Ocampo v.
Ocampo
G.R. No. 150707, April 14, 2004
Panganiban, J.:
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: This case was a dispute between siblings who were survived and substituted by their
spouses and children. The siblings were the children of spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-
Ocampo. It was alleged that during the lifetime of the spouses, they acquired several parcels of
land denominated as parcels (a),(b), and (c). Upon their death, the spouses divided parcel (a) in this
manner:
(a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines
Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on the SE by the
Burgos Street, on the SW by a Street, and on the NW by Julian Ocampo and Carmen
Ocampo, containing an area of 1,119 square meters, more or less, presently covered by
TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and
assessed at ₱17,240.00
All the named parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late
spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander Ocampo although the land denominated as parcel (a) is
ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property
owned in common by all of them, brothers and sisters. Plaintiffs desire to partition parcel (a) but
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so and, moved
by a common purpose, both of them mortgaged to the PNB the land denominated as parcel (a) of
the complaint to secure the payment of a ₱110,000.00 loan. the proceeds of the said loan went to
the exclusive benefit of the defendants. Plaintiffs further allege that the defendants had been
receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs amounting. Plaintiffs prayed
for the partition of the subject property and released the same from any and all
encumbrances.RTC ruled found, held and declared that defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito was the
the true and lawful exclusive owners of the following properties. In affirming the ruling to the
RTC, CA found no documentary evidence offered to establish petitioners’ claim of co-ownership.
The CA held that a piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial
and documentary evidence that had been adduced by respondents to prove their defenses.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership exists.
Ruling: No. Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is simply the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and
the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not
prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by respondents.
Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of ownership of the questioned property that
eventually led to them. Petitioners presented absolutely no proof of ownership of their
predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-owned, the former rely
on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the
property and presented preponderant proof of her claim.
First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land. The theory of petitioners is
completely demolished by this document, which they never contested. According to them, the land
in question was the conjugal property of their parents; and that upon the latter’s deaths, the former
inherited it in common. If indeed the land was the conjugal property of Spouses Ocampo, then
petitioners should have presented evidence to prove such ownership by their alleged predecessors-
in-interest. Since the former failed to do so, how then can they prove the transfer to them of
ownership that has not been established in the first place? It is axiomatic that no one can transfer
to another a right greater than that which one has; thus, the legal truism that the spring cannot rise
higher than its source.
Javier v. Javier
GR No. L - 2812. October 18, 1906
Willard, J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: Since 1860, a parcel of lot locate in Malate, Manila was owned by Manuel Javier, father of
petitioner Longinos Javier and respondent Segundo Javier. Since then, it had been occupied by
his children and that no one of these children ever made any claim to the ownership thereof, and
no one of them ever occupied the property as owner. Thereon, Segundo and his wife Isabel
Hernandez constructed a house thereon.
Subsequently, Longinos, as administrator of the estate of his father filed an action in court
contesting ownership over the house and lot. The lower court ruled that the land belonged to
Longinos as administrator of the estate of his father while the house was owned by respondents
Isabel Hernandez and her son Manuel Ramon Javier. Judgment was rendered in favor of Longinos
for the possession of the property but Segundo et al. Were given a reasonable opportunity to
remove the house.
On appeal, Segundo et al. Contended that the case should be decided by an application of
the principles of law relating to the community of property because a community of property
existed as the house was owned by them while the land by the Longinos. They also declared that
they were possessors in good faith and that they should be reimbursed for the construction of the
house.
Issues: 1. Whether or not there is a co-ownership when the house and the land are owned by
different persons.
2. Whether or not SEGUNDO ET AL. Was entitled for reimbursement for the construction of
the house.
Held: 1. NO. The ownership of a house by one person, and of the land on which it stands by
another does not create a community of property Such a condition of affairs did not create a
community of property. If, on the other hand, it was meant that community of property existed
because the land itself belonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier, and that two of the respondents
were such heirs, it can be said that the decision of the court below was fully as favorable to the
appellants as it could be.
2. NO, he should not be entitled for reimbursement of the house he constructed thereon. Segundo
could not claim for reimbursement a builder in good faith since he was in bad faith as he and his
wife had always believed that the land did not belong to them but belonged to the estate of Manuel
Javier.
