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HANDBOOK OF

Intelligence

Edited by

Robert J. Sternberg
Yale University
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PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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°
c Cambridge University Press 2000

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2000

Printed in the United States of America

Typeface Stone Serif 9/12 pt. and Antique Olive System LATEX 2ε [TB]

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Handbook of intelligence / edited by Robert J. Sternberg.
p. cm.
Includes indexes.
ISBN 0-521-59371-9 (hardcover), – ISBN 0-521-59648-3 (pbk.)
1. Intellect. 2. Intelligence levels. 3. Intelligence tests.
4. Psychology, Comparative. I. Sternberg, Robert J.
BF431.H31865 2000
153.9 – dc21 99-24437
CIP
ISBN 0 521 59371 9 hardback
ISBN 0 521 59648 3 paperback
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Contents

Preface page ix
Contributors xi

PART I. THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT

1 The Concept of Intelligence 3
ROBERT J . STERNBERG

2 History of Theories and Measurements of Intelligence 16

NATHAN BRODY

3 Contemporary Models of Intelligence 34

JANET E . DAVIDSON AND C . L . DOWNING

PART II. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

4 Heritability and Intelligence 53
ELENA L . GRIGORENKO

5 Intellectual Development in Childhood 92

ZHE CHEN AND ROBERT S . SIEGLER

6 Intellectual Development in Adulthood 117

CYNTHIA A . BERG

PART III. GROUP ANALYSES OF INTELLIGENCE

7 Intelligence and Mental Retardation 141
DOUGLAS K . DETTERMAN , LYNNE T . GABRIEL , AND JOANNE M . RUTHSATZ

8 Intelligence and Giftedness 159

CAROLYN M . CALLAHAN

9 Group Differences in Intelligence 176

JOHN C . LOEHLIN

PART IV. BIOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE

10 Animal Intelligence 197
THOMAS R . ZENTALL

11 The Evolution of Intelligence 216

HARRY J . JERISON

vii
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viii CONTENTS

12 The Neuropsychology and Psychophysiology

of Human Intelligence 245
PHILIP A . VERNON , JOHN C . WICKETT , P . GORDON BAZANA , AND
ROBERT M . STELMACK

PART V. INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION PROCESSING

13 Simple Information Processing and Intelligence 267
IAN J . DEARY

14 Complex Information Processing and Intelligence 285

DAVID F . LOHMAN

15 Artificial Intelligence 341

ROGER C . SCHANK AND BRENDON TOWLE

PART VI. KINDS OF INTELLIGENCE

16 Social Intelligence 359
JOHN F . KIHLSTROM AND NANCY CANTOR

17 Practical Intelligence 380

RICHARD K . WAGNER

18 Models of Emotional Intelligence 396

JOHN D . MAYER , PETER SALOVEY , AND DAVID CARUSO

PART VII. TESTING AND TEACHING INTELLIGENCE

19 Psychometric Approaches to Understanding
and Measuring Intelligence 423
SUSAN E . EMBRETSON AND KAREN M . SCHMIDT M C COLLAM

20 Tests of Intelligence 445

ALAN S . KAUFMAN

21 Interpretation of Intelligence Test Scores 477

MARK H . DANIEL

22 Teaching Intelligence: A Performance Conception 492

TINA A . GROTZER AND DAVID N . PERKINS

PART VIII. INTELLIGENCE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE

23 Intelligence and Education 519
RICHARD E . MAYER

24 Intelligence and Public Policy 534

CRAIG T . RAMEY AND SHARON LANDESMAN RAMEY

25 Intelligence and Culture 549

ROBERT SERPELL

PART IX. INTELLIGENCE IN RELATION TO ALLIED CONSTRUCTS

26 Intelligence and Personality 581
MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS

27 Intelligence and Creativity 611

ROBERT J . STERNBERG AND LINDA A . O ’ HARA

28 Intelligence and Wisdom 631

ROBERT J . STERNBERG

Author Index 651

Subject Index 671
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PART I

THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE

AND ITS MEASUREMENT
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CHAPTER ONE

The Concept of Intelligence

ROBERT J. STERNBERG

Looked at in one way, everyone knows what intelli- Second, implicit theories of scientific investigators
gence is; looked at in another way, no one does. Put ultimately give rise to their explicit theories. It thus
another way, people all have conceptions – which is useful to find out what these implicit theories are.
also are called folk theories or implicit theories – of Implicit theories provide a framework, or lay of the
intelligence, but no one knows for certain what it land, that is useful in defining the general scope of
actually is. This chapter addresses how people con- a phenomenon – especially a not-well-understood
ceptualize intelligence, whatever it may actually be. phenomenon. These implicit theories can suggest
what aspects of the phenomenon have been more
or less attended to in previous investigations.
WHY CONCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE
Third, implicit theories can be useful when an
MATTER
investigator suspects that existing explicit theories
Why should we even care what people think intelli- are wrong or misleading. If an investigation of im-
gence is as opposed only to valuing whatever it ac- plicit theories reveals little correspondence between
tually is? There are at least four reasons people’s con- the extant implicit and explicit theories, the implicit
ceptions of intelligence matter. theories may be wrong. But the possibility also needs
First, implicit theories of intelligence drive the to be taken into account that the explicit theories
way in which people perceive and evaluate their are wrong and in need of correction or supplemen-
own intelligence and that of others. To better un- tation. For example, some implicit theories of intel-
derstand the judgments people make about their ligence suggest the need for expansion of some of
own and others’ abilities, it is useful to learn about our explicit theories of the construct.
people’s implicit theories. For example, parents’ im- Finally, understanding implicit theories of intelli-
plicit theories of their children’s language develop- gence can help elucidate developmental and cross-
ment will determine at what ages they will be will- cultural differences. As mentioned earlier, people
ing to make various corrections in their children’s have expectations for intellectual performances that
speech. More generally, parents’ implicit theories of differ for children of different ages. How these ex-
intelligence will determine at what ages they believe pectations differ is in part a function of culture. For
their children are ready to perform various cognitive example, expectations for children who participate
tasks. Job interviewers will make hiring decisions on in Western-style schooling are almost certain to be
the basis of their implicit theories of intelligence. different from those for children who do not partic-
People will decide who to date on the basis of such ipate in such schooling – or at least they should be
theories. In sum, knowledge about implicit theories (Greenfield, 1997).
of intelligence is important because this knowledge This chapter is divided into four parts. First, I dis-
is so often used by people to make judgments in the cuss lay conceptions of intelligence. This discussion
course of their everyday lives. is divided into two sections. The first section deals

