High Speed Rail

March 2010
 High Speed Rail

Presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for Transport
by Command of Her Majesty
March 2010

Cm 7827 £26.60
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UIC: pp37

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Contents

Foreword 5
A National Strategy for High Speed Rail 7
Executive Summary 11
Part 1: The Case for High Speed Rail
1 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge 24
2 Capacity, Connectivity, Sustainability 42
3 Supporting Growth in the Regions 55
4 A Core High Speed Rail Network 64
Part 2: High Speed Two – London to Birmingham
5 London to Birmingham 80
6 High Speed Two – The Route 97
7 High Speed Two – International Connections 120
8 Design Standards and Regulation 127
Part 3: The Way Forward
9 Engagement and Consultation 134
10 Planning Consents and Construction 138
11 Costs and Funding 141
12 New Industry, New Jobs 144
Conclusion 151
Foreword

Britain’s future prosperity depends upon investing in technologies that drive

economic growth. High speed rail has a crucial role to play.
New national networks will be essential. In telecommunications, the Next Generation
Fund will underpin the provision of fibreoptic broadband throughout Britain. In
energy, the need to enhance supply whilst reducing carbon emissions is requiring
huge changes in how we generate and distribute electricity. Our transport networks
will also need to be radically enhanced.
Britain pioneered the railways in the nineteenth Century, and in the thirty years
from 1959 it built a national motorway network. More recently, short haul aviation
has developed a sizeable market. Taken together, these networks will not be
sufficient – or on their own suitable – to fulfil Britain’s inter-city transport requirements
for the twenty-first Century. New inter-city networks will be required to enhance
both capacity and the connectivity of our major urban economies. But they need
to be sustainable, and consistent with the imperative to reduce carbon emissions.
Across the world, high speed rail is helping to achieve these objectives. Not only
France’s TGV and the pioneering Japanese Shinkansen but new high speed
networks across Europe and Asia are increasing capacity, slashing travel times,
transforming the connections between cities, and offering the most comfortable
and convenient travelling experience in history. Where high speed rail connects
cities in less than about three and a half hours, traffic moves en masse from the
plane to the train. It is striking that countries which have built a first high speed
rail line have gone on to build more.
Even the US, where passenger railways fell into virtual disuse in the post-war
decades, is now looking to make a decisive leap to high speed rail, in place of
yet more domestic aviation.
Britain’s High Speed One line, from St Pancras to the Channel Tunnel, shows
what can be achieved. Completed on time and on budget in November 2007,
High Speed One has cut journey times from London to Paris and Brussels to
around two hours and seen rail’s share of the travel market to these cities grow
to over 70 per cent. The introduction of Javelin high speed domestic services last
December has radically reduced journey times to London from towns across Kent,
opening up major growth and regeneration opportunities.

5
High Speed Rail

Over the past year, HS2 Ltd – a Government appointed company – has developed
detailed, costed and deliverable options for a high speed line from London to the
West Midlands, and assessed a range of possibilities for a wider network which
could stretch to the North and to Scotland.
This Command Paper sets out the Government’s proposed strategy for High
Speed Rail. As a first stage it proposes the development of a core high speed rail
network linking London to Manchester and Leeds via Birmingham, with high speed
services connecting directly to other cities in Northern England and Scotland
from the outset.
Over the coming months the Government will consult widely on these proposals,
with a view to legislating to take forward a project in the light of the responses.
High speed rail has a transformational role to play at the heart of Britain’s twenty-
first century transport infrastructure. This Command Paper sets out a plan for the
future. The next step is for a national debate to begin.

Gordon Brown Andrew Adonis

Prime Minister Secretary of State for Transport

6
A National Strategy for
High Speed Rail

In January 2009, the Government established High Speed Two Ltd (HS2 Ltd) to
consider the options for a new high speed rail network in Britain, starting with a
costed and deliverable proposal for a new line from London to Birmingham.
HS2 Ltd’s report was presented to the Government at the end of December 2009.
It is published alongside this Command Paper today. It concludes that there is a
strong business case for a new London to Birmingham line, and sets out detailed
recommendations for the design of its route, together with a range of options for
how it might be extended to serve other conurbations.
The Government has evaluated these proposals in respect of their costs and benefits
for enhancing capacity and connectivity in a sustainable way, which is its key
strategic objective for inter-city transport. As part of its analysis, it has also
considered other realistic options for meeting the UK’s inter-urban capacity needs
over the next 30 years, including carrying out a detailed analysis of the potential
costs and benefits of major improvements to existing rail and road networks.

Rail Images

7
High Speed Rail

On the basis of this evidence, the Government’s assessment is:

1. That over the next 20 to 30 years the UK will require a step-change in
transport capacity between its largest and most productive conurbations,
both facilitating and responding to long-term economic growth;
2. That alongside such additional capacity, there are real benefits for the economy
and for passengers from improving journey times and hence the connectivity
of the UK;
3. That new capacity and improved connectivity must be delivered sustainably:
without unacceptable environmental impacts, and in line with the Government’s
strategy to promote a low carbon economy, including its statutory targets for
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases;
4. That high speed rail is the most effective way to achieve these goals, offering
a balance of capacity, connectivity and sustainability benefits unmatched by
any other option;
5. That high speed rail should form an essential part of a wider strategy for
sustainably enhancing national, regional and local transport networks in the
UK that includes policies for managed motorways, rail electrification, and the
increasing uptake of low carbon vehicles;
6. That Britain’s initial core high speed network should link London to
Birmingham, Manchester, the East Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds, and be
capable of carrying trains at up to 250 miles per hour. This Y-shaped network
of around 335 miles (see indicative map on page 14) would bring the West
Midlands within about half an hour of London, and deliver journey times of
around 75 minutes from Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester to the capital.
HS2 Ltd’s work has shown that as a first step a high speed line from London
to Birmingham would offer high value for money as the foundation for such a
network, delivering more than £2 of benefits for every £1 spent;
7. That the initial core ‘Y’ high speed network should include connections onto
existing tracks, including the West and East Coast Main Lines, so that direct
high speed train services can be operated from the outset to other cities
including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Newcastle and Liverpool. Consideration should
be given to extending the network subsequently to these and other major
destinations to further improve capacity and connectivity;
8. That the capacity released through transferring long-distance services to this
network should be used to expand commuter, regional and freight services
on existing lines, with particular benefit for areas expected to see significant
housing growth including Milton Keynes, Luton, Northampton, Peterborough,
Kettering, Corby and Wellingborough;
9. That HS2 Ltd’s recommended route for a London-Birmingham high speed line
(‘High Speed Two’), which would run from a rebuilt Euston station in London
to a new Birmingham City Centre station at Curzon/Fazeley Street, is viable,
subject to further work on reducing specific impacts on the local environment
and communities;

8
 A National Strategy for High Speed Rail

10. That following completion of that further work, formal public consultation on
the Government’s proposals for high speed rail in the light of HS2 Ltd’s
recommended route for such a line should begin in the autumn;
11. That HS2 Ltd should now begin similar detailed planning work on the routes
from Birmingham to Manchester and to Leeds, to be completed in summer
2011, with a view to consulting the public early in 2012;
12. That effective integration with London’s current and planned transport
networks is crucial, and that this is best delivered through the combination
of a Euston terminus and a Crossrail Interchange station sited between
Paddington and Heathrow, which would also provide a link to the Great
Western Main Line;
13. That a second interchange station located to the south east of Birmingham
would be of value in enhancing access to the high speed line for the West
Midlands, and offer direct links to Birmingham Airport, the National Exhibition
Centre and the M6 and M42. Such a station should be included in the core
project, subject to an acceptable funding package being identified;
14. That high speed rail access to Heathrow is important, and should be provided
from the outset through a fast and direct link of about 10 minutes via the
Heathrow Express from the Crossrail Interchange station;
15. That, as foreshadowed in paragraph 57 of the Government’s 2009 Decision
on Adding Capacity at Heathrow, further assessment is needed of the case
for a potential station at Heathrow Airport itself. The Government has appointed
Lord Mawhinney to assess the options, and their respective business cases,
taking account of the work published today by HS2 Ltd, the study already
underway by the airport operator, and the proposals that have been put
forward for a station at Iver;
16. That the new British high speed rail network should be connected to the
wider European high speed rail network via High Speed One and the Channel
Tunnel, subject to cost and value for money. This could be achieved through
either or both of a dedicated rapid transport system linking Euston and
St Pancras and a direct rail link to High Speed One. HS2 Ltd will carry out
further work to assess the viability and cost of each of these, including a full
assessment of the business case, prior to any public consultation;
17. That powers to deliver this proposed high speed rail network should be
secured by means of a single Hybrid Bill, to be introduced subject to public
consultation, environmental impact assessment and further detailed work on
funding and costs to feed into decisions to be taken in the next Spending
Review. Depending on Parliamentary timescales and approval, this could allow
construction to begin after the completion of London’s Crossrail line, opening
from 2017, with the high speed network opening in phases from 2026;
18. That HS2 Ltd’s estimated £30 billion cost for a core high speed rail network
linking London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds reflects its finding that
construction costs for major projects in the UK are higher than for comparable
projects elsewhere in Europe. In the light of this evidence, Infrastructure UK

9
High Speed Rail

will work with the Department for Transport to consider whether and how
civil engineering costs can be reduced, and further work on HS2 Ltd’s cost
estimates may be required following the completion of that work;
19. That the funding options for high speed rail should be further developed by
the Government, taking particular account of the scope for securing third
party contributions towards the cost of constructing new lines and stations;
20. That a long-term programme of investment in high speed rail would present
significant new opportunities for the UK’s design, engineering, construction
and manufacturing sectors; enable the development of skills and expertise in
the UK’s rail industry supply chains; and promote UK firms’ expertise and
competitiveness in the global high speed rail market;
21. That a strategy of this kind can only be developed and made a reality through
active and open engagement with those who will be affected by or who are
interested in it; and that, well before formal consultation starts in the autumn,
HS2 Ltd should engage with local authorities and representative groups,
including those representing key minorities, to ensure that the consultation
can be as effective as possible.

This Command Paper sets out both the Government’s response to HS2 Ltd’s
recommendations and its assessment of the case for an initial core British high
speed rail network, on the basis of the evidence presented by HS2 Ltd and its
own analysis. It will be the subject of formal public consultation and further review
and assessment before any final decisions can be taken on either the strategic
case for high speed rail or the specific routes that any line may follow.
The Government proposes to begin formal public consultation in the autumn, to
cover three key issues:
● HS2 Ltd’s detailed recommendations for a high speed line from London to the
West Midlands
● The strategic case for high speed rail in the UK
● The Government’s proposed strategy for an initial core high speed rail network
Part 3 of this document sets out in more detail the Government’s plans for public
engagement and consultation.

10
Executive Summary

The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge (Chapter 1)

Demand for travel between the UK’s largest cities is expected to increase significantly
over the coming decades, driven by continuing economic growth and rising prosperity.
This has the potential to see congestion and crowding gradually worsen across
all modes of transport, leading over time to slower, less reliable and more
uncomfortable journeys for travellers, and potentially endangering the long-term
health of the UK economy.
The Government is taking action to address these challenges and, in line with
Sir Rod Eddington’s recommendations1, is focusing substantial investment on
improving the capacity and performance of existing networks.

Rail Images

For rail, some £25 billion will be invested in capacity enhancements in England
and Wales over the next seven years, including at least 1,300 extra railway carriages,
major line and station upgrades in Reading and Birmingham, and the Thameslink

1 The Eddington Transport Study (2006) http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/transportstrategy/eddingtonstudy/

11
High Speed Rail

and Crossrail schemes to transform capacity and major north-south and east-west
commuter routes into London. The recently completed modernisation of the West
Coast Main Line has substantially increased rail capacity to Birmingham and beyond.
Electrification and additional rolling stock are also planned for the Great Western
Main Line and on commuter routes in the North West.
On the strategic road network, motorway widening and the innovative use of
hard shoulder running at peak times on the M42 near Birmingham, together with
improved real time information for motorists, offer the prospect of sizeable capacity
and reliability benefits. The £6 billion roads programme announced in January 2009
is rolling out this approach much more widely, alongside a number of targeted
motorway and strategic road widening schemes across England.
But there is a limit to the improvements that can be squeezed out of our current
transport system. The same railway lines that provide inter-urban routes north of
London must also support the capital’s commuter market, as well as regional and
freight services. As a result, they are already close to carrying as many services as
they can.
Further major upgrades to the existing network would be highly expensive,
problematic and disruptive. The West Coast Route Modernisation project cost
£8.9 billion and took almost a decade. It delivered fewer benefits than originally
envisaged and caused serious disruption to travellers and to business, at a
significant economic and social price in addition to the cost of the project itself.
Given the extended timescales for planning, developing and delivering major schemes,
it is therefore vital that work begins now to identify how best to ensure that the
UK’s transport infrastructure can continue to support and facilitate a successful
twenty-first century economy.
Improving capacity and connectivity cannot be the sole objectives for new national
transport infrastructure. It must also be sustainable.
Transport projects bring substantial social and economic benefits, but they can also
impose costs through their impacts on individuals, communities and the environment,
including through the carbon emissions that they generate. In developing the
UK’s future transport networks, therefore, the Government’s objective is to bring
forward transport projects which will deliver the greatest improvements in capacity,
connectivity and performance whilst minimising these negative impacts.

The Strategic Case for High Speed Rail (Chapters 2 and 3)

The Government has considered a wide range of options for addressing Britain’s
long-term inter-city transport challenges, taking into account their impacts on
capacity, connectivity and sustainability, as well as their financial costs. These
included new motorways and railway lines, both conventional and high speed, an
expansion in domestic aviation, and a number of major packages of improvements
to existing networks.
In respect of improving the networks linking England’s principal conurbations, the
Government has ruled out major new motorways and an expansion of domestic
aviation on sustainability grounds. The growth in car travel enabled by entirely new

12
 Executive Summary

major motorways would increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially, over and
above the local environmental implications of such schemes. And new motorways
would not in any case provide significant time savings for city centre to city centre
journeys. A major expansion in domestic inter-city aviation is considered by the
Government – in line with the Committee on Climate Change’s advice in December
2009 – not to be a viable option due to long term constraints on aviation capacity.
A detailed analysis has been carried out by the Government of the potential costs
and benefits of improving existing road and rail networks, alongside the work done
by HS2 Ltd on the case for new high speed and conventional railway lines.
This assessment indicates that major, multi-billion pound upgrades to existing road
and rail networks would provide far less additional capacity than a new railway line.
Major upgrades also involve considerable disruption for travellers. Moreover, they
yield few of the connectivity improvements which new high speed routes make
possible – for example, transforming links between the West Midlands and other
conurbations in the Midlands, the North and Scotland, in addition to substantially
improving journey times to London.
While entirely new conventional rail lines could address the long-term capacity
constraints on the rail network, their net costs would be almost as high as those of
high speed rail without delivering anything close to the same journey time benefits.
High speed rail, in contrast, delivers against every one of the Government’s key
objectives. It offers dramatic connectivity benefits and journey time savings
between major urban centres. It provides very significant capacity increases for
long-distance travellers as well as releasing space on conventional networks for
increased commuter and freight services. And it achieves this whilst remaining
consistent with the Government’s overall strategies for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.
Furthermore, HS2 Ltd’s work suggests that a well-designed and managed high
speed rail project, despite its substantial costs, could deliver high value for money,
with well over £2 of benefits for every £1 spent.
On the basis of this analysis, the Government’s assessment is that high speed rail
should be at the heart of its long term strategy to transform the UK’s inter-urban
transport networks.

A core high speed rail network for the UK (Chapter 4)

In comparison to other European nations, Britain’s economic geography is tightly
packed, with relatively short distances between its major cities, especially in the
Midlands and the North. Journey times and capacity between the UK’s four
largest conurbations – London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds – could be
transformed by a Y-shaped high speed rail network of around just 335 miles of
high speed track, capable of carrying trains at up to 250 miles per hour.

13
High Speed Rail

Figure ES.1 Initial core high speed rail network

Key

HS1
Initial core high speed network
Potential extensions to core
network (Intermediate station(s)
to be decided)
Conventional connection
to Liverpool
Heathrow Express
Possible HS1 connection
Glasgow Edinburgh

Newcastle

Leeds
Manchester
Sheffield
Liverpool
East Midlands
Derby-Leicester-Nottingham
station(s)

Birmingham Birmingham
Interchange

LONDON

Crossrail Euston St Pancras

Interchange International

Heathrow
Airport

PARIS

BRUSSELS

AMSTERDAM

14
 Executive Summary

The benefits of this initial Y-shaped network would not be limited only to travellers
from the four cities directly situated on the high speed line. By including stations
in the East Midlands and South Yorkshire, connectivity and capacity would be
increased to other key cities and regions. Additional destinations, including
Liverpool, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh, would be reached directly by high
speed trains from the outset, by building in the links necessary for trains to continue
at conventional speed onto the East and West Coast Main Lines.

Capacity
The most significant capacity benefits of this network would be felt on the three
principal rail corridors heading north from London, and particularly the critical
London-West Midlands corridor, whose rail capacity would be more than trebled.
This would address the substantial demand growth expected on these key
strategic routes, which serve extensive long distance, commuter and freight
markets, as well as providing the foundation for journeys to a wide range of
destinations further north, on both sides of the Pennines.
The very high capacity of the new line would be achieved both through its dedicated
use for high speed operations, allowing an intensive service pattern, and through
the use of longer (and larger) trains of up to 400 metres (compared to the current
207-metre Pendolinos currently in service on the West Coast Main Line).
By transferring long distance services to the high speed line, significant amounts
of capacity would also be released on the existing West Coast Main Line for
commuter and freight trains, including services to key areas of housing growth
around Milton Keynes and Northampton.
A Y-shaped core high speed rail network yields similar increases in capacity
on the East Coast and Midland Main Lines. Long-distance services to the East
Midlands, South Yorkshire and Leeds would switch to the new network, as well
as the southern portion of journeys to Newcastle and Edinburgh. All these lines
are expected to experience significant capacity constraints over the next 20 to
30 years.

Connectivity
This initial core high speed rail network would not only provide capacity benefits,
but would also significantly reduce journey times between all of the UK’s largest
conurbations.
The fastest journey from the West Midlands to London would be more than
halved to around half an hour, and Manchester and Leeds would be brought within
around 75 minutes of London, with travel time from these cities to Birmingham
halved to just 40-45 minutes. The time needed to travel from Sheffield to London
could be cut by 55 minutes to just 75 minutes, and from Sheffield to Birmingham
from 75 minutes to just 45 minutes.
Furthermore, the links from the core high speed network onto current inter-city
lines would see greatly improved connectivity to Liverpool, Newcastle, Edinburgh
and Glasgow. A journey time from Glasgow and Edinburgh to London of just

15
High Speed Rail

3 hours 30 minutes could be achieved – fast enough to be an attractive and viable

alternative to travelling by air. The use of flexible rolling stock, able to run on both
high speed and conventional lines, would ensure that these wider benefits were
delivered from the outset.
The connectivity benefits of this core network would be multiplied by a fast,
convenient link onto Crossrail, the rapid and frequent east-west underground line
through London due to open from 2017. A high speed rail/Crossrail Interchange
station, west of Paddington, would slash end-to-end journey times to key
destinations in the West End, Canary Wharf and the City of London. The journey
time from Leeds’ financial services sector to Canary Wharf, for instance, would
be as little as an hour and a half.
A Crossrail interchange station would also transform connectivity between the
north-south rail network and both Heathrow and the Great Western Main Line.
This would bring Heathrow Airport to within an hour of the centre of Birmingham,
and around 45 minutes of Birmingham Airport, and provide swift connections for
those travelling to the cluster of technology and other firms in the Reading/M4
corridor, and to Bristol, South Wales and the South West. A second interchange
station close to the National Exhibition Centre could bring Birmingham Airport
closer to London.

Sustainability
The capacity and connectivity benefits of high speed rail are substantial. But for a
British high speed rail network to be a viable way forward, it is equally important
that it is sustainable.
HS2 Ltd has carried out a thorough assessment of high speed rail’s potential
carbon implications (based on a London to Birmingham line). Its conclusion is that,
even allowing for the additional demand for travel that such a line would generate,
they are likely to be broadly neutral: a change in average annual emissions in a
range from -0.41 to +0.44 million tonnes, equivalent to just +/-0.3 per cent of
current annual transport emissions. There would also be some carbon emitted as
a result of construction but this would not be significant in the context of the UK’s
overall emissions.
The great majority of transport carbon emissions – around 90 per cent – are
generated by road transport, and cutting these emissions will be the key factor in
ensuring that the transport sector plays its full part in meeting the UK’s statutory
carbon reduction targets. The Government’s low carbon transport strategy sets
out a routemap to achieve this. Any new high speed network would also need to
be designed and built to be resistent to the unavoidable impacts of climate change.
A high speed rail network would have other implications for sustainability as
well as its carbon emissions. The Government is mindful of its responsibilities to
protect landscapes and biodiversity, including sites of particular beauty or scientific
interest, as well as to ensure that land take, noise and other impacts on local
communities are proportionate.

16
 Executive Summary

In contrast to carbon emissions, these effects are heavily dependent on the detailed
route chosen and mitigation measures deployed. HS2 Ltd has assessed a range
of route options between London and Birmingham for sustainability, and identified
a recommended route whose impacts on the local environment and communities
are assessed as being the most consistent overall with the Government’s sustainable
development objectives. However, having assessed the recommended route in
detail, the Government believes that further mitigation may be possible, and has
asked HS2 Ltd to consider the options for providing such additional mitigation.

The Government’s view

The Government’s view is that the UK’s initial core high speed rail network should
consist of a Y-shaped network connecting London directly with Birmingham,
Manchester and Leeds at speeds of up to 250 miles per hour.
The necessary interchange stations and links to the conventional rail network
should also be provided to reach the full range of potential destinations from the
outset, and the capacity released on existing lines should be used to expand
commuter and freight services, with particular benefit for key areas of housing
growth around Milton Keynes and Northampton.
This assessment will be subject to the results of the further work by HS2 Ltd that
the Government has commissioned on the detailed route options and business
case for the lines to Manchester and Leeds, as well as to the outcome of
forthcoming public consultation.
In the longer term, the initial core ‘Y’ network could also provide the foundations for
a more extensive network of high speed lines encompassing other English regions,
Scotland and Wales. The work carried out by HS2 Ltd indicates a potentially
strong business case for lines extending to Glasgow and Edinburgh, but further
work will be required to understand the costs and benefits of each link in more
detail and to identify the optimum solutions and funding packages. Any future
decision on the construction of new lines in Scotland would be a devolved matter.

‘High Speed Two’ – London to Birmingham (Chapters 5 and 6)

The practical implementation of high speed rail remains a major planning, construction
and funding challenge. This is why, as well as considering the options for a British
network, HS2 Ltd was also commissioned to develop a costed and buildable
proposal for a high speed line from London to Birmingham, ‘High Speed Two’,
and to assess its costs and benefits.
After evaluating a range of possible station and route configurations, HS2 Ltd
identified a recommended route option which their calculations indicate would
deliver significant benefits of well over £2 for every £1 spent.
The Government has carefully assessed the various route options considered by
HS2 Ltd, including routes using elements of the existing transport corridors of the
M1, M40, A413 and West Coast Main Line, and also those which follow new
alignments, for instance crossing the Hughenden Valley through the Chiltern Hills.

17
High Speed Rail

It agrees with HS2 Ltd that its route option 3, which in part follows the A413
corridor, appears to best meet the Government’s objectives for minimising journey
times and cost, and managing impacts on the local environment and communities
in an acceptable way. After thorough consideration, the Government has come
to the overall view that all of the other route options presented by HS2 Ltd are
significantly inferior. It is therefore HS2 Ltd’s recommended route option 3 which
the Government proposes to put forward for public consultation in the autumn,
following the completion of further work on mitigating specific impacts on the local
environment and communities along the route.

Figure ES.2 London to Birmingham, HS2 Ltd’s preferred scheme

A link between HS2 and WCML near Lichfield to allow trains to serve
cities further north – such as Liverpool, Preston and Glasgow.

The line enters Birmingham via the existing Water Orton rail corridor
Birmingham
leading to a new station near the site of the old Curzon St Station in
Curzon Street
the Eastside area, close to the city centre and New Street Station.

An interchange station near Birmingham International, connected to

Birmingham
the WCML train station, the NEC and the airport via a rapid transit
Interchange
people mover.

The line of route to follow the existing Chiltern Line corridor out of
London. From West Ruislip the route would pass over a long low
viaduct to reach the M25 where it enters a tunnel. As it passes
through the Chilterns a number of mitigatory measures are proposed
to minimise its impact. North of the Chilterns the route would be
mainly open with one tunnel near Cubbington. HS2 Ltd recommended
that the main line of route would not include an intermediate station.

All trains stop at the Crossrail Interchange between Paddington

Crossrail
and Heathrow. This provides connections with Crossrail, Heathrow
Interchange
Express and the Great Western Main Line.

The main terminal station in London at Euston. This station would

London Euston be expanded to combine existing classic services and High Speed
Two services.

As described by HS2 Ltd, this route would run in tunnel from a rebuilt Euston
Station, surfacing in West London to follow the route of the existing Chiltern Line,
leaving London near Ruislip. The route would proceed largely in tunnel from the
M25 as far as Amersham, and then continue to the west of Wendover and Aylesbury,
partly in tunnel and partly following the existing A413 and Chiltern Line corridor.
18
 Executive Summary

The next section of the route would make use of the largely-preserved track-bed
of the former Great Central Railway, before continuing north west through
Warwickshire to enter Birmingham close to Water Orton. The route would terminate
at a new city centre station built at Curzon/Fazeley Street in Birmingham’s Eastside
regeneration area, with the main line extending north to join the West Coast Main
Line near Lichfield, enabling services to continue at conventional speeds to
destinations further north.
The Government’s view is that a London-Birmingham route along these lines is
viable, subject to further work on reducing the local impacts on landscape and
communities, and could offer high value for money as the foundation for the high
speed network. Following the completion of this work, public consultation will
begin in the autumn of 2010.
Alongside this, the Government has also commissioned HS2 Ltd to undertake
more detailed work on potential routes from Birmingham to Manchester and
Leeds. This will be completed by summer 2011, with a view to consulting the
public early in the following year.

Integration with urban and international networks (Chapters 6 and 7)

No effective high speed line can exist in isolation. Travellers are not interested in
getting merely from one city centre station to another but in making complete
journeys. It is therefore vital that high speed lines are well integrated with other
transport networks, so that time savings are not dissipated through slow,
unreliable or non-existent connections.
HS2 Ltd’s modelling indicates that by far the largest market for High Speed Two
would be for travellers to and from London, who would comprise more than
80 per cent of High Speed Two’s passengers. As a result, the most important
interchanges must be with London’s current and planned urban transport networks,
in particular the Underground and the new Crossrail line to be opened from 2017.
Whilst the proposed terminus at Euston would allow convenient transfer for
passengers to the Victoria and Northern Lines, as well as access to other lines at
Euston Square, it would not provide any connection with Crossrail. Furthermore,
the large numbers of additional passengers generated by a new high speed line
could cause significant operational problems on Euston’s increasingly crowded
Underground platforms.
A Crossrail Interchange station a short distance west of Paddington, as recommended
by HS2 Ltd, addresses these issues directly. An interchange station would provide
a fast, direct link to Crossrail for passengers travelling onwards to the West End,
the City and Canary Wharf, enhancing the connectivity of the high speed line and
significantly reducing crowding and dispersal issues at Euston.
The Government therefore agrees with HS2 Ltd’s recommendation that a Crossrail
interchange station is important for integration with London transport networks
and should form part of the London-Birmingham line.
The Government also considers that rail access to Heathrow is an important factor
for High Speed Two, given the airport’s strategic importance for the UK economy.

19
High Speed Rail

The Crossrail Interchange could provide a rapid (around 10-minute) and frequent
service to Heathrow via the Heathrow Express and Crossrail.
A strategic case has been suggested for an at-airport station in addition to, or in
place of, the Crossrail Interchange. The far greater connectivity and dispersal benefits
of the Crossrail Interchange have led the Government to discount the option of
an at-airport station substituting for this Interchange. However, consistent with
paragraph 57 of its 2009 Decision on Adding Capacity at Heathrow, the Government
wishes to assess further the case for an additional high speed station at Heathrow,
on a loop line from HS2 Ltd’s recommended route, subject to the considerations
set out in Chapter Seven. The Government has appointed Lord Mawhinney to
undertake this assessment and to provide advice to Ministers.
Heathrow is not the only airport whose customers might make use of any high
speed network. HS2 Ltd’s report also recommends that a second interchange
station should be built close to the National Exhibition Centre, providing direct
access to Birmingham Airport as well as to the West Coast Main Line and the M42
and M6. The Government agrees that such an interchange has great potential to
support wider connectivity within the West Midlands area and should be included
as a part of the core project, subject to an acceptable funding proposal supported
by the major beneficiaries. As part of its detailed design work for the routes north
of Birmingham, HS2 Ltd will evaluate the business case and options for a similar
interchange providing access to Manchester Airport on similar terms.
Links between High Speed Two and the existing High Speed One line to the
Channel Tunnel and the wider European high speed rail network are also an
important consideration. This could be achieved by a direct rail connection and/or
more efficient connections from Euston to the existing High Speed One terminus
at St Pancras. HS2 Ltd’s report considers options for a possible High Speed Two/
High Speed One link, and a short dedicated rapid transit system between Euston
and St Pancras. The Government wishes to assess firm proposals for both
options, and has asked HS2 Ltd to undertake further work on both, including an
assessment of their business cases, prior to the commencement of consultation.

Funding a UK High Speed Rail Network (Chapter 11)

HS2 Ltd estimates the total development and construction costs of the proposed
initial core ‘Y’ network to be in the region of £30 billion, including risk, spread out
over twenty years or more. Many of these costs, and especially the very significant
expenditure on construction, would not be incurred for several years. Construction
would not start until after the Crossrail scheme is completed from 2017. Moreover,
as Crossrail and other major capital projects such as the Olympic Park indicate,
the average rate of expenditure during construction of around £2 billion per year
is not unprecedented.
It is vital that any project of this scale is delivered in such a way as to provide the
best possible value for money. For this reason, the Government proposes that
further work should now take place on both the costs and funding options for
high speed rail.