He could not also be reimbursed under Art. 491 (then Art. 397) of the Civil Code, which
relates to improvements made upon the common property by one of the co-owners. The burden
of proof was on Segundo et al. To show that the house was built with the consent of their co-
tenants. According to Manresa, Even if a tacit consent was shown, this would not require such co-
tenants to pay for the house.
Tomas Claudio Memorial College v. CA
GR No. 124262. October 12, 1999
Quisumbing, J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: In 1993, private respondents Crisanta, Elpidia, Efrina, Ireneo de Castro and Artemio de
Castro Adriano, filed an action for partition against petitioner TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL
COLLEGE, INC. They alleged that their father and predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro
owned a parcel of land located at Morong, Rizal with an area of 2,269 sq. m. Juan De Castro died
intestate in 1993 and survived by the respondents as his legitimate heirs. In 1979, without their
knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to TOMAS CLAUDIO
MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property.
That the said sale affected only Mariano’s undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares
of the other co-owners equivalent to 4/5 of the property.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled against TOMAS CLAUDIO
MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. That it filed a petition via certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the right of the De Castros for partition had already prescribed.
Held: NO, it had not prescribed. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights
of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the
recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for division
or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it. Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to
the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC.'s
defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494
of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner
may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned." In Budlong vs. Bondoc (1977), the Supreme Court had interpreted said provision of
law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription.
Honorio Bulao v. CA, et al.
GR 101983, Feb. 1, 1993
Cruz, J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: The case at bar involves water and water rights and is thus a water dispute. The proper
authority to try and decide the case is the National Water Resources Council pursuant to Article 88
of Presidential Decree 1067 providing as follows: “The Council shall have original jurisdiction
over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control,
conservation and protection of waters within the meaning and context of the provision of this
Code.” The petitioner invokes in this connection the cases of Abe-abe v. Manta (90 SCRA 526)
and Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton (172 SCRA 253). In the first case, the petitioners sought a
judicial confirmation of their prior vested right under Article 504 of the Civil Code to use the water
of Anibungan, Albay and Tajong Creeks to irrigate their rice-lands upstream. They also wanted to
enjoin the private respondent from using the water of the creeks at night to irrigate his riceland
located downstream. In the second case, the court was asked to prevent the Municipality of
Pamplona from interfering with the management of the Tanjay Waterworks System. It was held in
both cases that jurisdiction pertained to the National Water Resources Council as the issues
involved were the appropriation, utilization and control of water.
Held: It is clear from a reading of the private respondent’s complaint in Civil Case 70 that it is an
action for damages predicated on a quasi-delict. A quasi-delict has the following elements: a) the
damage suffered by the plaintiff; b) the act or omission of the defendant supposedly constituting
fault or negligence; and c) the causal connection between the act and the damage sustained by the
plaintiff. All these elements are set out in the private respondent’s complaint, specifically in
paragraphs 5, 7 and 8 thereof. The damage claimed to have been sustained by private respondent
consists of his loss of harvest and consequent loss of income. The act constituting the fault is the
alleged malicious construction of a dam and diversion of the flow of water by the petitioner. The
said acts allegedly caused the interruption of water passing through petitioner’s land towards
respondent’s lands, resulting in the destruction of the respondent’s rice plants. The averments of
the complaint plainly make out a case of quasi-delict that may be the basis of an action for damage.
The Court also notes that the title of the complaint is “Civil Case 70 — Damages.’’
Although not necessarily determinative of the nature of the action, it would nevertheless indicate
that what the private respondent contemplated was an action for damages. It is pointed out,
however, that paragraph (a) of the prayer for relief seems to convey the impression that the private
respondent is asking for the right to use the irrigation water and for the recognition by the
petitioner of an easement on his land. Would this change the character of Civil Case 70?
We have consistently held that the allegations of facts set forth in the complaint and not
the prayer for relief will determine the nature of an action. In any case, the injury has been done
and that is what the private respondent was suing about in his action for damages. The relief he
prayed for did not change Civil Case No. 70 into a water dispute coming under the jurisdiction of
the National Water Research Council. It follows that since the court a quo had jurisdiction over the
action instituted by the private respondent, its decision, which has already become final and
executory, can no longer be disturbed.
