125743

THE HISTORY OF SPAIN by Louis

BERTRANJD and SIR CHARLES PJETJ^IB, was first

published in 1934, when it established itself im-

mediately as the standard one-volume history.
The book went out of print very cjuickiy and,
owing to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil
War in 1936 and of the Second World "War in
I939> it 'was not possible to produce the second
edition until 1952. The original edition finished
with the establishment of the Second Spanish
Republic in 1931; the second revised and ex-
tended edition brings the story of Spain down
to 1945-
The late Louis Bertrand was a Jbrejach. his-
torian in the great tradition of eloquence and
passion. The avowed object of his History of
Spain, which ended with the death of Philip II,
was to bring about a revaluation, 'both in
Europe and America, of Spain's contribution to
civilization. It was perhaps inevitable that for
centuries English text booV hculJ have been
affected by memories of the long hostility be-
tween the two countries, while th.c Americans,
who fought Spain as recently as 3:898, have
found it even more difficult to be dispassionate.
But the civilization which dominated Europe
for a hundred and fifty years, which held a huge
Colonial empire together longer than any
power since Rome, and which has stamped Tralf
the American, continent indelibly with its im-
print, cannot be disregarded as a blind and
ignorant reactionary force. No reflecting man
can dismiss the creative genius which produced
Velasquez, Goya, Lope de Vega, Cervantes,
Calderon, St Teresa of Avila and St John of the
Cross, the cathedrals of Burg*- Toledo and
[continued on back flap

SECOND EDITION
SECOND IMPRESSION
lilSTORY OF
 THE
HISTORY OF SPAIN
PARTI
FROM THE VISIGOTHS TO THE DEATH
OF PHILIP H
b
LOUIS BERTRAND
of the Acadtmit Frayaijt

PARTH
FROM THE DEATH OF PHILIP H TO 1945

by

SIR CHARLES PETRIE BT .

M.A.(OXON.), F.R.HIST.S,
Corresponding Member of the Royal Spanish Academy of History

Second Edition
Revised and continued to the year 194?

EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE

LONDON
 First published 1934

Second> revised edition 1952

Reprinted 1956

The French translated by

WARRE B. WELLS

Printed in Great Britain for

Eyre t$ Spottiswoode (Publishers) Limited*
1 5 Bedford Street, London, IP.Cz.
by
Lowe & Brydone (Printers) Ltd,,
London,
 CONTENTS
PACK
INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION by Sir Charles Petrie ix

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION x

PART I
CHAPTER
I. MUSULMAN SPAIN
I. VISIGOTH SPAIN ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB CONQUEST 17
II. THE ARAB-BERBER CONQUEST 21

III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MUSULMANS IN THE

PENINSULA 30
IV. THE FIRST EMIRS DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS 36

IL THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA

V. ABD ER RHAMAN, EMIR OF SPAIN 41
VI. THE CALIPHATE 48
VII. THE COURT OF THE CALIPHS AND MUSULMAN PAGANISM 59
VIII. WHAT THE ARAB-SPANISH CIVILISATION WAS jz

III. THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND

CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
IX. THE DAY OF THE DITCH AND THE REVOLT OF THE
SUBURB 83
X. THE GREAT HUMILIATION OF THE CHRISTIANS 87

IV. THE REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS

AND THE ALMOHADES
XI. THE END OF THE CALIPHATE AND THE LITTLE
MUSULMAN KINGDOMS 99
XII: THE ADVANCE OF FERDINAND AND ALFONSO 106

XIII. THE CID CAMPEADOR no

XIV. THE INVASION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMO-
HADES 1*5
 CONTENTS

V. THE RECONQUEST
PACE
XV. THE STAGES OF THE RECONQUEST 133

XVI. THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA 136

XVII. THE SURRENDER OF GRANADA AND THE EXPULSION OF

THE MOORS 147

XVIIL THE BALANCE-SHEET OF THE ARAB CONQUEST 157

VI. THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF

AMERICA
XIX. THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD, OR THE LAST
CRUSADE 163

XX. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, PROPAGATOR OF THE FAITH 69

XXI. WHAT THE CONQUEST MEANT 176
XXII. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CONQUISTADOR 189
XXin. THE VICEROYS AND THE MISSIONARIES 194
XXIV, THE WORK OF SPAIN IN AMERICA 203

XXV. THE WORLD BALANCE-SHEET OF THE DISCOVERY 209

VH THE HEGEMONY AND THE

SPANISH
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY
XXVI., THE POLICY OF THE CATHOLIC SOVEREIGNS* THE
WARS OF ITALY. THE ROYAL MARRIAGES. SETTLE-
MENTS IN AFRICA 2x5

XXVII. THE EMPEROR CHARLES V. RENEWAL OF THE WARS

OF ITALY. THE PROIESTANTS. THE BARBARESQUES 221

XXVIIL PHILIP II. THE APOGEE OF THE SPAJWSH MONARCHY

AND THE COUNTER-REFORMATION 225

XXIX. THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIP EL THE ABSOLUTE

MONARCHY. THE INQUISITION 235
XXX. THE GOLDEN CENTURY 242
vi
 CONTENTS

PART U
CHAFttUl FJLGK
XXXI. THE REIGNS OF PHILIP HI AND PHILIP IV (i 5 98-1665) 249
XXXII. CHARLES THE BEWITCHED, AND THE SUCCESSION
QUESTION (1665-1700) 264
XXXHL THE SPANISH DOMINATION IN ITALY AND AMERICA 271
XXXIV. THE EARLY BOURBONS (1700-1759) 281

XXXV. THE REIGN OF CHARLES HI (1759-1788) 293

XXXVL REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION (1788-1833) 301
XXXVII. THE Loss OF AMERICA 316
XXXVm, ISABEL H (1833-1868) 323
XXXIX. THE TROUBLOUS TIMES (1868-1885) 353
XL. THE REGENCY (1885-1902) 343
THE EARLIER YEARS OF ALFONSO XIII
XLI. (1902-1923) 348
XLIL THE DIRECTORY AND THE REVOLUTION (1923-1931) 358
XLIIL THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1931-1936) 371
XLIV. THE CIVIL WAR (1936-1939) 584
XLV. SPAIN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1939-1945) 396
XLVL THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 402

BIBLIOGRAPHY 404

APPENDICES :

PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SPAIN 406

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE SOVEREIGNS OF SPAIN 408
TABLE SHOWING THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1700 411
TABLE SHOWING THE CARLIST CLAIM 412
GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE CHRISTIAN KINGS OF
SPAIN facing pag 412
INDEX 413

vii
 LIST OF MAPS
FAOX
i. MUSULMAN SPAIN AT THE END OF THE NINTH CENTURY 16

a. CHRISTIAN SPAIN BEFORE THE UNION OF CASTILE AND ARAGON 132

3. THE SPANISH POSSESSIONS IN AMERICA 162

4. THE SPANISH POSSESSIONS IN EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OP

WESTPHALIA, 1648 248

j. MODERN SPAIN 395

vui
INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION
this Second Edition no alterations have been made in Part I
which was written by the late M. Louis Bertrand, but two chap-
INters have been omitted in order to preserve the balance of tne
book. On the other hand, there have been a considerable number of
additions to Part II: in the original edition it finished with the estab-
lishment of the Second Republic in 1931, but the narrative has now
been extended to cover the Civil War, and the additional chapters
carry the story of Spain down to the close of the Second World War.
The documentation of the last years of this period is still incomplete,
but it is hoped that the summary of the campaign, which left General
Franco master of the country, and of Spanish foreign policy, will not,
in the light of the information now available, be considered in-
adequate.
CHARLES PETRIE
April* 1951.
 INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION
subject of this book is the study of a great civilisation. It is
the story of die influence which Spain has exerted in world
THE history, first in mediaeval Europe, wnen she drove the Moslem
invader slowly back, and then both in Europe and America, when
she colonised the greater part of a continent, without for a moment
abandoning her traditional policy as the champion of Christendom
against the infidel.
In the original French edition, of which the present English one
is a translation, M. Louis Bertrand distinguishes four great periods
in Spanish history: first of all, the contest with Islam in the Peninsula
itself, which occupied eight centuries of Spain's existence, and is the

capital fact of it; then her discovery and conquest of the New World;
next the establishment of the absolute monarchy, and the struggle
against the Reformation; and finally her effort to remain a Great
Power.
The chapters which deal with this period are as M. Bertrand wrote
them, but those which the French historian devoted to the centuries
that have elapsed since the death of Philip n
have been very con-
siderably expanded by the present writer, and the events leading up
to the establishment of the Second Republic in 193 1 have been treated
at length.
The common mistake made by British and American historians in
dealing with Spain, in the mediaeval period especially, is to regard
her as a world apart. They fail to depict Spanish events against
background, and
their European thus miss their real significance.
M. Bertrand has liyea for some years in Africa with Spaniards and
Moslems, in a setting, as he says: "somewhat analogous with what
the Southern Spain of the Middle Ages must have been," and so he
is
peculiarly
well
equipped to present the history of the Spanish
Middle Ages in its right light.
Much that he has to say may seem strange to the Anglo-Saxon
reader, accustomed to regard Spain from the standpoint of his
Elizabethan forefathers ; but no one can follow M, Bertrand's brilliant
of the so-called Arab civilisation without reaching the con-
analysis
clusion that his interpretation is the correct one, and Siat many
British workers in this field have gone seriously astray.
For two hundred and fifty years, that is to say from the death of
Mary Tudor to the outbreak of the Peninsular War, England was
intermittently at war with Spain, and the passions which were roused
during that contest have u^ortunately been only too faithfully
reflected in the of English historians. The result has been that
pages
the ordinary educated Anglo-Saxon on both sides of the Atlantic
still reads Spanish history with all the prejudice of his ancestors.
The propaganda that attracted recruits to the colours in the days of
 INTRODUCTION
the Armada permeates the textbooks. The American is in an
still
even worse plight, forhe fought the Spaniards as recently as 1898,
so that the older generation is still under the influence of the bitter
feeling which that conflict engendered.
For millions of people, therefore, Spain in the days of her great-
ness was the embodiment of all that is evil; a Power which strove to
suppress civil and religious liberty throughout the world, and was
herself sunk in ignorance and superstition. The novelist has com-
pleted what the historian began, and the Spaniards portrayed by
such writers as Charles Kingsley have been accepted as the normal
type of their fellow-countrymen.
The decline of Spanish power was described as the inevitable
consequence of the policy which had been pursued in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and was generally treated as just retribu-
tion. It was not understood that what had exhausted the nation's
strength was the simultaneous colonisation of America and the
struggle against the Musulmans, and it was assumed, rather than
proved, that a misguided people had met a fate to which they had
teen doomed from the beginning,
Nor was any allowance made for the economic difficulties of
Spain at this period. The discovery of America, and the importation
into Europe of precious metals in quantities previously unknown,
caused a fall in the value of money, and a consequent rise in prices :
Spain, the possessor of the Indies, was naturally the first and the
most seriously affected by this development. If too much attention
is perhaps paid to economic history to-day, too little was certainly

given to itm the past, and for this reason, too, Spain has not received
a fair deal at the hands of the Anglo-Saxon historians.
In her Golden Age she is shown as arrogant and intolerant, and
when, in her decline, she was struggling to remain a Great Power,
she is dismissed with a sneer as a beggar aping the state of his betters.
As for her history since the Napoleonic invasion, it is invariably
ignored, and nineteenth and twentieth century Spain is (juoted as
an excellent example of a nation that has had its day, and is scarcely
worth a passing reference.
How those who adopted this standpoint reconciled it with the
facts of Spanish civilisation it is difficult to say. The people who
were steeped in ignorance and bestiality produced Veldzquefc, Murilloi
and Goya; Lope de Vega, Cervantes, and Calderdn. Their architects
designed the cathedrals
of Burgos, Toledo, and Seville, and covered
the New World with buildings that are among its most treasured
possessions at the present time. For a hundred.and fifty years, from
the time of Gonsafo de Cordova to the battle of Rocroy, the Spanish
infantry were invincible, while Spanish sailors were revealing the
secrets of the seven seas. Above all, America was being explored
and colonised, and in the whole of recorded history there have been
no feats to surpass those of the conquistadores. In the fuller knowledge
xi
 INTRODUCTION
and greater impartiality of to-day it must be admitted that the Anglo-
Saxon presentation of Spanish history has too often been unjust.
The corollary of this persistent denigration of the Spaniard was
the exaltation of his enemy, the Moor. The Musulman who had
conquered the Peninsula became the very pattern of chivalry, and
the civilisation of Cordova and Granada was contrasted with the
savagery of the Christian Reconquest.
Those who took this line never stopped to enquire why, if this
civilisation was purely Musulman, the Arab elsewhere should have
remained sunk in the most profound ignorance. The overthrow of
Spanish Islam was written down as a definite calamity, and one from
which unhappy Spain has never recovered. The anarchy which was
continually breaking out even in the heyday of Omayyad power, and
the ferocity which marked the rule of the various Arab dynasties,
were glossed over or altogether ignored, and a picture was painted
which bore but a scanty resemblance to the truth. In the following
pages M. Louis Bertrand sweeps away the misconceptions to which
such treatment gave rise. He does not allow the romance of Musul-
man Spain to blind him to the reality, and he shows that such of it
as is worthy of praise was in fact Spanish.
The work of the Spaniards in America has likewise been far too
harshly judged, and the civilisation of such people as the Incas
unduly praised. "The Inca," to quote M. Bertrand once more, "is
represented sometimes as the type of good savage, full of innocence
and virtue, dear to the heart of Jean Jacques Rousseau; sometimes as
the heir of a high civilisation, hatefully blotted out by the barbarism
of the
conguistaaores"
What Spain set up was vastly superior to what
she pulled down, and it is a mistake to allow our natural horror at the
methods of the conqmstadores (who were no more brutal than their
English contemporaries) to blind us to their achievements, for they
brought two-thirds of the American continent within the sphere of
European culture.
Nor was Spanish rule in the New World the grinding tyranny that
it is so often described in English and American textbooks; if such

Jaad been the case it would not have taken Bolivar and San Martin
so many years to sever the connection with Madrid- The contest
which resulted in the independence of Spanish America was a civil
war, in which the side opposed to the continuance of Spanish
was victorious after a long struggle. Relatively few native
government
Spaniards took part in the war, which was one between the colonists
themselves.
In the pages which follow it has been the endeavour of M. Louis
Bertrand and myself to place such events in their correct
perspective,
and in so doing not only to narrate the history of Spain, but to show
how much that great country has contributed to the common stock
of our civilisation.
CHARLES PETRIE
xii
 PART I
SPAIN FROM THE VISIGOTHS TO THE
DEATH OP PHILIP II
 1

MUSULMAN SPAIN
 CHAPTER I

Visigoth Spain on the Eve of the Arab Conquest

the battle of Algeciras, which handed Spain over to the
Arabs, it was impossible, their annalists tell us, to find any trace
ATER of Rodrigo, the Visigoth king who was defeated in that battle.
"The Musulmans," writes Ibn el Athir, "indeed found his white
horse, which was mired in a slough, with its saddle of gilded buck-
skin adorned with rubies and emeralds. They found also his mantle
of cloth of gold, adorned with pearls and rubies. ..." A
little
farther away, stuck in the mire, was one of his half-boots, of cloth of
silver.
But it was absolutely impossible to discover the body of the king,
ifhe was killed in the battle or assassinated by one of his own side.
If he fled, he escaped so completely from those who pursued him,
and succeeded in hiding himself so well, that he was never heard of
again.
That that remained in the imagination of the Musulmans,
is all
after this great event which delivered up to them, together with a
great kingdom, the gates of Western Europe: a king who suddenly
disappeared, who plunged into impenetrable darkness; with that
disappearance, an empire which collapsed; and, as souvenirs of all
this, a silver boot, a war-horse, a saddle spangled "with rubies and
emeralds, a mantle of cloth of gold embroidered with precious stones
and pearls. . . .

The care with which the Arab annalists note these sumptuous
relics clearly reveals their astonishment and admiration in the pre-
sence of the luxury of the Visigoth kings and their court. Spain all
along appeared to them especially to the uncivilised Berbers of the
Moghreb a country of enchantment.
The Roman cities into which they penetrated so easily surprised
them no less than the fertility of the country. All their annalists
recall the appearance at that time of Seville, Cordova, Merida, and
Toledo, "the four capitals of Spain, founded," they tell us naively,
"by Okteban the Gesar." Among these capitals they forget, or they
ignore, those of northern Spain: Tarragona, Barcelona, Pampeluna,
Le6n.
Seville, above all, seems to have struck them by its opulence and
its illustriousness in various ways. "It was," writes Ibn Adhari,

"among all the capitals of Spain the greatest, the most important, the
best built and the richest in ancient monuments. Before its conquest
by the Goths it had been the residence of the Roman governor. The
Goth kings chose Toledo for their residence; but Seville remained
the seat of the Roman adepts of sacred and profane science, and it
was there that lived the nobility of the same origin/' There is
a similar eulogium of Merida: "This former capital possessed
B 17
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
admkable ancient monuments, a bridge and magnificent palaces and
churches."
When Mousa, after completing the conquest of Spain, went to
Damascus to render account to the Caliph of his conquest and his
administration, he proudly displayed the booty which he had taken
from the Spaniards "thirty thousand -virgins, daughters of Goth
:

kings aftd princes, and an innumerable quantity of merchandise andprecious

stones." Among these valuable objects there was one truly fabulous,
which had been taken in a city near Guadalajara, and which the
Arabs called the Table of Solomon. "The edges and the legs were of
emeralds. .
These, to the number of three hundred and sixty,
. .

were enriched with pearls and coral." Finally the invaders, after a
raid as far as France, found in Saragossa "riches incalculable."
No doubt we must make allowance in all these marvels for
Oriental exaggeration. Those who tell us about them are compilers
writing in accordance with traditions already remote. But it is still
certain that the spectacle of Roman Spain, even much diminished
and much impoverished after the devastations of the Vandals, the
Swabians, and the Goths, must have amazed, if not the Syrian Arabs,
at least the Berbers of Africa, who made up the greater part of the
conquering armies.
It was a country governed, administered, and
organised on
Roman lines, with a single head, a king hereditary at least in principle,
at the apex of the hierarchy. Spain, thanks to the Visigoth kings, had
ceased to be a province, or a group of provinces, and had become a
kingdom. There was henceforth a King of Spain, as there had been
a Caesar in Rome, and as there still was an
Emperor in Byzantium a
king who ruled over all the Spains something that was not to be
:

seen again until Charles V. It is from the date of this unification,

superficial and artificial though it
may have been, that, properly
speaking, the history of Spain begins that Spain has a history.

This Visigoth period, which runs from about 410 to 711, the date
of the conquest of Spain by the Arabs, is a thankless and also, for
lack of documentation, a somewhat obscure field of study. It is full
of devastations, massacres, political assassinations, intestinal wars
among thfe invading barbarians. Even after the triumph of the Visi-
goths and the coming of their monarchy disorder continued. It was
only after the conversion of King Recaredo to Catholicism that one
can recognise at least some
progress in absolute power and, con-
sequently, in internal pacification.
This absolute monarchy, like most of the barbarian institutions,
was modelled upon that of the Roman Caesars. The Visigoth kings
adopted their sons as their eventual successors, by way of assuring at
least the principle of heredity. But this principle was contested by
that of election, which the nobles strove to maintain, and this led to
disturbance at every succession.
18
 VISIGOTH SPAIN ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB CONQUEST
For Spain the Visigoth monarchy was, in short, an aggravation of
the Roman regime. Most of the land was in the possession of the
Catholic clergy, who became all-powerful after the conversion of
Recaredo. He was rich, cultured, and a lover of luxury. He made
Seville and Toledo regular centres of study what are rather
pompously called universities.
This clerical culture of Visigoth times had its great man and its
source of learning in the person of Saint Isidore of Seville, author of
encyclopaedic compilations, theological
and philosophical works,
and a history of the Visigoths, Vandals, and Swabians, which, des-
pite its gaps and its defects, is a considerable achievement.
Side by side with the clergy, there was a military nobility, which
shared with the clergy the ownership of the soil; and finally there
was a whole administrative personnel, a whole army of officials, who
were the same as those or the Roman administration, with their
dukes and their counts, governing the cities and the provinces
respectively.
But the class of small landowners had almost completely dis-
appeared, and the condition of the serfs attached to the soil had
become still worse since the end of the Empire. A whole part of the
population, the Jews, very numerous then as they were in Spain
throughout the Middle Ages, was the object of more and more
rigorous repression. At the beginning of the seventh century,
during the reign of Sisebut, there was open persecution: religious
fanaticism no doubt, but also a political measure.
The Spaniards were always afraid of the intrigues of the Jews
with their co-religionists of Barbary, who might influence the Africans
among whom they lived to attempt fresh landings or fresh raids on
the soil of the Peninsula. Let us not forget and I shall have fre-
quent occasion to recall this capital fact, which must never be lost to
/Sight when one studies the history of Spain that Spain lived for
thousands of years in terror of African invasions or piracies.
Throughout the centuries the attitude of the Jews remained the
same: they were the allies of the Africans against the Spaniards, of
the Musulmans against the Christians, and of the Christians against
the Musulmans, when the tide turned. They neutralised their
enemies one with the other: it was a system of counterpoise.
In these first years of the seventh century, whether it was that
their number ana their wealth alarmed the government, or that they
were suspected of being in negotiation with the Berbers or the
Byzantines of Africa, drastic measures were taken against them.
They were given a year to become converts to Christianity or leave
the country.
It seems that 90,000 of them preferred baptism to expatriation,
and there were pretended conversions by the swarm. Thanks to this
expedient they remained. They continued e/en to practise their
religion and live according to their law; but it was a wretched life
19
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
of ceaseless anxiety that they led, with repression and tolerance
alternating.
Towards the end of the century that is to say, a few years before
the Musulman invasion they decided upon a general rising. Were
they driven beyond endurance, as certain historians say, or did they
judge the moment opportune and the circumstances particularly
favourable? The two hypotheses are equally admissible, and it is
very probable that the two motives operated at the same time.
Carthage, the last foothold of the Byzantines in Africa, had just fallen
(693). There were, so to speak, no Christians left on
the other side
ofthe Mediterranean. Islam was triumphant from one side of Africa
to the other.
It \*jas then that the Jews came to an understanding with their co-
religionists of Barbary and with the Spanish Jews in exile in Africa
in consequence of Sisebut's measures. The rising was to break out
simultaneously with a descent by African Jews, no doubt supported
by Berber tribesmen, on the coast of Andalusia. The plot was dis-
covered, and its discovery led to a redoubling of repressive measures
against the Spanish Jews. Once more they were confronted with the
alternatives of becoming converts or leaving the country.
All this agitation profoundly disturbed the kingdom. It was cease-
lessly distracted by the rivalries ofthe Grandees, and there were also
populations which
other dissidents besides the Jews namely, entire
had remained Arian or pagan in the midst of Christians and Catholics.
To all these causes of weakness was added laxity of morals, at least
'among; the Grandees. Laity and clergy maintained regular harems of
concubines, despite all ecclesiastical censures. It was not yet Musul-
man polygamy, but it was something that strongly resembled it.
Ibn Adhari tells us that, when Mousa returned from Spain to Damas-
cus, he was closely interrogated about that country by the Caliph
Soleyman. The Caliph asked Mousa what had struck him most in it.
"The effeminacy of the princes," replied that austere Musulman.
Spain, under the last Visigoth kings, was ripe for foreign invasion.
 CHAPTER II

The Arab-Berber Conquest

A T Toledo, at the spot where the gorge of the Tagus closes in

r\ and the bend of the river opens on to the plain, they still show
^
-^to-day a heap of shapeless ruins called the Baths of La Cava.
It was there, so the legend runs, that Rodrigo, the last Visigoth king,
seduced the daughter of Count Julian, the beautiful Florinda, whom
the poets of the Romancero call La Cava. It was to avenge the dis-
honouring of his daughter that the traitor Julian invited the Arabs
to Spain and handed over his fatherland to the infidels. As a matter
of fact, these ruins are the debris of an old bridge, and it is not certain
that La Cava ever existed.
So, from the very beginning of her history, Musulman Spain
possessed a romantic character, which she retained to the end.
When one emerges from the brief Visigoth annals, she conveys an
impression of fantasy and frivolity. It is another atmosphere; it is
the beginning of a new world, a world not made to our measure,
which attracts and shocks us, which disconcerts all our habits of
mind.
This world has scarcely been thought about or described by Latin
and European minds, so that it is difficult for us to represent it to
ourselves as it really was.A complete critical exegesis is required to
bring it in touch with us and subject it to the habitual conditions of
our point of view and the methods of our thought.
/ For the whole of this in fact, we have scarcely any dooi-
y period,
mentation except in Arabic. Latin texts are rare, and the reasons for
.
this fact are only too easy to understand. The Musulman invasion
led to a decay, not to say a of Latin culture in
complete destruction,
Spain, especially northern Spain, which remained Christian and
Roman. Perhaps it would not be paradoxical to say that this culture
was better preserved in southern or central Spain, at Cordova or at
Toledo, under the Musulman regime, than it was in Asturias or
Navarre, reduced by the invaders to a precarious and wretched
existence, and exposed to periodical devastations.
/ In any case, the Latin documents which we possess about Musul-

'fnan Spain are few, and they do not tell us much. They are, in general,
the work of clerics or monks, who are interested only in their own
church or monastery and execrate the infidels. They speak of the
Musulmans and their princes only to revile them. What they see in
this lamentable story of Spain under the invader is a pretext for

teaching a lesson to their flocks. They see in it the finger^of God and
the just punishment of the Christian people, in expiation of their
vices and their impiety. In any case it is an abominable story, and it
is much better not to talk about it.
It is, therefore,
especially to Arabic texts that
we must turn for this
21
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
the early Middle Ages in Musulman Spain. But here every
period of
kind of precaution is called for on the part of foreign readers,
especially those who are not
Arabic scholars and have to resort to
translations or content themselves with the commentaries of our
historians. In the first place, it appears that the lack of precision in
the Arabic language justifies the most disconcertingly wide inter-
pretations of the same text. Who is to decide among;
the translators?
We profane people are compelled to put up with what they offer us,
though we may preserve a prudent scepticism.
We must, moreover, be on our guard against being deceived by
words, which do not mean the same thing for us as for Orientals.
The words "learning" and "scholar" have not the same sense for a
Christian of the twentieth century as they had for a Musulman, or a
Christian of the ninth century. When we are told about Musulman
tolerance and about the cult of literature, science, and art at the court
of the Caliphs, when the praises of the universities of Cordova,
Seville, or Toledo are sung to us, it would be very naive to judge
them by our standards, and to see in these universities something like
the Sorbonne, even that of the Middle Ages. The poetry of the Arabs
is quite different from ours and so also is their history.
;

The Arab "historians," as they are generously called, can only be

regarded from our point of view as dry annalists or, in general,
compilers without any critical faculty. As Gobineau has already
remarked, in connection with the Persian writers, they do not possess
the sense of what we understand by truth, or, more exactly, the sense
of Yes and No. They have a hazy idea of the boundaries of history
and poetry, properly so-called.
,Thus tneir histories are strewn with long fragments of poetry, to
^hich they attribute the value of historical evidence; they accept the
most fabulous legends and traditions without interpreting them;
they fall into kinds of Oriental exaggeration; and, when they
all

quote figures, they let themselves go to astronomical valuations.

As for marshalling of narrative and methodical exposition, nothing
could be further from their habits of mind. Everything is
put on the
same plane trivial incidents and important events which led to
changes of regime or the fall of empires.
The most annoying thing for us is that the narrative is cut up into
annual sections and continually chopped off and interrupted by the
obligation to respect the chronology. It is impossible to follow the
development of an action: the plan of the annalist is opposed to it.
This produces extraordinary complexity and intricacy, something
like the inextricable labyrinth of lines in an
arabesque: a torture to
the mind, which finally gives up trying to make head or tail of it.
Along with this goes a lack of personality in the actors, a lack of
relief in the characters, who
repeat themselves indefinitely. These
histories if one dare
give them that name only too often leave us
with the impression of an absurd and
unintelligible chaos.
22
 THE ARAB-BERBER CONQUEST
With regard to the Spanish historians who write in Arabic
especially those who write about the period with which I am con-
cerned Dozy remarks very pertinently that they have more com-
mon sense, or at least a more exact and realistic sense of things, than
the Orientals. Ibn Kaldoun, the one among all these writers who
approximates closest to our conception
of an historian, was of
Spanish origin. Yet these Spaniards themselves, these Islamised
Spaniards, admit the fables of the Egyptians and the Persians as
authentic documents for the ancient history of their own country.
Instead of investigating local traditions and Latin or Greek texts
about Spanish antiquities, they prefer to rely upon the doctors of
Cairo or Bagdad, who are regarded by them as the sources of all
learning and the models of all orthodoxy, and therefore the sole
repositories
of truth. Hence arise the strangest fantasies. But, when
it is a Question of events of which
they were witnesses and, in general,
of Musulman Spain, even that of the early centuries, they rediscover
their faculty of judgment and their realist and positivist mind.
In connection with the beginning of the Arab Conquest we have
the good fortune to possess one of these Spanish documents, which
is entitled the Akbar Madjmoua.
According to the best judges, one
can rely upon it without too much risk of error. The personalities
and the facts, taken as a whole, seem to be quite authentic. We are
as near as possible to the truth; but, even so, this history still pre-
serves in pkces the air of a fairy-tale.

The governor of Africa for Rodrigo, King of Spain, Count Julian,

had a daughter fair as the day, whose name was Florinda. In accord-
ance with the custom of Spanish patricians, who sent their children
to the court of the Visigoth king, there to learn the service of princes
or the profession of arms, Julian sent his daughter to Toledo, where
she was attached to the higher household ranks in the palace* As
luck would have it, Rodrigo fell in love with the fair Florinda.
One day, when she was bathing in the Tagus, he surprised her
treacherously and took his pleasure of her* Julian's daughter found
means of informing her father of her dishonour. He swore to be
avenged. A little later, Rodrigo asked him for falcons and hawks for
his hunts. "I will send you/ replied Julian, "a hawk such as you
have never heard of before. ..." It was a veiled allusion to the
barbarian invader whom he contemplated launching against his
master's kingdom.
He was, in fact, not slow in approaching Tarik, who was in com-
mand at Tangier in the name of Mousa, governor of Ifrikia, and
showing him how easy the conquest of Spain would be for a leader
of armies who was so close to her. Tarik responded to his o^fertures,
and Julian sent over to Spain, in coasting boats and in small parties,
lest the Spaniards should be put on the alert, a whole body of troops,
who went to ground and awaited the arrival of their " " 1
-

23
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
Tarik set off with the last contingent. He disembarked at Gibral-
tar, seized and, in order to terrorise the Spaniards,
Algeciras,
ordered his soldiers to cut a party of prisoners to pieces and boil their
flesh in cauldrons. Then he set his other captives at liberty. Aghast
at this horrible spectacle, they set off to spread the alarm throughout
the country.
Tarik resumed his march, met Rodrigo on the banks of a river,
and vanquished him in a battle which lasted from morning till night.
After that he took possession, almost without striking a blow, ofthe
principal cities of Andalusia, occupied Toledo, the capital of the
kingdom, and, still pursuing his triumphal march, pressed on to
Guadalajara and the pass of Buitrago. There he was overtaken by
Mousa, his superior, who, jealous of his laurels, had come over to
Spain himself. Mousa, after picking up many successes on his way,
took Saragossa and, through the valley ofthe Ebro, penetrated even
into France.
The whole of Spain was thus conquered in a very short time;
and, when Mousa went to give his account of his conquest to the
Caliph of Damascus, he laid at the feet of the Commander of the
Faithful an immense booty, thousands of captives and inestimable
riches. . . .

Such is the semi-legendary narrative which the Arab annalists all

reproduce, with more or less important variations, but which is
fundamentally identical in all of them. The Akbar M.adjmoua9 while
it admits some fabulous features, nevertheless possesses a more

seriously historical character. It offers the beginning of a genuine

synthesis which modern critical methods can follow up to obtain at
least an approximation very close to the truth.

In the fi*st place, who was this Julian, this Count Julian, this
traitorof melodrama, who was the cause of such a deplorable catas-
trophe: a catastrophe whose effects were to kst more than seven
centuries?
Was he in command at Ceuta or at Tangier, or, as others say, at
Algeciras? Was he Visigoth by birth, Spanish, Greek, Roman, or
Berber? All this is difficult enough to elucidate. At the same time,
it seems reasonably certain that he was
governor of Ceuta. Ibn
Adhari tells us that, at the beginning of this eighth century, a cer-
tain number of "Christianities" still persisted, even after the Musul-
man invasion, on this part of the African coast.
7
"Tangier, Ceuta, Algeciras, and that region/ he says, "belonged
to the King of Spain, in the same way as almost all the coast of
Southern Morocco and its neighbourhood were in the hands of the
Roums. It was they who lived there, for the Berbers have no love
for living in towns or villages, and seek only the mountains and the
fields, on account of their camels and their flocks/'
Dozy has found ingenious arguments for that Julian
supposing
 THE ARAB-BERBER CONQUEST
was a Byzantine. His name certainly seems to indicate it. 1 Expelled
from Tangier by Mousa, he took refuge in Ceuta, with the empty
title of Exarch of Africa, and thence exercised purely nominal

authority over all those "Christianities" which Islam was about to

annihilate. Harassed by the Musulmans, and being able to base only
the most precarious hopes on help from the Basilcus of Constanti-
nople, he was driven to turn, as his natural ally, to the Visigoth
king who reigned at Toledo, the Christian monarch nearest to his
province.
Did he even declare himself Rodrigo's vassal, in order to obtain
his protection against Mousa? Nothing is more likely. This would
explain how Ceuta came to be regarded in the eyes of the Arab
historians as a possession of the King of Spain.
What wrong did Rodrigo do Julian? The story of the seduction
of La Cava and her father's vengeance seems difficult to accept.
But Rodrigo certainly provided Julian with a pretext for betraying
him. It is probable that Julian looked for this himself. He
pretext
had only the choice between two masters Rodrigo or Mousa. The
:

latter, the lieutenant of a prince who ruled over half the ancient
Roman Empire, and whose armies were pressing him closely, was a
more powerful protector for Julian than die King of Spain. Accord-
ingly, to assure the goodwill of the Musulman, he facilitated his
passage to the coast of Andalusia.
Anumber of other hypotheses are tenable. To multiply them gets
us no further. The only certain thing is the invasion of Spain by the
Musulman with the complicity of Julian. All the rest is darkness.
There is the same obscurity where Rodrigo is concerned. Was he
of royal blood, or one of the great feudatories of the Crown? We
know only that on the death of King Wamba, his predecessor, he
was elected in preference to Wamba's sons. Henceforth the two
ousted princes exerted themselves by all the means in their power to
dethrone the man whom they regarded as a usurper. When the
Musulman leader attacked Rodrigo, near Algeciras, they gave
ground deliberately, and through this defection caused the loss of
the battle and the death or at least the downfall of their enemy.
It required such treachery to compass the defeat of the Visigoth

king. The anonymous author of the Akbar Madjmow claims that he

had assembled an army of about a hundred thousand men, whereas
Tarik, his opponent, had only twelve thousand. Without discussing
these figures, we may admit that the Visigoth troops were superior
in numbers to the Musulman troops.
may seem surprising that an army of invasion should be so
It
small in numbers. The fact is that the Musulmans did not at the
outset intend to invade Spain, or, if they were contemplating it more
or less deliberately, they did not think that the opportune moment
This name is disputed. The opinion
1
now most favoured is that Julian, or rather
Oulban, was a Berber.
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
had yet come. Mousa, the governor of Tangier, either as a sequel to
Julian's advice and overtures, or spontaneously,
had consulted the
Caliph of Damascus on the subject.
The Commander of the Faith-
ful replied: "Make a reconnaissance into Spain with light troops, but
be careful not to expose the Musulmans to the perils of a stormy
sea." Was this "stormy sea" an Oriental metaphor, or should we
-'take these words literally and read into them the Arabs* well-known
ifear of the sea and all its unknown dangers ?
In any event the Caliph counselled prudence to his lieutenant.
Accordingly, Mousa confined himself to having a preliminary
reconnaissance made on the Andalusian coast by his freedman Tarif
to be confused with Tarik, the first Musulman conqueror of
(not
Spain). This took place in 710 of our era.
Tarif the freedman set off
at the head of four hundred infantry and one hundred horsemen,
transported in four ships. They landed opposite Tangier, at aport
which has since been called Tarifa, in commemoration of larif.
They pushed on as far as the outskirts of Algeciras, and made a fine
raid there, laying hands on a
cjuantity
of money and bringing back
into captivity women so beautiful that neither Mousa nor any of his
comrades had ever seen anything like them.
Encouraged by this fortunate brigandage, Mousa decided to equip
an expedition on a larger scale. The following year (711) he sent to
Spain "another of his favourites, the leader of his bodyguard, who
was called Tarik ibn Ziyad," according to some authorities a Persian
by origin, and according to others a Berber. Tarik had at his disposal
only seven thousand men and four ships to transport them. He
assembled his troops on the Rock of Gibraltar (to which he gave its
name: Djebel-Tarik), and lost no time in seizing Algeciras.
Meanwhile, having learned that Rodrigo, King of Spain, was
matching against him with a strong army, he demanded reinforce-
ments from Mousa, who sent him another five thousand men, thus
the strength of his forces to twelve thousand men in all.
raising
Rodrigo was defeated as a result of the defection of the sons of
Wamba, His numerically superior army disbanded and broke into
flight before a handful of Berbers. Thereupon, thanks to all kinds of
complicities, and especially to the advice of Julian, who revealed the
weak points of the enemy to the Musulmans, Tarik, taking advantage
of an unexpected opportunity, rapidly subjugated almost the whole
country.
Apart from the treachery which prepared the path for him, and
the facilities which were
put at his disposal, it appears that the terror
inspired by his barbarian hordes also worked to his advantage.
Whether it was that the atrocities committed by his troops gave rise
to the report, or that he judged it convenient to
put it into circu-
lation, he and hi$ army advanced preceded by tne reputation of
cannibals. Let us note this
significant detail: when the Musulmans
penetrated into Spain, they were regarded not as representatives of
 THE ARAB-BERBER CONQUEST
a higher civilisation, but as absolute savages, who fed on human
flesh.
After routing the remnant of Rodrigo's army in the neighbour-
hood of Ecija, Tarik, still relying on Julian's advice, decided to
march on Toledo, the capital of the kingdom. He entrusted the siege
of Cordova to his lieutenant Moghit, and dispatched different
detachments against Elvira, Malaga, and Murcia. When Toledo
opened its gates to him, Tarik pursued his march northwards, until
he was overtaken by Mousa, jealous, as I have already said, of the
laurels won by his lieutenant and attracted by the ease of the
conquest.
Mousa lost no time in taking possession, if not of the whole
country, at least of all the important strategic points of the Peninsula.
Soon there was nothing left to the Christians but the mountains of
Galicia and the coasts of the Basque territory. All along the line
Islam had triumphed in the most glorious and the most unexpected
way.

How is one to explain such a sudden collapse of the Visigoth

autocracy? No doubt this monarchy, foreign in its origin, was not
very deeply rooted in the old Iberian soil. I have just mentioned,
moreover, the reasons which made it unpopular, and even unendur-
able, to a whole section of the population.
But all these reasons together do not suffice to explain this kind of
triumphal progress of the Musulmans through a vast country, which
seemed to accept their domination or to resign itself to it readily
enough, even though there were some attempts at resistance here
and there. Rodrigo, to all appearances, had superior forces at his
disposal. Even after the loss of two battles, it was still possible for
the Spaniards to cut the invaders' communications and throw them
back to the other side of the sea.
But neither the nobility nor the population of the towns and the
countryside seem even to have thought of it. Like the royal princes,
the sons of Wamba and the enemies of Rodrigo, the Spaniards saw
in Tarik's tribesmen only involuntary allies, who were going to rid
them either of a detested rival and usurper or of a fiscal and clerical
tyranny which was hateful to them. They imagined that these
Africans, once they were gorged with booty, would turn their
._

horses' heads around and re-embark for their Barbary, as Tarif haa
done the year before.
So far was this the case that almost everybody helped them on
their way. They were regarded as liberators. It was Julian, a Chris-
tian, who had summoned the Musulmans to Spain; and it was Chris-
tian Spaniards who acted as guides to them and, on occasion,
opened the gates of towns to them.
This incorrigible blindness was an error which was to repeat itself
indefinitely in the course of the centuries. What Visigoth Spain had
 MUSULMAN
once done light-heartedly Musulman Spain was to do over and over
of the conquest. At every turn the
again through a regukr fatality
the little Moorish kings, called upon
Caliphs and their successors,
Africans to support them against a rival or a Christian prince, or
simply to maintain their personal security.
They thought that they were finding in them merely momentary
they let them establish themselves in their towns; and,
allies;
when
they wanted to get rid of them, they had to fight and expel them
at the cost of great effort, or else to submit themselves to the
interlopers.
The Visigoth lords who had permitted the Berbers of Tarik and
Mousa to penetrate into Andalusia were, therefore, cruelly deceived
in their selfish calculations; and so, equally, were the rich inhabitants
of the towns. When the enemy revealed their real designs, they had
no option but to retreat to Toledo, and then to Galicia, or else sub-
mit to the conquerors.
Only the Jews and the serfs found some advantage in this change
of regime, inasmuch as both of them were treated less harshly by
their new masters than they had been by the Visigoth clerics and
barons. In many districts the Jews acted as auxiliaries to the invaders.
The captured towns were entrusted to Jewish garrisons, with a
stiffening of Musulmans, to hold down the Christians.
The Spaniards were never to forget this treachery. Much later,
'during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabel, when the Jews were
expelled from the Peninsula, resentment against this defection,
strengthened by more recent grievances, was still alive.
The Spaniards, therefore, began by failing to realise the Arab
conquest. They had already seen so many pillagers pass over their
soil and disappear, like locusts after the harvest. The invaders them-
selves had not envisaged their expedition as anything more than a
mere raid. They were the first to be surprised by the ease of their
success.
But they felt very strongly that this success was not assured and
that this great, unknown country, where chance had made them
masters, contained all kinds of traps and dangers. They were afraid
of it ; they thought that at any moment they might have to pack up and
decamp. When the whole country, from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar,
was subject to them, the Caliph Omar ben Abd el Aziz still con-
templated evacuating it.
"His purpose/' says Ibn Adhari, "was to withdraw the Musul-
mans and let them evacuate this country, for they were too widely
separatedfrom their brethren and too much in contact with the infidels and the
enemies of God. But he was informed that they were in
great numbers
and had spread themselves everywhere; and then he renounced this
"
purpose,
Let us note, in passing, a curious resemblance between the motives
of the Commander of the Faithful and those of the princes of the
28
 THE ARAB-BERBER CONQUEST
Church and the theologians who advised the Catholic Sovereigns to
expel the Moors and Moriscos. On both sides there was the same
fear of seeing the true believers lose the purity of their faith through
contact with the infidels.
But the fears of the Caliph were not solely of a religious order.
He was afraid, above all, that the conquerors might be too few to
occupy the country with complete security. It appears that Mousa
himself, despite the rapidity of his conquest, shared these apprehen-
sions. When he set off for Damascus, recalled by the Caliph, he
chose Seville as the seat of government, no doubt because it was
nearest to the sea, in case the Musuknans should be driven to take
flight.
As a matter of fact, no great strength was needed to keep popula-
tions disarmed and abandoned by their leaders in their place. After
the battles of Algeciras and Ecija, not very much can have been left
of the Visigoth army. Besides, at that period, the occupying troops
in conquered countries were always relatively few in numbers.
Under the Emperors, Roman Africa- was held by about twelve
thousand men. Similarly the eighteen thousand soldiers of Tarik
and Mousa, even if we concede that many of them returned to Bar-
bary, were more than sufficient to assure order from one end of the
Peninsula to the other.
Be that as it may, these conquerors despite themselves undoubtedly
had the feeling that they were no more than encamped in this vast
country which had so easily submitted to them. Thanks to a con-
catenation 'of improbable circumstances, they were to remain there
for more than seven centuries; but this feeling of impermanency was
never effaced among them, or at least among the princes and the
nobles, who, in the midst even of Islamised Spaniards, always re-
garded themselves as being more or less in enemy country.
That was what had happened to the Visigoths. But the Visigoths,
converted to Catholicism, professed the same religion as the Spani-
ards, and there was thus a prospect that they might end by fusing
completely with the natives. In the case of the Musulmans, the
difference in religion was to be an invincible obstacle to fusion. So
they remained to the end foreigners in Spain.
 CHAPTER III

The Establishment of the Musulmans in the Peninsula

handful of adventurers
began by being nothing more than a
in the country, and they never succeeded in constituting a homo-
THEY geneous people or establishing national unity there. In the
brightest days of the Musulman hegemony Spain strongly resembled
one of those countries of the Levant where, until modern times, a
minority of Turks, garrisoned in a few important towns, held an
amorphous mass of hybrid populations in check. Like Palestine,
Syria, or Anatolia in our day and no doubt also in antiquity
Musulman Spain at the period of the Caliphate was a medley of
Jews, Berbers, Yemenite and Syrian Arabs, Christian and renegade
Spaniards.
The Musulmans, at the outset, were in a very small
minority.
There were a number of reasons for this. The first was that Spain
was separated from the rest of Islam by the sea and the Musulmans
were always very much afraid of the sea. The Arabs were never
navigators. Mousa ibn Nosair, the governor of Ifrikia at the time of
the invasion of Spain, had no fleet at his disposal. The first scouts
whom he sent to raid Andalusia were transported there in four
ships. The next year Tarik's seven thousand men had to make use of
coasting vessels and passed over only in small detachments no
doubt lest the Spaniards should be put on the alert, but no doubt also
because they had very few ships available.
The Akbar Madjtttoua goes so far as to say that these seven
thousand men were transported in the four ships of the first raid.
But it adds that Mousa, realising the necessity of a fleet if he proposed
to undertake expeditions into the Peninsula on a larger scale, had a
number of other ships built.
In any case, the first expeditionary force commanded by the Berber
Ta.dk numbered originally only seven thousand men, to whom five
thousand reinforcements were then added, making a total of twelve
thousand men. "Most of these soldiers," the Akbar tells us, "were
Berbers and freedmen, and only a very small number were Arabs."
Later Mousa crossed the straits with an army estimated at
eighteen
thousand men, who very probably were also Berbers for the most
part.
This raised the numbers of the invaders to about thirty thousand
men: a strength considerably inferior to that of the French
army,
which, in 1830-1, conquered no more than the city of Algiers and its
neighbourhood. Out of this strength many were doubtless killed or
went back to Africa with their booty, thus still further restricting the
first Musulman
population of Spain.
If we bear in mind that their domination extended from the
marches of Septimania to the Strait of Gibraltar, it is obvious that
30
 ESTABLISHMENT OF MUSULMANS IN THE PENINSULA
these invaders must have been submerged in the native population*
In any event, this small number of them certainly seems to have con-
sisted mainly of African Berbers, stiffened by a few Arab leaders.
Nothing, therefore, could be wider of the mark than to imagine
Spain in the Middle Ages as occupied and peopled by the Arabs.
No doubt there were many later infiltrations or Syrian and Pales-
tinian Arabs, but these were small in numbers by comparison with
the mass, which was Berber and, above all, Spanish.
The Caliphs frequently invoked the aid of African contingents,
and finally there were two great Berber invasions in the time of the
Almbravids and the Almohades. Despite this, the Musulman ele-
ment never reached the point of being completely predominant in
Spain, at least during the apogee of the Caliphate. According to the
best authorities, only one-half of the population was Musulman.
The remainder was composed of Christians and Jews; and, even
among the Musulmans themselves, the majority of the population
was of Berber or Spanish origin.
The expressions "Arab civilisation," "Arab art," as applied to the
civilisation and art of Southern Spain in the Middle Ages, are,
accordingly, as incorrect as they could possibly be apart from the
fact that the Arabs never had an art or a civilisation of their own.
These new-comers, small in number as they were, could not aspire
to people a great country like Spain. They could not have lived there
at all Without the natives. For this reason they were compelled to
treat them with consideration. Otherwise it meant famine and lack
of commodities and primary necessities no more means of livelihood,
:

no more commerce, no more industry. In a country with a settled

administration like Spain, extreme confusion and even complete
anarchy would have resulted if the conquerors Had failed to respect
the old administrative framework. The population, mainly Chris-
tian, accordingly retained its counts, its governors, its bishops, its
clergy, its judges and its courts, and its tax-collectors.
There remained the question of the division of the soil conquered
by the invaders. Let us recall once more that at the outset they did
not intend to remain in Spain. Like the true African nomads they
were, they contemplated contenting themselves with taking booty
and slaves, and then returning home. The leaders themselves, who
were Arabs, had no desire to strike roots in Spain.
"When Mousa," says an anonymous text quoted by Dozy, "when
Mousa and a number of his comrades in arms presented themselves
before the Caliph Walid, they asked him for permission to evacuate Spain
and return to their homes. The Caliph treated them with great con-
sideration and kindness ; be gave them fiefs in the Peninsula, but he
refused to give them means of quitting the country, and would not
allow that they should abandon it under any pretext whatever.
Accordingly he sent them back there, after ordering them to com-
municate his reply to their comrades."
3*
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
Elsewhere we read: "If Omar I, he said, had not given fiefs to his
soldiers in India, the defence of that country would have been
impossible. What was true in
the case of India was even more true
in the case of Spain. Please God that the Musulmans might not one
day be forced to abandon this country 1"
These words attributed to the Caliph Walid adequately interpret
the feeling of instability which their over-rapid conquest inspired in
the invaders of Spain. But for the occupation of the principal
strategic points and the division
of the soil it is unquestionable, as
the Calipn said, that die Musulmans would have been unable to
maintain themselves there.
Accordingly land was distributed among the soldiers. But it is
important to distinguish between the territory that was conquered
by force of arms and the territory that was surrendered in due form.
The first was shared among the conquerors, with the exception of
three districts, namely, that of Coimbra, that of Santarem, and
another district in the East. A
fifth part of these estates was reserved
to the State, and was farmed by Christian peasants, who paid one-
third of the proceeds to the treasury.
"Mousa, says the document quoted above, "left in the Khoms
(that fifth part of the estates which
had become State property) the
peasants and those children who were stillyoung, so that they might cultivate
it" Such was the system that was applied to the territory conquered
by force of arms.
As for the other territory, that which was handed over to the
Musulmans by capitulation, the Christians were left masters of it.
They retained their estates, together with timber, dwellings, and all
movable property; and they retained also the right of sale. This
territory which was added to the domain of Islam by surrender was
situated in the north of the Peninsula. "The whole country, with
the exception of a small number of well-known localities, was
annexed to the Empire. For, after the rout of Rodrigo, all the towns
made terms with the Musulmans. Accordingly the Christians who
lived there remained in possession of their lands and their other
property and retained the right to sell them."
It would appear that this immunity
applied only to landed estate.
In accordance with the usages of war, the Christians who capitulated
must have been subjected to a considerable indemnity and been freely
plundered by the conquerors. This is proved, as a matter of fact, by
the quantity of booty taken by Tarik and Mousa.
A regular Arab feudalism was established in the south of Spain,
comprising the territory conquered by force of arms, the ecclesiasti-
patricians who took to flight.
cal property, and the estates of those
The soldiers of Mousa and Tarik were its first beneficiaries. Later
the government of Spain was separated from that of Ifrikia, and the
new governor, Saim ibn Malik, brought with him Syrian-Arab
soldiers, who had to be provided for in their turn. Rivalry developed
3*
 ESTABLISHMENT OF MUSULMANS IN THE PENINSULA
between the new-comers and Mousa's soldiery. Then the Caliph
decided that the original occupiers should keep their lands and that
the Arabs should have land taken from the Khoms, that is to say
from the State territory. These Syrian-Arabs were called BalaJis.
Later again a new governor, Baldj, brought with him a fresh
contingent of Syrian-Arabs, who lost no time in coming to blows
with the Ba/adis. It was a regular civil war, which lasted until the
arrival in Spain of still another governor, who distributed the latest
arrivals through the southern provinces and assigned to them for
their subsistence one-third of the taxes paid by the Christians of the
Khoms. All these immigrants were soldiers encamped in conquered
territory, and lived on the native population.