20
 Executive Summary

As part of its work HS2 Ltd made a comparison of UK rail engineering costs and
those in comparable European countries. This work identified significant disparities
– in line with the high prices that can be seen across the UK civil engineering sector.
The Department for Transport and Infrastructure UK (IUK) will work together to
consider how and whether the cost of relevant civil engineering works could be
lowered, taking into account HS2 Ltd’s evidence. HS2 Ltd will engage closely as
this work progresses, and its construction cost estimates will be kept under review
in the light of the results emerging from this work and subsequent actions.

In funding a new core high speed network, the Government is determined that fair
contributions should be made to the overall funding package by those who will benefit
from it. The Government will therefore further consider the funding options for a
high speed rail network in the UK. These may include third party contributions,
including developer contributions linked to new station and interchange sites, and
local authority funding where the project supports local economic growth.

New Industry, New Jobs (Chapter 12)

A long-term programme of investment in high speed rail would present significant
new opportunities for British business and enable the UK to capitalise on its
strengths in design, engineering, construction and manufacturing.
The UK’s rail sector is recognised across the world as a source of innovative
products and services, from sophisticated low-carbon technologies, to engineering
solutions, consultancy and major infrastructure projects. The UK has a strong and
highly competitive export capability in this sector, and its open market and strong
business environment make it an attractive location for inward investment.
A commitment to invest in high speed rail would provide the construction and
engineering industries in Britain with a predictable, long-term pipeline of major
infrastructure projects, following the completion of the current works on the
Crossrail and Thameslink schemes and the Olympic Park. HS2 Ltd has estimated
that the construction of a new high speed line over seven years could generate as
many as 10,000 new jobs, and provide significant opportunities for the development
of the UK’s skills base. It would also promote the UK supply chain across the world,
by providing a show case for its world class expertise across a range of sectors.
The Government will work closely with HS2 Ltd and with industry to maximise the
business opportunities associated with the development of a British high speed
rail network. In doing so, it will seek to ensure that firms in the UK have the skills
and capability to compete successfully for contracts and to offer the best value
for money, and that every opportunity is taken to promote the expertise and
innovation of British firms to the broader global market.

Engagement and Public Consultation (Chapter 9)

This document describes the Government’s response to HS2 Ltd’s recommendations
for a high speed rail line from London to the West Midlands. It also sets out the
Government’s proposals for a core high speed rail network extending to Manchester
and Leeds, with through services running beyond, which could be developed and
delivered over the next twenty years.

21
High Speed Rail

Transport proposals of this scale and complexity can only be taken forward
through a process of full and open public engagement with those who will be
affected by them and interested in them.
HS2 Ltd has been asked to carry out further work on specific aspects of its
recommended route. Subject to completion of that work, the Government proposes
to undertake a formal public consultation in the autumn. This consultation will
cover three key issues:
● HS2 Ltd’s detailed recommendations for a high speed line from London to the
West Midlands.
● The strategic case for high speed rail in the UK.
● The Government’s proposed strategy for an initial core high speed rail network.
Alongside this, HS2 Ltd will also develop detailed plans for extensions to
Manchester and Leeds for public consultation.
Subject to the results of those consultations and further detailed work on costs
and funding to feed into decisions to be taken in the next Spending Review, the
next step will be to carry out the necessary preparations, including the process of
environmental impact assessment, for the introduction of a Hybrid Bill for a core
high speed network linking London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds.
This could see the London-Birmingham route opening by the end of 2026, with
the legs to Manchester and Leeds opening over the succeeding years, although
that is clearly dependent on securing Parliamentary approval.
But the very next step must be to ensure that the public is properly informed and
to engage with local authorities and representative groups with a view to ensuring
that the public consultation can be as effective as possible. The Government’s
plans for that process of public engagement are set out in detail in Chapter 9.
A new high speed rail network would be a project spanning the coming decades
and which could transform the capacity, connectivity and sustainability of inter-
urban travel in Britain. If such a network is to be made a reality, then it must be
delivered in the way which best balances its potential impacts with the very
considerable benefits for the UK economy and society that it would bring.

22
Part 1:
The Case for
High Speed Rail

Japanese Shinkansen (‘bullet train’) in Hikari Station, 1965. One of these bullet trains
– long out of service – is now an exhibit in the National Railway Museum in York.
1. The Twenty-First Century
Transport Challenge

1.1 Throughout the past three hundred years, improvements to transport

networks have both promoted and responded to economic growth.
1.2 The canal networks created in the eighteenth century supported the first
flourishing of a modern manufacturing sector by enabling the safe and
affordable transit of raw materials and finished goods, for instance to
and from the foundries of Shropshire and the West Midlands or the
Staffordshire potteries.
1.3 In the nineteenth century, the railways improved still further the speed and
flexibility with which goods could be carried. They fuelled a huge leap in
productivity by permitting reliable inter-urban business travel for the first
time and by transforming labour markets. The development of the railway
network in Britain effectively created the concept of commuting, and in
doing so contributed to the explosion in metropolitan economic activity in
Victorian and Edwardian Britain, fostering trade and enterprise.
1.4 Similar patterns can be discerned in the twentieth century. The growth
of motoring from the early years of the century transformed the flexibility,
affordability and quality of journeys – leading to greater willingness to
undertake journeys of all kinds and boosting economic prosperity and
quality of life.
1.5 These benefits were further enhanced from the 1960s by the development
of the motorway network, which transformed the speed and reliability of
journeys between the major towns and cities of Britain. In contrast to the
unplanned and unmanaged approach to railway development in the Victoria
era, which bequeathed a legacy of duplication and inconsistency, the creation
of the motorway network was underpinned by clear strategic planning
on the part of the Government from the start. As early as 1943, the War
Cabinet’s Reconstruction Problems Committee considered proposals for
a future motorway network, including a map (Figure 1.1), which bears a
strong resemblance to the network serving Britain today.

24
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

1.6 This network was opened over a 32 year period, beginning with the Preston
Bypass in 1959. It finished in 1991 with the opening of the final section of
the M40, whose completion marked the end of the construction of major
new motorway alignments. Enhancements since then have focused on
delivering improved performance through targeted widening schemes.
Other than relatively short stretches to ease congestion in the worst
affected areas, mostly notably the M6 toll road to the north of Birmingham,
no significant new additions to the network have been made in England.
1.7 Alongside the increase in car travel, the twentieth century also saw an
expanding and increasingly efficient aviation sector transform the UK’s
international connectivity, giving access to new markets and talent from
across the world. More recently, low cost airlines have transformed
short-haul aviation.
1.8 But it cannot be assumed that the networks developed in previous
centuries will continue to be adequate to support the UK’s long term
prosperity and growth. Network utilisation is constantly changing. In 1910,
there were 19,889 rail route miles, today it is under 10,000. Just as the
canal network was long ago superseded by other faster and more flexible
forms of transport, our current road and rail networks face a pattern of
rising congestion as demand for travel increases.
1.9 Each decade since the 1950s has seen the planning or delivery of additional
transport capacity between the UK’s major cities, and this continues today.
The Government is improving network performance through upgrading
existing networks and through better management measures, such as hard
shoulder running on motorways. This approach is delivering substantial
improvements in capacity and reliability. But over the next 20 to 30 years,
as the UK economy returns to a long term pattern of growth, it is almost
certain that more radical enhancements of the UK’s transport networks
will be needed.
1.10 Successful firms will see their workforces grow and their pools of clients
and contractors broaden and diversify. Changes in technology and other
opportunities for innovation will see new businesses established and new
markets develop. Increasing specialisation in regional and city economies
will require companies to reach further to distribute their products and
services and develop their customer base. Although not all new economic
activity will require new travel, the scope for videoconferencing and other
technological changes to reduce the need to travel appears limited.
1.11 As the economy grows, the UK’s inter-city links can be expected to see
a particularly rapid rise in demand for travel, fuelled by the increasing
importance of high value and high-technology sectors such as business
and financial services and the creative industries, which tend to cluster in
major cities. As Sir Rod Eddington noted in his 2006 study of transport and
economic growth, “It seems likely that these large urban areas will be the
drivers of UK growth over the next few decades.”

25
High Speed Rail

Figure 1.1 Proposed UK motorway network, 1943

26
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

1.12 New and upgraded networks must, however, be sustainable. The

Government’s low carbon transport strategy sets out a routemap for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from transport through policies aimed
at supporting the take-up of new technologies and fuels, promoting more
sustainable forms of travel, and using market mechanisms to incentivise a
shift to lower carbon choices. This strategy includes a major programme to
promote the development and purchase of electric and hybrid vehicles, the
electrification of the Great Western Main Line and key regional rail routes in
the North West, and the entry of the aviation sector into the EU Emissions
Trading System from 2012. It is vital that any measures taken to improve
the capacity and connectivity of the UK’s inter-city networks are consistent
with this strategy.
1.13 The challenge of increasing the capacity and connectivity of inter-city
transport networks whilst maintaining and enhancing their sustainability
is faced by all developed countries. No other country has concluded that
additional inter-urban capacity is unnecessary or unsustainable. Meeting
reasonable demand for fast, convenient and sustainable inter-urban
transport is seen as an imperative in maintaining long-term economic
growth and competitiveness across the globe. Most other developed
countries are now looking to high speed rail as a critical means of
achieving this – either by expanding existing networks or by planning
and constructing new ones.
1.14 For these reasons, it has been acknowledged for some time that there is a
strong case for looking at the potential of high speed rail to provide a core
element of Britain’s future inter-urban transport network. Planning for a
motorway network began some years before firm proposals reached the
Cabinet. Similarly, a high speed rail network has now been given serious
consideration for a decade. In 2001, the Government’s Strategic Rail
Authority commissioned the consultancy firm Atkins to look at the case for
a high speed line from London to the North. More recently, Greengauge 21
has acted as a strong advocate for the benefits of high speed rail in the UK,
while Network Rail has carried out work into the potential benefits of adding
capacity to the UK rail network through both new high speed and
conventional lines.
1.15 As with the development of the motorway network, however, it is for
Government to take a strategic view of the case for new transport
infrastructure. In January 2009, the Government took an important step
forward. As part of an integrated package of measures aimed at improving
the long term capacity and performance of the UK’s major transport
networks, including announcements on additional capacity at Heathrow
Airport and a £6 billion strategic road investment programme, it published
Britain’s Transport Infrastructure: High Speed Two, which set out its
proposals for analysing the case for high speed rail in the UK.

27
High Speed Rail

1.16 This document announced the establishment of HS2 Ltd to make a full
assessment of the case for a British high speed rail network, and to develop
a detailed proposal for an initial line from London to the West Midlands,
reporting back to Government at the end of 2009.
1.17 This chapter explains why the Government took these steps.

The policy context

1.18 Sir Rod Eddington’s 2006 transport study focused on the role of transport
in sustaining the UK’s productivity and competitiveness. In it, he set out a
framework for transport’s contribution to economic growth and identified
three key priorities for long-term transport investment, which he defined as:
● the UK’s growing and congested urban areas and their catchments;
● the key international gateways; and
● the key inter-urban corridors.
1.19 To meet future transport needs in these areas, he recommended that the
first priority should be to focus on the performance of existing networks
before considering new links, and proposed a “sophisticated policy mix”
to achieve this. This policy mix was to be developed through careful
assessment of the full range of policy options, including pricing, better
management and infrastructure improvements.
1.20 This approach underpins the Government’s current transport policy
framework, which uses the full range of measures to increase capacity
and improve performance and connectivity across all transport modes:
● The 2007 Rail White Paper set out an investment plan for rail to 2014,
which included the completion of the West Coast Route Modernisation
programme and a £10 billion programme to increase rail capacity and
ease crowding, including train and platform lengthening on major
commuter lines. The Government has subsequently announced plans to
further improve rail performance and capacity through the electrification
of the Great Western Main Line and of key inter-urban routes in the North
West, new rolling stock, and a substantial upgrade of the Chiltern line.
● The recent trial of hard shoulder running at peak times on the M42 near
Birmingham, together with improved real time information provision for
motorists, has delivered sizeable capacity and reliability benefits. The
£6 billion roads programme announced in January 2009 is rolling this
approach out much more widely, alongside targeted motorway widening
projects including between junctions 16-23/27-30 of the M25.
● In the UK’s cities, the £16 billion Crossrail scheme and the Thameslink
upgrade will transform travel into and across the capital; and the
Government is also investing in a range of major urban transport schemes,

28
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

including enhancements to the Manchester, Nottingham and Tyne &

Wear light rail systems, at a total cost of well over £1 billion, as well as
improvements to bus services, for instance through over £170 million of
funding for major upgrade schemes in Luton and Cambridge.
● The 2003 Aviation White Paper described the Government’s long term
development plan for the UK aviation sector, including new runway
capacity in the South East and at key regional airports. In January 2009,
the Government confirmed its support for a new runway at Heathrow.
Alongside this decision, the Government announced a target to reduce
UK aviation emissions to below 2005 levels by 2050, and asked the
Committee on Climate Change to assess the scope for emissions
reductions from within the sector to achieve this target. The Committee’s
report, which was published in December 2009, concluded that a 60 per
cent expansion in passenger numbers could be accommodated within
the Government’s targets for reducing emissions, and that for domestic
and short-haul routes of under 500 miles, high speed rail could offer a
viable alternative to aviation.
1.21 The Eddington study also stressed the long-term potential of road pricing to
deliver capacity improvements, but the Government’s view is that despite
the success of the London Congestion Charge, the introduction of national
road pricing is not currently technologically feasible, even if it could secure
public approval. The Government will continue to assess the viability of
road pricing measures for the future, keeping a particularly close eye on
developments in Denmark and the Netherlands. In the meantime, more
tried-and-tested means to deliver improved capacity and connectivity are
required. The Government will also provide the resources, through its new
Urban Transport Challenge Fund, for local authorities to pursue demand
management measures if they so wish.
1.22 The Government is currently assessing the medium-term investment
options for the 2014-19 period, as set out in its recent policy document,
Developing a Sustainable Transport System. This process will allow the
Government and local and regional partners to identify the highest priority
transport interventions through a rigorous process of option generation and
value for money appraisal.

The long-term capacity and connectivity challenge

1.23 These measures will see significant improvements in capacity and
connectivity over the coming years, and will improve performance and
reliability for travellers on all modes of transport. It is inevitable, however,
that over the next 20 to 30 years further increases in capacity will be
needed as the UK’s economy returns to a pattern of long term and
sustained growth.

29
High Speed Rail

Figure 1.2 Average load factors on long distance rail services in 2008

Glasgow

Edinburgh

Newcastle

Leeds
Manchester
Liverpool
Sheffield

Nottingham

Birmingham

London

Volume over seats (%)

0 20 40 60 80 80+

30
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

Figure 1.3 Average load factors on long distance rail services in 2033

Glasgow

Edinburgh

Newcastle

Leeds
Manchester
Liverpool
Sheffield

Nottingham

Birmingham

London

Volume over seats (%)

0 20 40 60 80 80+

31
High Speed Rail

1.24 A key priority will be to improve the links between Britain’s largest and most
productive urban economies. This will mean, in particular, tackling crowding
and congestion and improving the performance of transport links between
London and the major conurbations in the Midlands and further north,
where current networks are likely to be most stretched in future.
1.25 The capacity challenge is obvious. Rail journeys between these cities are
already crowded at peak times and can be expected to grow ever more
so unless action is taken, with crowded trains a feature for more and more
of the day. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the increase in crowding that could be
expected on long-distance services, including the routes to Birmingham,
Manchester and Leeds. Peak time crowding on these routes will be even
worse, routinely exceeding 100 per cent, leading to many more economically
valuable journeys being forced off rail at these times.
1.26 This growing congestion on major rail lines would also have a significant
impact on the freight industry and its customers. The West Coast Main
Line, in particular, is a key artery for freight services, not least as it serves
the UK’s “golden triangle” for logistics warehousing between Rugby, Daventry
and Northampton as well as several power stations and manufacturing
centres. Around half of all UK rail freight uses the West Coast Main Line
at some stage in its journey, including much of the UK’s international and
domestic intermodal rail freight traffic. The Government’s modelling suggests
that the vast majority of international containers using national networks
between Birmingham and Manchester are on rail rather than road.
1.27 With the M6 north of Rugby carrying some of the heaviest volumes of
HGVs on the motorway network, there would be considerable potential, if
capacity were available, for further modal shift to rail. However, both freight
customers and third party logistics providers have expressed concern that
there is already insufficient capacity on the line to accommodate likely future
freight services.
1.28 The motorway network is unlikely to provide an effective alternative for
either passengers or freight, with congestion on the M1 and M6 increasing
significantly over the coming decades, as Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show, even
before the impacts of urban congestion on the reliability of city centre to city
centre travel are taken into account.
1.29 Not all new economic activity will require new travel. New communications
technologies have changed the way that firms and individuals work, and will
continue to do so. But the scope for such changes is likely to be limited.
The Climate Change Committee’s recent report on aviation found that
teleconferencing would reduce business air travel by only 30 per cent in
their most optimistic scenario, with the net effect more likely to be close to
zero, as it would be just as likely to generate additional travel (for instance,
to follow up on decisions taken by videolink) than to reduce it.
1.30 As a result, the choice facing the UK will be between providing new capacity
where it is essential to the economy and can be delivered sustainably, or
forfeiting the economic and social benefits which growth in travel can bring.

32
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

Choosing not to provide additional capacity would be certain to lead to the

regulation of demand by either price or congestion, which would tend to
restrict travel to those who could afford it and which would have significant
negative impacts on the UK’s economy and on individual opportunity.
1.31 Improving connectivity could also provide valuable benefits for long term
economic growth and prosperity. The recently completed upgrade of the
West Coast Main Line has reduced journey times and improved reliability
between a number of major cities. Usage of the line is increasing fast and
rail’s share of the overall market is growing as passengers transfer from
planes and cars.
1.32 But in an age in which national and global networks of communication and
interaction are constantly being enriched and expanded, public expectations
about the ease and rapidity of travel will continue to rise, particularly as
other countries invest in enhancing connectivity. Similarly, the global
competitiveness of the UK’s city economies will benefit from faster and
more reliable access to the widest possible pools of skills and expertise, as
well as to more extensive customer and supply bases. It will be important
therefore to take every opportunity to improve the speed, comfort and
convenience of inter-urban journeys in Britain.
1.33 Further investment in Britain’s inter-urban transport networks will clearly be
required to address capacity constraints and performance challenges in
order to reduce the risk of them acting as a brake on future economic
growth. Planning for such investment must be carried out well in advance
of it being required, particularly if the options under consideration are to
include entirely new links, as both the Eddington study and the Rail White
Paper acknowledge they must, given that these can take years or even
decades to plan and deliver.

The need for sustainability

1.34 Any planning for investment in Britain’s inter-urban transport networks
must also take account of the wider global context. The need to improve
sustainability and in particular to reduce carbon emissions has gained
significantly in urgency over recent years and will continue to do so.
1.35 The Government’s low carbon transport strategy, published in July 2009,
outlines its policy framework to ensure that transport plays its part in
delivering an 80 per cent reduction in emissions by 2050, in line with the
Government’s statutory targets set out in the Climate Change Act 2008.
This framework is based on three key approaches:
● Supporting the shift to new technologies and fuels within each mode
of transport;
● Promoting lower carbon choices both within and between modes; and
● Using market mechanisms to encourage a shift to lower carbon transport.

33
High Speed Rail

Figure 1.4 Strategic roads: peak delay 2010

Peak delay/km (hrs/km/year)

Total vehicle hours delay per kilometre (over a year) against free flow speed, for the morning and evening
3 hour peaks (7-10am and 4-7pm)
16,000 to 38,000 38,000 to 55,000 55,000 and above

34
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

Figure 1.5 Strategic roads: peak delay 2035

Peak delay/km (hrs/km/year)

Total vehicle hours delay per kilometre (over a year) against free flow speed, for the morning and evening
3 hour peaks (7-10am and 4-7pm)
16,000 to 38,000 38,000 to 55,000 55,000 and above

35
High Speed Rail

1.36 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from car travel will be a central part
of achieving these goals, as the road network will continue to be the only
option for many journeys. The Government is therefore investing heavily in
supporting the shift to lower carbon cars, including through a £450 million
programme to incentivise the purchase of electric and hybrid cars and the
provision of the necessary recharging infrastructure, as well as promoting
the use of sustainable biofuels and other lower carbon technologies.
1.37 Reducing the carbon emissions from rail and aviation is also important.
Both the Government’s 2007 Rail White Paper and the recent Committee
on Climate Change report on aviation provide clear routemaps for how this
can be achieved. The Government has also announced a rolling programme
of electrification of key rail routes including the Great Western Main Line. It
will be equally imperative to ensure that all modes of transport are effectively
integrated, and that lower carbon choices are available where they are
feasible – in particular for urban and city centre to city centre journeys.
1.38 Transport policy must ensure that future infrastructure is sustainable, that
growth in demand is accommodated in a way that is consistent with the
Government’s overall carbon reduction targets, and that low carbon choices
are available that will meet the changing needs of the economy and society.
This must form a key part of the assessment of the options for improving
inter-urban capacity and connectivity.
1.39 Any new infrastructure must also be designed, built and operated in such a
way as to be resistent to the unavoidable impacts of climate change.
1.40 However, carbon emissions are not the only factor in assessing sustainability.
The Government is mindful of its responsibilities to protect the natural
environment, including important landscapes and biodiversity, as well as to
limit harmful impacts on local communities, such as noise and air pollution,
in taking any future decisions on investment in transport.

The international response

1.41 Much of Europe and Asia is looking to high speed rail to increase the
capacity and connectivity of inter-city key transport networks whilst at the
same time maintaining and enhancing their sustainability.
1.42 Japan was the first to introduce high speed services in 1964, with the initial
Shinkansen line reducing travel times between Tokyo to Osaka to 3 hours
and reaching around 135 miles per hour. The Shinkansen runs largely on a
dedicated high speed network, entirely segregated from conventional lines.
This network has now reached more than 1500 miles, stretching from
Hachinohe at the northern tip of Honshu to Kagoshima on the southern
island of Kyushu and operates at speeds of up to 185 miles per hour.

36
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

Figure 1.6 Current European high speed rail network

Key

250 kph+
250 kph+ planned
180 to 250 kph
Oulu
Other lines

Tampere

Oslo St.Petersburg
Helsinki
Turku
Tallinn
Stockholm
Göteborg
Riga
Edinburgh
Glasgow
Vilnius
Kobenhavn Gdansk Moskva

Hamburg
Dublin Minsk
Amsterdam Berlin Poznan
London Hannover
Bristol Warszawa
Brux
Köln
Praha Kiev
Fkft Katowice
Lux Krakow
Nürnberg
Paris Wien
Strasbg Bratislava
München Budapest
Nantes Zürich Chisinau
Ljubljana
Lyon Milano
Zagreb
Bordeaux Beograd
Torino Bologna Bucuresti
Coruña Toulouse Sarajevo
Nice
Vitoria Sofia
Marseille Podgorica
Vigo
Roma Skopje
Valladolid Tirana Istanbul
Porto Zaragoza Barcelona
Madrid Ankara
Napoli Thessaloniki Sivas
Bursa
Valencia

Konya Kayseri
Lisboa
Alicante Athinai Izmir
Sevilla

Málaga

Copyright © UIC 2009

1.43 In Europe, although it was Italy which first completed a high speed line in
1978, France quickly established itself as the leading innovator when it
opened the first Train a Grande Vitesse (TGV) line between Paris and Lyon
in 1981. The French approach differed from the Japanese in using a
combination of dedicated high speed lines and normal running on
conventional lines to increase the number of destinations served, but as
with Japan, the French have grown their network significantly since it
opened. It now runs to over 1100 miles of dedicated high speed track,
with a further 1800 miles either planned or in construction.
1.44 A wide range of European nations have now built significant high speed
networks, and the rate of construction shows no sign of slowing. As shown
in Table 1.1, this is matched by developments in Asia, where South Korea,
China and Taiwan have joined Japan as operators of high speed services.

37
High Speed Rail

Table 1.1 International high speed rail networks

Under
Network Length (m) Built Planned Total
Construction
Japan 1524 367 362 2253
France 1163 186 1626 2975
Spain 993 1379 1058 3430
Germany 799 235 416 1450
China 742 5611 1803 8156
Italy 463 82 245 790
Taiwan 214 0 0 214
South Korea 205 51 0 256
Netherlands/Belgium 108 97 0 205
United Kingdom 70 0 0 70

1.45 Demand for high speed rail in all these countries has been consistently high
and continues to rise. Japan’s Tokyo-Osaka high speed line carries over
150 million passengers per year, and in France the TGV has seen demand
quadruple as its network has expanded from around 30 million journeys in
1990 to well over 120 million in 2008. In Spain, the high speed line between
Madrid and Barcelona has increased rail’s share of the combined train and
air market between those cities from 16 per cent to around 50 per cent.
1.46 In the United States, a country with no recent track record of investing in
passenger rail, the State of California’s successful ballot proposition for a
bond to pay the first $10 billion needed for a San Francisco to Los Angeles
line has now been followed by an $8 billion programme of Federal
Government funding announced by President Obama for high speed
inter-city services.

High Speed Rail in the United States

The United States currently operates only one semi-high speed rail service,
on Amtrak’s north-eastern corridor route between Boston and Washington
DC, which reaches a top speed of around 150 miles per hour.
However, the Federal Government has recognised the contribution that
high speed rail can make to improving the speed, convenience and
sustainability of inter-urban travel. On 28 January 2010, President Obama
announced an $8 billion funding package for high speed rail projects
across the United States, as part of the “largest investment in infrastructure
since the Interstate Highway System was created.”

38
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

The funding will be used to support the development of 13 new large-

scale high speed rail corridors, improving inter-urban links between major
cities across 31 states and the District of Columbia. The map below
indicates the full range of routes receiving funding.

Northern New England

Pacific Northwest
Empire

Chicago Hub
Network Keystone

NEC

California

Southeast

South Central

KEY
Designated High-speed Rail Corridor
Northeast Corridor (NEC) Gulf Coast
KEY
OtherHigh-speed
Designated Passenger Rail Routes
Rail Corridor
Florida
Northeast Corridor (NEC)
(Alaska Railroad (Seward to Fairbanks/Eielson) not shown.) Copyright: US DoT
Other Passenger Rail Routes

The project to develop an 84 mile high speed rail corridor between Tampa
and Orlando in Florida, a little less than the distance between Birmingham
and Leeds, will receive $1.25 billion in Federal funding. This line is expected
to be completed in 2014 and will allow trains to run at up to 168 miles per
hour, providing a journey time of under an hour compared to 90 minutes
by car.
The Californian high speed rail programme will also receive significant
funds. Around $2.25 billion of Federal funding will support the
development of a 220 mile per hour network linking major population
centres from San Francisco and Sacramento to Los Angeles and San
Diego with over 300 trains per day. The journey time between Los
Angeles and San Francisco will be about 2 hours 40 minutes, well under
half the time it takes to make the same journey by car.
Alongside these major new schemes, additional investments will be made
in a number of other States, including schemes in the north-eastern
corridor, in the Midwest around Chicago, and in the Pacific north-west
between Portland and Seattle.
The aims of this programme, according to US Transportation Secretary,
Ray LaHood, are to improve connectivity, cut congestion, reduce
emissions, and create jobs, and in doing so to “reposition America’s
infrastructure for the twenty first century.”

39
High Speed Rail

From High Speed One to High Speed Two

1.47 Britain is no stranger to high speed rail. The High Speed One line from
London to Brussels and Paris has cut travel times to around two hours.
Rail’s share of the market between London and Paris has increased to
almost 80 per cent as a result. More recently, the introduction of domestic
services onto the line has substantially reduced journey times into London
from towns in Kent including Ramsgate, Dover, Folkestone and Canterbury,
as well as from Ashford, one of the Government’s key housing growth areas.
1.48 High Speed One was constructed on time and on budget; it played a key
role in helping London win the 2012 Olympic Games, for which it will carry
thousands of passengers an hour on dedicated Javelin services to and from
Stratford; and it has restored George Gilbert Scott’s St Pancras terminus to
its former glory as one of the world’s iconic railway stations.

High Speed One

High Speed One (HS1) – the 68 mile high speed line between London and
the Channel Tunnel – became fully operational in November 2007.
It was the first new railway to be constructed in Britain for more than 100
years. The construction of HS1 and the iconic refurbishment of St Pancras
Station have been recognised with an array of awards.
The new railway was an immediate success. Completion of Section 2 of
HS1 – the last leg into St Pancras – which cut international journey times
by a further 20 minutes, saw Eurostar passenger numbers rise 10 per
cent in 2008 compared to 2007. And growth in passenger numbers
continued in 2009 despite the challenging economic environment.
High speed domestic services on HS1 (see Figure 3.1) commenced in
December 2009. The time savings for passengers are very significant with
commuters from Ashford to London having their journey time more than
halved to 37 minutes. The introduction of domestic services on HS1 has
released much needed capacity on the Network Rail network.
HS1’s performance has proved to be extremely strong with the current
moving annual average of about 6 seconds delay per train from
infrastructure incidents.
HS1 has also delivered useful environmental benefits. An independent
study found that the completion of the new line had, in its first three
months, delivered a saving of 118,000 tonnes of carbon as a result of
modal shift from air to Eurostar.

1.49 Similar improvements in the capacity and performance of domestic inter-

urban networks will have a central role to play in maintaining the long-term
economic vibrancy of the UK’s major cities. It is clear from international
experience that high speed rail offers a potentially sustainable means of
achieving these aims.

40
 The Twenty-First Century Transport Challenge

1.50 Constructing a new high speed line would also, however, carry a significant
financial cost and its impacts on the environment and local communities
need to be carefully assessed to ensure that they are justified. As Sir Rod
Eddington’s study warned, no government should pursue a grand projet
of this kind for its own sake or simply because a competitor city or country
has one.
1.51 Therefore any future decisions on high speed rail, or other major new
transport infrastructure, must be based on thorough analysis of the long
term transport challenges and the potential options to address them, using
the most robust evidence available.
1.52 The UK has significant experience and expertise in modelling and appraising
the impacts of options to increase inter-urban capacity and performance
through enhancements to the current strategic road and rail networks. But
there is relatively little comparable experience with regard to new railway
alignments, and the impacts of High Speed One are significantly different
from those that might be expected of an inter-city network connecting
Britain’s major conurbations. Similarly, although the High Speed One project
has provided valuable insight into the design, engineering and construction
challenges involved in delivering high speed rail infrastructure in the UK,
there is not the same depth of experience as there is in respect of projects
to enhance existing roads and rail lines.
1.53 It was for this reason that, in January 2009, the Government established
High Speed Two Ltd (HS2 Ltd), with the following remit:
“High Speed Two’s purpose is to help consider the case for new high
speed services from London to Scotland. As a first step, we have asked
the company to develop a proposal for an entirely new line between London
and the West Midlands. To reach a view on this, the company will need to
assess the likely environmental impact and business case of different routes
in enough detail to enable the options to be narrowed down. We expect work
to be completed by the end of the year. The Government will thereafter
assess the options put forward for the development of the new line.”2
1.54 HS2 Ltd delivered its report to the Government at the end of December
2009. It is published alongside this Command Paper.
1.55 The remainder of this document sets out the Government’s response to
its conclusions.