Mangahas v. CA
GR No. 95815. March 10, 1999
Purisima, J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: Since 1955, the spouses Severo and Caridad S. Rodil, occupied and possessed an agricultural
land with an area of 15.0871 hectares. Petitioner, Servando Mangahas, had beenin possession
thereof by virtue of the agreement between him and the spouses Rodil, allowing him to occupy
and cultivate the said parcel of land. In the Kasulatan ng Pagtanggap ng Salapi, Mangahas paid the
amount of P7,000 to the spouses Rodils for allowing him to occupy and cultivate the same. 12
hectares of the property were then developed into a fishpond, 2 hectares were planted with rice
and 1 hectare was used as "tumana" with a house erected thereon. In 1971, the spouses Rodil
decided to sell the said piece of land. Mangahas approached private respondent Spouses Pablo
Simeon and Leonora Cayme to offer to them the property for sale. The Spouses Cayme agreed to
purchase the property for P7,000 and Mangahas was the broker of such sale. An Affidavit of proof
to such was executed by the Spouses Rodil in favor of the Spouses Cayme in the presence of the
herein Mangahas. The Spouses Cayme, on the same day, filed a free patent application for the land,
which was later approved. Later,title in their names was issued. The Spouses Cayme permitted
Mangahas to continue possessing and working on the same land, even after the sale, upon the
request of the former themselves because they were then busy in their palay business. The spouses
Cayme did not get any share in the fruits or harvest of the land except on one occasion, when
mangahas gave them 1/2 "tiklis" (big basket) of "tilapia". Later, the Spouses Cayme had demanded
from Mangahas the return of the premises in question but the latter refused to vacate the place. In
1985, the Spouses Cayme commenced an action for recovery of ownership and the possession of
real property. Mangahas theorized that he entered into the possession of the land under
controversy in 1969 by virtue of a prior sale he inked with the spouses Rodil in 1969. He averred
that he had been in continuous occupation and possession in concepto de dueño, enjoying the fruits
thereof to the exclusion of all others, his right thereto being evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Pagtangap
ng Salapi dated 1969. He also denied that he brokered the sale between the spouses Rodil and
Spouses Cayme. The trial court ruled against Mangahas. It held that the Spouses Cayme were the
absolute and registered owners of the land in question. It also ordered Mangahas to remove his
house constructed thereon and deliver the possession to the Spouses Cayme. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the same decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Mangahas possessed the property in the concept of an owner.
Held: NO, Mangahas only possessed it in the concept of a holder for the following proofs:
1. The spouses Rodil only allowed him to occupy and cultivate the said parcel of land by lease
Wherein Mangahas paid P7,000 as evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Pagtanggap ng Salapi.
2. Mangahas was the one who offered the property for sale to the SPOUSES CAYME when
The spouses Rodil decided to sell it. In fact, he was the broker of the sale, and
3. On one occasion, Mangahas gave the Spouses Cayme 1/2 "tiklis" (big basket) of "tilapia".
Prescription did not run in favor of Mangahas. Mangahas's grantor or predecessor in
interest spouses Rodil took possession of the property, subject matter of the litigation in 1955.
Since the complaint in the case at bar was filed in 1985, the requirement of at least 30 years
continuous possession has not been complied with even if we were to tack Rodil's period of
possession. Mangahas could not now feign ignorance of such judicial admission which he had
resolutely repudiated in his present petition. Acquisition of ownership under the law on
prescription cannot be pleaded in support of Mangahas' submission that subject land has ipso jure
become his private property.
YU v. De Lara
G.R. No. L-16084 November 30, 1962
Makalintal, J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: Lot No. 14, block No. 51-C of the Gram Park subdivision, which was a 682.5-meter
property, was originally registered in 1916. Subsequently, it was acquired by the Philippine Realty
Corporation.