The natives were divided into two categories the Christians, who
:

were called Mozarabs, and the converts to Islam, who were regarded
as renegades in both camps.
The Christians, who had retained their own governors and their
own tax-collectors, were subject to a head-tax. They were relieved
of it if they embraced Islam, but they were not relieved of the
Kharadj, the property duty, the tax on the produce of the soil. In
general the Caliphal government did not want to see the Christians
turn Musulman. The treasury lost too much if they did, inasmuch
as it was they who paid the major part of the taxes.
i/ It is difficult to find, as most of our historians do, an attitude of
tolerance and broad-mindedness in this entirely self-interested line
of conduct. The Caliph Omar declared frankly: "We must live on
our Christians, and our descendants must live on theirs, as long as
Islam endures."
That was what was really at the back of the conquerors* minds.
At the outset, for reasons of prudence which can readily be under-
stood, the Christians of Spain were not crushed with taxes. But soon,
as Dozy admits himself, the domination of the Musulmans, "lenient
and humane as it had been at the beginning, degenerated into an
..intolerable despotism." The Christians were bled white.
The least wretched of them were the serfs, who, in fact, found
their condition better than it had been under the Visigoth regime.
They could win their freedom by abjuring Christianity; and, despite
the reluctance of the Arabs to accept converts, for the reasons of self-
interest which I have just recalled, many of these unfortunates went
over to Islam: for example, when they had not enough money to
pay the head-tax, or when they were afraid of conviction by
a Chris-
tian court. They only had to pronounce a brief formula, whereas
being a Christian was a troublesome business.
But, whether they were Christian or Musulman, it was these
Spanish peasants, these serfs attached to the soil, who continued to
nourish the invaders, as they had nourished their former masters.
It is necessary to insist
upon this fact, because of the ineradicable
33
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
assumption, piously maintained
even by serious historians, that it
was the Arabs who introduced the art of cultivating and irrigating
the soil into Spain.
We have only to reflect for a moment upon the desolation^ the
sterility, which the Arabs,
like the Berbers,
spread everywhere they
went, to appreciate the absurdity of any such idea. Their historians

the Arab Conquest), and in any case the conquerors were much too
proud to engage in it."
We need not rely, however, upon the confessions of the Arabs.
We know that these processes of agriculture and irrigation were
familiar in Africa long before their arrival, since as far back as Roman
and Carthaginian times. It was when Africa became Musulman, on
the contrary, that these processes were abandoned, and that was the
end of die legendary fertility of the country. The knowledge of the
Roman or Carthaginian cultivator took refuge in the oases, where it
persisted, in a paltry and bastardised form, down to our own time.
It is more than probable that these same Carthaginians and these
same Romans, masters as they were of Spain, or at least of the coastal
regions of the South and East, introduced their methods of cultiva-
tion there always assuming that the Spaniards had any need of
tutors in this direction; for, from the most remote times, the fertility
of Betica was as famed as that of Numidia or the Proconsulate. But
all these considerations do not suffice to
prevent manuals of history
from continuing to teach that the Arabs taught the Spaniards the art
of cultivating and irrigating the soil.

Itwas not only the peasants, however, who became converts to

Islam. Among the renegades there were many landowners and
patricians. Taken as a whole they made up, together with the Jews,
the majority- of the all fresh converts,
population; and, like they dis-
played great zeal in piety, real or pretended.
This did not make them any the more acceptable to the Old
Musulmans, who were suspicious of them and jealously barred them
from all lucrative employments. They were spoken of as "slaves" or
"sons of slaves." Many of them, as a matter of fact, were freed serfs;
but the same disrepute attached to the converted freedmen and
patricians.
The fact is that there
was not only rivalry of interest between the
*new converts and the Old Musulmans : there was also racial hostility.
All these renegades were of Spanish origin, whereas the old believers
were Arabs, Berbers, Syrians, or Egyptians. Nothing could prevail
over this fundamental enmity. It was to continue to make itself felt
throughout the domination of Spain in Islam, and, eight centuries
later, it was to show itself still as much alive and as irreducible
34
 ESTABLISHMENT OF MUSULMANS IN THE PENINSULA
between Moriscos and Old Christians, between Musulman converts
and Spanish Catholics.
Over against these renegades, these conquered people, Christian
or Musulman, proudly stood the Arab aristocracy, some of whose
representatives prided themselves upon belonging to the family of
the Prophet or the families of his
companions. Finally, there were
the Berber lords, who were treated disdainfully enough by the Arabs,
almost on the same footing as the renegades.
These warriors and horsemen, accustomed to nomadic life, lived
for preference on their estates and in their strongholds, far from the
towns and the seat of government. They were men of violence and
uncompromising believers. In the course of centuries they might
slough off their roughness and their fanaticism; but they could not
get rid of their essentials of Asiatic and African barbarism. They
might become more polished, but they lost nothing of their violence
and their cruelty.
After the capture of Seville and Toledo, when Mousa met his
lieutenant Tarik, whom he accused of peculation, he received him
with blows of a whip and ordered his head to be shaved. He ad-
vanced across Spain himself, preceded by the reputation of a canni-
bal. Later, when booty was
being divided, he wanted
to
deprive
another of his lieutenants of an important prisoner, the Christian
governor of Cordova. "It was I who made this man prisoner," cried
this officer, who was called Moghit, flying into a passion; "they want
, to deprive me of him; very well, I will have his head cut off!" And
so he did on the spot.
Never were these brutal habits to disappear completely from
, MusulmanSpain. From one end to the other, the history of the
\Spanish Caliphate is strewn with severed heads and crucified corpses.

J5
 CHAPTER IV

The First Emirs Dependent on Damascus

E conquest of Spanish soil was completed, or at least carried

I as far as possible,
by the successors of Mousa. His son Abd el
-*-
Aziz who, so the Arab annalists tell us, hastened to marry a
Christian, in the person of Egilona, widow of Rodrigo, the Visigoth
king vanquished by Tarik made an expedition into Portugal. His
successor, El Horr, directed his efforts towards the northern fron-
tier. The forward march of the Musulman armies crossed the

Pyrenees, invaded France, and did not stop until 732, when Abd er
Rhaman ben Abd Allah, one of El Horr's successors, was defeated
in the battle of Poitiers by Charles-MarteL
Alegend, reproduced by Ibn Adhari, has it that Mousa, the first
conqueror of Spain, when he came to the limit of his campaign in the
northern territory, found a statue, which had these words written
on its breast: "Sons of Ishmael, here is your farthest point. If you
ask whither you shall return, we tell you that it is to quarrels among
yourselves such quarrels thatyou mil cut off one another s heads"
This prophecy, clearly penned after the event, sums up in its few
naive words the whole history of the period which begins with the
establishment of the Musulmans in the Peninsula, not only down to
the arrival of the Omayyads in Spain, but even down to their
definitive expulsion by the Catholic Sovereigns. In any case, the first-
part of this period, that of the Emirs dependent upon the Caliphate
of Damascus, which lasted for more than forty years until the arrival
of Abd er Rhaman in 75 5, is nothing but a long series of intestinal
struggles, slaughterings, massacres, and assassinations,
It was anarchy in all its horror, fed by family hatreds and the
rivalries of tribe
against
tribe Arabs of the North Arabs of
against
the South, Yemenites against Kaishites, Syrians against Medinites.
All these Asiatics had a common enemy in the nomad African, the
Berber, the eternal spoiler of cities and the auxiliary of all invaders.
The Berbers of Africa, who in fact had been the real conquerors of
Spain under Tarik's orders, were not content with their lot. When
Mousa arrived after them with his Arabs, the hardest part of the job
had been done. But, instead of treating the Berbers according to
their deserts, the Arab chiefs, full of
contempt for these new Musul-
mans, assigned them the most ungrateful share in the division of the
soil.
While the Arabs laid hands themselves on the most fertile regions,
those of the East and of Andalusia, "they relegated the companions
of Tarik to the arid plains of La Mancha and Estremadura, and to
the mountains of Leon, Galicia, and Asturias, where they had to
skirmish ceaselessly with the unsubdued Christians." These dis-
satisfied Berbers were not
long in coming to blows with the Arabs,
 THE FIRST EMIRS DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS
who for their part were jealous among themselves and wantonly
massacred one another.
Nothing emerges from this perpetual killing but the savagery,
the brutality, and the cruelty of the new-comers. Under their domi-
nation poor Spain got used to being ridden over and devastated
periodically, in a way that soon became as regular as the alternation
of the seasons. It was the regime of the raid, to which northern
Algeria was subjected for centuries down to the beginning of the
French conquest in 1830;
In this chaos of meaningless little wars and atrocities there are no
figures that stand out, unless it be by the violence of their unrestrained
instincts, like those of Baldj or Somail. Baldj., who was a Syrian by
origin and had gone to Africa to fight the Berbers, finally found him-
self besieged and being starved out by them in the town of Ceuta.
Reduced to the last extremity, he appealed for supplies to the gover-
nor of Spain, the old Abd el Malik, who was a man of Medina and
an inveterate enemy of the Syrians. Delighted to see the Syrians
shut up in Ceuta in such an awkward position, he forbade the
Spaniards to send them supplies.
Nevertheless, a noble of the tribe of Lakam, either through self-
interest or out of compassion, had the audacity to send two ship-
loads of corn to Baldj *s soldiers. The enraged Abd el Malik had the
Lakmite arrested, and first condemned him to seven hundred lashes.
Then, on the pretext that he was trying to foment disturbances, he
ordered his eyes to be put out and his head to be cut off. His corpse
was hung on a gibbet, with a crucified dog to the right of him.
The Berbers of Spain, however, became more and more menacing,
and Abd el Malik found himself driven to invoke the aid of Baldj
and his Syrians shut up in Ceuta. He had them transported across
the straits under certain conditions. The Syrians defeated the Berbers
in several engagements. But they had not forgotten Abd el Malik's
earlier attitude and his ill-will towards them. Moreover, they were
Yemenites, while the governor of Spain belonged to the hated tribe
of the Kaishites.
Accordingly Baldj, though he was a Kaishile himself, allowed his
soldiers to lay hands on the nonagenarian Abd el Malik. They beat
him, slashed him with swords, and crucified him opposite the bridge
of Cordova, between a dog and a pig also crucified.
After that Yemenites and Kaishites, delivered from the Berber
danger, came to blows among themselves. The Kaishites, under the
leadership of their chief, Somail, routed their adversaries in the plain
of Secunda, the Roman town on the other side of the Guadalquivir
opposite Cordova. The victorious Somail had the Yemenite chiefs
beheaded in the square in front of the Cathedral of Saint Vincent,
which as yet was only half turned into a mosque.
Seventy heads had already fallen when one of the chiefs in alliance
with Somail protested against this horrible butchery, not in the name
37
 MUSULMAN SPAIN
of humanity, but in the name of Musulman solidarity. Somail,
nevertheless, went on with his executions until his ally, indignant at
his excessive cruelty, threatened to turn against him.

These divisions among the Musulmans enabled the Christians

who had taken refuge in the North to assume the offensive against
the invaders.
Unhappily the history of this preliminary to the Reconquest is

alrpost entirely
obscure. The offensive was begun by a
Visigoth
chief, who afterwards became for the Spaniards a regular national
hero: Pelayo, a semi-legendary figure, about whom we Enow nothing
for certain, except that he defeated the Musulmans in 718 at the battle
of Cavadonga. Even the date of this battle is disputed. We
do not
even know whether Pelayo was of royal blood, the successor of
Rodrigo, or simply a chieftain who assembled some contingents of
mountaineers.
"
However this may be, centres of resistance were gradually
established in the north of the country, in the Basque provinces, in
Navarre, and in the mountainous region of Arag6n. In addition
Pelayo's successors, notably King Alfonso I, known as the Catholic,
succeeded in reconquering some towns in Galicia, in Cantabria, and
in Le6n. At this period the line of the Musulman frontier was
drawn back slightly towards the South: it passed through Coimbra,
Coria, Talavera, Toledo, Guadalajara, Tudela, and Pampeluna.
Between it and the little Christian kingdom extended a neutral zone,
which became a regular desert and was periodically invaded and
raided by the two adversaries, who were ceaselessly on guard against
one another.
Accordingly Musulman Spain, about the middle of the eighth
century only forty years, that is to say, after the Conquest was
already threatened in her very existence, not so much by the Chris-
tian armies as by her internal discord. It needed a man, a
strong
leader, to avert the inevitable catastrophe. The Musulmans of Spain
were lucky enough to find him.
 II
THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
 CHAPTER V

Abd er Rhawan, Emir of Spain

is always an element of the romantic and the marvellous
I Arab histories. The providential man who was to save the
in
** Musulman domination in
Spain was cast for this great role by
many prophecies. In any case it was good policy to make his soldiers
and his subjects believe it, and Abd er Rhaman did not fail to do so.
Perhaps he believed it himself.
In the whole history of the Arab peoples prophecy occupies a
very important place. There is no event of any importance which
was not predicted either by an old text, or by an astrologer or a
"mathematician," as they were called. In the Arab world and at the
'court of the Caliphs these personages enjoyed the same reputation
as they had formerly enjoyed in the Helleno-Latin world, and at the
court of the Roman Emperors. They were fawned upon or perse-
cuted, in accordance with whether their predictions were desired or
feared. The soothsayers who foretold changes in succession were
hunted out and put to death on the one hand, and flattered and loaded
with presents on the other.
In the case of Abd er Rhaman, he related himself how his high
destiny was announced to him in advance. "On my arrival in Spain,"
he said, "I was wholly possessed by the prediction made by my great-
uncle, Maskma ben Abd el Malik, in the following circumstances.
One day he came to see my grandfather, the Caliph Hisham, at a
time when I was present, being then quite a child. When mjr grand-
father proposed to send me away, Trince of Believers,' said Mas-
kma, 'let the child be. For I see in him the man of the Omayyads,
he who will revive this dynasty after its fall/ From that moment I
observed that my grandfather always showed a marked predilection
for me."
Later, when he was a fugitive in Africa and was arrested at
Kairouan, he was proclaimed to the governor of Ifrikia by a Jew, an
old servant of his "as destined to conquer Spain
great-uncle Maslama,
and no doubt Africa as well." This conqueror was to be called Abd
er Rhaman, and would have two curls of hair on his forehead.
The governor Habib, having examined the new-comer and seen
that he had two curls of hair, sent for the Jew and said to him:
"Here, wretch, is the man of whom your prediction speaks. So I
am going to have him put to death." "But, the Jew told him, "if
it is indeed he,
you cannot kill him, for Destiny does not permit you."
Then Habib confined himself to putting to death the Omayyads
who accompanied the fugitive and seizing their goods.
It is quite certain that these
predictions, true or false, had a real
influence upon the destiny of Abd er Rhaman. This future master of
Spain was a Syrian, born in theterritory of Damascus. He was of the
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
a grandson of the Omayyad Caliph Hisham.
Imperial family, being
When the Abbasids seized the throne and set about exterminating
the numerous descendants of the fallen dynasty, young Abd er
Rhaman succeeded in hiding for some time in a 'village near the
Euphrates; but a party of Abbasid horsemen
discovered his retreat.
He fled with his brother, a boy of thirteen, flung himself into the
river, and swam across it. The boy, who was not such a good
swimmer as his elder brother, was captured by the soldiers. From
the opposite bank Abd er Rhaman saw him beheaded by the Caliph's
myrmidons.
This horrible spectacle was, no doubt, an excellent lesson in things
for him. He who, perhaps, was already dreaming of empire learnt
early at what price a throne is won and to what vicissitudes he who
occupies it is exposed. Exile, a life of wandering, prison, torture,
assassination he must prepare himself for all these ordinary acci-
dents of a royal destiny.
After succeeding in reaching Palestine, he traversed Egypt and
finally arrived in Ifrikia by the long and dangerous caravan route.
He stayed some time in Kairouan, where, as we have seen, he
attracted the ill-will of the
governor,
Ibn Habib, who, having re-
fused to recognise the Abbasid Caliph, contemplated carving out an
independent kingdom in Africa and scented a possible rivalin Abd
er Rhaman. Fearing for his life, the descendant of the Omayyads
escaped from Kairouan and resumed his wandering life. He crossed
the whole of Morocco, and finally settled down among a Berber
tribe near Ceuta the tribe of Nafza, to which his mother, an African
slave, belonged.
There he was bound to find support among the relatives and
retainers of her family. There he was quite close to a country
Spain,
delivered up to anarchy and awaiting a master: Spain, the former
fief of his ancestors. He had only to cross the Strait to wm an em-
pire, perhaps. Then he must have recalled the predictions which
hailed in him the future conqueror of Spain, What a temptation to
attempt such an adventure the more so as he had no other prospect
before him except either a wretched, always threatened life, or the
adventure with all its risks!
In Spain, moreover, there were Omayyad partisans, who would
perhaps be ready to declare for him. They were old soldiers, belong-
ing to the divisions of Damascus and Kinnesrin, settled in the terri-
tories of Elvira and Jaen. Abd er Rhaman charged one of his freed-
men, the faithful Badr, with the duty of going and sounding these
veterans and coming to terms with them if they were
favourably
disposed.

The moment seemed as opportune as possible for this scion of

kings. Spain at this time was tyrannised over by a kind of military
duumvirate, consisting of the brutal and drunken Somail, the con-
42.
 ABD ER RHAMAN, EMIR OF SPAIN
queror of the Yemenites, who had decimated them so
cruelly in the
square in front of the cathedral of Cordova, and the governor,
Yousouf ben Abd er Rhaman, the Fihrite.
The Yemenites, who saw in the Omayyad's overtures an oppor-
tunity of taking their revenge on their mortal enemies, the Kaishites
or Maadites the partisans of Somail finally declared for Abd er
Rhaman. There followed long pourparlers with Somail, then
governor of Saragossa, whom the wily Abd er Rhaman hoped to
detach from his ally Yousouf. Finally, after much marching and
counter-marching, Yousouf and Somail decided to join forces against
this intriguer. They were defeated in a battle fought on the banks of
the Guadalquivir, between Seville and Cordova, after which Abd
er Rhaman was recognised as Emir of Spain by his two rivals

He proceeded to make himself independent of the Caliph of Bag-

dad. It was the beginning of a new dynasty, a Syrian-Arab dynasty
transplanted on to western soil. Almost the whole Peninsula was
to have a single head, though one whose authority was ceaselessly
disputed. This monarchical fafade masked, in fact, an irreducible
anarchy.
Abd er Rhaman spent himself in mastering it, and to a certain
extent he succeeded. But after him everything had to be done all
over again. It was to be the same in the case of those of his successors
who were the most brilliant and the most jealous of their authority:
so much so that the reign of Abd er Rhaman may be regarded as the
prototype of the reigns that followed it. With minor variations,
they were a monotonous repetition of it the same internal dissen-
sions, the same rising and harsh repressions, the same impotence to
establish a durable authority and a unified empire.
So far as we can trust the Arab annalists, this is briefly what hap-
pened. Once he was in possession of the Emirate, Abd er Rhaman
enjoyed barely a year of tranquillity. His two rivals, Somail and
Yousouf the Fihrite, seemed at first to be resigned to their fate.
Somail, sodden with drunkenness, was scarcely to be feared, though
he was subject to frightful outbursts of rage. But Yousouf was not
long in breaking openly with the Emir. He fled from Cordova and
assembled an army of twenty thousand men, composed of all kinds
of disaffected elements and especially of Berbers those African^
who were always ready to engage in war, pillage, and massacre.
Abd er Rhaman, supported by the governor of Seville, routed
his enemy, who took refuge in the region of Toledo. After wandering
about there for some time he was taken prisoner and beheaded. His
head was carried to Abd er Rhaman, who had it exposed on the bridge
of Cordova, side by sicje with the head of his son, who had been held
as a hostage and whom the Emir beheaded too.
There remained Somail, who was also imprisoned. He was
strangled in prison. It was announced that he had died of apoplexy.
43
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
In any case Abd er Rhaman was henceforth disembarrassed of his
two chief enemies.
His authority was none the more stable for that. This Syrian, after
all, was a foreigner in the country.
He had triumphed only thanks to
the help of the Yemenites, who, moreover, had embraced his cause
out of hatred of Somail and Yousouf. Judging themselves badly
recompensed, they rose in revolt under the command of Ala ben
Moghit, nominated Emir of Spain by the Abbasid Caliph
El Man-
sour. Toledo, which had always been in rivalry with Cordova, rose
at the same time.
Abd er Rhaman, though besieged for two months in Carmona,
ended by routing the rebels. Their principal leaders were decapitated.
Their heads were filled with salt and myrrh, they were packed in
boxes, covered with the standard of the Caliph of Bagdad, who had
been the instigator of the revolt, and Abd er Rhaman, with cruel
irony, sent the Caliph this macabre present. El Mansour was at the
time on pilgrimage to Mecca. Abd er Rhaman's emissaries deposited
their boxes in front of the tent of the Caliph, who could do nothing
but curse the butcher of his Spanish allies. "Allah be praised," he
said with real piety, "that the sea divides us from this devil!"
As to the rebels of Toledo, they lost no time in surrendering.
The leaders were brought to Cordova. Their heads were shaven,
they were clothed in rags, and, in this grotesque guise, they were
paraded on donkeys' backs through the streets of the city to the
place where crosses had been made ready for them, and there they
were crucified.
This was not the end of it. After the Yemenites, the Berbers rose
in their turn, joining hands with the remnants of the Yemenite army
defeated by the Emir. With their usual African perfidy, the Berbers
betrayed their allies on the field of battle, where thirty thousand men
are said to have been killed. The Berbers of Central
Spain were still
to be subdued, and it took ten years of warfare to do it.
This warfare was still in progress when a new and dangerous
insurrection broke out in the North. The leaders of the coalition
were the governor of Barcelona and the son and son-in-law of You-
souf the Fihrite. They called to their aid Charlemagne, Emperor of
the Franks, who, with his nephew Roland, crossed the Pyrenees and
laid siege to Saragossa,
Charlemagne, attacked in the North by the Saxons, had to raise
the siege precipitately and retreat to France. This completed the
disbandment of Abd er Rhaman's enemies. But Saragossa held out
against him until finally the inhabitants of the town surrendered
their defender, Hussein, to him. The Emir ordered his hands and
feet to be cut off, after which he was killed with blows of an iron
bar.
Abd er Rhaman had triumphed once more. But his enemies did
not lay down their arms. Until his death (788) he had to crush con-
44
 ABD ER RHAMAN, EMIR OF SPAIN
spiracles
and revolts. His retainers, his associates, the members of
his numerous family, all those Omayyads whom
he had summoned
from Damascus or who
had hastened to Spain to profit by their
relative's success everybody conspired against him.
He had to exile to Africa one of his brothers, Walid, whose son
had fomented a fresh plot against him. Walid, aghast at the execution
of his son, burst into protestations of fidelity and obedience. But
this servility on the
part of his brother was far from allaying the
suspicions of the Emir, who said to one of his confidants "Let him
:

not think to deceive me! I know him, and I know that, if he could
assuage his thirst for vengeance in my blood, he would not hesitate
for a moment."
The Omayyad turned into a tyrant. He who had once been
popular no longer dared to walk about the streets of Cordova.
Feeling safe no longer, he summoned Berbers from Africa for his
bodyguard, and raised the strength of his personal army to forty
thousand men.
His successors were compelled to follow his example. The
Caliphate could maintain itself only on condition that it became a
military despotism.

I have summed up in outline the principal events of the reign of

Abd er Rhaman because, since these events were to repeat them-
selves indefinitely during the reigns of his successors, the latter do
not call for any detailed treatment. All these Arab sovereigns called
in Berbers or other foreigners to maintain an always tottering
.authority; all of them had to suppress conspiracies hatched by
members of their own family or by relatives of their victims all of ;

them had to fight against insurgent leaders or rivals; all of them,

finally, made it a pious duty to raid the Christian territory at least
twice a year.
I shall therefore confine myself to emphasising and commenting
upon events that were new, and to isolating among all these figures
most of them as impersonal as the history of their reigns those
who were really significant.
Abd er Rhaman himself was a real character, an individual among
this succession of princes who, in general, are all as like one another
as the anonymous steles of Musulman cemeteries.
This exiled Omayyad, who escaped by a miracle from the massacre
of his family and ended, by dint of strength and perseverance, in
transplanting the dynasty of his ancestors to Spain this Syrian of
Damascus was in the first place a virile human animal tall, fair, with
:

a fairness bordering upon reda with a mole on one cheek and his two
curls on his forehead; he was cut out to withstand the severest tests
of his wandering adventurer's life. Despite his continual wars and
the daily work of administration, with which he dealt himself, he
found time to have twenty children: eleven boys and nine girls,
45
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
His successors, less busy or more sensual, had them by the
dozen. This partly explains the troubles which multiplied in Cor-
dova and in Caliphal Spain. The Emirs and the Caliphs, in ceaselessly
for themselves, or for
increasing their progeniture, were preparing
the heirs designated by them, enemies and Sitter rivals. The harem
was one of the great causes of weakness of the Arabs in Spain, as it
was, for that matter, everywhere they went.
Ibn el Athir tells us that Abd er Rhaman was a fluent and accom-
plished speaker and that, like all well-born Arabs,
he took pride in
composing verse. "Benignant, well-informed, resolute, prompt to
crush rebellion, he never remained long in repose or given over to
idleness; he never entrusted the care of his affairs to anybody, and
his own. Endowed with
relied upon no judgment but profound
intelligence, he united bravery pushed to the point of daring with
great prudence, and he showed himself broad-minded and generous.
He usually wore white clothes. . ."
.

Despite his recorded cruelties, we are asked to believe that this

one-eyed man, clothed in white, was benignant. It is difficult for us
to-day to pronounce upon the morality of his actions. They were
no doubt imposed upon the Emir by circumstances and by the bar-
barous customs of his comrades and his enemies. Compelled to
defend himself and, together with his person, the destiny of Islam
in the West, he also found himself driven to be, like his adversaries,
slippery, treacherous, and cruel.
At the same time there seems to have been in this red-haired
colossus an inborn element of violence and savagery, brought from
the Yemen by his nomad ancestors. He did not confine himself to
ordering terrible executions; he carried them out himself. For
example, he tried to stab with his own hand a Sevillian chieftain
against whom he thought he had a grievance. The man defended
himself vigorously, and he had to have him finished off by his
guards.
Whatever one may say about him, it is certain that he had a highly
developed sense of his greatness and that there were no limits to his
ambitibn. He brought back from the East the Imperial idea, which,
since fhe fall of Rome and of the Visigoth kingdom, had been almost
completely eclipsed in Spain and throughout the Moghreb. He toyed
with ,the dream of a new Empire of the West, or at least of a great
monarchy, unified under an autocrat.
Bu{ the incessant wars which he had to wage prevented him from
showing his worth as an administrator. He had not even time to
build. fi(e had work started on the Great
Mosque, but the only other
thing he found time to do was to adapt to his own convenience the
old palace of Cordova, the castellum of the Roman and Visigoth
governors. He had to leave the great bridge across the Guadalquivir,
whose arches had been carried away by a flood, in ruins. Outside his
capital, at the foot of the last spurs of the Sierra, he contrived to con-

46
 ABD ER RHAMAN, EMIR OF SPAIN
struct a country seat which he called Ruzafa, in memory of the
Damascene Ruzafa, built by his grandfather, Hisham.
He was homesick for Damascus and for his Syria, at least towards
the end of his life, after a long experience of bloody wars, con-
spiracies, assassinations, and betrayals, when he felt himself execrated
by his own family. The Arab annalists have handed down two short
poems of his, which give us a glimpse of all the melancholy of the
exile, and perhaps also the disenchantment of the ambitious man dis-
appointed by men and fate.
Traveller, you who go to
my country, take withyou there the salutation of
half of myself to my other half.My body, as you know, is in one place, but my
heart ana its affections are in another. Marked out as it was by destiny, the

separation has had to be accomplished^ but it has chased sleep away from my
lids. The Divine will that ordained this divorce will perhaps decree, some
day, our reunion."
The other poem, inspired by the sight of a palm tree in the gardens
of Ruzafa, makes one think of an epigram from the Greek Anthology.
In R#%afa there hasjust appeared to me a palm tree, strayed into the soil

and my family. tree, you have grown up in aforeigp land, and, like
palm
you, L am and divided
distant from mine own. May the breasts of the
. . *

morning dew give you to drink as much water as Xrcturus and the Cluster
pourr
It is difficult for us to understand how that same hand of the rough
adventurer, which made so many heads fall, could have written these
graceful verses, so poetical and so tender in their sentiment.

47
 CHAPTER VI

The Caliphate

i, who at the outset

ABD ER RHAMAN did not dare to proclaim
f\ himself independent of the Caliph of Bagdad, did not himself
-* -^take the tide of This title was not assumed until much
Caliph.
later, in 929, by his seventh successor,
Abd er Rhaman III. But the
established with the arrival of the first Omay-
Caliphate was virtually
yad in Spain. These Emirs of Cordova were true sovereigns, who
regardedthemselves as the masters not only
of Spain, but also of all
the African Moghreb. They were the Emperors of the West, or at
least of the Mediterranean West.
They were at the beginning pure Arabs, who took a certain length
of time to acclimatise themselves in Spain, and whose ruder traits
were polished away but slowly. Their annalists are careful to note
this fundamentally Arab character of theirs. But what does being

profoundly Arab mean in their eyes?

According to Abou Mohammed ben Hazam, quoted by Ibn
Adhari, "the Omayyad dynasty was truly Arab in the sense that none
of its representatives made a capital for himself. Every one of them
continued to live in the place and on the property where he had
resided before becoming Caliph, without troubling either to accumulate
immense wealth or to build palaces, without demanding of those who
c
addressed him that they should call him Lprd/ and without re-
quiring demonstrations of servility, such as kissing the ground, the
hand, or the foot/'
This disdain for the ceremonial of courts, this contempt for luxury
and, above all, for magnificent building, betray the nomad, accus-
tomed to dwell in a tent, and also the devout Musulman, "Civilisa-
tion/' says the historian, Ibn Khaldoun, "means sedentary life and
luxury. .. The character of men trained under the influence of
.

sedentary life and luxury is, in itself, evil personified." To the pure
Arab, therefore, civilisation is synonymous with evil. Nevertheless, the
descendants of the Omayyads of Syria, those Puritans of Islam,
transplanted into Spain, ended by admitting a certain measure ojf
civilisation and even protecting and developing it.
The reason was, in the first place, that they* were not slow to lose
their racial purity. Abd er Rhaman I, the founder of tibe
Spanish
dynasty, was the S9n of a Berber slave. Abd el Afcifc, the son of
Mousa, the conqueror of Spain, had married Egilona, widow of
Rodrigo, the Visigoth king vanquished by the Arabs. This princess
was followed into the Caliphal harem by a swarni of Christian
captives or skves, such as the Sultana Aurora and the favourite
Romaiquia.
This perpetual intermarriage with women of Berber, Iberian, or
Visigoth blood produced a race which had scarcely anything Arab
48
 THE CALIPHATE
leftabout it, but, at the same time, was not altogether Spanish. Most
of these Caliphs were ruddy men, or fair men with blu6 eyes which :

would seem to indicate the predominance of Berber or Visigoth

blood. But, since they took much pride in their origin, some of them
dyed themselves dark, as though by way of asserting their Arab
descent better.
The first Emirs, absorbed in their pillagings,, their rivalries of
clans and tribes, their wars of extermination, do not appear to have
concerned themselves much about either the amenities or the refine-
ments of civilised life* It was only during the reign of Abd er
Rhaman II (822-852) that the Mussulmans of Spain began to imitate
Oriental luxury.
"It was Abd er Rhaman II," we are told, "who first adopted the
traditional usages of the Caliphs so far as concerned pomp, exterior
form, the organisation of service, the use of the most luxurious
clothes. He embellished the palaces and conducted water to them.
. .He built mosques throughout Spain, introduced embroidery for
.

clothing and encouraged the making of it, established the Mint at

Cordova, and, in a word, gave a setting of grandeur to his royalty.
... It was during his reign that there entered into Spain rich carpets
and all kinds of precious things, coming from Bagdad and else-
where. After the murder of Haroun al Rashid and the plundering of
his goods, there were imported into Spain rare and precious objects,
as well as jewellery which had this origin: thither was brought, too,
the necklace called 'the Scorpion's Sting/ which had belonged to
Zobeyda, mother of Dj afar."
This famous necklace of the Sultana Zobeyda, to which there
seemed to be attached an influence fatal to anybody who touched it,
we shall see making its
appearance again, some centuries later, in
equally tragic circumstances,
Abd er Rhaman II appears to have desired to rival, and then to
eclipse, the court of Bagdad, where reigned his detested rivals, the
murderers of his ancestors. This court of the Abbasids, affected by
Persian influence, was at that time the model of all elegance for the
Moslem world. Accordingly Abd er Rhaman II summoned the
famous musician Zkyab from Bagdad to Cordova, to strike the right
note for the Spaniards, not only in music and poetry, but also in
deportment, style, and good
manners. Nevertheless, despite all the
efforts of these sovereigns to refine themselves, the old barbarian
substratum still persisted in them.
The
climate of Andalusia softened the sons of these rude horse-
men. It soon made them sensual and voluptuous, lovers of wine,
singers, and dancers, in short, of all the pleasures which had made
Cadiz and the Gaditanes famous during the Roman period. Let us
note that all this was forbidden by the law of the Prophet: wiae,
music, dancing, and even hunting.
The Emirs, no doubt, took up hunting in imitation of their pre-
c 49
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
decessors, the Visigoth kings. We
have seen that Rodrigo asked for
falcons for his hunts from Count Julian, and probably also from his
African vassals* But among the conquerors the love of wine degener-
ated into drunkenness. The feasts at the Caliphal court, and later
at the little courts of the Taifas, were only too often nothing but
gross orgies.
Here, for example, is a story which has much to tell us about the
habits of these new masters of Spain. It happened during the reign
of another Abd er Rhaman, the third of the name, the Victorious,
the greatest of all the dynasty. This Caliph thought that he had a
grievance against one of his officials, named Mohammed ben Said,
whom he suspected of peculation. "One day, at one of his bancjuets,
as Mohammed was pouring out wine for him, while he was himself
cutting an apple with a knife, 1 should like,* he said, 'to cut off in the
same way tine head of him whom I know to have acquired an enor-
mous fortune at my expense and to have paid none of it to the
treasury.*
"Mohammed was quite taken aback, and, knowing that he was
himself in question, he said: *My fortune I acquired by saving.
Please Allah that you do not lay hands on my goods, lest I reclaim
against youl The souls of men are delivered up to avarice/
"This reference to the sacred words of the Koran about avarice
recalled the Caliph to himself, and, ashamed of his
cupidity, he set
himself to dispel Mahommed's fears in friendly fashion. Moham-
med, still trembling, started drinking to drown his troubles.
"
'Gently, Mohammed!* said the Caliph. 'Can you not see reason?'
"Mohammed went on drinking. He got drunk and started
vomiting. Slaves hastened to bring him a basin
c
and napkins, while
the Caliph, holding his head, said to him: Get it off your stomach,
and take it gently !

"At first Mohammed did not distinguish his voice from that of
the servants. But, turning his head, he saw that it was the Prince
himself. Then, unable to restrain himself, he
flung himself
at his feet
and kissed them crying: *O son of Caliphs, is this the measure of your
goodness tome?' And he began to address to him all kinds of vows
and to manifest his gratitude very earnestly.
" c
'It is but
just/ replied the Prince, that I should recompense you
for my behaviour towards you this evening, by repaying you in
attention for the fright I gave you, and in kindness for my harshness/
Then he had a cloak put about him, and the man went home" (E/
Bayaxo'I-Mogrify.
This story of the basin proves that tigers are capable of being
tamed. Abd er Rhaman was not always so good-humoured, any
more than his kindred. As I have already remarked, the customs of
the time and their environment drove the governors to a certain
degree of cruelty. They had to be cruel, or become cruel, in order to
retain their power.
50
 tHE CALIPHATE'
Not only did the Caliphs inflict atrocious punishments, but, in
order to be sure that the guilty party or enemy had paid the penalty,
they even saw it inflicted before their eyes. Sometimes they carried
out executions with their own hands. Sometimes, too, the victim
was their own son, or some member of their family. El Mansour,
learning that one of his numerous sons was the accomplice of a gang
of malefactors, had him brought to the hall of the Chorta and whipped
to death. When another of his sons, Abd Allah, rebelled against
him, he had him decapitated and sent his head to Cordova along with
a bulletin of victory. .

Under the regime of these Africans and Asiatics beheadings and

crucifixions were continual. The custom of cutting off the heads 'of
conquered enemies, dead or alive, and piling up these heads into a
hideous trophy, persisted among the Moors down to their expulsion
from Spain. After every campaign the number of cut-off heads was
counted, and, to impress or terrorise the people, the heads were
salted and sent in boxes to the principal towns of the empire, where
they were exposed to the best advantage.
After some battles they made heaps so high, the annalists tell us,
that horsemen could ride between them without being seen. El
Mansour, having defeated the Christians of Leon, took thirty
thousand prisoners, and by his order, so Ibn el Athir relates, the
corpses were piled up and from the top of this bloody mass, as
though it were from the height of a minaret, the call to evening
prayer was sent forth by the muezzin.
Fundamentally these men were devout and even fanatical. It
would be a naive error to see in them easy-going sceptics, indifferent
about religious matters and animated by the most broad-minded
tolerance. We shall see later how much this alleged Musulman
tolerance was worth. The utmost we can say is that some of these
Caliphs, more sensual, more debauched than others, showed them-
selves very lax about the Islamic law. They drank wine, they gave
themselves up to orgies in the midst of their dancers, their singers,
their musicians, and their favourite pages all things forbidden by
their religion.
But to regard them as sceptics would be sheer madness. In most
cases these debauchees endeci by being converted, dying in the odour
of sanctity, and giving every satisfaction to the faquis, those stern
guardians of dogma and morals, those theologians of Islam who
were as quarrelsome as our own scholiasts. In fact, all these Caliphs,
without exception, were pious men, some of them as submissive to
die faquis as certain Catholic kings later were to their confessors.
Under Abd er Rhaman II, the faqui Yahya ibn Yahya exercised
the same influence over his sovereign as Cisneros did over Isabel and
Ferdinand. Among these sovereigns there were some really religious
men: for example, Hisham I, son of the first Abd er Rhaman,
who sought to do good and live in accordance with the law
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
of Allah, and Hakam II, who multiplied pious and charitable
foundations.
It would equally be an error to represent these true believers as
something born in advance of their time. It
like "intellectuals"
would even be rash to apply to them the traditional clich\ "They
cultivated letters, science, and art." These deceptive words, these
Western ideas, do not correspond to the reality of things where
Eastern and Musulman culture is concerned. We
must understand
precisely what that culture really was.
Whatever it was, the Caliphs themselves had relatively little to do
with it. They were too busy with the continual wars and rebellions
that threatened their authority and they had to be on the look-out for
treachery from all sides. They had at their disposal, it is true, secre-
taries and scribes who wrote a fine style and they were rather scru-
pulous in this matter, for fear lest they should be regarded as rude
and illiterate in the eyes of the people of Bagdad and Cairo.
They had, moreover, poets in their pay, whom
they maintained
abroad and in the chief centres of their kingdom. These poets
played a role analogous with that of our journalists of to-day: the
role of jesters, but especially of political informers or agents. The
Caliphs subsidised the poets just as our present ministries subsidise
a newspaper.
As to their government and their administration, we do not know
very much about them. When they established themselves in Spain,
in any case, their task was very much simplified for them. They
found there an administration which had been organised long ago.
In this respect they had only to follow in the footsteps of their
Roman or Visigoth predecessors. Whether it is a question of internal
policing, of justice, of finance, or of the collection of taxes, their
organisation, with its viziers, its walis, and its cadis, appears to have
been of the most elementary kind.
Their greatest innovation in the sphere of government was the
importance which they gave to the court and to the personal pro-
tection of their princes. The palace became a world of its own, with
its servants, its officials, its eunuchs, its
bodyguards, and its barracks
of Praetorians. From the reign of Mohammed I onwards the eunuchs
developed into an important power. In connivance with the harem,
they distributed honours and jobs. Later the "Slavs" made them-
selves a regular party inside the framework of the State. Hakam I
surrounded himself with Mamelukes and negroes.
But the worst scourge of this regime was its periodical appeal to
the Berbers of Africa. Abd er Rhaman I, Abd er Rhaman in, and
El Mansour all abused this expedient. They could not maintain their
authority without the support of a foreign bodyguard and foreign
armies. The consequences were inevitable. The Berbers, once they
were installed on the soil, behaved themselves as though they were
in a conquered country.
5*
 THE CALIPHATE
"They became its masters/' says Ibn Adhari, dealing with the
reign of El Mansour, "as a sequel to their notorious attack, which
left the greater part of Spain uncultivated and desert, filled it with
wolves and wild beasts, and left it for a time deprived of any
security. ..."

Still,undistinguished by personal features as the figures of these

Caliphs may be, there are at least two who stand out with an air of
grandeur and power. Seen from a distance, they assume the imposing
appearance or autocrats- who bent everything to their will and whose
prestige spread far and wide. In this guise appear to us Abd er
Rhaman III, who was the first to assume the official title of Caliph,
and the usurper El Mansour, who was, as a matter of fact, the des-
troyer of the Caliphate.
During the long reign of Abd er Rhaman III (912-961) war was,
practically speaking, continual just as it was in Spain, for that
matter, throughout the period of the Musulman domination.
Struggles against the Arab aristocracy, against the renegade Spani-
ards, against the Christians at home and abroad, and finally against
the Fatimides of the Moghreb these more or less filled the half-
century during which the reign of the new Caliph lasted.
By dint of cunning and, sometimes, of duplicity, of pitiless
punishment, of cruelty, and, above all, by invincible determination
and perseverance, Abd er Rhaman ended by putting most of his
enemies in their place and establishing an almost absolute authority
which extended throughout Musulman Spain. But these achieve-
ments were supremely fugitive: in the first place because reducing
undisciplined and fundamentally refractory populations to obedience
was a task all but impossible, and, in the next place, because these
wars were never carried to a conclusion, either from lack of men or
as a matter of tactical routine.
These annual, and sometimes biannual, expeditions were scarcely
more than raids the accustomed habits of ravaging and pillaging
nomads which came to an end as soon as enough booty had been
assembled, enough prisoners taken, a few hundred heads cut off for
exposure on the bridge of Cordova, and the back of the resistance
broken at least for a season. As a result, everything had to be begun
all over again. It sufficed to the Caliphs to weaken their adversaries
and reduce them to famine, and to create a zone of desert between
them and themselves by cutting down trees and crops, burning and
sacking houses, and razing the ground to its very subsoil, after raid-
ing it as as possible.
completely
Under Abd Rhaman's successors war broke out again as fiercely
er
as ever, against the Christians of the North, and against the Berbers
of the Rifh Conspiracies, rebellions, intestinal feuds recommenced in
a cycle of struggles, in which the head of the central government often
gained the upper hand only with the greatest difficulty. So the
53
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
problem of national unity always remained in suspense. Nothing
stable was created.
What was perhaps most solid in the achievement of Abd er
Rhaman III was his building. Like many men of war, he was a
to make all the constructions
great builder, as though he wanted
which he had destroyed forgotten by his new ones. He embellished
the old palace of Cordova and added to k. He raised a minaret above
the Great Mosque and altered the facade of it, which must have
resembled that of the former church of Saint Vincent, whose place
the mosque had taken. Above all, he lavished his care upon the
building
of Medina az Zahara, at once a fortress and a country seat,
which the Arab authors describe for us with evident admiration, but
with no less obvious exaggeration.
He built this country seat, we are told, to please his favourite,
Zahara (the Fair or the Golden), who had asked him to give her
name to this palace of enchantment. He was certainly capable of such
a piece of flattery, but it is more probable that he was guided in the
matter by considerations of personal security. At Fez, as at Granada,
Saragossa, or Cordova, the Musulman sovereigns constructed as
their usual residences palace-fortresses, which dominated their capi-
tals and held them in awe. They thought that they were thus better

protected against conspiracies and insurrections.

