LAGMAN VS MEDIALDEA – Presidency

FACTS:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report
pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only
escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of
Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. The
President went on to explain that a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing
havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing
violence aimed not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians
and their properties. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi
City falls under the control of the lawless groups.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing
full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found
no compelling reason to revoke the same.

The House of Representatives likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support to the
President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. Invoking the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens filed several petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s
specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and
seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus;
a. Is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. Is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National
Defense; or
c. Is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been actually reported?

2. Whether or not there were sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
 c. What is the threshold of evidence?

3. Whether or not the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration
of graduated powers granted the President as Commander- in- Chief?

4. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation 216 and in the Report of the
President to Congress sufficient bases;
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao region?

5. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus?

6. Will nullifying Proclamation 216:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or

RULING:

1.)

a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and
not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the
facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of
the situation. To require him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.

To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically
necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports
submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to
dictate.

b. NO. The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare martial
 law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion
and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the
decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Only on the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

c. YES. As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of
Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call
of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis
for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to
the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information
are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.

2.) YES. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising,
the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion
of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the
President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed
and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

a. (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power (3) there
is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
b. The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the
existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable
cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President
can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the writ.
c. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to
which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely,
at least initially, lies with the President.
4.) YES. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of
its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President
to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that
public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

5.) YES. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of
terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only
one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed. For a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of actual
rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his report, the President noted that the acts of
violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces
or establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. The security of the entire Mindanao
Islands was compromised. Based on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there
being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law
declaration and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

6.)

a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court’s declaration of a
state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation
No. 55 dated September 4, 2016 where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless
violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines. The President’s calling out
power is in a different category from the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to declare martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out
the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be precluded to a possible
future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

b. NO. Under the “operative fact doctrine”, the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
“operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional. The actual existence of a statute prior to
such a determination of constitutionality is an operative fact that may have consequence which
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
the invalidy may have to be considered in various aspects- with respect to particular regulations,
individual and corporate and particular conduct, private and official.