In 1945, several persons settled on the property and constructed houses thereon without
permission from the Philippine Realty Corporation. On various dates thereafter, between 1947 and
1952, respondents Maximo De Lara, Juan Panlilio, Lucia Rivero, Florentino Roque and Domingo
Samson bought the houses of those settlers and continued in occupancy thereof without paying
any rents to the owner of the land. Later in 1956, Philippine Realty Corporation sold said property
to petitioner John O. Yu, who later obtained a TCT in his name. In 1957, YU advised DE LARA
ET AL. To vacate the property within 30 days. Because of the latter’s refusal, UY filed a complaint
of unlawful detainer.
The lower court ordered De Lara et.al. To vacate the premises and to pay monthly rentals
from the time the action was filed until they vacate the premises. On appeal, De Lara Et Al.
Contended that Philippine Realty Corporation had lost possession of the property by
abandonment, in failing to take action against them and showing lack of interest in said property
since they started their occupancy.
Issue: Whether or not the property was abandoned by Philippine Realty Corporation.
Held: NO. It was not abandoned. The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to constitute
abandonment, which requires not only physical relinquishment of the thing but also a clear
intention not to reclaim or reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof.
Indeed, abandonment which according to converts the thing into res nullius, ownership of
which may be acquired by occupation, can hardly apply to land, as to which said mode of
acquisition is not available, let alone to registered land, to which "no title in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession".
No possessory rights whatsoever can be recognized in favor of appellants, because they are
in fact nothing but squatters, who settled on the land without any agreement with the owner,
paying neither rents to him nor land taxes to the government, and who impliedly recognized their
squatters' status by purchasing only the houses built by the original settlers. Their occupancy of the
land was at the owner's sufferance, and their acts were merely tolerated which could not affect the
owner's possession.
Moralidad vs. Pernes
GR. No. 152809, (Aug. 3, 2006)
Garcia, J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land located in Davao City and registered in
the name of petitioner Mercedes Moralidad under TCT No. T-123125 of the Registry of Deeds of
Davao City. The Respondent in this case is Mercedes’ niece, Arlene Pernes. During the height of
rebel insurgencies in Davao and while Mercedes was working in the US, she bought the subject
property and instructed Arlene and her family to stay thereon. She also allowed her other relatives
to stay in the said lot, evidenced by a document she executed allowing them to stay thereat “for as
long as they liked.”
Upon her retirement, she went back to Davao and decided to stay with her relatives. Their
relationship went sour. In event, petitioner lodged an unlawful detainer case against Arlene and her
husband with the MTCC of Davao City. She alleged that she is the registered owner of the land on
which the respondents built their house. In a letter, she demanded from the respondent to vacate
the premises and to pay rentals thereof, which respondents refused to heed. Respondent argued
that petitioner allowed them to build their house on the said lot and to stay thereat for as long as
they like. They presented the document executed by the petitioner as an evidence. The MTCC
ruled in favor of Mercedes arguing that being builders in good faith was not a valid excuse for
unheeding the compliant to vacate. Accordingly, respondents’ continued stay in the premises
became unlawful when the demand to vacate the same was unheeded by them. RTC reversed the
MTCC’s decision, holding that respondents’ possession of the property in question was not, as
ruled by the latter court, by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent.
RTC applied Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code instead of Article 1678 explaining thus, since
the defendants-appellees are admittedly possessors of the property by permission from the
plaintiff, and builders in good faith, they have the right to retain possession of the property subject
of this case until they have been reimbursed the cost of the improvements they have introduced on
the property. Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA but the appeal was dismissed for being
premature.
Issue: 1. Whether or not usufruct exist.
2. Whether or not the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been extinguished or
terminated.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court agrees with the CA that what was constituted between the parties was one of
usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the
naked title thereto remained and the respondents being two among other unnamed usufructuaries.
The Court however cannot agree with CA that the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed
on the ground of prematurity. Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to
enjoy another’s property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another
temporarily, including both jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus desponendi or
the power to alienate the same. It is undisputed that petitioner, as evidenced by the document she
executed, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to
enjoy the fruits of her property.
2. Yes. The term or period for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the
thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instance whereby the usufruct shall be
considered terminated or extinguished as enumerated in Article 603 of the CC.
In the document executed by the petitioner, it contained among others a statement “That
anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided,
however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof.” What may be inimical to the
purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner
made it abundantly clear “that anybody of my kins wishes to stay on the aforementioned property
should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one
another.” In fine, the violation of the said provision constituted a resolutory condition which, by
express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct. Thus, the Court ruled that the continuing
animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes Family and the violence and humiliation she was
made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, were enough factual bases to
consider the usufruct as having been terminated.