2 Britain’s Transport Infrastructure: High Speed Two; at http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedtwo/infrastructure/

41
2. Capacity, Connectivity,
Sustainability

2.1 In his 2006 study of transport’s role in supporting economic growth and
productivity, Sir Rod Eddington recommended that in taking decisions on
transport investment the Government should:
“…[enshrine] a systematic approach which starts by identifying clear
objectives, takes a cross-modal approach to finding solutions, considers all
types of interventions, assesses the full impacts of policies and prioritises
those options which do most to deliver on [its] objectives.”
2.2 The Government has carried out an analysis of the options for sustainably
enhancing inter-urban capacity and connectivity.
2.3 The Government’s judgement is that a viable case cannot be made for
major new motorways as a sustainable solution to the UK’s long term inter-
urban transport needs. Nor is a significant expansion in domestic aviation
considered to be a sustainable way to meet this challenge.
2.4 Therefore, a series of packages of large-scale improvements to existing
road and rail networks were identified for more detailed analysis, and the
costs and benefits of each calculated. The Government has reviewed these
alongside the results of HS2 Ltd’s comparative assessment of the case for
new high speed versus conventional rail capacity.
2.5 This has demonstrated that high speed rail offers overall benefits unmatched
by any other option, whilst its costs are comparable with those of alternative
approaches to increasing rail capacity. The package of upgrades to Britain’s
current rail network necessary to deliver only half of a new high speed line’s
capacity benefits would be more expensive than such a new line and would
be hugely disruptive to passengers and other rail users.
2.6 For this reason, the Government’s assessment is that high speed rail
appears the most effective way to meet its capacity, connectivity and
sustainability objectives for inter-urban travel over the next 20 to 30 years.
2.7 This chapter sets out in detail how this position was reached.

Assessing the options – capacity, connectivity,

sustainability
2.8 As set out in the previous chapter, the UK can expect to see demand for
inter-urban travel continue to climb over the next 20 to 30 years, driven by
42
 Capacity, Connectivity, Sustainability

sustained economic growth and rising prosperity, even allowing for other
means of sustaining growth. Investment in inter-urban transport networks
will deliver significant additional capacity. However, over the longer term,
substantial additional capacity will be required to sustain economic growth.
2.9 Additional capacity must, however, be sustainable. New networks must be
compatible with the Government’s long term strategy to promote a low carbon
economy, including its statutory targets to reduce carbon emissions set out
in the Climate Change Act 2008, and their impacts on local landscapes and
communities must not be disproportionate to the economic and social
benefits that they would bring.
2.10 Not every option meets this sustainability test. In particular, the Government
has concluded that neither a significant expansion in domestic aviation nor
major new motorway alignments would be consistent with its objectives for
sustainable development.
2.11 Although such a calculation will always depend on the load factors used,
the evidence suggests that under most realistic scenarios the carbon
emissions generated per passenger kilometre by domestic aviation will
be high in comparison with other modes (Figure 2.2 sets this out in more
detail). Therefore, the carbon impacts of growth in domestic aviation would
be likely to be substantial.
2.12 This conclusion is in line with that reached recently by the Committee on
Climate Change, whose December 2009 report concluded that whilst there
was significant scope to reduce the carbon intensity of air travel over the
years to 2050, this would be unlikely to offset forecast growth in full, and
therefore other measures would be needed in order to keep within the
Government’s target to reduce total aviation emissions to below their 2005
level by 2050.
2.13 The local environmental effects of airport expansion, including noise and
air quality impacts, can also be substantial. This is acknowledged in the
Future of Air Transport White Paper (2003) which sets out clearly that the
provision of additional airport capacity must be subject to meeting strict
environmental criteria.
2.14 Domestic aviation will remain a viable option in some cases, particularly on
longer routes – generally where the journey time for surface travel is around
four hours or more – for routes from more remote destinations, and for
many trips where passengers are travelling to transfer to international flights.
2.15 In respect of major new motorway alignments, the landtake and noise
impacts would be a whole order more damaging than those from additional
electric rail capacity. Moreover, with typical loadings, car travel is significantly
more carbon intensive than even the fastest train, whilst still not matching the
journey times or reliability offered by rail for city centre to city centre travel.
2.16 No major new motorway has opened since the completion of the M40 in
1991. Roads policy in England has instead focused on making better use of
existing capacity and on targeted infrastructure enhancements. These have

43
High Speed Rail

included short new stretches of motorway to relieve the most congested

sections of the strategic road network, such as the M6 toll road, as well as
a range of motorway widening projects and the use of hard shoulder running,
which can increase capacity by up to 30 per cent without new alignments.
2.17 This is the approach to improving the capacity and performance of the
strategic road network that the Government will continue to follow.
2.18 For these reasons, the Government’s detailed option assessment has focused
on significant packages of enhancements to the existing road and rail networks
between London and the West Midlands, together with HS2 Ltd’s analysis of
the business case for new high speed and conventional rail lines along the same
corridor. These packages, which all also take account of the Government’s
current investment plans for transport, are described in detail below:

Table 2.1 Rail options

Package Description
Package 1 Extra long distance capacity delivered through the operation of
longer trains on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) with platform
lengthening and other infrastructure enhancements.
Package 2 Extra long distance capacity delivered through an increase
in train service frequencies on the WCML with supporting
infrastructure enhancements including extra platforms at
Euston and Manchester Piccadilly stations, grade separation
of junctions and 4-tracking sections of route.
Package 3 Building on package 2, the capacity and maximum speed of the
Chiltern route between London and Birmingham is enhanced
to allow fast WCML London – Birmingham trains to be diverted
to the Chiltern Line, releasing capacity on the WCML for other
services. Associated infrastructure enhancements include
electrification, short new alignments, 4-tracking sections of route
and additional platforms at Euston, Birmingham Moor St. and
Manchester Piccadilly stations.
Package 4 Building on package 3, London – Birmingham journey times are
reduced to a minimum through further infrastructure enhancements
including a new alignment between the Chiltern Line and the
WCML in the Kenilworth area.
Package 5 Building on package 4, additional capacity is provided between
Birmingham and Stafford to enable WCML services between
London and the North West to be diverted to the Chiltern route,
releasing capacity on the WCML for other services. Associated
infrastructure enhancements include 4-tracking the route between
Birmingham and Stafford and further 4-tracking of the Chiltern route.

44
 Capacity, Connectivity, Sustainability

Table 2.2 Road options

Package Description
Package 1 Extension of hard shoulder running to the M1 (junctions 1-19),
M40 (except between junctions 8 and 9) and M42 (junctions 1-7),
plus widening the M42 between junctions 3 and 7 from three
permanent lanes to four.
Package 2 Building on package 1, hard shoulder running is added to the
M25 (junctions 15-21) – plus upgrading from five permanent
lanes to six between junctions 14 and 15.
Package 3 Building on package 2, the M40 is upgraded to provide
generally four permanent lanes throughout its length and five
lanes between junctions 1A and 3.
Package 4 Building on package 3, where feasible, all sections of hard
shoulder running are upgraded to provide a permanent
extra lane.

2.19 In order to enable a robust comparison between these options and those
considered by HS2 Ltd, the Government commissioned engineering firm
Atkins to assess the costs and benefits of each package on the basis of
detailed modelling. The following sections set out the results of that
comparison in terms of capacity, connectivity and sustainability.

Capacity
2.20 HS2 Ltd’s analysis shows that a new rail line connecting London to the
West Midlands, and linked to the existing West Coast Main Line north of
Birmingham to enable services to run on to additional destinations, would
deliver a transformational increase in inter-urban capacity, potentially
more than trebling total rail capacity on one of Britain’s most congested
transport corridors.
2.21 Any new line, whether high speed or conventional, will transform capacity.
This is because:
● Firstly, any new line would in itself provide the opportunity to run very
significant numbers of additional services.
● Secondly, in contrast to upgrading an existing route, a new line can easily
be constructed in such a way as to permit the operation of longer trains.
Current European standards for new lines require them to allow trains of
up to 400 metres (in comparison to the 207 metre Pendolinos in use on
the West Coast Main Line).
● Thirdly, a new line would enable faster long distance services to be
segregated from slower regional and commuter services, which stop
at more stations, as well as from freight. The capacity benefits from
segregating service types in this way can be substantial, given that a
single slower train can cut across the paths of up to seven high speed
services, as the diagram below shows:
45
High Speed Rail

Figure 2.1 Train paths: benefits of segregating service types

Paris – Montparnasse

TGV High Speed Train

at 300kph (53mins)
Conventional Train
at 200kph (80mins)
Distance

53mins

Tours – Montlouis Time Source: UIC

● Fourthly, the use of a new line for long distance services from London
to Birmingham and beyond would release significant capacity on the
existing West Coast Main Line for other service types – including
commuter and regional passenger trains and freight.
2.22 In contrast, works on the current rail infrastructure would not come close
to matching this trebling of capacity. To deliver just half the capacity
increase of a new line would require major upgrades to four important
stations (Euston, Paddington, Birmingham Moor Street and Manchester
Piccadilly) as well as major 4-tracking and other track and infrastructure
works on the Chiltern and West Coast Main Lines. These upgrades would,
taken together, cost more than a new high speed line and they would cause
immense disruption to travellers over a construction period spanning
several years.
2.23 In respect of the motorway options, the work undertaken by Atkins shows
that further investment could provide substantial additional capacity.
However, the road network is not mainly used for city centre to city centre
journeys – indeed, the high levels of congestion experienced in all urban
centres, and most of all in London, mean that it is generally a less reliable,
and as a result less attractive, way to make such trips than rail. Furthermore,
for business journeys, travelling by road provides little or no opportunity to
work whilst on route, and is therefore more costly than the alternatives in
terms of productivity.
2.24 Increasing motorway capacity will not solve any of these problems; it would
not make city centre to city centre road journeys competitive with rail in
terms of either predictability or productivity. Increased motorway capacity
may be justified for other reasons – for instance, to tackle congestion
bottlenecks. But it would not be an effective substitute for the direct inter-
city capacity that new or improved rail lines can provide.

46
 Capacity, Connectivity, Sustainability

Connectivity
2.25 With regard to improved connectivity, the most significant benefits would
clearly be delivered by a new high speed rail line, which would cut the time
it takes to travel from Birmingham city centre to London by more than
40 per cent from the current 1 hour 24 minutes to as little as 40-49 minutes.
2.26 Both improvements to existing lines and a new conventional line could also
provide some journey time savings, but in neither case would they be
comparable with those created by a high speed line. HS2 Ltd estimates the
likely savings from a new conventional line at around 20 minutes, compared
to the 35 minutes provided by the high speed alternative, and the saving
from a conventional line would only be delivered if it was built to a similar
specification as their high speed proposal, meaning, in particular, that no
stops would be included outside the two conurbations. The savings
provided by upgrades to the current network would also be comparatively
low – no more than 10-20 minutes at most.
2.27 In respect of new motorway enhancements, although additional capacity
might improve average journey times if it effectively tackled congestion
bottlenecks, it could not reduce minimum journey times. Indeed, hard shoulder
running uses a reduction in speed limits as one of the measures to smooth
the flow of traffic and provide more reliable journeys at congested times.
2.28 Connectivity is not only a question of the time it takes to make a journey.
Improving the reliability and predictability of journeys is also a factor.
Motorway improvements are of value in this respect, but these benefits
would not be enjoyed in full by those making city centre to city centre
journeys, as a result of the likely congestion experienced on urban roads
at the beginning and end of their trips.

Sustainability
2.29 In assessing the relative sustainability of options to improve the UK’s inter-urban
transport links, two key issues must be taken into account: their implications
for greenhouse gas emissions and their local environmental impacts.
2.30 Figure 2.2 shows the Government’s estimate of the typical relative performance
in carbon terms of different inter-urban travel modes.
2.31 Although the figures for aviation and rail are highly sensitive to load factor
assumptions, this analysis demonstrates that, so long as a high load factor
is maintained and on the basis of the fuel types currently used, carbon
emissions from rail are substantially lower per passenger mile than those
from other modes.

47
High Speed Rail

Table 2.3 UK CO2 emissions by mode of transport

Mode Total CO2 Share of total Share of UK
emissions in UK domestic domestic
2007 emissions transport
(Mt CO2) emissions
Car 74.4 13.7% 55.4%
Rail 2.2 0.4% 1.6%
Domestic flight 2.3 0.4% 1.7%

2.32 Further improvements to carbon efficiency can be expected across all

modes as new technologies are developed and tighter carbon constraints
apply. In Japan, the most recent generation of Series N700 Shinkansen
trains consumes 30 per cent less energy at 165 miles per hour than the
earlier Series 0 model travelling 30 miles per hour slower. The average fuel
consumption of new cars in the UK has fallen by almost 20 per cent
since 1998.
2.33 In the same way, more fundamental changes to how transport is powered
may occur, with significant implications for long-term carbon emissions. The
electrification of the car fleet and uptake of sustainable biofuels, as envisaged
in the Government’s low carbon transport strategy, may over a long period
of time reduce road transport’s emissions per passenger mile relative to rail.
2.34 However, it is likely that the comparative advantage in terms of greenhouse
gas emissions will continue to lie with rail for many decades. And increasing
decarbonisation of electricity could improve rail’s advantage over road in
the interim.
2.35 Moreover, in the light of the UK’s statutory targets for the reduction of carbon
emissions, which were set in the Climate Change Act 2008, it is not enough
merely to identify that rail is preferable to road in terms of relative carbon
emissions. Having identified a preferred option for delivering enhanced
inter-urban capacity and connectivity, it will be necessary to ensure that its
absolute impact on carbon emissions is consistent with the achievement
of these targets. This issue is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
2.36 The second sustainability issue that must be taken into account is the
impact of each option on the local environment, including its implications
for landscape, air quality and noise.
2.37 In contrast to carbon emissions, these impacts are highly dependent on
the specific route chosen and mitigation measures employed. The likely
environmental impacts of any specific option must be considered in the
context of more detailed planning and assessment, informed by public
consultation.

48
 Capacity, Connectivity, Sustainability

Figure 2.2 Carbon emissions per passenger kilometre by mode

of transport3

250

200
Emissions per passenger km (gCO2)

150

100

50

0
Domestic Car (average Car – Car – Car – Car – Intercity Rail Eurostar
flight occupancy) 1 occupant 2 occupants 3 occupants 4 occupants

Mode

2.38 All major transport infrastructure projects will have some negative impacts.
Any new alignment, whether road or rail, conventional or high speed, will
require a significant amount of land take, and railways as well as motorways
will have a degree of negative impact in terms of noise. However, a new
motorway would require at least twice as much land as a high speed rail
line, and motorways can be harmful for local air quality, whereas new
railways would rely on electric power.
2.39 In terms of completely new alignments, therefore, the environmental
advantage will lie with rail. It is also likely that the impacts of new alignments
will be somewhat higher than those of major improvements to existing
infrastructure, though these should still not be underestimated. But in all
cases appropriate detailed mitigations would need to be put in place to
ensure that such impacts were managed and reduced wherever possible.

3 Figures for car travel, aviation and Eurostar are based on Defra’s Company Reporting Guidelines (2009). Intercity rail
figures are derived from the Department for Transport’s network modelling framework. All figures are based on an
average load factor for the mode.

49
High Speed Rail

The overall assessment – costs and benefits

2.40 As set out above, a new railway line would supply the greatest increase in
capacity, with only a high speed line being able to add to this significant
connectivity benefits. The rail options are also likely to be the most
sustainable, so long as their local environmental impacts are appropriately
mitigated, and usage is consistently high enough to maintain their relative
advantage in terms of greenhouse gas emissions.
2.41 Overall, therefore, it appears probable that a high speed line will offer the
greatest benefits: a conclusion borne out by the analysis carried out for the
Government by HS2 Ltd and Atkins. This analysis was based on calculations
of the economic value of the capacity and journey time improvements of
each of the options, and is published alongside the Command Paper.
2.42 However, any analysis of the options must also take account of the costs of
each proposal, in order to make an assessment of its overall value for
money, especially given the potentially very high costs of some of the
options, including not only a high speed line, but also some of the more
significant upgrade packages.
2.43 Table 2.4 sets out the costs and benefits of the options considered, along
with the overall value for money calculation for each one. It focuses on two
of the packages considered for each of road and rail – firstly that offering
the highest value for money and secondly that offering the highest benefits
regardless of cost. It also includes an assessment of the disruption that
would be caused by each option to travellers during construction.
2.44 The costs used in the table are the net cost to government – i.e. the overall
cost less any revenue that would be generated by the project (e.g. through
fares). They show clearly that the largest upgrades to existing railway lines
are more expensive than an entirely new line over the long term, yet these
can at best provide only half of the capacity benefits of a new line.
2.45 The net costs of a new conventional line are only marginally lower than
those of a high speed line. This is because without the connectivity benefits
offered by high speed rail, a conventional line would not attract the same
number of passengers, and as a result its fare revenues would be
significantly lower than those of the high speed equivalent.
2.46 Furthermore, it is unlikely that these calculations capture the full costs
of each project, once disruption to travellers is also taken into account.
The modernisation of the West Coast Main Line took almost a decade to
complete. Its costs included more than £500 million in compensation to
train operating companies as a result of disruption to their services, and
this accounted for only a fraction of the economic and social cost of the
disruption to passengers and other rail users. The larger rail upgrade
packages outlined here would be on a similar scale, with similar potential
impacts. Equally, the packages of road upgrades would entail significant
disruption for motorists whilst construction takes place.

50
 Table 2.4 Comparative benefits of new capacity options, London to Birmingham
Comparison of Mid-scale Large-scale New
New High Mid-scale Large-scale
London-West Midlands rail upgrade rail upgrade conventional
Speed Rail road package road package
Corridor options package package Rail
Maximum potential ~50% ~100% ~200%+ ~200%+ ~20% ~20%
capacity increase
Journey time ~10 mins ~20 mins ~20 mins 35 mins ~2–4 mins ~3–6 mins
improvement
Present value costs to £3.1 £13.7 c. £11.5 £11.9 £1.4 £3.2
HMG (bn)
Present value benefits £6.8 £11.6 c. £22.5 £28.7 £5.1 £7.0
(bn)
Benefit:cost ratio 2.2 0.9 ~2.0 2.4 3.7 2.2
Disruption impact
Works at Works at 2 Major works Major works Modification of Widening of
Euston and major London at Euston and at Euston and 255 motorway 448 motorway
Manchester terminals, connection connection lane miles for lane miles with
Piccadilly. Birmingham to WCML at to WCML at Hard Shoulder associated
Moor St. and Lichfield Lichfield Running and temporary
Grade
Manchester widening of 34 speed
separation
Piccadilly. lane miles with restrictions and
and significant
associated lane closures
4-tracking on Significant 4
temporary
WCML. tracking of
speed
WCML and
restrictions and
almost all of
lane closures
Chiltern Line

51
Capacity, Connectivity, Sustainability
High Speed Rail

2.47 It is clear from this assessment that there are still strong gains to be made
from the further roll-out of hard shoulder running. But it should be noted that
the value for money offered by even the smallest and cheapest packages of
measures is lower than that of the current managed motorways programme.
It appears likely that the scope for incremental improvements to continue
to offer high value for money is finite, with the returns from such packages
decreasing substantially as they grow in size and cost.
2.48 In contrast, the benefits delivered by a new London-Birmingham high
speed line are in excess of those from any other option under consideration,
totalling almost £29 billion as a result of radical capacity increases and a
dramatic reduction in journey times. Furthermore, even when the costs of
such a line are taken into account, it offers value for money greater than
that of any but the smallest packages of road improvements, providing well
over £2 of benefits for every £1 spent.

Compatibility with UK’s carbon targets

2.49 A high speed line would provide very significant capacity and connectivity
benefits and offer high value for money as a result. But as noted in
paragraph 2.35, it can only be a viable option if its carbon emissions
can be accommodated within the UK Government’s statutory targets
for reducing overall greenhouse gas emissions.
2.50 It is therefore important to take into account not only its relative carbon
impacts compared to other modes, but also the absolute increase or
reduction in carbon that it would entail compared to what would happen
if such a line was not built. This means ensuring a) that its emissions are
justified by the wider benefits it offers, and b) that any change in emissions
as a result of such a line can be accommodated within the UK’s overall
strategy for reducing transport’s impacts on climate change.
2.51 With regard to a), the assessments of value for money set out above
include carbon emissions and other environmental costs, and demonstrate
that the carbon cost of a high speed line would be significantly outweighed
by its capacity and connectivity benefits. Also, given that any new high
speed line would rely on electric power, it should be noted that its power
sources would be covered by the European Union Emissions Trading System.
This means that it could not generate any net increase in emissions at the
EU level, although unless renewable electricity sources were used its
operators would need to purchase allowances to cover its energy
requirements.
2.52 With regard to b), the overall carbon impact of a new high speed line would
depend on three factors:
i) the carbon emitted as a result of construction (referred to as
“embedded carbon”);

52
 Capacity, Connectivity, Sustainability

ii) the increased carbon emissions as a result of high speed journeys that
would not otherwise have been made (or to a lesser extent switches
from conventional rail, which has lower emissions); and
iii) the reduction in carbon emissions due to some journeys switching to
high speed rail from higher carbon modes such as the car and aviation.
2.53 HS2 Ltd’s assessment is that the overall embedded carbon from building
a London to Birmingham line is relatively small, only 1.2 million tonnes over
the entire construction period, and not significant in the context of the UK’s
overall emissions.
2.54 Therefore, the key issue in terms of a high speed line’s compatibility with the
UK’s statutory targets to reduce emissions is whether the carbon emitted as
a result of the operation of a high speed network is consistent with the UK’s
carbon reduction targets.
2.55 HS2 Ltd’s calculations suggest that it is. They indicate a range of potential
changes in carbon emissions over 60 years resulting from a high speed line
from London to the West Midlands of -25.0 million to +26.6 million tonnes,
depending on the level of modal shift achieved and the rate at which
electricity generation ceases to rely on fossil fuels. The basis for this
calculation is set out in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Range of carbon impacts estimated by HS2 Ltd

for a high speed line from London to Birmingham
Change in CO2 over 60 years (MtCO2)
HS2 Emissions 0 to +26.1
Other Rail Impacts -1.3 to +0.5
Car Mode Shift -0.5 to 0
Air Mode Shift -23.2 to 0
Total -25.0 to + 26.6

2.56 It should be noted that these figures do not assume that travellers from
London to Birmingham, or vice versa, would switch from air, as the journey is
too short for aviation even now. Rather, HS2 Ltd’s modelling suggests that it
is the journey time savings delivered to more northerly destinations, such as
Manchester and Glasgow, through high speed services connecting onto the
West Coast Main Line, that would encourage some modal shift from plane
to train. If a wider network was built, with further reductions in journey times
to Manchester, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh, the potential for modal
shift and consequent carbon reductions would be far greater.
2.57 But even if no modal shift at all was achieved and there was no
improvement in the carbon intensity of electricity generation, HS2 Ltd’s
figures still indicate that the additional carbon generated would average
only around 0.44 million tonnes per year. To put this in context, this figure

53
High Speed Rail

would represent around 0.3 per cent of current domestic greenhouse gas
emissions from transport, which totalled 131.9 million tonnes in 2008.
2.58 There is plenty of evidence to suggest that high speed rail can attract
passengers from aviation. Rail’s share of the combined rail/aviation market
increased from under 25 per cent to over 80 per cent following completion
of the Madrid-Seville high speed line. Closer to home, by improving journey
times and reliability for services between London and Manchester, the
completion of the West Coast Route Modernisation led to roughly a
doubling in rail’s share of the combined market from one third to two thirds.
2.59 Even so, aviation will remain the most attractive choice for some journeys –
most notably, those of more than 500 miles, such as from London to the
north of Scotland.
2.60 Any calculation which relies on modal shift will be sensitive to changes in
the relative carbon efficiency of each mode. But there is no good reason to
believe that these changes would significantly disadvantage high speed rail.
As set out in paragraph 2.32, history shows a clear pattern of increasing
efficiency from high speed rail in other countries, no less than from car travel.
2.61 The Government’s assessment therefore is that high speed rail is consistent
with its carbon reduction targets for transport, and the option which most
effectively balances its capacity, connectivity and sustainability objectives for
inter-urban transport.
2.62 This should come as no surprise. Rail is a comparatively low carbon mode of
transport, responsible for just two per cent of overall transport emissions. In
contrast, road transport is responsible for around 90 per cent, so efforts to
improve the efficiency of that sector will inevitably form the main part of any
transport carbon reduction strategy.

The case for high speed rail

2.63 Chapter One demonstrated that the UK will require significant improvements
in inter-urban capacity and connectivity over the next 20 to 30 years, in
order to support its continued economic growth and prosperity.
2.64 The Government has considered a range of options to meet these goals.
Its assessment is that high speed rail is the most effective way forward.
Neither major new motorways nor a significant expansion of domestic
aviation can be considered a sustainable solution to the UK’s long term
inter-urban transport needs. And high speed rail offers benefits unmatched
by any other option including new conventional rail lines or major upgrades
of existing road or rail networks.
2.65 However, it is unlikely that this would be the sum total of the benefits of
such a line. Over and above its conventional transport benefits, a project
of this kind could play a significant role in helping deliver increased
competitiveness and productivity in the UK and supporting regional
economic growth. The next chapter looks at these benefits in more detail.

54
3. Supporting Growth
in the Regions

3.1 Chapter Two examined the case for high speed rail against other options
for tackling the UK’s inter-urban transport challenges over the next 20 to 30
years. Its assessment was that high speed rail is the most effective way to
deliver sustainable improvements in capacity and connectivity between the
major conurbations of the North, the Midlands and London. On that basis
alone high speed rail appears the most attractive option.
3.2 However, the direct benefits in terms of increased capacity and reduced
journey times are unlikely to be the sum total of the benefits of a high speed
network in Britain.
3.3 Such a network could also provide important support for long-term regional
economic growth in the UK, for instance by:
● Increasing the productivity of the UK’s urban economies by providing
access to deeper labour markets and wider pools of customers and
suppliers as a result of faster and more reliable inter-urban journeys;
● Enabling the major cities of the Midlands and the North to compete
and collaborate more effectively, particularly when combined with
improvements to Trans-Pennine services. This would incentivise greater
specialisation and promote investment and growth in these regions.
● Supporting housing growth in the Milton Keynes/South Midlands growth
area (MKSM), through the use of released capacity on existing lines to
provide enhanced commuter services; and
● Promoting London’s long-term competitiveness, by providing efficient
connections between urban, national and international networks.
3.4 This chapter explains these potential benefits in more detail and describes
the contribution that the Government believes a high speed network could
make to regional economic growth over the next 20 years as part of the
UK’s twenty-first century economic infrastructure.

Increasing urban economic productivity

3.5 Improving transport links has long been acknowledged as a key means
of supporting growth and increasing productivity in major conurbations.

55
High Speed Rail

3.6 This is not only because such measures reduce journey time for travellers,
but also as a result of wider effects. Increasing the distance that can be
travelled within a given time broadens the pools of employees, customers
and suppliers that a firm can access, and thereby enables businesses to
recruit staff whose skills more closely match their requirements, to sell their
products more widely, and to get better deals from suppliers, reducing the
costs for their customers. It can also create ‘knowledge spillovers’, which
incentivise skills improvements and innovation, because companies and
individuals are more likely to interact with and therefore be able to gain
from a greater depth and variety of contacts.
3.7 These processes – referred to by economists as ‘agglomeration effects’ –
enhance competition and innovation, reduce costs, increase productivity
and create business opportunities. They were highlighted by Sir Rod
Eddington as one of the most important ways in which transport investment
can support economic competitiveness, alongside the increased efficiency
created by faster and more reliable journeys:
“Transport improvements can expand labour market catchments, improve
job matching, and facilitate business to business interactions.”
3.8 The Department for Transport has published draft guidance on valuing
impacts of this kind from transport schemes, and HS2 Ltd used this to
assess the potential agglomeration benefits arising as a result of their
proposed London-Birmingham high speed line.
3.9 HS2 Ltd’s calculation suggests that the wider agglomeration benefits
related to such a line could amount to around £2 billion at 2009 prices
over a 60 year period. This figure is derived specifically from the benefits of
improved linkages between firms. HS2 Ltd’s report also acknowledges that
there could be additional benefits as a result of the new line enabling people
to move to more productive jobs, but these benefits are more uncertain and
have not been valued.
3.10 Furthermore, it is likely that the agglomeration benefits from high speed rail
connections between other cities would also be of value – especially between
Birmingham and both Manchester and Leeds, given the short distances
between these significant economic centres, which are poorly connected
at present. Further work will be undertaken to measure these benefits.
3.11 HS2 Ltd also identified a second wider economic benefit from a new
London-Birmingham line: increased productivity generates benefits in line
with the value that customers place on the goods and services that result,
which tends to be higher than the costs of production alone. This benefit,
calculated in accordance with Department for Transport guidance, is
estimated at around £1.6 billion over 60 years.
3.12 Taken together, if these additional benefits are added to those included in
HS2’s calculation of the conventional benefits of a London to Birmingham
line its benefit:cost ratio increases from the 2.4:1 quoted in Chapter Five to
around 2.7:1.

56
 Supporting Growth in the Regions

3.13 In order to inform their assessment of the wider benefits of a high speed line
from London to the West Midlands, HS2 Ltd also commissioned research
to assess the degree to which agglomeration benefits were likely to be
created between major economic centres through transport improvements
on major inter-urban routes. This research concluded that improved
connectivity between cities could create agglomeration and other wider
economic benefits, and as a result that:
“…high speed rail could have an important effect on the level of
connectivity between firms (business movements) and between workers
(community movements)”4
3.14 These effects are more uncertain than those experienced within urban
centres that informed the calculations above, and they would also not be
expected to be as pronounced. Nonetheless, the research indicates that
there could be some additional benefits from a high speed line not picked
up by the existing guidance on valuing agglomeration effects.