There emerges from all this an unquestionable impression of great-
ness and magnificence. Threatened and baffled in his achievement
though he was, the new Caliph sought to convey the idea that he
was me real Emperor of the West. Cordova, his capital, was to eclipse
Bagdad. The mosque of Cordova was to be the great sanctuary of
Islam, throwing those of Damascus, Cairo, and Kairouan into the
shade. It was his dream to extend his dominion over the whole of
northern Africa, and this was why he finally occupied Ceuta and the
coast of Barbary which faces Spain. But his Empire was nothing
more than a brilliant fafade.
Out of all this great effort, so long maintained by the first Caliph,
there survived at least these two principles, which were handed on
to the Catholic Sovereigns. The first was that Spain, ceaselessly
threatened by the Berbers of Africa, could not be safe unless she
occupied the points of embarkation on the African coast. Hence, in
the case of the Caliphs, as in the case of the Kings of Spain, arose
their anxietv to be masters df Tangier, Ceuta, and Melilla, and, later
of Oran, Algiers, Bougie, and Tunis.
v
The Berber was the hereditary enemy, as Germany became for
France. To the
Spaniards the Riff frontier and the Barbary Coast
assumed the same importance as the Rhine frontier did to the French.
It was as important for them to hold the African
ports as it was for
the French to hold the bridge-heads over the great river. Abd er
Rhaman seems to have been the first Musulman sovereign who
realised this necessity, though, perhaps, the
Visigoth kings, when
they occupied Ceuta, had already sensed it.
54
 THE CALIPHATE
The second principle was that a country divided like Spain,
inhabited by populations of a strongly particularist turn of mind,
could only preserve its integrity and its independence with the help
of a very powerful central authority. It is a significant fact that unity
was never imposed upon Spain except by sovereigns of foreign
origin: the Visigoth kings, the Musulman Caliphs, the Austro-
Burgundians with Charles V 4nd Philip II, the Bourbons of France
with Philip V
and his descendants.
Under Abd er Rhaman in was extremely precarious;
this unity
and it was, above This Caliphal Spain, made up of
all, f artificial.

hybrid populations, in which Arabs and Berbers, Christians, Jews,

and Musulmans, clashed with one another, could not have been any-
thing but very difficult to govern, or even to pacify. The sovereign
was so well aware that his authority was, so to speak, in the air, and
that his person was always at the mercy of a conspiracy or a palace
revolution, that he made up his mind, in order to maintain himself,
to live outside his capital and rely upon a foreign guard and a foreign
household administration.
\XThese foreigners, who were
erroneously called "Slavs," became
not merely a party within the but even a regular population.
State,
During this reign, we are told, there were nearly fourteen thousand
of them. As eunuchs they governed the harem and the palace. As
scribes and officials they had the administration in their grip. As
soldiers they controlled the army.
These "Slavs," detested by the Arabs, as well as by the Berbers
and the Spaniards, came from all parts of the Mediterranean countries.
Bought by Jews in the ports or the Black Sea and the Levant, they
were re-sold to Spain, where they were subjected to a special train-
ing. Among them were Galicians, French, Germans, and Lombards.
Certain towns of the South of France, it appears, fabricated eunuchs,
who reinforced the strength of the "Slavs." Verdun also was re-
puted to be renowned for this kind of industry.
This army of Slavs, palatine officials and military chiefs, was the
main instrument of the Caliph's authority. His power was a military
dictatorship. He maintained himself only thanks to these foreigners,
with the result that the unification of the empire was merely external.
He was himself a foreigner in his own kingdom. After centuries of
Musulman domination, he remained simply encamped in Spain as
the Arabs and the Turks always were in every country they occupied.

Abd Rhaman did not succeed in amalgamating the races of his

er
empire. El Mansour, the other great man of the Caliphate, was no
more successful. He was not even an authentic Caliph ; he was only
a usurper who tried in vain to found a new dynasty to take the place
of that of the Omayyads. This adventurer, who, without assuming
the Caliphal title, was the real ruler under the weak Hisham II, was a
dicator in the fullest sense of the term.
He was, above all, even from his early youth, a man of great
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
ambition, determined to seize power by all possible means. The
following anecdote is told of him. One day, during
one of the earliest
years of the reign of Hakam II,
Abd er Rhaman's son, he was dining
in a garden in Cordova with four fellow-students. They were a gay
party. Only the future
El Mansour stayed silent, as though sunk
in a deep meditation. Finally, emerging from his reverie, he cried
suddenly: "Have no doubt about this one day I shall be the master
of this country!'*
His friends burst out laughing. Not in the least disconcerted, he
continued: "Let each one of you tell me what position he wants. I
will give it him, when I am master."
"Well," said one of the students, "I find these fritters delicious,
and, if it's all the same to you, I should like to be appointed inspector
of markets. Then I could always have fritters in plenty, and without
their costing me anything."
"I," said another, "am very fond of these figs, which come from
Malaga, my native So
soil. make me Cadi of that province!"
"The sight of all these beautiful gardens delights me," said the
third. "I should like to be Prefect of the Capital."
appointed
But the fourth kept silent, indignant at the presumptuous thoughts
of his fellow-student.
"It's your turn," said El Mansour; "ask what you will."
The comrade whom he addressed got up and pulled him by the
beard.
"When you govern Spain," he said, "wretched braggart that you
order me to be smeared with honey, so that the flies and the bees
are,
may come and sting me, sit me backwards on a donkey, and have me
driven thus through the streets of Cordova!"
El Mansour looked at him furiously, but he tried to restrain his
wrath.
"Very well," he said, "each one of you shall be dealt with accord-
ing to his desires. One day I shall remember all that you have said."
And it appears that he kept his word.
This young man, so avid for power, was really named Abou Amir
Mohammed. The Amirite dynasty which he tried to found could
rival that of the
Omayyads in nobility. El Mansour let us give him
the name which he did not assume until much later pridea himself
upon his descent from an old Yemenite family and, even more, from
one of the few Arab chiefs who formed part of the army of Tarik,
the conqueror of Spain.
Despite this illustrious origin, the outset of his career was modest,
At first a scribe in the service of the Cadi of Cordova, he contrived
to have himself made steward of the estate of the
young Abd er
Rhaman, son of the Caliph Hakam II. This was the beginning of his
good fortune. He lost no time in insinuating himself into the good
graces of the Sultana Aurora, a Basque by birth and doubtless a
Christian, who completely dominated the Caliph. He soon became
$6
 THE CALIPHATE
her lover; and it was thanks to- the fair Aurora that he was made
overseer of the Mint, trustee of vacant inheritances, Cadi of Seville
and Niebla, and finally commander of the Chorta^ the regiment
entrusted with police duties.
On the death of Hakam, he came to an agreement with the Grand
Vizier to assassinate a pretender to the throne, who was supported
by the all-powerful eunuchs of the palace, partisans of the "Slavs."
After that his career was nothing but one long series of treacheries
and assassinations, with the object of eliminating all his competitors
one after the other. Hisham II, the new Caliph, shut up by him in
the old palace of Cord6va, let him reign in his stead.
El Mansour had a palace built for himself on the outskirts of {he
capital, thinking, no doubt, that residence in Cordova was not safe
for him and that Medina az Zahara, the seat of Abd er Rhaman HI,
was too far away. Thence, amid perpetual struggles against rivals
and rebels, he governed an empire more extensive than that of the
great Abd er Rhaman had ever been.
To the South he reasserted Caliphal hegemony over maritime
Barbary. To the North he pushed his conquests over the Christians
almost as far as the Cantabrian Sea, seizing Leon and Santiago de
Compostela. Never had the Christians found themselves in such a
critical position. But, as always, these conquests were without a

sequel. This Musulman Spain, which embraced almost the whole

peninsula, which had the Kings of Castile and of Navarre for its
vassals, was to fall to pieces once more.
Internally El Mansour's position, despite his cruel despotism,
always remained equally unstable. As his predecessors had done, he
had to rely upon an army of Praetorians and upon a following of
foreigners. Whereas Abd er Rhaman HI had organised the corps of
the *^51avs" for his defence, El Mansour, following the traditional
tactics of the Musulman princes, appealed to the Berbers of Africa.
A body of six hundred Africans began the process. But the
dictator kept *on summoning others, giving them an assurance "that
they would be well and generously treated, so that they hastened to
cross over to Spain and that all these warriors, arriving without inter-
mission one after the other, came and grouped themselves around
him. They disembarked with their garments in rags and mounted
on sorry jades. But he soon clothed them in broidered silk and rich
gave them thoroughbred horses, and installed them in palaces
stuffs,
such as they had never seen before, even in their dreams. Thus they
ended by exceeding in numbers the soldiers of the Spanish Djonds
(the standing army). It was they who enjoyed the confidence and
the friendship of El Mansour, and it was they who flaunted it as the
richest and the most influential" (Ibn Adbart).
This lucky lover of the Sultana Aurora, this assassin of his patrons
and his allies, this despot who shrank from no cruelty and from no
perfidy, became devout in his later years. Feeling himself to be
J7
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
suspect in the eyes of the faquis, those intolerant defenders of ortho-
doxy, he satisfied them by increasing the mosque of Cordova to
almost twice its former size, and by burning with his own hand "the
materialist and philosophical works in the library assembled by
Hakam II."
He punished "those who occupied themselves with philosophy or
religious controversy." When an astrologer foretold the end of his
power, he condemned him to crucifixion, after having his tongue
cut out. He sentenced to be whipped, imprisoned, and finally exiled
a poet who had spoken badly of him.
This real King of Spain had an ascetic side which foreshadowed
that of Philip II. With the same hand that burnt the heretical books
he made a copy of the whole of the Koran, which he carried about
with him everywhere and over which he meditated endlessly.
Taking a sura of the Prophet literally, he collected. the dust which
covered his boots and his clothes in the course of his campaigns
against the Christians, inasmuch as this dust, according to the liook,
was agreeable to Allah. "He thus collected a great coffer of it,"
which he ordered to be placed on his grave after his death. In a
spirit of mortification, he travelled with the shroud in which he was
to be buried: which reminds us of Philip II having his coffin pkced
in his room.
He asked Allah for the favour of dying in battle against the infidels.
This favour was granted him. On his return from his last expedition,
against the Christians, after burning the monastery of Saint
the patron saint of Castile, he died in the odour of sanctity at Medina
Celi. Thither the dying El Mansour had been carried
by his soldiers,
as the dying Philip II was carried in a litter from Madrid to the
Escorial, there to be interred.
 CHAPTER VII

The Court of the Caliphs andMusulman Paganism

Spanish civilisation reached its full bloom in the tenth

I century of our era, during the reigns of Abd er Rhaman the
-*-
Great and under the usurper El Mansour. It was a century or
even more in advance of the civilisation of the West and, in particu-
lar, of that of the little Christian kingdoms of Spain. This statement
will fill with joy those historians who have a hatred of Christian
Spain and see in Islam a civilising agency much superior to
Christianity.
But these latter always choose to overlook the fact that Western
Europe had been reduced to a condition of anarchy by the barbarian
invasions which lasted until the tenth century, and especially that
she had been cut off from the old centres of Mediterranean civilisa-
tion. Rome and Italy, ravaged by the same invaders, had lapsed into
a state bordering upon barbarism, or at least into shameful degenera-
tion. Constantinople was far away. The great eastern centres,
Damascus, Alexandria, Bagdad, were closed to Christians.
If Western Europe as a whole was eclipsed, the
plight of the little
Pyrenean and Cantabrian kingdoms was worse. During the Roman
period, as during the Visigoth period, this had always been the least
rich, the least fertile, and the least civilised region of Spain. From
the morrow of the Musulman conquest, this unhappy territory was
subjected to raids at least once a year: devastation, burning, sacking
of towns and monasteries, wasting of harvests, uprooting or cutting
down of fruit trees. This went on for centuries. Every spring the
armies of the Caliph started campaign ing against the Christians.
The Holy War was, so to speak, permanent, and for practical pur-
poses remained declared all the time.
What country could have withstood such a regime? But this was
not all. The
population was continually decimated, when it was not
exterminated. The objective of the Caliphal troops was to bring
back to Cordova, together with plenty ot booty, as many prisoners
as possible, who became slaves especially women and children;
the others were massacred and decapitated. The more severed heads
were piled up and brought back, the more the campaign was glorious
and meritorious in the eyes of Allah.
In such conditions, we should admire the poor people of Navarre
and Asturias for simply succeeding in carrying on their wretched
"and ceaselessly threatened life. They had neither the time nor the
means to cultivate the fine arts and the flowers of literature. They
had enough to do in hastily sowing their fields, burned by the
enemy, and rebuilding their cottages.
Only a few monks in out-of-the-way monasteries, or clerics behind
the walls of their towns, could pay some attention to the things of the
59
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
mind, assemble a few books, and try to compose bad Latin verse or
write dry-as-dust chronicles. That the Asturian and Basque peasants
and even squires should not have been able to read or write is quite
if the reverse had been
easy to understand. It would be surprising
the case.
Dozy, who feels uncomfortable in the presence of this illiteracy,
tells us off-handedly that "in Andalusia almost everybody knew how
to read and write." One may ask on what texts he bases this some-
what extraordinary statement. But knowing how to read and write
constitutes at best an indifferent claim to superiority. Never have
education and mateiial well-being necessarily been marks of civilisa-
tion. One does not see, in any case, why the subjects of Alfonso or
:Ordofio should have minds more barbarous than those of Hakam or
Abd er Rhaman. It was not on the Christian side that heaps of
severed heads and rows of crucifixes were to be found.
Be that as it may, these poor lands of the North, ceaselessly in-
vaded and devastated, could not dream of rivalling the favoured
lands of the South and East, which enjoyed a peace less often dis-
turbed. Western civilisation may have been asleep in the North for
centuries; but it was thence that it was to set out to conquer the
whole of Spain and yield such fruits as the Caliphal civilisation had
never known.
That civilisation had the good fortune to find a ground eminently
propitious for its development. Not only did the Musulmans possess
/themselves of the most fertile part of Spain, that part whose climate,
like its sun, is the most blessed; they also found, when they arrived
in Andalusia, the remains of a magnificent civilisation. The African
barbarians who made up the greater part of their armies, coming
from the half-savage regions of the Moghreb, had never seen any-
thing in their own country to equal such capitals as Seville, Merida, or
Cordova.
At the outset they confined themselves to following in the foot-
steps of their predecessors and picking up the Roman heritage,
increased by the dowry of Byzantium and the Near East, which their
Syrian horsemen brought at their horses' heels. Thanks to them,
thanks to the efforts of their Walis and their Emirs to maintain the
Latin order and preserve at least the material part of the old Mediter-
ranean civilisation, that civilisation was able to live or at least to
survive. It even had the beginning of a rebirth,
foreshadowing the
great Western Renaissance of the fifteenth 2nd sixteenth centuries.
,
The chief merit of the conquerors was that they renewed the link,
/broken by the barbarians, between the East and the West. Hence-
forth the routes were reopened towards the great cities of Africa,
Egypt, and the Levant: Tunis, Kairouan, Cairo, Alexandria, Damas-
cus, Bagdad. The caravans resumed the Roman tracks which led
towards the Moghreb through Cyrenaica and Libya. The Saracen
ships found their way to the Spanish ports again. Carpets, silks,
60
 THE COURT OF THE CALIPHS AND MUSULMAN PAGANISM
gold and silver ware and Oriental gems flowed to the courts of the

Caliphs
and into the bazaars of Cordova.
It, in the sphere of science, philosophy and letters the Spanish
Musulmans did not add much to the old Greco-Latin heritage, they
did increase it in the artistic, practical and utilitarian sphere. They
added to the amenities of life at least, of life as it had become in
Spain and elsewhere after the decay or disappearance of the Roman
culture.
In the field of art especially, their great originality was this that
:

they allied the delicate gracefulness and fancy of the Orient to Latin
and sense of rhythm. Fantasy of form, the charm .of curved
/ solidity
t

lines, the mysterious evocativeness of the arabesque all this they

taught to the Westerners ; and, in doing so, they introduced into the
world a new paganism, which doubtless was only a diminished, and
incomplete image of the old, but which, armed with new seductions,
preserved an incomparable power of attraction.

The old paganism revived, paganism in turban and long robe

this was the aspect in which Islam first presented itself to the Spani-
ards. This, perhaps apart from reasons of self-interest explains
why so many of them abandoned Christianity. These sensual
Southerners saw only one thing: that Islam was indulgent towards
pleasure. While the religion of Christ severely condemned all carnal
delights, that of Mahomet authorised polygamy and promised to its
faithful a paradise of houris and endless enjoyments.
This was the reason why, in the eyes of the Christians of the Middle
Ages, the Musulmans were pagans, just as the Christians, in the eyes
of the Musulmans, were polytheists. In the Chanson de ILoland the
Saracens are never called by any other name than "the pagans"
not exactly because they were reputed to worship a statue of Maho-
met, as the author naively believed, but above afl because they led a
basely materialist and corrupt life. That was the chief complaint of
the Spanish clerics and monks against the Musulmans.
Those of them who lived at Cordova under the Caliphs reproached
them with wallowing in debauchery. Not only did they hold up to
the contempt of the Catholics this Paradise which was nothing but a
brothel, these harems which were haunts of all the vices, these pre-
tended asceticisms of Ramadan which were nothing but an excuse
for renewed revelries and fornications. They also denounced with
horror this return of the Musulmans to all the pagan vices the abuse
:

of wine, torchlight orgies, dancers, and singers, musicians and poets

who sang of carnal love and all the concupiscences of life; and
finally luxury in building, the use of hot baths which softened the
body, those therma which were places of illicit meetings and the
refuge of every kind of vileness.
It is true that in all this they joined hands with the faquis and the
Musulmans of strict observance. They, too, as we have already seen,
61
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
and the usage of wine. But the
proscribed dancing, music, hunting,
influence of climate and environment was too strong.
Down to the very last day the Musulmans of Spain contrived to
reconcile this paganism with the practice of their religion. As a
result they lost their old warrior virtues ; but they made it a kind of
point of national honour to preserve their dancers,
their singers, their
musicians; and, on the eve of exile, they went on drinking, with their
poets and their favourites, the heady, sweet wines of Andalusia.
TThis Musulman paganism exerted a regular fascination over the
Spaniards. It was for this reason that the
Christian priests regarded
it as so dangerous for their flocks not in the least from the doctrinal
point of view, but because of the facilities which it accorded to the
flesh. liked and say what they liked, how-
They might do what they
ever: even the Christians who
remained faithful to their ancestral
religion allowed themselves to be contaminated by the pagan
example.
The men of the North, the Franks especially, yielded at once to the
attraction of these pagan pleasures. Many who fought in
of them,
the pay of Musulman princes, ended by living entirely in the Saracen
way.
An Arab author tells us the strange adventure of a gallant Norman
Count, who, after the taking of Barbastro by his co-religionists in
1064, installed himself in a house in the town and, not content with
wearing the clothes of the former owner, started living a la Morisco.
He was to be found sitting on a divan, in a room in which nothing
furniture or fittings had been altered since the departure of the
Musulman master, amid young slave-musicians. He had the lyre
played for him and Arab songs sung to him. Around him silks and
brocades were spread,
jewel-caskets lay open, precious stones and
metals were displayed. The hardy Norman had slid into the skin of
the Saracen whose place he had taken.
It needed the virile virtues of a hero like the Cid to resist the pagan
seduction of this decadent Islam. He joined hands in that with the
faquis, who never ceased to reproach the Musulman princes with
their laxity. To the Valencians who came to surrender to him he said
sternly: "If you have urgent business, come to me and I will listen to
you. For I do not shut myself up with women to drink and sing* as do your
lords, of whom you can never have audience." These words of the
Christian re-echo those of the Almoravid Youssouf ben Teshoufin,
that unpolished African, that austere Musulman, who also
reproached
the Andalusian kinglings with being debauched and impious
libertines.
Vain sermons Neither the most edifying discourses, nor even
I

the most vital reasons of dynastic or national interest, availed to con-

vert the pagan soul of Andalusia. The sigh of the exiled Moor, when
he looked back for the kst time upon Granada, was one of regret for
the Enchantress and her lost delights. . . .

6z
 THE COURT OF THE CALIPHS AND MUSULMAN PAGANISM
At least, however, it cannot be denied that many of these Caliphs
and these Musulman kinglings had a sense of beauty, and almost all
of them a sense of magnificence. But unhappily these instincts of
grandeur and luxury consorted ill with the poverty of the times.
War and brigandage were continual, and droughts and famines
frequent.
For more than a century the conquerors added little to Roman
Cordova. It took more than two centuries to finish the construction
and decoration of the Great Mosque. Nevertheless, there were
periods of peace and prosperity, especially in the course of the tenth
century. Commerce, in the hands of the Christians and the Jews,
became considerable, and customs duties contributed much revenue
to the State.
/The most important source of revenue, however, appears to have
Keen the booty taken at least once a year, and often twice a year, in
Christian territory. The thousands of prisoners periodically brought
back by the armies of the Caliph were employed as manual labourers,
especially in the construction of mosques. Finally, the sale of Chris-
tian slaves, women, girls, and children, was also profitable to the
treasury. To forestall criticisms which the magnificence of his
buildings might arouse, El Mansour was careful to draw public
attention to the fact that all this was paid for by the infidels. "The
treasury," he said, "is well filled, thanks to the riches which I have
won from the wretches."
Be that as it may, it is certain that all these sovereigns exerted
themselves to invest their court, if not their capital, with an air of
grandeur, and to introduce all kinds of embellishments into it.
They chose Cordova for their residence because Toledo, the for-
mer capital of the Visigoth kings, was too near the Christian frontier,
and Seville, linked with the sea by its river, was at the mercy of an
African fleet. The situation of Cordova, in Andalusia, was more or
less central. Moreover, the ancient Colonia Patricia of the Romans,
the old capital of Betica, still preserved a certain prestige in the eyes
of the people.
Under the Roman and Visigoth domination the city, properly
speaking, had about the same extent as it had under the Musulman
domination. Its area embraced a number of suburbs, with farms,
villas, monasteries, and churches. At the outset the Musulmans con-
fined themselves to occupying the Roman enclosure and the suburbs,
which must have been partly unpopulated
and covered with ruins,
especially after the sacking of the city by Moghit's Berbers.
The bridge across the Guadalquivir, in particular, was badly
damaged. The restoration of this bridge was one of the first works
of public utility undertaken by the Musulmans (719). Nothing else
was undertaken until the reign of El Mansour in other words, for
nearly three centuries.
It is extremely probable that this Roman Cordova presented an
63
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
fairly close to that
which we still see to-day.
In any case
appearance
the principal buildings those which gave the city its character
even if they had not yet attained their full size and their full magnifi-
cence, were at least already in existence: the great bridge across the
river; the monumental gate, which was called the Gate of the Statue
because of die lion, probably in gilded bronze, which surmounted it;
the castellum> which later became the Alcdzar; and finally the Cathe-
dral of Saint Vincent, which became the Great Mosque.
The city as a whole was small, like all the cities of antiquity and
the Middle Ages. It is absolutely impossible to accept the fantastic
figures which the Arab annalists give us and which Dozy blindly
reproduces. According to them,
Cordova had half a million inhabi-
tants, three thousand mosques, a hundred and thirteen thousand
houses, and three hundred public baths, without counting the
twenty-eight suburbs. Under the Caliphs, as a matter of fact, the
fortified area or Medina did not represent even half the extent of
present-day Cordova, which has ninety thousand inhabitants at the
most; and this area, we are told, included a number of spacious
!
gardens
Let us add to it the nearest suburb, which already existed in part
during the Roman period and later was embraced within the area of
the modern city, called by the Arabs the Ajerqufa: let us add even the
suburb of Secunda, another Roman foundation we still cannot con-
:

trive to squeeze into this perimeter the half-million inhabitants, the

hundred and thirteen thousand houses, and the three thousand
mosques about which we are told.
We can only suppose that the Arab authors designated by the
name of Cordova not only the present city and its suburbs, but also
an immense area of environs which extended to the foothills of the
Sierra, even as far as thirty-five kilometres from the present city.
Even if we accepted a Cordova thus arbitrarily aggrandised, the
figure of five hundred thousand inhabitants still seems remarkably
exaggerated.
Of these environs, certainly more populous then than they are to-
day, and of the Musulman city properly speaking, nothing remains
apart from the mosque and some ruins of no great architectural
interest. This seems to indicate that the
buildings were not very
substantially constructed, and that the Medina itself like all Musul-
man towns to-day possessed no monumental or even architectural
character, at least in its exteriors.
It must have been a network of very narrow little streets, an agglo-
meration of little houses with few windows, whitewashed walls, and
no external adornment. The houses of the rich, of course, were
larger and comprised fairly extensive gardens but from the outside
;

there was nothing about them, any more than about the houses of
the to attract the attention of the passer-by.
poor,
They were the ancient Roman and Mediterranean houses, with
64
THE COURT OF THE CALIPHS AND MUSULMAN PAGANISM
their interior patios and their gardens surrounded by high walls. A
text of Aben Pascual tells us that there were to be seen in Cordova
surviving buildings "Greek and Roman. .
. Statues of silver and
.

gilded bronze within them poured water into receptacles, whence it

flowed into ponds and into marble basins excellently carved." The
Musulmans, in short, found ready-made in Roman Cordova not only
the type of their dwellings and the lay-out of them, but also the prin-
cipal themes of their interior decoration. They had merely to adapt
all this to their personal tastes or convenience, or to new forms of
Oriental style.
It is possible that the present city, despite so many successive
revolutions and civilisations, has preserved the essential features of
Musulman and even Roman Cordova. The houses have given them-
selves a little more air and light on the street side; but, in their coats
of whitewash, they are still the same unsubstantial constructions of
brick or clay-mortar, with the same bright, bare surfaces on which the
smallest decorative accessory acquires an outstanding importance.
There are still the same street-corners, with low houses dominated
by the square towers of churches, which were once minarets, after
as Spanish or Visigoth watch-towers. There are still the
serving
same little squares, where a root of jessamine or plumbago assumes
a fugitive aspect of the miraculous, and the red note of a pot of
geraniums or carnations strikes with an intensity almost cruel
in its sharpness against the blinding whiteness of the walls in the
sun.

The Arabs, like the Berbers, had no love for residence in towns.*
That was why the Medina, the seat of the patrician families, scarcely
exceeded the bounds of the Roman enclosure. The Musulman aristo-
cracy, the higher officials, and the Court preferred the country aad
summer seats on the slopes of the Sierra.
In the case of the Caliphs themselves there were reasons of security
in this choice. In their Cordovan Alcdzar they were always at the
mercy of a rising. These foreign sovereigns, encamped in con-
quered territory, felt themselves to be under observation by their
subjects, with no goodwill towards them and ever ready to join
hands with the disaffected. It was for this reason that they multiplied
villas, pleasure resorts, and even fortified retreats in the environs of
their capital.
Naturally the Arab authors speak of these villas in the most
enthusiastic terms. Wonderful names are applied to them in their
texts. There were the Perfect, the Flowery, the Amorous, the Magni-
ficent, the Villa of Delights, 'the Villa of Felicity, the Villa of Prodi-
gies. Unquestionably they were charming places, with water in
abundance, shady patios, embowered retreats, and channels of
marble or baked earth running between flower-beds. To understand
the admiration of the Arabs tor them, we have only to remember
65
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
went into ecstasies in the presence of the merest
that their writers
clump of trees.
But, naive or hyperbolical though these praises may have been,
the homes of pleasance to which they were applied must at the very
least have been extremely attractive, especially in the summer, in the
harsh dryness and barrenness of the plain of Cordova. The Moorish
villas, of which some survivals are still to be found in the environs
of Algiers, may perhaps give us an approximate idea of them.
Among these Caliphal villas, however, some, it appears, were
regular palaces: the Medina az Zahira, built by El Mansour; the
Medina az Zahara, built by Abd er Rhaman HI; and finally another,
die Alamyria, which seems to have been an offshoot of the second.
It is difficult to as we have little to go on except the
judge them,
descriptions of tne Arab authors, which usually make up in dithy-
rambics what they kck in precision. Nothing of the Az Zahira is
left to us.A few remains of the Alamyria survive. As to the famous
Az Zahara, the excavations which have so far been made give us
only a very inadequate idea of it. We are therefore driven back upon
Arab testimony.
"Medina az Zahara/' says Edrisi, "was a considerable town, built
in an amphitheatre, in superimposed stages so that the ground of the
uj>per town was on a level with the roofs of the middle town, and
this on a level with the roofs of the lower town. All of them were
surrounded by walls. In the upper town there were palaces of such
beauty that it defies all description. The middle town comprised
orchards and gardens. The lower town consisted of dwelling-houses
and the mosque."
Here is what Ibn Adhari has to say about it. "It was begun under
En Nasir (the surname of Abd er Rhaman HI), at the commence-
ment of the year 325 (936 of our era). Every day six thousand
squared stones were placed in position, apart from the rubble
employed in the foundations. The marble was imported from Car-
thage, Ifrikia, and Tunis by trusty agents. . . The building required
.

4313 columns, of which 1013 came from Ifrikia and 140 were sent
by the King of the Christians (the Basileus of Byzantium?). The
remainder were derived from Spain herself.
"As for the magnificent basin, sculptured and adorned with gilded
images, it was brought from Constantinople by the Bishop Rebi(?)
... En Nasir had it placed in the chamber of repose in the Eastern
hall, known by the name of Morines. It was adorned with twelve
statues of red gold, inlaid with pearls of great price statues fashioned
:

in the workshops of the palace of Cordova. Eight hundred

. . .

loaves were used daily to feed the fish in the ponds. ... It is said
that the apartments comprised within the enclosure of the palace of
Az Zahara, intended for the lodging of the Sultan, his family and his
court, were of the number of four hundred; that the number of
Slavonian eunuchs was three thousand seven hundred and fifty; that
66
 THE COURT OF THE CALIPHS AND MUSULMAN PAGANISM
in the palace of Az Zahara the number of women, old and young,
and slave-girls was six thousand three hundred; and that to feed
everybody required thirteen thousand pounds of meat, without
counting chickens, partridges, and birds and fish of all kinds."
Let us leave Ibn Adhan the responsibility for these figures, and
note that this compiler was writing after the reconquest of Cordova
by the Christians, at a time when Medina az Zahara was no more
than a heap of ruins. Let us remark, moreover, that most of the
columns were brought ready-made from Carthage and Constanti-
nople or borrowed from the pagan temples and the churches of
Spain, and that the decoration came in part from Byzantium: the
basins, the gold and silverware, and probably also the mosaics.
There was, notably, "an extraordinary pearl, which figured in the
marvellous hall. It came from the Greek Caesar of Constantinople,
who sent it to En Nasir with a number ofprecious gifts" I repeat once
more: Islam, at least at the outset, adorned itself with the leavings of
Latinity.
What has so far been cleared of the ruins of Medina az Zahara
"
scarcely conveys the impression of a considerable town." It is not
larger indeed, it is smaller than the Alhambra of Granada.
Rather than a town it is a fortress the AJcasyba of all the Moorish or
:

African kinglings, who, always afraid of insurrections or sudden

attacks, lived outside their capitals, on a height whence they could
command the city and the roads leading to it.
At the same time it is unquestionable that the excavated founda-
tions and debris indicate a place of magnificence. Marble, onyx,
alabaster, and the most precious substances are plentiful. The decora-
tive themes are related to Byzantine sculpture, or the Roman African
sculpture of the period of decadence; but, while they reveal Oriental
influences, they possess an evident originality.
As a matter of feet what survives is so chaotic and so limited that
it is absolutely impossible to come to any conclusion about this
"marvellous" palace. It is probable that it was very luxuriously
decorated and furnished, and it must have been a very pleasant and
cool residence during the hot season. Medina az Zahara was abun-
dantly supplied with water. It had plenty of shade in its gardens ;
and, from the height of its terraces, one must have enjoyed a delight-
ful view over Cordova and its countryside, sown with villas, gar-
dens, and orchards.
The luxury displayed in these buildings made the strict Musul-
mans murmur. It was not only a question of the scandal of statues,
bas-reliefs, and perhaps paintings, which reproduced living or vege-
table forms, all things forbidden by the law ; it was also a question of
the gold and the precious metals thus idly wasted. Ibn el Athir tells
us that, after the construction of this Palace of Enchantment, Abd
er Rhaman gave audience one day "in a pavilion inlaid with
gold,
whose marvellous architecture was beyond compare- The Prince,
67
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
surrounded by great personages, asked them whether to their know-
ledge anyone had ever raised such a building. All of them replied,
witn high praises, that they knew of nothing like it.
"Only the Cadi Moudhir Ballouti remained silent, with downcast
eyes. Questioned by the Caliph, he replied,
with the tears running
down to his beard *I call Allah to witness I did not think that Satan
: :

(may he be confounded I) would win such power over you as to make

you descend to the level of the Infidels 1* And he quoted a text of the
Koran, in which it is written that roofs of silver and ornaments of
gold are made only for the wicked. Abd er Rhaman lowered his eyes
without answering; and began to weep."
It is certain that nothing could have been more pagan than these

voluptuous Andalusian vims. The nomad Arab or Berber, enemy of

towns and of all dwellings built in stone, could not fail to condemn
the impiety and the wantonness of these too magnificent palaces.
To take pleasure in them men needed to be, like the CaEphs, sons of
foreign concubines, men of mixed blood and suspect faith, who sur-
rendered themselves to all the relaxing influences of a soil saturated
with idolatry and of a climate and a sky only too beautiful.

It is
paganism again, that ineradicable paganism whose subtle
perfume still floats in the air of Andalusia it is this again which we
find in the most religious monument which the Caliphs have left us :

that astonishing Mosque of Cordova, out of which the Christians

vainly tried to make a cathedral.
Yet at the outset it was a church, pkced under the patronage of
the great Spanish martyr, Saint Vincent. During the Roman and
it was the cathedral church of Cordova. It is well to
Visigoth period
recall this fact to the minds of literary tourists, who hasten to
pro-
claim that Christianity is an intruder in this environment. No, the
intruder was Islam, which ousted from it the Christ of the Gospels,
Who, no doubt, had taken the place of some pagan god. From the
earliest days of the Arab conquest, the Christians, after
seeing all
their churches demolished, had to share their cathedral with the
Musulmans as well.
"The Musulmans/* says the compiler, Ibn Adhari, "after their
conquest of Spain, took as a precedent what Abu Obeyda and
Khalid had done, with the consent of the Prince of Believers, Omar
ben Khattab, touching the division by halves of Christian churches
in territories which had surrendered on terms, for
example, at Damas-
cus and elsewhere. the Musulmans came to an agree-
Accordingly
ment with the barbarians [sit] of Cordova to take half of their greatest
church, which was situated inside the city. Out of this half they made
their principal mosque, while they left the other half to the Chris-
tians ; but they destroyed all the other churches."
During the reign of Abd er Rhaman I this mosque, contiguous
with the Christian church, became too small for the growing number
68
 THE COURT OF THE CALIPHS AND MUSULMAN PAGANISM
of the faithful, and the Emir compelled the Christians to surrender
the other half of their cathedral to him, in return for an indemnity
and the right to restore churches which had been destroyed at the
time of the Conquest outside Cordova. The edifice was completely
rebuilt in 786 of our era. Most of the successors of this prince made
a point of embellishing or extending this mosque, which ended by
becoming the greatest sanctuary of Islam after the Kaaba of Mecca.
n
Abd er Rhaman added new bays lengthwise. Then these bays
were still further extended by Hakam II. Next El Mansour almost
doubled the width of the edifice by adding eight lateral aisles to the
eleven constructed by his predecessors. Finally, Abd er Rhaman HI
built the minaret which still stands to-day. In all its essential parts,
therefore, the Mosque of Cordova was finished by the end of the
tenth century.
It is extremely probable that this mosque, which took the place of
an old Christian basilica, began by copying its arrangement and per-
haps exactly reproducing its plan. That basilica, like the African
basilicas with which we are familiar, had a courtyard in front of it,
doubtless surrounded with porticos and provided with a basin for
ablutions. This was what the Spaniards later called, in all the edifices
of this kind, the "Court of Orange Blossom." The central nave must
have been larger than the lateral aisles. It is possible that the Church
of Saint Vincent itself had nine lateral aisles, like the moscjue of Abd
er Rhaman in any case, the great basilica of Tipasa has nine aisles
and that the Musulmans only added one on each side of the building.
The tnirhab the niche which gives the orientation towards Mecca
for prayer simply took the place of the apse. This apse was pro-
gressively moved back with the outer wall, in proportion as the
mosque was extended lengthwise. When El Mansour extended it
crosswise, the sanctuary was thrown out of its axis, inasmuch as the
mirhab remained on the axis of the old church. It is possible, in
short, that until the reign of Abd er Rhaman III (9:^-961), who, we
are told, regularised the jfo/W*, the mosque preserved the basilical
form, that is to say, a central nave higher than the aisles.
</
Regarded as a whole, therefore, the Mosque of Cordova is merely
a Christian basilica amplified in both directions. This amplification
was limited to the alignment of columns and the prolongation and
multiplication of their rows. These columns, moreover, were for
the most part of
pagan or Christian origin whether they came from
Africa or from Spam. The Roman civilisation had left the debris of
an immense quantity of derelict material on the ground. The Arabs
confined themselves to using all this over again, re-erecting the fallen
columns and crowning them' with their Roman or Byzantine capitals.
The only difficulty was that these fortuitous columns were not
always high enough* Then it was necessary, as at Kairouan, to shore
them up. Sometimes they were too high, and they had to be cut
down. At Cordova the architects happily avoided the shoriags of
69
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
Kairouan; but the second-hand columns, sometimes cut off above
thek pedestals, were still of inadequate height ; and it was therefore
necessary to surmount them with two superimposed arches in order
to obtain a proper elevation of the ceiling.
We also know that the mosaics of the mirhab in other words, the
in the Mosque of
only feature that is properly speaking Oriental
Cordova were executed by Byzantine workers lent to the Caliph
Hakam H by the Emperor of Constantinople. Not only did the
Basileus dispatch his workers, but he had also to send to Cordova
even the material for the mosaics "three hundred and twenty quin-
:

tals of cubes," Ibn Adhari tells us.

For the masonry itself the workers were Christians. They were
prisoners taken in the territories of the North and brought back to
Cordova by the Caliphal armies. There has been found on a wall the
form of a cross, rudely carved by one of these unfortunates. Finally,
the building expenses were mostly met either by tribute imposed
upon the Christian princes of the peninsula, or out of the proceeds
of the raids made in thek territory by the Caliph.
Accordingly in this great sanctuary of Islam, the first after that of
Mecca, everything, or nearly everything, is Christian the plan of the
:

edifice, the material employed, and even the workmanship. We may

know all this, all about these borrowings, these odds and ends
assembled here and there; but still it must be admitted that the effect
of the whole is as original 'as possible. The Moscjue of Cordova
resembles no other. It seems to be a product of Spanish soil, a unique
plant which could have grown nowhere else.
'

Its fanatics lament the mutilations which the Christians of the

Reconquest inflicted on it. They regret the old ceiling of painted

and sculptured wood, and disparage the indifferent vaultings which
have replaced it. They wax especially indignant over the Catholic
cathedral, half flamboyant, half grotesque in style, which the Cor-
dovan canons planted right in the middle of the Mosque.
These disturbances are, no doubt, very But what may
regrettable.
console us is, in the first pkce, that the capilla mayor and the nave of
this cathedral rnake a magnificent whole; and, in the next jslace, that,
without the high vaultings of this central part, the vaulting of the
apse and the choir, and even the lower vaulting of the lateral aisles,
the ceiling of this immense edifice, perched upon columns dispro-
portionately small, would produce a crushing effect. One would
reel as though he were walking through an endless mouse-trap.
The vaultings of the aisles and, above all, the splendid sweep of the
vaulting of the apse, in my opinion, relieve this too low ceiling very
happily. They invest the building with a character of spirituality
which the Musulman sanctuary never possessed.
But this character disappears as soon as one emerges from the
Christian enclave. The canons may have done their best: there is no
means of Christianising a place like that. The edifice remains pagan.
 THE COURT OF THE CALIPHS AND MUSULMAN PAGANISM
The architects who designed this marvel may have been Islamised
Spaniards ; they remained in their hearts Latins with the sense of
voluptuousness and of the beauty of form. No religious idea pos-
sesses you as you sit in front of these rows of columns and these
arches with their keystones painted purple. They make you think
rather of series of flowery pergolas, with their
green roofs, their
trellises of climbing plants, their curves heavy with roses and con-
volvulus.
Or they make you think of the doorway of a tepidarium> or of a
courtyard indefinitely multiplied, where you visuause at the end of
the vista, in a flight of floating gauze, the harmonious outlines of
ancient choirs and dances. Only the Oriental overloading and com-
plexity of the intertwining and polylobed arcatures which surround
the mirhab clash a little with this illusion. But to look aside and let
your eyes stray among the beautiful columns of mauve or rose marble,
with their Corinthian capitals, suffices to make the pagan vision
continue.
The exterior of the edifice produces an effect no less striking. It
should be seen from the left bank of the Guadalquivir, from that
wretched suburb which is called the Campo de la Verdad. Surrounded
by the neighbouring buildings, it acquires an accent of strange inten-
sity. In summer, towards noon, when the architectural lines stand
out with almost brutal precision against a dead blue sky, it forms
part of an extraordinary whole, or the most vehemently Spanish
character.
The old Roman bridge with its castillo of the Middle Ages the ;

Moorish battlements of the Alcdsar the quadrangular towers of the

;

episcopal Palace, which, with the enclosing wall of the Mosque, re-
calls the stem nakedness of the EscoriaT; and finally, Philip IPs
monumental gate, at the other end of the bridge: these harsh, crude
tones ; these tones of ashes intermingled with the redness of live
coals ; these lilac and mauve tiles which look as though they were
blazing away on the roofs in a silent fire all this seems dried-up aad
dead, and yet burning. It is, as it were, a passion driven in upon it-
self, overwhelmed by the weight of the sun, which you expect to see
burst forth and gush up with a cry of rage towards the sky of fire. . . .
 CHAPTER VIII

What the Arab-Spanish Civilisation was

was in the tenth century, especially during the reigns of Abd er

Rhaman the Great, of his son Hakam II, and even of the, usurper
ITEl Mansour, that,
despite the unpropitiousriess of the time, despite
perpetual wars and rebellions,
what is called the Arab-Spanish
civilisation developed.
It is here especially thatwe must be on our guard against being
misled by words, which do not mean the same thing to us as they do
to Orientals. To judge this civilisation reasonably, it is important
not to let ourselves be carried away by the hyperbolical admiration,
the
preconceptions,
and the prejudices of those who exalt Arab-
culture to an extent only in order to de-
Danish exaggerated
Catholic Spain and, in general, medieval Christian culture
grade
in proportion.
The gravest error in this matter is to believe that the Arab-
Spanish civilisation was the work of Arabs. The Arabs, who were
very small in number in the Peninsula, were never anything for the
Spaniards and for Western Europe but intermediaries, most of the
time unconscious and involuntary, who reopened to them the roads
of the great civilising centres of the East: Byzantium, Damascus,
Cairo, Bagdad. The Arabs themselves brought nothing with them
but their nomad poverty and roughness, their pride of race, their
inveterate hatred of everything that we understand by the word
civilisation. Even those historians who are most prejudiced in their
favour are obliged to recognise their nullity as civifising elements and
as factors of progress.
"They are the least inventive people in the world," writes Dozy,
"Invention is so rare in their literature that, when one encounters an
imaginative poem or story in it, one can almost always declare off-
hand, without fear of being mistaken, that this production is not of
Arab origin,
but is a translation from a Hindu, Persian, Syrian, or
Greek original." Elsewhere he writes: "They translated and com-
mented upon the works of the ancients. They enriched certain
branches of study by and minute investiga-
specialised patient, exact,
tions. But they invented nothing, we do not owe
any great and fertilising
idea to them. As a result of contact with the
peoples whom they con-
quered they cultivated learning and civilised themselves, so far as
that was possible for them."
It should be added that, to be exact, it was above all the
peoples
conquered by them, the Syrians, the Persians, the Egyptians, the
Spaniards, who, under their domination and through the medium of
their
language,
went on cultivating and started popularising the
ancient learning and
philosophy, those of the East and of the old
7*
 WHAT THE ARAB-SPANISH CIVILISATION WAS
Helleno-Latin world. If there was an Arab-Spanish civilisation,
was
^ ' '
it

,was
, * especially
t . i.
to the Spaniards
Spaniard
* i
.
Christians, Jews, and renegades
_,**

'that this civilisation was due.

Spanish Islam, in the first place, inherited all the material part of
the Roman Germanic invasions
civilisation, as it subsisted after the
and the Visigoth attempts as restoration.
We have seen above that the administrative framework of the
Roman and Visigoth period was adopted by the Arab conquerors.
Similarly, so far as habitation, hygiene, and public works were con-
cerned, they merely followed in the footsteps of their predecessors.
They found comfortable houses, well suited to the cHmate, some-
times luxurious ; towns planned by the military genius of the Romans,
adorned with magnificent monuments, as their historians recognise;
fortified areas, observation posts, roads, bridges, and aqueducts,
which they had nothing to do but maintain or repair.
Doubtless the public fountains and baths still existed, if only, so
far as the latter were concerned, in a state of ruin. These baths,
abandoned by the Christians and condemned by the Church for
reasons of morality and orthodoxy, because they were, so it was said,
the sink of all iniquities and the last refuge of paganism these baths
did not need much reconstruction to become what the Catholic
Spaniards called "Moorish Baths/* They were merely less magnifi-
cent, more strictly utilitarian, than during the Roman period.
As for the fountains, we have only to look at those which survive
at Timgad, at Djemila, at Dougga, or at Pompeii to recognise in
them the prototypes of the Musulman fountains in Egypt, in Syria, in
North Africa, or in Spain. There is the same arrangement in the form
of a niche, and the same striking colours: colours made up of
camletted stucco or mosaic inlay, which was later replaced by the
enamelled faience of the a^ulejos*
The Arab and Berber chieftains, when they arrived in Spain, also
found fields excellently tilled by the Andalusian peasants, wno to this
very day are first-class cultivators, worthy descendants of those who
won Betica its reputation for fertility. It is probable that the heed-
lessness of the new masters produced the same results in Spain as in
Roman and Byzantine Africa. The soil, less well cultivated, less well
irrigated, became also less fertile. Some regions were allowed to lie
fellow. In any case, from the date of the Musulman conquest
droughts and famines frightful famines which depopulated whole
districts tended to multiply.
We learn from the Arab historians that the first emigration of
Andalusians to Morocco (749) was caused by a famine, which lasted
nearly five years. In the course of the ninth century there were at
least five of dearth. Very frequently this formula recurs
great periods
in these histories "That year there was a great drought in Spain."
:

It is a thing that cannot fail to surprise those who nave read the
73
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
dithyrambs of most modern historians about Spain and her wonderful
irrigation by the Arabs.
Be that as it may, the new-comers had merely to set on its feet
again a country formerly fertile and prosperous,
which asked only
to be reborn. But, without the aid of the conquered, in other words,
the real sons of die soil, Arabs and Berbers would have achieved
nothing. These Spaniards Christians, Jews, or converts to Islam
had only to look around them to find models or stimulants in the
vestiges of the old Hispano-Roman civilisation.
The conquerors,
moreover, by opening the roads to the great Oriental metropoles for
them, presented them with new models, forms of art hitherto un-
known; and they also brought with them in their train inventions
and material refinements stm novel in the West.
In addition to the old Helleno-Latin learning, Byzantine, Alexan-
drine, and Persian influences were put at the disposal of these
aspirants to a new civilisation. Byzantium especially had much to
teach to the architects, the sculptors, and the mosaic workers of
Cordova and Medina az Zahara.
Undoubtedly under the Abd er Rhamans, in the finest flower of
the Caliphate, Musulman. Spain aspired towards a renaissance. Given
a good administration, in a country which was at peace and felt itself
to -be safe, and in which public spirit was exalted by a sense of
national strength and greatness, such a renaissance might well have
taken pkce. But the movement in this direction was thwarted by all
kinds of unfavourable circumstances.