3
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4 ROBERT J. STERNBERG

with Western conceptions, and the second with con- theories of intelligence over the life span. Their par-
ceptions from other parts of the world. The second ticipants ranged in age from 20 to 83 years and were
part of the chapter deals with what might be called divided into three groups averaging 30, 50, and 70
expert conceptions of intelligence. This discussion years of age. The main finding of interest was that
is divided into three sections. First, I discuss defi- older individuals tend to view everyday competence
nitions of intelligence that have been proposed by as more important in characterizing the difference
experts. I then describe some conceptions of experts between individuals of average and exceptional in-
inferred by means other than direct definitions. Last telligence than do younger individuals. Moreover,
I delineate some of the usually implicit metaphors middle-aged and older individuals tend to com-
that have driven explicit theories of intelligence pro- bine crystallized intelligence with problem-solving
posed by experts. The third part of the chapter deals abilities for most age-specific prototypes. Thus, the
with implicit theories of how intelligence relates to distinction between fluid (abstract-reasoning) and
society at large, and the fourth part consists of a brief crystallized (knowledge-based) abilities seems less
summary and some conclusions. important to the older individuals than to the
younger ones.
Some of the most interesting work on implicit
theories of intelligence has been done by investi-
LAY CONCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE
gators seeking an understanding of the nature of
Western Conceptions of Intelligence intelligence in children. Siegler and Richards (1982)
Some of the studies of implicit theories of intelli- asked college students what they thought intelli-
gence among mainland U.S. adults have been con- gence is at different ages. In particular, participants
ducted by my collaborators and myself. We have were asked to describe the nature of intelligence in
been involved in three major sets of studies. The first 6-month-olds, 2-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults.
was on implicit theories of intelligence, academic The authors reported the five traits (in order of the
intelligence, and everyday intelligence in layper- frequency of mention) that most often were men-
sons and experts (Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & tioned as characterizing intelligence at different
Bernstein, 1981). The second set was on implicit the- ages. At 6 months old, these traits were recognition
ories of intelligence as well as wisdom and creativ- of people and objects, motor coordination, alert-
ity in laypersons and experts in various fields of en- ness, awareness of the environment, and verbal-
deavor (Sternberg, 1985c). A third set of studies was ization. At 2 years of age, they were verbal ability,
on implicit theories of intelligence across the adult learning ability, awareness of people and environ-
life span (Berg & Sternberg, 1985). ment, motor coordination, and curiosity. At 10 years
In the first set of studies (Sternberg et al., 1981), old, they were verbal ability, followed by learning
three factors emerged from analyzing ratings of the ability, problem-solving ability, reasoning ability –
ideally intelligent person as supplied by laypersons. all tied for second place in frequency of mention –
The factors were labeled Practical Problem Solving, and creativity. At the adult level, the traits were
Verbal Ability, and Social Competence. The first fac- reasoning ability, verbal ability, problem-solving
tor included behaviors such as reasoning logically ability, learning ability, and creativity. Clearly, there
and well, identifying connections among ideas, and is a trend toward conceiving of intelligence as
seeing all aspects of a problem. The second fac- less perceptual–motor and as more cognitive with
tor included behaviors such as speaking clearly and increasing age.
articulately, having verbal fluency, and conversing One of the more interesting studies of implicit
well. The third factor included behaviors such as theories regarding children’s intelligence was done
accepting others for what they are, admitting mis- with teachers rather than with college students. Fry
takes, and displaying interest in the world at large. (1984) asked teachers at the primary, secondary,
Sternberg (1985c) obtained fairly similar results in and tertiary levels about their conceptions of intel-
the second set of studies. ligence. Elementary school teachers tended to em-
In the third set of studies, Berg and Sternberg phasize social variables such as popularity, friendli-
(1985) investigated the development of implicit ness, respect for law and order, and interest in the
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THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE 5