Traders Royal Bank vs. Cuison Lumber
G.R. No. 174286 (June 5, 2009)
Brion, J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: Roman Cuison, then president of Cuison Lumber Co. Inc. (CLCI) obtained two loans from
the petitioner bank. The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 10282, which was the subject property in this case. CLCI failed to pay the loan,
prompting the bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage on the subject property. The bank
was declared the highest bidder, hence a Certificate of Sale and Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale were
then issued in bank’s favor. In a series of communications to the bank, CLCI manifested its
intention to restructure its loan obligations and to repurchase the subject property. CLCI then paid
the bank P50,000.00 in August and another P85,000.00 in September of 1986. The bank received
and regarded the amounts as ‘earnest money’ for the repurchase of the subject property. The
Board of Directors of the bank, in a letter sent to Cuison, laid down the terms and conditions of
the repurchase which the CLCI failed to comply. However, CLCI tendered a check to cover the
fifty percent of the twenty percent of the bid price. The check was however returned for
insufficiency of funds. CLCI tendered another an additional of P50,000.00. The bank, in a letter,
informed Mr. Cuison that the P185,000.00 paid by CLCI was not a deposit, but formed part of the
earnest money. Mr. Cuison, in a letter, requested the bank to reduce their obligation, which
amount to P1, 221, 075.61, to P 1 million and that the remaining balance be condoned. CLCI then
paid the bank, in two instances, the amount of P 300,000.00 which the bank credited as earnest
money. A year later, the bank informed CLCI that it would resell the subject property for P 3
million and gave them 15 days to make a formal offer, otherwise, the bank would sell the property
to third parties. CLCI tendered P1.5 million considering that they already tendered P 400,000.00
earnest money. CLCI then filed a case against the bank claiming that the bank breached the terms
of repurchase, as it had wrongly considered its payments as earnest money, instead of applying
them to the purchase price. In answer, the bank alleged that the repurchase agreement was already
cancelled due to CLCI’s failure to comply its terms and conditions. RTC ruled in favor of CLCI,
contending among others that the repurchase agreement was not perfected. CA affirmed the
ruling. Hence, this case.
Issue: Whether or not perfected contract of repurchase existed and can be enforced between the
parties.
Ruling: NO. Under the law, a contract is perfected by mere consent, that is from the moment that
there is a meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause that constitute the
contract. The law requires that the offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute and
unqualified. A qualified acceptance constituted a counter-offer.
A reading of the bank’s letter containing the resolution of the board of directors showed
that the tenor of acceptance, except for the repurchase price, was subject to conditions not
identical in all respects with the CLCI’s letter-offer. In this sense, the bank’s letter was effectively a
counter-offer that CLCI must be shown to have accepted absolutely and unqualifiedly in order to
give birth to a perfected contract. The Court found that CLCI accepted the terms of the TRB
Repurchase Agreement and thus unqualifiedly accept the bank’s counter-offer. Failure of CLCI to
comply with the terms and conditions of the repurchase agreement did effect the perfected
contract. While there was a perfected contract between the parties, the bank effectively cancelled
the contract when it communicated with CLCI that it would sell the subject property at a higher
price and open the same to third parties
Soriano vs. Laguarda
G.R. No. 164785 (March 15, 2010)
Velasco, Jr., J.
by: Glene A. Nalla
Facts: The MTRCB imposed a penalty of three-month suspension on petitioner Eliseo Soriano,
the host of the television show Ang Dating Daan. The Court modified the decision by imposing
the penalty on the show itself. Hence this motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension constitutes prior restraint.
Ruling: No. The sanction imposed on the TV program does not, under the factual milieu of the
case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past
violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program on August 10,
2004. Petitioner had not contested the fact of his having made statements on the air that were
contextually violative of the programs’ “G” rating. To merit a “G” rating, the program must be
“suitable for all ages,” which contain anything unsuitable for children and minors and may be
viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time
television can in no way be characterized as suitable for all ages and is wholly inappropriate for
children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State
is duty bound to prevent.