If a great civilising movement is to take pkce in a country, it is

above all necessary that there should be a certain
homogeneity of
race, *or at least a certain community of ideas and feelings. The
Augustan age, or the age of Louis XIV, is comprehensible only in
terms of a comparative unanimity of the nation. Musulman Spain,
on the contrary, was an assembly of heteroclite populations. To get
an idea of it we must hark back to the comparison which I have
already made with the countries of the Levant as they were until
quite recent times, before the enforced unification imposed by the
Turks.
Spaniards, Visigoths, Berbers, Syrian Arabs, Arabs of the Hedjaz
/and the Yemen, Christians, Jews, Musulmans all these peoples
lived side by side, as best they could, most of the time without under-
standing one another. Unity of language did not exist. Literary
Arabic, the official and religious language, was not understood or
spoken except in educated circles and among the officials of the
caliphate. Trie lower-class Musulmans spoke a vulgarised Ajtabic,
with a strong admixture of local idioms of Berber dialects. The
Christians and the Jews commonly spoke "Roman," die first form of
Spanish.
Nevertheless, by force of circumstances, conquerors and con-
74
 WHAT THE ARAB-SPANISH CIVILISATION WAS
quered were naturally driven to try and understand one another. A
number of Mozarabs that is to say, educated Christians knew not
only the vulgarised Arabic, but also literary Arabic. On the other
hand, the Musulman magistrates and the Caliphs in person ended by
familiarising themselves with Roman.
In general it was the degree of culture upon which the use of the
two languages depended. Educated persons spoke Arabic, and the
uneducated Roman. "We know,*' says Mendndez Pidal, "that about
the year 1050 there were illiterate, but very devout, Musulmans in
Toledo who could not speak Arabic."
Similarly four hundred years later in the kingdom of Granada,
which had become the last refuge of Spanish Islam, and therefore
was as Arabised or Berberised as possible, there were to be found
Christians who could only speak Arabic. In some Christian villages,
Marmol tells us, it was as much as one could expect if the priest and
the beadle understood a few words of Spanish.
Can we believe that there was any mutual penetration among these
juxtaposed ethnical elements? If so, it did not go very far. The
habit of side by side produced nothing more than a certain-
living
degree of reciprocal toleration, which readily turned into hostility
at the least friction. To realise this we have only to look at what

happens to this very day in Syria or in Palestine. Musulmans,

Christians, and Jews live there side by side, use the same language,
and often have the same way of life; but their minds remain pro-
foundly different, even when they are not living in open strife.
Perhaps unity in teaching might have produced a public spirit
favourable to a high state of culture and even a complete civilisation
national in its character. But the schools remained, as they still do
in the Levant, purely religious. Education was not
organised and
ad-
ministered by the State; it depended entirely upon private initiative*
There is quoted, it is true, the case of the pious Caliph Hakam BE,
who subsidised schools for the poor children of Cordova. There
were three in the neighbourhood of the Great Mosque, and twenty-
four in the suburbs. But this was an isolated act of charity and piety,
a quite personal "good work" which does not appear to have been
imitated by the successors of this Caliph.
It is true that schools of a sort were numerous, at least in the towns,
as they had been during the Roman period. It was open to anybody
to set up as a schoolmaster. These schools, however, were strictly
sectarian, and the teaching was purely religious. Those which Hakam
subsidised were intended to "teach the Koran" to the poor children
of the capital. That did not even mean that the children were taught
to read and write in Arabic. Teaching the Koran means teaching
recitation of the suras of the Holy Book by heart. To affirm on the
strength of this that everybody knew how to write in Musulman
Andalusia seems to be a curious exhibition of credulity.
As for higher education, it did not exist, or at least it had no
75
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
/official existence.Like primary education, it was left to private
initiative, and was,
it moreover, strictly supervised by the Musulman
theologians. Certain Caliphs, like Abd er Rhaman II, Abd er Rhaman
en Nasir, and Hakam II, may have encouraged and patronised poets,
writers, men of learning, and philosophers. That depended on their
good humour. The masters taught at their own risk and peril. Besides,
this teaching, if it were to be tolerated, had to restrict itself to the
purely formal or utilitarian.
Grammar, rhetoric, prosody, for the training of scribes and
versifiers ; theology, exegesis, canon law, for the training of jurists
and clerics these were about all the subjects which were taught in
'these private schools, called "universities" by historians with vivid
imaginations. If there were schools in Musulman Spain which re-
motely resembled our universities, they were schools of theology
grouped around great mosques and maintained by pious founda-
tions.
Learning, as we understand it, had only the most restricted place
in them. It was regarded with suspicion by the religious intolerance
of the faquis, which was often translated into very drastic prohibi-
tions and persecutions. During periods of extreme rigour, all that
was permitted to students of mathematics was to acquire the know-
ledge necessary to orientate the mosques in the direction of Mecca
and determine the seasons, the phases of the moon, and the exact
hour of prayer. Everything else was regarded as dangerous.
While the profane encouraged astrologers, soothsayers, horo-
scope-readers, and makers of amulets and talismans, astronomy
properly so-called, scientific and rational astronomy, was frowned
upon though this did not prevent it from being cultivated clande-
stinely, or even openly, when circumstances permitted. What
especially attracted pupils even Christians from all parts of the
Christian territory around these Musulman and Jewish teachers was
the occult sciences demonology, magic, alchemy, when they were
:

tolerated, or secretly favoured by powerful personages or by the

Caliphs themselves.
Medicine and botany, by reason of their practical utility, escaped
the severity of religious censorship. There were famous Spanish
doctors ana surgeons. The celebrated schools of Salerno and Mont-
pellier owed part of their renown, it appears, to the influence or the
presence of these Arabic-speaking Spanish doctors, who were mostly
of Christian or Jewish origin. But, apart from certain altogether
exceptional intuitions, this medicine makes us smile to-day. It was a
formulary of incredible prescriptions. It sets one dreaming to think
that these old wives' or negro sorcerers* remedies may once have
cured.
All this so-called science had nothing in common with ours. It
was the liquidation of the old Greco-Latin empiricism plus an
Alexandrine and Oriental endowment. It was a farrago which the
 WHAT THE ARAB-SPANISH CIVILISATION WAS
modern age had to abandon. The same thing applies to other
branches of Arab erudition or "science.**
Our historians invite us to marvel at the library assembled at
Cordova by Hakam II, a library which contained four thousand
volumes others say six thousand. If the figures are correct, this
obviously amounted to a considerable collection. But, if you
eliminate from all this assembly the books of and of theo-
exegesis
of jurisprudence, of rhetoric, of grammar, of prosody every-
logy/
thing that is strictly Arab and Musulman what remains that could
really serve towards the progress of the human spirit?

Enemies of learning in general, the Musulman theologians were

especially so in the case of philosophy. "It is only by a very deceptive
equivocation,** writes Renan, "that the name of 'Arab philosopny* is
applied to the sum of works undertaken, through reaction against
Arabism, in parts of the Musulman Empire as remote as possible
from the Arabian Peninsula Samarkand, Bokhara, Cordova, Morocco.
:

"This philosophy was written in Arabic, because that idiom had

become the learned and sacred language of all the Musulman
countries ; but that was all. ... The origins of Arab philosophy derive*
accordingly from an opposition to Islam. It is for this reason that
',

philosophy always remained among the Musulmans an alien intru-

sion, a frustrated effort without effect upon the intellectual education
of the peoples of the East.**
I leave it to the learned to decide to what extent this severe
judg-
ment is justified in the case of the generality of philosophical writings
in the Arabic language. So far as the Spaniards are concerned, it is in
the first place to be noted that these philosophers were, for the most
part, of Christian or Jewish origin. The most famous of them, Ibn
Hazam and Averrofe, were respectively of Jewish and Christian
descent.
As Renan points out, their doctrines had no effect in Musulman
circles. They were taken into consideration, studied and discussed
only by the Christians. Moreover, the basis of these doctrines went
back to the old Greco-Latin scholiasts, the neo-Platonism of the
Alexandrines, or to Aristotelian peripateticism, more or less distorted
by translators and commentators.
In any case these philosophers, who were in no sense regular
professors, but masters who surrounded themselves with disciples,
were constantly exposed to the suspicion and hatred of the orthodox
Theologians. So-called Musulman tolerance did not go the length of
respect for other people's opinions. Ibn Masarra, the Cordovan
philosopher, who was regarded as having renewed the pantheism
of Empedocles, had to go' into exile to avoid the accusation of
atheism, with all its consequences, of which the gravest was the
death penalty. He could not return to his country until after the
accession to the throne of the great Abd er Rhaman HI, who was
7?
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
able to moderate the fanatical zeal of the faquis. Even then he had to
hide his opinions behind a display of strict piety and asceticism. But
this did not disarm the clergy, who, justifiably alarmed by Ibn
Masarra's doctrines, burnt his books, tainted with atheism and heresy,
in default of the philosopher himself.
Ibn Hazam, who has been regarded as a critical historian of
religions though it takes an effort to do so was subjected to
similar persecution at the hands of the theologians. Driven by them
to leave Majorca, where he had found a protector and even a partisan
of his ideas in the -governor of the island, he had to take refuge in
Seville. The hatred of the faquis pursued him there. King Almotatid,
yielding to their insistence, had his books publicly burned.
A century later Averro6s found himself obliged to leave Cordova
in his turn, after being deprived of his dignities and his property.
He took refuge in Morocco, where he was imprisoned ana con-
strained by the Almohade Caliph to retract his errors at the door of
the Great Mosque. According to some accounts he had to stand
there while the in his face.
passers-by spat
In general, the Arab historians congratulate the Caliphs on the
rigour with which they persecuted the heterodox. "El Mansour,"
writes Ibn Adhari, "was as ill-disposed as possible towards those
who concerned themselves at all with philosophy or religious con-
troversy, or discussed astrological matters and signs, or treated the
of tfee religious law lightly. He consigned the material-
prescriptions
ist and
philosophical works comprised in the libraries of El Hakam
to the names, in the presence of the leading men of learning, and it
was with his own hand that he did this.
"Among those whom he smote for reasons analogous with such
detestable opinions figured Mohammed ben Abou Djoma, who pro-
fessed to have learned of a danger foretold by the stars, threatening
the end of his power. He ordered his tongue to be cut out, and then
had him executed and crucified: which closed all mouths."
To close all mouths must have been, in fact, the main preoccupa-
tion of all these despots, whose authority was always precarious. Let
us note that El Mansour was of Arab origin, and that he prided him-
self upon certain intellectual elegances. In the following century,
under the regime of the fanatical Almoravids and Almohades, the
theologians became even more powerful than before, so that free
thought must have been more man ever persecuted and driven to
conceal itself.

Whatever one may say of this philosophy and this "learning" in

the Arabic language, it is nevertheless true that the Christians of the
West owe a certain debt to them. For it was through these transla-
tions, these adaptations, and these commentaries that our schoolmen
became acquainted with Aristotle, the doctors, the mathematicians
and the geographers of Greco-Latin antiquity.
78
 WHAT THE ARAB-SPANISH CIVILISATION WAS
The Arab literature and poetry appears to have been
influence of
less deep, though some have sought to draw analogies between Arab
poetry and Provencal and Catalan poetry. These are analogies purely
of form, concerned solely with prosody.
The fact is that Arab poetry is almost all formal. It possesses a
verbalism disconcerting to our Western minds. Let us leave the
specialists to strain themselves in the effort to make us admire a
poetry which consists entirely in plays upon words, in alliterations
and metrical artifices and refinements, for it must be confessed that
these beauties are foreign to our taste or beyond our understanding.
Whether we are examining martial, political, or satirical poetry, or
bacchic songs andlittle erotic and gallant pieces, we find always the
same gaudy and commonplace metaphors. Princes are Compared
with liqns and their enemies with tigers or leopards or else with
suns with their trains of moons, satellites, and stars. Women are
invariably gazelles, doves, or sometimes camels ; and their cheeks and
their breasts are only to be compared with lilies, roses, jessamine,
hyacinth, myrtle, and narcissi. At the same time it is only fair to
recognise that there may be in these poems, often obscure, deliber-
ately enigmatic, or strangely far-fetched as they are, a verbal music
which escapes us.
Among these flowers of rhetoric I confess that I can find an
all
interest in very few. Some of these pieces, such, for example, as the
following, recommended themselves by real sincerity or real depth
of This fragment is from the philosopher, Ibn Hajzam, in
feeling.
whom one would scarcely expect to find a soul so sentimental.
"In the palace of my father there was a girl brought up with the
other women. She counted sixteen years, and there was none to
equal her in beauty, intelligence, modesty, reserve, shyness, and
sweetness. . None dared to raise his desires to her, and yet her
. .

beauty made a conquest of all hearts. . .She was serious, and had
.

no taste for frivolous amusements, but she pkyed the lyre divinely.
"I was very young then, and I thought only of her. I heard her
speak sometimes, but always in the presence of otherpersons. For
two years I had vainly sought to speak to her alone. Then, one day,
there was held in our house one of those feasts such as often take
place in the palaces of the great, to which the women of our house
and of my brother's house, and of our retainers and our most re-
spected servants, were invited. After spending part of the day in the
palace, these ladies went on to the terrace, whence there was a
magnificent view over Cordova and its environs, and they grouped
themselves where the trees in our garden did not spoil the view.
"I was with them, and I approached the embrasure where she
stood. But, as soon as she saw me beside her, she ran with graceful
speed to another embrasure. I followed her; she escaped me again.
Happily the other ladies did not notice; for, bent upon finding the
finest view-points, they paid no attention to me.
79
 THE CALIPHATE OF CORDOVA
"Then the ladies went down to the garden, and those who, by
their rank their age, had the most influence, begged the lady of
and
my thoughts to sine. I supported their request. Then she took her
lyre and started tuning it with a modesty which, to me, doubled her
charms ;
after which she sang these verses :

"
7
think only of mine own sun, the lithe, gracefulgirl whom I saw disappear
behind the dark walls of the palace. Is she a human' creature? Is she a genie?
She is but a woman: but, if she has all the beauty of a genie, she has none of its
malice. Her face is a, pearl, her form a narcissus, her breath a perfume, and
all her body an emanation of light. When one sees her, clad in her robe the
colour of saffron, walking with inconceivable lightness, one would say that she
9
could set her foot on the most fragile things without breaking them.

"While she sang, it was not the strings of her lyre that she struck
with her bow. It was my heart. Never has that day of delight left
my memory, and, on my death-bed, I shall still remember it. ..."

The Spaniard who caught this accent of quite platonic senti-

mentality anticipated by three centuries the sonnets of Petrarch. But
it was only a sigh lost in a vain thrumming of guitars. Out of all this
Arab poetry there is not a single piece which, so to speak, holds us :

a cry of the soul or of the heart, a great lyrical outburst, a great work,
in short, so widely human in its character that it takes its place quite
naturally in universal literature.
There is nothing that resembles the Divine Comedy, just as, in the
intellectual sphere, the Arabs of Spain produced nothing to compare
with the Summa of Saint Thomas. Finally, so far as architecture and
the plastic arts are concerned, there is nothing on the level of our
cathedrals or the sculpture of our thirteenth century.
The civilisation of the Caliphate was rather an end than a begin*
ning. It was the liquidation of the old Mediterranean civilisation
not without its unquestionable aspirations, first towards new forms
of art, then towards new forms of thought. These aspirations were
not to be realised until much later, in the great movement of our
Renaissance. But it was neither from Musulman Spain, nor from
Africa, nor from the Near East that was to blow the wind of
resurrection.

80
 III

THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND

CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
 CHAPTER DC

The Day of the Ditch and the 'Rjtvolt of the Suburb

the continual wars which these Musulman

princes had to
wage throughout the duration of the Caliphate, there were two
A:ONGwhich assume quite a special importance, by virtue of their
national and religious significance: the war against the Spanish
renegades, and the war against the Christians. Fundamentally, these
were one and the same war, which went on for centuries ; for the
Spanish renegades, that is to say, the Spaniards converted to Islam,
were of Christian origin and nurtured the same hatred of the Arabs
and the Berbers as the Mozarabs, that is to say, the Christians who
lived among the Musulmans, and the independent Christians of
Castile and Leon.
The renegades, as we have seen, were treated with little considera-
tion by the Old Musulmans. They were suspected of insincerity and
kept aloof from the administration and from lucrative positions, and
many of them regretted their apostasy. They regretted it the more
inasmuch as it was impossible for them to return to their former
religion. In this respect the Musulman law was rigid. Whoever
denied Islam exposed himself to the death penalty. The renegades,
therefore, were disaffected. The Christians were no less so.
If we bear in mind that these two groups, together with the Jews,
who were very numerous in Spain, made up a majority of the popu-
lation, we shall realise that they formed an element very dangerous
to the Caliphate. Left to their own resources they could not do
much; but, given the support of an Arab or Berber faction, they
became a force to be considered very seriously. Agitators hostile to
the government fully appreciated this fact. m
order to overthrow
the reigning Caliph, one of them made an alliance with the renegades,
who in turn took advantage of the more or less declared complicity
of the Christians.
This agitator was the Berber, Yahya ben Yahya, one of those
faquis who, during the reign of Hisham I (788-796), acquired
extraordinary importance and enjoyed extraordinary influence..
These Musulman theologians were a regular power within the State.
They not only controlled opinion and kept guard over orthodoxy,
but also shared, in their own persons or through their nominees, in
the exercise of authority. Never did the doctors of the Sorbonne
exert such an influence under the French kings. They were not only
inquisitors, but also political leaders.
When the pious Hisham died, the faqui Yahya declared against his
successor Hakam I, whom he regarded as neither sufficiently defer-
ential towards the doctors nor a good enough Musulman. The new
prince, as a matter of fact, was far from being an unbeliever. But he
 THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
was a man fond of pleasure, who had the fault, in the eyes of the
faquis, of drinking wine and liking hunting.
He was, in short, a bon
vivant, who, of his twenty-five years' reign, had fifty
in the course
children, boys and girls, by his favourites.
The first conspiracy hatched against him by Yahya was discovered.
The ringleaders, to the number of seventy-two, were arrested and
crucified, and Yahya fled to Toledo.
This former capital of the Visigoth kings, still haloed by the
prestige of an Imperial city and a city of learning, inhabited mostly by
Christians and emigrants from the South, had never submitted to the
yoke of the Caliphs with anything but repugnance. It was notorious
throughout Islam for its spirit of independence and its rebellious-
ness. A Toledan poet, Gharbib, a renegade of Christian origin,
maintained the effervescence of his compatriots, who were doubtless
further stirred
up by the refugee, Yahya.
The Caliph did not dare to attack the malcontents openly. He
employed a subterfuge to checkmate the Toledans. He gave them as
their governor a renegade from Huesca named Amrous, with whom
he came to an understanding that the leading notabilities of the city,
the heads of the Spanish party, should disappear. The Toledans,
flattered by having one of their compatriots, and not an Arab, as
their governor, received the newcomer more or less favourably.
He persuaded them to construct an alcazar for the purpose of hous-
',

ing ^c garrison troops as well as protecting themselves against a

possible attack.
When the alcazar was built, the Caliph assembled an army on the
pretext that it was to be employed against the Christians of Castile.
He entrusted the command of it to one of his sons, who came and
encamped not far from Toledo. The young prince, with Amrous's
connivance, found a means of getting himself invited by the inhabi-
tants to honour the city with his presence. Once he had introduced
himself into the alegar with his soldiers, he announced that he pro-
posed to offer a great feast to the notabilities. They were admitted
into the fortress one by one as they presented themselves.
In the courtyard was a trench, still full of chalk or clay-mortar,
which had been used during the building operations. The Toledans
had to walk alongside this trench, and, as they passed it one after the
other, executioners posted on the spot decapitated them and threw
their bodies into the chalk or day-mortar. A
great number died in
this way: the Arab annalists declare that there were seven hundred
^
victims. Some, with their usual exaggeration, assert that there were
five thousand. This was what the annalists call "The Day of the
Ditch" (806).
This drastic measure of repression daunted not only the Toledans,
but also the Spaniards of Cordova. The clerical party of the faquis,
however, did not lay down its arms. Yahya returned to the capital
and continued to incite his students, as well as the renegades.
84
 THE DAY OF THE DITCH AND REVOLT OF THE SUBURB
Insurrection simmered for a considerable time. Finally, it broke
out in the month of May of the year 814. A soldier of the Caliphal
guard killed an armourer who had taken the liberty of keeping him
waiting to sharpen his sword for him, and the people rose especially
the population of artisans and theological students who lived in the
suburb of Secunda, on the left bank of the Guadalquivir, opposite the
bridge of Cordova.
The Caliph Hakam was in the greatest danger, but, having made
up his mind to burn the suburb, he finally succeeded, not without
difficulty, in quelling the insurrection. The repression was terrible
and merciless. Three hundred notabilities were crucified, head down-
wards, along the river opposite the bridge and the Great Mosque.
It must have been a frightful spectacle for the of the city.
people
These three hundred wretches writhing in the convulsions of a slow
agony ; these three hundred crosses aligned along the Guadalquivir
this surpassed in horror anything that they had hitherto seen in the
way of punishment. But that sinister spot which is called to-day
El Campo de la Verdad, "The Field of Truth," no doubt in testimony
to all the cruelties which stained it with blood that hideous bank
was to witness many others.
Hakam, in his fury, ordered that all the inhabitants of the suburb
should leave Spain within three days, and that the quarter where they
lived should be entirely destroyed. It appears that fifteen thousand
of them, after an exodus of great hardship across the Andalusian
sierra, embarked for Barbary and thence for Egypt. After living some
time in the suburbs of Alexandria they had to take refuge in Crete,
where they finally installed themselves.
Perhaps the Candiote Theotocopuli, known as El Greco, who was
the most Spanish of all the painters of the Renaissance and died at
Toledo, was a descendant of one of these Spaniards exiled by the
Musulmans. That would explain what it is fashionable to call "the
secret of El Greco."
Another group of eighteen thousand families, also expelled from
Cordova, went and established themselves in Fe2, where they con-
stituted the quarter of the Andalusians, which exists to this very day.
These Spaniards, sons of Christians, never completely fused with the
Musulman Arabs and Berbers, and they were undoubtedly a civili
sing influence in barbarous Morocco.
These mass expulsions aroused a violent hatred which lasted for
centuries. When the Christians in their turn expelled the Moors from
Spain, those Moors who were the sons of Berbers and Arabs, they
were only avenging their brother Spaniards driven from their
country by the Musulmans. There is no occasion to approve or
excuse either of them. But it is astonishing that historians, who
brand the expulsions ordered by the Catholic Sovereigns, should
apparently regard those which were ordered earlier by the Musulman
iphs as quite natural.
85
 THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
When Hakam I drove the Spanish renegades out of their father-
land, he was acting in obedience not only to political motives, but
also to religious motives. These renegades were Spaniards and
descendants of Christians. On both grounds they were incapable of
assimilation by the Arabs and the Berbers.
From the beginning of the Musulman conquest war between the
natives and the invaders had been more or less declared. It assumed
a more and more bitter 'character in the course of the ninth century.
From that period, one feels, one of the two peoples was bound to give
way completely to the other. The duel between the African and the
Spaniard, between the Christian and the Musulman that duel which
was to last seven centuries had begun.

86
 CHAPTER X

The Great Humiliation of the Christians

Christians of the interior were mastered. They had lost

their leadersand their principal centres of resistance. The
THE armies of the Caliph, the Arab and Berber chieftains, had
massacred them, burned them out and pillaged them to the best of
their ability. Thus decimated and humiliated, they nevertheless con-
tinued to exist, in a furtive and more or less precarious way of life,
among the Jews and the Musulmans.
Like the Jews, they had their ghetto in order to spare true believers
contact with their impure persons and also for reasons of prudence,
in order to avoid brawling and plundering. They retained their
counts, their special magistrates, their bishops, their metropolitans
often chosen by the government and suspect of treachery. More-
over, they were allowed to keep a certain number of churches. They
were cultivators, merchants, scribes, office employees, and soldiers.
Perhaps, on the whole, they did not think themselves too unfortu-
nate and did not in the least envy their co-religionists of the North,
free of Musulman domination, but subject to grasping and tyrannical
clergy and feudal lords.
The Christians of the North scarcely knew the meaning of repose,
security, or any of the amenities of life. They were continually at
war with their Musulman neighbours. It was the fatality of that
Arab conquest, a superficial and hasty conquest, never carried
through to the end, that it had divided the country into two irredu-
cible camps that of the replete, and that of the hungry those who
:
;

held the best soil, and those who were relegated to the mountains or
to desert plains.
Everything drove them to destroy one another famine, rapacity,
the mania for taking booty and cutting off heads, religious fanaticism
ot simply difference of belief, and, finally, the conviction among
those of the North that they were the real masters of the country,
and that they could not rest in peace so long as the invader was
encamped on their soil. On the one side and the other, there were
the same hatred and, after two centuries of oppression and carnage,
the same thirst for vengeance.

Towards the Christians of the North the attitude of the Caliphs

could not be anything but distrust and permanent hostility ; first,
because they were the natural allies of all rebels in the interior,
especially alone the Northern frontier the people of Toledo and
Saragossa ; and next because at the first opportunity, as soon as the
sultan was engaged in suppressing rebellion or repelling the Berbers
of Africa, the Leonese, the CastUians, the Navarrese, and the Aragon-
8?
 THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
ese hastened to invade Musulman territory and make raids there,
following the example of the Caliphal troops.
was necessary, therefore, to remain constantly on a war footing,
It
The sovereign of Cordova was hemmed in between the Musulmans
of Africa and the Christians of the Pyrenean regions. He had to dis-
arm or conciliate one in order to combat the other ; with the result
that, according to circumstances, the Berbers or the Christians were
sometimes the enemies and sometimes the allies of the Caliph. It was
true that he had the advantage over the Christians and the nomads
of Africa of being at the head of a unified kingdom though every-
thing was far from being tranquil in his provinces, which were so
often disturbed by racial or tribal rivalries whereas the Christians
of the North were split up into a number of little states, almost as
torn by internal strife as those of southern Spain afterwards became.
> There were at least three Christian States on the northern
frontier: the kingdom of Le6n, that of Navarre, and that of Aragon.
These were further divided into sub-kingdoms: Galicia, Asturias,
Castile, all more or less given over to feudal competition. Navarre
and Aragon were bordered to the East by the Countship of Bar-
celona, itself sub-divided into the countships of Cerdagne and Besalu.
Of all these little States, the kingdom of Le6n was, if not the most
important, at least the most national, if one may say so the one which
:

had best preserved the Visigoth and Roman traditions, and whose
head regarded himself as the representative and legitimate continuator
of the Spanish monarchy. From the reign of Alfonso III (866-910) the
Kings of Le6n assumed the title of Imperator, Basileus, or RJX magnus*
So the Imperial dignity was restored by this little Pyrenean king-
ling even before the Emir of Cordova thought of taking the title of
Commander of the Faithful. He was the Roman Emperor, the
Emperor of the West, as the sovereign who reigned at Byzantium
was the Emperor of the East. Theoretically he ruled over one-half
of Christendom. Over against the Sultan of Cordova, he was the
Commander of the Christians of the West,
Leon, his capital, was still the seat of the Roman "imperiun?\ as
at the period when it had been a fortified camp, occupied by the
Seventh Legion, the Gemina Pia Felix. It had preserved its walls and
the powerful defensive system constructed by the military genius of
Rome, which the Arabs, in Spain as in Africa, confined themselves
to keeping in repair or copying. Behind the towers and battlements
of the old Roman encampment the kingling could defy the Arab
cavalry or the Berber hordes and protect the booty taken in Musul-
man territory.
This citadel of Le6n was in the North the pendant of Bobastro in
the South. Is it not a significant fact that, on the one side as on the
other, for these Spaniards in revolt against Islam, the centre of re-
sistance, and the starting-point of the Reconquest, should have been
an old Roman fortress?
88
 THE GREAT HUMILIATION OF THE CHRISTIANS
Were these little Christian kingdoms as poverty-stricken, as
barbarous, as is generally believed? It is certain that these mountain-
ous regions of the North could not be compared, either in fertility,
or in wealth, or in degree of civilisation, with the more fortunate
regions of the East and South. It is certain, moreover, that for
centuries they were horribly overriden and devastated by the
Musulmans.
But Galicia at least,and all the Cantabrian littoral, were generally
spared
this devastation. Thanks to the pilgrimage to Santiago de
(Jompostela that is to say, from the second half of the ninth
century all this Pyrenean territory was in constant relations with
the rest of Christendom. Thousands of pilgrims maintained the
sense of Christian
strength
and solidarity there. They reinforced and
exalted the Christian faith there, and, at the same time, they brought
there, together with their offerings, the products of their. art and
architecture and the models of their popular poetry.
In the following century these great religious manifestations were
regularly organised. The Arab annalists themselves compare them
with the pilgrimages to Mecca. In their eyes the tomb of Saint James
had, for the Christians, the same importance and the same prestige as
the Kaaba for the Musulmans.
If the tomb of the Apostle was inferior to the tomb of Christ, it is
nevertheless true that Compostela rivalled Jerusalem in the number
of its visitors. They went there not only from France, Germany, and
all the countries of the North, but even from Ethiopia and Nubia.
The Copts of Egypt united with the Auvergnats of Murat and Saint
Flour to go and venerate the relics of the great Apostle, whom tradi-
tion represented to them in the guise of a celestial horseman leading
the forces of Christ against those of Islam. So the Church, by creat-
ing this twofold current of migration among the Christian masses,
taught them the way of struggle and resistance, by directing them
towards the two most menaced points of Christendom, namely
Spain and Asia Minor, Jerusalem and Santiago.
Compostela was a centre of both religious and martial faith. The
treasury of the Apostle was rich, as a result of the perpetual war
against the Musulmans. In accordance with "the vow of Saint
James," it received every year the first-fruits of the harvest and a
specified part of the booty taken in Musulman territory. The
churches and monasteries strung out aldng the route of the pilgrim-
age were bursting with offerings and wealth. This is attested, not
only by the ecclesiastical writers, who tell us of the treasures of the
Church "accumulated for centuries," but also by the Arab authors,
who frequently insist upon the rich booty taken by the troops of the
Caliph at the expense of the Christians.
In any case, when they report these expeditions into Christian
territory, they do not give us the impression of entering barbarous
countries. Abd er Rhaman the Great, having led an expedition
89
 THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
against Aragon, defeated King Ordofio and his ally, Sancho of
Navarre, and then took possession of the fortress of Muez, which
was pillaged by his soldiers.
"In this fortress/' writes Ibn Adhari, "and in the Christian camp,
which was close at hand, were found in innumerable quantity
merchandise, tents, jewels artistically cuty vases ..." In other words,
the Musulmans found there precious stuffs, tents sumptuously
decorated like their own, and all kinds of jewellery. Later, when the
Musulmans penetrated for the first time into Compostela, the same
annalist, relating the sack of the holy city, is careful to note that "fine
palaces, solidly constructed, were reduced to dust."
This solidity of Roman construction always struck the Arabs,
accustomed as they were to their own buildings of brick or mud-
plaster. This architecture, made to last, secretly aroused their admira-
tion, at the same time as their jealousy. What these "fine palaces" of
Compostela may have been we cannot attempt to guess ^probably
remains of the Roman or Visigoth period. Let us be careful not to
exaggerate such splendours, which must have been rare and, in the
way of amenity, luxury and adornment, could not have rivalled the
palaces and the kiosks of the Cordovan Medina az Zahara. Neverthe-
less, about the same time as the taking of Compostela, an envoy of
El Mansour who was touring Biscay with Garcia, the lord of the
district, mentions, apart from the churches, "the pleasure pavilions"
which he was taken to visit.

Be that as it may, life cannot have been very gay, or very easy,
in the Biscay and the Cantabria of that time, least of all for the
peasant and the man-at-arms, who were ceaselessly on the alert.
Towards these little Christian kingdoms the tactics of the Emirs
and of the Caliphs of Cordova remained immutable throughout the
three centuries of their domination. Their watchword was to limit
themselves to the conquests of Tarik and Mousa, and above all to
make no further attempt to cross the Pyrenees and penetrate among;
the Franks, into that vague region, full of terrors, which they called
"the Great Land." They had long memories of the battle of loitiers
and the stout barons of Charles Martel.
But, far indeed from adventuring beyond the Pyrenees, they even
seemed decided not to go beyond the course of the Ebro and the
Duero. They interposed a desert between themselves and the
Christians, and made a waste of the region which lay on the left bank
of the latter river. This was what they called "the Great Desert."
When Abd er Rhaman wanted to transport his army from Clunia to
Tudela, it took him five days to cross a part of it. All those great
plains which lie between Salamanca and the Sierra de Guardarrama
were as bare as the steppes of the North of Africa.
,,
To keep the Christians in their place it did not suffice to surround
them with a zone of famine and devastation. It was necessary also
90
 THE GREAT HUMILIATION OF THE CHRISTIANS
to
go and saw terror and massacre among them. Twice a year, in
spring and autumn, an army sallied forth from Cordova to go and
raid the Christians, destroy their villages, their fortified posts, their
monasteries and their churches, except when it was a question of
expeditions of larger scope, involving sieges and pitched battles.
In cases of simply punitive expeditions, the soldiers of the Caliph
confined themselves to destroying harvests and cutting down
trees.
Most of the time they took the field to win booty. A
district was
allowed to repeople itself and be brought under cultivation ; then it
was suddenly fallen upon. Workers, harvesters, fruits and cattle
were seized. It was a process of revictualling in Christian territory.
As the Caliph Omar said, one "ate up the Christian," while waiting
to be eaten up by him. The contemporaries of the Cid who went to
eat and seek adventure at the expense of the Moors were following
the example of the Moors themselves, who for centuries had eaten
at the expense of the Christians.
If one bears in mind that this
brigandage was almost continual,
and that this fury of destruction and extermination was regarded as a
work of piety it was a holy war against the infidels it is not sur-
prising that whole regions of Spain should have been made irremedi-
ably sterile. This was one of the capital causes of the deforestation
from which the Peninsula still suffers.
With what savage satisfaction and in what pious accents do the
Arab annalists tell us of those at least bi-annual raids A typical
1

for the devotion of a Caliph is this: "he penetrated

phrase praising
into Christian territory, where he wrought devastation, devoted him-
self to pillage, and took prisoners. After that he brought the Musul-
mans back to Cordova safe and sound and laden with booty." Abd
er Rhaman, in the course of a campaign in Navarre, "did not fail,
whenever a Christian retreat was to oe found in the neighbourhood,
to carry destruction there and deliver the surrounding country-
side to incendiarism, so that the Christian territory was ravaged by
the flames to an extent often
square miles."
The same Caliph, when he laid siege to Toledo, began by destroy-
ing everything in the rich plain which surrounded the town. "He
commenced by doing the rebels unimaginable harm. He remained*
therefor thirty-seven days without ceasing his devastation> cutting down the
trees, pillaging and ruining the villages, destroying all the crops."
And again: "the strongholds of this region were reduced to ruins.
Not one stone was left upon another. . The suburbs were sur-
. ,

rendered to the flames, the harvests and all the property in the neigh-
bourhood were utterly ravaged and laid waste."
They did not content themselves with pillaging and devastating
their own
only Christian territory. They did the same thing in
territory, where brigandage, revolts, and civil war were an endemic
condition. Abd er Rhaman put to fire and sword a whole district of
91
 THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
Andalusia to starve out the rebels whom he was besieging. When he
went to besiege Bobastro, "he cut down the fruit trees that still
existed in the mountains." The next year he began over again: "he
finished cutting down what remained of the fruit trees and the vines,
and laying waste all the subsistence of the enemy. He spent seven
whole days in destroying and ravaging everything without mercy, and he acted
in the same way towards other fortresses of the rebels/'
At the sarne time as they were devastated, whole regions were de-
populated. The vanquished, the men in a condition to bear arms,
were massacred pitilessly. Their heads were cut off: that was the
great joy triumph over the infidels in all its purity. To show that a
good job had been made of it, these heads were stuffed into sacks or
baskets and sent to Cordova to be exposed at the bridge-head or on
the battlements of the Alcdzar. Some were even dispatched to the
cities of the African Moghreb for the purpose of "showing off."
But the really lucrative part of the operation was the booty and the
sale of slaves. Thousands of women and children, whole popula-
tions, were sold by auction. Massacre, like slavery, did not threaten
only the Christians. The Musulman population of Andalusia, as we
have seen, was decimated in the same way.
How can one be surprised, after that, at the depopulation of Spain,
above all when it is remembered that the Christians devoted them-
'selves to similar extermination, as soon as they got the chance? Eye
for eye, tooth for tooth they replied to carnage with carnage, to
executions with executions. Ordofio II, King of Leon, had the head
of a Musulman general nailed to the walls of the castle of Saint
Etienne de Gormaz, side by side with a boar's head* In both camps
they spoke of each other mutually as "dogs" and "sons of dogs."
They had nothing for which to reproach one another in the way of
ferocity and destructive barbarism.
The prolonged presence of the Musulmans, therefore, was a
calamity for this unhappy country of Spain. By their system of con-
tinual raids they kept her for centuries in a condition of brigandage
and devastation. It was a state similar to, though much less lament-
able than, that in which the French found Algeria when they arrived
there in 1830. Northern Africa did not number two millions of in-
habitants. It was the same thing in Spain. From the period of the
Caliphs she had to be ceaselessly repeopled, either by slaves or serfs
brought from the northern provinces, or by Berber immigrants.
What deceives us at a distance is the relative prosperity of certain
great commercial and maritime towns, such as Seville or Mdlaga, or
of a capital like Cordova, which was surrounded by a fertile country-
side and was, moreover, protected against incursions and devasta-
tion by the presence of the Caliph and his armies. We forget also
that in Musulman countries the greatest
poverty often exists side by
side with the greatest luxury and
opulence. Somebody said of the
Spaniards of the end of the eighteenth century "they die of hunger
:

92
 THE GREAi* HUMILIATION OF THE CHRISTIANS
beside Madonnas clustered with diamonds." That was equally true
of Musulman Spain.
But not only did the Arabs make a desert there and introduce
drought and sterility by their deforestation. What was worse was
that they brought with them there, and maintained by their example,
unpolished manners, cruelty in repression, in short, brutal and blood-
thirsty habits of which the Spaniards were to have great difficulty'
in ridding themselves. Above all, by their atrocities they aroused
among the vanquished an appetite for reprisals, a thirst for ven-
geance, of which they were later to be the victims,

Let us think of it for a moment two expeditions a year a per-

;

petual holy war against the Christians It must have been frightful.
!

The greatest praise which the biographers of El Mansour bestow

upon him is this: "he made war, summer and winter, against the

Among these expeditions there were some especially famous ones,

which excited profound emotion both in the whole of Christendom
and throughout the Musulman world: for example, that of Abd er
Rhaman against Navarre, and that of El Mansour against Galicia.'
The campaign against Pampeluna, in April 924, seems to have
been provoked by the incursions of the Leonese and Navarrese. In
the preceding years Ordofio II, King of Leon, had carried his raids
as far as the neighbourhood of Cordova. A little later Sancho of
Navarre took two fortresses on the Musulman frontier: Majera and
Viguera. The taking of the latter especially was bitterly resented by
the Moors. Then the Caliph swore that he would go and punish his
imprudent aggressors. In the early days of spring he left Cordova
at the head of his army, announcing that he was going "to avenge
Allah and religion upon the impure race of miscreants."
After a feint towards Murcia and Valencia, he reached Toledo,
destroyed a number of strongholds which belonged to the King of
Navarre, and penetrated deep into Christian territory, spreading
terror and desolation everywhere. By this means he succeeded in
advancing as far as Pampeluna, which was abandoned by its inhabi-
tants and emptied of everything it contained in the way of wealth
and precious objects.
"The Prince in person entered it," says Ibn Adhari, "and, after-
going through it, gave the order to destroy all the houses and reduce
to ruins the Christian church which stood there and served as a
temple to the Infidels for the accomplishment of their religious
practices. Not one stone of it was left upon another. Thence he
transported himself to a place where stood a church built by the
Christian prince, who had lavished his care upon it and delighted for
a long time to adorn it and assure its defence.
"Our troops had arrived and were beginning to reduce it to ruins
when this dog of an infidel appeared on a mountain which dominated
93
 THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
the with the intention of defending it. But the servants of God,
site,
quicker than the twinkling of an eye, pursued him and forced him
and his to show their heels. The church and the buildings that sur-
rounded it were reduced to ruins, and the village became the prey
of the flames."
After a whole series of burnings, destruction, and skirmishing of
this kind, the Caliph made his entrance into Cordova in the month
of August of the same year. The punitive expedition had lasted no
less than four months. The Musulmans had penetrated into Christian
territory much farther than they had ever done before. The worst
feature, which especially dismayed the Navarrese and their neigh-
bours, was the destruction of Pampeluna and its cathedral, not to
speak of that other church, enriched and embellished by the King of
Navarre, which seems to have been one of the principal sanctuaries
of the region.
This pitiless proceeding made a great impression in the Pyrenean
region and probably beyond. But, in these shadowed years approach-
ing the year 1000, what most struck terror into Christendom was the
sack of Santiago de Compostela by the armies of El Mansour. In
Musulman annals also this expedition remained famous under the
name of the "Campaign of San Yacoub."
The pretest for it was the refusal of King Bermudo II of Galicia
to pay the tribute to which he was subject in accordance with a recent
convention. The dictator left Cordova on July 3, 997, and invaded
Galicia by way of Coria and Viseu. He was supported by a fleet
which hugged the Atlantic coast, and at Viseu he found nis army
reinforced by the contingents of a certain number of Christian
counts who recognised his authority.
The campaign appears to have been especially arduous owing to
the difficulty which he had in forcing a way for himself through a
mountainous region, traversed by rivers, water-courses, and arms
of the sea. The Christians, following tactics which had become
habitual to them, retired before the invader, leading him after them
into defiled and desert districts.
Finally El Mansour, after having burned the highly venerated
sanctuary of El Padr6n, arrived with his troops at the walls of "the
proud city of Saint James." It had been abandoned by its inhabitants,
as in the case of Pampeluna at the time of Abd er Rhaman's campaign.
The Caliphal army pillaged everything it could carry away, and the
town was completely destroyed, inducting the church, "of which not
a trace remained."
Nevertheless El Mansour, as a good Musulman, respectful to-
wards a disciple of the Prophet Alssa, mounted a guard of soldiers
over the tomb of Saint James, which was thus spared. An old monk,
it
appears, was found sitting beside the sepulchre. Alone out of all
the population that had taken to flight, he had regarded it as his duty
not to abandon the relics of the great protector of Spain. The
94
 THE GREAT HUMILIATION OF THE CHRISTIANS
dictator asked him why he had stayed there, "To honour Saint
James," he said simply. El Mansour ordered that he should be
allowed to pray in peace, and so the old monk's life was spared.
El Mansour acted throughout this aflair as a perfect Musulman.
At the outset, in order to win the support of the Christian counts
of the Portuguese marches, he gave them to understand that he had
come solely tor the purpose of punishing a rebel vassal, in the person
of King Bermudo. In accordance with feudal custom, the counts
who recognised him as their suzerain were in this case under an
obligation to assist their lord.
But what was at the back of El Mansour's mind was in fact to
inflict a deep humiliation on the Christians by laying waste one of
their greatest centres of pilgrimage. It was to this end that he
destroyed everything that was specifically Christian: basilicas,
oratories, sanctuaries, and monasteries. He respected only what was
honoured by Islam itself namely, the tomb of a marabout who was
a disciple of Ai'ssa, and the man of prayer who watched over that
tomb.
Apart from this homage paid only indirectly to the religion of
Christ, he did everything he could to give his triumph over the
Infidels the appearance of a definitive victory. When he returned to
Cordova, the Musulmans saw filing through the streets a throng of
Christian prisoners, carrying on their shoulders the bells of Saint
James's and the doors of his basilica. These doors, no doubt wrought
and carved, were placed in the Great Mosque ; and the bells, we are
told, were turned into lamp-holders. Together with these trophies,
the thousands of prisoners, who were employed on the work of
extending the mosque, attested in the eyes of the faithful the irremedi-
able defeat of the enemies of Islam.

For the Christians it was a without precedent. An

disaster
ecclesiastical writer, the monk de
Silos, writes in his chronicle:
"Divine worship was annihilated in Spain. The glory of the servants
of Christ was utterly abased. The treasures of tne Church, amassed
in the course of centuries, were all pillaged."
There is here an obvious exaggeration. "Divine worship" was
not annihilated throughout Spain, despite the sack of Santiago and.
that of the cathedral of Pampeluna. But it is true that never had
Christendoni been more humiliated, and that never had the Pyrenean
kinglings, driven back into their mountains, found themselves in a
more sorry situation. Nevertheless, despite all reverses and devasta-
tions, despite their ridiculous divisions in the face of the common'*
enemy, salvation was to come to them from the fact which was
momentarily their weakness the fact that they were Spaniards and
:

Christians.
In the first place, as ever, the Caliph did not knowhow to profit
by his advantage. With their ineradicable nomadic habits, the Arabs
95
 THE AWAKENING OF NATIONAL AND CHRISTIAN SPIRIT
were incapable of anything but pillage and destruction. They had
no plans of conquest they took no broad view of the situation as a
;

whole. In the next place, the Arab theocracy was never anything
more than encamped in any territory. It was a religious society, not
attached to the soil, striking no deep roots.
On the other hand, over against the Caliph, the little King of
Leon and Castile represented what was most profoundly Spanish.
Despite all feudal rivalries, all divisions and all the narrownesses of
the particularist spirit, the racial instinct, allied with the unifying
tendencies of the old Visigoth monarchy, ended by gaining the upper
hand. Moreover, behind the kings, the barons, and the micfdle
classes were the monks the inspirers and leaders of Crusades, who
:

simply could not rest so long as the followers of Christ had not
regained the mastery over those of Islam.
The monarchical idea, the Christian idea, merging in the idea of
the Fatherland, was to end by expelling from Spanish soil the in-
vaders who had trampled it underfoot and harrowed it for so long.
 IV
THE REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND
THE ALMOHADES
 CHAPTER XI

The End of the Caliphate and the Little Musulman Kingdoms

MANSOUR, the usurper of the Caliphate, died in 1002 at Medina

EL Cell, in thecourse of a further expedition against Castile: a fact

which once more proves the fleeting effects of the Musulman
victories and the uselessness, from the political point of view, of
these biannual campaigns against the Christians.
Hisham II, the legitimate caliph whom he had set aside, was still
alive* The sons of the usurper had to fight against his partisans ro
maintain themselves in power. But they were no better able than
their father to establish an enduring regime. After terrible struggles,
in which the old enemies took one another's measure once more
Arabs against Berbers, renegades and Christians against the central
government and against the Musulmans the Caliphate, which had
ceased to serve any purpose, ended by collapsing. In 103 1 the viziers
declared it abolished, and Cordova became a republic.
Then the provinces broke the links which bound them to Jie
capital. The Arab monarchy fell to pieces, and gave place to a
swarm of little independent States, regular Hngdoms in themselves >
of which the most important were those of Seville, Granada, Almerla,
Badajoz, Valencia, and Saragossa. The Berbers were dominant in
the South, the "Slavs" in the East, the Arabs in the South-west, and
the renegades and Christians in the North of the Peninsula.
Thus, through the fault of the Arabs and Africans, as a resuk of
their spirit of'sof," of rivalry and bickering, in short, their unbridled
individualism, Spanish unity was more than ever compromised.
There was no longer a great Musulman monarchy to act as a model
and a stimulus to the Christian kingdoms of the North. The
Arab anarchy could not fail to encourage them in their feudal
anarchy.
This confusion was to last for centuries, despite the efforts made

by certain Spanish sovereigns to re-establish a precarious unity.