environment in their conceptions of intelligence. ers, and attempt to ‘‘look good’’ to others in their
Secondary teachers, in contrast, were inclined to work. ‘‘Incremental theorists,’’ on the other hand,
stress verbal variables, such as verbal fluency and believe that intelligence is something that increases
energy, in their conceptions. The tertiary teachers throughout the life span and that the method of in-
tended to regard cognitive variables such as reason- crease is through learning. They are inclined, there-
ing ability, broad knowledge, logical thinking, and fore, to be learning rather than performance ori-
the ability to deal maturely with problems as most ented and to seek new challenges that will help
important to intelligence. Thus, the teachers at the them improve their intelligence.
three levels in effect recapitulated the three factors Nicholls (1990) has also studied children’s concep-
obtained by Sternberg et al. (1981) in their study tions of abilities. Like Dweck, he found that chil-
of implicit theories, but the emphasis was on the dren differ in their conceptions of intelligence and
applicability of different factors at different ages. its relationship to effort. Some children view effort
Problem-solving ability applied most to teachers’ and ability as largely differentiated, whereas oth-
conceptions of college students’ intelligence, verbal ers do not. Nicholls also found that children dif-
ability to their conceptions of secondary school stu- fer in their overall conceptions of intelligence. Some
dents’ intelligence, and social competence to their children view the development of intelligence as in-
conceptions of elementary students’ intelligence. volving effortful learning or acquisition of informa-
Yussen and Kane (1985) studied conceptions of in- tion, whereas others do not. Also, as children be-
telligence, but they used as their participants chil- come more sophisticated, they begin to differentiate
dren rather than adults. They interviewed students the acquisition of information from problem solv-
in the first, third, and sixth grades. Children were ing with information.
asked questions concerning such issues as visible
signs of intelligence, qualities associated with intelli- Conceptions of Intelligence
gence, the constancy or malleability of intelligence, around the World
and the definition of intelligence. The authors In some cases, Western notions about intelli-
found that older children’s conceptions were more gence are not shared by other cultures (Berry, 1984;
differentiated than were those of younger children Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998). For example, the West-
and that with advancing age children increasingly ern emphasis on speed of mental processing is not
characterized intelligence as an internalized quality. shared by many cultures (Sternberg et al., 1981). Peo-
But older children were less likely than younger chil- ple in other cultures may even be suspicious of the
dren to think that overt signs indicate intelligence. quality of work done very quickly and may empha-
Older children also are less global in the qualities size depth rather than speed of processing. They are
they associate with intelligence than are younger not alone. Some prominent Western theorists have
children. There is a tendency as well for younger pointed out the importance of depth of process-
children to think of intelligence largely in terms of ing for full learning and understanding of what one
social skills but for older children to think of intelli- learns (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972).
gence largely in relation to academic skills. Yang and Sternberg (1997a) have reviewed
Dweck (1999; Dweck & Elliott, 1983) has also in- Chinese philosophical conceptions of intelligence.
vestigated concepts of intelligence among children The Confucian perspective emphasizes the charac-
and has found that children generally have one of teristic of benevolence and of doing what is right.
two kinds of concepts regarding the plasticity of As in the Western notion, the intelligent person
intelligence. ‘‘Entity theorists’’ believe that intelli- spends much effort in learning, enjoys learning,
gence is something you are born with and that its and persists in lifelong learning with enthusiasm.
level remains constant across the life span. Because The Taoist tradition, in contrast, emphasizes the
these children believe that there is not much they importance of humility, freedom from conven-
can do to increase their intelligence, they tend to be tional standards of judgment, and full knowledge
oriented toward showing intelligence through their of oneself and of external conditions.
performance. They are often afraid to make mis- The difference between Eastern and Western con-
takes, particularly if they will be observed by oth- ceptions of intelligence may persist even today.
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6 ROBERT J. STERNBERG