Supporting growth in Britain’s core cities

3.15 The wider economic benefits of a UK high speed rail network might be
most substantial in the major city regions of the North and the Midlands.
Despite the comparatively short distances between them, rail journey times
between these cities can be surprisingly high – an hour and a half for the
95-mile trip from Birmingham to Manchester, and around two hours for the
similar length journey to Leeds. Rail journeys tend to be especially lengthy
where crossing from one of the major Victorian north-south arteries to
another, for instance from the West Coast Main Line in Birmingham to
destinations such as Sheffield or Nottingham on the Midland Main Line
or Leeds on the East Coast Main Line. Rail Images

4 Advice on the Assessment of Wider Economic Impacts: A Report for HS2, Daniel J. Graham and Patricia Melo, 2010
57
High Speed Rail

Figure 3.1 High Speed One domestic services

Key

HS1
St Pancras Stratford Existing network on to
International International which high speed trains run

Ebbsfleet
International
Sittingbourne

Canterbury Ramsgate
West

Dover Priory

Ashford
International Folkestone
Central

Channel
Tunnel

3.16 Furthermore, the strategic road network cannot offer a competitive

alternative for city centre to city centre travel. The motorway connections
between these cities are amongst the most congested motorway links in
Britain after the M25 and, even when uncongested, journey times by car
are as high or higher than those by rail, given the slower average speeds
compared to rail and the difficulty of access to city centres.
3.17 This lack of connectivity between the major urban economies in these regions
is likely to be one of the important reasons why they continue to function
more as isolated economies than as a single functional economic area. This
has been identified as a key weakness in research commissioned by the
Northern Way into city economies in northern regions, which notes that:
“the cities of the North largely operate as relatively self-contained economic
entities … Hence, any synergy between the North’s two major cities of
Manchester and Leeds, which might in principle be expected to increase
their potential to act together as a countermagnet to complement London
and the wider South East, is largely unrealised since service industries in
the two cities largely replicate each other.”5

5 A report to the Northern Way: The roles and economic functions of the city regions of the North (2008);
at http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/downloaddoc.asp?id=458

58
 Supporting Growth in the Regions

3.18 An initial core high speed network linking Birmingham to Manchester and
Leeds, together with improvements to the Trans-Pennine routes connecting
those two cities could play an important role in addressing this. By improving
journey times, capacity and reliability between those cities, and potentially
other major conurbations in the East Midlands and South Yorkshire, it could
make it significantly easier for firms based in one city to work across these
regions rather than being restricted to a single conurbation.
3.19 In the short term this could reduce costs for firms, for instance enabling
them to access several major conurbations from a single office, and it could
provide access to more significant markets, including labour markets. This
would be comparable with the situation in western Germany where the high
speed line between Frankfurt and Cologne (roughly the same distance as
between Birmingham and Leeds) is enabling workers to access job
opportunities in both cities.
3.20 Over the longer term, it could have more profound effects, improving
overall productivity and competitiveness in the Midlands and the North by
encouraging greater specialisation in urban economies, building for instance
on Leeds’ growing reputation as a financial centre, and Manchester’s
strength in the creative and media industries over the past 50 years, which
has been underlined by the BBC’s recent decision to relocate a significant
part of its activities to Salford Quays.
3.21 To support such a pattern of increasing specialisation and economic
productivity, the Midlands and the Northern regions have significant
resources upon which they can draw. They contain no fewer than seven
universities in the Times World Top 100: Manchester, Warwick, Birmingham,
York, Sheffield, Nottingham and Leeds; as well as major international
airports at Manchester and Birmingham, strong regional airports at Leeds
Bradford, Liverpool, and in the East Midlands; major port facilities, highly
developed supply chains, important research and development facilities
(such as Astra Zeneca’s Cheshire plant), and long-standing traditions of
excellence and innovation in advanced manufacturing and engineering.
3.22 Furthermore, released capacity on conventional rail networks could also
help to support regional growth by enabling improved commuter services
into major cities, and by allowing levels of rail freight into key interchanges
in the Midlands and North West to increase substantially.
3.23 By transforming the connectivity of the Northern and Midlands regions to
London they would also be better placed to attract firms and business
areas which would otherwise be expected to be based close to the capital.
Sir Rod Eddington’s study of transport and productivity in the UK stressed
the importance of ‘there-and-back-in-a-day’ travel between key economic
centres, but further reductions in journey times enabling half-day business
trips, such as those potentially delivered through high speed rail, could have
a long-term impact on decisions such as business location.

59
High Speed Rail

3.24 Currently firms wishing to tap into the London market tend to congregate
in areas within an hour to 80 minutes of London, along with the back office
functions for some major London businesses. In part as a result of this, a
correlation can be seen between the rail journey time from London of British
towns and cities and the value of the goods and services they produce
(known as Gross Value Added (GVA)), as Figure 3.2 shows.

Figure 3.2 Gross value added (GVA) per head and journey time to London

35

Reading
30 Swindon

Milton Keynes

Peterborough
GVA per head 2007 – £000s per head

25
Central Bristol
Oxford Leicestershire Bournemouth
Slough Derby
Southampton Warrington
Luton
Brighton
20 Portsmouth Gloucester Manchester West
Northampton Nottingham Telford Yorkshire
Ipswich Kingston- Tyne and
West Midlands Upon-Hull Wear
Colchester
Plymouth
Southend-on-Sea Norwich
15 Preston Middlesbrough
North South Blackburn
Staffordshire Yorkshire
Torbay
Merseyside Blackpool
10

5
0 50 100 150 200

Journey time by rail from city centre station to nearest London station – minutes

3.25 Journey time from London is not the only factor taken into account in
business location decisions, as evidenced by the significant differences in
GVA between towns at roughly the same distance from the capital, such
as Swindon and Southend. The availability of the right skills, together with
issues such as cost, wider market access and quality of life, are other factors.
3.26 However, as noted above, the major cities of the Midlands and the North
are home to major education and cultural sectors, and can offer a lower
cost of living than London and the South East, and potential access to very
significant regional markets. As such, bringing these cities closer to London,

60
 Supporting Growth in the Regions

and reducing journey times to less than 80 minutes in all cases, and just 40-
49 minutes for Birmingham, has significant potential to generate additional
regional growth by influencing long term business location decisions.

Supporting housing growth

3.27 A British high speed rail network could also bring important housing
benefits for the UK, in particular supporting housing growth in key towns
and cities to the north of London.
3.28 The Government sees increasing the supply of housing as a key priority for
tackling housing affordability and homelessness. The Milton Keynes/South
Midlands sub-region (MKSM) has been identified as one of the major areas
for that growth to take place, due to its potential for strong economic
development and new housing development, and its proximity to both
London and Birmingham.
3.29 Around 225,000 new homes and 200,000 new jobs are planned for the
sub region over the next 10 years, with a further 100,000 new homes in the
following decade. Whilst the region already has good links to London and
Birmingham via the West Coast Main Line, improved transport provision
has been identified as a key part of the MKSM delivery plan.
3.30 The improvements to journey times, capacity and reliability provided by
the recent modernisation of the West Coast Main Line have already helped
make the MKSM sub-region a more attractive proposition for business and
for people commuting to London or Birmingham. But services to and
from London remain highly congested at peak times, and this will worsen
considerably over the coming 20 years without substantial increases in
rail capacity.
3.31 HS2 Ltd’s modelling of a London-Birmingham high speed line suggests that
it could liberate sufficient capacity on the existing line to run a substantially
improved service to Milton Keynes, Rugby and Northampton, potentially
including seven non-stop services and five stopping services an hour from
Milton Keynes to London at peak times.
3.32 The extension of High Speed Two to Leeds via the East Midlands and
South Yorkshire would have the potential to deliver even greater benefits
to key growth points within the MKSM sub-region, including Kettering,
Wellingborough, Bedford and Luton, by removing many long distance
services from the Midland Mainline and creating space for commuter
capacity to grow as a result. Moreover, the released capacity delivered on
the East Coast Main Line by a Leeds extension would help support housing
growth in Peterborough, one of the key towns in the London-Stansted-
Cambridge-Peterborough growth area.
3.33 In this way, all four of the priority areas for housing growth identified by the
Government could benefit directly from its investment in high speed rail.
Ashford and the Thames Gateway are already reaping the benefits of the

61
High Speed Rail

recently introduced domestic services on the High Speed One line to the east
of London and into Kent (see Figure 3.1). London-Cambridge-Stansted-
Peterborough could benefit from released capacity on the East Coast Main
Line. And MKSM could potentially see substantial capacity increases for
commuter and regional services, as a result of capacity created on the
upgraded West Coast Main Line by a new high speed line to Birmingham
and further north.

Supporting London’s long term competitiveness

3.34 For London, the potential benefits of high speed rail would also be
considerable. The core ‘Y’ high speed rail network described in the
following chapter could bring at least six of the major cities of the Midlands
and the North to within 80 minutes of London, enhancing access to
concentrations of innovation, knowledge and skills, for instance from the
major universities and research facilities based in those city regions. By
providing direct links to Crossrail, Heathrow and potentially High Speed
One, the integration of the urban, national and international networks
serving the capital could be significantly enhanced.
3.35 A new high speed rail network could bring other economic benefits for
London. By basing the London terminus at a rebuilt Euston station, as
HS2 Ltd have recommended, it could promote the further development of
the Euston Road Corridor, alongside the new St Pancras terminus, as well
as the British Library, the Wellcome Institute and the planned UK Centre for
Medical Research and Innovation (see Sir Terry Farrell’s commentary in
Chapter 6). It could also contribute to the development of a key regeneration
area in West London through the proposed Crossrail Interchange at Old
Oak Common.
3.36 The Mayor of London states in his draft Economic Development Strategy
that he “supports the proposal of a north-south high speed rail line, which
would help economic development and release some airport capacity.”6

The Government’s conclusions

3.37 A high speed rail network connecting London with key city regions in the
Midlands and the North, as well as offering through services to Scotland
and the North East via existing lines, could offer significant wider economic
benefits for the UK, over and above the conventional transport benefits
which informed the conclusions set out in Chapter Two.
3.38 These could include agglomeration benefits for London and other major
cities, enabling firms to access wider labour markets, and customer and
supply bases. A high speed network could also promote more effective
integration of city economies, permitting increasing specialisation and

6 The Mayor’s Economic Development Strategy: Public Consultation Draft (2009); at http://lda-consult.limehouse.co.uk/
portal/eds/eds

62
 Supporting Growth in the Regions

productivity, and influencing national and international business location

decisions.
3.39 A high speed network would also support the Government’s housing
growth objectives, as the capacity that it would release on existing rail lines
would permit a significant increase in commuter and regional services to the
key MKSM growth area. It could also support the long term competitiveness
of the London economy, as well as the development of key regeneration
areas in the capital.
3.40 These benefits are significantly more difficult to value than the conventional
transport benefits used as the basis for the Government’s appraisal in
Chapter Two – although HS2 Ltd’s assessment of the potential agglomeration
and wider economic benefits of a London to Birmingham line indicates that
they could be substantial.
3.41 Given their uncertainty, the Government has not included these benefits as
part of its core assessment of the case for high speed rail in the UK. But it
notes that they are potentially very significant, and that they would be in
addition to the conventional transport benefits underpinning its conclusion
that high speed rail offers unmatched potential for addressing the UK’s
long-term inter-city transport challenges.
3.42 The Government will carry out further work to assess the growth opportunities
that high speed rail could deliver, in order that this might inform the future
development of Regional Strategies and Local Development Frameworks
where appropriate.

63
4. A Core High Speed
Rail Network

Introduction
4.1 This chapter considers the possible scope of a British high speed rail
network, drawing on HS2 Ltd’s analysis of the options for linking London
to Scotland. Its assessment is that the UK’s initial core high speed rail
network should consist of a Y-shaped set of routes connecting London
to Birmingham, Manchester, the East Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds,
with through services running onto the conventional network to additional
destinations, including Liverpool, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh.
4.2 This network of around 335 miles, which would be capable of carrying
trains at up to 250 miles per hour, would bring the West Midlands within
about half an hour of London, and deliver journey times of 75 minutes from
Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester to the capital. It would also transform
connectivity between Birmingham and cities in the East Midlands, the
North and Scotland, for instance halving the current journey times from
Birmingham to Manchester and Leeds.

The economic geography of Britain

4.3 Britain’s largest conurbations are tightly packed into a roughly triangular
wedge heading from London to the North West and Yorkshire, as the
population map of Britain at Figure 4.1 shows.
4.4 This area encompasses England’s four most significant economic centres:
London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds, and their surrounding areas,
as well as Liverpool, Sheffield and the cities of the East Midlands. It also
highlights, further north, the major cities of Scotland and the North East,
and Bristol and the cities of South Wales to the west. But the most
concentrated areas of economic activity can still be clearly discerned.
4.5 As the Eddington study notes, this means that the UK has different
transport challenges from some of its major European competitors:
“the UK, like the Netherlands, has a high number of large settlements in
close proximity to each other, whereas countries such as France and Spain
may be characterised as having a greater dispersal of urban areas.”

64
 A Core High Speed Rail Network

Figure 4.1 Population density

Edinburgh

Glasgow

Newcastle

Manchester Leeds

Sheffield
Liverpool

East Midlands

Birmingham

LONDON

Population density

population of 250,000+ population of 10,000+

© Crown copyright. All rights reserved Department for Transport 100039241 (2010)
High Speed Rail

4.6 It has been argued that this tightly packed economic geography means that
high speed rail is of less potential benefit to the UK than to other countries, as
key urban centres are already generally within one day’s return rail travel of one
another. However, this contention is not borne out by experience elsewhere.
4.7 Many of the most successful high speed lines connect cities as close to or
closer to one another than those in the UK. Within France, the first and
most-heavily used TGV line connects Paris to Lyon, a distance of about 265
miles and comparable with the distance from London to Newcastle upon
Tyne. The most heavily used section of the Japanese Shinkansen (indeed,
the most heavily used high speed rail line in the world) is only just over 300
miles long, from Tokyo to Osaka. This line includes 14 intermediate stations,
providing high speed connectivity for journeys of all distances.
4.8 Similarly, some of Germany’s most successful high speed lines link cities
no further apart than those in England. The only line in Germany which has
been almost entirely upgraded to high speed is between Frankfurt and
Cologne, a distance of around 110 miles – roughly the same as between
London and Birmingham. The recently completed high speed line between
Amsterdam and Brussels is just over 120 miles long and the distance from
Paris to Le Mans on the French LGV Atlantique line is only slightly further.
4.9 All of these European lines link into their host country’s conventional rail network,
enabling services to continue at slower speed to more distant destinations.
This principle should also underpin the British high speed network.
4.10 The UK’s economic geography therefore makes it well suited to high speed
rail. The capacity and connectivity between its largest conurbations could
potentially be transformed by a relatively short network of high speed lines.
As can be seen from the table below, the core network required to connect
the UK’s four largest cities would be shorter than for any comparable
country other than Japan.7

Table 4.1 Current or projected national high speed rail networks

Country Largest Cities Approx Length
of Track
UK London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds 335 miles
France Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Lille/Roubaix 475 miles
Japan Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya 320 miles
Spain Barcelona, Madrid, Seville, Valencia 890 miles
Germany Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne 708 miles
Italy Turin, Milan, Rome, Naples 545 miles

7 The figures for the UK are derived from HS2 Ltd’s calculations for their ‘inverse A’ network; figures for France, Japan,
Spain and Italy are based on current and/or planned high speed rail networks; figures for Germany are a rough
approximation based on driving distance.

66
 A Core High Speed Rail Network

4.11
Figure 4.2 Journey time savings to and from London
Key

Initial core high speed

network
Existing lines for
direct services
Heathrow Express

Glasgow - Euston
Edinburgh - Euston
Current rail HS2
Current rail HS2
4 hrs 30 3 hrs 30
4 hrs 30 3 hrs 30

Edinburgh
Glasgow Newcastle - Euston

Current rail HS2

Manchester - Euston 3 hrs 09 2 hrs 37

Newcastle
Current rail HS2

2 hrs 08 1 hr 20 Leeds - Euston

Current rail HS2

Liverpool - Euston 2 hrs 20 1 hr 20

Leeds
Current rail HS2
Manchester
Sheffield Sheffield - Euston
2 hrs 10 1 hr 36
Liverpool
East Midlands Current rail HS2
D
Derby-Leicester
b L i 2 hrs 09 1 hr 15
Birmingham - Euston -Nottingham station(s)

Current rail HS2 Birmingham Birmingham Interchange

1 hr 24 49 mins

LONDON
Crossrail Interchange Euston

Heathrow
Birmingham Interchange Airport
- Euston Birmingham Interchange
- Crossrail Interchange
Current rail HS2

1 hr 10 38 mins Current rail HS2

N/A 31 mins

67
High Speed Rail

4.12 It is therefore important in considering the case for high speed rail not just
to look at a single route, but to analyse the options for a wider network in
order to identify the proposal which would offer the greatest value for Britain
at large. The Government believes that the core network should include
direct links to the four largest English conurbations, as identified above. It
should also make provision, from the outset, for through services to cities
further north, before any decisions are taken about subsequent extensions
of the high speed line to these destinations. This mirrors the successful
experience of France, where TGV services have long run beyond the high
speed network onto conventional lines to major cities including Bordeaux,
Rennes and Nice, destinations to which the high speed lines are planned to
be extended.

The case for the ‘Y’

4.13 A high speed line from London to the West Midlands alone would deliver
capacity increases and reduced journey times to cities in the North West
and Scotland, by allowing long-distance services from London to continue
at conventional speed onto the West Coast Main Line.
4.14 However, the Government’s assessment is that such a short stretch of line
on its own would not be the optimal way forward, other than as the first
stage in the development of a more extensive high speed network. It has
taken into account three key factors in reaching this view.
4.15 Firstly, the per mile costs of the London-Birmingham line would be substantially
higher than of any extension north, as it would have to address the particularly
expensive challenges of delivering a viable London terminus, a Crossrail
Interchange, and a route out of the capital. Extensions of the line to major
cities north of Birmingham would be likely to be achievable at a significantly
lower per mile cost. HS2 Ltd estimate the infrastructure cost of linking
England’s four largest cities with a roughly 335-mile Y-shaped network
would be around £30 billion, compared to between £15.8 and £17.4 billion
for the first 128 miles of track from London to the West Midlands alone. Given
that the extended ‘Y’ network would also greatly increase the benefits, this
suggests that it would be likely to improve overall value for money.
4.16 Secondly, the journey time savings offered by a London to Birmingham
line alone to destinations north of the West Midlands and, in particular, to
Scotland are valuable, but not sufficient to deliver sizeable modal shift from
air, with the journey times from Glasgow to London not dropping below four
hours at best, which is barely faster than today’s fastest train services.
4.17 Thirdly, the London to Birmingham route alone would not provide any
opportunity for high speed services to connect with the East Coast or Midland
Main Lines. Therefore it would not deliver any connectivity or capacity
improvement for destinations to the east of the country, including Sheffield,
Leeds and the cities of the East Midlands. Nor would it release any capacity
for additional commuter services on the congested stretches of those lines

68
 A Core High Speed Rail Network

close to London. By contrast, the ‘Y’ would offer transformational connectivity

and capacity benefits from London to destinations on both the Midland and
East Coast Main Lines, delivering a journey time from London to the East
Midlands of as little as 50 minutes and to Leeds of around 75 minutes.

Figure 4.3 Birmingham/West Midlands connections

via core high speed network
Key

Initial core high speed

network
Existing lines for
direct services

Birmingham - Glasgow

Current rail HS2 Birmingham - Edinburgh

3 hrs 57 3 hrs 15
Current rail HS2
Edinburgh 4 hrs 02 3 hrs 15
Glasgow

Birmingham - Newcastle

Current rail HS2

Newcastle
3 hrs 2 hr 20
Birmingham - Liverpool

Current rail HS2

Birmingham - Leeds
1 hr 34 1 hr
Current rail HS2
Leeds
Manchester 2 hrs 1 hr 05
Sheffield
Liverpool
East Midlands
Derby-Leicester-Nottingham station(s)
Birmingham - Manchester
Birmingham Birmingham Interchange
Current rail HS2

1 hr 30 40 mins

LONDON
Birmingham - London

Current rail HS2 Birmingham Interchange -

West London Interchange
1 hr 24 49 mins
Current rail HS2

N/A 31 mins

69
High Speed Rail

4.18 To appreciate the full and potentially transformational benefits of the ‘Y’
network, it is important to recognise the opportunity it provides to overcome
the acute connectivity limitations of the Victorian rail network, whose three
separate and poorly-inter-connected main lines from London to the North
have survived largely unchanged to the present day, each with its own
separate London terminus. Leeds would be less than 20 track miles further
from London on the proposed ‘Y’ high speed network routed via Birmingham,
yet such a high speed line would slash the journey time to the capital from
both Leeds and Sheffield, whilst also halving journey times to Birmingham,
whose connectivity with these Yorkshire cities is currently very poor (see
paragraph 3.15).
4.19 Conceptually, the ‘Y’ network would unite the West Coast Main Line, the
Midlands Main Line and the East Coast Main Line into a single, integrated
high speed line for long-distance services into London, with a Birmingham
Interchange station – on the eastern edge of the city, close to Solihull
and Coventry – at the junction of the high speed routes north towards
Manchester and beyond; and north east to the East Midlands, Sheffield,
Leeds and beyond. Furthermore, the ‘Y’ network would overcome the
historical route limitations of the West Coast Main Line itself, which reaches
Birmingham via a long spur from Rugby, severely limiting connectivity
between Birmingham and Manchester, Britain’s second and third largest
cities and economic centres. Figure 4.4 indicates these old and new
network connections.
4.20 By including a Crossrail Interchange station as part of the core ‘Y’ network,
all of these cities would gain further connectivity benefits, as this would
deliver a fast and frequent service to London’s West End, City and Docklands
districts, providing a level of connectivity to all of the major economic,
business and cultural centres of central and east London unmatched by
any London terminal today.
4.21 This core high speed network, the ‘Y’, therefore offers a once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity not only to accelerate train services between Britain’s major
conurbations, but also to reinvent the inter-city rail network itself. It could
transform inter-urban connectivity as well as the speed of services, and
overcome the severe limitations of the Victorian north-south network,
built by separate competing companies, which has remained sacrosanct
for too long.

70
 A Core High Speed Rail Network

Figure 4.4 Main lines north from London: existing lines and
Newcastle
proposed initial core high speed network
Key

Proposed initial core Existing rail

high speed network
Heathrow Express

Leeds
Manchester Sheffield

Liverpool
East Midlands

Ea
W

Mi

st
es

dla

Co
tC

nd

ast
oa

Birmingham
st

Ma

M
M

ain Lin
in
ain

Lin
Lin

Birmingham
e
e

e
Interchange

LONDON
Crossrail
Kings Cross
Interchange
St Pancras
Euston
Heathrow
Airport

HS2 Ltd’s analysis of options for a wider network

4.22 The Government’s proposal for a Y-shaped network linking London to
Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds has been informed by an analysis
carried out by HS2 Ltd of the options for extending the high speed network
north from Birmingham to Scotland.
4.23 HS2 Ltd considered three options for such a wider network, which are set
out in Figure 4.5.
4.24 Of these options, HS2 Ltd’s analysis suggests that although it is not the
shortest or cheapest option, the ‘Inverse A’ is likely to present the best
business case. This is because its additional costs are more than
outweighed by the improved journey times it offers to the widest range of
destinations, and the additional growth in the market, including as a result
of modal shift from aviation, that it would attract as a result.

71
72
Figure 4.5 HS2 Ltd’s wider network options

Inverse ‘A’ configuration Reverse ‘S’ configuration Reverse ‘E’ configuration

High Speed Rail

Glasgow Glasgow Glasgow

Edinburgh Edinburgh Edinburgh

Newcastle Newcastle Newcastle

Leeds Leeds Leeds

Manchester Manchester Manchester
Sheffield Sheffield
Liverpool East Midlands Liverpool Liverpool East Midlands

Birmingham Birmingham Birmingham Birmingham Birmingham Birmingham

Interchange Interchange Interchange

Crossrail Crossrail Crossrail

Interchange Interchange Interchange
LONDON LONDON LONDON
Euston Euston Euston
 A Core High Speed Rail Network

4.25 HS2 Ltd also noted that this ‘Inverse A’ network could be built in stages,
beginning with the legs to Manchester and Leeds. Each of these two legs
would be likely to have a strong business case as an addition to the initial
London-Birmingham line, and their completion would deliver the core ‘Y’
network described above, as well as providing a foundation for any
continuations north.
4.26 HS2 Ltd’s analysis is summarised in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 Comparison of HS2 Ltd’s wider network options

Journey Times (hrs:mins)
Route Inverse A Reverse S Reverse E
London-Manchester 1:20 1:20 1:40
London-Leeds 1:20 1:35 1:20
London-Newcastle 2:00 2:07 2:00
London-Glasgow/Edinburgh 2:40 3:17 3:10
Birmingham-Manchester 0:40 0:40 1:28
Birmingham-Leeds 1:05 1:07 1:05
Manchester-Glasgow/Edinburgh 1:45 2:48 3:15/3:30
Business Case
Infrastructure Capital Cost £52.2 bn £44.3 bn £49 bn
Benefits £103 bn £73.9 bn £87.3bn
Indicative Benefit:Cost Ratio 2.3:1 1.8:1 1.9:1

4.27 In considering the journey times and benefit:cost ratios set out above, it
should also be borne in mind that the journey times from Birmingham to
Leeds and Newcastle for the ‘Inverse A’ and the ‘Reverse E’ include stops
at additional stations in the East Midlands, South Yorkshire and Teesside,
offering wider connectivity benefits that the ‘Reverse S’ cannot provide.
4.28 Although HS2 Ltd’s work suggests that the ‘Inverse A’ is likely to be the best
candidate, it does not offer a definitive view as to the precise configuration
of the optimum wider network, given the strategic nature of its analysis. Rather,
it limits itself to a small number of broader conclusions, which are set out below:
● There is a good case for going on to develop high speed lines beyond
the West Midlands and, of the networks we have looked at, a network
with two branches either side of the Pennines performs best.
● While there appears to be a good case for continuing High Speed Two
on to the North West and Manchester, there looks also to be a particularly
strong case for a branch to Yorkshire and Leeds, via the East Midlands.
Both appear to be strong candidates for more detailed work as part of
the next stage of development.
73
High Speed Rail

● Government needs to decide its aspirations for the longer term network
before plans for the next stage can be worked up in detail. We have been
able to design High Speed Two in such a way that options for the future
remain open, but this will not be the case for route sections beyond
Birmingham.
● The longer term network should initially be built out from the High Speed
Two trunk. If there is further demand in the longer term, a second leg
could be provided from the East Midlands to London.

The ‘Y’ – a core high speed rail network for the UK

4.29 The Government accepts HS2 Ltd’s analysis, and agrees with its conclusion
that there is a good case for the UK’s core high speed rail network to
include branches to either side of the Pennines, connecting to both
Manchester and Leeds. Its analysis of HS2 Ltd’s ‘Inverse A’ option has
also led it to make three further proposals.
4.30 First, the Government’s view is that the potential benefits from connections
to Manchester and Leeds are sufficiently high, and the credibility of the
project sufficiently strong, that these links should be planned as part of
Britain’s initial core high speed network, the ‘Y’, subject to effective route
planning and public consultation, and to the confirmation of the provisional
benefits and economic case for the Manchester and Leeds extensions.
4.31 Second, the Government believes that the link between Manchester and
Leeds would be best enhanced through consideration of options for a
conventional upgrade of the existing line rather than through a new high
speed line, given the proposals for upgrading the line contained in Network
Rail’s Northern Hub plan.
4.32 Third, the Government believes it imperative that Scotland and Northern
England should gain the benefits of high speed services from the outset
of any network. Significant journey time savings and connectivity benefits
would flow to Scotland and Northern England from the through high
speed trains which are part of the Government’s core proposition. The
Government will work with the devolved administrations in Scotland and
Wales to ensure that any future plans for high speed services or lines are
coordinated with their own transport plans.
4.33 At around 335 miles, this Y-shaped network would be less than half the
length of the ‘Inverse A’ and substantially lower in cost. HS2 Ltd’s analysis
suggests that the infrastructure cost would be around £30 billion, compared
to around £52.2 billion for the full ‘Inverse A’, yet it would be likely to deliver
the great majority of its benefits. It would directly link all of the UK’s four
largest conurbations, as well as enhancing connectivity to two more key
city regions through possible stations in the East Midlands and Sheffield.

74
 A Core High Speed Rail Network

Figure 4.6 The initial core high speed rail network – The ‘Y’
Key

HS1
Initial core high speed
network
Existing lines for
direct services*
Heathrow Express
Possible HS1 connection
Edinburgh
* with possible intermediate stops
en route.
Glasgow

Newcastle

Leeds
Manchester
Sheffield
Liverpool
East Midlands
Derby-Leicester-Nottingham
station(s)

Birmingham Birmingham
Interchange

LONDON

Crossrail Euston St Pancras

Interchange International

Heathrow
Airport

PARIS

BRUSSELS

AMSTERDAM

75
High Speed Rail

4.34 On the basis that it would be built to at least the same specification as the
most recent TGV lines, allowing trains to run at up to 225 miles per hour,
this ‘Y’ network would reduce the journey time from the centre of Birmingham
to London to as little as 40-49 minutes, depending on the London station
used, and would bring Manchester and Leeds within 40-45 minutes of
Birmingham and 75 minutes of London.
4.35 Furthermore, a link into the East Coast Main Line at York would provide
significantly improved journey times to Teesside, Newcastle and destinations
further north by running onto the conventional network. And through a
similar link onto the West Coast Main Line at Preston the journey time to
Glasgow and Edinburgh could be cut to 3 hours 30 minutes, fast enough
to generate the scope for significant modal shift from aviation.
4.36 HS2 Ltd’s analysis suggests that by including links to Crossrail and the
Heathrow Express in West London, end-to-end journey times to and from
key business destinations could be reduced further still. Figure 4.7 sets this
out in more detail.
4.37 The benefits of the ‘Y’ network would not be limited to those travelling to
and from the destinations served. As set out in Chapter Two, by removing
many long distance services from conventional lines, a high speed network
can also release capacity for additional commuter and freight services.
Unlike a London-Birmingham line, the ‘Y’ network would not only deliver
such capacity increases on the West Coast Main Line. It would also see
long-distance services reduced on the heavily used southern sections of the
Midland and East Coast Main Lines, as long-distance services to the East
Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds transferred to the new high speed lines.
4.38 These capacity increases would enable the numbers of commuter services
to be expanded serving areas expected to see significant population
growth, including the Milton Keynes/South Midlands Housing Growth Area,
as well as other major towns and cities such as Luton and Peterborough.
4.39 The continuation of the ‘Y’ network beyond Birmingham to Manchester
would also be likely to significantly improve its value in terms of increased
freight capacity. HS2 Ltd’s report notes that a high speed line to
Birmingham alone would free up some additional freight paths on the
southern stretch of the West Coast Main Line, but that the overall benefits
would be limited by capacity constraints between Birmingham and the
North West. Extending the network to Manchester would address these
constraints and unlock a much more substantial increase in capacity on
Britain’s most heavily used rail freight artery. There would also be additional
freight capacity on the East Coast Main Line and the Midland Main Line.
4.40 Developing the ‘Y’ high speed network would follow commitments from
the Government’s current rail investment plans which focus, following the
completion of the West Coast Route Modernisation programme, on
enhancing capacity on major commuter routes and on the electrification
of the Great Western Main Line and key regional routes in the North West
as the first part of a rolling programme of electrification.