This was a great source of weakness to Spain. But, while she lost
in power and political importance, perhaps she gained from it in
culture, if not in civilisation. Between the death of El Mansour and
the invasions of the Almoravids and the Almohades there was a
period of about a century, during which the Arabs became almost
completely Hispanised, their fanaticism waned, and they appeared to be
won over to the ideal of luxurious and intellectual life, it was some-
thing like the Italy of the ppdestas and the little municipal republics.
These Musulman kinglin^s, softened by all the charms of the
climate, lost their warrior virtues. So did their Arab and African
soldiers. More and more, in order to defend themselves, they were

obliged to appeal to Christian auxiliaries. The profession of con-

99
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
dottkrc in Islamic territory became a means of existence for a swarm
of Castilians, Basques, Navarrese, Aragonese, and Catalans.
The sovereigns whom they protected were in general dominated
by their viziers, regular "mayors of the palace,*' ambitious intriguers
who ended by making themselves omnipotent and often shared the
luxurious and studious tastes of their masters. Among them may be
mentioned Ibn Abbas, the vizier of Almeria, who was a great glutton
for money and a petty tyrant, but had a palace on a princely scale
built for him ; maintained five hundred singers in his harem ; assem-
bled a library containing thousands of volumes in rich bindings ; and
was a highly educated man who knew how to draft documents in
the best diplomatic style and had the reputation of a master of the
art of letter-writing.

Side^by side with these all-powerful Ministers, however, there

were some strong sovereigns, men of character, even if somewhat
violent character, who were capable of commanding respect and
making their will prevail. Among these princelings there stand out
some figures who are worth studying a little more closely, if we
desire to form an idea of Musulman Spain at this period. Musulman
Spain showed more than one face. That with which we are now con-
cerned differed noticeably from that of the Spain of the Caliphs.

The two most important one can scarcely say the most powerful
of these sovereigns appear to have been the princes of
little
Granada and of Seville. These two capitals were in rivalry. Seville
was Arab, Granada was Berber. El Mansour, although of Arab
origin, had planted Berbers everywhere to maintain his tyranny as
usurper and dictator. As a result he had bitterly incensed the Arabs
and the Spaniards. It was their common interest to get rid of these
foreigners and throw these African barbarians back across the Strait.
The two hostile factions ended by finding two leaders equally
implacable one against the other, in the persons of Badis, prince of
Granada, and Motadid, prince of Seville.
They were two really extraordinary types. The first, Badis, was a
bloodthirsty brute, the nomad of Africa in all his savage crudeness,
a Berber without culture, speaking Arabic badly and glorying in his
ignorance and roughness, and, along with that,
a drunkard and a
violent sensualist. Nevertheless he had been born in Spain and
grown up in an atmosphere of opulence, and, indeed, on the steps of
the throne. His father, Habous, was Sovereign Prince of Granada,
which he fortified and surrounded with walls.
Badis himself constructed an alcazar of which the Arab authors
',

vaunt the magnificence. There he lived like a vulgar parvenu, sur-

rendering power to a Jew, by the name of Samuel, who had dazzled
him by his glibness of tongue and his knowledge of literary Arabic.
The drunken Badis left his orgies only to put himself at the head of
his troops and cut off heads ; for he had at least physical courage.
100
 END OF CALIPHATE AND LITTLE MUSULMAN KINGDOMS
Carried away by his attacks of blind rage and brutal cruelty, he often
filledthe office of executioner himself, and did his stabbing and
beheading in person.
Very different was Motadid, his rival of Seville, though they re-
sembled one another in their cruelty, their viciousness, and their
drunkenness. In despite of the prescriptions of the Koran, Motadid
of Seville was as fond of wine as the Berber of Granada. He spent
days and nights together drinking with his companions in debauchery
and his favourites. His harem was one of the best supplied of all
Spain eight hundred girls, we are told, entered it in the course of his
reign.
Naturally this lover of licence was a man of refined cruelty. Fol-
lowing the example of one of the last Caliphs of Cordova, he had
flowers planted in the skulls of his enemies and adorned his terraces
with these macabre pots. In order to refresh and nurture his hatreds,
a label attached to each of these improvised flower-pots recalled the
name of the decapitated. The skulls of conquered princes were
treated with more consideration. The tyrant of Seville kept them in
caskets like precious stones, and took them out from time to time
to feast his eyes on them.
All this went comfortably hand-in-hand with a certain dilettantism.
Like all Arabs, like any man in the street, Motadid composed verses.
He had strings of poets in his pay and, by contrast with his rival,
Badis of Granada, he fine language and fine
prided himself upon
style and turned his skill in letters to account. A diplomat and an
arm-chair strategist, he scarcely ever appeared at the head of his
armies. A man of guile and calculation, who never shrank from any
treachery or any atrocity, he was the politician of his time in all its
perfection.
Through divers traits in his character he maintained relationship
with the rough conquerors of the early period, as he did with the
Emirs and the Caliphs of Cordova. His son, Motamid, presents a
newer and more varied psychology. He was a new type in. Musul-
man Spain: the type of Arab refashioned by climate, by environment,
by Spanish and Christian heredity. He requires to be studied in more
detail, along with his friend Ben Ammar, who was also a striking and
singularly representative personality.

In the life of Motamid there were, in the first place, a passionate

friendship and a love story which invest him at once with a certain
air of romantic poetry. When he was very young he was barely
twelve years of age his father appointed him governor of Silves,
capital of the province of Algarve. This province is one of the most
picturesque in Portugal, and Silves, in the eyes of the Musulmans of
that time, was regarded as a place of delight and enchantment. There
the boy fell completely under the influence of a local poet, con-
siderably older than himself, one Ben Ammar, an adventurer somewhat
101
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
dubious, somewhat murky, somewhat shifty, but infinitely attract-
ive.
This individual, though of low enough extraction, had neverthe-
less received a certain amount of education. He had studied first in
Silves, his native town, and afterwards at Cordova. Then, as he had
a real talent as a poet, he started wandering about Spain, peddling his
verses in the best market. Poets at that time were paid
panegyrists
and polemists, or even newsmongers, filling something like the role
of publicists to-day.
But Ben Ammar, badly served by his poor appearance and his
beggarly attire, had no success with the powerful and highly-placed.
Tked of a life of poverty, he decided to return to Silves, hoping that
his compatriots would appreciate his talents better. He arrived there
in the greatest destitution, having for all his belongings only the mule
which served him as a mount. He had not even anything with which
to feed it.

In his distress he remembered a rich merchant of the town who

might be ready to help him out of his difficulties. He addressed to
him a dithyrambic poem, in which, while flattering the merchant's
vanity, he described the sad case of himself and his mount. The
merchant, who liked his joke, confined himself to sending him a sack
of barley for his mule.
It was in these circumstances that he made the acquaintance of the
young prince Motamid. To what charm was it that he surrendered
as soon as he saw. Ben Ammar. It is certain that poetry a
played
great part in their relationship. Motamid, even more than his father,
had literary pretensions. The verses of the poet of Silves captivated
him to such a point that he appointed him nis vifcier and made him
his favourite.
The friendship was a tyrannical one. Henceforth Motamid could
not do without his new friend. Yet this extreme favour was not with-
out its disquieting side for Ben Ammar. Perhaps he realised betimes
that one had to reckon with the inconstancy or the great. One night,
when Motamid had kept him with him, he dreamt that he heard a
voice which said to him: "Unhappy man, Motamid will be your
murdererl"
It was a prophetic dream, which frightened the favourite to such
an extent that hegot up at dead of night and tried to escape from the
in vain. Tne next day the two friends had an explanation, and
palace,
Motamid lavished such words of affection on his poet and gave him
such proofs of his attachment that everything was forgotten.
Their life of pleasure and intimacy went on with nothing to mar it.
When Motamid returned to Seville, Ben Ammar accompanied him.
He was the confidant of his love-af&irs. One day, during a popular
ftte on the banks of the Guadalquivir at a place which was called the
Meadow of Silver, the two friends, duly disguised and mingling with
the crowd, 'were amusing themselves by improvising verses, as the
102
 END OF CALIPHATE AND LITTLE MUSULMAN KINGDOMS
Seyillians
do to this very day, and exchanging saetas. Motamid spoke
a line ; Ben Ammar, taken by surprise, was at a loss hoy to cap it,
when a girl immediately provided the reply to the disguised prince.
It was the famous Romaiquia, who was to become Motamid's
mistress and soon rank as his wife and his regular consort.
Who was this Romaiquia, around whom the Christians themselves
wove a legend? Was she one of them? It is very likely, given the
fact that she was a slave and that she followed a profession quite un-
known among Musulman women: she called herself a mule-driver.
which in Spain has always been at home with poetry.
It is a profession
This plebeian and brazen creature therefore possessed enough natural
genius to shine in the midst of fine wits. She appears, moreover, to
have possessed all the charm and all the coquetry necessary to turn
the head of a lover like Motamid.
The Infante Juan Manuel, in his curious book Comt I~,$canor> tells
a story about her which is as charming as it is poetical. Are we to see
in it merely an imaginary piece of Spanish gallantry? It is quite
possible ; but the contrary is also possilble.
The Infante tells us that one winter clay, when she was at Cordova
with Motamid, the beautiful Romaiquia, looking out of a window
of the palace, marvelled at an extraordinary spectacle hitherto un-
known to her: the Cordovan plain all white with snow. It seemed to
her so lovely that she asked her husband to repeat this prodigy for
her. She wanted to have snow before her eyes and go to countries
which enjoy the privilege of this divine whiteness. To satisfy his
sultana's caprice, Motamid had almond-trees planted in the plain of
Cordova. So every year, when the winter was over, he was able to
show her the Andalusian countryside covered with a white shroud
of snowy blossom.
Onanother occasion the whimsical Romaiquia, seeing some
women of the people trampling with their bare feet tihe red day out
of which bricks were made, declared that she was dying with desire
to imitate these women. Motamid ordered all kinds of spices and
aromatics to be poured out in the palace courtyard and mixed with
rose-water, so that the courtyard became a regular perfume-vat.
Then he invited Romaiquia and her women to come and trample
with their bare feet in this perfumed paste.

Meanwhile, despite the sinister prediction, Motamid's friendship

forBen Ammar in no way diminished. Their intimacy, indeed, be-
came so close that the prince's father, that terrible cutter-off of heads
Motadid, took offence at it and perhaps became frightened of it. He
exiled his son's confidant, who had to take refuge at the court of
Saragossa.
But the old tyrant was no sooner dead than Motamid hastened to
recall his friend and appoint him governor of Algarve. The poor
boy of Silves, who had once had to beg a sack of barley for his
103
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
mount, returned to his native town with all the trappings of a
sovereign. He did not stay there long. His master, who could not
do without him, soon recalled him to Seville and made him his prime
minister.
It was, no doubt, at his that Motamid undertook an
instigation
expedition against Cordova, which he finally succeeded in seizing,
after alternating reverses and successes, and after crucifying the
leader of the resistance to him. Even at the Alc&zar of Seville life
could not be a perpetual pleasure-party. Surrounded by fierce
enemies and competitors, these Moorish kinglings, lovers of enjoy-
ment though they might be, were compelled to concern themselves
with serious affairs.
Doubtless was also on Ben Ammar's advice that Motamjd under-
it
took* another expedition against Murcia. The prime minister was
certainly an ambitious man, and besides, despite all his protestations
of affection, he was afraid of his master. To put himself out of reach
of his anger and treachery, it is extremely probable that he sought to
possess himself of a principality where he could make himself in-
dependent. In any case, once master of Murcia, installed in the town
and with all the resources of the province at his disposal, he severed
relations with his sovereign, to such a point that Motamid, egged
on by his counsellors, regarded him as a traitor and a rebel.
Ben Ammar, fearing the worst in the way of revenge from the
friend whom he had deceived, fled to Saragossa. The crowned poet
and his former favourite mutually loaded one another with epigrams
in verse and satirical pieces, until the day came when Ben Ammar,
betrayed by his allies, finally fell into the hands of the tyrant of
Seville.
He was put in irons and spent some time in prison. But, poet as he
stillwas, he contrived to soften Motamid by his flattery, by his invo-
cation of the past, and by all the artifices of his prosody. There was a
kind of reconciliation between them. In the end the prince, exasper-
ated by an imprudent boast on the of the prisoner, seized an axe
part
and pursued him up the palace stairs to his room. There it was in
vain that the unhappy Ben Ammar threw himself at his feet, once
more appealing to their past friendship. Motamid, brandishing his
axe, nerved himself to strike him until the cotpse lay in a pool of
blood. Perhaps the prince had just left his singers and was drunken
with wine.

Such was what they were. Soft living did not destroy the in-
stinctive savagery which they brought with them from Africa and
Asia. They were rhetoricians of decadence. Their rhetoric masked
the persistence in them of the old barbarian strain. They were blood-
thirsty, readily cruel, and atrocious in their cruelty, drunkards, and
sensualists. They were prodigal, but they were also greedy and
miserly,- and they became so more and more. The hunt for gold
104
 END OF CALIPHATE AND LITTLE MUSULMAN KINGDOMS
became the main object of all their raids. They were to communicate
this lust for gold to the Spaniards, who were to intoxicate themselves
with it to the
point
of madness, of launching themselves into the
wildest enterprises to satisfy their rapacity.
But they had also the qualities of their vices. These voluptuaries
were more intellectual than their predecessors. If they lost their
warrior virtues, they became wily diplomats and sometimes clever
politicians. The fanaticism of their ancestral faith weakened in them.
Without being sceptics, they practised a less rigid and perhaps more
human religion. They displayed a laxity of morality and observance
which scandalised the puritans of Islam.
Bastardised by mixture of blood, corrupted by the delights of
Andalusian life, captives of that only too charming soil, they were in
of forgetting their fatherland, their ancestors, their religion
process
itself. Like the last Visigoth kings, who preceded them in the Penin-
sula, they were ripe for a new invasion.

105
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
mount, returned to his native town with all the trappings of a
sovereign. He did not stay there long. His master, who could not
do without him, soon recalled him to Seville and made him his prime
minister.
It was, no doubt, at his that Motamid undertook an
instigation
expedition against Cordova, which he finally succeeded in seizing,
after alternating reverses and successes, and after crucifying the
leader of the resistance to him. Even at the Ald&ar of Seville life
could not be a perpetual pleasure-party. Surrounded by fierce
enemies and competitors, these Moorish kinglings, lovers of enjoy-
ment though they might be, were compelled to concern themselves
with serious affairs.
Doubtless was also on Ben Ammar's advice that Motamid under-
it
took* another expedition against Murcia. The prime minister was
certainly an ambitious man, and besides, despite all his protestations
of affection, he was afraid of his master. To put himselt out of reach
of his anger and treachery, it is extremely probable that he sought to
possess himself of a principality where he could make himself in-
dependent. In any case, once master of Murcia, installed in the town
and with all the resources of the province at his disposal, he severed
relations with his sovereign, to such a point that Motamid, egged
on by his counsellors, regarded him as a traitor and a rebel.
Ben Ammar, fearing the worst in the way of revenge from the
friend whom he had deceived, fled to Saragossa. The crowned poet
and his former favourite mutually loaded one another with epigrams
in verse and satirical pieces, until the day came when Ben Ammar,
betrayed by his allies, finally fell into the hands of the tyrant of
Seville.
He was put in irons and spent some time in prison. But, poet as he
was, he contrived to soften Motamid by his flattery, by his invo-
still
cation of the past, and by all the artifices of his prosody. There was a
kind of reconciliation between them. In the end the prince, exasper-
ated by an imprudent boast on the of the prisoner, seized an axe
part
and pursued him up the palace stairs to his room. There it was in
vain that the unhappy Ben Ammar threw himself at his feet, once
more appealing to their past friendship. Motamid, brandishing his
axe, nerved himself to strike him until the corpse lay in a pool of
blood. Perhaps the prince had just left his singers and was drunken
with wine.

Such was what they were. Soft did not destroy the in-
living
stinctive savagery which they brought with them from Africa and
Ask. They were rhetoricians of decadence. Their rhetoric masked
the persistence in them of the old barbarian strain. They were blood-
thirsty, readily cruel, and atrocious in their cruelty, drunkards, and
sensualists. They were prodigal, but they were also greedy and
miserly,- and they became so more and more. The hunt for gold
104
 END OF CALIPHATE AND LITTLE MUSULMAN KINGDOMS
became the main object of all their raids. They were to communicate
gold to the Spaniards, who were to intoxicate themselves
this lust for ,

with it to the point of madness, of launching themselves into the

wildest enterprises to satisfy their rapacity.
But they had also the qualities of their vices. These voluptuaries
were more intellectual than their predecessors. If they lost their
warrior virtues, they became wily diplomats and sometimes clever
politicians. The fanaticism of their ancestral faith weakened in them.
Without being sceptics, they practised a less rigid and perhaps more
human religion. They displayed a laxity of morality and observance
which scandalised the puritans of Islam.
Bastardised by mixture of blood, corrupted by the delights of
Andalusian life, captives of that only too charming soil, they were in
of forgetting their fatherland, their ancestors, their religion
process
itself. Like the last Visigoth kings, who preceded them in the Penin-
sula, they were ripe for a new invasion.

IOJ
 CHAPTER XII

The Advance of Ferdinand and Alfonso

fact, as early as that second half of the eleventh century Spanish

Islam was in a very awkward position. While Motamid and Ben
IN Ammar were amusing themselves by rhyming erotic poems, and
spending their nights in drinking or listening to the story-telling of
Romaiquia and the singers of the harem, the Christians were en-
camped on the frontier and threatening the gates of Seville.
Tneir advance became so menacing that one is driven to ask why
they did not press it to the end, and why Spain had to wait another
four centuries for her definitive liberation. In any case, from this
period the military superiority of the Christians over the Musulmans
of Spain asserted itself in a striking and unquestionable way.
Ferdinand I, King of Galicia and Castile, reconquered extensive
Portuguese territory from the Prince of Badajoz. He made incursions
into the domains of the King of Saragossa, and recovered from him
a certain number of fortresses south of the Duero. Mamoun, King
of Toledo, became his vassal. So did Motadid, King of Seville, who
came to his camp in person to implore his clemency. Finally he led
an expedition against the kingdom of Valencia. The city was in a
critical situationwhen illness compelled Ferdinand to raise the siege.
His son, Alfonso VI, took up the struggle with renewed vigour
and bitterness. He .knew the Musulmans wen. Driven by his brother
to go into exile at Toledo, he offered his services to Mamoun. Living
on the spot, he had leisure to observe the weak points of the defence
and study the character of his host, as well as those of the Toledans
and the principal personages of the court.
No sooner had he assumed power than he laid hands on the weak
Cadir, son of Mamoun, his former protector, who, like his father,
remained tributary to the Kings or Castile and Leon. To satisfy
Alfonso's demands, Cadir had to impose extraordinary taxes. These
aroused protests from his subjects, who finally revolted and demanded
aid from the Musulman prince of Badajoz. Under pretext of defend-
ing Cadir, his ally, Alfonso proceeded to lay siege to Toledo. He
ended by compelling it to surrender and restoring Cadir.
But, by way of payment for this service, he exacted obviously
with intention such an exorbitant price that the unhappy prince
preferred to abandon his kingdom, in return for an almost illusory
compensation, Cadir signed a capitulation by whose terms he ceded
the city of Toledo and its territories to Alfonso, Emperor of the
Christians.
The lives of the Musulmans were to be respected. The Christians
took them and their property under their protection. They were free
to leave the country or to remain there, and, if they remained,
they
were to be constrained to pay no more than a tax fixed in advance,
106
 THE ADVANCE OF FERDINAND AND ALFONSO
roughly equal to that paid by the Christians in Musulman territory.
They preserved also the free practice of their religion and possession
of the Great Mosque, which had formerly been a basilica consecrated
to the Virgin, and was not much kter to become the Cathedral of
J
Toledo. Finally Alfonso undertook to support Cadir s pretensions to
the kingdom of Valencia.
On May 25, 1085, the King of Castile and Le6n made his solemn
entrance into die old capital or the Visigoth kings, in other words the
old capital of the Kingdom of Spain. It was a great date in the history
of the Peninsula. Henceforth the monarchical idea had resumed
embodiment for the Spaniards and the effort towards unity had begun.
But, while Spain awaited this still distant realisation, a most
important result had been achieved for Castile. Henceforth her
security was assured on that one of her frontiers which hitherto had
been the most threatened. From the banks of the Duero she had
extended to the other side of the Tagus. On the Musulman side,
however, she still had two troublesome neighbours: the kingdoms
of Saragossa and Valencia, which constituted a menacing enclave, a
salient thrust forward into Christian territory.
Alfonso had sworn to take Saragossa. He laid siege to the city,
and, still under pretext of defending Cadir, now in Valencia, imposed
upon him the protection of Castilian troops under the command of
the famous Alvar FdSez. These troops, which pillaged and massacred
allies and enemies without distinction, conducted themselves in
their protg6's territory as though they were on conquered soil. In
fact, Alfonso was master in Valencia.
One of his lieutenants, Garcia Xlmenes, threatened Murcia.
Alfonso himself, having occasion to complain of Motamid, his vassal,
who was trying to defraud him of his tribute by unloading base
money on him, blockaded Seville. Thence he raided the surrounding
territory, took skves and booty, and reached as far as the beach of
Tarifa: as far as those Pillars of Hercules which the Christians had
had to abandon almost four centuries earlier. Exulting in this
the foam of the ocean, and, mad
thought, he drove his horse into
with joy and pride, cried aloud : "Here is the uttermost limit of Spain.
I have touched it I"
If all Spain was not reconquered, he had traversed her from one
end to the other. All the little Musulman sovereigns were either his
tributaries or else he had reduced them to impotence. It remained for
him to subdue only the extreme South: Malaga, Granada, Almeria.
Why, then, were four centuries more to pass before the Peninsula was
completely freed from the yoke of Islam?

In the first place, the case was the same with these expeditions of
the Christians as with those of the
Caliphs.
There was never a
definitive victory, never an advantage exploited to the full. It sufficed
to put the enemy temporarily out of condition to do any damage.
107
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
In the next place, these little kingdoms of the North were severely
limited in their resources. They were short of men and short of
money. It was difficult for them to maintain regular campaigns, or
even expeditions of any considerable duration. Finally the Christian
princes were divided among themselves: Castile against Le6n and
against Navarre, Arag6n against Catalonia. They had to reckon,
besides, with feudal rebellions and all kinds of internal divisions.
Above all, what retarded the Reconquest, what indefinitely pro-
longed the status quo the condition of stagnation and partition which
>,

threatened to become eternal in Spain, was the difficulty of peopling

the vast regions which would have become almost desert if the
Musulmansliad been expelled. The Christians of the South had been
decimated by the Caliphs, and the Pyrenean regions had been bled
white, to such an extent that the kings of Castile found themselves
faced with the impossibility of repeopling the territories which they
reconquered.
Accordingly they preferred to adopt the system practised by the
Arabs and by the government of Cordova: to make the infidel terri-
tories a zone of raids and contributions. Castilians and Aragonese
found it convenient to go and live at the expense of the Moorish
lands "/r a tierra de moros" as the Musulmans had long lived at
the expense of the Christians. One went to prey upon his neighbours
the more respectable said to "make a living" among them. The
ordinary means of making a living was marauding and pillaging by
force of arms.
Alternatively, enormous contributions were imposed on the little
Musulman sovereigns which reduced them to impotence. This was
what was called the system ofparias. It was something like a rough
sketch of our "protectorates" of to-day. The Christian prince who
levied iheparia
upon a Musulman prince owed him aid and protec-
tion against all his enemies, whoever they might be, Christian or
Musulman. But niost of the time this aid was illusory. In reality the
tributary was at the mercy of his protector, who, thanks to this
system, had all the advantage of sovereignty in occupied territory
without any of its expenses.
Accordingly Islam was able to maintain itself indefinitely in Spain.
The Christian princes either yielded to the necessities of a period of
impoverishment, or else let themselves be infected by the contagion
of Arab customs and spirit. This was what delayed the Reconquest
so long.
Northern Spain acquired the habits and the vices of the Musul-
nians of the South, or rather of the Arab, and especially the Berber,
bands which had installed themselves in Andalusia. Living by pil-
lage, eating at the expense of one's neighbour, cutting off heads,
taking booty all these deplorable practices were unhappily to enter
into the Spanish character. Wars as a rule were to be
nothing more
than raids/
108
 THE ADVANCE OF FERDINAND AND ALFONSO
Alfonso VI, who had lived at Toledo in the service of King
Mamoun, became too Arabised, or too Africanised, to be able to
react vigorously against such habits and such a state of afiairs. To do
so would have required a man of great strength of character, of
original and really superior turn of mind, a man of new ideas, capable
of thinking alon Roman and European lines. Such a man Spain
nearly found in him whom she was later to make a national hero in
Rodrigo de Vivar, surnamed the Cid Campeador.

109
 CHAPTER XIII

The Cid Campeador

*ERE, indeed, was a man a man Spanish and Christian, standing

i
as sharply opposed as possible to the men of Islam, Arabs or
-Berbers with a mind capable of prevision and of conceiving
designs,
; of fashioning order and unity and organising on lasting
fines, and with a strength of will capable of resisting events and com-

pelling
them to yield to his law.
This Castilian small squire, whom the Musulmans as well as the
Christians called"Lord," had an extraordinary, a paradoxical for-
tune, if one bears in mind the modesty of his beginning. The
imagination of posterity has played so much around him and his
adventurers that it is difficult to recover his true physiognomy-
History has distorted him as much as legend. This obvious distortion
has inspired such doubts that some critics, such as the Spanish
Jesuit Masdeu, have ended by denying his existence and regarding
ntrr> as a fabulous personage. The Cid, according to this point of

view, is as legendary as the heroes of Greek or Germanic epic.

The JLomancero represents him as a turbulent and undisciplined
vassal, more or less a rebel against his king, a Moor-killer whom
nothing can withstand. Modern poetry depicts him as a fiery youth,
the slave of his lady and his honour, or as a knight-errant, defender of
the poor and the oppressed, a conqueror who crosses a dazzled and
dominated world in a clamour of apotheosis.

"So, you, who have but to take the field

it is

And say 'Forward!* to sound through Spain,

From Avis to Gibraltar, from Algarve to Cadafal,
Ogreat Cid, the thrill of trumpets triumphant,
And to draw hastening over your tents,
Beating their wings, the swarm of singing victories."
On the other hand some historians, such as Dozy, have exerted
themselves to deprive him of his halo. Prejudiced against the Cid by
the fact that they are Arabophiles, interpreting texts badly, and as
ignorant of states of mind as they are of environment and customs,
they refuse to see in him anything but a bloodthirsty brute, a cruel
veteran, without faith or loyalty, a mercenary without a fatherland
who sells his sword to the highest bidder.
The real Cid was very different from all this, so far at least as the
definite data of history allow us to visualise or
guess him. These
data are neither so few nor so suspect as is sometimes believed.
Apart from annals of Arab origin and Latin chronicles close enough
in time to the facts, we also possess authentic documents
'
bearing the
Qd's signature, which in the first place assure us of his existence, and
in the next
place give us information as substantial as it is suggestive
no
 THE CID CAMPEADOR
about his life, and even about his character. The traces which he has
left behind him are numerous enough to enable us to reconstruct
from them a type of medieval man magnificent in his originality.

Rodrigo de Vivar was in the first place, as much as a roan could be,
the man of his country, the Spaniard of the North, the Castilian, he
who ransomed Spain from Islam and refashioned her unity. He re-
sembled his native soil, which has nothing either poetic or striking
about it, is the very negation of all fantasy, and represents prose in its
severest and most strictly practical form.
Vivar is a little village, even to-day backward and grim in its
appearance, a few kilometres away from Burgos. Neither the
proximity of the city nor the sierra which displays its outline in the
distance avails to diminish the impression of poverty-stricken barren-
ness that is conveyed by the wide, desokte and stony in which
plain
it lies. Burgos itself is poor ; it possesses
nothing but its magnificent
cathedral. The defiles of Pancorbo and the high summits which
bound the horizon in the other direction are sinister in their rugged-
ness. The plain of Vivar, which extends to the foothills of the
mountains, is a tawny desert, in which are to be seen only a few
clumps of trees, a few rows of slender poplars, along the chilly water-
courses which turn two or three mill-wheels.
But this 'sterilityis only
apparent. The countryside is agri-
cultural, fertile incorn despite the climate, which is rigorous in the
extreme, glacial in winter and torrid in summer violent contrasts
which are similarly to be found in the character of the Cid. Its
dominant feature is its severe utilitarianism. This soil, burning and
icy, produces only at the cost of the most persevering and the most
praiseworthy efforts. Its flatness and its harshness are overcome only
by. dint of asceticism and self-discipline.
At the period of the Cid, Vivar was also a frontier district, march-
ing with Navarre, which was often at war with Castile, and traversed
by hostile armies and bands of partisans. This circumstance doubt-
less played its part in the training of a future leader who was to
spend his whole life waging war and, in the memory of Spaniards,
was to remain the frontiersman: he who defended the marches of the
kingdom against the eternal Africao invader.
Was he born in the castle of Vivar, or did he see the light in
Burgos, as an old tradition would have it? Nothing of this is verifi-
able, any more than the date of his birth. It is to be presumed, how-
ever, that the Cid was born about the year 1043, anc what is certain
is that he was
given the name of Rodrigo : a name predestined in the
eyes of the Arab historians themselves.
It was that of the last Visigoth king, whose defeat delivered Spain
over to the Musulmans. Ibn Bassam claims that the Cid one day
declared to somebody, who repeated it to him: "This Peninsula was
conquered tinder a Rodrigo. It is another Rodrigo who will deliver
nx
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
it!" It was a saying which most probably, like so many others, has
nothing historical about it except the truth of fact which it recalls.
The child's mother belonged to a great Asturian family. But the
lineage of his father, Diego Leinez, descendant of Lain Calvo, one of
the great judges of Castile, was nothing more than respectable. Later,
it the Cid had occasion to regret the inadequate lustre of his
appears,
origin. I shall endeavour in a moment to show how this came about.
In any case, there seems to have been a little bitterness or some-
thing of the insolent pride of the upstart in the following sentences,
which the Campeador is said to have spoken in the presence of the
notables of Valencia, on the morrow of the surrender of their city :
"I am a man who has never possessed a kingdom, and nobody in my
lineage has ever had one. But, from the day when I saw this city, I
found it to my liking and I desired it, and I asked God to make me
master of it!" There came a time, in short, when it would have been
useful to the Cid to be a king, or at least of royal blood.
Having lost his father at an early age probably when he was
about fifteen he was brought up at the court of the Infante Don
Sancho, where he doubtless received the education which was then
given to royal princes. This teaching, as in all the schools of the
Middle Ages, comprised the liberal arts namely, grammar, rhetoric,
logic, perhaps a little mathematics, and finally law. The Cid, as we
shall see, was a good jurist. It was, in short, in Latin guise, the very
same education as he would have received at Cordova if he had been
a Musulman.
Accordingly those who imagine him as a rough soldier, com-
pletely illiterate, not knowing how to read or write, or even how to
sign his name at the foot of a contract, are utterly mistaken. Several
signatures of his have been handed down to us, together with this
Latin sentence written in his own handwriting on the charter of a
donation made to the cathedral of Valencia: "Bgo Rudenco y simulcum
conjuge mea, afirmo oc quod superius serifturn est; I, Rodrigo, in agree-
ment with my wife, affirm what is written above/* Doubtless he was
sufficiently familiar with Latin not only to write a formula such as
this, but also to understand the meaning of a document drawn up in
Latin.
At the same time it would be childish to exaggerate the culture of
the Campeador. It is certain that he was never a fine wit, or a
poet,
like those
kinglings of Seville and Granada who rhymed gallant
madrigals or even a man of erudition, a connoisseur of fine bind-
ings, or a collector of rare books, like such-and-such a vizier or
caliph. But,without being a great reader himself, he encouraged
men of learning and had Arab stories read to him.
Inasmuch as he spent almost the whole of his life among Musul-
mans, he was acquainted with their language. This is attested by the
following passage from Ibn Bassam: "Books were studied in his
presence. The doings and deeds of the paladins of Arabia of old
112
 THE CID CAMPEADOR
were read to him, and, when one came to the story of Mohallab, he
was enchanted to the point of ecstasy, and showed himself full of
admiration for that hero." From this it emerges that this untutored
man delighted to listen to fine heroic tales, and that this Christian,
not content with knowing the language of Islam, did not withhold
his admiration from the enemies of his race and his faith.
That he held this intellectual culture in small enough estimation
himself is extremely probable. At that period the essential
thing for
a man of his quality, together with physical strength, was excellence
in all bodily exercises and knowledge of the profession of arms.
Rodrigo's robustness and power of endurance are sufficiently proved
to us by the harassing and perilous life which he led for such a long
time. The same applies to the single combats, or rather the judicial
duels, which he had to fight as Constable of Castile and from which
he emerged victorious, thus demonstrating that he was a jouster to
be feared.
As to the soldier's profession, he learnt it at an early age. When
he was barely twenty he fought his first campaign with the Infante
Sancho and took part in the battle of Graus, in which Ramiro, King
of Aragon, was defeated by the Castilians and the Moors of Saragossa
in alliance.
What was the appearance, what was the exterior of this fine
soldier, of this youth whom poetry has made the sigher after Jimena?
The chroniclers of the time paid no attention to this detail. Perhaps
we may find a memory of oral tradition, and something like a reflec-
tion of reality, in those verses of the 'R.omancero which represent the
Cid to us as a sturdy man, very tall and very hairy, a rough warrior
in a leather jerkin, but, like an Arab chieftain, a lover of magnificence,
of arms and horses of price, of trappings embroidered with gold, of
sumptuous tents, flinging over his rude war harness the folds 'of a
great mantle dyed purple.

Yet, during the earlier part of his life, this future leader of raiders,
this heroic adventurer, presents himself to us as a man of sedentary
habit, a country gentleman, above all careful to protect and increase
his property. He does not appear to have done anything different
from what his fathers had done before him occupy himself with his
:

estates and the men on his estates ; protect his vassals, his retainers,
his servants, "those of his table and his bread/* as the old Castilian
poem says ; and finally support his suzerain, fight for him as a good
vassal ought to do, and obtain the due recompense of his services.
He began by being A/fire? of Castile under King Sancho: a
dignity comparable with that QtConnetable in France. In this capacity
he was not only the king's master of the horse, but also the supreme
head of the army. He watched over the interests of the kingdom.
Moreover, he was chief justice ; he defended the widow and the
orphan, and prosecuted lords who were rebellious or false to their
E 113
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
obligations. In short, he was
entrusted with a judicial function,
which from time to time carried military duties with it.
We find, in fact, that Rodrigo Dfaz de Vivar had frequently- to
fight
for his sovereign in the struggles which he carried on either
with his neighbours or with his brother Alfonso. Finally, when
Alfonso had Sancho- assassinated, or was privy to his assassination,
Rodrigo, evidently suspect by the new sovereign, had to resign his
office as Alfere%. Henceforth he was no more than a vassal of Alfonso,
who, for political reasons, did not wish to break with him openly.
Alfonso carried his policy to the point of marrying Rodrigo to a
relation of his, Jimena, Diaz, daughter of the Count of Oviedo and
of the niece of Alfonso V, King of Le6n. It was a brilliant match,
which seems to have been arranged solely for the purpose of recon-
ciling the nobility of Castile with
the Leonese, and in which senti-
ment appears to have played a very small part.
Rodrigo accepted Jimena because she was offered to him, and per-
haps imposed upon him, by his suzerain. All that we know of their
relations clearly indicates that it was a marriage of convenience and
interest, performed in accordance with the usual formulas of the
period. As a matter of custom, the lord of Vivar settled a marriage-
portion on his wife, and, also as a matter of custom, he justified his
donation, in the document which has been handed down to us, in the
time-honoured formula: "por decoro de su berwosuraj ppr el virginal
connubio in consideration of her beauty and of her virginity as a
:

spouse/* It has been sought to read an avowal of affection into these

few words ; but they were nothing more than a conventional phrase
which is to be found in all matrimonial contracts of the period.
We are far, therefore, from the lover immortalised by the tragedy
of Corneille, and even from the brutal boy of the Rjoziancero, who
shot down Jimena's doves with arrows and bespattered his future
fiancee's pinafore with blood. Nor did he fight any duel with her
father. Jimena was not the passionate and practical daughter who
fell in love with her father's slaver on account of his
strength and his
brutality just because he would be capable of defending her. It was
a perfectly quiet and, if one may venture to say so, a perfectly middle-
,dass marriage. Rodrigo, we may assume, saw nothing in his wife
but the headof his household and the perpetuator of his line.
Deprived of his dignity as Alfire%> he installed himself in his
castle of Vivar, a sombre feudal stronghold in a still more sombre
countryside, from which he emerged only to accompany his suzerain
in some of his progresses and form part of his escort of honour. This
life of retirement embraced no more than two or three events of some

importance: a mission to Seville to the court of Motamid to receive

the annual tribute which he owed to Alfonso VI ; a victorious
engage-
ment with his rival, Count Garcia Ordonez, who had taken the liberty
of attacking Motamid, Alfonso's ally ; and finally a
punitive raid in
Moorish territory in the kingdom of Toledo.
114
 THE CID CAMPEADOR
He spent nearly ten years in 'this comparative inaction, in this
leisurewithout glory and he was in the flower of his youth not yet
;

thirty years of age! During these years of his full development, we

imagine him bursting with sap and desire, drunk with ambition,
dreaming only of battles and victories. Instead of all that, he was a
his peasants and servants, concerning himself
squire living among
with lawsuits, boundaries and party-walls, and saddling his great
war-horse only to go and raid ms neighbour's cows and sheep.
Let us try and see what lay hidden behind this unstriking /#/#&:
what passions, what feelings, in short, what character were maturing
slowly during these years preparatory to so resounding a destiny.
What we know definitely about Rodrigo de Vivar does not indicate
a nature spontaneously precocious. He was rather a man of tardy
development, of solid and serious genius which, to give its full
measure, required in the first place favourable circumstances, an
opportunity to point the way to it, and, in the next place, reflection,
consideration, a whole course of education. Solidity, seriousness
these were his most obvious characteristics. He was also a strong-
willed and obstinate man who followed his path without deviating
from it.

Fundamentally tempestuous and violent by nature, he learnt how to

hold himself in check. He got the better of his competitors and his
enemies by a perfect mastery over himself, even though he was some-
times subject to terrible gusts of passion. He restrained them almost
immediately. This violent man was able to pass himself off as a man
temperamentally moderate.
He went farther: he was chivalrous towards his adversaries, even
the most embittered. When he took prisoner Count Berenguer of
Barcelona, who had sworn to destroy him, he treated him honour-
ably and let him go without ransom, though this was contrary to the
usages of war. No doubt he had his reasons for doing so ; for the
Cid, a man prudent above all things, did nothing haphazard.
Unquestionably he showed himself stern in repression, and he re-
garded this sternness as necessary to keep fierce and merciless enemies
in awe. Such repression, or reprisal, was in accordance with the
habits and customs of the time. Modern historians have taken it as a
text to represent him as a monster of cruelty.
This allegation is either based solely upon Arab documents, whose
is only too obvious, or it is a generalisation from isolated
partiality
instances. In short, the reputation for cruelty attributed to the Cid
comes from the Musulmans, and it can only be justified by some
drastic proceedings which he took during the two sieges of Valencia,
It is alleged that he had his prisoners torn to pieces by dogs or
burned alive. This did happen, in fact, at Valencia, and in very special
circumstances. The Cid had been besieging the city for some time,
and he was afraid that armies from Africa might force him to raise
the siege. At the outset he allowed starving Valencians to enter his
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
camp. Finally, in order to hasten surrender through famine, he
decided that henceforth he would drive back any further refugees
into the city, under threat of the direst punishment. The besieged
were warned to the sound of trumpets of the penalties to which they
would be exposed if they continued to try and escape.
As the exodus continued, the Cid carried his threats into execu-
tion* The refugees were thrown into bivouac fires or chased back
towards the gates by the camp dogs. Obviously this treatment was
not merciful ; but at least it had the justification of exceptional circum-
stances and also of the example set by the Musulmans themselves,
who treated their prisoners in the most barbarous way.
Another grievance against the Cid is the punishment which he in-
flictedupon the cadi of Valencia, Ibn Djahaf, who had betrayed him
by intriguing with the Almoravids and had previously instigated the
assassination of his sovereign King Cadir, protege of the Campeador
and ally of Alfonso VI of Castile. In having him burned alive, the
Cid considered that he was acting judicially he was punishing an
;

assassin the assassin of a prince who was has friend and he was
avenging himself upon a many times perjured traitor.
Let me repeat: these were unquestionably cruel proceedings. We
can only accept the fact and at the same time the fact that they were
in accordance with the customs of the period. We are not judges of
the necessities or the circumstances which imposed atrocious
measures of repression and terrifying measures of prevention upon
the men of war of that time. How do we know whether the Cid was
not like Marshal de Saint-Arnaud, who, in the heroic days of the
conquest of Algeria, gave orders, sick at heart, that the cruelties of
the 6edouin should be met by similar cruelties, and grieved over the
trees cut down and the homes reduced to ashes by his own troops?
Rodrigo de Vivar was certainly a hard man, and, in the environment
in which he lived, it was essential that he should be. But he knew
how to be merciful when he
believed it opportune, and sometimes
simply from instinctive pity and natural kind-heartedness. After
threatening the Moors of Murviedo with putting them to fire and
sword if they did not surrender within a stated period, he ended by
granting them a reprieve and letting them depart with their belong-
ings. Most of them took advantage of this permission. Those who
stayed behind entrusted their hoards of money to the refugees to
put them in safety, and even handed over to them subsidies intended
For the Almoravid armies which were
marching against the Cid.
Very justly, he punished the guilty parties by imposing upon them
a contribution equal to the sums which
they had hypothecated from
the war indemnity or treacherously sent to his enemies.
Thereupon
prejudiced historians, who* always find a Spaniard and a Christian in
the wrong, but slur over all the Musulman Atrocities, accuse the Cid
of perfidy and inhumanity.
But not only was this stern man capable of unbending on occa-
116
 THE CID CAMPEADOR
sion ; he was also kind and courteous towards the humble. Popular
poetry so represents him, and, if it has given him this reputation, he
must certainly have provided some reason for it.
An incident which illustrates one of the most pleasant aspects of
his natural kindliness has been handed down to us by a Spanish
annalist. The Cid, exiled with his men and his servants, was wander-
ing in the region of the marches of Castile and Saragossa. Suddenly
he gave the order to strike camp. The baggage was already being
loaded when he overheard some of his men remarking that his cook's
wife had just given birth to a child. At once the thoughtful Cid
asked them: "How long do Castilian ladies usually remain in bed
after childbirth?" The men told him. "Well," said the Cid, ".we
shall stay here for that length of time. Set the tents up again 1"
Despite the fact that the countryside was swarming with enemies, he
did not budge until the good woman, intensely proud of being thus
treated by her lord as a great lady, was on her feet again.
It is extremely probable that the charge of perfidy is no better
founded than that of inhumanity. The bad faith of the Cid could not
have been worse than that of the Arabs and the Berbers, who at all
times have been past-masters of it. Unquestionable proof of the
charge, moreover, is lacking. All the examples which have been
adduced are subject to reserve, when they are not flagrant errors due
to a hasty and also prejudiced interpretation of texts.
The same thing applies to the Cid's rapacity, which has been
enormously exaggerated. No doubt, like all the Musulman and
Christian princes of that time, he went after treasure and continually
made raids in enemy territory. But we must bear in mind the
obligations of a guerrilla or army leader who had nothing but the
booty taken from the enemy with which to pay and feed his men. If
the Cid raided and hoarded, it was in the first place for the mainten-
ance of his
troops.
At the same time, it certainly seems as though, like the Moors of
Granada and Seville, he, too, yielded to the fascination of gold, and
that his imagination was haunted by the idea of buried treasure.
When he took the castle of Polop from the Lord of Denia, he found
dug in the mountain-side a regular Ali Baba's cave, where the
Moorish prince had accumulated enormous wealth in gold, silver,
and precious stones and stuffs.
vAt very probable that the Cid was a great connoisseur of all such
is

things.
At Valencia Ibn Djahaf had seized the treasure of King
Cadir. When the Cid made him disgorge it, he kept for himself the
famous necklace of the Sultana Zobeyaa: that necklace of fabulous
value which was called "the Scorpion's Sting," and was said to bring
misfortune upon its possessor. It is a fact that the Cid died shortly
afterwards, after being present at the defeat of his army.

The most specious accusation which has been formulated against

"7
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
him that he was a mere mercenary without faith or fatherland,
is

fighting for or against his king, passing

over from one camp to the
other without the least scruple, and, in short, as much of a Musulman
as a Christian, as much of an Arab as a Spaniard. This charge is now
1
rebutted, thanks to searching critical studies which have reduced aU
such prejudices and misunderstandings to nothingness.
It is proved, on the contrary, by the most ample evidence that

Rodrigo de Vivar was not merely a good Christian, but even a

devotee, and that he was so throughout the whole of his life, in
Castile no less than in Saragossa and Valencia, scrupulous about
celebrating religious festivals, observing Lent as a Musulman
observes Ramadan, and making donations to monasteries and
churches. It is no less certain that he conducted himself always as a
good vassal, no matter what wrongs his sovereign did him.
He fought for Musulman princes, as did at that time all the
Christian princes of the peninsula, who had allies and vassals among
the Moors and vice versa. It is to be noted that he never fought
against the allies of his suzerain, Alfonso VI, whether those alSes
were Musulmans or Christians. When he finally conquered the king-
dom of Valencia, he reserved the suzerainty of Alfonso over and
above his own rights. Finally this exile, kept in disgrace by his king,
always remembered his native Castile with a kind of tenderness ; and
as we shall see in a moment this alleged sans-patrie respected
the quality of Spaniard even in the case of those of the Musulmans
who were his enemies or the allies of his enemies.
All this contradicts the
preconceived idea of the medieval squire
who recognised only the right and the law of force. The Cid was
respectful of all written laws. This man, who was a regular jurist,
presided over trials, discussed the authenticity of documents, and
was as familiar with the Musulman code as with thefaeros of Le6n or
Castile, always put reason before violence. If he was terrible in
repression, he was concerned above all to be just and scrupulously to
observe contracts or customs.
I insist upon this point, as
upon certain traits of his character,
solely for the purpose of defining this outstanding figure. It is
essential not to make a plaster saint out of him, but to discover the
reason for his immense popularity and the nature of the great ser-
vices which raised him to the rank of a national hero. If he became so
when he was nearly forty, after spending. a dozen years in semi-
obscurity, are we to see in that only the result of chance or of favour-
able opportunity? For men of this stamp chance is never more than
apparent and opportunity is always providential.
Rodrigo de Vivar, suspect in the eyes of Alfonso of Castile from
their very first meeting, became embroiled with his
king. Alfonso
exiled him, though without depriving Htm of his
property. This exile
1
See, in particular, the masterly study by Menadez Pidal La Espatia del Cid, Madrid,
:

1929.
 THE CID CAMPEADOR
nevertheless condemned him andHs retainers to a life of wandering
and to poverty. It was the point of departure of his extraordinary
career.
On which side did the wrongs lie? It seems that the gravest were
on the side of the king. If Alfonso could reproach Rodrigo with
having raided among his Moorish allies of the kingdom of Toledo,
and perhaps with having taken money from Motamid of Seville, all
this served as scarcely more than a pretext for paying off old scores.
Alfonso's bitterest grievance was the memory of the oath which the
Qd had made him take at Burgos, in the church of Santa Gadea, be-
fore an assembly of Castilian nobles, to the effect that he had not
been his brother's assassin. For Alfonso was, at least, privy to the
assassination.
But that, too, scarcely mattered: the real reason of their rupture
was that the suzerain was secretly jealous of his vassal. After all, a
man like the Qd could not live in the background, relegated to the
life of a country gentleman. The exile to which he was condemned
meant liberation for him, and at the same time the revelation of him
as a hero.