Yang and Sternberg (1997b) studied contemporary 1985a), minimal moves to a solution (Newell &
Taiwanese conceptions of intelligence and found Simon, 1972), and creative thinking (Goodnow,
five factors underlying these conceptions: (a) a gen- 1976). Moreover, silence is interpreted as a lack of
eral cognitive factor, much like the general factor in knowledge (Irvine, 1978). In contrast, the Wolof
conventional Western tests of intelligence; (b) inter- tribe in Africa views people of higher social class
personal intelligence; (c) intrapersonal intelligence; and distinction as speaking less (Irvine, 1978). This
(d) intellectual self-assertion; and (e) intellectual difference between the Wolof and Western no-
self-effacement. In a related study but with differ- tions suggests the usefulness of looking at African
ent results, Chen (1994) found three factors underly- notions of intelligence and its manifestations in be-
ing Chinese conceptions of intelligence: nonverbal havior as possible contrasts to Western notions.
reasoning ability, verbal reasoning ability, and rote Ruzgis and Grigorenko (1994) have argued that,
memory. The difference may be due to different sub- in Africa, conceptions of intelligence revolve largely
populations of Chinese, to differences in methodol- around skills that help to facilitate and maintain
ogy, or to differences in when the studies were done. harmonious and stable intergroup relations; intra-
Chen and Chen (1988) explicitly compared the group relations are probably equally important and
concepts of intelligence of Chinese graduates from at times more important. Serpell (1974, 1977, 1982)
Chinese-language versus English-language schools found that Chewa adults in Zambia emphasize social
in Hong Kong. They found that both groups consid- responsibilities, cooperativeness, and obedience as
ered nonverbal reasoning skills as the most relevant important to intelligence; intelligent children also
skills for measuring intelligence. Verbal reasoning are expected to be respectful toward adults. Kenyan
skills and social skills were next and then numeri- parents also emphasize reasonable participation in
cal skills. Memory was seen as least important. The family and social life as important aspects of intel-
Chinese-language-schooled group, however, tended ligence (Super & Harkness, 1986). In Zimbabwe, the
to rate verbal skills as less important than did the word for intelligence, ngware, actually means to be
English-language-schooled group. Moreover, in an prudent and cautious, particularly in social relation-
earlier study, Chen, Braithwaite, and Huang (1982) ships. Among the Baoule, service to the family and
found that Chinese students viewed memory for community and politeness toward, and respect for,
facts as important for intelligence, whereas Aus- elders are seen as key to intelligence (Dasen, 1984).
tralian students viewed such memory skill as of only Wober (1974) investigated concepts of intelli-
trivial importance. gence among members of different tribes in Uganda
Das (1994), also reviewing Eastern notions of as well as within different subgroups of the tribes.
intelligence, has suggested that in Buddhist and Wober found differences in concepts of intelligence
Hindu philosophies, intelligence involves waking within and between tribes. The Bagandans, for ex-
up, noticing, recognizing, understanding, and com- ample, tended to associate intelligence with men-
prehending but also includes such things as deter- tal order, whereas the Batoro tribespeople were in-
mination, mental effort, and even feelings and opin- clined to associate it with some degree of mental
ions in addition to more intellectual elements. turmoil. On semantic– differential scales, Bagandan
Differences between cultures in conceptions of in- tribespeople thought of intelligence as persistent,
telligence have been recognized for some time. Gill hard, and obdurate, whereas the Batoro thought of
and Keats (1980) noted that Australian university it as soft, obedient, and yielding.
students value academic skills, whereas Malay stu- Harkness and Super (1983) analyzed concepts of
dents value practical skills as well as speech and intelligence among the Kokwet of western Kenya.
creativity. Dasen (1984) found that Malay students He found that intelligence in children seemed to
emphasize social and cognitive attributes in their be conceived differently from intelligence in adults.
conceptions of intelligence. The word ngom was applied to children and seemed
Western schooling also emphasizes other things to note responsibility, highly verbal cognitive quick-
(Srivastava & Misra, 1996) such as generalization or ness, the ability to comprehend complex matters
going beyond the information given (Connolly & quickly, and good management of interpersonal re-
Bruner, 1974; Goodnow, 1976), speed (Sternberg, lations. The word utat was applied to adults and
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THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE 7

suggested inventiveness, cleverness, and sometimes to be intelligent. For example, Latino parents of
wisdom and unselfishness. A separate word, keelat, schoolchildren tended to emphasize the importance
was used to signify smartness or sharpness. of social competence skills in their conceptions of
Similar emphasis on social aspects of intelligence intelligence, whereas Asian parents tended rather
has been found as well among two other African heavily to emphasize the importance of cognitive
groups – the Songhay of Mali and the Samia of skills. Anglo parents also placed greater emphasis
Kenya (Putnam & Kilbride, 1980). The Yoruba, an- on cognitive skills. Teachers, representing the dom-
other African tribe, emphasize the importance of inant culture, emphasized cognitive rather than so-
depth of listening rather than just referring to in- cial competence skills more. The rank order of chil-
telligence and of being able to see all aspects of an dren of various groups’ performance (including
issue and to place the issue in its proper overall con- subgroups within the Latino and Asian groups)
text (Durojaiye, 1993). could be predicted perfectly by the extent to which
The emphasis on the social aspects of intelligence their parents shared the teachers’ conceptions of in-
is not limited to African cultures. Notions of intel- telligence. That is, teachers tended to reward those
ligence in many Asian cultures also emphasize the children who were socialized into a view of intelli-
importance of the social aspects of intelligence more gence that happened to correspond to the teachers’
than do the conventional Western or IQ-based no- own. Yet, social aspects of intelligence, broadly de-
tions (Azuma & Kashiwagi, 1987; Lutz, 1985; Poole, fined, may be as important as, or even more impor-
1985; White, 1985). tant than, cognitive aspects of intelligence in later
It should be noted that neither African nor life. For example, a team that needs to complete a
Asian notions emphasize exclusively social notions cognitive task may not be able to do so if mem-
of intelligence. In a collaborative study with sev- bers are unable to work together. Heath (1983) also
eral investigators, Sternberg and Grigorenko (1997; found differences in conceptions of intelligence be-
Sternberg et al., in press) have studied conceptions tween White and Black groups characterized by the
of intelligence in rural Kenya. In one such rural Black groups’ emphasizing nonverbal communica-
village, well over 90% of the children are infected tion skills more and the White groups’ placing more
with parasitic infections. Consequently, they expe- emphasis on verbal communication skills.
rience stomachaches quite frequently. Traditional
medicine suggests the usefulness of a large variety
EXPERT CONCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE
of natural herbal medicines that can be used to
treat such infections. It appears that at least some Expert Definitions of Intelligence
of these – although perhaps a small percentage – ac- Perhaps the most famous or infamous definition
tually work. More important for our purposes, how- of intelligence, depending upon one’s point of view,
ever, is that children who learn how to self-medicate was proposed by Boring (1923) in an article in The
with these natural herbal medicines are viewed as New Republic. Boring proposed that intelligence is
being at an adaptive advantage over those children what tests of intelligence test. Boring was not so
who do not have this kind of informal knowledge. foolish as to believe that this operational definition
Clearly, the kind of adaptive advantage that is rele- was the end of the line for understanding intelli-
vant in this culture would be viewed as irrelevant in gence. On the contrary, he saw it as a ‘‘narrow def-
the West, and vice versa. inition, but a point of departure for a rigorous dis-
Although these conceptions of intelligence em- cussion . . . until further scientific discussion allows
phasize social skills much more than do conven- us to extend [it]’’ (p. 35).
tional Western conceptions of intelligence, they si- To the extent that some view the definition as in-
multaneously recognize the importance of cognitive famous, it is probably because they see this defini-
aspects of intelligence. Note, however, that there tion as seriously flawed. First, it seems to define away
is no one overall Western or even U.S. conception intelligence rather than defining it. To this day, it is
of intelligence. Okagaki and Sternberg (1993) found not totally clear what intelligence tests measure, and
that different ethnic groups in San Jose, California, thus it cannot be clear on the basis of this definition
had rather different conceptions of what it means what intelligence is. Second, tests of intelligence do
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8 ROBERT J. STERNBERG