76
 A Core High Speed Rail Network

Figure 4.7 End-to-end journey time savings

via Crossrail Interchange
Key

Initial core high speed network Crossrail

Existing lines for 4 mins Journey time from
direct services Crossrail Interchange
Heathrow Express

Central Edinburgh - City Of

London (Liverpool Street)
Edinburgh
Current rail Aviation HS2
Glasgow
4 hrs 50 3 hrs 40 3 hrs 42

Newcastle
Central Manchester -
London West End Leeds - Canary Wharf

Current rail Aviation HS2 Current rail Aviation HS2

2 hrs 29 3 hrs 50 1 hr 27 2 hrs 58 4 hrs 25 1 hr 39
Leeds
Manchester
Sheffield
Liverpool
East Midlands
Derby-Leicester-Nottingham station(s)

Central Birmingham -
Heathrow Birmingham Birmingham Interchange

Current rail Car HS2

2 hrs 27 2 hrs 09 58 mins

LONDON
Crossrail Interchange Euston
E t
Heathrow
Airport
Reading - Manchester Birmingham -
Canary Wharf
Current rail Car HS2
Current rail Car HS2
3 hrs 28 3 hrs 50 1 hr 35
2 hrs 2 hrs 45 1 hr 10

Crossrail 24 mins
Thames Interchange
Stratford
Valley Euston
Bristol 4 mins 7 mins 9 mins 12 mins 14 mins 17 mins
Cardiff 11 mins
Paddington Bond St Tottenham Farringdon Liverpool Whitechapel
Heathrow
Ct Rd St
Airport 21 mins
Canary Wharf

77
High Speed Rail

4.41
4.47 It would also be consistent with a longer-term aspiration to see the network
extended further to link directly to the cities of the North East and Scotland,
and to other major destinations. If such extensions are to progress, it will be
vital that the necessary planning work does not wait for the initial Y-shaped
network to have been constructed.
4.42 However, the immediate priority for detailed route planning, in order to
inform formal public consultation in due course, is to identify viable route
options north from Birmingham to Manchester and Leeds.

The Government’s proposed policy for a high

speed network
4.43 The Government’s first proposal is that the UK’s initial core high speed
network (the ‘Y’) should be planned to link London to Birmingham,
Manchester, the East Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds.
4.44 The Government’s second proposal is that this network should include
connections onto existing tracks, including the West and East Coast Main
Lines, so that direct high speed services can be operated from the outset
to other cities including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Newcastle and Liverpool; and
that consideration should be given to extending the network subsequently
to these and other major destinations to further improve capacity and
connectivity.
4.45 The Government’s third proposal is that the capacity released through
transferring long-distance services to this network should be used to
expand commuter, regional and freight services on existing lines, with
particular benefit for areas expected to see significant housing growth
including Milton Keynes, Luton, Northampton, Peterborough, Kettering,
Corby and Wellingborough.
4.46 Further work is now needed on the detailed route options to Manchester and
Leeds and to assess fully their business cases. Formal public consultations
will be held in due course on the Government’s policy for high speed rail
and on each element of the proposed network.

78
Part 2:
High Speed Two –
London to Birmingham

Euston Station, which opened in the 1830s, was extensively rebuilt during the 1960s.
It continues to operate as the southern terminus of the West Coast Main Line, serving
destinations in the West Midlands, North West and Scotland. Euston is proposed as the
terminus for the new high speed line, and would be rebuilt, expanded and modernised
to cater for existing and new traffic.
5. London to Birmingham

5.1 Part One of this Command Paper assesses the strategic case for high
speed rail in the UK. It concludes that high speed rail offers benefits
unmatched by any other major new infrastructure option for tackling the
UK’s inter-urban transport challenges over the next 20 to 30 years, and that
an initial core high speed network linking London to Birmingham, Manchester
and Leeds should be taken forward to public consultation.
5.2 However, it is one thing to make a strategic argument for high speed rail,
and another to demonstrate that a British high speed line would be a
credible and buildable project, especially given the challenges posed in
identifying and constructing a London terminus and a route out of the city.
5.3 For this reason, HS2 Ltd was commissioned to develop a detailed proposal
for a high speed line from London to Birmingham including potential route
options, train service patterns, and costs for the development, construction
and operation of the line.
5.4 London to Birmingham would be the essential first stage of any British high
speed rail network for three reasons. First, the transport corridors north
from London will be amongst the UK’s most congested over the coming
decades (as can be seen from the congestion maps reproduced in Chapter
One). In conjunction with extensions to Manchester and Leeds, a London-
Birmingham high speed line would relieve all three main rail lines and the
major motorways serving these routes. Second, such a line would link –
and transform connectivity between – the UK’s two largest population and
economic centres. And third, it would provide the necessary foundation to
serve destinations further north and through to Scotland from the outset.
5.5 This Chapter describes the approach taken by HS2 Ltd in developing its
recommendations and the basis on which the Government has assessed
them. It then sets out the high-level results of that process, concluding that
the business case for a London to Birmingham line is sound and that such
a line is a viable project offering high value for money, with more than £2 of
benefits for every £1 spent.
5.6 The following chapters consider each part of HS2 Ltd’s proposed line in
turn and set out the Government’s response in each case, including the
further work that it has commissioned where necessary.

80
 London to Birmingham

The approach taken by HS2 Ltd

5.7 As a foundation for its detailed design and planning work, HS2 Ltd identified
six key principles which underpin its recommendations for high speed rail in
the UK. These principles are set out below:
i. High speed capacity should be used in a way which yields the maximum
overall benefit, given its high cost and expected strong demand.
ii. High speed rail services should serve long distance, city-to-city journeys
rather than shorter distance trips.
iii. New high speed lines should only be used by high speed trains. Adding
slower trains reduces capacity.
iv. In the early stages of developing a network, the benefits should be
extended to cities further north with trains running off the high speed line
and onto the existing classic network. This is crucial to the business case.
v. Over time, however, the longer term high speed network should become
more segregated from the constrained classic network to maximise the
benefits of reliability and capacity.
vi. High speed lines must be well integrated with other transport networks
to allow the time savings to be carried through to the whole end-to-end
journey.
5.8 Building on these principles, HS2 Ltd’s work was carried forward through a
process of option sifting and assessment to identify the route and station
choices which offered the highest value for money. This process included
assessments of engineering and operational viability, financial cost, impact
on journey times and capacity, and implications for the local environment
and communities.
5.9 The assessment process was also underpinned by a project specification,
which comprised the line’s main technical, operational and environmental
requirements and was drawn together on the basis of European and
international best practice. The key principles of this project specification
are summarised in the box overleaf.
5.10 Underlying HS2 Ltd’s approach was also the requirement to achieve value
for money, by striking an appropriate balance between costs and the
design aims.
5.11 The service specification used to model the benefits of High Speed Two
was based on the current maximum train speed on European high speed
networks of around 360 kilometres per hour. This provides a realistic
assessment of likely network performance, but does not rule out the option
of introducing faster services as and when the technology develops to
deliver these.

81
High Speed Rail

High Speed Two – Summary of Project Specification

a) The infrastructure is designed for speeds up to 400 kilometres per

hour (roughly 250 miles per hour) – a higher maximum speed than
existing lines but in line with designs for future routes in Europe.

b) The adoption of proven European standards, technology and practice.

c) 400m-long European-sized trains, which are higher and wider than UK

rolling stock and with a capacity of up to 1100 seats.

d) An initial capacity of up to 14 trains per hour for High Speed Two,

rising ultimately to 18 with a longer term network and likely future
technological development.

e) A maximum train speed of 360 kph (225mph) is assumed at opening.

f) The design should follow the Government’s sustainable development

objectives, avoiding as far as possible harm to the natural and built
environment and to communities.

5.12 In developing its proposals, HS2 Ltd’s approach involved discussions with
more than 200 stakeholders and drew on both major project experience
accumulated in the UK and overseas experience of high speed rail. Its
robustness was tested through independent expert challenge and close
collaboration with relevant organisations.

High Speed Two – the Government’s assessment

5.13 The Government’s key objectives for inter-urban transport are capacity,
connectivity and sustainability, and it is on this basis that it has
assessed HS2 Ltd’s recommendations for a London-Birmingham line
(“High Speed Two”).
5.14 The assessment has focused in part on whether the potential capacity and
connectivity benefits of High Speed Two would justify the substantial costs
of such a line.
5.15 The assessment has also looked at the environmental impacts of HS2 Ltd’s
proposals. This includes the potential effect on overall greenhouse gas
emissions, and particularly the local environmental impacts of the detailed
route options. The Government has sought to identify for further consideration
those options which are most consistent with its objectives for sustainable
development. In some areas it has commissioned further work on mitigating
negative impacts to ensure that those objectives can be met.
5.16 In making its overall assessment, the Government has taken into account
not only the evidence on capacity, connectivity and sustainability presented
by HS2 Ltd, but also its own analysis of the wider benefits that such a line
might bring to the UK, including, for instance, the types of impacts on

82
 London to Birmingham

regional growth described in Chapter Three and its view of the potential
long-term case for improved integration of urban, national and international
networks.
5.17 The remainder of this chapter sets out HS2 Ltd’s high-level findings,
including their recommended route for a London-Birmingham line and their
assessment of its costs and benefits, together with the Government’s
response to those findings.

High Speed Two – the recommended route from

London to the West Midlands
Figure 5.1 High Speed Rail: London – Birmingham
Key
HS1
Initial core high speed
network
Heathrow Express
Connection to
West Coast Main Line Possible HS1 connection

Birmingham Birmingham
Interchange

LONDON

Euston St Pancras
Crossrail
International
Interchange

Heathrow
Airport
PARIS

BRUSSELS

AMSTERDAM

5.18 HS2 Ltd’s recommended route for its proposed High Speed Two line would
begin at a rebuilt and expanded Euston Station, and proceed in tunnel
beneath north west London to surface at a new Crossrail Interchange
station located at Old Oak Common (an existing railway facility in West
London close to Willesden Junction). This would provide travellers with
direct connections to Crossrail, Heathrow Express and the Great Western
Mainline, helping to ease crowding at Euston and significantly improving
links to such important business destinations as Canary Wharf, Heathrow
Airport, the Reading/M4 corridor, and the City of London.

83
High Speed Rail

5.19 After departing from the Crossrail Interchange station, HS2 Ltd’s recommended
route would leave London via the Ruislip area, making use of an existing rail
corridor. It would then cross the Chilterns in the Aylesbury direction, partly
in tunnel before following the route of the A413 past Wendover. HS2 Ltd’s
report presents a number of options for this part of the journey, each of
which presents different engineering and sustainability challenges with
associated costs. These are considered in detail in Chapter Six.
5.20 North of the Chilterns, the recommended route would follow in part the
disused Great Central rail alignment before passing Brackley and entering
Warwickshire. It would then skirt to the east of Birmingham, to enter the
city via a short link beginning in the Water Orton area, with the main line
extending north to join the West Coast Main Line near Lichfield, enabling
services to continue to Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow on the
conventional network.
5.21 A new Birmingham city centre station is recommended at Curzon/Fazeley
Street, in the Eastside regeneration area, which would be developed to
provide rapid and convenient access to the existing Moor Street and New
Street stations.
5.22 A West Midlands interchange station is also recommended to be built to
the south of Birmingham, extending the overall West Midlands market, and
providing connections to Birmingham International Airport, the National
Exhibition Centre and the motorway network. HS2 Ltd does not propose
any other stations on route, arguing that intermediate destinations such
as Milton Keynes would be better served through increases in commuter
services made possible as a result of released capacity on existing lines.
5.23 Figure 5.2 provides a summary of HS2 Ltd’s recommended scheme.

High Speed Two – the benefits

Capacity
5.24 In terms of capacity, HS2 Ltd’s design would permit up to 14 train services
an hour, rising to 18 an hour in future, subject to development of a more
extended network and to future development of rolling stock and signalling
technology.
5.25 The high speed trains would be formed of 200 metre sets, in line with
European practice, and would carry up to 550 passengers (around 100
more than the current 9-car Pendolinos in use on the West Coast Main
Line). For the services running entirely on high speed lines, it would be
possible to operate two sets in formation, extending the length to 400
metres and increasing capacity to up to 1100 passengers.
5.26 Whilst decisions on actual service patterns would not be taken until a later
stage, HS2 Ltd developed an initial service specification for modelling
purposes to inform its assessment of the project’s business case.

84
 London to Birmingham

Figure 5.2 London to Birmingham, HS2 Ltd’s preferred scheme

A link between HS2 and WCML near Lichfield to allow trains to serve
cities further north – such as Liverpool, Preston and Glasgow.

The line enters Birmingham via the existing Water Orton rail corridor
Birmingham
leading to a new station near the site of the old Curzon St Station in
Curzon Street
the Eastside area, close to the city centre and New Street Station.

An interchange station near Birmingham International, connected to

Birmingham
the WCML train station, the NEC and the airport via a rapid transit
Interchange
people mover.

The line of route to follow the existing Chiltern Line corridor out of
London. From West Ruislip the route would pass over a long low
viaduct to reach the M25 where it enters a tunnel. As it passes
through the Chilterns a number of mitigatory measures are proposed
to minimise its impact. North of the Chilterns the route would be
mainly open with one tunnel near Cubbington. HS2 Ltd recommended
that the main line of route would not include an intermediate station.

All trains stop at the Crossrail Interchange between Paddington

Crossrail
and Heathrow. This provides connections with Crossrail, Heathrow
Interchange
Express and the Great Western Main Line.

The main terminal station in London at Euston. This station would

London Euston be expanded to combine existing classic services and High Speed
Two services.

This made use of 11 train paths in the peak, on the basis that initial demand
would not require every path to be used, and that additional services could
be provided as demand increased over time.
5.27 As set out in Chapter Two, these long distance services would not be the
sum total of the capacity benefits of High Speed Two. HS2 Ltd’s modelling
suggests that with the new high speed line in place there would be a
reduction in the number of long distance passenger journeys made each
day on the current West Coast Main Line from 105,000 to 20,000, allowing
the removal of a large number of services to Birmingham, Manchester and
other destinations which would be better served by the new line.

85
 Figure 5.3 HS2 Ltd’s preferred line of route – southern section
High Speed Rail

Reproduced from the Ordnance Survey material with the

permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the controller
of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright.
Unauthorised reproduction infringes crown
copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings.
Licence number 0100049190.

86
5. High Speed Two – London to Birmingham

87
Figure 5.4 HS2 Ltd’s preferred line of route – northern section
High Speed Rail

88
5. High Speed Two – London to Birmingham

Legend
Route 3
Surface
Tunnel

Reproduced from the Ordnance Survey material with the

permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the controller
of Her Majesty's Stationery Office © Crown copyright.
Unauthorised reproduction infringes crown
copyright and may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings.
Licence number 0100049190.

89
High Speed Rail

5.28 The removal of these services would release capacity on that route for
additional commuter services to London and Birmingham, whilst still catering
for rail freight growth and preserving long-distance services to other
important destinations such as Crewe, Stoke-on-Trent, Wolverhampton
and North Wales.
5.29 As a result of the released capacity it would be possible to run a
substantially improved service to Milton Keynes, Rugby and Northampton,
potentially including seven non-stop services an hour from Milton Keynes to
London in the peak and five stopping services. This could help to address
the significant increase in commuter demand expected as a result of the
large amount of new housing planned in the Milton Keynes/South Midlands
growth area.
5.30 Taken together, HS2 Ltd estimate that new infrastructure, longer trains and
released capacity on the current network would see maximum potential
capacity between London and the West Midlands increase by more than
200 per cent.
5.31 The Government’s view is that these estimates of the capacity increases
provided by High Speed Two are robust.

Connectivity
5.32 As well as this increase in rail capacity, High Speed Two would also significantly
improve connectivity between London and Birmingham, as well as to a
number of cities further north.
5.33 The journey time from London Euston to the centre of Birmingham would
be reduced to just 49 minutes (an improvement of over half an hour from
the current 1 hour 24 minute service). And the shortest West Midlands-
London journey, from an interchange station close to Birmingham Airport to
the Crossrail Interchange west of Paddington, would be quicker still, taking
just 31 minutes.
5.34 The direct connections to Crossrail and the Heathrow Express provided
by the Crossrail Interchange would cut journey times to key business
destinations even further. The time taken to travel from central Birmingham
to Canary Wharf would be halved from two hours to one by using the
interchange station to connect to Crossrail, as opposed to using the current
route from Euston via the Victoria and Jubilee Lines. The journey from
central Birmingham to Heathrow via the Crossrail Interchange would be
cut to under an hour, as opposed to the current two and a half hours by rail,
or two hours by car. The proposed Birmingham Interchange station would
reduce journey times from London to Birmingham Airport from 70 minutes
to around 40 minutes.
5.35 These connectivity benefits would not be restricted to London and the West
Midlands. The connection to the West Coast Main Line north of Birmingham
would allow high speed trains to continue on the conventional network to
major destinations further north, including Manchester, Liverpool and

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 London to Birmingham

Glasgow. In each case, these destinations would benefit from around

a 30 minute saving on current average journey times.
5.36 The Government’s view is that HS2 Ltd’s assessment of the proposed line’s
connectivity benefits is robust.

Demand growth and modal shift

5.37 The UK is likely to see very significant growth in rail demand over the next
20 to 30 years, and will therefore need additional capacity to accommodate
it. The substantial increases described above as a result of High Speed Two
would allow the rail network to accommodate the forecast growth in
demand for inter-urban travel over the coming decades, whilst still reducing
crowding and incentivising travellers to shift from other modes due to
improved connectivity.
5.38 The modelling carried out by HS2 Ltd estimates that without a new high
speed line the current 45,000 long-distance journeys taken each day on the
London to the West Midlands section of the West Coast Main Line will more
than double by 2033 to around 105,000.
5.39 The consequence of this growth will be crowded trains throughout the day
and severe congestion experienced routinely during peak hours. Even with
lengthened trains and other planned improvements, the West Coast Main
Line will effectively be full, with many potential travellers either discouraged
from travelling altogether or forced to use other, more polluting modes such
as aviation.
5.40 The picture would be very different with High Speed Two in place. In this case,
HS2 Ltd’s modelling suggests that the improvements in travel time and
experience brought by the new line would attract a large number of additional
travellers, with as many as 165,000 long-distance journeys being made on the
same stretch of line in 2033, an increase of more than half on the base case.
5.41 Even allowing for this growth in traffic, the additional capacity provided by
High Speed Two would significantly alleviate overcrowding for passengers.
HS2 Ltd’s modelling suggests that long distance services on the new line
would have an average daily load factor of around 60 per cent, broadly in
line with existing services but well below that which would be experienced if
they continued to share space on existing lines with commuter, regional and
freight services. Furthermore, substantially more commuter services could
be run as a result of the reduction in long distance traffic on the West Coast
Main Line, reducing crowding for passengers from Milton Keynes,
Northampton and other towns on this route.
5.42 This is because, of the 105,000 long-distance passenger journeys
predicted in 2033 without a new line, HS2 Ltd’s modelling predicts that
around 85,000 would switch to High Speed Two, with about 20,000
continuing to use the current network (to travel to intermediate destinations
not served by high speed trains). Each of those passengers switching to
the new line would benefit from the travel time savings they gain as a result,

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High Speed Rail

which would enable them to spend less time in transit and more time
engaged in more productive or enjoyable activities.
5.43 This switch would not account for all of those who would be expected
to use the new line. HS2 Ltd’s modelling indicates that around 57 per cent
of passenger journeys made on the new high speed journeys would
otherwise have been made by conventional rail. A further 27 per cent would
be entirely new journeys, made as a result of the enhanced connectivity
offered by High Speed Two, and the final 16 per cent would have switched
from other modes (roughly half from aviation and half from car).
5.44 The Government has reviewed this assessment of the additional demand
and modal shift generated by High Speed Two, as well as the accompanying
sensitivity analysis conducted by HS2 Ltd, and considers it a robust basis
on which to calculate the benefits that the new line would provide.

Sustainability
5.45 Chapter 2 assessed the sustainability of high speed rail against other options
for meeting the country’s long term capacity and connectivity needs – and
in particular its impact on overall carbon emissions in comparison with other
modes. That assessment was based on HS2 Ltd’s calculations of the
carbon impacts of High Speed Two.
5.46 Its conclusion was that high speed rail would be relatively carbon efficient in
comparison with most other ways of meeting the UK’s inter-urban transport
challenges over the next 20 to 30 years. It also concluded that the carbon
impacts of High Speed Two, which HS2 Ltd calculated as being in a
range from -25.0 million to +26.6 million tonnes over 60 years, could be
accommodated within the Government’s overall strategy for achieving its
statutory target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
5.47 HS2 Ltd’s design work also took into account the need for High Speed Two
to be resilient to the unavoidable impacts of climate change.
5.48 The other sustainability impacts of any high speed rail project would depend
very much on the specific route taken and mitigations put in place. To give
just one example, impacts on landscape can be reduced through careful
design (including following existing transport corridors) and use of tunnelling
in the most sensitive areas.
5.49 HS2 Ltd carried out a careful analysis of the wider environmental and
sustainability impacts of its recommended route, as well as substantial work
on the options for mitigating these. HS2 Ltd’s key conclusions are
summarised below:
● Noise: About 350 dwellings could experience high noise levels, with
a much larger number experiencing a noticeable noise increase. With
additional mitigation these numbers could potentially reduce by half or
more. The Government has commissioned HS2 Ltd to carry out further
analysis to identify more precise noise impacts for settlements on the
recommended route, and to consider the options for mitigating these

92
 London to Birmingham

through measures such as noise barriers or landscaping, prior to the

commencement of any formal public consultation.
● Air Quality: The use of electric traction for rolling stock would mean that
the operation of the High Speed Two would not itself have any air quality
impacts. Some deterioration in air quality could be seen around stations
if these attract significant car traffic, but this could be largely mitigated by
ensuring good public transport links are in place.
● Landscape and townscape: Considerable work has already been
undertaken to identify ways to mitigate landscape impacts, including
using tunnelling and following existing transport corridors. There would
be comparatively few impacts on townscape, but the works required
to expand Euston station would require the removal of five blocks
containing around 220 residential flats largely owned by Camden Council
and a small number of other buildings. There would also be a number of
properties elsewhere on the route which would need to be demolished.
● Heritage: The recommended route has been carefully designed to
minimise heritage impacts, although a number of protected buildings
and grounds would still be affected by it. In particular, the redevelopment
at Euston would affect up to six Grade II listed structures, and the line
of route recommended by HS2 Ltd would pass near a small number of
protected buildings.
● Wildlife and biodiversity: The recommended route would avoid most
potential impacts on designated habitats and sites. No international sites
would be affected and impacts on nationally protected sites would be
restricted to a few locations.
● Soil and land resources: High Speed Two would have a positive
impact on the development of brownfield sites at Euston and Old Oak
Common, and in Birmingham’s Eastside regeneration area. Whilst HS2
Ltd’s recommended route affects none of the most productive Grade 1
farmland, it does cross some 14 miles of Grade 2 land.
● Regeneration: High Speed Two would support regeneration initiatives at
Euston, Old Oak Common and in central Birmingham.
5.50 The Government and HS2 Ltd are mindful of their obligations in respect of
protected habitats and species at international, national and local levels,
and are aware of the general duty to protect biodiversity contained in
Section 40 of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006.
HS2 Ltd will, in conjunction with the relevant statutory agencies, continue
to investigate any potential impacts of its recommended route, in order to
identify and assess possible ways of mitigating these. This will form part of
its ongoing development of the proposed line to prepare for formal public
consultation later this year.
5.51 Subject to completion of this work and to the results of consultation, the
Government’s view is that the wider sustainability impacts of the HS2 Line
are broadly acceptable, and that it is a therefore a viable project in
sustainability terms.
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High Speed Rail

Rail Images
A Eurostar travelling on High Speed One, alongside sound insulating walls
and embankments

High Speed Two – Costs and Value for Money

5.52 High Speed Two’s benefits for the economy and society need to be set
against its costs in order to assess whether it would offer good value
for money.
5.53 HS2 Ltd has estimated the present value cost of High Speed Two as around
£25.5 billion at 2009 prices. Because these costs would be incurred in the
future, a ‘discount rate’ of 3.5 per cent for the first 30 years and 3 per cent
thereafter has been applied to derive this figure. This is in line with HM
Treasury guidance and reflects the fact that benefits and costs today are
more highly valued than those in the future.
5.54 This overall figure is derived from a number of elements including
infrastructure costs for the design and construction of the High Speed Two
line itself, plus the cost of rolling stock and also the longer term costs of the
operation, maintenance and renewal of the line. HS2 Ltd’s report explains
how it has derived its cost estimates in more detail.
5.55 As well as the costs of HS2 Ltd’s proposed line, the long term revenues
that it would generate, mainly from fares, also need to be considered. These
are estimated as totalling around £15 billion over the 60 year appraisal
period. Again, this figure is at 2009 prices and discounted according to
HM Treasury guidance. It is derived on the basis of the demand forecasts
summarised above and an assumption that fares on High Speed Two would
be broadly comparable with those charged on the existing conventional
network for the same journey.

94
 London to Birmingham

5.56 Taken together, and following further, largely technical, adjustments, HS2
Ltd calculates that these give a net cost to Government over 60 years of
£11.9 billion at 2009 prices.
5.57 The estimated value of High Speed Two’s benefits is derived from the
assessment of the time savings delivered to its passengers (in comparison
to the journey times they would have experienced had they made their
journeys via existing networks), and improvements in crowding and reliability.
5.58 HS2 Ltd has assessed the potential transport benefits which would accrue
from High Speed Two over 60 years as totalling approximately £28.7 billion
at 2009 prices.
5.59 Alongside these transport benefits, there would be benefits as a result of
overall improvements in safety, air quality and noise due to passengers
shifting their journeys from other modes of transport, which HS2 Ltd
calculates total less than £0.1 billion. In line with the overall assessment of
carbon impacts as broadly neutral, no provision has been made by HS2 Ltd
in its value for money assessment for changes in carbon emissions.
5.60 These costs and benefits are summarised in Table 5.1. It shows an overall
benefit:cost ratio of around 2.4:1. This is well in excess of the Department
for Transport’s 2:1 threshold for high value for money.

Table 5.1 Present Value Costs and Benefits of HS2*

Business Other
(1) Transport User Benefits £17.6bn £11.1bn
(2) Other Benefits (excl. Carbon) Less than £0.1bn
(3) Net Transport Benefits (PVB) = (1) + (2) £28.7bn

(4) Capital Costs £17.8bn

(5) Operating Costs £7.6bn
(6) Total Costs = (4) + (5) £25.5bn

(7) Revenues £15bn

(8) Indirect Taxes -£1.5bn
(9) Net Costs to Government (PVC) = (6) − (7) − (8) £11.9bn

(10) NATA** Benefit Cost Ratio = (3) ÷ (9) 2.4

* (PV2009 discount year and prices)
** NATA is the DfTs standard appraisal method which provides estimates of all the impacts of a scheme and
expresses most of the main ones in money values to provide a benefit cost ratio (NATA BCR).

95
High Speed Rail

5.61 This assessment follows the Department for Transport’s standard New
Approach to Appraisal (NATA) methodology, and therefore does not include
other potential benefits, such as the project’s wider economic impacts, as
discussed in Chapter Three. If these wider economic impacts are included
in the assessment the benefit:cost ratio increases to 2.7:1.
5.62 There would also be additional impacts for which monetisation poses
significant challenges, but which still need to be taken into account – in
particular the proposed line’s effects on landscape, biodiversity and heritage
set out above. In addition, noise impacts can only be monetised to a limited
extent. From the Government’s initial assessment, it does not, however,
believe that these would alter its overall conclusion that High Speed Two
would offer high value for money.
5.63 The Government has assessed HS2 Ltd’s calculation of the costs and
benefits of its proposed high speed line, and considers that it is robust
and has been carried out fully in accordance with HM Treasury and NATA
guidance. It notes both High Speed Two’s potential non-monetised impacts
on the local environment, and the wider economic benefits that it could
deliver. On that basis, it agrees with HS2 Ltd that it is likely that High Speed
Two would deliver high value for money, with more than £2 of benefits
provided for every £1 spent.

The Government’s Assessment

5.64 HS2 Ltd’s work has demonstrated that a British high speed line, based on
tried and tested technologies, built to European standards and future-proofed
to accommodate future growth in demand and technological changes,
could be a credible, buildable project. The Government’s assessment is that
HS2 Ltd’s work has shown that its proposed high speed line from London
to Birmingham, High Speed Two, would offer high value for money,
delivering more than £2 of benefits for every £1 spent.
5.65 In recommending a viable London terminus and route out of the city, it has
met one of the most significant challenges that any north-south high speed
line faces. By providing substantial capacity increases on a key rail corridor
north from the capital, such a line would provide the foundation for a wider
network, whilst at the same time enabling services to be run beyond
Birmingham from the outset by linking to existing lines.
5.66 The Government’s view is that High Speed Two should be planned from
the start to form the foundation for a wider core high speed rail network
extending to Manchester and Leeds. It has asked HS2 Ltd to undertake
similar detailed planning work on the routes from Birmingham to those
cities, to be completed in summer 2011, with a view to formal consultation
beginning in early 2012.
5.67 The following chapters provide a more detailed explanation of the specific
issues considered by HS2 Ltd in their design of their recommended route,
the conclusions they reached, and the Government’s response in each case,
including where it has commissioned further work on particular topics.
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6. High Speed Two – The Route

6.1 This chapter describes HS2 Ltd’s recommended route for a new high speed
line from London to the West Midlands (“High Speed Two”). It sets out the
options that HS2 Ltd considered in reaching its recommendations, and the
Government’s response.