Rodrigo left Jimena at Vivar with their children. The separation

was to be a long one but it was only prudent. Somebody had to
;

stay and take charge of the old family manor and look after the
abandoned fiefs.
Moreover, one can hardly imagine the Cid's wife living in the
promiscuity of a band of adventurers, following her husband's hard
road, exposed to all kinds of dangers. For it was a perilous and pain-
ful existence which the exile was henceforth to lead. In his own
*e
words, he had to win his bread" and that of his men. There was
only one means of winning it the means employed at that time by
all needy squires fighting and
:
marauding in Moorish territory.
He offered his services first to Berenguer of Barcelona, expecting
that he would engage him to fight against his neighbours, the Musul-
mans of Saragossa and Lerida. Finding himself cold-shouldered by
the Barcelonan, he turned to Moctadir, the Moorish King of Sara-
gossa. It is such volte-faces which have made the Cid regarded as a
mere mercenary, who sold hissword indifferently to Musulmans or
Christians. What forgotten is that the Musulman princes of that
is
time were almost or vassals of Christian kings, and that the
all allies

protecting prince, in return for the tribute which they paid him,
owed them aid and support.
As a matter of fact, Moctadir was the tributary and ally of Alfonso
VI, the suzerain of the Lord of Vivar. Rodrigo, in putting himself
at his service, was doing nothing more than defend &&protig& of his
prince. Moreover, he was acting as a good CastiHan in keeping Sara-
gossa in subjection to Castile, and in preparing by his presence and
his influence for the annexation of this great principality to the King-
119
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
dom of Le6n and Castile. This had long been the objective of Ferdi-
nand and Alfonso*
He was able to make himself indispensable to Moctadir, and then
to his successors, Moutamin and Mostain. He defeated their
Christian or Musulman enemies on several occasions and returned to
that he acquired the
Saragossa in triumph. It was at this period
reputation of invincibility throughout Spain and was hailed as the
Camptadori a vague term, about which there has been much
great
discussion, that seems to mean simply "the victorious." He became
a regular power side by side with the prince, who, inasmuch as he
needed him, treated him tactfully and loaded him with honours.
These sovereign princes of Saragossa, the Beni Houd, were of
Arab origin, but they had long been under the protection of Castile.
This was perhaps one of the reasons why the Cid got on so well with
Moctadir. Once installed at his court, he livea there for several
years. Doubtless it suited his purposes. In any case, it may be said
that his stay there coincided with a decisive evolution in his character
and ideas. Saragossa opened horizons to him.
The ancient Gesarea Augusta was not exactly a great city. All
these cities of the Middle Ages, especially the ancient colonial cities
enclosed within the boundaries of an old Roman camp, were in
general quite small. But all the same it was something different from
Burgos or Le6n. Apart from its strategic importance, Saragossa,
proudly established on the banks of its river, enjoyed a quite special
prestige among the cities of Spanish Islam.
It was white city" on account of its tufa-stone walls
called "the
and houses whitened with chalk, which, it appears, rose in an
its

amphitheatre above the ramparts and shone in the sun like an

enormous snowy cupola. At night, it was claimed, this whiteness
illuminated the darkness, no doubt miraculously. The Christian
Mozarabs of the district explained this nocturnal splendour by the
presence of the famous Virgin of Pilar. It was the supernatural
purity of the Immaculate which appeared through the white walls of
her cherished city.
Despite its strong Roman and Christian stamp, Saragossa was per-
haps the most Islamised city in Spain. It owed this, no doubt, to its
quality as a frontier-city. It is always on the marches of a country
that the colonising effort of conquering peoples is most intensely
brought to bear. Even to-day traces of Islam are to be found every-
where in Saragossa. Its church towers are minarets, its churches and
its cathedral are former
mosques. Its venerable sanctuary of Pilar
itself,with its domes encrusted with glazed porcelain, reminds one
of the Great Mosque of Cordova. Its Aljaferia, the old palace of the
Moorish kings, still preserves some excellent remains of "half-
orange" ceilings, and above all a little oratory, blossoming with
arabesques, which is a gem of Arab-Spanish art.
When the Cid arrived there, Saragossa was still in all its glory as a
120
 THE CID CAMPEADOR
Musulman Moctadir, a man of letters,
capital. surrounded himself
with a court of poets, philosophers and learned men, for the most
part of Jewish or Christian origin. As he talked with this prince,
who appears to have been a man as intellectual as he was cultivated,
the Castilian soldier must have been persuaded that it was
great
possible to reach an understanding, at least on certain points, be-
tween all Spaniards, Musulman and Christian. He familiarised him-
self more with the Moors who surrounded him.
Doubtless it was from this time that he adopted a line of conduct
towards them from which he departed only when he was constrained
by circumstances or by the attitude of the Moors themselves that of
:

treating them, in short, as compatriots, respecting their possessions,

their estates, their language and their religion, and bringing them
little by little to accept life in common with the Christians.
It was obviously an ideal difficult to attain,
upon which reality was
not slow to inflict cruel disillusions. But it is certain that the Cid
was haunted by the idea, not indeed of fusion, but of reciprocal
tolerance. It is extremely
probable that this idea would have led him
nowhere owing to the irreducible hostility of the two opposed
civilisations but as a political expedient, a means of arranging things
;

provisionally, it proved to have its advantages.

Among the distinguished Musulmans whom the Cid met at
I should perhaps mention one who may have exercised a
Saragossa
certain influence upon bus projects: the famous Ben Ammar, the
minister and friend of Motamid of Seville, who had tried to seize the
kingdom of Murcia at the expense of his master, and to escape his
anger had been driven to take refuge with Moctadir.
Undoubtedly the Lord of Vivar was equally possessed for some
time past by the idea of carving out an independent principality for
himself somewhere in Musulman. territory. Alfonso's injustice to-
wards him seemed to counsel such a measure of precaution. The vain
attempts which he repeatedly made to effect a reconciliation with his
suzerain showed him quite unmistakably that he had nothing to
expect from him but bad treatment, and that he must provide for his
own security as soon as possible. Why should not he, too, be a king,
like so many Musulman and Christian princelings who had been
nothing but squires or lucky soldiers?
Still, the example of Ben Ammar, who had just failed in such a
fine scheme, constrained him to be prudent. Tnere was an example
even more outstanding that of the famous El Mansour, who, though
:

he had usurped the sovereign authority, had never gone so far as to

assume the Caliphal title. If the Lord of Vivar dared to proclaim
himself king, he would have against him not only his suzerain, but
also all the Musulman princes, including Moctadir, his ally and his
protigL
In these circumstances, he must arrange matters so that he would
be the master of a territory which he could hold strongly, but with-
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
out breaking the link of vassalage with Alfonso of Castile. While
pretending to be acting in his interests, he could make
himself power-
fill not to be afraid of him. In case of misfortune, of extreme
enough
danger, he could always call upon the help of
a suzerain towards
whom he had always showed himself a good vassal. It was, no
doubt, for similar reasons of prudence that he never quarrelled
with his friend the prince of Saragossa: he might need him some
day.
But upon what "kingdom" was he to cast his choice? The easiest
to conquer was that of Valencia, where reigned the weak Cadir,
former King of Toledo a&&prottgt of Alfonso VI. Surrounded by
rivals, he maintained himself there only thanks to Castilian mer-
cenaries under die orders of the Cid's own nephew, the famous
Alvar FdSez. The delicate part of the afiair was to oust the com-
petitors,
or at least to put them in their pkce. The cleverness of the
Campeador consisted in presenting himself not as a conqueror or a
usurper, but as the defender of Cadir, the protfge of his suzerain.
Thus he continued to conduct himself as a good vassal, zealous for
the interests of his lord.
The most formidable obstacle, however, was the threatening
advance of the African hordes which, under the leadership of the
Almoravid Caliph, Yousouf ben Teshoufin, seemed on the eve of
all the territory lost by Islam. The Cid realised the gravity
regaining
of the situation immediately. While King Alfonso of Castile with-
stood the pressure of the Almoravid armies in the South-west, his
own rok was to bar their way in the East, and prevent them from
reaching Saragossa and joining hands with the Musulman princes
who still held the valley of the Ebro, the south of Catalonia, and the
kingdom of Valencia.
So the personal ambitions of the Cid were subordinated to the
national interest. It was a question of preventing a second invasion
of Spain by Islam* His great merit was that he appreciated that the
Spanish efforts must be concentrated upon the East and a solid
barrier be established there against the Moorish invaders.
For this purpose, it no longer sufficed to make raids in Moorish
territory, or even to inflict serious defeats on the enemy, or, again, to
impose tribute upon Musulman kinglings. It was essential for him
to establish himself strongly and definitively in the conquered terri-
tory, and, if necessary, found a new dynasty there. So it was that the
Cid was brought to undertake the conquest of Valencia and the
V
neighbouring region in the East, and that alencia became for some
time "Valencia of the Cid."

This conquest was slow and arduous. The Campeador bent his
whole soul to the task. "He fastened
upon that city," says an Arab
author, "as a creditor fastens upon his debtor. He loved it as lovers
love the places where they have tasted the delights of love/* One
122
 THE CID CAMPEADOR
might say more: he loved it like a mistress. The great love of the
Cid was not Jimena ; it was Valencia.
He did not possess it for very long four or five years at the most.
But he made a point of acting there as a master, a sovereign, who was
taking possession of a territory for ever. He gave the city a new
statue. The first thing he did was to convert the Great Mosque into
a cathedral and enthrone an archbishop there.
This warrior proposed to be a founder. He administered and he
legislated. He established his residence in the Musulman AldLzar
and summoned his wife and his daughters there. But the Berber
hordes were at the gates. He had to go on fighting to his kst breath.
Undermined by fever, weakened by old wounds, he died at the age of
fifty-six, in the month of July 1099.
After him his wife succeeded in holding out for a few years more.
Finally she had to abandon beloved Valencia and take to flight,
carrying with her the bones of her husband, which she had exhumed
lest they should be profaned by the Musulmans. Such
profanation
was the great dread of the Christian leaders of that time. "If by
chance I should die on Moorish soil," says one of them in his testa-
ment, "may my soul be with Christ and may my body be carried to
my own land and buried with those of my ancestors. And if I die
there, and my vassals do not bring me back here, may they be stamped
with infamy as traitors to their lord!"
Jimena, therefore, regarded it as a matter of conscience to bear
the remains of her husband back to Castile. This exodus of the
vanquished must have been a pitiful business. We may imagine it
from a miniature in the Escorial which represents a similar scene:
a little box, containing the bones of die hero, tied on the back of a
mule, jolting along the paths and the rocky roads of the Valencian
sierra ; and, behind the funereal burden, in the middle of an escort
of retainers, Jimena in her widow's veil, drooping upon her palfrey
and following for days and days, threatened by all kinds of dangers,
that poor little coffin which holds a whole world of poetry.
The long victorious ride of the Cid across Moorish and Christian
territory ended, then, in this lamentable progress. The invincible
was vanquished ; nothing was left of work and his beloved
his ;

Valencia, the Valencia of the Cid, was again to become the Valencia
of Islam.
But the defeat of the Campeador was only apparent. He had
bla2ed the trail for the conquerors of Spanish soil and shown them
the tactics which they must pursue. Nothing would be done so long
as they did not renounce the sterile system of raids and protectorates
imposed upon Musulman princes. They must first take Saragossa
and Valencia, cut Islam's road to the North, and replace the little
kingdoms of the Moors by a- great Christian kingdom.
It is, indeed, impossible that this great Castilian, who remained
faithful to the end to the King of Castile, to him who proudly called
"3
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
himself "Emperor of the two religions," should not have conceived
the future unification of Spain as an absolute necessity. In any case,
his example and the memory of his deeds were to confer upon the
name "Christian" an incomparable prestige, before which the Musul-
mans themselves bowed down.

124
 CHAPTER XIV

The Invasion of the Almoravids and the Almohades

momentarily made the work of the Cid sterile and

arrested the Christian advance for more than a century
WHAT was the double invasion of the Almoravids and the Almo-
hades the return of the Berbers en masse on to the soil of the
Peninsula.
As always, they were summoned by the Spaniards, who never
schooled themselves whether they were Christians or Musulmans
out of periodical appeal to the barbarian, regarded as a saviour,
To deliver themselves from one oppressor, they threw themselves
into the arms of another, who proved worse. Accordingly the
Andalusians and all the Musulmans of Spain, frightened by the pro-
gress of Alfonso VI, resigned themselves to demanding help from
Yousouf ben Teshoufin, the Almoravid Sultan of Morocco.
They saw the time coming when they would be obliged to submit
to the Emperor of the Christians, or, if they were not ready to bow
to the yoke of the Infidel, emigrate to Islamic lands. "Be on your
way, O Andalusian," sang one of their poets, "for to stay here is
madness 1" Those of them who knew the Africans were afraid in
advance of having them as allies. They realised that these so-called
protectors would behave among them as though they were in con-
quered territory. Perhaps it would be better to accept the domina-
tion of the Christians, who at least were Spaniards, men of their own
country and even of their own race.
But religious considerations prevailed over those of politics and
prudence. Motamid of Seville, sick at heart, decided with some of
his neighbours to implore the aid of the Almoravid. "I do not wish,"
he said, "that my name should be accursed in all the Musulman
pulpits,
and if I must choose, I would rather be a camel-driver in
Africa than a pig-driver in Castile/'
Accordingly he allowed the Moroccan troops to disembark at
Algcciras. Soon afterwards Yousouf ben Teshoufin came to take
command of his army. Alfonso VI of Castile, who had hastened to
the Andalusian frontier to bar his way, was defeated in a great battle
on October 23, 1086, which the Musulmans called the battle of
Zallaca and the Christians the battle of Sacralias. But, as usual, the
Berber did not press his advantage over the Castilians. He judged
it more
opportune to subdue the whole of Southern Spain to himself.
After that he marched against Saragossa.
So the Moorish kinglings who had called him to their aid were
dethroned, their treasures were pillaged, and those of them who were
not killed found themselves, like Motamid, carried away into cap-
tivity. Soon the tyranny of the Almoravids became so unendurable
to the Spaniards that they began to turn their eyes again towards
125
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
Africa, A new dynasty, that of the Almohades, more fanatical still
than that of the Almoravids, had replaced them in Morocco.
In 1 146 the Caliph Abd el Moumin began the invasion of Spain,
where, little by little, the Almoravid leaders were ousted. In 11^5
the Caliph Yacoub el Mansour defeated Alfonso VIII of Castile in
the battle of Alarcos. Thence he advanced towards the North, and
took possession of Madrid, Ucles, and Guadalajara.
Almost all Musulman Spain was once more reunited under a single
master. This new advance of Islam became a great danger to
Christendom, the more so as at the other end of Europe, over against
the feeble Empire of the East, the young power of the Turks was
rising as a terrible threat.

This double invasion had q,s its result the further Africanisation of
southern Spain. The Musulman Spaniards were once more deci-
mated by the Berbers of Africa, and this went on throughout this
lamentable twelfth century. Their cities were taken, and their
princes massacred or expelled.
The fate of the Christians and the Jews, still numerous in Andalu-
sia, was even worse. During the reign of Yousouf ben Teshoufin the
Jews were compelled to become converted, on the ground that,
according to a tradition, they had entered into an agreement with
Mahomet to turn Musulmans at the end of the fifth century of the
Hegira. They escaped this cruel necessity only at the cost of paying
an enormous sum to the Caliphal treasury. Later, under the Almo-
hades, they were compelled to wear a special costume and were
deprived of their synagogues.
Among us/* writes Marrakeshi, "no security is accorded either
to Jews or Christians since the establishment of the Masmoudite
(Almohade) power, and there exists neither synagogue nor church in all the
Musulman territory of the Moghreb. . The Jews profess Islamism
. .

externally ; they pray in the mosques and teach the Koran to their
children. God alone knows what they hide in their hearts and what
their houses conceal.
"
From the outset of the Almoravid invasion the destruction of
Christian churches had begun.
Among them was destroyed a very
old and very curious basilica in the neighbourhood of Granada, the
church of Gudila. The faquis commenced to persecute the Christian
Mozarabs so intolerably that they begged the King of Arag6n,
Alfonso the Warrior, to come and deliver them. The Aragonese did
not succeed in taking Granada. When they retreated, the faquis
avenged themselves on the Mozarabs in the most merciless
fashion.
Already ten thousand of them had been compelled to emigrate into
the territory of Alfonso to
escape their enemies' repression. The re-
mainder were deprived of their property, imprisoned, or
put to
death. Many of them were
deported to Africa. They were estab-
126
 INVASION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
lished in the neighbourhood of Sal6 and Meknes, where oppression
of all kinds compelled them to embrace Islam. Ten years later there
was a fresh expulsion. The Christians were again deported to
Morocco en masse.
Here, then, were cities and whole districts depopulated by
massacres and proscriptions. .This corresponded with a plan drawn
upon in advance, a systematic course of action. "Sultan Yousouf,"
writes Marrakeshi, "never failed to repeat at every one of his
audiences 'To rid the Peninsula of the Qiristians that is our sole
:

purpose ; since we have^seen, on the one hand, that they have become
entirely its masters, and', on the other hand, how great is the careless-
ness of the Musulman princes, their lack of zeal in making war, their
internal dissensions and their love of repose. None of them has any
other thought but to empty goblets, to listen to and to spend
singers,
his life in amusing himself. If I live, I shall not fan to restore to the
Musulmans all the provinces that the Qiristians have taken from
them.'"
Accordingly, after having expelled the Christians, he replaced
them by Berbers. "To con^bat our enemies," said Yousouf himself,
"I shall fill Spain with horsemen and footmen who think nothing of
repose, who do not know what it is to live softly, whose sole thought
is to groom and train their horses, take care of their arms, and hasten
to obey their orders.*'
The Almohades devoted themselves no less ardently to repopu-

lating the South of by filling it with Africans and Arabs.

Spain
"When Abd el Moumin left the Peninsula," says the author quoted
above, "he installed Arabs there, some in the neighbourhood of
Cordova, others in the direction of Seville and in the direction of
Jerez and its territory. They are still there in the present year (621 of
the Hegira), and constitute an important group. For they have
increased in number through births and through the new recruits
sent there by Abou Yacoub and Abou YousouL"
Spain, therefore, was submerged by a whole influx of foreign
invaders, whom the natives, Christian and Musulman, no longer
counterbalanced, as during the first period of the conquest. So any
hope of fusion between victors and vanquished, the dream of unity
cherished or played with by the great Caliphs, and especially by
Spaniards sucn as the Cid and some of the Kings of Castile this
dream was henceforth made impossible of fulfilment.
While the national element predominated, it was possible to hope
that the spirit of the race would end by absorbing Berber and Arab.
Now, after so many massacres and expulsions, after this new flood
of barbarous and fanatical invaders, understanding between Christian
and Musulman became absolutely unrealisable. Religious passions
and hatreds, which had certainly died down under the regime of the
little Moorish kingdoms, acquired intensified vigour andT virulence.
Once more the fatal dilemma which had hung over Spain for more
127
 REACTION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
than four centuries presented itself to the Spaniards: expel the
foreigner, or be expelled by him!

Whatrendered contact with these Africans the more unpleasant

to them was the lack of culture of these soldiers who thought of
nothing but their arms and their horses. The little Moorish courts of
Andalusia, as we have seen, prided themselves upon their high degree
of refinement. They were very proud of their poets, their rhetoricians
and their grammarians. The Berbers themselves were considerably
dazzled by the Spanish civilisation.
"Spain," said Marrakeshi, "is the true capital and centre of the
Moghreb el Aksa, the source of its merits. All talents of all kinds derive
their origin from her and are regarded as belonging to her. It is in
this country that the suns and the moons of learning rise it is the
;

centre and the pivot of talents/*

Jealous of their brilliant neighbours, though they affected to de-
spise them, the Almoravid and Almohade Caliphs tried to make their
own original roughness and barbarism forgotten by attracting to
them men of letters, fine orators and penmen, and even philosophers.
It was said to be in accordance with a desire expressed one day by
Abou Yacoub El Mansour, one of the Almohade Caliphs, that
Averro6s undertook his commentary on Aristotle. But this zeal for
philosophy seems to have been nothing but a passing whim, the
"gesture" of an upstart. This same El Mansour, no douot under the
influence of the Musulman theologians, soon changed his tastes.
"Having convoked the principal personages of Cordova," writes
Renan, "he summoned Averros oefore him and, after having
anathematised his doctrines, condemned him to exile. At the same
time the Emir had edicts dispatched to the provinces prohibiting
dangerous doctrines, and ordering all books dealing with them to be
burned. Exception was made only in favour of medicine, arithmetic
and elementary astronomy."
One of his predecessors had already condemned to the flames the
books of the celebrated Ghazzali, author of The Vivification of Re-
ligious Knowledge. At Bougie the founder of the Almohade sect, Ibn
Toumert, in a fit of puritan zeal, had set an example by breaking
amphorae and musical instruments.
Fundamentally all these Berber sovereigns were fanatical devotees.
Never did the faquis enjoy a greater influence than during their
reigns. It was the theologians who were consulted about affairs of
State. No important decision was taken without their advice.
Philip II is the object of mockery because he submitted his cases
of conscience to his confessors. Apparently it is regarded as quite
natural that Yousouf ben Teshoufin should have thought fit to ask
the approbation of his faquis before undertaking a military operation
or deposing a traitorous prince. The founder of the Escorial con-
sidered public prayers and processions the surest means of winning
128
 INVASION OF THE ALMORAVIDS AND THE ALMOHADES
victory. The Almohade El Mansour, when he took the field, sur-
rounded himself with pious personages whose intercession he sought,
and he said to his officers: "There is my real army!"
These men, rude and full of faith, might have arrested the Spanish
Reconquest completely. In any case they held it back for nearly a
century. Their lack of a sense of continuity, their incapacity for
taking a broad view, and finally their perpetual divisions, enabled the
Christians to gain the upper hand again.
After the terror inspired throughout the West by the defeat of
Alfonso VIII at Alarcos, the Spaniards succeeded in reorganising
themselves and stimulating a kind of crusade in the neighbouring
countries. On July 16, 1212, the victory of Las Navas de Tolosa, in
which the Africans were overwhelmed, marked the beginning of the
deliverance.

129
THE RECONQUEST
 CHAPTER XV

The Stages of the

would be very simple-minded to imagine Christian Spain as

sighing, during eight hundred years after her defeat under Rodrigo,
ITfor
revenge and the reconquest of her lost provinces. In the first
place, there was
at that time no such thing as
Spain, but merely a
swarm of little states more or less divided one against the other.
Unity is a Roman conception, which was instinctively repugnant
to the Arabs, and no doubt also to the Arabised Spaniards. Funda-
mentally, it was only the clergy and even so only the regular clergy,
obedient to the Cluniac discipline and subject to Rome together
with the monks, and a few ambitious and intelligent princes, who
favoured a return to the unity of the kingdom.
On the other hand, the status quo undoubtedly presented many
advantages, though we are no longer in a position to judge them to-
day. Peoples, or the soundest sections or them, tend to prefer the
conditions they know to the risks of revolution or of a change of
regime. Disturbances are never welcomed except by a turbulent
minority. The masses submit, willy-nilly, to events which they can-
not control.
I have already pointed out why the reconquest was so slow. But
in the thirteenth century new factors emerged, which for a time
hastened the march of events. The power of the Almohades was
overthrown in Africa by that of the Merinides. That was the end of
the African strangle-hold on Spain, even though there were still
some attempts at Berber invasion of Andalusia under the Merinide
princes.
At about the same period, Spain was fortunate enough to produce
certain energetic ana enterprising sovereigns, who regained some
important fragments of the national patrimony and began the pro-
cess of throwing the hereditary enemy back to the other side or the
Strait: for example Ferdinand HI, Alfonso X, and Alfonso XI of
Castile and Alfonso the Warrior and James I of Aragon.
;

Victorious over the Africans in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa,

Alfonso Vin of Castile was no more capable of profiting by his
success than any Caliph of Cordova or Marrakesh. After a few raids
in Andalusia he recrossed the Sierra Morena and retired towards the
North. It was only under his successors that the reconquest acceler-
ated its tempo and acquired a scope hitherto unaccustomed.
In 1236 Ferdinand III, whom the Church made a Saint, obtained
the capitulation of Cordova on favourable terms. Some
unexpectedly
years later, in 1241, he advanced as far as Mdlaga and finally, in 1248,
to Seville. Southern Spain was beginning to recover her natural
frontiers.His son, Alfonso X
the Wise, retook Carthagena, CAdiz,
San Lucar, Niebk, and some towns in Algarvc,
133
 THE RECONQUEST
Meanwhile, in 1118, the King of Aragon, Alfonso the Warrior,
had taken possession of Saragossa, which the Almohades vainly
endeavoured to reoccupy. In the course of the thirteenth century
which was decidedly the great century of the reconquest his
successors made progress throughout the region of the East. James I
the Conqueror drove the Moors out of the Balearic Islands. (1229),
and recovered Valencia (1238), which had been evacuated by the
Christians after the death of the Cid, and finally Elche and Alicante.
In the following, century, Alfonso XI of Castile stopped a final
offensive of the Africans at Rio-Salado. This was after the Merinide
Sultan of Fez, summoned to Andalusia by the King of Granada
in accordance with the deplorable custom of the Musulman king-
lings had crossed the Strait with the intention of recovering
Andalusia from the Christians. Alfonso reconquered Algeciras, an
important strategic point as the disembarkation place of Berber
invaders. Only illness prevented him from recovering Gibraltar as
well.

In short, by the second half of the fourteenth century almost the

whole of Spain was in the hands of the Christian princes. One cannot
say that the reconquest came to a complete standstill at that date, for
it continued to progress slowly up to the end of the following

century. But it slowed down in a fashion which at first sight appears

incomprehensible, inasmuch as the Christians had nothing left in
front of them except the little kingdom of Granada. It seemed that,
after
forcing
one after another and at the cost of what efforts ! all
the mountain ramparts which divided the Peninsula, they became
immobilised at the one which protected the last Musulman state, in
front of the last of the Andalusian sierras, as though the final obstacle
were the most difficult to surmount.
This stagnation is to be explained in the first place by the dissen-
sions and civil wars which tore Spain during all the second half of
, the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth century,
and also by the rivalry between Castile and Arag6n. But perhaps the
main reason was the habit which the Spanish princes had acquired of
living at the expense of the Musulmans. It was so convenient to go
and raid in the territory of the Moors who for that matter did lie
same thing to the Christians. There was no reason why this deplor-
able system should come to an end so long as the two adversaries
found it to their advantage.
Only religious or monarchical motives could dictate the complete
and definitive expulsion of the Moors. But for that purpose a regular
campaign, a great military effort, was necessary. The kingdom of
Granada was not only excellently defended by nature, but also, with
the progress of the reconquest, it had become peopled by all the
elements which were most to Spain and to Christianity in
refractory
the whole of the evacuated area of the Peninsula.
Apart from the
134
 THE STAGES OF THE RECONQUEST
fact that the population had grown very dense, it was conspicuous
for its fanaticism and its hatred of the Christians. Finally these Moors,
descendants of the African Berbers, could always count upon their
brothers of Africa in case of attack by the Spaniards. Their ports
were open to all the tribesmen of Barbary.
For this final assault upon Islam, therefore, there were required
great strength and a unified Spain. This was why nothing serious
was attempted before the union of Castile and Aragdn under Ferdi-
nand and Isabel. Then the King of Granada, Abou Hassan, made the
mistake of provoking the Queen of Castile by taking Zahara from
her in 1478.
Isabel, occupied elsewhere, deferred her revenge for four years.
But in 1482 she inspired a regular crusade against the Moors,
assembled a considerable army, and decided her husband to act
vigorously against the Granadines. It was a great undertaking: it
took ten years to reduce the little kingdom and plant the Cross on
the walls of the Alhambra.
 CHAPTER XVI

The Kingdom of Granada

was this kingdom of Granada which so intensely

aroused the desire of the Catholic Sovereigns, of the Spanish
WHAT nobility, and of all adventurers in quest of booty?
'

To inform ourselves on this subject we can scarcely count on the

Arab writers, or even upon some Spanish writers, who have described
it without moderation or common sense. Both of them let themselves

go in laudatory exaggeration, in the most extravagant hyperbole, the

Spaniards in order to emphasise the value of .their conquest, the
Arabs in order to stress their regret for the lost province.
In the case of the latter, especially, the rigmarole and grandilo-

banaHty of their descriptions. The faults of decadence make them-

selves sadly conspicuous among these writers of Oriental prose. The
most important of them, Al Khatib, the Granadine historian, dis-
appoints us the more in proportion to the great hopes which we base
upon the exactitude and sanity of a Moor of Granada in describing
his city and his native soil to us.
This rhetorician who, at the same time, was a very shrewd and
clever politician boldly entitles his history of Granada: Splendour of
the Full Moon upon the Kingdom of the Nasserites. To him the city and
the court of Granada, as sublime as they are magnificent, defy aU
praise and all judgment They exhaust and reduce to impotence any
genius of language which would seek to describe and exalt them.
The beauty of the city is without rival, the desirableness of its situa-
tion beyond compare. Its throne is resplendent with glory. The two
rivers which enclose it are as a necklace of pearls.
Let me not seek to stop this windmill of words. Let me say merely
that out of all this beating of wings not very much emerges. Yet
these Arab word-mongers are less deceptive for us than the modern
historians, romancers and assthetes, who have buried poor Granada
under such a mass of prejudices, naive or clumsy errors, ready-
made phrases, in short under so much "literature/* that its true
appearance has ended by becoming unrecognisable. The case of cer-
tain historians is the most lamentable. These professionals of
criticism, whom elementary prudence ought to put on their guard,
have accepted the vaguest dithyrambs of the Arab authors with their
eyes shut and as "scientific" evidence.
Attempting to derive from these authors what residue of definite
information they nevertheless provide, and taking as my guide the
Spaniard who was best acquainted with the Musulmans of Africa
and Spain namely, Luis del Marmol Cdrvajal I shall endeavour to
present here a more faithful picture of Moorish Granada and the
kingdom.
 THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA
This little kingdom was in its decadence at the period of Ferdinand
and Isabel: in the first place on account of the palace intrigues and
revolutions and the wars of partisans which had weakened the
central authority ; and in the next place, and especially, because it was
ceaselessly threatened and attacked by the Christians.
Going back to the worst traditions of the caliphs and the Moorish
kings, the Christians raided the frontiers of Granada several times a
year.Despite truces, tributes paid by the Musulman princes, and
ofvassalage concluded by them, the Granadines within reach
treaties
of Castilian territory found themselves periodically invaded by
armed bands which cut down fruit trees, carried off crops and cattle,
made prisoners and seized all possible booty.
There was no security except in the city of Granada itself, which
was defended by the sovereign's mercenaries and, even so, Al
Khatib admits that it was sometimes alarmed by the incursions of the
enemy. The maritime regions and towns were probably more peace-
ful than the inland. They had not very much to fear from the
Christians, although Castifian squadrons practised piracy there from
time to time. They remained in touch with Barbary, which could
defend them in case of extreme necessity, at their own risk and peril.
The best protected part of the population was undoubtedly the
mountaineers of the Alpujarras, that region of the Andalusian sierras
whete the peasant was more or less his own master, and soldiers and
police only ventured with precaution in view of the difficulty of
access.
The country was certainly fertile and
prosperous. The Arab and
Spanish authors excel one another in admiration of so much richness
and fecundity. One would like to know precisely what justified these
eulogies and what exactly this terrestrial paradise was like. But they
tell us nothing that we could not guess in advance from a little read-

ing of the Arab geographers.

We may take it for granted. In all the towns there were excellent
baths and mosques, and bazaars bursting with merchandise. Here
the local figs were noted for their exquisite taste. There was to be
found cool water, even in summer and this water was sweet as
honey. Such-and-such a locality was renowned for its almonds and
raisins. Such another was noted for the excellence of its milk and
the perfumed breath of its women. A third Mdlaga "smelt sweet
as an uncorked phial of musk."
All this is charming, but it does not tell us much. At all times this
region of Andalusia was fertile ; it still is, despite the heat of a more
than African climate. It is naturally watered bjr the very abundant
streams of its mountains. During the last centuries of the Musulman
domination, when the population was considerably increased as a
resultof the exodus or the Moors expelled from the reconquered
provinces, the soil must have been intensively cultivated to a quite
exceptional extent.
137
 THE RECONQUEST
At the same time, we should not exaggerate the fertility of the land.
In general the district is of quite African aridity an aridity tempered
by oases of cultivation. Wherever there is water, fruits and crops
grow as well as could be wished. These water-points, these vegas and
these huertas^ abound in Andalusia. Moreover, at die period with
which we are concerned the cultivable soil of all this region was in
the hands of those admirable Spanish peasants who, in the distant
days of the Roman hegemony, gave Betica its reputation, and who
nowadays have succeeded in restoring in French Algeria the fertility
destroyed by the carelessness and barbarism of the Arabs.
These peasants are agricultural workers of extraordinary endur-
ance and application. It is they who have cleared the bush of the
Algerian Sahel and Tell, planted vines and sown corn, act as har-
vesters every year in the province of Oran, created zones of kitchen-
gardens around Algiers, and fill the French markets with early vege-
tables. Under the Arab domination, these serfs, attached to the soil
by the Romans and the Visigoths, became converts to Islam in large
numbers, owing to the facilities of afiranchisement which were offered
them. It was they who nourished their new masters, ignorant of
agriculture and, in addition, too proud and too laay to engage in it.
When the Christians regained the upper hand, these Spanish
peasants regarded it as a point of honour to remain faithful to Islam,
it was necessary to expel them, or attempt to convert them. After
they had gone, it was a hard job repopulating the soil, which for a
long time remained uncultivated. Hence arises the tenacious and
deep-rooted idea of modern historians that it was the Arabs who gave
Andalusia its fertility. In fact, these alleged Arabs were Spanish
peasants converted to Islam, when they were not Christians.
While the native element predominated in the country, in the
towns the bulk of the population was composed of Berbers and a
small number of Arabs, whose ancestors generally came from Syria.
In Granada itself, notably, the majority of the inhabitants were
Berbers, in other words Africans hence the hatred of them by the
Spaniards. On their side, all the Musulman Granadines, of whatever
origin, cordially execrated the Spaniards, "the barbarians who," as
Al Khatib puts it, "worship the wood of the Cross."

In this little state, the most fertile and undoubtedly the best culti-
vated in all Spain, wealth was above all agricultural. The Granadine
wig*, dotted with farms and country-houses, full of gardens and
orchards; aroused the admiration of the Venetian ambassador,
Andrea Navagero, as late as the reign of Charles V. The abundance
of water, of fountains, of irrigation canals, the plentifulness of flowers
in spring and of fruits almost all the year round, were another source
of marvelling for foreigners.
The figs of MAlaga enjoyed a special reputation throughout the
Mediterranean, It appears that they were exported not only to Egypt
138
 THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA
and Syria, but even, according to Al Macari, as far as China and
India. A
similar reputation was enjoyed by the Malagan raisins and
wines especially the wines, with which the good Musulmans re-
galed themselves, whether they were fermentedor not. There was a
saying current among them which was attributed to one of these con-
noisseurs, a hardened drunkard. When he was at the point of death
and was exhorted to repentance, he found only this grayer "Lord, I :

ask but one thing of Thee in Thy Paradise: to drink the wine of
Malaga and the vytoW- of Seville!"
The kingdom of Granada also produced a wheat which was highly
esteemed. Nowhere, it was said, was the bread better than at
Granada. It was that very compact and very white bread which is
still made in the eastern Spanish countryside, and of which the

fugitive Moors carried the recipe to Africa.

Apart from this agricultural wealth, the Granadines also enjoyed
commercial wealth and even, up to a certain point, industrial wealth.
The capital had some luxury industries jewellers' work, embroidery,
:

But the two really rich towns were the

business in stuffs of all kinds.
maritime towns, Almeria and Malaga. Both of them maintained
close relations with the ports of Barbary Oran, Algiers, Bon6, Tunis
and even with the Italian, Catalan, Levantine, and Turkish ports.
It was especially in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, under its

independent emirs, that Almeria witnessed

a great prosperity. It
carried on active trade with all the countries of the Mediterranean.
It had silk factories which, we are told, occupied as many as
eight
hundred looms. It also wove brocades and precious stuffs as well as
manufacturing cheap cotton stuffs. It produced pottery, glass-ware,
and all kinds of utensils in iron and bronze. If the Arab authors are
to be believed, its countryside was an enchantment, a paradise of
shade and greenery.
Most of these advantages and these beauties were no more than a
memory at the time of the conquest of Granada by the Christians.
On the other hand, Malaga had preserved all its importance and all
its wealth. It was still the rendezvous of the Barbary ships. It was
thither that flowed the alms collected throughout African Islam to
carry on the holy war against the Christians of Spain. Musulman
fraternities, analagous with the French fraternities de la Merci or de la
Triniti, were established there to ransom Musulman prisoners and
slaves in Christian territory. Finally, it was at Mdlaga that were un-
laden the ships bringing arms, munitions and even troops sent to the
support of the sovereigns of Granada by the Sultan of Morocco.
On account of this great, strategic importance of Mdlaga, and of
its famous citadel of Gibralfaro, which was regarded as impregnable,
Ferdinand began his campaign by laying siege to this rich and strong
city, and ended by capturing it. Its customs dues were to be an
important source of revenue to the treasury of Castile, apart from its
1
Zebfbi appears to have been a wine manufactured out of dried grapes.
'39
 THE RECONQUEST
still considerable commerce: its figs, its raisins, and its famous wines,
whose manufacture was increased by the Christians. I may also men-
tion its gilt porcelain, which at that time enjoyed a Mediterranean
reputation.

But these places were eclipsed by Granada, of which the

all

Spaniards, like the Arabs, speak with a kind of amorous exaltation.

It must be admitted that this city, so loved and so celebrated, pos-
sesses a charm to which we are still subject to-day, and which the
Spaniards of the sixteenth century must have felt more intensely
than we do, despite the presence or an execrated race and the almost
intact environment of a civilisation which they would have liked to
destroy * charm which is at first sight enigmatic ; for Granada is not
what is called a fine city, nor is it a comfortable or agreeable place in
which to live.
Marmol says that it resembled Fez, and that the citadel of the
Alhambra resembles that of Fez Djedid. He adds this illuminating
comment "The Kings of Granada always imitated those of Fez ; and
:

their cities, in site, appearance, buildings, administration and the rest

of it, much resemble Moroccan cities." The analogy is certainly

striking. When you contemplate Granada from the heights of the

Albaycin, this city built in tiers, with its terraces descending sharply
towards the steeply banked bed of the Darro, you are in fact re-
minded of the Moroccan capital as it is seen from that belvedere
where are the tolnbs of the Merinides.
But it is especially the colour, the atmosphere, which are the same :

the tawny, bare mountains in the distance, quite African in their

ruggedness and nakedness; and, sloping down the ridge in which the
river is swallowed up, the white and mauve tones of the buildings,
the burning red of the roofs, and the pale green of the porcelain
which armours the campaniles of the churches and the koubas of the
old Moorish pavilions. One thinks also of Tlemcen, whose country-
side, however, is greener and better watered than the vega of Granada.
One thinks of it especially because of Sidi Sou Medine,, which
strangely recalls the Generalife, quite white in its belt of
cypresses.
The landscape remains African. But the city of to-day is not in the
least like what it must have been under the Moorish kings. If we
wish to get an idea of it, we must deliberately close our ears to the
extravagances which the Arab authors tell us about it. They tell us
that it numbered more than two hundred thousand inhabitants, that
its fortified area was flanked by thirteen thousand towers, that it con-
tained more than sixty thousand houses, and all the rest of it.
Marmol, who interrogated Musulmans contemporary with Moorish
Granada, and may have seen the city very much, like what it was at
the time of the conquest, gives us much more modest
figures.
"When the Moors possessed it, 5 * he says, " and especially under
140
 THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA
Abou Hassan, about the year 1476 of the Christian era, Granada had
thirty thousand inhabitants. There were, besides, eight thousand
horse, more than twenty-five thousand crossbowmen, and three
days sufficed to assemble there fifty thousand men at arms, come from
the Alpujarra, from the Sierra, and from the Granadine valleys and
countryside." Marmol, moreover, reduces to thirteen hundred the
number of towers that flanked the enclosure which remains a
respectable figure.
It follows that the Moorish city, if we add the soldiers of the per-
manent garrison to the civil population, had scarcely more than
sixty-three thousand inhabitants a total decidedly less than that of
:

the present population, which is about one hundred thousand.

But one has only to follow the line of the old ramparts, of which
important remains subsist, to realise that the area of the Moorish
city, like that of Caliphal Cordova, was much less than that of the
modern city. The old city appears to have been divided and sub-
divided into a network of quarters or islets, enclosed within walls,
such as is still to be seen in the Moroccan cities and as was to be
seen also in Europe in the cities of the Middle Ages.
The chief quarter, to begin with the oldest, was that of the
Albaycin, built on the slope of a hill which runs down very steeply
to the rocky bed of the torrent and forms, in conjunction with the
closely neighbouring hill of the Alhambra, a regular rocky gorge.
This quarter was the true heart of the Moorish city. The first emirs
of Granada constructed there a fortress which was called the
Alcazaba Kadima, or the Old Citadel.
Another quarter, contiguous with this, comprised the Alcazaba
Djedid, or New Citadel ; and finally there was the Albaycin properly
so-called, which occupied the highest part of the hill. Opposite, on
the ground with a gentle slope which runs down to the wga* are the
more modern quarters of Zenete, Bibarambla, and Antequeruela.
As to the Alhambra, which dominates both the upper city and the
lower city, it was very early from the end of the ninth century a
fortified place. The Granadine princes, following the example of the
Cordovan emirs, who did not feel very safe in their capital, preferred
to establish themselves outside its walls, in a strong castle, whence
they could keep their subjects under surveillance and defend them-
selves against them in case of insurrection. But the Alhambra did
not reach its full development and attain its full splendour until the
dynasty of the Nasserites, that is to say at the end of the thirteenth
century and especially in the fourteenth.
Granada, like all Musulman
cities, had no monumental character.
"The Marmol, "were so narrow that from a window
streets/* says
one could touch the one opposite by stretching out his arm. There
were quarters where men on horseback and carrying lances in their
hands simply could not pass." The houses were small and narrow,
with very thick walls and no exterior ornamentation. The principal
14*
 THE RECONQUEST
public buildings were the mosques, which were very numerous, the
Koranic schools, the medersas* and the hospitals.
Marmol adds that these buildings were constructed along African
lines "a la usan%a africana" It seems more correct to say that they
were African houses built in the Spanish style, inasmuch as the
Berbers, especially the Moroccans, did nothing but imitate their co-
religionists of Spain that Spain which was regarded, in their eyes, as
:

the fatherland of art and enlightenment. Marmol, contemporary

with a Spain already re-Christianised, who had travelled in Africa,
may well have made the error of confusing the imitation with the
original he was not acquainted with Musulman houses other than
:

those of Africa.
It does not appear, in any case, that these buildings were anything
out of the way. Otherwise, despite all vandalism and all religious
or aesthetic prejudices, they would have been preserved, as were the
Mosque of Cordova, the Alcazar of Seville, and the Alhambra
itself:
The souks, for reasons of public utility, were preserved longer.
As in all the cities of Barbary, they were surrounded by high walls
and closed with heavy gates, strongly bolted and barred with iron.
There was what was called the Alcaicerta, the great silk market,
whose remains subsisted until modern times: narrow booths like
those of the old Roman markets, of which the souks are only a
survival, a maze of lanes, often covered by vaulting, in which the
merchants grouped themselves together in accordance with the
nature of their commerce.
Everything which is still sold in such places was sold there. But
there were Granadine specialities in the way of stuffs and jewellery,
necklaces, ear-rings, and silks and brocades of gold which were
especially renowned. The women, it appears, were very elegant, and
fond of rich and striking stuffs and of all the adornments of luxury.
One of the obstacles to the conversion of the Moriscos was the
obligation which was imposed upon them to change their Moorish
costume for the sober and severe Castilian costume. The Spanish
Moors clothed themselves in a way which foreshadowed that of the
Algerian
Moors of to-day. The women, veiled in white and with
their faces completely covered, except for the eyes, wore trousers
and plaited stockings which made their legs inordinately fat.
According to Andrea Navagero, the Venetian ambassador, who
visited Granada in 1526, they were shod in little shoes very neatly
worn, like our Algerian Moorish ladies. Finally, according to the
same witness, they wore in their hair high combs, whose shape could
be seen through their veils a detail of fashion which has been pre-
:

served by the Andalusian women, and of which something is to be

found even to-day in the coiffure of the women of Tlemcen.
Places of business on small lines and modest shops, the souks are
only exceptionally great commercial centres. At Granada wealth
142
 THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA
and government revenue were derived from other sources. Much
has been made of the weaving of silk, which still persisted there at
the time of the conquest. These looms must have been beginning
to vegetate, threatened as they were by Italian competition ; but they
made shift to live for some time longer. The silk industry had existed
for centuries in Spain, where it was not introduced by die Arabs, as
is continually repeated, but was already flourishing in Roman and

Visigoth times, when it was the subject of special regulation.

The major part of private fortunes, as of national wealth, was
derived in Granada, as elsewhere in the kingdom, from the fruits of
the soil. It is unquestionable that at that period the vega was excel-
lently cultivated, and covered with gardens and orchards, water-
mills and windmills, farms and villages, villas and country houses.
These retreats of shade and verdure, these oases bursting with
flowers and fruits, the abundance of water in a region of intense heat
and general aridity, at all times aroused passionate admiration and
recognition on the part of travellers. Still, neither these beauties of
the countryside, nor the natural amenities, nor the dazzling sun-
shine, nor the sublimity of the sierras none of these things would
suffice to explain the charm of Granada, where one might pass by
carelessly enough, were it not that, along with all these advantages,
it possesses something unique: namely, the astonishing perfection of
its Alhambra.