not intercorrelate perfectly, and therefore they do the ability to learn. Other contributors to this sym-
not produce a singular entity of the kind the defini- posium did not provide clear definitions of intelli-
tion implies. Or if they do, it is a subset of what they gence but concentrated instead on how to test it.
measure rather than the whole thing (Spearman, Of course, there have been many definitions of
1927). Third, the definition is extremely conserva- intelligence since those represented in the journal
tive in that it never will enable us to understand in- symposium, and an essay has been written on the
telligence in a way that goes beyond the traditional nature of definitions of intelligence (Miles, 1957).
tests. Finally, many view the definition as circular. But a subsequent symposium was designed to up-
Probably the most famous study of experts’ defini- date the earlier one.
tions of intelligence was done by the editors of the Two dozen experts (including one team of two)
Journal of Educational Psychology (‘‘Intelligence and in the field of intelligence were asked to define
its measurement,’’ 1921). Contributors to this issue intelligence 65 years later (Sternberg & Detterman,
provided several different definitions as follows: 1986). The panelists were Anne Anastasi, Paul
Baltes, Jonathan Baron, John Berry, Ann Brown and
1. The power of good responses from the point of Joseph Campione, Earl Butterfield, John B. Carroll,
view of truth or facts (E. L. Thorndike); J. P. Das, Douglas Detterman, William Estes, Hans
2. The ability to carry on abstract thinking (L. M. Eysenck, Howard Gardner, Robert Glaser, Jacqueline
Terman); Goodnow, John Horn, Lloyd Humphreys, Earl
3. Sensory capacity, capacity for perceptual recogni- Hunt, Arthur Jensen, James Pellegrino, Sandra Scarr,
tion, quickness, range or flexibility of association, Roger Schank, Richard Snow, Robert Sternberg, and
facility and imagination, span of attention, quick- Edward Zigler. Rather than try to review each defi-
ness or alertness in response (F. N. Freeman); nition here, I will summarize the main similarities
4. Ability to learn or having learned to adjust oneself and differences between the two symposia (see
to the environment (S. S. Colvin); Sternberg & Berg, 1986).
5. Ability to adapt oneself adequately to relatively First, at least some general agreement exists across
new situations in life (R. Pintner); the two symposia regarding the nature of intelli-
6. The capacity for knowledge and knowledge pos- gence. The correlation between frequencies of listed
sessed (B. A. C. Henmon); behaviors was .50, indicating moderate overlap in
7. A biological mechanism by which the effects of present and past conceptions. Attributes such as
a complexity of stimuli are brought together and adaptation to the environment, basic mental pro-
given a somewhat unified effect in behavior ( J. cesses, and higher order thinking (e.g., reasoning,
Peterson); problem solving, decision making) were prominent
8. The capacity to inhibit an instinctive adjustment, in both listings.
the capacity to redefine the inhibited instinctive Second, certain themes were prominent in both
adjustment in the light of imaginally experienced symposia. The issue of the one versus the many –
trial and error, and the capacity to realize the modi- Is intelligence one thing or is it manifold? – contin-
fied instinctive adjustment in overt behavior to the ued to be of concern, although no consensus existed
advantage of the individual as a social animal (L. L. in either symposium. The issue of breadth of def-
Thurstone); inition also continued to be of concern. As in the
9. The capacity to acquire capacity (H. Woodrow); earlier symposium, some panelists in the 1986 sym-
10. The capacity to learn or to profit by experience posium defined intelligence quite narrowly in terms
(W. F. Dearborn); and of biological or cognitive elements, whereas oth-
11. Sensation, perception, association, memory, imag- ers included a broader array of elements, including
ination, discrimination, judgment, and reasoning motivation and personality. The issue of breadth,
(N. E. Haggerty). like that of the one versus the many, remains un-
resolved.
To the extent that there are common themes in Third, despite similarities in views over the 65
these definitions, they would appear to be with re- years, some salient differences in the two listings
spect to the ability to adapt to the environment and could also be found. Metacognition – conceived of
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THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE 9