London Terminus
6.2 Building a city centre high speed rail station would be particularly
challenging in London: a historic and densely developed metropolis in which
existing rail corridors and stations are close to operational capacity and
where new development sites are at a premium.
6.3 The size of the extension necessary to accommodate international high
speed services at St Pancras – hitherto a much under-utilised station –
demonstrates the scale of footprint required for 400 metre long high speed
trains. The trains using High Speed Two would be similar in length to those
on Eurostar services, and substantially larger than any trains currently
operating on the conventional network, in some cases carrying over 1,000
passengers. This would create very significant potential demands on
connections to urban transport systems including the Underground.
6.4 HS2 Ltd started with an extensive long-list of 27 sites in London. These
included inner and outer London locations, as well as surface and
underground options. It also tested two alternatives to a single London
terminus: either two smaller independent termini or two configurations of
a central London through-station. HS2 Ltd applied an iterative short-listing
process, in which locations were assessed against criteria including: overall
fit with the remit; operational/engineering feasibility; demand (including
passenger access times to various locations in London); cost; and planning
and environmental constraints. This produced a short list of a surface
station at Euston (with three sub-option configurations) and a cut-and-cover
station at Kings Cross Lands.

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High Speed Rail

6.5 Of these, a single-level station at Euston was identified as the most

promising option on the grounds of construction and operational impact,
sustainability, cost and economic case. Furthermore, the existing Euston
Station would need to be redeveloped within the timescale of the High
Speed Two project even without a new high speed line, due to growth in
passenger demand on the West Coast Main Line.
6.6 HS2 Ltd’s recommendation is therefore for a redeveloped Euston Station.
This station would comprise 10 high speed platforms and 14 classic
platforms and would be able to accommodate the proposed new high
speed line’s long-term maximum service pattern of 18 trains per hour.
All platforms would be just below the track level in the existing station. The
station’s design would allow for an extension of the concourse above the
trains to almost the full length of the trains, and would provide ground level
accessibility to the concourse from three sides of the station.
6.7 HS2 Ltd noted the potential increase in Underground crowding that would
result from high speed rail passengers using Euston. By 2033 it is expected
that some 200,000 passengers will be travelling through Euston on London
Underground services during the three-hour morning peak, with West Coast
Main Line services into Euston contributing a further 24,000 passengers
even without High Speed Two. The case therefore, for an additional
Crossrail Interchange to relieve pressure at Euston, whilst enhancing
High Speed Two’s connectivity, is compelling. Assuming that a Crossrail
Interchange station is provided, High Speed Two would add only another
4,000 Underground passengers at Euston, beyond the 24,000 forecast
above. In further developing its plans, HS2 Ltd proposes to work with
Transport for London and Network Rail on options for managing the interface
with London Underground and other local transport at Euston Station.
6.8 There would also be significant redevelopment potential at Euston and in the
surrounding area, due to the enlarged station footprint and the subsurface
location of the rebuilt platforms and track. HS2 Ltd has noted the significant
potential for residential, recreational, retail and commercial development as
part of a Euston Station rebuild, akin to the redevelopment now taking place
at nearby Kings Cross and St Pancras, together with the opportunity to
reconnect communities on either side of the existing station.
6.9 The benefits to local communities of a well-designed and managed
redevelopment could be substantial, as described by Sir Terry Farrell
later in this chapter. However, the Government also recognises that any
development at Euston would have some adverse impact for a number of
local residents, particularly while construction is underway. HS2 Ltd’s proposed
station footprint would require the demolition of a number of buildings,
including five blocks of flats currently mainly occupied by Camden Council
tenants. It would be a priority to ensure that clear and appropriate proposals
were agreed for suitable re-accommodation of people affected in this way,
including, if Camden Council so wish, considering rehousing options on-site
as part of the redevelopment. HS2 Ltd proposes to work with Camden
Council and local residents on a suitable masterplan for the site.

98
 6. High Speed Two – The Route

Proposed footprint of expanded Euston Station, to accommodate high speed and

conventional trains 99
High Speed Rail

Figure 6.1 Platform and track layout for expanded Euston Station

6.10 The Government would expect that the funding package for any
redevelopment would include appropriate contributions from those
organisations benefiting from it.
6.11 Redevelopment of Euston Station would also directly affect rail passengers
both as a result of the physical construction work and through any disruption
to existing train services. Initial work by HS2 Ltd has identified various ways
in which such disruption could be substantially mitigated, and it does not
anticipate the need for any extended closures or for the construction of a
temporary station – as was required at St Pancras. Identifying optimum
construction phasing would form part of the future detailed design work,
involving HS2 Ltd, Network Rail and Transport for London, and can be
expected to take several years.
6.12 Subject to the considerations set out above, and to public consultation,
the Government agrees with HS2 Ltd’s recommendation that a London
terminus for the new high speed rail line should be provided by
redeveloping Euston Station.

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 High Speed Two – The Route

Crossrail Interchange
6.13 A central London terminus for High Speed Two is essential. However, in
addition to the capacity considerations described above, Euston is also
limited in its connectivity. It has direct connections only to the Northern and
Victoria Underground lines, and relatively poor connectivity for those making
east-west journeys.
6.14 Valuable connectivity – as well as capacity – benefits would flow from a
High Speed Two interchange with the new east-west Crossrail line, which
will run from west of Paddington through to the West End, the City of
London, Canary Wharf and into Essex, and will include a link to Heathrow.
6.15 A Crossrail Interchange station would (according to HS2 Ltd’s modelling)
benefit about a third of all High Speed Two passengers, who would use
the Crossrail Interchange in preference to Euston, relieving pressure on the
Victoria and Northern lines. This interchange could also provide additional
links to services on the Great Western Main Line and Heathrow Express
connections to Heathrow Airport.
6.16 Having considered several potential sites, HS2 Ltd has recommended
a Crossrail Interchange station on railway land a short distance west of
Paddington at Old Oak Common in West London. This would enable the
station to be developed on a site currently used for depots and sidings,
substantially limiting its potential impacts on the local environment and
communities. The site is also in an area of London identified as a priority
for regeneration, to which the development of a new interchange station
could make a major contribution.
6.17 From a construction perspective, HS2 Ltd advise that Old Oak Common
is the only site in West London suitable for launching the tunnel boring
machines needed to create the tunnels needed for High Speed Two to
reach Euston. This substantially reduces the additional cost of providing
an interchange station on the site, as some of the major excavations will
be needed whether a station is built or not.
6.18 An interchange station at Old Oak Common would provide good
connections for passengers between High Speed Two, Crossrail, the Great
Western Main Line and the Heathrow Express. It would have the potential
to be served by up to 24 Crossrail services per hour giving passengers a
fast, high frequency, high capacity service to key business destinations in
the West End, the City and Docklands.

101
 Sir Terry Farrell: Opportunities for cities
and place-making
As an architect and town planner, I believe in the potential of stations to
transform cities.
Across the globe in countries such as Japan, Korea, and China – and in
most European countries – there is a strong commitment to high speed
rail and expansion of high speed networks. I have been involved in
designing and building some of the world’s largest railway stations and
transport interchange buildings. As an architect and town planner my
own particular focus has been on cities and place-making rather than
on route planning and train technology per se. To me, the potential of
stations to transform cities is critically important.
High speed rail stations are so much more than points of arrival and
departure. They create whole new districts – places defined by their
connectedness to other city centres and to airports, ports and
metropolitan transport infrastructure. They become accumulators and
attractors for all movement systems including underground rail, buses,
taxis, pedestrians and cyclists.
They also attract people and new investment. In the projects that I have
been involved in, high speed rail stations attract new businesses, office
development, hotels and conference centres. They become desirable
new residential districts, and they present civic opportunities for new
public squares, cultural activity and recreation. Stations have become
pre-eminent in their role as place-makers.
This is all a far cry from the origins of rail in the nineteenth century, where it
was initially associated with goods transportation. Early stations sat within
an environment of coal yards, gas works, factories, breweries, warehouses
and industrial canal basins. In the UK many of our primary rail stations
were built in the industrial era, so in most major cities stations were built
on the periphery in areas of low value, set apart from the vibrancy of city life.
But 21st century train travel is essentially people-based, and the best
systems combine the inherent civility of train travel with the standards of
efficiency, modernity and cleanliness to be found in high quality air travel.
The critical advantage is that these can be integrated within the heart of
our city centres rather than banished to places where noise and pollution
impacts are less important.
Properly designed, stations become magnificent expressions of civic
endeavour. The best have concourses that are grand halls with thriving
restaurants, meeting places and other amenities. It is said that within the
new St Pancras station 40% of the people there at any given time are
there for reasons other than travel.

102
In Hong Kong our Kowloon Station development has attracted high
value development more than twice the size of Canary Wharf. The focus
of this new place is a grand station square set within Kowloon on what
was the less favoured side of Victoria Harbour. The station complex –
which includes a high speed rail link to Guangzhou – has generated city-
wide change and will in time become one of the largest land transportation
hubs in the Far East. It will have Asia’s largest cultural district and some
of its finest buildings (including some of its tallest and most valuable).
Our Beijing South Station was deliberately planned from the outset as a
whole new centre within the capital city, with a new metro serving a new
mixed use commercial district. The centre of this new district is the
station itself with a vast hall twice the size of that at Grand Central
Station in New York. The extent to which high quality stations embody
civic pride and city-making is reflected in the fact that Beijing South
Station won a recent public poll as the city’s favourite building amongst
a list that included the ‘Bird’s Nest’ Olympic Arena and the National
Opera House. It gained 3,500,000 votes.
Of course, some of the circumstances are different in Britain, but the
principles still apply. The UK’s new high speed rail stations would transform
all their destinations. We can already see how the emerging new city at
Stratford in East London – the base of the 2012 London Olympics – and
the new international station at St Pancras have revolutionised different
parts of London. This effect would be repeated all over the UK wherever
high speed rail arrives and departs. The greatest value of high speed rail
could be its effect on cities and towns and their economies.
In London, the new terminus at Euston Station could become one of the
greatest stations in the world. The proposals include not only new platforms
but also a remodelled and expanded tube station and dedicated bus and
taxi interchanges providing direct and seamless access to the station
concourse.
It would be much more than one new station. A new dedicated pedestrian
link could connect Euston Station to St Pancras and Kings Cross to
become Europe’s ‘super rail hub’. It is estimated that together these
stations will carry more than 250 million passengers per annum in the
long run. By comparison, London’s three main airports carry less than
half of this number today.
With the regeneration at Kings Cross, station development at Euston would
create potential for development at least equal in scale to Canary Wharf.
It would become the most vibrant and cosmopolitan new district in
London as well as its most connected, forming as it does part of the
Marylebone – Euston Road corridor which extends west to Paddington
Station, with its national and international connections including the
Heathrow Express.

103
Since the new platforms would be almost two stories below ground level,
the new Euston would allow the introduction of new streets and public
squares which improve east-west connections, notoriously difficult at
present given the current station design. It would allow much better
resolution of the interchange between rail, bus and taxi, and on Euston
Road there is an opportunity to create a London square fit for the 21st
century. I support the return of a reconstructed Euston Arch at the
station’s front door.
In Birmingham the new high speed station would be similarly revolutionary
in its impact. The new hub would improve interchange between the three
stations (including Birmingham New Street and Moor Street stations).
It would improve the setting of the new award winning shopping centre
at the Bullring, and improve connectivity to the city’s central area via
New Street to Victoria and Chamberlain Squares, the city’s civic heart.
Rail could reinforce Birmingham’s commitment to an improved pedestrian
experience in the city centre, a far cry from the city’s vision of itself as
the motor car city of the 1960s and 1970s.

104
The new rail hub would also form the centrepiece of a major regeneration
and development area in East Birmingham. This would be around 45
minutes from London’s West End, making East Birmingham more
accessible to central London than some of the London Boroughs on the
metropolitan periphery. This accessibility would undoubtedly help to
attract new investment to the city and the Midlands generally.
Both London and Birmingham would also have much improved
connections to airport interchanges by means of stations at Birmingham
International (also improving access to the National Exhibition Centre)
and a Crossrail Interchange station in West London (which would also
connect to the existing national rail network and Heathrow Express,
acting as a catalyst for regeneration and development in this relatively
underperforming part of West London).
High speed rail represents a great opportunity to re-think cities and
place-making. New high speed stations are potentially the most exciting
opportunities for our cities at this time.

Sir Terry Farrell CBE105

High Speed Rail

Figure 6.2 London rail and Underground connections

from High Speed Two
Key

HS1 Possible Possible rapid

connection transit link
Initial core to HS1
high speed Northern line
network Crossrail
Victoria line

Stratford
Crossrail
Interchange
4 mins
Kings Cross
Euston St Pancras
International

Channel
Tottenham Liverpool St. Tunnel
Court Road
Canary Wharf

6.19 Connections between High Speed Two and other lines at the Crossrail
Interchange would be fast and convenient. In contrast to Euston, where
access to the Underground is some distance from the main line platforms,
HS2 Ltd’s proposed design locates the Crossrail, Heathrow Express
and Great Western Main Line platforms very close to those serving High
Speed Two.
6.20 Through the connection with services on the Great Western Main Line,
HS2 Ltd’s proposal would provide opportunities for passengers from West
London and the Thames Valley to reach the Midlands and the North on
High Speed Two without having to travel via Central London and Euston.
For other Great Western Main Line passengers, this interchange station
may provide a quicker and easier link to Crossrail than changing trains
at Paddington. This could help to reduce the number of passengers
interchanging between high and low level platforms at Paddington.
6.21 The Crossrail Interchange station would also facilitate fast and convenient
connections to High Speed Two and Crossrail for Great Western travellers
from Bristol, the South West and South Wales. It would also provide a
connection to direct Heathrow Express services to and from Terminals 1,
2, 3 and 5 at Heathrow Airport. This would enable Heathrow to be served
economically and efficiently using existing infrastructure, alongside any
potential future extension of the high speed rail network to include an
at-airport station at Heathrow.

106
 High Speed Two – The Route

Figure 6.3 Crossrail Interchange connections from

High Speed Two
Key

Core high-speed National Rail

network
Heathrow Express
Possible connection
to HS1 Crossrail
Birmingham
Potential Interchanges Central Line

Stratford Milton Keynes

Watford Junction
Harrow and Wealdstone
Line
North London

Channel
Tunnel

Thames
Valley Crossrail Euston
Bristol Interchange
Cardiff

Terminal 5 Paddington
e

Central
on Lin

Terminal
Heathrow Area
L on d

Airport
Terminal 4
st
We

Richmond
Clapham Junction
East Croydon

6.22 BAA is currently promoting the Heathrow Airtrack project to provide new rail
links to Heathrow Airport from Surrey, Berkshire and South West London.
As part of this proposal, alternate Heathrow Express services would run
beyond Heathrow Terminal 5 to Staines where connections would be made
with the South West suburban rail network. If approved and implemented,
these services would further widen the catchment area of the Crossrail
Interchange station and avoid the need for passengers to travel via
Central London.
6.23 As well as significantly reducing pressure at Euston, HS2 Ltd’s analysis
suggests that the high levels of accessibility offered by a Crossrail
Interchange station at Old Oak Common would attract up to seven per cent
more passengers to use High Speed Two services than if no comparable
interchange was provided, and would deliver net benefits of some £2 billion.
6.24 The Crossrail Interchange station proposal also has further long term
potential to provide connections with other rail routes passing close to the
site. It could enable passenger access from wide areas of London by
means of London Overground services. Although somewhat further from

107
High Speed Rail

the proposed Crossrail Interchange site, the Central and Bakerloo lines also
pass through the area and may have the potential to be linked in to a wider
redevelopment project.
6.25 The Government believes that the proposed Crossrail Interchange station
could act as a catalyst to transform the current brownfield area and
surrounding neighbourhoods and could provide major employment and
housing opportunities. As the site is already largely used for railway purposes,
any adverse environmental impacts resulting from the development would
be limited.
6.26 HS2 Ltd notes that serving a Crossrail Interchange station would lengthen
journey times for through passengers both on High Speed Two and Great
Western Main Line services. However, as the site of the proposed Crossrail
Interchange is close to Central London in an area where both High Speed
Two and Great Western line speeds are relatively low, the additional journey
time resulting from calling at the station would be fairly small – around four
minutes for through passengers on High Speed Two. As noted above, HS2
Ltd’s assessment shows that the overall benefits to passengers as a result
of the proposed interchange far outweigh these longer journey times to the
extent that net benefits of some £2 billion are generated.
6.27 The Government accepts HS2 Ltd’s recommendations in respect of a
Crossrail Interchange station, because of its key role in integrating High
Speed Two with London’s transport networks, enhancing connectivity,
facilitating passengers’ end-to-end journeys and helping to relieve crowding
on London Underground services at Euston. The Government expects that
the existing Crossrail scheme will continue to be delivered as defined and
will open from 2017. Over the coming months, HS2 Ltd will undertake
further detailed work, in collaboration with Crossrail and its sponsors –
the Department for Transport and Transport for London – as well as with
Hammersmith and Fulham Council to develop more detailed plans for a
Crossrail Interchange station, which will form part of the formal public
consultation on the route.
6.28 Subject to that consultation, further work will be required by HS2 Ltd in
conjunction with Transport for London, the relevant London Boroughs,
Network Rail and other stakeholders to develop an overall plan for the Old
Oak Common area which will maximise the benefits for passengers and
take full advantage of the wider development potential of the site and
surrounding areas. The Government expects that the funding package for
the Crossrail Interchange would include equitable contributions from those
who would benefit from this redevelopment.

The Route from Central London to the West Midlands

6.29 The challenge in finding a route out of London is the obvious one of
threading a high speed line through a dense urban landscape. As set out

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 High Speed Two – The Route

in the box below, balancing the significant costs and impacts of tunnelling
with the noise and other impacts on communities from a surface route is
a difficult judgement. This has been a major concern for HS2 Ltd in its
recommendations on the options for the route to Birmingham.

Tunnelling involves significantly higher and more uncertain costs than

a surface alignment, and is not without environmental impact: in terms
of higher ‘embedded’ carbon in construction; the need to dispose of a
substantial volume of excavated material; the need for surface works for
ventilation purposes; and the (relatively small) risk of surface properties being
affected by subsidence during construction and by ground-borne noise
and vibration afterwards. Nor are long tunnelled sections desirable from
an operational perspective. On the other hand, a surface route can have
visual and noise impacts, may require compulsory purchases and demolitions
of property, and may cause severance if it creates a new transport corridor.

6.30 HS2 Ltd has taken into account the need for effective integration between
High Speed Two and existing urban, national and international networks,
through direct connections with key London transport networks, including
Crossrail and the Heathrow Express. For these reasons, HS2 Ltd has
focused on routes leading out of London to the north west and west. In
considering the options presented by HS2 Ltd, the Government has also
borne in mind their potential to allow a direct connection to an at-airport
station at Heathrow in future.
6.31 HS2 Ltd’s preferred route from Euston is a tunnelled section running from
just north of the terminus to Old Oak Common, which is proposed as the
site for the Crossrail Interchange station. After departing the Crossrail
Interchange station, HS2 Ltd’s recommended route would leave London
via the Ruislip area, making use of an existing rail corridor.
6.32 Having left London, the most direct route to Birmingham would pass
through the Chiltern Hills. The challenge for HS2 Ltd, therefore, has been
to design options for this section of the route as sensitively as possible and,
in particular, to minimise any potential impacts on the Chilterns Area of
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB).
6.33 As part of its route evaluation process, HS2 Ltd considered two routes that
largely avoided the Chilterns AONB. These options, which sought to follow
the routes of the M1 and Midland Main Line, were discounted after analysis
by HS2 Ltd. Their alignments would be less direct, resulting in longer journey
times; and they would involve the need for significantly more demolition
than other routes, including of residential properties, unless substantial and
expensive tunnelling was undertaken to reduce the impacts on major towns
such as Luton and Dunstable. The Government also notes that their routes
through Hertfordshire and Luton would be much too far to the east for a link
to an at-airport station at Heathrow to be remotely feasible.

109
High Speed Rail

Following close to existing motorway alignments could provide an

opportunity to reduce some of the potential impacts of a new high speed
rail line. However, because high speed rail requires shallower curves than
either conventional rail or motorways, it would not be possible for a new
line to follow many existing routes without requiring either frequent speed
restrictions which would undermine the core benefit of high speed rail or,
alternatively, blighting significant ‘islands’ of countryside by isolating them
between the curves of the road alignment and the necessarily straighter
railway. This would be true of both the M1 and M40.

6.34 HS2 Ltd therefore concluded that any viable line of route between London
and Birmingham would, subject to management of its local and environmental
impacts, necessarily traverse some part of the Chilterns. From the six main
corridors through the Chilterns, HS2 Ltd short-listed three potential routes:
● A route leaving London via the existing Chiltern Line corridor to Ruislip,
and then using a combination of tunnelling and the existing A413 corridor
to reduce impacts on the Chiltern AONB (HS2 Ltd’s ‘Route 3’);
● A route following the same corridor to Ruislip, but then passing in tunnel
beneath Gerrards Cross before crossing the Chiltern AONB through
a combination of tunnelling and surface routes including a 720 metre
viaduct across the Hughenden Valley (HS2 Ltd’s ‘Route 2.5’);
● A route leaving London via a 28-kilometre tunnel towards Kings Langley,
before passing through the Chilterns AONB and close to the town of
Berkhamsted (HS2 Ltd’s ‘Route 4’).
6.35 HS2 Ltd assessed the operational and environmental effects of these three
options. This led it to recommend following the A413 transport corridor
(Route 3). This route is shorter and would provide a faster journey time
than either of the others. It also offers, overall, a number of sustainability
and environmental advantages over the other options. Furthermore, its
estimated cost of £3.7 billion (without provision for risk) is significantly lower
than the alternatives (HS2 Ltd estimate the costs of Route 2.5 at £4.3 billion
and of Route 4 at £5.1 billion without risk).
6.36 The Government agrees with HS2 Ltd that the route via Kings Langley is
inferior, due to its slower journey times and the considerably higher costs
entailed in constructing a route entirely in tunnel out of London to the M25.
The total length of tunnel from Euston to Kings Langley would be around 22
miles – over two thirds the length of the Channel Tunnel. By leaving London
to the north west, it would also effectively preclude the future provision of a
link to an at-airport station at Heathrow.
6.37 The Government has carefully evaluated the choice between the A413
and Hughenden Valley routes, and considers that, as well as its cost and
journey time advantages, the A413 route’s local and environmental impacts
are on balance lower than those of the Hughenden Valley route. The A413
route has lower impacts in respect of its potential for isolation of existing

110
 High Speed Two – The Route

settlements and ground-borne noise. Its environmental impacts are reduced

by following existing transport corridors, including the busy A413 itself, for
well over half the distance travelled at surface level through the AONB; and
by reducing visual intrusion through the use of cuttings and screening with
vegetation and embankments.
6.38 In contrast, although the Hughenden Valley route’s surface sections through
the Chilterns AONB are shorter than those of the A413 route, they would
have other potentially significant impacts, including on townscape and
landscape setting, as there is no major existing transport corridor that this
route can follow to reduce its negative impacts. A major viaduct would be
required to cross the Hughenden Valley itself, with significant visual,
townscape and environmental implications for the surrounding area. Other
impacts associated with the proposed tunnels on this route include greater
energy expenditure, larger quantities of spoil, and greater potential vibration
impacts, and it would also require more land take and more potential
demolitions than the A413 route.
6.39 North of the Chilterns, the A413 route would pass Aylesbury before
following the largely preserved track-bed of the former Great Central
Railway until Brackley. Other than a short length of line running close to
the edge of Aylesbury, for which the Government has asked HS2 Ltd to
assess options to mitigate the noise impacts, this section of the A413 route
presents few significant impacts on communities or key environmental
features. Conversely, the alignment of the Hughenden Valley route prior
to Brackley would follow close to the current Chiltern Line for some of its
length but would also have sections passing through open countryside
without following any existing transport corridor.
6.40 Both the A413 route and the Hughenden Valley route follow the same
alignment after Brackley. This runs through open countryside into
Warwickshire using cuttings and embankments, due to the area’s rolling
topography, and passes under the SSSI at Long Itchington Wood in a 1400
metre tunnel. It also runs between the registered Stoneleigh Abbey Park
and Garden and the neighbouring National Agricultural Centre. Given its
potential impacts on these sites the Government has asked HS2 Ltd to
carry out further work to identify the optimum alignment at Stoneleigh.
6.41 Taking account of all these considerations, the Government’s assessment
is that the route following the A413 corridor would be superior in terms of
strategic fit, cost, journey time benefits and overall sustainability impacts,
considering the potential for further mitigation. For these reasons, the
Government agrees, subject to public consultation and further work on
options for mitigating its impacts, with HS2 Ltd’s recommendation that the
A413 route is the best option, judged against the full range of its objectives.
6.42 The Government is, however, mindful of the need to explore all options for
reducing the impacts on the local environment and communities. The initial
findings of HS2 Ltd’s additional work on route alignments at Aylesbury and
Stoneleigh has suggested that its impacts at these places could be reduced.

111
High Speed Rail

The Government has therefore asked HS2 Ltd to carry out detailed work on
these issues and on measures elsewhere to further mitigate noise and other
environmental impacts, as the basis for public consultation on this route in
the autumn.

Serving Birmingham City Centre

6.43 As with the London terminus, HS2 Ltd evaluated and sifted a range of
options in identifying its recommendation for a central Birmingham station
and the route through the city to reach it. These included using a new
through-station allowing the line from London to run directly through the city
centre, as well as a number of options for a station connected to the main
high speed line via a short spur, one of which was a redesigned station at
Birmingham New Street.

Figure 6.4 Platform and track layout at proposed Curzon Street Station

HS2 Platforms

Concourse (Paid)

Concourse (Unpaid)
Lift

Escalator

112
 High Speed Two – The Route

6.44 Whilst in principle the option of the high speed line running from London
directly through Birmingham city centre appears attractive, none of the
options for a through-station was assessed by HS2 Ltd to be workable in
practice. Any new through-station would have to be built below surface
level, as no appropriate surface site could be identified. This would entail
prohibitive costs, relative to other options, and unacceptable townscape
and land take impacts.
6.45 There is also little scope for redesigning Birmingham New Street to
accommodate high speed services. The station is already operating at
close to capacity and is closely bounded by tunnels and city infrastructure,
making expansion exceptionally difficult and expensive, and impossible
without having to relocate a large number of the existing services to a new
station built elsewhere.

Figure 6.5 Birmingham Curzon Street connections

from High Speed Two
Key

Initial core high Existing rail

speed network
Possible rapid
transit link

Leeds
Manchester Sheffield
Stourbridge East
Midlands

Birmingham
Wolverhampton
Snow Hill
W
es
tC
oas 2 mins
tM
ain Curzon
Line
Street

Birmingham We
st C
New Steet oa
st
Worcester M
Birmingham ain
Moor Street L
Cheltenham
ine

Birmingham
Interchange
Solihull London
Euston

London

6.46 Of the remaining options for a station on a spur line, the two most promising
options identified were both for a new station immediately to the east of the
city centre and close to Birmingham New Street: either at Curzon/Fazeley
Street just to the north of the existing West Coast Main Line, or at Warwick
Wharf to the south.

113
High Speed Rail

Footprint of proposed Birmingham Curzon Street Station

114
 High Speed Two – The Route

6.47 The costs of the Curzon/Fazeley Street station would be lower than those
of a station at Warwick Wharf, and it would offer marginally quicker journey
times. Also, the site on which it would be constructed is mostly vacant
and is part of the Eastside area currently identified for redevelopment by
Birmingham City Council. Although current plans would need to be revised,
a new station at Curzon/Fazeley Street could make a significant contribution
to the overall regeneration of the area.
6.48 In contrast, the Warwick Wharf site would be directly within the Warwick
Bar Conservation Area, and would substantially affect the street pattern
and built character of both that area and the neighbouring Digbeth/Deritend
Conservation Area. It would directly impact a number of historic industrial
buildings and local landmarks, and affect the setting of several nationally
listed buildings.
6.49 For these reasons, the Government agrees, subject to public consultation,
with HS2 Ltd’s recommendation that the Birmingham terminus should
be situated at a new station in the Eastside regeneration area at Curzon/
Fazeley Street.
6.50 The Government believes that the station could be constructed as a
landmark gateway to Birmingham, with wider redevelopment of the vicinity
taking place in parallel, creating exciting new opportunities for the local
area, the city and the region more widely. It could incorporate the Grade I
listed former station building at Curzon Street, a former Birmingham railway
terminus, which is currently unoccupied. It is close to the city centre’s
shops and other amenities, and has potential for easy and direct access
to Birmingham New Street and Moor Street stations, which are currently
around a five-minute walk away.
6.51 The Government will start work with Birmingham City Council and other local
partners over the coming months to consider how they might take forward
this vision, including identifying a package of third party contributions to its
costs in line with the benefits that the scheme, if adopted, would generate.
6.52 The location of the Birmingham terminus would also have implications for
the route taken by any high speed line through Birmingham and into the city
centre. A key advantage of both the Warwick Wharf and Curzon/Fazeley
Street sites is that they would enable the high speed line to follow HS2 Ltd’s
recommended route option running directly east-west from a junction with
the main high speed line in the Water Orton area. This option was considered
to have lower environmental and social impacts than the alternative route
following the West Coast Main Line corridor into the city, as well as ultimately
offering faster journey times to locations north of Birmingham.
6.53 HS2 Ltd also recommended that the main high speed line should continue
north from Water Orton through the West Midlands to join the West Coast
Main Line close to Lichfield, allowing services to continue at conventional
speeds to destinations including Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow.

115
High Speed Rail

6.54 The Government agrees, subject to public consultation, with HS2 Ltd’s
recommendations regarding the route into Birmingham and the provision
of a link to the West Coast Main Line near Lichfield.

National Railway Museum/SSPL

Birmingham Curzon Street Station 1839
The Grade I listed frontage of Birmingham’s former Curzon Street
terminus was built in 1837 and was intended as a counterpart to the
Euston Arch, marking the northern and southern ends respectively of
the London and Birmingham Railway. This area of Birmingham included
not only the Curzon Street station, but also the Birmingham termini for
the Grand Junction Railway from Liverpool and Manchester and the
Birmingham and Derby Junction Railway. In 1854, the new through
station at New Street was opened, and the Curzon Street station was
relegated to handling goods traffic. HS2 Ltd’s recommended station
option for Birmingham city centre offers an exceptional opportunity to
restore this iconic structure to railway use.