There is, nevertheless, something else to be seen at Granada:

there is a magnificent cathedral, which is one of the masterpieces of
the Spanish architecture of the Renaissance. Alongside this cathedral
there is also a sacrarium, occupying the site of the principal mosque
of the Moors (a fact which at least proves that this mosque was not
very large) a chapel-royal in which is the mausoleum of Ferdinand
:

and Isabel. Finally there are the Lonja and the old Chapter House,
which in their way are little masterpieces too.
But all these pale into insignificance beside the outstanding grace
of the Alhambra and of its satellite, the Generalife. The marvellous
cathedral of Granada has its counterparts in Spain herself, to begin
with in its nearest neighbour, that of Seville. The Alhambra and the
Generalife have no analogies. There is nothing that resembles them.
They are as extraordinary in their perfection, measure for measure,
as the Parthenon or the little temple of the Wingless Victory.
It must be recognised that chance has its part to play in this per-
fection: it is the fortuitous meeting of an accomplished work of art
and a great, or a charming, setting. The Alhambra, in short, is no
more man a kasbab, an alcazar, such as are to be found throughout
the lands of Islam: like Medina az Zahara, like Fez Djedid. But these
sumptuous edifices lack a pedestal.
Dismount the Parthenon from its Acropolis, and it is diminished
down to, if not below, the level of the temple of Paestum. Dis-
143
 THE RECONQUEST
mount the Alhambra from its hill, deprive it of the altitude of its
towers and its walls falling sheer to the gorges of the Darro, rob it
of its view of the Albaycin as a background and it is reduced to the
same level as the Alcdzar of Seville, which is larger, richer, is in parts
and opens upon splendid gardens.
as fine,
The Alhambra and the GeneraJife are masterpieces made out of
nothing, whose charm depends upon the intimate collaboration of
all kinds of external influences and circumstances, which unite with
the resources of an art bordering upon perfection. As to this art
itself, in what does it consist? It is an affair of plaster, wood, brick,
arrayed in mouldings. It is a fragile setting which has no pretensions
to lasting, and has had to be restored over and over again. This
gallery, or that belvedere, stands all awry.
Yet the architects who grouped these effects, who arranged these
vistas, have made mediocre material and cheapness yield the maxi-
mum of advantage in the way of amenity and beauty. These plasters
crumble away, they are coloured in crude or common tones which
are not always modern restorations. But the artists in stucco who
worked upon them were endowed with a startling and never equalled
imaginativeness.
These so much vaunted gardens and courtyards are little flower-
beds and squares. Only the Court of Myrtles, with its mirror of water,
satisfies the demands of our eyes. The Court of Lions strikes us as

congested and crowded ; it lacks proportion. These stuccos seem cut

out of cardboard, these columns all in a row seem mean and flat as
wood-carvings. These little rose-jets of water which scatter a scanty
shower ; these little water-channels ; these little basins ; these pigeon-
baths ; these lawns on which a meagre verdure withers ; these few
roses, these few jessamines ; these pots of flowers here and there ;
these glazed pantiles and porcelain all this is utterly simple and
puerile ; it is tne very infancy of art. The greenery itself is restricted
to a few shrubs.
To create some shade around the Alhambra, it was necessary for
the English to come along and plant some elms the English know
what they are doing where trees are concerned. But this fine British
park, which serves as a vestibule to the palace of Boabdil, and which
tourists take to be a Moorish creation, is regarded as extremely
commonplace by comparison with the little courtyard of Lindaraja,
where there is nothing to be seen but a fountain inside four walls and
half a dozen cypresses.
One can understand the contempt of the architects of Charles V
for these dolls* gardens, these kiosks in pkster and brick, all this
mediocre material. It was in fine marble that they preferred to build
and build edifices which defied the centuries. They started their
own masterpiece opposite the Moorish rubbish-heap a heavy
barracks, which in some of its proportions is nevertheless admirable.
But this colossal palace,, with its pretensions to overwhelm every-
144
 THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA
thing, cannot stand up for a moment against the fragile miracles of
the Granadine stucco-workers, gardeners, and architects.
Whowere these artists and architects? Whence did they come?
The Alhambra is a unique creation, whose antecedents and themes of
inspirationmay indeed be found elsewhere, which itself served as a
model ; but it is of such clean-cut originality that it could not have
arisen anywhere but where it stands. It is a product of the soil.
Those who summoned this piece of fairyland out of the ground, like
those who raised the mosque of Cordova, could not have been any-
thing but Spaniards, sons of a country of delight, a country of sculp-
tors and builders.
We know for a fact that a number of Christian captives worked on
the Alhambra, either as decorators or as simple artisans. Some
critics profess to see in it, or at least in certain parts of the edifice,
the achievement of Christian artists. 1 The arabesques of the Barka
and those of the Court of Lions admit floral elements, notably corols
of jessamine, which are contrary to the canons of Musulman art.
It is quite possible. But it is equally admissible that the authors of
these marvellous embroideries of stucco were Musulman Spaniards
influenced by the ornamental sculpture of the
Visigoth artists.
The Visigoth sculptors and ornamenters in Spain appear to have
rivalled the Musulman stucco- workers the former did with stone
:

and marble what the latter did with stucco. It was a question who
could push decorative exuberance and complexity furthest. In any
case, tne influence of Gothic seems obvious in the Alhambra, in the
paintings of the Hall of Justice as well as in the arabesques of the
Barka and the Court of Lions.
Yet the two arts, the Gothic and the Moorish, appear to be
mutually exclusive. They proceed from opposed principles. The
first iswholly penetrated with life and intellect. Not only docs it
strive to reproduce all living forms ; it also speaks to the mind. It
desires to instruct It suggests a conception of the world and of life.
It is human and serious.
The second lays claim to nothing but an appeal to
the eye. It is an
art which is
extremely sensual. It seeks voluptuousness much more
than beauty. That is why one stands disarmed in the presence of it.
Itconquers you with the minimum of effort. It is the courtesan who
has only to present herself naked before her judges to make them
yield.
Contemplate the Court of Myrtles one evening, at the hour of
twilight. Iknow no enchantment comparable with it. You have
around you nothing but bare walls framing a mirror of water. At the
two ends of the courtyard two galleries extend their arcature under a
lacework of stucco. In the background the battlements of the Tower
of Comares stand out against the sheen of the sky a powerful, war-
like masonry which contrasts with the fragility ana grace of the

Georges Mar^ais: Manuel d' Art Musulman^ Vol.

1
Cf. II, p. 640.
F 145
 THE RECONQUEST
arabesques, with the wide, warm orange surfaces still
tinged with
the splendour of the setting sun.
At your feet lies the shining surface of the quadrangular basin,
which reflects all these reposeful, magnificent forms. There is the
pearly tinkle of a fountain or a jet of water dropping into a vase.
A fresh breeze, coming from the snowy mountains, adds its caress to
the perfume of myrtle and jessamine stUl burning with the heat of the
day. In the distance, beyond the shady halls with their stalactite
cupolas, is the double arcn of a single window, whose middle column
stands out divinely against the background of an aery landscape
bathed in all the lights of Paradise.
One does not say for a moment "How fine this is
: 1 How
uplifting
this isl" but "How delicious this is! How charming it is herel I
wish I could stay here always I'*

On January 2 of the year of grace 1492, in the morning, the

Catholic Sovereigns made their solemn entrance into the Alhambra.
They had just planted the silver Cross and the standard of Castile
on the Watch Tower. On the threshold of the Citadel, the alcaide
Youssef Aben Comija had handed over the keys to Their Highnesses.
But these grave personages had no eyes either for the wonderful
landscape or the miracles of art which surrounded them. Perhaps
they were only half sure of themselves when they penetrated into
this last retreat of their vanquished enemy. In any case serious
anxieties must have absorbed their thoughts. They entrusted the
keys of the fortress to the Count de Tend ilia, whom they appointed
They had the
their Captain-General of the Kingdom of Granada.

ramparts
and the towers occupied by their infantry. Then, after
receiving a delegation of notables, they spent their first night in that
unknown palace, above a city silent, secret, and seemingly deserted.

146
 CHAPTER XVII

The Surrender of Granada and the Expulsion of the Moors

make an end of anything. In history as in

surrender did not
I life, no such thing as an end everything begins all over
there is :

--
again. It would be a mistake to suppose that, after the taking
of Granada, Spanish Islam was decisively vanquished that there
was nothing left except, on the one side, faithful subjects of the
Catholic Sovereigns, honest Musulmans who asked only to be
allowed to live in peace, and, on the other side, fanatical Christians,
intent upon persecuting them.
In reality there was still in Spain a foreign people, once victorious
and conquering, now momentarily beaten, but awaiting a revenge
foretold by prophecies, as its defeat had been. This people was not
confined to the narrow limits of the kingdom of Granada. Its rami-
fications extended throughout all Spain. It maintained constant rela-
tions and contact with its co-religionists in Africa. It was restless and
still to be feared.

Outsjde,the JPeninsulaJt was not understood in the first place why

jte Christian reconquest,had beeu so slaw, and, aboye all, why the
^ Spaniards, now^tibat they wese masters of the country again, did not

^erminateTor expel the Moors once and for alL As far back as die
thirteenth century, at the time of the great Almohade peril, when
jcontitigents from beyond the Pyrenees came to the help of the 4

^CasiriliaQSy these allies- of theirs were indignant "at the comparative

"leniency of the Spaniards towards Moors who were defeated or com-
pelled to surrender.
Alter th Vidtol^oFLas Navas, the Archbishop of Narbonne, who
was among the combatants, openly complained about the capitula-
tion proposed by the inhabitants of Ubeda, which guaranteed them
possession of their city and the surrounding territory, together with
their property. According to the archbishop, this was "an arrange-
ment made against God/* a veritable sacrilege. Later, when Franois
I was a prisoner of Charles V, and the story of die conquest of
Granada was read to him, it appears that he exclaimed: "And these
Musulmans? They were not ctriven out? Then everything is still to
be done!"
Events more and more justified the view of the King of France,
who was reasoning here as a political realist. But neither the French
nor any other foreigners could understand the practical motives
which dictated the conduct of the Castilian and Ajragonese princes.
In maintaining the Moors in Spanish territory, in granting them
what was called "the share of the Mud^jares" that is to say, the
convention specifically made with the Musulmans living on Christian
soil they were solely concerned with avoiding the depopulation of
 THE RECONQUEST
the reconquered territories. They did not want to ruin either the
commerce or the agriculture of their new domains.
Besides, it was a long-standing custom among the Christian
princes to prefer protectorate,
with payment of tribute,^ to complete
conquest
and expulsion or extermination. For centuries they had
lived on tribute paid by the Moors. In the same way as the Moors
for centuries had "consumed the Christians," so, since they had be-
come the stronger, they had started consuming their enemies.
There were thus created and maintained supporting territories,
tributaries which cost nothing and paid handsomely. Indeed, it
seemed quite natural and even quite just to take the conquered
enemy's money and sell him for hard cash the right to live and
possess. Given this system, it was no wonder that the reconquest
dragged on so long.
It must be recognised, moreover, that this system did not involve
too much inconvenience so long as the Catholic Sovereigns found
themselves confronted by an Islam divided into a swarm of little
states, which they could always play off one against the other. The
situation changed when, in opposition to a unified Spanish Christi-
anity, there remained only a confused mass of Musulmans united
only by religious belief, hatred of the conqueror, and desire for
independence.
occupied by the Moors were
Superficially the territories formerly
ail reconquered. They were so only on paper. Parchments, covered
with signatures and duly sealed with leaden seals hanging by silk
threads, recognised the Spanish sovereigns' possession of the town?
and fortresses which had surrendered to them. As much by guile
and diplomacy as by force of arms, they were the victors. Then they
had to accept the consequences of conquest: either assimilate the
vanquished, or else eliminate them.
The greatest error of all is to suppose that, for the Spaniards, the
maintenance of the Moors in their national territory reduced itself to
a question of liberty of conscience. Liberty of conscience is never
more than a pretext, which always covers material interests of the
most tangible character, Ifmotive&of a religious kind were advanced
to justify the expulsion or conversion of the Moors, the real motives,
or at least the most were of a political kind.
Dressing,
-
In default of forming a clear idea of the political side of the prob-
lem, most modern historians have judged it in the most unreasonable
way. They speak of this tragic affair as though it were solely a
matter of principle, as though it all resolved itself for the Spaniards
into a question of showing tolerance and Christian charity. They
refuse to see that after the taking of Granada, as before it, Spain was
partly occupied by a foreign people, With whom the Spaniards could
nave nothing in common: a people fixed in their religion, their
language, and their customs, who proposed to go on living there
as though they were at home, detested their rulers and
neighbours,
148
 SURRENDER OF GRANADA AND EXPULSION OF THE MOORS
and maintained relations with peoples which were enemies of Spain*
and Christianity the Berbers, the Moroccans, the Egyptians, the
Turks and plotted with them. -7*" '

One must be completely blinded by prejudice, or have no sense of

historical realities, to fail to see how dangerous the presence of the
Moors in the territory of Spain was to the Spaniards. Imagine the
situation if, say, the French had, not only on their marches, in
Lorraine, in Champagne, and in Franche-Comte, but even in
Provence and Languedpc, whole populations of Germans, installed
in their towns and their countryside, proposing to remain German
and learning nothing of French language or French usages, continu-
ing to live as a separate "nation," and finally trafficking and intriguing
with their compatriots on the other side of the Rhine.
The answer is supplied by facts. When they recovered Alsace and
Lorraine, which the Germans had annexed, the French began by
expelling a number of Germans whose presence in French territory
seemed to them dangerous. Everybody found this measure quite
natural and perfectly legitimate. Similarly nobody took exception
when the government of Mustapha Kemal expelled a million and a
quarter of Greeks from Asia Minor.
It is true that the reasons invoked were political reasons. Never-
theless, in the case of the Turks, the real and fundamental reasons
were of >a religious kind. It is a wretched business to mix up
religlbn'^th these brutal measures of national security. That is what
has aroused so much hatred against the Spaniards. But in the six-
teenth century, as in the Middle Ages, political measures were
masked by religious pretexts, just as to-day they are masked by racial,
social or humanitarian considerations. It is in the name of humanity
that millions of Russians have been exterminated or driven to take
flight by the Soviets.
Fundamentally, it is always a question of suppressing the adversary
of taking his property or his purse. But we require an ideal to veil
or colour human weaknesses. Humanity does not dare to be frankly
frightened or nakedly ferocious. It was, alas in the name of Heaven
!

that the Spaniards exterminated and expelled the Moors j but it must
be recognised that in doing so they had the best of worldly reasons.
I may add that they had, above afi, the example of the Moors them-
selves, and, in addition, an appetite for vengeance and reprisal which
had been awaiting its satisfaction for centuries. We have seen that,
under the Emirs of Cordova, as under the Almohades, whole popula-
tions of Spaniards, Christians and Musulmans, had been massacred,
deported or exiled, forced to abjure or die. It was this violence, these
bloodthirsty proceedings, which provoked the reprisals of the
Spaniards and made them, in their turn, fanatical and merciless.
Finally we should not forget that, at the time of the war of
Granada, Barbary piracy was more than ever afflicting the coasts of
Andalusia and the East of Spain ; that thousands of Spaniards were
149
 THE RECONQUEST
regularly being reduced to slavery by
the Moors of Africa ; that the
Christians in their turn were bent upon capturing Barbaresques ; and
that it was a war without mercy, in which each side tried to do the
other the utmost possible harm.
But, I repeat, welare not concerned to justify or condemn either
the one side or the other. History is not a special pleader. It seeks
to explain, to understand, to discover the causes of events and dis-
close the motives of human actions. ?Let us see, then, how the situa-
tion presented itself to the Catholic Sovereigns, on the morrow of the
taking of Granada.

The Moors were very far from being crushed. The proof that

they had not ceased to be formidable was that fighting against them
had been going on for ten years, and no longer in a little war of
skirmishes and raids, but in a regular campaign involving large
numbers of men, an imposing amount of artillery, and a whole field
train. Despite this great effort, the Spaniards had succeeded in taking

only the principal fortresses. Moreover, they had obtained sur-

renders such as those of Milaga and Baza only after more or less
dubious dealings which strongly resembled treachery on the other
side.
Granada itself would have been very difficult to take by force of
arms. The Spaniards confined themselves to besieging it on the side
of the vega. But this blockade was guite inadequate, as the com-
munications of the besieged on the side of the mountains remained
entirely free.
Finally, in despair of anything else, Isabel caused a rival city to be
constructed
opposite Granada, Santa-F,
where her army would
remain indefinitely until Granada capitulated. It was the Arab
system, employed notably by El Mansour to reduce Tlemcen. The
prospect of an interminable siege, maintained by a niunerous army,
alone decided the notables ana King Abou Abdilehi (Boabdil) to
surrender.
Conscious of their strength and their number, they proposed their
own terms to the Spaniards. They treated with them as equals with
equals. In short, there were neither victors nor vanquished. This
was why^ the Moors thought that they could show themselves exact-
ing, while the Catholic Sovereigns, realising how insecure their
opportunity was, gjave proof in the matter of really extraordinary
generosity and spirit of conciliation. This capitulation, which com-
prised no less than fifty-five articles, is worth studying in detail. It
shows in how much of a hurry Ferdinand and Isabel were to end
the war, and, accordingly, how ready they were to make any
concessions.
On the Spanish side the dominant idea was to persuade
the
Granadines that, in capitulating, they were merely passing under the
protection of masters much gender than their Musulman princes.
150
 SURRENDER OF GRANADA AND EXPULSION OF THE MOORS
Instead of being ground down by greedy tyrants who loaded them
with taxes and were incapable of defending them, they were to be-
come the faithful vassals of powerful lords, who would treat them
with kindness and consideration.
One point to which the contracting parties revert repeatedly is

of respecting t
^
,

The Christian soldiers were forbidden to enter the mosques with-

out the permission of the faquis, to go into Moorish houses, steal
fowl or beasts, or give balls and feasts against the wishes of the in-
habitants. Further, on the day of Their Highnesses' entrance into
the Alhambra, the Christian troops did not march through the city.
They took a roundabout route, outside the walls, in order to avoid
any provocation. Finally, the Spanish soldiers were not allowed to
set foot on the ramparts which separated the Alcazaba from the
Albaycin, whence they could have cast indiscreet eyes upon Moorish
dwellings. It would have been impossible to be more respectful
towards the vanquished and their usages and susceptibilities.
They were, of course, granted complete liberty of conscience and
freedom of public worship. They preserved their mosques, their
minarets, and their muezfcins. Conversions to Christianity were to
be unforced. "The Moors shall be judged by their own laws, in
accordance with the decisions of their cadis. They shall maintain,
and be maintained in, their usages and good customs."
They were to retain their property, movable and immovable. In
regard to taxes, "they shall not give and pay others to Their High-
nesses than those which they give and pay to the Moorish kings."
A capital clause was that they owed no military service. c *It is estab-
lished and agreed that the Moors shall not be summoned or con-
strained to any service of war their will."
against
If they did not wish to be subjects of the Catholic Sovereigns, they
had the option of emigrating to "the other side of the sea," in other
words, to Africa. Ships chartered by Their Highnesses would trans-
port them there in all security. They could pass freely to Barbary or
Morocco with their property and their merchandise, tneir gold, their
silver, their jewels, and even their arms, fire-arms exceptecL
If they were not satisfied "on the other side of the sea," if they
found themselves molested as was to be foreseen by their co-
religionists there, they had the right to return to the tingdom of
Granada within a period of three years, and they would then enjoy
all the advantages contained in the capitulation.
Merchants could come and go freely and in all security to transact
their business "on the other side of the sea," in other words anywhere
in Africa. "They may travel and traffic in all the provinces subject to
Their Highnesses, without paying more excise dues than the
Christians pay."
 THE RECONQUEST
The markets and the slaughterhouses of the Christians were to be
separated from the markets and slaughterhouses of the Moors.
Their merchandise and provisions were not to be intermingled with
those of the Christians. They were to conserve their aqueducts and
their fountains. They were to drink their own water. The Christians
were forbidden to drink it or wash clothes in it.
All this was summed up in the preliminary formula: "The Moors
shall be favoured and well treated by Their Highnesses and their
'
honourable officers as good vassals and servants.

It was too good to be true for the Moors, and it was disastrous for
the Catholic Sovereigns. Such a treaty amounted purely and simply
to recognition of a "Moorish nation" maintained in Spanish territory
in a
privileged position
no military service, right to be judged by a
special jurisdiction, right to travel in Barbary and traffic there with
other Musulmans.
One is driven to ask how Ferdinand and Isabel could have put
their signatures at the foot of such conditions, and done so in the
most strictly and solemnly binding formulae: "We assure, promise
and swear by our faith and royal word that we will observe, and make
observed, everything herein contained, everything and every part,
now and hereafter, now and forever."
Did they sign this capitulation only for the purpose of bringing
to an end a costly war, which had been
going on for ten years, and
with the secret intention of breaking their engagements? It is quite
possible in the case of Ferdinand. It is less admissible in the case of a
Christian as pious as Isabel. Perhaps she really believed, at the out-
set, that everything could be settled in a friendly way, given plenty
of goodwill on both sides.
Certain members of the clergy themselves, such as the first Arch-
bishop of Granada, Don Fernando de Talavera, were in favour of the
broadest tolerance. "They are children/* this said of the
prelate
Moors; "they must be nourished with milk." This missionary spirit
was convinced that, by dint of charity, it was possible to educate and
convert them. Perhaps, too, the victorious sovereigns were subject
to that common and always reborn illusion, which consists in believ-
ing that the vanquished may stretch out his hand to the victor, be-
cause it suits the latter to forget the harm they have done one
another.
If Ferdinand and Isabel began by sharing this illusion, they were
not to keep it long. To know where they stood, they had only to
cast an eye over their new conquest, and take stock of the position
in which they had themselves placed the Moors in their respective
states.
The situation was far from being
reassuring
to them. They
occupied, in fact, only Granada, the surrounding cities, and the mari-
time towns. Apart from these, the coasts were not safe: they were
 SURRENDER OF GRANADA AND EXPULSION OF THE MOORS
infested by Barbaresque pirates and spies. The inhabitants of the
ports and the coastal villages concerted plans with the Africans
little
for descents and raids inland. The whole mountainous centre, and
notably the region of the Alpujarras, was peopled almost exclusively
by rebels, declared or secret. A mistake had been made in allowing
these warlike mountaineers, like the rest of the population, to retain
their arms.
These Moors of Andalusia were mostly of Berber origin, in other
words, Africans who could not fail to detest the Spaniards and be
detested by them. It is generally forgotten that racial hatreds are at
the bottom of all fanaticisms and all religious hatreds.
Another piece of imprudence was the permission granted to the
Moors to cross over to Africa, where they went to swell the number
of pirates and enemies of Spain and Christendom. Still worse, those
who stayed behind were permitted to travel in Barbary and do busi-
ness there in other words, maintain relations with the worst
enemies of the Spanish Sovereigns. Spies were thus benevolently
provided for future invaders or for the ordinary pirates who per-
petually made clandestine descents on the Andalusian coast. Realisa-
tion of these grave errors came quickly. Later, instead of the expelled
Moors being directed towards Barbary, they were compelled to pro-
ceed to Biscay and Catalonia.
The worst danger was that not only was the kingdom of Granada
mainly peopled by Moors, but also they were established throughout
the Peninsula. There were Mudejares, as they were called, in Castile,
in Arag6n, in the old kingdom of Valencia, and even in Le6n. Those
of Granada were now authorised to circulate freely in all the Spanish
provinces. It was obvious that an intolerable situation was being
created and that the Musulmans were being positively encouraged to
form a dangerous solidarity.
Side by side with this internal danger there was the external
danger, which, at that moment, was even worse. If Barbary was
divided and its sovereigns no_longer had anything more man a
nominal authority, the Barbaresque corsairs, protected by the Turks,
were increasing all the time. Since the taking of Constantinople,
the Ottoman menace had become a nightmare for Europe. The
Moors of Andalusia went on repeating that at any moment tne fleets
of the Sultan, in alliance with those of the Barbaresque pirates, would
once more invade Spain.
This popular belief kept the Musulman masses in a more or less
latent state of effervescence and rebellion. In fact they relied cjuite
openly upon these protectors of Islam. Some years after the capitula-
tion,when the Catholic Sovereigns compelled the Moors to become
converts or cross over to Barbary, those of the Albaycin dispatched
emissaries to the Sultan of Egypt to demand his intervention. He
threatened the Spanish Sovereigns with reprisals against the Christians
of Ask, and they were reduced to sending the first prior of the
IJ3
 THE RECONQUEST
Cathedral of Granada, Pedro Martir, to furnish him with explana-
tions and put before him letters signed by the authorities of the mari-
time towns of Barbary, attesting that the expelled were being treated
by the Spaniards with all possible consideration.
All this was sufficiently humiliating for Ferdinand and Isabel, and
the position of the Moors established in Spain became a more and
more disquieting problem. They might present the appearance of the
most peaceful submission, they might even become converts ; they
remained nevertheless fundamentally Musulmans, watching for a
favourable opportunity and patiently awaiting the hour of revenge,
promised by tneir prophecies.
So the taking of Granada, so much celebrated by the Castilians and
by the whole of Christendom, did not seem at first sight to be more
than a decorative event, which masked a very serious situation and a
future full of menace. At the same time, the mere fact that there was
no longer a single Musulman state in Spain was in itself a consider-
able result. But it was only the beginning of a long process of uni-
fication which was to last more than a century.

Fgr Ferdinand and Isabel the most pressing task was that of pre-
venting the cohesion of all the Moors scattered about the soil of the
Peninsula. Their obviously designated intermediary was the Jew -
the travelling, trafficking Jew.
The Spaniards still remembered the role which the Jews had played
at the time of the invasion of Spain by the Musulmans. They had
made a pact with the invaders, and provided garrisons to watch over
the* Christian cities and keep them in
subjection.
The Christians re-
garded them as traitors and as the natural allies of the Moors. Now
that die whole of Spain had become Christian again, the Jews had no
other resource but to lean upon the Musulmans, their sometime
enemies.
This certainly seems to have been the reasoning which decided
Isabel and Ferdinand to expel them from less than three
Spain,
months after the surrender of Granada. Besides, their money was
wanted to defray the expenses of the war. Once again religious
motives lent cover to a brutally cynical proceeding. On March 30,
1492, the decree of expulsion was signed.
After this preventive measure, the line of conduct adopted by die
Spanish Government towards the Moors appears to have been this:
to induce them to leave by an undethand system of oppression and by
pressure aimed at bringing them to baptism. The illusion prevailed
for a time that mass conversions might yield good results. It was
reckoned that, failing the parents themselves, at least the sons of
converts
might make good Spaniards and good Christians.
This illusion was dispelled. Despite the most severe supervision,
despite the terrible rigours of thelnquisitipn, the converted Moors,
the Moriscos as they were called, remained obstinately Musulman.
154
 SURRENDER OF GRANADA AND EXPULSION OF THE MOORS
They were a permanent danger to the Spanish state, especially when
war or European politics provided them with favourable oppor-
tunities for trying to shake off the yoke*
Atthe end of me reign of Philip B, the Moriscos of Aragon made
an offer to Henri IV _o France to put at his disposal an arm of F

eighty thousand men. It was not treason, inasmuch as these Moriscos

regarded themselves as foreigners in Spain and were treated there as
pariahs* But it is understandable that these malcontents and secret
rebels should have remained a continual object of suspicion and
anxiety on t&e part of the Spaniards.'
So, after the expulsion or the Moors, the logic of the reconquest
led the conquerors tq expel the Moriscos as well. That this drastic
procedure was disastrous for Spain there is not the shadow of a
doubt. If a swarm of people profited by it, the country as a whole
was impoverished, and above all it was
depopulated.
It is idle to
attempt hypocritically to disguise the fact that every
conquest, like every revolution, is always an expropriation, more or
less disguised. Wmle the constables and the officers of justice had
filled their pockets with the fines to which repressive regulations

exposed the poor Moriscos, Christian merchants and landlords

bought at bargain prices the houses and the lands which they
abandoned when they were expelled. But the nobles who employed
Moorish or Morisco peasants on their estates to till their land were
furious at these expulsions, and they opposed them as far as they
could, making themselves responsible for the peacefulness and sul>
mission of the suspects.
Indeed, the government of Madrid itself was dismayed at the
thought of depopulating whole regions and ruining the commerce
of towns. Philip II, despite his religious convictions, only very re-
luctantlybrought himself to sign the edict which, in 1565, gave the
Moriscos the choice between exile and sincere and complete con-
version.
One can easily realise, therefore, what Spain lost through these
radical measures of protection. But.tbe~txuth is that there was an
absolute incompatibility of temperament between her nationals and
these foreigners, descendants of Africans. She could not keep them
on her soil except at the price of subjecting them to armed force and
constraining
them to perpetual surveillance, as in colonial territory.
The Peninsula, with its unassimilable Moors and Jews, would
have been nothing more than a transit territory, as the countries of
the Levant still are a without unity, without
to-day: hybrid country,
character. Europe would have had its "Levantines" like Asia. Spain
would have become one of those bastard countries which live only
by letting themselves be shared and exploited by foreigners, and have
no art, or thought, or civilisation proper to themselves.
As though they realised this, her rulers sacrificed everything to the
,

task of political and religious unification. It is a surprising thing that,

 THE RECONQUEST
despite their terrible hecatombs, they diminished neither the military
power of their country nor its capacity for expansion* After rudely
all the foreign elements which might adulterate its
rejecting strength
of character, the Spanish genius, as though it had been contracted
and driven in upon itself, acquired a unique originality.
Never did it give more abundant and more magnificent fruits than
hundred and fifty years which followed die
in that period of nearly a
conquest of Granada, and which the Spaniards called their "Golden
Century/* Finally, and above all, thanks to this pitiless policy,
Europe, threatened in the East throughout the sixteenth century
and even in the seventeenth century by the advance of the Turks,
was delivered in the West from the Musulman peril.

156
 CHAPTER XVIII

The Balance-Sheet of the Arab Conquest

you travel in Greece of to-day, you are surprised at

the fewness of the traces which the Turkish domination
WHEN has left. At most in some little town, entirely European in
appearance, you will find, if you look for it carefully, a minaret or
the wall of a mosque which the Greeks forgot to demolish.
Similarly in Spain, though there the Musulman domination
lasted very much longer, you must have good eyes to find Arab
remains. Certainly many more exist than the uninformed tourist
or traveller realises; but you have to look for them. The three
most important monuments which have survived, namely the
Alhambra of Granada, the Alc&ar of Seville, and the Great Mosque
of Cordova, clash so sharply with the buildings which surround
them that they have the air of exotic edifices. So the spontaneous
feeling of the passer-by is that Spain, like Greece, did everything
she could to rid herself of Islamism.
It requires very little reflection to realize the utterly contradictory
factors which separated the Christians from the Musulmans of Spain.
Externally there was nothing in common between these two species
of men inhabiting the same country nothing either in costume or
:

in manner of life* The miniatures of the Middle Ages show us the

Andalusian Musulmans clothed in the Asiatic way, with turban
and long robe, whereas the Castilians wear the helm and breeches
of the men of the North. I have also insisted earlier upon the horror
of the Christians for the dissolute life of the "pagans* of Andalusia.
Yet, though the external influence of the Arabs is but little to be
seen in Spain, their moral influence, their action upon character
and mentality, were more profound than is generally believed. At
this in our study, it is appropriate to ask ourselves in what
point
this influence consisted and what the Spaniards owed to the Arab

conquest.

What they certainly owed to the schools of Cordova, Seville and

Saragossa was a variety of scholasticism, similar enough, for thaf
matter, to that of our own universities of the Middle Ages. The
scholasticism of the Arabs was in itself only a shadowy derivative
of Greco-Latin scholasticism. The bulk of this teaching terrible
in its verbalism and almost entirely theological reduced itself to
some idea of medicine, mathematics, and astronomy, but especially
of astrology, alchemy, and detnonology. The occult part of the
Judeo-Arat> learning was what most attracted the Christians not
only of Spain, but also of the whole of medieval Europe.
Let us recall, in this connection, that the basis of this scientific
teaching was of Greek, Latin, or Persian origin. It was the philosophy
157
 THE RECONQUEST
of Aristotle which came back to the Latins of the West through the
medium of the more or less faithful interpretation of Averroes.
In the way of art, the influence of the Arabs was certainly con-
siderable. It was this art, invented and practised by Spaniards,
that was the most original thing they produced. Mudejar art was
adopted, in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, by
the whole Christian community. If it acted upon Gothic, Gothic in
its turn reacted upon it. It must be admitted that this action of the

Mud6jar was not always very happy. It led the Spaniards to rival it
in decorative overloading and complexity.
For example, the doorway of the cathedral of Salamanca clearly
reveals how anxiety to rival arabesque led the Christian sculptors to
work marble as die Moors worked plaster, in such a way as not to
leave upon a wall the smallest surface empty of ornamentation.
The same anxiety is apparent in a still more striking manner at the
Audiencia of Barcelona, in the sculptures which decorate the entrance
to the little chapel of Saint George. In this case there is even, in
the Gothic forms, an evident imitation of the Mud6jar.
It is especially in the forms of Spanish poetry that one feels the
Arab influence. The short poems of the f^omancero recall the poetry
of Andalusia through the character of their inspiration, which is
either historical and warlike, or romantic and gallant. It is obvious
that the refinements of style of Gongora are a throw-back to the
Arab rhetoricians and versifiers, and that the popular improvisations
of the modern Sevillians, in their famous saetas, is a traditional
survival from the of the Moorish improvisers of the
popular poetry
time of Motamid and Ben Ammar.
But all this, after all, is very superficial. The influence of the Arabs
and Berbers of Africa upon the Spanish character was radical in
quite a different way. It may even be maintained that through
contact with them the Spaniards became half Arabised or Africanised.
This Islamic impress is very visible among the contemporaries
of the Cid, or among those of Isabel and Ferdinand. It is still
evident among the subjects of Philip II. Later it may have diminished,
or even become eflaced on die surface; but it always reveals itself to a
close observer as more or less latent.
In the first place there is an excessive individualism that habit
of indiscipline and anarchy, as a result of which two Arab chieftains
could never get on together, and Musulman Spain was parcelled
out into a swarm of little states, delivered up to political rivalries,
torn by the warfare of tribe tribe. It was the same in-
against
dividualism, the same jealous particularism, which so long prevented
.the unification of Christian
Spain and, even after the establishment
; of the absolute
monarchy, was to maintain in face of it vice-royalties
very much attached to their privileges and a provincial autonomy
that refused to abdicate.
It was the same spirit of indiscipline and anarchy which was to
158
 THE BALANCE-SHEET OF THE ARAB CONQUEST
array against one another the conquerors of the New
World, to such
a point that half a dozen Spaniards could not find themselves to-
gether in a fort or a caravel without at once forming two or three
parties bent upon destroying one another. These defects may always
have existed among the Spaniards ; but it must be conceded that the
example set by the Arabs and the Berbers could not fail to intensify
them.
Another bad example was the sinuosity of these Africans and
Asiatics, their shifty ruses, their duplicity in the keeping of contracts.
The historians who accuse the Spaniards of bad faith in their
conventions with the Moors forget to tell us that the Moors were at
'

least equally perfidious : it was merely a question who should outwit

the other.
Habits of this kind are not easily lost. Given favourable circum-
stances, they tend rather to develop and perfect themselves. In the
sixteenth century, Spanish diplomacy was notorious for its hidden
traps and, in general, for its excessive craftiness. Louis XIV, in his
Memoirs, still had to complain that the Spaniards could not sign a
treaty without the idea of breaking their engagement at the back
of their minds.
Lust for gold, bloodthirsty rapacity, the feverish pursuit of hidden
treasure, application of torture to the vanquished to wrest the
secret of their hiding-places from them all these barbarous pro-
ceedings and all these vices, which the conquistadors were to take to
America, they learnt at the school of the caliphs, the emirs, and
the Moorish kings.
When the Almoravid Yousouf ben Tcshoufin seized Granada,
he opened the treasury of Abdallah, the prince whom he had de-
throned: a prodigious treasury in which, in addition to great
quantities of gold and silver, he found heaps of precious stones,
among them a necklace of four hundred pearls or fabulous value.
But, as Yousouf suspected Abdallah's mother of having hidden other
riches, he subjected her to torture to make her reveal her hiding-
places. That was not enough: fearing that she had not told him
everything, the Almoravid ransacked even the foundations and the
drains of the palace. The companions of Cortes and Pizarro acted
no differently towards the Aztecs and the Incas.
Like the Moors, the Spaniards were to keep their women jealously
sequestered and veiled. Gratings and duennas were to replace the
harem and the eunuchs. There was the same secret and often blood-
stained lust, the same habit of taking foreign concubines. The caliphs
and the Moorish kinglings had Catalan and Basque slave-girls as
their favourites. The Christian princes chose to imitate them. If
they did not dare to install harems openly in their palaces, they had
Musulman concubines. Alfonso VI, the suzerain of the Cid, had
five wives,
among whom was the Moorish Zaida, daughter of
Motamid, King of Seville.
 THE RECONQUEST
The worst characteristic which the Spaniards acquired was the
parasitism of the Arabs and the nomad Africans the custom of
:

living off one's neighbour's territory, the raid raised to the level of an
institution, marauding and brigandage recognised as the sole means
of existence for the man-at-arms. In the same way as they went to
win their bread in Moorish territory, so the Spaniards later went to
win gold and territory in Mexico and Peru.
They were to introduce there, too, the barbarous, summary
practices of the Arabs putting everything to fire and sword, cutting
:

down fruit-trees, razing crops, devastating whole districts to starve

out the enemy and bring them to terms; making slaves everywhere,
condemning the population of the conquered countries to forced
labour. All these detestable ways the conquistadors learnt from the
Arabs.
For several centuries slavery maintained itself in Christian Spain,
as in the Islamic lands. Very certainly, also, it was to the Arabs that
the Spaniards owed the intransigence of their fanaticism, the
pretension to be, if not the people chosen of God, at least the most
Catholic nation in Christendom. Philip II, like Abd er Rhaman or
El Mansour, was Defender of the Faith.
Finally, it was not without contagion that the Spaniards lived for
centuries in contact with a race of men who crucified their enemies
and gloried in piling up thousands of severed heads by way of
trophies. The cruelty of the Arabs and the Berbers also founded a
school in the Peninsula. The ferocity of the emirs and the caliphs
who killed their brothers or their sons with thqir own hands was to
be handed on to Pedro the Cruel and Henry of Trastamare, those
stranglers under canvas, no better than common assassins.
But the most lamentable thing of all was the permanent state of
division and anarchy in which the Arabs kept Spain for centuries.
Through their discords, their racial and tribal wars, their systematic
and continual ravaging, their massacres and their deportations,
they rendered her sterile and depopulated. They made a desert of her
as of Northern Africa. Even to-day this country, only too largely
arid and under-populated, bears the stigmata of the
foreign conquest
in the aspect of its soil as well as in the character of its inhabitants.
The traveller through the mournful solitudes of La Mancha feels
only too intensely that the Berbers of Africa have passed that way.
On balance, it can fairly be said that the Musulman domination
was a great misfortune for Spain.

1 60
 VI
THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
PACIFIC

THE SPANISH POSSESSIONS IN AMERICA

From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries*

162
 CHAPTER XDC

The Conquest of the New World y or the Last Crusade

had no sooner opened its
gates to the Catholic
Sovereigns (January 2, 1492) than, after protracted discussion
GRANADAand prolonged hesitation, they decided to provide the funds
for the expedition, long advocated by Christopher Columbus,
which was to end in the discovery of the New World.
Its avowed object was to reach the East Indies, so as to take Islam
in the rear, and to effect an alliance with the Great Khan a mythical
personage who was believed to be the sovereign of all that region,
and favourable to the Christian religion and finally, after the
sectaries of Mahomet had been reduced to impotence, to diffuse
Christianity throughout that unknown continent and trade with the
traditional source of gold and spices.
These chimerical ideas and these very definite aspirations were in
the air of that "fin de siecle" All the hotheads, all the ardent or
ambitious souls of that time, monks, soldiers, and adventurers, were
obsessed by them. In short, it was the Crusade against the Moors
which was to be continued by a new and surer route. It was by way
of the Indies that Islam was to be dealt a mortal blow.
There are three facts which leave no room for doubt on this
subject. The connection between them is so evident that Columbus
himself noted it in his Journal, in a passage whose religious inspiration
is obvious and whose substance since the original is lost Las
Casas, the historian of the Indies, has preserved for us in the follow-
ing terms :
"In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Most Christian, the
most high, the most excellent and most powerful princes, King and
Queen of the Spains. . , . In this present year 1492, after Your
Highnesses had brought to an end the war against tne Moors who
reigned in Europe, and after Your Highnesses had terminated this war
in the very great city of Granada, where, in this present year, on the 2nd
of the month of January, I saw, by force of arms, the royal banners
of Your Highnesses planted on the towers of the Alhambra, the
citadel of the said city, and where I saw the Moorish king come
out of his gates and kiss the royal hands of Your Highnesses;
"And immediately afterwards, in this same month, in consequence of
information which I had given Your Highnesses on the subject of
India, and of the Prince who is called the "Great Khan/ which, in
our Roman, means 'the King of Kings' namely, that many times
he and his predecessors had sent ambassadors to Rome to seek doctors
of our holy faith, to the end that they should teach it in India, and
that never has the Holy Father been able so to do, so that accordingly
so many peoples were being lost, through falling into idolatry and
receiving sects of perdition among them;
163
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
"Your Highnesses, as good Christian and Catholic princes,
devout and propagators of the Christian faith, as well as enemies of
the sect of Mahomet and of all idolatries and heresies, conceived the
plan of sending me, Christopher Columbus, to this country of the Indies,
there to see the princes, the peoples, the territory, their disposition
and all things else, and the way in which one might proceed to
convert these regions to our holy faith.
"And Your Highnesses have ordered that I should go, not by
land, towards the East, which is the accustomed route, but by the
way of the West, whereby hitherto nobody to our knowledge has
ever been. And so, after having expelled all the Jews from all your
kingdoms and lordships, in this same month of January, Your High-
nesses .ordered me to set out, with a sufficient fleet, for the said
country of India, and, to this end, Your Highnesses have shown me
great favour. .. ."
It is of little importance that Columbus, writing after the event,
should approximate his facts rather arbitrarily. It is nevertheless
true that within the period of three months three great events
occurred, which certainly seem to have a close connection among
them. Probably, indeed, Columbus's impressions are more exact
than chronology. If the capitulation or Granada occurred on
January 2, 1492, the expulsion of the Jews on March 30, and the
convention granted to the Discoverer on April 17, it is unquestion-
able that, as early as January of that same year, the Catholic Sovereigns
had made up their minds to expel the Jews and to support the enter-
prise of the Genoese at the cost of the treasury.
As long as Granada had not surrendered, Ferdinand and Isabel
were afraid of committing themselves to a maritime adventure which
might prove very expensive in fact they lacked the money for even
the most modest expedition. Now that they were relieved of this
anxiety, they were more inclined to lend ear to the wonderful
promises of Columbus.
If they made up their minds in his favour, they would have to find
the money. Well, it would be the Jews who would pay both for
the expenses of the war against the Moors and for those of the
Armada which was to discover the New World that is to say, those
chimerical Indies in which popular imagination saw the land of
gold and spices.
But these mercenary motives were not the only ones* There were
political and religious reasons as well. Inasmuch as the capitulation
of Granada licensed the existence in Spanish territory of a Musul-
tnan population no attempt had yet been made to convert it it
became a dangerous matter to allow the subsistence side by side
with it of another dissident population, which, in case of persecution,
had always tended to make common cause with it.
Besides, the mercantile Jews maintained relations of all kinds with
the Musulmans of Africa, who already were in only too close contact
164
 THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD
with their co-religionists in Andalusia. Finally, the surrender of
Granada had not eliminated the Islamic and African threat to Spain.
Revolt was simmering not only in the region of the Alpujarras, but
even in the heart of Granada, in the Moorish quarter of the Albaycin.
If the Barbaresques, exasperated by the defeat of the Andalusian
Moors, aided by the Ottoman fleet, and profiting by all kinds of
connivance, should attempt a descent upon the Spanish coasts, the
danger for the Catholic Sovereigns might become great.
It was especially the Ottoman menace which was to be feared.
The Catholic Sovereigns realised that they had not finished with
Islam* The Crusade, organised for the conquest of Granada, must
be continued. For this last campaign had been a real crusade, for
which the Pope had promulgated Bulls, accorded indulgences, and
offered a massive silver Cross the one which was planted on one
of the towers of the Alhambra at the time of the entrance of Ferdinand
and Isabel. The Spanish clergy and the Cardinal Archbishop of
Toledo had contributed subsidies towards it.
Columbus's shrewdness consisted in dazzling the eves of Isabel
with the possibilities of a last Crusade, which, after all, would not
be very costly and would definitely reduce Islam to impotence. The
very terms of the text which I have just quoted proved conclusively
that the Genoese had conceived his discovery as a pious enterprise
of mass conversion. So it was that the discovery of America was the
last Crusade against Islam,

To understand this properly^ we must bear in mind the terror

which the Turks had inspired throughout Europe since they had
set foot there, and especially since die taking of Constantinople.
As early as 1442, Pope Eugene IV issued an encyclical calling the
Christians to arms against the Infidels, who were increasingly
threatening the Entire and Italy. In 14 JQ Pius n, the learned Sylvius
Aeneas Piccolomim, convoked an assembly of the Christian nations,
at Mantua to concert means of combating the new barbarians.
In the
following year he proclaimed holy
a war against the Turks.
But the Christian nations, at war with one another, made no
response to the appeal of the Sovereign Pontiff. He refused to be
discouraged. In November 1463, Pius n set himself at the head of a
crusade against the Turks, and once more conjured the Christian
world to unite against the common enemy. It was a fruitless effort.
Europe took no interest in what was happening on the banks of the
Danube.
In 1477, Mahomet II penetrated into Carniola, Styria, and
Carinthia, and invaded Salzburg and Friuli. In the following year he
occupied Albania. There he was at the gates of Italy. In 1480
he
launched a fleet of a hundred sail against the town of Otranto and
seized it. Now he was at the and of Rome.
gates of Naples
The startled Pope addressed the most pressing adjurations to
165
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
Christendom. "The conquerors,** said Sixtus IV, "spread themselves
with insatiable avidity over the towns and the neighbouring country-,
sides. Nardi, Lecci, Castro, Brindisi, Bari are exposed to their out-
rages or have already fallen into their power. Soon they will be
masters of Sicily, of the Neapolitan kingdom, of the whole Penin-
sula, if we remain plunged in the same inertia, if the princes and the
peoples do not rise incontinent, hasten to arms, and lend one another
mutual support, to defend their fields and their homes> their children and
their wives> their religion and their liberty.
"Let them not think that they are protected against invasion,
those who are at a distance from the theatre of war They, too, will
I

bow the neck beneath the yoke, and be mowed down by the sword,
unless they come forward to meet the invader. The Turks have
sworn the extinction of Christianity. A truce to sophistries It is the
!

moment not to talk, but to act and to fight!"

This, no doubt, was why this same Sixtus IV encouraged the
Spanish crusade against Granada and sent the Catholic Sovereigns,
by way of a standard, the famous massive Cross of silver which was
finally planted on the Watch Tower of the Alhambra. To fight Islam
in Andalusia was equivalent to depriving die Turks of ports of
disembarkation and lessening the chances of invasion.
Accustomed as we are to-day to regarding the Turks as mere
catspaws, or seeing them only through the spectacles of Lori's
idyllic descriptions, we cannot imagine what terror the Ottoman
fleets and Barbaresque corsairs inspired in the men of the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, as much in Italy as in Spain and even in
Provence.
The danger seemed so menacing that, in the very year which
preceded the capitulation of Granada, Innocent VHI organised, once
more, a Crusade to attack the Turks by land and sea. This time it
was to be an operation of great scope, in which a dozen states were
to take part. This ambitious project failed like all the others, and for
the same reason: the indifference or the selfishness of the European
peoples and potentates. Happily the Turks, like the Arabs and the
Baroaresques, never exploited an advantage to the uttermost. They
confined themselves to taking booty; and, when they had raided and
pillaged a district or a town sufficiently, they disappeared, to begin
over again at the first favourable opportunity.

