling operator is given the responsibility
to keep the machinery and equipment assigned to him clean and safe. The program
reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly move about in the performance of
their duties and responsibilities.

The bottling operators took issue with the removal of the chairs. Through the
representation of herein respondent, they initiated the grievance machinery of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in November 2008. Even after exhausting the
remedies contained in the grievance machinery, the parties were still at a deadlock with
petitioner still insisting on the removal of the chairs and respondent still against such
measure. As such, respondent sent a Notice to Arbitrate, dated 16 July 2009, to petitioner
stating its position to submit the issue on the removal of the chairs for arbitration.
Nevertheless, before submitting to arbitration the issue, both parties availed of the
conciliation/mediation proceedings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) Regional Branch No. VII. They failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
They then executed a Submission Agreement which was accepted by the Arbitration
Committee on 01 October 2009. As contained in the Submission Agreement, the sole issue
for arbitration is whether the removal of chairs of the operators assigned at the
production/manufacturing line while performing their duties and responsibilities is valid or
not.

Ruling of the Arbtration Committee

On June 11, 2010, the Arbitration Committee rendered a decision in favor of the Royal
Plant Workers Union (the Union).
Not contented with the Arbitration Committee’s decision, CCBPI filed a petition for
review under Rule 43 before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On May 24, 2011, the CA rendered a contrasting decision which nullified and set aside
the decision of the Arbitration Committee.
The CA held, among others, that the removal of the chairs from the
manufacturing/production lines by CCBPI is within the province of management
prerogatives; that it was part of its inherent right to control and manage its enterprise
effectively; and that since it was the employer’s discretion to constantly develop
measures or means to optimize the efficiency of its employees and to keep its
machineries and equipment in the best of conditions, it was only appropriate that it
should be given wide latitude in exercising it.
Disgruntled with the adverse CA decision, the Union has come to this Court praying for its
reversal on the following GROUNDS
Issues:
1. Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy in
challenging the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.
2. Whether or not the removal of the bottling operator's chairs for CCBPI's
production/manufacturing lines a valid exercise of management prerogative.

Ruling:
1. YES. A Petition for Review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy
CCBPI is correct. This procedural issue being debated upon is not novel. The Court has
already ruled in a number of cases that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is
appealable to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. The recent case of
Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v. Hon. Voluntary
Arbitrator Buenaventura C. Magsalin and Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines6
reiterated the well-settled doctrine on this issue, to wit:
In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan,7
we repeated the well-settled rule that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is
appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43. We held that:
"The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has
already been settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees, where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals,
in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now
embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-
judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the
original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of
adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.
2. YES. Again, the Court agrees with CCBPI on the matter.
The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion
and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management
prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor.10
In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the operators’
chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean"
program, launched to enable the Union to perform their duties and responsibilities
more efficiently. The chairs were not removed indiscriminately. They were carefully
studied with due regard to the welfare of the members of the Union. The removal of the
chairs was compensated by: a) a reduction of the operating hours of the bottling
operators from a two-and-one-half (2 ½)-hour rotation period to a one-and-a-half (1 ½)
hour rotation period; and b) an increase of the break period from 15 to 30 minutes
between rotations.
Apparently, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions as CCBPI
wanted to avoid instances of operators sleeping on the job while in the performance of
 their duties and responsibilities and because of the fact that the chairs were not
necessary considering that the operators constantly move about while working. In
short, the removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Hence,
CCBPI’s exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without doing
any harm to the workers’ rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Case 10: Goya Inc. vs. Goya Inc. Employees Union-FMW, G.R. No. 170054, Jan. 21,2013

FACTS:

1. Goya, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, importation, and

wholesale of top quality food products.

2. Said corporation hired contractual employees from PESO Resources Development

Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory.

3. This prompted respondent Goya, Inc. Employees Union–FFW (Union) to request for a
grievance conference on the ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the
categories of employees stipulated in the existing CBA.

4. When the matter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to the NCMB for
voluntary arbitration. They agreed to submit for resolution the solitary issue of
“whether or not the Company is guilty of unfair labor acts in engaging the services of
PESO, a third party service provider, under the existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence.”

5. VA dismissed the Union’s charge of ULP for being purely speculative and for lacking in
factual basis, but the Company was directed to observe and comply with its
commitment under the CBA.

6. The Company immediately filed a petition for review before the CA to set aside the
directive to observe and comply with the CBA commitment pertaining to the hiring of
casual employees when necessitated by business circumstances contending that such
order was not covered by the sole issue submitted for voluntary arbitration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator can decide questions not covered by
Submission Agreement.

2. Whether the CBA violation constitute a ULP.

3. Whether the act of hiring contractual employees is a valid exercise of management

prerogative.

RULINGS:

1. YES. First, the said ruling of the VA is interrelated and intertwined with the sole issue to
be resolved that is, “Whether or not the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice in
engaging the services of PESO, a third party service provider, under existing CBA, laws,
and jurisprudence.” Both issues concern the engagement of PESO by the Company
which is perceived as a violation of the CBA and which constitutes as unfair labor
practice on the part of the Company.

In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those questions expressly stated and
limited in the submission agreement. However, since arbitration is the final resort for
the adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has the power to make a
final settlement. Law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of
authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law
on voluntary arbitration was created – speedy labor justice.

2. NO. While the engagement of PESO is in violation of the CBA, it does not constitute
unfair labor practice because it is not characterized under the law as a gross violation
of the CBA. Violations of a CBA, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice. Gross violations of a CBA means flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

3. NO. As repeatedly held, the exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited; it is

subject to the limitations found in law, collective bargaining agreement or the general
principles of fair play and justice. In contracting out services, the management must be
motivated by good faith and the contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent
the law or must not have been the result of malicious arbitrary actions.

In the case at bench, the CBA of the parties has already provided for the categories of
the employees in the Company’s establishment. These categories of employees
particularly with respect to casual employees serve as limitation to the Company’s
prerogative to outsource parts of its operations especially when hiring contractual
employees. With the provision on casual employees, the hiring of PESO contractual
employees, therefore, is not in keeping with the spirit and intent of their CBA.