Intermediate Stations
6.55 As well as identifying options for city centre stations in London and
Birmingham and for an interchange with Crossrail in West London, HS2 Ltd
was asked to consider the case for providing an intermediate station between
London and the West Midlands – for instance, to provide access to high
speed rail services for major towns such as Milton Keynes or Oxford.
6.56 HS2 Ltd examined the potential benefits and disbenefits of such a station
and considered a number of options for its location in the light of potential
demand. It concluded that an intermediate station between London and the
West Midlands would be detrimental to the overall business case.

116
 High Speed Two – The Route

6.57 The main disbenefits, besides the cost of construction, are the journey time
penalties to through passengers and the loss of capacity on the overall high
speed network. These arise both through the need to run trains part way
with empty seats reserved for passengers joining mid-route, and through
the train paths that are foregone as a result of stopping trains on a section
of the line that would otherwise be operating at the highest speed. On the
latter issue, HS2 Ltd concluded that even with carefully designed junctions
and separate approach tracks to and from the intermediate station, the loss
of line capacity would still be considerable.
6.58 Furthermore, many of the towns which might benefit from such an
intermediate station will already see improvements to existing services on
the conventional network over the coming years, such as the benefits for
Oxford commuters from investment in the Great Western and Chiltern lines.
If High Speed Two was constructed as recommended by HS2 Ltd, many
of them, including Milton Keynes, would be likely to benefit from the use of
capacity released on the West Coast Main Line as a consequence.
6.59 For these reasons, the Government agrees with HS2 Ltd’s recommendation
that no intermediate station between London and the West Midlands should
be included in the further development of options for the High Speed Two line.

Birmingham Interchange
6.60 HS2 Ltd’s analysis indicates that the case for an interchange station in the
West Midlands, close to Birmingham Airport, is far more promising. As well
as providing enhanced access to the airport for high speed rail passengers,
HS2 Ltd’s preferred option for such a station would be located close to the
M42 and M6 motorways, the existing Birmingham International station and
the National Exhibition Centre, improving connectivity for a wide range of
travellers to and from the West Midlands.
6.61 HS2 Ltd’s modelling indicates that around half of the passengers travelling
to and from the West Midlands on High Speed Two would use this station,
and that one in six of those would not otherwise have travelled by high
speed rail.
6.62 In contrast to an intermediate station between London and the West
Midlands, the disbenefits of HS2 Ltd’s proposed interchange for other
passengers are comparatively modest. This is because the proposed
location of such a station close to Birmingham means that there would be
relatively little capacity lost as a result of seats occupied by interchange
passengers. Trains would also already be slowing to approach Birmingham,
reducing the journey time penalties. If any service pattern chosen was to
include services that did not stop at the interchange, HS2 Ltd’s feasibility
work suggests that it would be possible to design the track and junction
layout so that they would not be subject to any longer journey times.

117
High Speed Rail

Figure 6.6 Birmingham Interchange connections

from High Speed Two
Key

Initial core high Existing rail

speed network
Possible rapid
transit link

Manchester

Leeds

42
Sheffield

M
East Midlands

Birmingham

Birmingham M6
M1
M4 2

Birmingham
International

Birmingham Birmingham
NEC
International Interchange
5-7 mins
A45
Solihull Coventry
A4
52

Leamington Spa

Euston London

6.63 Although the proposed station would be located within the existing
greenbelt, its site also forms part of one of the Major Urban Areas identified
in the West Midlands Regional Spatial Strategy, and is bordered on all sides
by motorways and airport infrastructure, as well as having previously been
proposed as a location for a national football stadium.
6.64 The Government recognises the substantial benefits that an interchange
station in the West Midlands could generate, particularly in enhancing
connectivity with existing local, national and international transport networks
and attracting additional travellers to high speed rail. It therefore agrees with
HS2 Ltd that such an interchange station should be included as part of the
scheme put forward for public consultation, but only on the basis that an
appropriate funding package is identified.

118
 High Speed Two – The Route

6.65 Alongside HS2 Ltd’s further design work on this interchange station, the
Government will work closely with the surrounding local authorities and
wider West Midlands partners and businesses to ensure that all possible
synergies with other development plans are fully realised, that proposals
are sensitive to local requirements, and that an equitable funding package
is devised.

The Government’s Assessment

6.66 Subject to completion of the additional work described in this Chapter, the
Government’s preliminary assessment is that HS2 Ltd’s recommended
route, which would run from a rebuilt Euston station in London to a new
Birmingham city centre station at Curzon/Fazeley Street, is viable.
6.67 On this basis, the Government has concluded that formal public consultation
on the recommended route should begin in the autumn.
6.68 The Government and HS2 Ltd will also work with relevant local partners
to develop plans and identify an appropriate funding package, including
third party contributions, for each of the major station and interchange
developments.

119
7. High Speed Two –
International Connections

7.1 As a part of its work on the options for a new high speed rail line from
London to the West Midlands, HS2 Ltd considered the case for providing
links to Heathrow Airport and to the existing High Speed One line to the
Channel Tunnel.
7.2 This Chapter sets out HS2 Ltd’s recommendations in each case, and the
Government’s response, including the further work that it considers
necessary in the light of HS2 Ltd’s findings.

Connections to Heathrow Airport

7.3 In conjunction with High Speed Two, a new Crossrail Interchange station
would transform connectivity to Heathrow for rail passengers from the
Midlands and the North.
7.4 At present, passengers arriving at Euston, Kings Cross and St Pancras face
either a journey of an hour or more to Heathrow on the Piccadilly Line, or an
Underground journey to Paddington (especially inconvenient from Euston,
where passengers must leave the station and cross a busy road junction to
get to Euston Square Underground station), from where they can take the
Heathrow Express, taking up to an hour in total. By contrast, the Crossrail
Interchange station would provide a quick and convenient connection onto
the Heathrow Express, with a journey time of approximately ten minutes to
the airport.
7.5 In addition to, or instead of, a Crossrail Interchange, a strategic case has
been advanced for a direct rail link to Heathrow to be provided as part of
any high speed line from London to the West Midlands. HS2 Ltd therefore
also looked at a range of options for an at-airport high speed rail station. Its
analysis clearly demonstrated the significant difficulties associated with such
a station. The dispersed nature of Heathrow’s terminal facilities means that
there is no clearly optimal location for a high speed rail station which would
enable travellers to quickly access their flight, whatever terminal it left from.
Both Terminal 4 and Terminal 5 are a significant distance from the current
Central Terminal Area, as would be the proposed Terminal 6. Figure 7.1
demonstrates this.

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 High Speed Two – International Connections

Figure 7.1 Heathrow site and connections

Key

National Rail
Crossrail
M 25 Heathrow Express
Possible Iver Interchange
Piccadilly Line
e
Great Western Main Lin Possible station locations
Iver
(Current station)

M4

Proposed
3rd runway Possible T6
Central Terminal
Area (T1-3)

L ine
T5 ad
illy
c c
Pi
To on
Et
W Riv
in er

T4
ds si
or de

aterloo
Proposed Airtrack To W
an
d

connection

Bracknell
To
Staines © Crown copyright. All rights reserved Department for Transport 100039241 (2010)

7.6 A proposal has been made, which HS2 Ltd considered, for a station
outside the current airport boundary at Iver. This could provide good links
to existing transport networks including the Great Western Main Line and
the M4 and M25 motorways. But it is at some distance from the airport
(about 2.5 miles from the current boundary) and divided from it by a heavily
built-up area.
7.7 HS2 Ltd’s analysis also indicates that there is no credible route for a high
speed line to the airport – either as part of the main line, or as a loop or
spur – which would not pass mainly through residential areas, and would
therefore require significant and expensive tunnelling. The only credible option
for routing the main high speed line via Heathrow would entail a near-
continuous tunnel of around 29 miles – almost the length of the Channel
Tunnel – as well as increasing the journey time by around three and a half
minutes compared to HS2 Ltd’s recommended route. Even if only a spur to
the airport was provided, which would substantially reduce the capacity of
the line to central London as Heathrow trains would terminate at the airport,
the tunnelling required would lead to costs in excess of £1.5 billion.

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7.8 Given the complexity and high cost of serving an at-airport station at
Heathrow, and the availability of rapid and convenient connections for High
Speed Two passengers via the Crossrail Interchange station, it is vital to
carefully evaluate the market in considering the case for such a link.
7.9 In the case of the passengers who are perhaps most likely to transfer to
high speed rail from air – those who currently travel to London by air from
UK regional airports – the decision to transfer to high speed rail will not be
influenced by how High Speed Two serves Heathrow. These passengers’
interests will be best served by a high speed route which provides the
fastest transit time and most convenient connections to the capital itself.
7.10 HS2 Ltd’s analysis identifies three further markets which might be more
likely to make use of an at-airport station at Heathrow. These are
considered below:
● Passengers currently travelling to Heathrow by car and other surface
access modes. This market is large, with around 40 million journeys per
year made in total; however, only around 2.5 million of these originate
in the regions most effectively served by High Speed Two (the West
Midlands, the North West and beyond) and only a small percentage of
those can realistically be expected to transfer to High Speed Two given
their diverse starting points.
● Passengers who currently fly from regional airports to Heathrow in order
to transfer to long haul flights. This market is much smaller than the
surface access market, for instance just 2 million journeys per year in
total from Manchester, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh airports,
although this is expected to double over the next 20 years. Moreover, it is
not obvious that a significant proportion of these travellers would transfer
to high speed rail unless some specific challenges could be addressed –
in particular, the convenience for air passengers of checking in luggage
all the way to their final destination, the risk of missed connections, and
the economic incentives for airlines with significant ‘feeder’ networks to
keep fares low in order to maintain their competitive advantage.
● Passengers who currently fly from UK regional airports to European hub
airports, such as Amsterdam, to connect with long haul flights. Each
year some four million passengers make such flights from Birmingham,
Manchester, Glasgow and Edinburgh and other airports. Whilst there
may be scope for some of these to transfer to high speed rail, especially
given the wide range of long haul destinations served by Heathrow, the
same challenges as described above would still apply.
7.11 This analysis suggests that the current market for access to Heathrow via
an at-airport high speed rail station is comparatively modest – as few as
2,000 passengers per day, according to HS2 Ltd’s modelling. Such a
station could be used by other passengers to reach destinations to the
west of London, particularly if it provided convenient connections to
Crossrail, the London Underground and the Great Western Main Line.

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 High Speed Two – International Connections

7.12 The vast majority of those passengers’ interests would also be served by
the proposed Crossrail Interchange station, however, as Table 7.1 indicates.
Even in relation to passengers who would use an at-airport station to
access Heathrow itself, HS2 Ltd’s modelling suggests that nearly three
quarters would still travel by High Speed Two if access was provided via
a direct link to the Heathrow Express at its recommended Crossrail
Interchange station.

Table 7.1 Forecast Distribution of HS2 Passengers Per Day

With With
With No Crossrail Heathrow
Interchange Interchange at-airport
station station station
Forecast users of
second London station
by final destination
Greater London 31200 13800
Heathrow 1400 2000
Other 17400 24400
Total 50000 40200
Forecast users of Euston
by final destination
Greater London 113200 84000 79200
Heathrow 1000 0 0
Other 20000 11000 9200
Total 134200 94800 88400
Total HS2 passengers
134200 144800 128600
to London

7.13 Given the limited size of the market for an at-airport station at Heathrow,
HS2 Ltd’s analysis also takes into account the potential disbenefits for the
large majority of High Speed Two travellers making inter-urban journeys in
considering the case for a direct link.
7.14 The disbenefits of routing the main High Speed Two line via Heathrow
would be substantial, increasing journey times for non-airport passengers
by around three and a half minutes because of the longer approach to
central London, and the fact that trains would otherwise be travelling at full
speed at the same distance from London if a more direct alignment was
used. For this reason, combined with the very substantial additional costs
involved of over £3 billion compared to the recommended route, HS2 Ltd
did not recommend serving Heathrow in this way.

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7.15 HS2 Ltd also identified significant disbenefits for inter-urban travellers from
the spur and loop options. The cheapest option, a spur, would considerably
reduce capacity into central London by diverting a number of services to
terminate at Heathrow. A station on a loop from the main high speed line
was therefore considered by HS2 Ltd to be the best option. It could
combine faster direct services to the West Midlands with slower services
via Heathrow, thereby limiting the impact on passengers not wishing to
access the airport. Nonetheless, HS2 Ltd’s analysis suggested that the
demand for Heathrow services would not justify either the costs of a loop
to the airport (which it estimated as between £3.1 billion and £3.6 billion
depending on the station location) or the longer journey times for many
inter-urban passengers.
7.16 The Government has considered HS2 Ltd’s findings regarding the options
and market for a high speed link to an at-airport station at Heathrow. It
agrees with HS2 Ltd that the current market for such services would be
low, and that any option would entail significant cost and journey time or
capacity disbenefits for other travellers. It also notes the lack of a credible
option for such a station which could efficiently serve all of Heathrow’s
existing terminals, even before its future expansion is taken into account.
The Government therefore accepts HS2 Ltd’s recommendation that the
option put forward for public consultation should be to provide a rail link
to Heathrow via the direct connection to the Heathrow Express at the
Crossrail Interchange.
7.17 Nonetheless, the Government also believes that the importance of effective
integration between national and international transport networks is only
likely to grow stronger in the light of increasing globalisation and tighter
constraints on carbon emissions. As a result, the economic and social value
of a direct high speed link to Heathrow may rise, and the possibility of the
potential market growing rapidly should not be ruled out, particularly given
the Government’s proposal for a core network reaching to Manchester and
Leeds and offering significant journey time savings to other destinations
including Edinburgh and Glasgow.
7.18 For these reasons, the Government’s view is that, as foreshadowed in
paragraph 57 of the Government’s 2009 Decision on Adding Capacity at
Heathrow, further assessment is needed of the case for a potential station
at Heathrow Airport itself. The Government has appointed Lord Mawhinney
to assess the options, and their respective business cases, taking account
of the work published by HS2 Ltd, the study already underway by the airport
operator, and the proposals that have been put forward for a station at Iver.

Connections to High Speed One and the

Channel Tunnel
7.19 A connection from High Speed Two via the existing High Speed One line to
the Channel Tunnel would provide a direct link to the European high speed
rail network and allow direct services to run between major British and

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European cities. The journey to Paris from Birmingham could take as little
as three hours 15 minutes, and from Manchester around four hours,
potentially fast enough to influence passengers to switch from air to rail.
7.20 The strategic case for a High Speed Two/High Speed One link is obvious,
and the Government has asked HS2 Ltd to develop proposals for such a
link, in the context of the analysis below.
7.21 According to HS2 Ltd’s analysis, the initial market for high speed rail
journeys from major regional cities to the Continent would be relatively
small, even allowing for the expected growth in demand for long distance
travel. Table 7.2 shows the total forecast annual passenger demand for
journeys by air to and from Birmingham and Manchester in 2033. In the
case of journeys between Birmingham and Paris, this level of demand would
be equivalent to some 600 passengers per day flying in each direction.

Table 7.2 Air passenger numbers to/from Birmingham

and Manchester
Total annual air passengers
Paris CDG Brussels Amsterdam
2033 (thousands)
Birmingham 439 284 432
Manchester 880 308 589

7.22 It is also estimated that annual rail travel between Birmingham and Paris is
forecast to grow to around 130,000 by 2033.
7.23 Given that not all travellers would transfer to rail, HS2 Ltd’s assessment is
that direct high speed services between Birmingham and Paris/Brussels
could attract around half of the combined rail/air market with some 600 to
1250 daily passengers to and from Paris and 450 to 950 daily passengers
to and from Brussels. Lower proportions of air passengers would be
expected to switch to rail from Manchester and other cities where rail
journey times would be less competitive.
7.24 When considered in the context of the large capacity of high speed trains
– up to 1100 seats per train – these predicted passenger numbers suggest
that the market would be unlikely to justify running a large number of direct
European services until a larger market develops.
7.25 Although the proposed route of High Speed Two in North London is
relatively close to that of High Speed One, creating a physical connection
between the two routes in such a heavily built up area is complex. HS2
Ltd’s work indicates that a direct high speed connection to High Speed One
would be prohibitively expensive, requiring a dedicated tunnel from Old Oak
Common to the Barking area and costing some £3.5 billion. For this reason,
HS2 Ltd has identified an alternative option for a link using the conventional
rail network in North London and connecting with High Speed One near
St Pancras. This would still require some tunnelling and other major track

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works, but would be very significantly cheaper than the high speed option,
with an estimated cost of around £0.5 billion (excluding risk and ancillary costs).
7.26 In both cases, if a link between High Speed One and High Speed Two does
form part of longer-term plans, then to avoid significant disruption to High
Speed Two services after commencement, HS2 Ltd recommend that a
direct rail link between High Speed Two and High Speed One should be
built at the same time as High Speed Two.
7.27 Given the high costs of a direct rail link between High Speed One and
High Speed Two, HS2 Ltd also considered improving connections for
passengers between Euston and St Pancras International stations, not only
to provide an efficient link between high speed rail lines, but also to improve
access to conventional rail and London Underground services and to ease
dispersal at Euston. As an alternative option to a direct rail link, HS2 Ltd’s
report considered that a dedicated rapid transit system between the two
stations and running parallel to the Euston Road could provide an effective
way of achieving this.
7.28 In light of the potential for future demand for connections between European
high speed rail services and any domestic high speed line, but given that
more work is needed to confirm whether there is a viable economic case
for a link, the Government has asked HS2 Ltd to further develop options
for both a direct rail link to High Speed One via the existing North London
network and an improved passenger connection between Euston and
St Pancras, to include detailed assessments of their respective business cases.

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8. Design Standards
and Regulation

8.1 Alongside its work on the route, stations and international connections of
a London-Birmingham high speed line, HS2 Ltd also considered a number
of issues relating to the technical specification of High Speed Two. This
included consideration of the rolling stock that would use such a line, and
the potential options for use of the line and of released capacity elsewhere
on the network by long-distance, commuter and freight services. It also
considered the future options for regulation.
8.2 This Chapter presents HS2 Ltd’s recommendations in each case, and
the Government’s response, including the further work that it considers
necessary in the light of HS2 Ltd’s findings.

Technical Specification – Route Design

8.3 The Government agrees with HS2 Ltd’s decision to design High Speed Two
to provide for an ultimate maximum speed of 250 miles per hour, with a
view to accommodating train service speeds of 225 miles per hour, in line
with current best practice. The Government recognises and accepts that
this necessarily constrains the maximum acceptable track curvature and
gradients, which in turn restricts the number of potential route options. For
example, as Chapter Six sets out, it would not be possible for the new line
closely to follow the route of the M1 or M40. The Government considers
that HS2 Ltd has recommended a potentially viable route which can
accommodate an ultimate maximum speed of 250 miles per hour on route
sections where train performance or other factors such as environmental
considerations permit.
8.4 HS2 Ltd’s technical specification for High Speed Two complies fully with
EU Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI), including European
structure gauge. The Government agrees with this approach, which
accords with its policy of future-proofing the rail system by building new
rail infrastructure in accordance with the TSIs and, where appropriate,
progressively upgrading the existing rail infrastructure in line with these.

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Rolling Stock
8.5 HS2 Ltd’s report notes that compliance with European TSIs will permit
the use of European rolling stock on High Speed Two and allow for the
possibility of through-running between the European rail network and the
new line – for instance, by requiring infrastructure, and in particular station
platforms, to be designed to accommodate two 200-metre long trains,
separately or coupled to run together. Both the Channel Tunnel and High
Speed One, the high speed link into London, are already constructed to
European loading gauge.
8.6 HS2 Ltd therefore proposes that the rolling stock fleet which would operate
solely on High Speed Two should be built to take advantage of the larger
clearances. This will allow these new trains to be more spacious – taller and
wider – than any of Britain’s existing rolling stock, and will permit the use of
existing international standard high speed train designs. The Government
agrees with this recommendation.
8.7 The Government also notes that such European standard rolling stock
would not be able to run onto the current British rail network, and that HS2
Ltd’s analysis suggests that the full benefits of the initial High Speed Two
route, or indeed of a wider high speed network, would only be realised if
through-services via existing tracks are provided to destinations beyond the
reach of the high speed lines.

ALSTOM Transport

The latest in European high speed train design – the French AGV

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 Design Standards and Regulation

8.8 HS2 Ltd’s report identifies two options for providing such services: either
through the use of ‘classic-compatible’ high speed trains built to the smaller
UK loading gauge, or through gauge clearing the sections of the existing
network needed to enable European-sized high speed trains to run on it
to reach their final destinations. Gauge clearance would mean significant
alterations to the track and to structures such as bridges, tunnels and
stations to allow the passage of wider and higher trains. Such major works
could be costly and widely disruptive to existing train services.
8.9 The Government accepts that procuring classic-compatible high speed
trains will be more expensive than international standard designs built to
the European loading gauge, but it agrees with HS2 Ltd that it is still likely
to be considerably more cost effective to provide a classic-compatible fleet
of trains rather than undertake large-scale gauge clearance work on the
existing network. A classic-compatible fleet is also a more flexible solution.
8.10 The Government is therefore minded to endorse HS2 Ltd’s recommendation
of a mixed fleet of dedicated and classic-compatible high speed trains for
High Speed Two. In the first instance, the dedicated trains would provide
services only between London and Birmingham, while the classic-
compatible trains would be used for through services to destinations
beyond Birmingham.
8.11 However, given that HS2 Ltd’s assessment of the balance of advantage
was based only on the High Speed Two line to the West Midlands and not
on the extended ‘Y’ network, the Government has asked the company for
advice on whether this conclusion, and the recommended mix of dedicated
and classic compatible trains, still holds for the ‘Y’ network, albeit with a
much greater number of dedicated high speed trains.
8.12 Over the longer term, should Britain’s high speed network be extended, there
would be increasing scope for services to be provided by the more spacious
and dedicated high speed trains possibly including double-deck rolling
stock. The classic-compatible trains will continue to perform a valuable role,
however, by being reassigned to operate new services extending the
benefits of the high speed network beyond its expanded limits.
8.13 The Government accepts that it is not generally appropriate for existing
non-high speed rolling stock to use the new high speed line as its inferior
operating characteristics would consume several high speed train paths,
and prevent optimum usage of the new high speed line.
8.14 The Government endorses HS2 Ltd’s recommendation that both dedicated
and classic-compatible rolling stock sets should have consistent operating
characteristics, with distributed traction and a maximum speed in both
cases of at least 225 miles per hour (360 kilometres per hour).
8.15 The Government also accepts HS2 Ltd’s recommendation that the dedicated
fleet should be configured as 200-metre sets, to run singly or in pairs
according to demand requirements. The Government acknowledges that
stations on the current network will generally only be able to accommodate
200-metre sets.

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High Speed Rail

Maintenance and Stabling Depots

8.16 HS2 Ltd noted that High Speed Two would require a rolling stock depot,
a principal infrastructure maintenance depot and subsidiary depots at key
points along the route. It would also require various other equipment
locations including London terminal stabling, a control centre and power
supply facilities. For the rolling stock and maintenance depots, HS2 Ltd
identified four factors which need to be considered in assessing potential
site suitability: location; site requirements; access to relevant rail routes; and
sustainability criteria.
8.17 HS2 Ltd assumed that a single depot would maintain both the dedicated
and classic-compatible fleets and that it should be located in the West
Midlands. As well as effectively serving the High Speed Two line, this would
be roughly at the mid-point of the wider network extending to Manchester
and Leeds. A site in the Washwood Heath area of Birmingham was
regarded as a credible option for more detailed assessment, although HS2
Ltd recommended that further consideration also be given to alternatives.
8.18 For the principal infrastructure maintenance depot, a location adjacent to
the crossing of the Bletchley-Oxford line was identified as a potential option,
by virtue of the classic rail connectivity this would provide, but again, further
work is required.
8.19 The Government agrees with HS2 Ltd that the West Midlands could be
an appropriate location for a rolling stock depot, including for its proposed
wider ‘Y’ network, and has asked HS2 Ltd to do further work on this and
on the other depots and related facilities in time to inform a formal public
consultation in the autumn. Final decisions should be taken following
consultation if and when a preferred line of route is confirmed.

Freight
8.20 HS2 Ltd found that the additional costs of making High Speed Two capable
of carrying freight would be negligible (compliance with European TSIs
means that High Speed Two would be capable of accepting European
gauge wagons). The Government agrees that this could be important in
providing for high speed international rail-freight services, in competition
with air freight, as well as enhancing overall network resilience.
8.21 However, the Government concurs with HS2 Ltd’s conclusion that it would
not be feasible to permit conventional freight services (or other slower trains)
onto High Speed Two as part of its normal operations, because of their
severe impact on line capacity.
8.22 The more significant benefit for the UK rail freight industry and its customers
from High Speed Two would lie in the capacity a new line would release to
support continued growth in freight operations on the West Coast Main Line
and other existing routes.

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 Design Standards and Regulation

8.23 The West Coast Main Line is Britain’s key trunk route for rail-borne freight,
with around half of UK rail freight using it during some part of its journey.
It forms a vital international trade link between the major gateway ports of
the South East and the conurbations of the Midlands, North West and
Scotland, as well as serving key freight interchanges in the West Midlands
and North West. However, the West Coast Main Line is also currently
operating very near to line capacity, with little opportunity for freight
operators to secure additional freight paths.
8.24 This capacity constraint acts as a brake on the modal shift of freight from
road to rail. The use for freight purposes of some of the additional capacity
on the West Coast Main Line that would be released as a result of High
Speed Two could make an important contribution to addressing this.
8.25 The service specification modelled by HS2 Ltd to inform the business case
for High Speed Two assumes a notional distribution of released capacity
between freight, regional and commuter passenger services. However, the
Government recognises that the actual allocation of capacity would be
carried out through industry processes, and it would look to facilitate freight
use of such capacity where appropriate through related investment in the
capacity and capability of the Strategic Freight Network.

Regulation
8.26 High Speed Two would require an effective system of regulation. The
particular nature of this regulatory system would depend on a number of
factors, most notably the structure put in place for the operation of services
on the line. For instance, the number of potential train operators using High
Speed Two, including the scope for open access services, would have
implications for the scale of the regulator’s task.
8.27 The goals of the regulatory structure for High Speed Two would be likely
to encompass:
● ensuring that the line is operated in accordance with best practice in
safeguarding passenger and workforce safety;
● ensuring that the line is operated in a manner that provides value for
money for funders (including the taxpayer);
● requiring the infrastructure operator to manage the asset and to behave
in an efficient and effective manner; and
● meeting EU regulatory requirements.
8.28 Should there be a requirement to regulate access rights to the line, the
regulator would be required to determine the appropriate level of access
charges to be paid by train service operators, and to establish structures for
deciding upon access rights.

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High Speed Rail

8.29 The existing rail network in Britain is regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation
(ORR), which acts as a combined safety and economic regulator. The
obvious course, in terms of efficiency and the sharing of expertise, would
be to extend the ORR’s remit to cover High Speed Two. The ORR is already
accustomed to setting track access charges, determining access rights
and ensuring that Network Rail, the owner and operator of the existing rail
network, makes continuing improvements to safety and efficiency. It also
undertakes analogous functions in respect of the High Speed One link to
the Channel Tunnel, operated by HS1 Ltd.
8.30 However, at this stage, the Government does not believe that any option
should be ruled out, ranging from the ORR regulating High Speed Two to a
new high speed rail regulatory structure being put in place with dedicated
responsibility for any high speed network.
8.31 There may also be further questions relating to the nature of the regulator’s
interface with the public. Although it has wide ranging duties, including
protecting the interests of railway users, the ORR is perceived as an
industry-facing body, with Passenger Focus having primary responsibility for
responding to and promoting the concerns of passengers. The Government
would want to consider the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring that the
concerns of passengers using High Speed Two (and any future wider
network) are represented adequately.

Role of Network Rail

8.32 Network Rail will have a key role to play as HS2 Ltd develops its proposals
for a new high speed line to the West Midlands and potentially beyond. The
company owns and operates infrastructure which would be central to those
proposals, notably Euston station and operational railway land at Old Oak
Common and the Chiltern Line. Furthermore, all options for a new line,
including HS2 Ltd’s recommended route, would require new high speed
rolling stock to operate not just on the new line but on the conventional
network, where their timetables would need to mesh with those of
conventional services.
8.33 The Government and HS2 Ltd will therefore work closely with Network
Rail prior to consultation on both the further development of HS2 Ltd’s
recommendations and the broader strategy for high speed rail. This is
without prejudice to future decisions on where responsibility for the
construction, ownership, operation and maintenance of any new high
speed line should rest.

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 9. Engagement and Consultation

Part 3:
The Way Forward

St Pancras Station, restored, expanded and reopened in 2007 as the terminus for
High Speed One.
9. Engagement and Consultation

9.1 In Part Two of this Command Paper, the Government set out its response
to the detailed proposal developed by HS2 Ltd for a high speed line from
London to the West Midlands, which would provide the foundation for a
core high speed rail network. On the basis of the evidence provided, the
Government’s assessment is that HS2 Ltd’s recommended route is viable,
subject to further work being completed to mitigate a number of specific
environmental impacts.
9.2 Part Three sets out the Government’s plan for taking forward the work that
HS2 Ltd has undertaken to date and for developing a wider strategy for
high speed rail. Of fundamental importance within this process will be
formal public consultation on the detail of HS2 Ltd’s recommended route
option from London to Birmingham, and on the Government’s strategic
proposals for high speed rail. A consultation ‘routemap’ is provided later in
this chapter. The subsequent chapters deal with what would be entailed in
securing the powers to allow such a route to be constructed, and an outline
of the likely key elements and timing of the construction process itself.
9.3 The Government is mindful of the need for ongoing engagement with
stakeholders even ahead of formal public consultation. This process of
pre-consultation is important to ensure that the formal public consultation
is communicated successfully to interested parties and particularly those
most likely to be affected by HS2 Ltd’s recommendations. It will also help
to ensure that proposed activities to raise awareness of the consultation
are taken forward on an informed basis and are configured such that all
interested parties have access to the consultation materials and have
an opportunity to comment.
9.4 This chapter sets out the public engagement activities that the Government
and HS2 Ltd will now take forward to inform the Government’s preparation
of the formal public consultation planned for the autumn. These activities
will build on the stakeholder engagement which HS2 Ltd undertook in 2009
to inform its report to Government.