as both knowledge about and control of cognition – writers, philosophers, theologians, and others who,
played a prominent role in the 1986 symposium but in the course of their writings, speculated on but
virtually no role at all in the 1921 symposium. The did not attempt precisely to define the nature of in-
salience of metacognition and executive processes telligence. Some of these speculations are summa-
can be attributed to the rise of the computational rized here. (For a more nearly complete analysis, see
metaphor in the current study of intelligence. In the Sternberg, 1990.)
later symposium, a greater emphasis also was placed Homer, in the Odyssey, distinguished between
on the role of knowledge and the interaction be- good looks and good thinking. He noted that one
tween knowledge and mental processes. The change man may make a poor physical impression but speak
in emphasis was not entirely with respect to func- in an articulate and persuasive way. Another man
tions that occur within the organism. The later pan- may be handsome but lack the ability to communi-
elists showed considerable emphasis on the role of cate well with others.
context, and particularly of culture, in defining in- Plato had much to say regarding the nature of
telligence, whereas such emphasis was absent in the intelligence. Perhaps his most well-known com-
earlier symposium. ments are in the dialogue Theaetetus. Socrates asks
Definitions of intelligence tend to be based on Theaetetus to imagine that there exists in the mind
classical views of concepts (Katz, 1972) whereby an of man a block of wax that is of different sizes in dif-
attempt is made to specify the defining attributes ferent men. The block of wax also can differ in hard-
of intelligence, that is, what attributes are individ- ness, moistness, and purity. Socrates, citing Homer,
ually necessary and jointly sufficient for a person to suggests that when the wax is pure and clear and suf-
be considered intelligent. Neisser (1979) pointed out ficiently deep, the mind easily will learn and retain
that intelligence may instead be prototypically orga- information and will not be subject to confusion. It
nized, meaning that there are no clear defining at- only will think things that are true, and because the
tributes but rather only characteristic attributes that impressions in the wax are clear, these impressions
tend to be typical of intelligent persons. In this view, will be distributed quickly into their proper places
an intelligent person would be someone displaying on the block of wax. But when the wax is muddy
certain attributes, but there would be no particular or impure or very soft or very hard, there will be de-
attributes that could be identified as necessary and fects of the intellect. People whose wax is soft will be
sufficient for describing a person as intelligent. good at learning but be apt to forget. People whose
Another possibility is that there is no prototype. wax is hard will be slow to learn but will retain what
On views of intelligence involving not just a single they learn. People whose wax is shaggy or rugged or
ability but many, one could argue that there are gritty, or whose wax has an admixture of earth or
so many different ways to be intelligent that no dung, will have only indistinct impressions. Those
one prototype or even small number of prototypes with hard wax will have the same because there will
would suffice to characterize a person as intelligent. be no depth to their thoughts. If the wax is too soft,
Rather, it may be that we have stored in our minds the impressions will be indistinct because they easily
multiple exemplars of intelligent people, and we can be confused or remolded.
assess a person’s intelligence in relation to these Aristotle also had some well-formed views on
exemplars. For example, there might be someone the nature of intelligence. In the Posterior Analytics
we know who is test-smart, someone who is high Book 1 he conceived of intelligence in terms of
in common sense, and so on. Such a model would ‘‘quick wit.’’ For example, an intelligent person see-
be based on multiple-exemplar theories of concept ing someone in conversation with a man of wealth
meanings (see, e.g., Ross & Spalding, 1994). might conclude quickly that the person is seeking to
borrow money from the man of wealth.
Inferences about Expert Conceptions
of Intelligence CONTEMPORARY VIEWS . In the studies men-
HISTORICAL VIEWS . Historically, some scholars tioned earlier, Sternberg (1985c; Sternberg et al.,
who have explored intelligence would be considered 1981) looked at expert as well as lay views. Ex-
experts, but not in the field of intelligence. These are perts were all in the field of psychology. In the
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10 ROBERT J. STERNBERG

Sternberg et al. (1981) study, comparable factor anal- Guilford (1967), Cattell (1971), Vernon (1971), and
yses were carried out for experts as for laypersons. Carroll (1993). The basic unit of analysis in this
Three interpretable factors emerged for the experts. metaphor is the factor that typically is alleged to
They were verbal intelligence, problem-solving abil- be a source of individual differences among peo-
ity, and practical intelligence. These factors were ple. This metaphor has as some of its advantages
similar to those of laypersons but had a somewhat its (a) clear specification of proposed mental struc-
more academic slant in terms of the behaviors that tures; (b) direct operationalization through mental
loaded highly on them. tests; and (c) availability of sophisticated quanti-
Sternberg (1985c) looked at expert conceptions, tative machinery for implementation. Possible dis-
but in this study, the experts were professors in the advantages are (a) insufficient emphasis on mental
fields of art, business, philosophy, and physics. The processing, (b) difficulties in falsification of theories
experts had somewhat different conceptions of in- based on exploratory factor analysis, (c) very strong
telligence that seemed to reflect the requirements of dependence on individual differences, (d) rotational
scholarship in their fields. Whereas professors of art indeterminacy in exploratory factor analysis, and
emphasized knowledge and the ability to use that (e) questionable generalizability to everyday intel-
knowledge in weighing alternative possibilities and ligence.
in seeing analogies, business professors emphasized
the ability to think logically, to focus on essential as- COMPUTATIONAL METAPHOR . A second meta-
pects of a problem, and to follow others’ arguments phor is a computational one. Examples of theorists
easily and to see where these arguments lead. The who have adopted this metaphor are Simon (1976),
emphasis on assessment of argumentation in busi- Hunt (1978), and Sternberg (1977). The basic unit
ness professors’ implicit theories is far weaker in art of analysis is the elementary information process
professors’ implicit theories. Philosophy professors (or component). Exponents of this metaphor typ-
emphasize critical and logical abilities very heav- ically use reaction-time analysis, protocol analysis,
ily – especially the ability to follow complex argu- and computer simulation in their research. Some
ments, to find subtle mistakes in these arguments, advantages of this metaphor are (a) its detailed spec-
and to generate counterexamples to invalid argu- ification of mental processes and strategies, (b) real-
ments. The philosophers’ view very clearly empha- time analysis of task performance, and (c) the avail-
sizes those aspects of logic and rationality that are ability of sophisticated quantitative and computer
essential in analyzing and creating philosophical ar- machinery for implementation. Some possible dis-
guments. Physicists, in contrast, place more empha- advantages are (a) insufficient emphasis on men-
sis on precise mathematical thinking, on the abil- tal structures as sources of individual differences,
ity to relate physical phenomena to the concepts of (b) our uncertainty as to whether the mind really is
physics, and on the ability to grasp the laws of na- well modeled by a computer, and (c) the question-
ture quickly. Thus, experts tended, sometimes sub- able generalization of these theories to everyday life.
tly, to emphasize the skills important in their pro-
fession when queried as to their implicit theories of BIOLOGICAL METAPHOR . A third metaphor is a
intelligence. biological one. Some of the main theorists here are
Luria (1973, 1980), Hebb (1949), Halstead (1951),
Metaphors Underlying Experts’ and, more recently, Vernon (Vernon & Mori, 1992;
Conceptions of Intelligence Wickett & Vernon, 1994). The main unit of analysis
I have argued that several identifiable meta- varies across theories. For Hebb, it was the cell as-
phors underlie experts’ conceptions of intelligence sembly; for Vernon, speed of neuronal conduction.
(Sternberg, 1985b, 1990). Others, like Luria and Halstead, have proposed struc-
tural theories linking parts of the brain to various
GEOGRAPHIC METAPHOR . A first metaphor, a intellectual functions. A number of different meth-
geographic metaphor, views intelligence as a map ods of analysis have been used, including measure-
of the mind. Examples of theorists holding this ment of evoked potentials, measurement of speed
view include Spearman (1927), Thurstone (1938), of neuronal conduction, assessment of hemispheric
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THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE 11

specialization, and use of radioactive tracers to trace stage of intellectual development at roughly 11 or
via positron emission tomography (PET) or func- 12 years old, almost certainly before individuals
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning have reached intellectual maturity, and (c) the over-
parts of the brain that are involved in different kinds estimation of ages at which children are capable of
of mental tasks. Some advantages of this metaphor showing various intellectual performances.
are that it (a) links intelligence to its sources in the
brain, (b) often employs fairly precise experimen- ANTHROPOLOGICAL METAPHOR . A fifth meta-
tal and measurement techniques, and (c) carries the phor is an anthropological one. The question here
intriguing possibility, not yet realized, of culture- is that of what forms intelligence takes as a cultural
reduced or even culture-fair measurement. Some dis- invention. The basic unit of analysis is the individ-
advantages are that (a) the results of the approach ual in interaction with his or her cultural context.
are largely a promissory note not yet usable in any Examples of anthropologically oriented theorists are
practical application; (b) a tendency exists to ig- Berry (1984), Cole (1996), and Greenfield (1997).
nore the contexts in which intelligence manifests it- Advantages of this metaphor are its (a) recognition
self; and (c) the claims for the approach, especially of cultural roles in determining what constitutes in-
with regard to causality, go beyond the data. This telligent behavior and possibly even the nature of
last point is worth a bit of elaboration. Suppose, as intelligence, (b) greater potential cross-cultural ap-
has been claimed, that some measurement of a rest- plicability of theorizing, and (c) the recognition of
ing electroencephalography (EEG) proves to be re- the need to gear testing of intelligence to the cul-
lated to scores on a test of intelligence (Hendrickson, tural context. Some disadvantages are that (a) cog-
1982; see chapters in Eysenck, 1982). It is not clear nitive functioning is specified imprecisely or not at
from this correlation that the underlying biolog- all, (b) specification of theories tends to lack crucial
ical process is somehow causative of intelligence. details, and (c) extreme relativist positions – that
For example, cognitive processing may be respon- intelligence differs in nature in each culture – lack
sible for the correlation: Brighter individuals may parsimony.
use the time to think, whereas less bright individ-
uals do not. Or biological and cognitive processing SOCIOLOGICAL METAPHOR . This metaphor em-
may both be dependent on something else. For ex- phasizes the importance of socialization in intelli-
ample, electroencephalography is only an index of gence. Well-known theorists include Vygotsky (1978)
certain kinds of brain activity, the nature of which is and Feuerstein (1980). For Vygotsky, a particularly
unclear. Other measures, such as evoked potentials, important construct is internalization, whereby
really suffer from the same limitation. the child watches behavior in social interactions
and then internalizes – takes into him or herself –
GENETIC – EPISTEMOLOGICAL METAPHOR . A relevant aspects of the situation and makes them
fourth metaphor is a genetic– epistemological one. his or her own. For Feuerstein, a key construct is
The main theorist is Piaget (1972). The funda- mediated learning, which is knowledge acquisition
mental unit of analysis is the schema. Typical that occurs when a mediator, usually a parent or
methodology is close observation via case studies teacher, explains the environment to the child.
and experimentation. Some advantages of this Advantages of this metaphor are its (a) recognition
metaphor are its (a) comprehensiveness as a theory of the importance of internalization of experiences
of intelligence and intellectual development, (b) the initially encountered with others, (b) recognition
incredible range of research that has been done of the role of the mediator in internalization, and
under the metaphor on children of all ages all (c) recognition of the difference between latent
around the world, and (c) the detail with which capacity and manifest developed ability. Some dis-
many structures and processes have been described. advantages are (a) lack of detailed specification as
Some disadvantages are (a) the concentration of the to how internalization takes place, (b) questionable
theory on the logical and scientific aspects of intel- validity of the actual measurement operations for
ligence as opposed to other aspects of intelligence, Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development – the
(b) the placement of the commencement of the last difference between performance before and after
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12 ROBERT J. STERNBERG