Dealing with uncertainty and blight

9.5 Under existing planning law, residential and agricultural owner occupiers
directly affected by any confirmed plans for the development of any future

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 Engagement and Consultation

high speed line would have access in due course to statutory blight provisions,
which would apply from such time as safeguarding directions are issued in
respect of any route. These provisions also apply to commercial properties
with an annual rateable value of no more than £29,000.
9.6 The possibility of such a line being constructed, however, may in some cases
have an impact on property values in the period before statutory protection
is available. There is no statutory remedy for this, but the Government
accepts that those most affected by HS2 Ltd’s recommendations for a
London-Birmingham high speed line should have access to redress.
9.7 The Government therefore proposes to introduce an Exceptional Hardship
Scheme for householders most affected by these recommendations, and
in particular for householders who have an urgent need to relocate. It is
intended first to consult on this and, alongside this Command Paper, the
Government has published a consultation paper setting out its proposals
on the scope of such a scheme. This consultation paper is available on the
Department for Transport website at: www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/
9.8 The consultation period will run until 20 May 2010, with a view to launching
the scheme shortly thereafter.

Public Information
9.9 The Department for Transport will maintain a full selection of the relevant
documentation on its website, allowing interested parties to gain ready
access to the information they require on high speed rail. These documents
can be accessed at www.dft.gov.uk/highspeedrail
9.10 The Department has also prepared a CD-ROM containing all of the relevant
documents, including HS2 Ltd’s report and supporting material as well as
this Command Paper. These CD-ROMs can be ordered free of charge from
DfT Publications.8 Printed copies of this Command Paper can be ordered
from The Stationery Office.
9.11 The Government will operate an enquiry line to address questions relating
not only to blight and the consultation, but also wider questions about both
HS2 Ltd’s work to date and the Government’s proposed strategy on high
speed rail as set out in this document. The enquiry line will act as a ready
portal for all interested parties to gain information. It is not, however,
intended as a substitute for formal public consultation, which is to follow
in due course.
9.12 The enquiry line can be contacted on 020 7944 4908.

8 See http://www.dft.gov.uk/foi/dftps/howtoobtaindftpublications or tel: 0300 123 1102

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High Speed Rail

Stakeholder Engagement
9.13 HS2 Ltd’s consultation strategy, submitted to the Government alongside its
main report, advised that engaging stakeholders at an early stage ahead of
the launch of the formal public consultation would be beneficial in a number
of respects. The Government recognises the importance of continuing the
work that HS2 Ltd has already started.
9.14 This pre-consultation engagement does not preclude the need for formal
public consultation, but simply ensures that such consultation is as effective
as possible. The Government will work alongside HS2 Ltd in continuing this
engagement with key stakeholders.
9.15 Engagement at this stage will help to ensure that any particular local, regional
or cultural sensitivities are fully factored into consultation and communication
plans and, therefore, that the formal public consultation process planned for
the autumn enables all interested parties to register their views. We expect
this engagement also to involve representative groups with strong potential
interests in the proposals for high speed rail and their impacts. Advice from
these groups will be important in ensuring that communications activities
are conducted in the most effective way possible.
9.16 A wide range of both local and national stakeholders, representing a
diversity of potential interests, are likely to be keen to input to the consultation.
The Government will be responsive, as far as it reasonably can be, to the
different needs of these groupings, ensuring that all parties are presented
with the opportunity to comment on HS2 Ltd’s recommendations. The
Government will work with local authorities and other representative bodies
on devising appropriate public consultation strategies for their areas.
9.17 It is important that key minority groups are empowered to respond to the
consultation. The Government recognises that this is likely to necessitate
more extensive pre-consultation engagement, to allow an effective public
consultation strategy to be devised.
9.18 The Government acknowledges HS2 Ltd’s advice that these pre-consultation
activities are likely to need to be conducted over a number of months – as
many as six – ahead of the formal public consultation.

Formal Consultation
9.19 A project of the scope of High Speed Two has potential implications for
many individuals, families, communities and businesses.
9.20 The engagement process described in this chapter will enable HS2 Ltd and
the Government to understand better the concerns and interests of those
potentially affected by, or interested in, any new high speed line, and it will
inform the further development of both the Government’s proposed strategy
for high speed rail and HS2 Ltd’s detailed recommendations prior to
consultation. However, it is not and nor is it meant to be a substitute for
formal public consultation.

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 Engagement and Consultation

9.21 The Government proposes to begin formal public consultation in the autumn,
following completion of the additional work requested by the Government
from HS2 Ltd on its recommended route from London to the West Midlands.
This consultation will provide an opportunity for all interested parties to
express their view on HS2 Ltd’s recommended route and on the mitigation
measures that HS2 Ltd proposes to reduce any potential adverse impacts
on individuals, communities and the environment.
9.22 The consultation questions posed will be set out in detail in a formal public
consultation paper. They will also include questions on strategic issues
relating to the key transport challenges to be addressed, the options to
consider for addressing them, the weight to be attached to various factors
in assessing those options, and the strategic conclusions reached as a
result. The responses to these questions will inform the Government’s
consideration of its proposed strategy for high speed rail.
9.23 To inform this consultation, the Government will publish alongside its
consultation paper a full Appraisal of Sustainability which will take into account
the conclusions of the further work that has been commissioned from HS2
Ltd, as well as detailed maps and descriptions of the proposed route.
9.24 Given the particular interests and concerns of those living and working
close to the recommended route, HS2 Ltd will also hold engagement
events in a number of key towns and villages, which will enable those
people to pose questions about its detailed proposals and about how
to respond formally to the consultation.
9.25 The Government expects to hold a similar formal public consultation in
due course, but not before early 2012, on the options for the routes from
Birmingham to Manchester and Leeds, following completion of HS2 Ltd’s
detailed planning work. This expectation may, of course, be revised in the
light of the consultation later this year and HS2 Ltd’s recommendations.
9.26 The Government will not make a final decision on the detailed recommendations
made by HS2 Ltd or on its proposed strategy for high speed rail until it has
received responses to these consultation exercises. If it decides in the light
of those responses that the routes recommended are viable and that any or
all of them should be taken forward, the Government will commission HS2
Ltd to begin the work needed to prepare for seeking the necessary powers
via a Hybrid Bill, including environmental impact assessment, other requisite
assessment processes and further appropriate public and stakeholder
consultations.

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10. Planning Consents
and Construction

10.1 The previous chapter explained the Government’s plans to consult on the
initial assessments set out in this Command Paper and for an Exceptional
Hardship Scheme to deal with any unavoidable generalised blight issues
whilst public consultation is underway.
10.2 Following completion of those consultations, and subject to their results, if
the Government concludes that a high speed rail network should form a key
part of the UK’s future inter-urban transport infrastructure, then it proposes
to secure the necessary powers for its delivery through a single Hybrid Bill.
Hybrid Bills are a tried and tested means of securing planning and legal powers
for major new railway lines. Crossrail, High Speed One and the Dartford
Crossing were all successfully taken forward by means of Hybrid Bills.
10.3 The Hybrid Bill process, by which the Government can promote Bills which
would affect the private interests of particular people or organisations,
allows those affected by a scheme to petition Parliament directly and seek
amendments before the relevant Select Committees in both Houses.

Rail Images

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 Planning Consents and Construction

10.4 However, because such a Bill is enacted as primary legislation, this process
also allows the Government to seek all the necessary statutory powers and
authorisations that a complex scheme such as a high speed rail network
would require. These could include, amongst other things, revisions to the
rail regulatory regime, public finance provisions, and provisions to enable
the Secretary of State to make subsequent orders and regulations by way
of a statutory instrument.
10.5 Whilst it would be possible to seek powers for each leg of any high speed
rail network through separate Hybrid Bills, the Government’s view is that this
would not be viable in practice, and that subject to a decision to proceed,
a single Hybrid Bill should encompass the core initial ‘Y’ network from
London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. The passage of a Hybrid
Bill requires significant Parliamentary time and therefore any other approach
would create significant uncertainty about whether and when powers for
subsequent legs could be secured, which would impact upon the
consideration of the initial legislation.
10.6 A second advantage to securing powers via a single Hybrid Bill is that it
would enable construction of the network, should Parliamentary approval
be granted, to be planned as a single coherent project. This could potentially
reduce costs and bring forward completion, particularly of the later stages,
as some of those works could potentially be carried out concurrently with
construction of the initial route.
10.7 Therefore, if the Government remains of the view, following consultation, that
the core High Speed Two network should consist of routes from London to
Birmingham and on to Manchester and Leeds, it proposes to seek powers
for the whole of that network through a single Hybrid Bill, and will ask HS2
Ltd to take forward the necessary planning and preparation work, including
environmental impact assessment and other requisite assessments, to enable
such a Bill to be introduced as and when Parliamentary business allows.

Mobilisation and Construction

10.8 If a Hybrid Bill is enacted and powers are obtained, there would be
significant further work before construction of a new high speed network
could begin.
10.9 HS2 Ltd estimates that this phase, referred to as mobilisation, could last
around two years. This time would be required to allow for land assembly,
and commencement of initial utilities diversions and temporary works, as
well as to finalise the funding package for the network, carry out advanced
planning of the construction phase and let contracts.
10.10 Following completion of the mobilisation phase, and once funding and
construction contracts are in place, HS2 Ltd estimate that the construction
of the London-Birmingham route would take around six and a half years.
This timing is driven by the length of time needed to complete the most
significant works, which, if HS2 Ltd’s recommended route is taken forward,

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High Speed Rail

would be likely to be at Euston station and its approaches. Other major

works, such as at Curzon/Fazeley Street in Birmingham or at the Crossrail
Interchange in West London, could also take four years or more to complete.
10.11 As set out above, however, one of the key advantages of securing powers
for a network through a single Hybrid Bill is that this would allow construction
of different stages of the overall network to be planned in parallel. As well
as reducing costs by providing additional long-term certainty to construction
contractors and other supply chain firms, this could enable construction
resources freed up by the completion of smaller parts of the London to
Birmingham route to begin concurrent work on other parts of the network.
As a result, it is likely that the network could be completed sooner than if
each leg were delivered sequentially.
10.12 The final phase before passenger services could begin on any new high
speed line would be a period of testing and commissioning. This period
would be used to test the operation of the infrastructure and rolling stock,
as well as to carry out safety checks and staff recruitment and training.
Whilst this phase, which HS2 Ltd estimates as lasting around two years,
could begin prior to the completion of construction, a substantial proportion
would still have to take place after the entire line was built.
10.13 These estimates may be subject to significant change. Alterations to the
scope of the project, for instance, as a result of consultation, would entail
additional design and preparation works. And neither the duration nor the
success of Parliamentary approval processes can be guaranteed. Once
powers were secured, final decisions on the phasing of the project would
be likely to depend on public finance considerations at the time.
10.14 Subject to public consultation, environmental impact assessment,
Parliamentary approval and decisions on funding, the Government’s
preliminary assessment is that it should be possible for a London to
Birmingham line to open by the end of 2026, with the London to
Manchester routes to follow in subsequent years, subject to the same
principal considerations.

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11. Costs and Funding

11.1 HS2 Ltd’s calculations indicate that the cost of designing and building
a line from London to the West Midlands would be between £15.8 billion
and £17.4 billion, including appropriate provision for risk, at 2009 prices.
11.2 Although it has not done the same level of detailed planning, and therefore
a significantly higher level of uncertainty must be acknowledged, HS2 Ltd’s
initial assessment of the total infrastructure cost of an initial core network
linking London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds, and connecting to
the West and East Coast Main Lines close to Preston and York respectively,
is in the region of £30 billion.
11.3 In both cases, there would be substantial additional costs, most notably
the cost of rolling stock. HS2 Ltd estimate this would be around £3 billion
for a London-West Midlands line, and considerably higher for a wider high
speed network.
11.4 There would also be long-term costs associated with the ongoing operation
and maintenance of any new high speed line, although HS2 Ltd’s calculations
suggest that these would be exceeded by the revenues generated from
ticket sales and other sources.
11.5 Whilst these costs are clearly significant, they would be spread out over
a period of 15 or more years and the largest sums would not begin to be
spent until during construction. Furthermore, the rate of expenditure would
depend significantly on decisions about the phasing of individual segments
of the overall scheme.
11.6 In fact, under HS2 Ltd’s proposed spend profile, the average annual
expenditure during the construction period would be around £2 billion,
with the highest spend in a single year totalling £3.9 billion. This is broadly
consistent with planned spend during the construction period for the
Crossrail project.
11.7 The estimated design and preparation costs prior to the commencement
of construction, along with the costs associated with the introduction and
passage of a Hybrid Bill, are very significantly lower, and would depend
heavily on factors such as the duration and complexity of the preparatory
work and the amount of controversy and amendments encountered.

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11.8 The Government is committed to long term investment in the infrastructure

needed to support the UK economy. As Building Britain’s Future explains:
“Seizing the opportunities of the future depends on having truly nationwide,
high quality business and technical infrastructure. That is why we must give
priority to bringing greater focus to building and modernising our economic
infrastructure in energy, water, waste, communications, as well as transport
and housing.”
11.9 Although significant, the profiled costs estimated by HS2 Ltd and described
above are in line with this long-term commitment and with the pattern of
public sector investment in major infrastructure projects over recent years,
such as High Speed One, Crossrail and the Olympic Park.
11.10 Using HS2 Ltd’s best case scenario, construction works on any new high
speed line could not begin until after the completion of Crossrail, opening
from 2017, which could present opportunities for the transfer of skills and
expertise and for reducing supply chain costs by providing a predictable
and long term pipeline of major infrastructure projects.
11.11 Further work needs to be done to ensure that if such a project is taken
forward, it is done so in a way which presents the best possible value for
money. This work, described in more detail below, will focus on two areas:
firstly, the potential for the delivery costs of any new high speed line to be
reduced; and secondly, on the options for funding such a new high speed
line, focusing in particular on maximising potential third party contributions.

Reducing the Costs of Infrastructure Delivery

11.12 HS2 Ltd’s development of a proposal for a high speed line from London to
the West Midlands identified some initial evidence that delivering infrastructure
in the UK is more costly than for similar projects in other countries. Work to
benchmark costs of major, comparable high speed rail line projects across
Europe found that the UK unit rates for civil engineering works (for example,
tunnels and viaducts) for a high speed rail line could be up to double those
in Europe.
11.13 There is evidence to suggest that this conclusion applies more widely than
simply in the rail sector. For example, a 2009 study by The Whitehall and
Industry Group for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills concluded
that productivity in engineering construction could be improved, citing
project management, industrial relations, and stability in investment and
regulation as key issues9. A 2006 study by the European Commission
ranked the UK joint 11th of 13 Member States for efficiency in construction,
citing procurement and skills as key issues10.

9 Changing to Compete: Review of Productivity and Skills in UK Engineering Construction, The Whitehall & Industry
Group, December 2009
10 Benchmarking of construction efficiency in the EU Member States (Pilot study), European Commission, March 2006

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 Costs and Funding

11.14 Whilst it is quite possible that civil engineering costs for High Speed Two
may not be double those of other countries, even a more modest five to
10 per cent difference could save up to £1.5 billion.
11.15 The Department for Transport and Infrastructure UK (IUK) will work together
to consider how and whether the cost of relevant civil engineering works
could be lowered, taking into account HS2 Ltd’s evidence. HS2 Ltd will
engage closely with IUK as this work progresses, and its cost estimates
for its recommended route from London to the West Midlands will be
kept under review in the light of the results emerging from this work and
subsequent actions, as will the estimated costings developed in due
course for the Leeds or Manchester legs.

The Funding of High Speed Two

11.16 HS2 Ltd’s report considers the funding options for any potential new high
speed line and concludes that a largely public sector funding approach
for the upfront capital costs is likely to offer the best value for money,
particularly in respect of the railway components of the project.
11.17 Alongside this, however, it also identifies a wide range of ways in which
contributions to the costs of the project could be sought from non-
Government funders. These might include contributions from financial and
economic beneficiaries of the projects, including businesses and others in
the cities that it would serve, or from other public sector sources, such as
local authorities, Regional Development Agencies or the EU.
11.18 The Government agrees with these conclusions, and is determined to
ensure that a fair balance should be struck in terms of the contributions
made by all of those who would benefit from any new high speed network.
It will therefore be reviewing further the funding options for any high speed
rail network in the UK, taking particular account of the scope for securing
third party contributions towards the cost of constructing such a network.
These may include developer contributions linked to new station and
interchange sites, and local authority funding where the project supports
local economic growth. This review should also consider whether PPP
structures could provide a value for money means of financing parts of
any high speed rail project, for example, for rolling stock.

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12. New Industry, New Jobs

12.1 A new high speed line for Britain could be seen both as a transport project
and as a transformational investment underpinning Government objectives
on economic growth and support for industry.
12.2 Chapters 2 and 3 outlined how high speed rail could support UK economic
growth and prosperity. A long-term programme of investment in high speed
rail would also present new opportunities for British design, engineering,
training and development throughout the rail industry supply chain.
12.3 The Government has engaged with the key rail industry stakeholders,
including the Railway Industry Association, Rail Alliance and the Regional
Development Agencies on potential business opportunities associated with
new high speed rail investment.
12.4 This chapter outlines the case for an active role for Government, working in
partnership with industry, to ensure the UK has a supply chain that offers
best value for money as well as the skills and capacity to compete and win
new business, if, following public consultation, a decision is made to take
High Speed Two forward.

Investing in Business Success

12.5 In April 2009 the Government launched New Industry, New Jobs11 – an
active industrial strategy for Britain. This sets out a strategy to equip the
country to succeed over the next decade.
12.6 Going for Growth: Our Future Prosperity12, published in January 2010,
describes the capabilities the UK needs to invest in, and sets out a plan to
achieve sustainable economic growth. High Speed Two would support this
vision by providing new infrastructure to improve the overall business
environment, supporting the UK’s growing capability as a leader in low-
carbon transport, and generating new business opportunities arising from
new rail investment.

11 http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/new-industry-new-jobs
12 http://www.bis.gov.uk/growth/going-for-growth

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 New Industry, New Jobs

Rail Images
The UK Supply Chain
12.7 The UK was the global pioneer of rail in the nineteenth and early-to-mid
twentieth centuries. In 1910, some 800,000 people worked on the railways
and the country boasted twenty five major railway works facilities, the
largest (Swindon) employing 11,700 staff. In 1913 alone, 453 new steam
locomotives, 931 carriages and some 50,000 wagons were built in British
factories. As one railway historian has noted: “The railways were vast
engineering and manufacturing businesses, quite apart from the day to day
activity of moving people.”13
12.8 In the last 30 years the rail industry has become increasingly globalised,
with complex and inter-dependent supply chains that cross borders. Whilst
leading to decline in some areas of UK manufacturing, this new global
competition has also driven innovation and new inward investment. Today,
the UK rail industry is globally competitive, estimated to employ around
190,000 people and worth at least £9 billion annually.
12.9 Competitive pressure has also led to the development of important links
with the civil engineering and construction sectors, and innovative solutions
developed by the rail technology base can also be used by the aerospace
and automotive industries. This means that the skills developed in UK
universities and businesses can transfer to other sectors and help foster
innovative and green solutions in a variety of contexts.
12.10 High speed rail in Britain would present a new opportunity to develop and
demonstrate ingenuity and entrepreneurial excellence. HS2 Ltd estimates
that construction and operation alone of a new London-Birmingham line
would directly create over 10,000 new jobs. It would also support new

13 M. A-C Horne, A Century of Change, Railway Studies Association, 2010

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High Speed Rail

supply chain opportunities and provide a show case for world-class

expertise in design, consultancy and civil engineering.
12.11 The potential value to the UK could be even greater. Chapter Three articulates
the broader economic and employment benefits that high speed rail could
bring to the UK, and Chapter Four outlines the Government’s long-term
proposal for a core British high speed rail network extending to Manchester
and Leeds with through services running beyond. Should a new high speed
network be developed, it could provide employment in rail services and rail
freight, manufacturing, and maintenance, for decades to come.

UK company Pandrol is the global market leader in rail-fastening

manufacture and design, supplying innovative, good value and high-
quality solutions. The French track authority Réseau Ferré de France (RFF)
now uses the Pandrol FASTCLIP system on all concrete sleeper renewals
and new line construction projects in France, including the construction of
the new TGV Est high speed line

12.12 High Speed Two would build on the UK’s existing rail industry capability,
particularly in long-life, high-quality components and products. The long-term
nature of the project would provide opportunities to develop a strategic plan
and facilitate investment in new areas applicable to high speed rail technology
where the UK does not currently have core capability and expertise, and
where there is potential value to the UK. This would support a growing
export market.
12.13 To support the UK’s reputation as an open and competitive market, this
would mean working with investors and suppliers across the globe as well
as fostering close partnership with the UK supply chain.
12.14 High speed rail would capitalise on and reinforce the skills and supply chains
developed through existing rail and infrastructure investment programmes.
The Government has already committed to the £16 billion Crossrail project,
a £5.5 billion investment in Thameslink, a major £1.3 billion programme of
electrification, and wider rail modernisation and rolling stock investment.
There may be potential for synergies in areas such as skills development,
as well as opportunities to maximise value for money.

An Active Role for Government

12.15 The Government’s early engagement with the industry has made clear that,
should High Speed Two go ahead, the Government needs to start working
now to secure a strong and competitive supply chain capable of delivering
and supporting new business opportunities. This would require an active
role for Government.
12.16 Should proposals for High Speed Two be taken forward, the Government
will work with the industry to draw up a high speed rail industrial strategy.
The Government envisages that this could include:

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 New Industry, New Jobs

● identifying practical measures to ensure that the UK has the skills and
capability to design, build and operate high speed lines;
● working with the supply chain to enable companies to plan ahead and
so offer best value solutions; and
● ensuring that the way high speed rail is procured works for industry and
Government alike.
12.17 To take this work forward, the Government intends, subject to consultation
with industry, to establish a high level supply chain forum which would
focus on the opportunities presented by high speed rail and provide advice
to Ministers.
12.18 The Government will also consider:
● inviting a supply chain forum to provide industry input into the Value for
Money in Rail Study and work on the unit cost of high speed rail; and
● establishing an exchange of secondees between Government and the
rail industry.
12.19 Should proposals for High Speed Two be taken forward, the Government
would consult on a procurement approach that supports the Rail Sustainable
Procurement principles including best value for money, whole-life costs,
low-carbon and sustainable employment goals, and new business
opportunities in a globally competitive and open market.

Advantage West Midlands (AWM), the Regional Development Agency

for the West Midlands, has set up a programme of supply-chain groupings,
including for rail, bringing together groups of companies to collaborate on
quality, technology and performance issues. This is leading to the development
of best-practice principles throughout the supply chain.
The AWM model uses complementary, existing support mechanisms to
focus industry capability on new business opportunities. These mechanisms
include information-sharing, technology support in conjunction with
universities and research institutions, and business performance improvement
by linking with ‘Solutions for Business’ support. This approach has helped
companies develop new products and services with UK supply chains.

Supporting World-Class Skills

12.20 Investment in high speed rail would provide an opportunity to create new
skilled jobs and support upskilling at every level. Skills are important not
only for the delivery of a better, more efficient railway in Britain, but also in
helping British industry to compete internationally.

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High Speed Rail

Creactive Design, a Midlands based design consultancy, has developed

a new air cooling unit called Cabcool. The cooling system has been
designed for drivers of trains that previously had no air conditioning or
cooling system. The product is 30 per cent of the cost of installing a typical
air conditioning unit and because of its innovative design it uses only
10 per cent of the energy of a typical air conditioning unit. It allows the
drivers to operate in a space that was not designed with air conditioning
in mind. The product has been designed and wholly manufactured in the
UK and is now fitted on Victoria and Circle Line trains on the London
Underground. The company is focussing on exporting the product to
Northern Europe and South America.

12.21 The benefits would not be limited to the rail sector. Many of the skills and
resources needed to develop high speed rail are generic to manufacturing,
engineering and construction. Consequently, the UK manufacturing and
construction sectors, and especially civil engineering, could be expected to
benefit more generally.
12.22 The Government has laid out its strategy to meet the skills needs of the
future in Skills for Growth14, published in November 2009, and Higher
Ambitions15, the strategy for higher education. Key measures include
widening of access to higher education through apprenticeship and
vocational routes, with more flexible and workplace-based courses.
There will be enhanced support for science, technology, engineering
and mathematics subjects: key skill sets required by the next generation
of rail engineers, apprentices and technicians.
12.23 A bid to the Learning and Skills Council for a new National Skills Academy
for Rail Engineering has been submitted and shortlisted. This will help to
ensure that the engineering workforce has the necessary skills to support
the maintenance, development and expansion of a first-class, cost-effective
twenty-first century railway.

Promoting UK Leadership in Rail Innovation

12.24 The UK remains at the forefront of research, design and innovation in the
rail sector. It has an ambitious agenda to improve customer satisfaction
and capacity, while driving down costs and carbon emissions.
12.25 Government, industry, and the research sector work in partnership through
the rail industry Technical Strategy Advisory Group. This work is leading to
the development of new approaches, products and services, from adapting
to the impacts of climate change to understanding whole system reliability.

14 http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/skills-for-growth
15 http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/higher-ambitions

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 New Industry, New Jobs

LPA is a leading designer, manufacturer and supplier of environmentally

sustainable LED lamps and other electronic and electro-mechanical systems.
Train operators around the world choose LPA’s cost-effective solutions and
products for their known ability to enhance reliability and reduce
maintenance and life cycle costs. Its LED lamps, for example, last up to 30
times longer than halogen lamps, use one-fifth of the energy and deliver 20
per cent more light. A major train operator is successfully trialling LPA LED
lamps following its experience of energy shortages resulting from halogen
lamps which are more energy intensive and can require daily maintenance.
The system is running maintenance-free and releasing enough spare
energy to run a hot drinks vending machine, providing the operator with an
opportunity to increase revenue.

12.26 Evidence suggests that more could be done to accelerate the introduction
of new technology, products and systems. To help identify and better
understand the key barriers to innovation, the Government has commissioned
new research and with the industry is considering the case for new
testing facilities.
12.27 In addition, the Technology Strategy Board is currently working across the
surface transport sector, including rail, maritime, automotive, intelligent
transport systems and low carbon transport, to establish a new Knowledge
Transfer Network (KTN). The new KTN will support the exchange of
knowledge, information and ideas across the transport sector. This will
include work with the rail supply chain and associated industry partners
to identify where innovative new products and services can be developed.

Supporting UK Exports
12.28 Many countries are now looking at high speed rail as a sustainable way
to improve their future transport infrastructure. Huge global investment is
underway, from China to Europe, the Middle East and the USA. The UK
already has much to offer rail export markets, with its global reputation for
quality and excellence. A new high speed line would greatly enhance the
UK’s capability and provide a show case for British expertise.
12.29 To support the UK rail sector overseas, UK Trade and Investment (UKTI),
working in partnership with the rail industry, has an active programme of
export support. This includes inward and outward trade missions, and
UKTI will host a major international rail seminar to promote UK expertise
in May 2010.

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High Speed Rail

Arup and Terry Farrell & Partners: Beijing South Railway Station
The new Beijing South railway station is an architectural icon for China’s
capital city. It is a fully integrated multi-modal transport hub that serves
as a “Gateway” to the capital and a vital link in China’s new high speed
inter-city network.
The state-of-the-art station is one of the largest contemporary railway
stations in the world, designed for a passenger throughput of 286,500
passengers a day, 105 million passengers annually by 2030. It provides
28 high speed, urban, inter-city and mass transit platforms as well as
large bus interchange and car parking areas.
A team of the UK’s Terry Farrell & Partners (a firm of internationally
recognised architects and urban designers) and Arup (a UK-based,
independent firm of designers, planners, engineers, consultants and
technical specialists), together with Chinese design partners, led and
developed the scheme.
Terry Farrell & Partners developed the master plan and architectural
design for the station and the surrounding area, integrating the rail
infrastructure with Beijing’s urban fabric. Arup developed the initial
structural roof scheme with their Chinese design partners, and were
responsible for approval of the schematic, preliminary design and detailed
design of the large-scale multi-span, steel cable beam supported roof.
Arup also managed the wind tunnel testing for the building’s unique form
and provided advanced engineering techniques for assessing air quality
and indoor airflow, developing a combined cooling/heating power system,
and performing annual energy consumption analysis.

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Conclusion

This Command Paper responds to HS2 Ltd’s recommended route for a high
speed line from London to the West Midlands, as well as its assessment of a
number of options for a wider initial core high speed network linking the major
cities of the Midlands and the North, and stretching to Scotland. It has also
examined the case for high speed rail as a potential core element of the UK’s
twenty-first century inter-urban transport infrastructure.
The Government has reviewed the detailed proposals put forward by HS2 Ltd for
a high speed line from London to the West Midlands, and considers, subject to
further work on mitigating specific local and environmental impacts, that HS2 Ltd’s
recommended route could form a viable foundation for such a network.
The Government has also considered HS2 Ltd’s advice on the potential development
of a high speed link beyond the West Midlands. The Government’s view, subject
to consultation, is that there is a case for a core high speed rail network linking
London to Birmingham, Manchester, the East Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds, with
connections to existing main line routes to extend direct high speed services to
other cities including Liverpool, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh.
The Government has therefore asked HS2 Ltd to commence similar detailed
planning work on potential route options for high speed lines from Birmingham on
to Manchester and Leeds.
On the basis of HS2 Ltd’s recommendations and advice, the Government’s view is
that a high speed rail network offers a balance of benefits unmatched by any other
option and should be at the heart of the long-term development of inter-city travel
in Britain.
A project of the scope of a new high speed line has implications for many
individuals, families, communities and businesses. No firm decision can be
made by the Government either on its preferred route for any specific line, or
on its proposed strategy for high speed rail, until formal public consultation has
taken place, in which all those affected by or interested in its proposals have the
opportunity to participate.
The Government will begin such a formal public consultation in the autumn in
respect of its preferred route option for a London to Birmingham line and on
its overall strategy for high speed rail. This will provide all those interested in or
affected by its proposals with the opportunity to express their views. Subject to

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the results of that consultation, the Government plans in due course to consult
in the same way on detailed options for the Manchester and Leeds legs of a
core network.
Following completion of these consultations, as well as further development work
and financial and environmental assessment, if the Government’s conclusion is that
a British high speed network should be delivered, and that the routes proposed
are viable, it will commission HS2 Ltd to begin the work needed to prepare for
seeking the necessary powers via a Hybrid Bill.
This process would be consistent with opening the first leg of High Speed Two
in 2026.

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