mediation, and (c) ambiguities regarding conclu- (low-IQ ) people who cannot take care of them-
sions that can be drawn from many training studies. selves. Left to themselves, the unintelligent would
create, as they always have created, a kind of chaos.
SYSTEMS METAPHOR . The systems metaphor is The Jeffersonian view is that people are equal
based on the notion that intelligence is a complex in terms of political and social rights and should
system that integrates many levels of analysis, in- have equal opportunities, but they do not necessar-
cluding geographic, computational, biological, an- ily avail themselves equally of these opportunities
thropological, sociological, and others. The unit of and are not necessarily equally rewarded for their ac-
analysis is the system and its elements in interac- complishments. People are rewarded for what they
tion. Examples of theorists are Gardner (1983, 1993) accomplish, given equal opportunity, rather than
and Sternberg (1985b, 1997). Some advantages of for what they might have, or should have, or could
this metaphor are (a) its recognition of the com- have accomplished. Those who fail are not rewarded
plexity of intelligence, (b) its integration of multiple equally, just because they gave it a chance, with
levels of analysis, and (c) the breadth of abilities in- those who succeed. In this view, the goal of edu-
cluded within the theories. Some disadvantages are cation is not to favor or foster an elite, as in the
that (a) it is difficult although not impossible to test Hamiltonian tradition, but rather to allow children
the theories; (b) the theories are very complex, mak- the opportunities to make full use of the skills they
ing them less parsimonious; and (c) some of the the- have. My own views are similar to these (Sternberg,
ories tend to be specified more in breadth than in 1997).
depth. The Jacksonian view is that all people are equal,
Metaphors are not right or wrong. They can be not only as human beings but in terms of their com-
useful differentially, however. Most likely, their use- petencies – that one person would serve as well as
fulness depends on purpose. Thus, which metaphor another in government or on a jury or in almost
one best adopts depends on the purposes for which any position of responsibility. In this view of democ-
one needs a metaphor. racy, people are essentially intersubstitutable except
for specialized skills, all of which can be learned. Re-
lated views are proposed by Ericsson (1996). In this
IMPLICIT THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE
view, we do not need or want any institutions that
AND SOCIETY
might lead to favoring one group over another.
I have suggested that there are three major implicit
theories of how intelligence relates to society as
CONCLUSION
a whole (Sternberg, 1997). These might be called
Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian. These Implicit theories of intelligence and of the relation-
views are not based strictly, but rather, loosely, on ship of intelligence to society perhaps need to be
the philosophies of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas considered more carefully than they have been be-
Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson, three great states- cause they often serve as underlying presupposi-
men in the history of the United States. tions for explicit theories and even experimental
The Hamiltonian view, which is similar to the designs that are then taken as scientific contribu-
Platonic view, is that people are born with differ- tions. Different theorists and experimentalists start
ent levels of intelligence and that those who are from different sets of presuppositions and may be-
less intelligent need the good offices of the more lieve that they are arguing over the science of a mat-
intelligent to keep them in line, whether they are ter when in fact they are arguing past each other
called government officials or, in Plato’s term, because of the differing presuppositions they bring
philosopher-kings. Herrnstein and Murray (1994) to their scientific investigations. For example, the
seem to have shared this belief when they wrote same book ( Jensen, 1998) that one scholar might
about the emergence of a cognitive (high-IQ ) elite, view as obsessive and preoccupied with the exis-
which eventually would have to take responsibility tence of what is really a somewhat limited general
for the largely irresponsible masses of nonelite factor (Neisser, 1999) might be viewed by another
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THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE 13

scholar as a courageous and scientific exploration of Chen, M. J., & Chen, H. C. (1988). Concepts of intelli-
truths that the softer-minded or politically correct gence: A comparison of Chinese graduates from Chinese
might wish to explain away (Bouchard, 1999). Un- and English schools in Hong Kong. International Journal
of Psychology, 223, 471– 487.
til scholars are able to discuss their implicit theories
Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future disci-
and thus their assumptions, they are likely to talk pline. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
past rather than to each other in discussing their ex- Connolly, H., & Bruner, J. (1974). Competence: Its na-
plicit theories and their data. ture and nurture. In K. Connolly & J. Bruner (Eds.), The
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Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of process-
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Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671– 684.
Preparation of this chapter was supported under Das, J. P. (1994). Eastern views of intelligence. In R. J.
the Javits Act Program (Grant R206R950001) as ad- Sternberg (Ed.), Encyclopedia of human intelligence (Vol. 1,
ministered by the Office of Educational Research pp. 387–391). New York: Macmillan.
and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education. Dasen, P. (1984). The cross-cultural study of intelligence:
Grantees undertaking such projects are encouraged Piaget and the Baoule. International Journal of Psychology,
19, 407– 434.
to express their professional judgment freely. This
Durojaiye, M. O. A. (1993). Indigenous psychology in
chapter, therefore, does not necessarily represent the
Africa. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Indigenous psycholo-
positions or policies of the Office of Educational gies: Research and experience in cultural context. Newbury
Research and Improvement or the U.S. Department Park, CA: Sage.
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