Church, by playing the part of an

It is nevertheless true that the
alarmist, rendereda very great service to tiie Christendom of that
time. The Popes, engaged like the princes in temporal interests
and petty wars, had not always, perhaps, a very keen sense of the
danger. On the other hand, the religious Orders, especially the
Dominicans and the Franciscans, redoubled their vigilance against
the old enemy of Christendom, that Islam which not only did not
cease to menace it, but also appeared to close all avenues to its
166
 THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD
apostolate, by blockading against it the two extremities of the
ancient world.
The monks may have believed for a time in the possibilities of a
pacific or clandestine penetration. In the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, they tried to make catechists in Morocco and in India.
India especially attracted them, because they believed that it had
already oeen evangelised by Saint Thomas. The audacity, the
heroic intrepidity of the Franciscans was something almost in-
conceivable.
But, perpetually in contact with the Musulmans as they were
in the first place, in their capacity as guardians of the Holy Places
they were not slow to recognise that an apostolate, to be really
efficacious, must lean upon armed force, or at least upon the power
of a great nation capable of making itself respected at a distance.
Inasmuch as the European nations did not seem to understand
the Islamic peril, could one not find, in Africa or even in the depths
of Asia, peoples capable of counterbalancing die influence of Islam
and even, if need be, of uniting against it ? The Franciscans must have
penetrated into Abyssinia as early as the thirteenth century. Now
the Abyssinians were Christians. It was no doubt at the instigation
of the Friars Minor that the Negus, at the end of the fourteenth
century, sent emissaries to Europe to propose to the Christian
princes an alliance against the Musulmans.
In 1 3 91 a Franciscan, who had lived for several years in the country
of the Negus, was presented by the Count de Foix to John I of
Arag6n. In 1427, Alfonso V received at Valencia, in the presence
of the Cardinal-Archbishop of Foix, two Abyssinian ambassadors,
who renewed this offer of alliance. In 1452 the presence of an
Ethiopian ambassador in Lisbon was on record.
V
Two years later, in 1454, Pope Nicholas dispatched a Bull to
the King of Portugal on the occasion of the discoveries and con-
quests made in Africa by the Infante Dom Henry, with the object
of regularising the titles of possession of the Portuguese Crown in
connection with the newly accmired African territories.
"The Infante/* wrote the Pope, "bearing in mind that never
within the memory of man has anyone been able to navigate this
oceanic sea (the Atlantic Ocean), in order to proceed to the distant
harbours of the Orient, that this was utterly unknown to the peoples
of the West, and that the knowledge of these countries was nil,
believed, accordingly, that he would give God the greatest testimony
of submission if, through his aeency, one could render this oceanic
sea navigable asfar as the Indies, which are said to be subject to Christ. If he
should enter into relations with these peoples, he would arouse them to come to
the help of the Christians of the West against the Saracens and the enemies
of the faith. At the same time, he would* with the royal permission,
subject thepagans of those countries, not as yet infected by the Mahometan
plagte, by making known to them the name of Christ"
167
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
So here is sketched, twenty years in advance, the great idea of
Christopher Columbus. It was of Portuguese origin. It is what
was known as "the Plan of the Indies." 1 Let me add that the in-
spiration of it was entirely clerical. The idea was hatched, and
perhaps Launched, in Portugal by the monks. It was the missionaries
of Abyssinia who elaborated it. The plan consisted, in the eyes of the
Christians, in making alliance with the Negus and the fabulous Great
Khan, King of India India which was supposed to be Christian
in order to take Islam in the rear and begin, in the first pkce, by
ruining its commerce in the Red Sea.
But how was one to approach the Negus and the Great Khan?
Would it not be possible to reach the Indies by the route of the East,
by following the coast of Africa? This was the rdle assigned to the
Portuguese navigators in the development of the Plan of the Indies
whose object, let us remember, was to outflank Islam in order
to make sure of beating it.
In proportion as the Portuguese discoveries multiplied along the
African coast, this plan became more definite and its execution
became easier. So it was that in 1487, five years before the discovery
of America, Bartholomeu Diaz reached the Cape of Good Hope in
other words, the threshold of a world hitherto unknown. Hence-
forth it became possible to reach the Indies by the route of the East.
Columbus's great idea was that of reaching there by the route of
the West. The Genoese was merely all the more or less
synthetising
chimerical ideas -which had been in tne air for the last half century
at least,adding to them his own peculiar genius. It was to realise
the dream so long cherished by pious imaginations the dream of a
final and definite Crusade against Islam by way of the Indies that
he asked the Catholic Sovereigns for the three poor little caravels
which were to lead to the immense discovery.
1
See, in this connection, the novel and most interesting study by Senhor Joaquim
Bensuadc: Origrt of the Plan of the Ituiies, Coimbra, 1930, from which I have drawn the
most penetrating suggestions.

168
 CHAPTER XX

Christopher Columbus, Propagator of the Faith

has been denied that Columbus, in his first voyage, proposed

to go to the Indies. His objective, so it is said* was simply
IT unknown islands and lands whose existence had been revealed
to him either at Lisbon, by his father-in-law Perestrello, or at Palos,
by the brothers Pinz6n, or, again, at Huelva, by Alonso Synches,
that mysterious pilot whose strange story Garcilaso de la Vega has
told us, and who was reported to have touched at San Domingo,
about die year 1484, after a storm which lasted twenty-nine days.
It was only later that the Genoese conceived his grandiose idea.
The argument on which this theory is based is that, in the agree-
ment with Columbus signed in the month of April, 1492, by the
Catholic Sovereigns, there is no precise mention of the Indies but
only of lands to be discovered. This is easily explicable. Although
it was
possible that islands might be discovered in the oceanic
sea, it was much less probable that one could reach the Indies by this
route of the West. To the scientists of the period the idea was
Utopian, and to the theologians it was a heretical and damnable
proposition.
To count upon this problematical discovery was therefore a
decidedly delicate and dangerous matter. In case of failure such an
enterprise ran the risk of exposing its backers to ridicule. For all
these reasons, it is likely that the sovereigns confined themselves
to banking upon what seemed humanly possible,
It may be, for that matter, that Columbus had
given them formal
assurances on the subject of these unknown lands, in accordance with
the information, true or false, which he had obtained at Lisbon, at
Palos, or at Huelva. Weknow nothing about what was said at the
private interviews which he had with them, and the most elementary
prudence bound them to keep the secret.
But the proof that he undoubtedly had the intention of going to
the Indies, and was sure of getting there, is that the Catholic
Sovereigns furnished him with a letter of credentials to the unknown,
and therefore anonymous, sovereign of these distant lands : a letter
which has been discovered in the archives of the Kingdom of
Aragon, and in which diplomatic subtlety went hand in hand with
the most naive simplicity. Here is the translation of this documetn,
drafted in Latin, the universal language, which the Castilian chan-
cellery naturally assumed would be understood by the Hindus :
"To the Most Serene Prince, our very dear friend. . . Accord-
.

ing to reports which have been made to us by many of our subjects,

and also other travellers come from your kingdom and the neigh-
bouring regions, We have had the satisfaction of learning of your
good disposition and your excellent intentions towards us and
169
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
towards our State, and at the same time of your keen desire to be
informed about our recent success. * ..In consequence whereof
We have decided to send you as ambassador our Captain, the noble
Christopher Columbus, bearer of these presents, from whom
you may learn of our good health and our fortunate estate, as of
other matters which we have ordered him to report to you on our
behalf."
Certain historians have claimed that this open letter was addressed
to the Negus of Abyssinia. That is quite possible. But it could
equally have been addressed to that Great Khan of the Indies, whom
people talked about without knowing him, and who was assumed to
be a neighbour of the Negus. We have seen that the Pojpe counted
upon him to ally himself with the Negus and the Christians of the
west against the Saracens.
Let us admit, however, that no great importance is to be attached
to this document. But why was it necessary to assemble a com-
mission of learned men and theologians to examine Columbus's
project, if it was a question only of islands to be discovered and of
ordinary commercial interests? To explain this intervention of men
of learning and the excitement aroused in scientific and religious
circles by the ideas of Columbus, we must recognise that these ideas
were in contradiction with official theories, and that they interested
learning and religion alike in the highest degree.

At the beginning of the year 1488 Columbus betook himself to

Cordova to present his project to the Catholic Sovereigns. They
were away, with the result that he could not obtain audience of them
until four months later. Sympathetically received by the sovereigns,
he was sent by them before a commission presided over by the
Queen's confessor, Hernando de Talavera, Prior of Our Lady of the
Prado at Valladolid, and future Archbishop of Granada.
What happened at this junta* We do not know. In any case
Columbus's son, Ferdinand, later complained that this junta was
composed of incompetent persons, or at Least of persons insufficiently
informed to pass judgment upon his father's propositions.
These propositions must therefore have been very bold and very
technical to demand such a high degree of competency. Did the
junta* realising this, refer them to toe University of Salamanca,
which condemned them? Did the Dominicans of the monastery
of San Estebdn at Salamanca, on the other hand, take up arms on
behalf of Columbus against the university theologians? All this is
the
subject
of controversy. Be it as it may, it seems certain that the
discussions aroused by the theories of the navigator were of the first
importance, inasmuch as they excited so many learned personages
and set them at loggerheads.
Some years later further conferences took place at Santa F6 that
9

is in the fortified
camp of Isabel, who was then besieging Granada.
 CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, PROPAGATOR OF THE FAITH
They lasted from the month of July, 1491, to the month of January,
1492, just after the surrender of the city. According to Las Casas,
this new junta was composed of a number of persons, philosophers,
astrologers, and cosmographers, of the highest repute in all Castile,
as well as navigators and pilots.
The Italian Geraldini, who was present at some of these con-
ferences, tells us that "a great number of the bishops of the kingdom
found the ideas of Colombus manifestly tainted with heresy, because,
they said, Nicholas of Lyra professed that there was no inhabited
land in the part of the glooe lower than our own, which extends from
the Fortunate Islands, by sea, as far as the coasts of the Orient.
Moreover, Saint Augustine affirms that the antipodes are not
inhabited."
What emerges from this text, as from several others, is that the
ideas of Columbus were not entirely original, since the theologians
themselves admitted that beyond the Fortunate Islands, in other
words the Canaries, extended a sea which touched the Indies.
The great point in dispute was whether by this sea, by this route of
the West, one could reach the Indies.
The theologians affirmed that it was impossible, given, as they
claimed, that no inhabited land existed in that part of the globe,
Columbus's project was therefore chimerical, by reason of the length
of the voyage and the difficulties of navigation. To adventure into
these unknown seas was to expose oneself to shipwreck and to
death by starvation.
For the future Admiral of the Oceanic Seas to be able to triumph
over these a priori arguments, he must have provided the two
sovereigns with the most reassuring information about the mysterious
lands, known only to himself, which he was sure he would find on his
way to the Indies But that he proposed to go to the Indies there is no
.

shadow of doubt. As Henry Harris writes in his book 'Ferdinand

Columbus, "the admiral was convinced that he was going to make a
landfall, in a direct line, in China or Japan; and he died persuaded
that he had discovered what he went to seek, the East coast of Asia,
nothing else and nothing more/*
When he reached Cuba, he imagined that he was in the kingdom
of the Great Khan, and he sent two ambassadors to find him in
order to deliver his letter of credentials from the Catholic Sovereigns
to him. If Columbus had been told, before he started, that he was
going to discover a new continent and not reach the Indies, it is
probable that he would never have set out.

So much for the geographical and scientific character of the

Its religious character is no less striking.
enterprise.
If it had not been so, it would be difficult to explain the
really
passionate interest which the Franciscans and the Dominicans
took
in Columbus's projects. We do not know up to what point he was
17*
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
supported by the
Dominicans against the theologians and the
universkarians of Salamanca, or whether he really was sheltered and
protected by them against possible prosecution by the Inquisition.
What is is that he was encouraged and taken under his
certain wing
by Diego de Deza, the former prior of the monastery of San Estaban,
who probably received him when he stayed at Salamanca.
This Dominican, who was to become Archbishop of Seville and
Toledo, was at this time tutor to Prince John, the son of Ferdinand
and Isabel. He was at Santa F6 with the royal family when Columbus
met with a second refusal at the hands of the sovereigns. Deza, who
had great influence with the Queen, is said to have contributed
towards making her change her mind. Las Casas affirms that De^a
and Cabrera, King Ferdinand's groom of the bed-chamber, "vaunted
themselves as having been the cause of the Sovereigns* subscribing
to the enterprise andthe discovery of the Indies."
The role of the Franciscans appears to have been still more active
and decisive. They intervened on two occasions, in the persons of
two of them, Father de Marchena and Father Juan Prez, one a monk,
the other prior of the monastery of La Rdbida, near Palos, where
Columbus, after his first disappointment, took refuge with his
young son. It was Juan P6rez who facilitated his first meeting with
the sovereigns and recommended him to Talavera, the Queen's
confessor.
Later, when Columbus, disappointed a second time, had made up
his mind to go and
offer his services to die King of ^rance, and was
threatening to set -out at once for Marseilles, the prior of La Rabida
persuaded him to defer his departure. Immediately, in the middle
of the night, with a haste which was really very strange, the prior
set off to Santa F6 to plead the navigator's cause once more with
Isabel.
If it had been a question merely of islands to discover and of
commercial interests, such zeal on the part of men at least theoretically
aloof from this world's goods would seem remarkable, if not
reprehensible. What is more likely is that Columbus's religious
exaltation impressed the prior of La R&bida very This
strongly.
visionary promised to open an immense field to evangelisation.
The Franciscans were the great missionary Order of the Middle
Ages. It was they, as we have seen, who contributed the most to the
elaboration of the Plan of the Indies in Portugal. Here was this lan
revised by Columbus with a boldness which dazzled the
imagination.
He promised to realise all that the disciples of Saint Francis had so
long dreamed: reach the Indies directly; come to an understanding
there with the Great Khan and the Negus to attack Islam in its
commerce and in the very centre of its propaganda, in Arabia and
Mecca in short, take the Musulmans in the rear, while a new
Crusade, paid for out of the treasures of the Indies, wrested Palestine
and the Holy Sepulchre from them.
 CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, PROPAGATOR OF THE FAITH
It was certainly chimeras such as these which made the monks
such warm partisans of the Discoverer. At the same time as their
ardour for apostolic conquest had been fired by the taking of
Granada, those of them who knew the Musuiman world well could
cherish no illusions about the danger which still threatened Spain
and Christendom, as much from the Barbaresques as from the
Turks. A diversion must be made to ward off this danger. Many
other reasons of a practical kind militated, in their eyes, in favour
of the enterprise.
Besides Cardinal de Mendoza, the Archbishop of Toledo, who
also supported it with the Queen, two somewhat mysterious persons
intervened with the King: namely, his groom of the chamber, Juan
Cabrera, and the Controller-General or Aragon, Luis de Santangel.
Both them were of Je.wish origin and were in high favour with the
King. He had so much confidence in Cabrera that he chose him as
one of the executors of his will. As to Luis de Santangel, we know
that he was a member of the royal council, treasurer of the Holy
Brotherhood, and chancellor and controller-general of Arag6n.
He was at the head of an important business house, and belonged to
a rich family of converted Israelites.
Such conversion, incidentally, did not prevent these Marrams
from being persecuted by the Inquisition. Between 1486 and 1496,
more than ten of them perished at the stake. In the following year,
1497, Santangel obtained from Ferdinand an ordinance which
guaranteed him against any accusation of apostasy on the part of the
Inquisition & guarantee which extended to his descendants. This
converted Jew was one of the warmest protectors of Christopher
Columbus. On the other hand, in a letter to Ferdinand, which Las
Casas claims to have seen, Columbus himself recognised that the
discovery of the Indies was due to the intervention of the Marrano
Cabrera and the Dominican Deza.
There is an intriguing factor here, more especially if one associates
it with that other claim made by many historians of the Conquest

namely, that the mariner in Columbus's caravel who first sighted the
terra firma of the New World was also a Jew. Israel thus collaborated,
in a more or less direct way, in this great which was to
enterprise
change the face of the world. When the American continent was
opened to modern civilisation, the Jews had something to do with it.
Similarly, when a whole part of the African continent was opened
to French influence, it was the Jewish credit of Busnach and Bacry
that was a contributory cause. Without this credit, the French
would never have gone to Algeria, and France's colonial Empire
might have been limited to her old possessions overseas at the time
of the monarchy. Religious minds may see in this a Providential
intention towards the People of the Promise, which, if it is not the
principal actor, must play a part in all great human events.
What, on the other hand, were the particular reasons which
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
induced Cabrera and Luis de Santangel to embrace the cause of
Columbus? Was it only a case of that "wanderlust'* which drives
Jews into the most risky adventures? Did these two men, under
the influence of their ancestral dream of world domination, foresee
how widely Columbus's enterprise was going to enlarge the Old
World? Did Santangel, head of a business house, simply count
upon new markets for his merchandise?
It is more probable that religious zeal had much to do with it.
Some members of the Santangel family had just been burned for
secret apostasy; and the expulsion of the Jews was imminent. For
these two Marranos, certainly suspect, it was a fine opportunity of
proving the ardour and integrity of their faith, by associating
themselves with an expedition which had for its object the propa-
gation bf Catholicism throughout an unknown world.
But what purpose does it serve to pile up unverifiable hypotheses ?
Let us stick to what is certain the most ardent supporters of Colum-
:

bus were monks and Jews.

Over and above all personal schemes and reckonings, as over

and above all plans of conquest, we must set the Pontifical instruction,
which was formulated in two famous Bulls promulgated in 1493,
on the morrow of Columbus's first voyage, by Pope Alexander VI.
The Portuguese were alarmed at the Spanish discoveries in the
oceanic sea, and the two nations decided to resort to the arbitrage
of the Sovereign Pontiff. For him it was an opportunity of defining
Pontifical sovereignty in the temporal sphere once more. As the
vicar of Jesus Christ he was, by Divine delegation, the master
of the world, and he had the right to divide it up and distribute
kingdoms to the greater glory of God and the greater good of
religion.
In the particular case of the dispute between Castile and Portugal,
the Pope decided that the Catholic Sovereigns were to be the
legitimate sovereigns of all the territories discovered or to be dis-
covered in the Western Ocean, in the same way as Nicholas V had
earlier attributed to Portugal the countries washed by the seas of
Africa. A line drawn from one Pole to the other, and passing a
hundred leagues to the west of the Azores and Cape Verde,
separated the Portuguese possessions from the Spanish zone. As
to the route of the Indies for the objective was still to reach the
Indies in order to take Islam in the rear it was agreed that the
Spaniards should follow the route of the West and tine Portuguese
that of the East.
Here, then, was a whole continent given to the Spaniards by the
grace of God, but on the condition of making His name known
there and spreading His worship there. As His representative on
earth, the Pope dared to do this extraordinary thing: make a present
of a world to a Christian prince, and confer upon him absolute
 CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, PROPAGATOR OF THE FAITH
authority over millions of human beings and over immense territories,
which he did not know and of whose very names he was ignorant.
This extraordinary thing was not only respected by the whole of
Christendom, but was even admitted by the conquered peoples.
In return for such a favour, the beneficiaries were under the obliga-
tion of converting these peoples and propagating the faith in their
new Empire.
From this point of view, which was that of the Papacy and the
Catholic Sovereigns, as it was that of Christopher Columbus, the
conquest of the Indies accordingly had as its object to combat
Islam and convert idolatrous peoples to Christianity.
In practice, as we know, the Spaniards were not to be slow in
straying from this programme. The winning of gold was to end by
supplanting the winning of souls. But this was the initial object,
or at least the pretext which covered the enterprise. The colonisation
of America was profoundly stamped with this religious character.
The spirit which animated and inspired the ordinances of the
Spanish Sovereigns, like the conduct of the viceroys, was the same
as that which maintained the crusade against the Moors and drove
Columbus to the conquest of the Indies. The essential thing was the
propagation of the Christian faith.
We must take this as our point of departure if we wish to under-
stand the Spanish colonisation of America at all. If one does not
keep this idea constantly present in his mind, he is exposed to unfair
judgment of the colossal work accomplished in the New World by
the conquistadors.
 CHAPTER XXI

What the Conquest Meant

set out to find the Indies by the route of the West.
That implies, incidentally, that he certainly counted upon
COLUMBUS
finding islands where he could replenish supplies on his way.
Otherwise this long navigation would have been impossible.
Although he was widely mistaken about the distance which
separated the Indies from Spain by way of the Atlantic, and imagined
it to be much shorter than it really was, he quite certainly expected
to make a call at islands more or less close to the Asiatic coast.
But that these lands were a new continent here was something
of which he had no idea, and which he never admitted. There has
been seen in this an ironical denial given by facts to the imagination
of the Discoverer. Yet it was, after all, this visionary of genius who
was right. Others after him were to reach the Indies by the route of
the West, as he had foreseen.
There was another denial given by reality to the projects of
Columbus. He had set out with the intention, more or less official,
more or less expressed, of starting a new crusade against Islam and
conquering pagan nations for Christ. But there were no Musulmans
in the countries which he reached. If, on the other hand, there were
plenty of pagans to convert, it soon happened that anxiety to win
them for Christ vanished in the presence of that of winning plenty
of gold. It was claimed, indeed, that the gold brought back from
the Indies would be used to deliver the Holy Sepulchre. This
fiction was soon abandoned. The conquerors concerned them-
selves above all with making fortunes as quickly as possible, acquir-
ing vast estates, and, to this end, expropriating and exploiting the
natives.
Yet the evangelical ideal maintained itself strongly in the presence
of the most materialist and the most mercenary motives. Never did
Catholic Spain renounce her programme of evangelisation, any
more than she ever renounced her system of colonial exploitation.
In fact, the rapacity of the Spaniards and the apostolic zeal of their
missionaries were the two great crow-bars of the
conquest. Without
this twofold passion for the winning of
gold and the winning of souls,
America would never have been colonised.
Let us try to imagine the extraordinary difficulties of such an
enterprise, die almost superhuman courage which was required to
confront its dangers and we shall realise that those who dared to
throw themselves into such an adventure must have been moved
by appeal to the emotions or the instincts, at one and the same time
the most selfish and the most sublime, which divided between them
the Spanish souls of that time: the lust for gold, and the most
extreme self-sacrifice.
 WHAT THE CONQUEST MEANT
Without the least hypocrisy, these two motives could co-exist
in one and the same person. Colombus was two things together, a
converter and an exploiter of the natives. He wanted gold, not only
to satisfy his real avarice, but also to maintain those who had
followed him, to justify the promises of Paradise which he had
kvished upon the Spanish Sovereigns, and finally to pknt the
Cross and build chapels and churches on pagan soil.

As
a matter of fact, the reality was far from the dream. In the
firstplace the voyage itself was a terrible enterprise, even for
professional sailors. Although it has been disputed but what has
not been disputed in the story of Columbus? it seems dear that the
admiral had all the difficulty in the world in assembling a crew for his
first expedition.
To
sail far from the coasts, to distances which were regarded as

prodigious; to brave that great unknown Ocean, that sea of horrors

here was something to daunt the stoutest heart. Let us bear in
mind what the ships of that time were like, and how little security
they offered, and also what the art of navigation was at the end of
the fifteenth century, despite the progress recently made by the
Portuguese.
Alternatively, the three caravels which made the first known
crossing of the Atlantic have been underestimated and, probably,
overestimated. Some, with the intention of exalting the audacity
of the navigators, speak of wretched barques scarcely decked, mere
coasting vessels. Others, on the contrary, represent them to be
ships as good as anybody could want, of a reasonable tonnage,
fine sailing craft and well armed. According to this version it was
Columbus who was a poor navigator.
But, despite its hundred and twenty tons and its length of thirty-
four metres overall, the Santa Mariay the admiral's caravel, must
have felt an insecure shelter enough to the men who had to traverse
seven hundred leagues of sea before making a problematical harbour,
If the admiral's outward voyage lasted only a month, not counting
the crossing to the Canaries and the stay there, his homeward
voyage took twice as long, and he was overtaken by a terrible
storm, in the course of which his ship nearly foundered.
During these long months of navigation any number of risks
were run, with shipwreck as only the worst of them. Apart from
other inconveniences, the crew suffered from thirst, hunger, malaria,
and all kinds of diseases. When the admiral, after a second expedition
to the Antilles, disembarked at Cddis, in the month of June, 1496,
the inhabitants were startled at the sight of the voyagers, who seemed,
according to an eye-witness, "more dead than alive.'* It was a
lamentable procession of sick and starving men who could hardly
stand on their feet.
The crew of the first expedition, badly fed, anxious through
G 177
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
of sight of land, and feeling themselves lost in the midst
being out
of this marine immensity, mutinied. In fact, there were times when
they were completely lost. The admiral himself did not know where
he was. He steered at random. If the pilot, Alonso Sdnchez of
Huelva, really had given him information about an island where
he had touched, driven by storm, after twenty-nine days of naviga-
tion, this information must have been extremely vague.
"He (Sinche2) was constrained/' relates Garcilaso de la Vega,
the historian of the Incas, "to lower his canvas and abandon his
ship to the violence of the gale. It was so tempestuous that it made
him run before it for twenty-nine days, not fafowing where he was or
what course he ought to steer> inasmuch as throughout this time it was
impossible for him to take elevations either by the sun or by the
North/* This pilot may have had a confused idea of the direction
to be followed, but not of the length of the voyage. To this very day,
the caravaners of the desert count neither time nor distance* They
know confusedly that the end of the journey is "that way," as they
say, and this vague orientation suffices for them.
When, after all these anxieties of the voyage, the adventurers
finally touched land generally at random new and terrible ex-
periences awaited them: hardships of soil and climate, scarcity of
food, endemic diseases, hostility of the inhabitants. If the first
natives whom they met seemed as pacific as they were defenceless,
they were not slow in running up against warlike peoples provided
with formidable weapons, against which their rudimentary artillery
was often a poor advantage.
In any case, the conquerors were only a handful against thousands
of enemies. That a few nundred Spaniards, who were not even always
professional soldiers, should have been able little by little to conquer a
whole continent, is a prodigious fact which still remains insufficiently
explained. They must have had extraordinary boldness, courage,
and endurance, and, along with them, heroism and faith. The most
remarkable thing is that almost all this was due to private enterprise.
Sometimes a royal governor organised an expedition, which he
entrusted to the command of a man of his choice, who took the
pompous title of Captain-General of the Armada. This was the
procedure in the case of the conquest of Mexico. Diego Veldzquez,
governor of the Antilles, appointed Hernin Cortes captain-general
of the little army which he sent to Yucatan.
But most ships were fitted out by business men, landowners, or
the conquistadors themselves. Apart from professional soldiers,
anybody who liked could join the expedition, so long as he equipped
and fed himself. A captain had to do the same for nis men. Stores
consisted of bacon and manioc bread. "It was on bacon and manioc,"
Senor Carlos Pereyra tells us, "that America was conquered."
Apart from firearms and cold steel, beasts for killing and beasts
of burden, provision was also made of glassware, Castile cloth,
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 WHAT THE CONQUEST MEANT
shirts,bonnets and caps for exchange with uncivilised tribes or for
presents to chiefs. All this, in fact, did not amount to much weight
or make very heavy packs.
Before embarking for Mexico, Bernal Diaz, the admirable
chronicler of the conquest, tells us, Cortes "took tally of his soldiers,
to see how many he was leading. He found after the count that we
were five hundred and eight, without counting the master-pilots
and mariners, who numbered one hundred and nine, sixteen horses
and mules (all war and racing mules), and eleven ships, great and
small. There were thirty-two crossbowmen and thirteen blunder-
busses, and ten cannons of bronze and four falconets, and a quantity
of powder and shot."
Apart from the cannon and falconets difficult to handle and
better suited for parade purposes than for attack or defence let us
note the small number of firearms : thirteen blunderbusses against
thirty-two crossbows. The armament was still almost entirely that
of the Middle Ages.
Nevertheless this was an armada of considerable proportions.
The size of these expeditions was, in general, much more modest.
Pizarro set out for the conquest of Peru with a single ship, which
did not even belong to him,. It was Hernin Ponce de L6on who
fitted it out. "He embarked in it,** says Agustfn de Zarate, "with his
four brothers and the largest number of foot and horse he could
assemble." But it was a very small number, by comparison with
that of the enemy whom they had to fight. In the first battle, in
which the native king Ataliba was taken prisoner, the soldiers of
Pizarro were one against a hundred some say even two hundred.
They set put in tne assurance that nobody could resist good and
faithful subjects of His Majesty of Spain. They encountered both
peaceful peoples who brought them chickens and maize and warlike
tribes who resisted them stoutly. In either case, die first thing the
captain-general did was solemnly to take possession of the country
in the name of the Catholic King. A
royal notary, brought expressly
for the purpose, drew up documentary evidence during the pro-
ceedings.
It was a piece of high comedy, this bureaucratic red-tape dis-
playing itself pedantically in the midst of barbarism. They might
be short of food, or clothes, they might march with sandals on their
feet; but they took along with them a notary provided with good
ink, sealing-wax and parchment.
When Cortfe disembarked at Tabasco, says Bernal Diaz, "he took
possession of this country for His Majesty and for himself in his royal
name. And it was after this fashion: drawing his sword, he smote
three times, in sign of possession, against a great tree called ceiba,
and he declared that, if there was anyone who contested it, he would
defend his right with his sword ana the shield he bore. And all the
soldiers who were present on this occasion said that royal possession
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
had been duly taken in the name of His Majesty, and that we were
ready to aid him, if anyone dared to contradict him. This proceeding
was registered in the presence of a notary of the King"
In the eyes of the conquerors, however, this taking of possession
was legitimatised only on the condition of observing scrupulously
the obligations of conscience imposed upon the possessors by the
Pontifical Bulls. Let us not forget: the Pope, the absolute master of
new lands to be discovered, had granted them to the Spanish
and Portuguese sovereigns only to win them to the Christian
faith. This was why, after the Catholic King had been proclaimed
master of the country, it was added that he held his rights from the
Pontiff who dwelt in Rome, and benignantly called upon the new
subjects of His Majesty to renounce their idols and become converts.
They were preached a little sermon on the subject. After that,
no time was lost in raising crosses and building a chapel, in which
was placed the image of Our Lady. When one reads the history
of the conquest of Mexico in Bernal Dfaz, one finds that this edifying
ceremony was repeated at every stage by the conquerors.
Some of the natives listened to these pious exhortations without
moving a muscle. Fifteen Mexican Indians of an important village
came to salute Cortes and do homage to him, and he "showed them
much affection and told them many things touching our holy
Faith, as we were in the habit of doing everywhere we went, saying that
we were vassals of our great Emperor Don Carlos, and he gave them
some glass trinkets and other bagatelles of Castile/*
At other times the audience was less receptive. When Cortes
himself endeavoured on several occasions to make Montezuma, the
Mexican emperor, "see reason," that "savage** very politely put
him in his place. The Spanish captain had begun by telling him
"that we are vassals and servants of a great lord called the Emperor
Don Carlos, who has for his subjects numerous and powerful
princes; that having been informed of him (Montezuma) and his
greatness, he had sent us to these countries to see him and beg him
to make himself a Christian, with all his people, like our Emperor
and ourselves, and to save his soul and the souls of all his vassals
and many other good things.*'
Some days later, the self-made catechist besought Montczuma
"to be attentive to the words which he wished to say to him at this
time. And immediately he told him, and all very well explained,
about the creation of the world and how we were all brothers, sons
of a single father and a single mother who were called Adam and
Eve; that our great Emperor, in this quality of brother, grieved at
the perdition of the great number of souls which idols were leading
to Hell, had sent us to the Indians to bring them the remedy of our
counsel and the exhortation no longer to adore the said idols."
To which Montezuma replied: "We have here our gods whom we
have long worshipped, holding them to be good. Yours may be
180
 WHAT THE CONQUEST MEANT
good, too. For the moment, do not concern yourselves to speak to
us of them!"
The fact is that Cortes, in his zeal as a converter, went a little too
far, to such a point that the chaplain of the armada, Fray Bartolom
de Olmedo, thought fit to recall him to a sense of the opportune,
and also of the ridiculous. The monk jeered gently at the warrior
and his overdone sermonisings. The "Padre" himself employed more
tact and discretion. But this did not prevent the as
conquistadors
soon as they arrived in a Mexican town from hastening to have
Mass said, planting their crosses, and purifying a temple of idols,
stained with human blood, in order to install a statue of the Virgin
in it.

Later, in Peru, they were less ceremonious about seizing territory.

Nevertheless Pizarro himself, despite his expeditious brutality, made
it a
point to preserve the forms, at least at the outset of his campaign.
He sent two emissaries, one after the other, to King Ataliba, in
order to inform him "that he approached him on behalf of His
Majesty the King of Spain, with tne object of assuring him of the
good will of his master, in pursuance whereof he desired to meet
him, adding that he desired to be regarded as among his friends."
That was the first summons in the name of the Spanish sovereign,
appointed by the Pontifical Bulls absolute and legitimate master of
Peru. The second summons, in the name of the Pope himself,
followed it immediately. Ataliba, determined upon resistance,
marched against the Spaniards at the head of a powerful army so
powerful that Pizarro's soldiers were aghast at it and regarded
themselves as lost, failing supernatural aid.
When the combatants were face to face, there was witnessed a
in its audacity, if not its madness. The chaplain
sight dumbfounding
of the conquistadors, Bishop Francisco de Valverde, advanced to
King Ataliba's litter, holding his breviary in his hand, and said to
him in substance: "that there was one God in three Persons, who
had created Heaven and earth .
that, through the disobedience
. .

of our first parents, Adam and Eve, we were all become sinners, in
no condition, accordingly, to enter the Kingdom of Heaven, until
Jesus Christ, our Redeemer, suffered death to win us salvation and
fife; that this Jesus, after dying upon a Cross, left Saint Peter in
His pkce to be His vicar.
"He added that if was the successors of Saint Peter who bad divided all
the countries of the world among the Christian kings and princes, giving
every one of them the charge to conquer some part of it; that this
Kingdom of Peru had fallen to his Imperial Majesty the King Don
Carlos, and that this great monarch had sent in his place the governor
Don Francisco Pizarro, to make known to Ataliba, on behalf of
God and on his own behalf, all that he had just said; that, if Ataliba
was ready to believe what he had said, receive baptism and obey the
Emperor, this prince would protect him and defend him; that, if he
181
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
did otherwise, the governor declared to him that he would attack
him and put everything to fire and sword/*
So it went on at great length: the discourse of the good bishop
was a regular sermon duly divided into three parts. Ataliba replied
spiritedly enough "that this country and all
that it contained had been
handed down to him by his ancestors, and that he did not know how
Saint Peter should have been able to give it to anybody else . . .

that, in regard to Jesus Christ, Who had created Heaven and earth,
he knew nothing whatever about all this, or that anybody had
created anything . . that, in regard to the King of Spain, he knew
.

nothing about him, and had never seen him."

Thereupon battle was engaged, and, after a desperate struggle,
the unfortunate Ataliba was captured by the Spaniards. Peru
was virtually conquered. In the eyes of Pizarro and his companions,
it was also conquered legitimately, inasmuch as the
Sovereign
Pontiff, master of the whole world, had given this country to the
Emperor their master. He had given it to him on the condition
of converting it. Accordingly, to keep in line with the Pontifical
Bulls, every campaign must begin with a sermon. If the sermon
did not take effect, the conquistador regarded himself as entitled to
obtain conversion by other means.
These men, lost in the immensity of a hostile continent, must have
had the conviction that they were the masters of it by Divine right
to enable them to endure all that they suffered there. The lust for
gold could not have sufficed. Without all this religious ideology
which, in their eyes, legitimatised their violence, they would have
been nothing more than mere brigands, murderers, and highway-
men. The invaders brandished Bulls and theological texts, a whole
rubbish-heap of documents, by way of justifying their invasion.

But the invaded peoples did not let themselves be thus talked over.
The Spanish adventurers were met by thousands of Indians, often
very well armed, who discharged
a hail of poisoned arrows against
them. They had to make their way through unknown regions, in
perpetual dread of ambush or sudden attack, under a burning sun or,
on the other hand, in mountainous districts where they died of cold.
The soldier advanced painfully,
streaming
with sweat and suffo-
cating under his quilted armour padded with cotton to deaden the
effect of arrow strokes and with his feet bleeding in his tattered
sandals. Higher up, he froze and his teeth chattered in the cold of
the sierras, where he had nothing with which to cover himself.
He lacked the most elementary surgery. He was driven to dress
his wounds those frightful wounds inflicted by cold steel with
boiling fat taken from the corpses of the Indians. Then there were
the attacks by wild beasts, the danger from reptiles, the exasperating
swarms of mosquitoes which made sleep impossible to men dying
with fatigue.
182
 WHAT THE CONQUEST MEANT
The most demoralising thing was their small numbdr which we
should always bear in mind against a host of enemies. The ad-
vance of Cortes upon Mexico and the occupation of that great city
by a handful of adventurers was a coup de main of reckless heroism.
Despite their contempt for danger and their habit of not being
surprised at anything, some of them ended by feeling the extrava-
gance of such enterprises.
But it was still more the pride of having dared the impossible
which dominated thes hidalgos. Bernal Diaz, who was, as I have
said, the Xenophon of this prodigious Anabasis, cannot restrain
himself from remarking upon this, after telling us about the entrance
of his comrades into the capital of the Aztecs, the capture of
Montezuma, and the execution of his captains.
"la the whole world," he says, "what men has one ever seen who
dared to enter, to the number of four hundred and 'fifty soldiers
and we did not even reach that muster into a city as strong as
Mexico, greater than Venice, and so far, at more than one thousand
five hundred leagues, from our Castile, arrest such a powerful
lord and do justice upon his captains under his own eyes? Certainly
there is here much to be praised, and by no means so soberly as I
have done it."
At night they trembled with dread in their beds at the thought
of the ^reat city which offered them such a suspect hospitality, and
might rise against them and crush them. "Their blood," says Bernal
Diaz, "turned into poison in their veins." It was to rid themselves
of this terror that they conceived the desperate remedy, the plan
insensate in its boldness, of taking prisoner in his own palace the
sovereign venerated and obeyed as a god whose guests they
were.
No doubt they realised that seizing the person of the king was
equivalent to striking terror into the Indians and paralysing any idea
of resistance among them. The facility of the conquest is explained
not only by these tactics, but also by the advantage of armament,
by all the superiority that European civilisation put into the hands
of the Spaniards, and by all the extent to which it was in advance of
rudimentary civilisations.
The war-horses and the war-dogs employed by the conquistadors
sowed terror in the ranks of the Indians especially the horses,
unknown at that time in America, which the Indians regarded as
animals as fearful as they were fantastic. The sight of sailing ships,
and artillery, and musketry, in their infancy though they were,
were a great source of astonishment and dread to them.
But all these inventions of European enterprise would have ended
by succumbing to the omnipotence of numbers, if it had not been
for the fact that a powerful element of mysticism mingled with the
fear inspired by the arms and the military science of the invaders.
These white men, coming from regions where the sun rose, had
183
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
been announced to the Indians by prophecies. The Indians bowed
down before the masters foreseen by their divines and imposed
upon them by their gods. They regarded as foreign gods these
fearful beings who could release the thunder when they would.
They were slow to realise that the Spaniards were not immortal, as
they had thought at first. How could they resist these omnipotent
demons?
On the side of the Spaniards, an element of mysticism of another
kind was essential to give scope to such a rapid conquest. Not only
did they believe themselves to be the masters and apostles of the
New World; they were also persuaded that the hand of God led all
thisfabulous adventure. There were times when Cort6s and Bernal
Diaz stood in astonishment before the results of their victories,
those unexpected results so disproportionate to their deeds, heroic
as they were, and asked themselves whether they were not the
phantasmagoria of a dream.

Once installed in the conquered countries, they had to live and

support themselves there. It was no small matter. These Castilians
and Andalusians who disembarked in the Antilles or in Mexico
had to change all their habits of hygiene, comfort and diet. There
was no wheat or oats, or any butcher's meat. They were obliged to
introduce pigs, goats, sheep and fowl from Castile.
The first American wheat was regarded as a miraculous growth,
which soon had its legend. This legend is so charming that it is worth
preserving. It was said that the introduction of wheat into Peru
was due to Inds M&noz, the wife of Francisco Martin Alcantara,
brother of Pizarro. It was she, too, who created the gardens and
orchards on the outskirts of Lima.
One day, when she was winnowing some rice which had recently
arrived from Spain in a barrel, she found among the rice some grains
of wheat, "and she put them aside, with the intention of sowing
them and seeing whether one could cultivate wheat in that country.
She sowed them in a flower-pot, with as much care as though she
were planting shoots of mignonnette or basil; and, thanks to the
solicitude with which she watched over her little seed-bed, watering
it as she should, the
grains grew, and the plant developed strongly
and gave numerous and large ears." So, through a happy chance,
the Peruvian harvests of the future emerged from the flower-pot of
In6s Mtinoz.
There was a lack also of draught and riding beasts. There were
no horses or mules. As Sefipr Carlos Pereyra remarks very truly,
*c
without the cattle from the islands, and especially the horses, pigs,
goats, sheep and fowl, not a single step could have been made in
the continent/* 1 At the outset horses were a rarity. They were worth
their weight in gold. Bernal Diaz relates that Hdrnan Cortes,
1 Cf. Carlos
Pereyra: La obra de Rtpafta en America, p. 77.
184
 WHAT THE CONQUEST MEANT
when he set out on the Mexican expedition, had to sejl the shoulder-
knots off his fine velvet doublet to buy a mare. As we have seen, he
was not able to assemble more than sixteen horses for his armada.
These beasts, which terrified the Indians so much, were better
cared for than the men. Their lives seemed so precious that Bernal
Dfaz himself describes them with more care and in greater detail
than his comrades in arms. The sixteen horses which carried Cort6s
and some of his companions are piously catalogued and characterised
more exactly than Ortiz the musician and Juan de Escalante who
rode them. We are told the colour of their blankets, whereas we
are not told the colour of the beards or the hair of these gallant
conquistadors.
After they had assured themselves food and shelter, as well as
means of transport, they had to exploit the immense territories of
which they had boldly proclaimed themselves the lords and masters.
If they had expatriated themselves, if they had undergone the trials
and torments of a long and perilous journey, it was not to live worse
than in a village in Castile or Estremadura. They had come to find
gold and precious stones, to acquire great estates.
All this necessitated considerable manual labour. Where was it to
be found? One could not think of deriving it from Spain. Like the
earlier Arab invader of the Peninsula, the conquistador was much too
grand a gentleman to work with his hands. Besides, Spain, emptied
of her Moors, was in great need of manual labour herselfV So,
quite naturally, the conquistadors fell back upon the natives, upon
whom work in the mines and plantations was imposed.
Like the expropriation of the soil, the forced labour and the
slavery of the natives claimed as its justification fine theological
reasons and relied upon famous Pontifical Bulls, to which we must
always return in studying the history of the conquest of the Indies.
The Spaniards had come to America to convert the Indians. The
best means of doing so was to reduce them to slavery. So there
was established the notorious regime of encomiendas or "commanderies
of Indians/*
The concession of an estate or a district was officially obtained,
together with all the natives in it, but always on the condition of
converting them to the Christian faith. The Spanish colonist had
the same titles as the Emperor and King tides of proprietorship
:

and rights of sovereignty were legitimatised only oy apostolate.

There was here as we must admit a very lofty and noble idea,
which it was, unfortunately, only too easy to distort and falsify in
practice. The colonists mocked at their apostolic duties, made a
convenience of Christian charity, and refused to see in their Indians
anything but slaves and beasts of burden, from whom they extorted
the utmost possible profit.
The first slaves made in the Gulf of Mexico belonged to degenerate,
weak and lazy races. The excessive labour to which they were con-
185
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
strained was not slow in decimating them, in such proportions
that the home government became alarmed about it. The mission-
aries, scandalised and indignant at the rapacious cruelty of the
colonists, constituted themselves protectors of the oppressed, and
denounced their oppressors to the Catholic Sovereigns. Bartolome
de Las Casas and Fray Louis Bertrand, who evangelised New
Granada, distinguished themselves especially by their zeal in favour
of the Indians.
Las Casas in particular became their advocate and apologist.
He made several voyages to Castile and carried on controversies
with the theologians, including a famous one with the learned
Gin6s de Sepulveda, with the object of securing royal assent to the
abolition of the encomiendas. He recalled the great religious principles
upon which the right of colonisation had been based. The Christians
could not be regarded as the legitimate masters of a territory except
on the condition of establishing the religion of Christ there.
On the contrary, the Spanish colonists of the New World, by
their barbarous behaviour towards the natives, could not fail to
arouse hatred of that religion. Moreover, conversion ought not to
be obtained by violence. Finally the Indians, converted or not, once
they ceased to be prisoners of war, could only be regarded as good and
loyal subjects of the Catholic Sovereigns. In these circumstances,
it was a regular crime of treason to reduce them to slavery.
The partisans of the commanderies claimed to justify this slavery
by the moral decadence of the natives. They were an inferior race,
marred by all kinds of physical blemishes and infected by all
imaginable vices. It was necessary to treat them sternly if obedience
was to be secured from them. But Las Casas replied that these
accusations were pure calumnies; that the Indians were "gentle
sheep/* who askea nothing better than to serve their masters well,
on condition that they were humanely treated; that the vices with
which they were reproached were exceptional; and, finally, that they
were not morally or intellectually inferior to the Spaniards, any more
than the Berbers or the Moors.

One may imagine the scandal which these propositions aroused in

Spain,where passion was still hot from the struggle against the
Musulmans, With self-interest and ideological pedantry added to it,
the monk who made himself protector of the Indians raised a storm
against him.
Las Casas compromised a generous cause by the very intensity
which he brought to it. There was at once suspected in his argu-
ments the rivalry of cleric and layman. He claimed to know better
than the governors of His Majesty, and he was impatient at being
restrained, in his often chimerical proposals, by the civil power.
It is only too certain that he wanted to oe master and carry out the

evangelisation of the Indians in his own way.

186
 WHAT THE CONQUEST MEANT
This excellent man, who appears to have been good, if simple-
minded, as Utopian as he was obstinate, imagined that he had only
to take a cross and present himself to the Indians with words of
love to brine; them to baptism en masse. Sepulveda retorted quite
fairly that, wherever the missionaries had gone without the support
of soldiers, they had either been killed or their preaching had no
effect. Apart from the stupidity, the perfidy, the laziness, the
drunkenness and the sodomy of the natives, he instanced their
barbarism and their cruelty; the human sacrifices which stained the
temples of their idols with blood and made them regular slaughter-
houses; their markets of human flesh, their revolting cannibalism.
Their protector, carried away by his apostolic zeal, then resorted
to regular sophistries to excuse those whom he called "gentle sheep."
According to his argument, human sacrifices, abominable in them-
selves, did not constitute a sin on the part of those who offered them
in good faith, piously, to do homage to their gods. Such quibblings
bordered upon the ridiculous*
Astill graver matter was that Las Casas turned appearances

against himself, and made the purity of his motives suspect, by his
advocacy of replacing the slavery of the Indians by that of negroes.
It was insinuated that, if he favoured the introduction of negroes
into the New World it was because he was interested in the Portu-
guese companies which organised traffic in them. He discouraged
Spanish colonists by his activities on behalf of die Indians. He was,
therefore, a bad citizen and a dishonest man.
The honesty and charity of the good Las Casas are unquestion-
able. It is equally unquestionable that, if in all good faith he ex-
aggerated the cruelties and the devastations which he reported,
these cruelties and devastations were nevertheless only too true.
But how can one pronounce at this distance of time, after more
than four centuries have elapsed, upon what ought to have been
done at that period?
The quarrel between Las Casas and the viceroys, or the Spanish
colonists, was the quarrel which is constantly renewed in colonial
countries between people from home who visit there and the
administrators and landowners who live there; between the
humanitarians or the sentimentalists and the hard-headed men or
the merely businesslike. If colonists, through rapacity and brutality,
sometimes run the risk of provoking the natives to revolt and
compromising the authority of the motherland, ideologues, through
weakness and ignorance of environment and states of mind, run the
risk of the colonies.
losing
Without the veterans of Diego Vel&zquez, Cortds and Pizarro,
Las Casas and his missionaries would have been massacred or
ignominiously driven out by the Indians, On the other hand, it is
obvious that the affairs of the Spaniards themselves would have been
all the better for a little more
justice and humanity.
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
For by now the problem was no less than that of the colonisation
of the New World. Once they set out to conquer it, they had to
accept the consequences of the conquest to the full, or else evacuate
the country. The Indians must be held in subjection, or else the
Spaniards must pack up and go. Which was better to make a whole
continent enter the community of civilised peoples, or to leave it
isolated and shut up in its barbarism, with its cannibal peoples, its
temples which reeked of the slaughter-house, and its gods thirsty
for human blood?
The means employed to secure more or less superficial civilisation
were harsh often as barbarous as the barbarians whom it was
sought to enlighten and evangelise. The sovereigns, like the Spanish
missionaries, exerted themselves to soften these means as much as
they could. Could they have succeeded completely? To answer this
'question fairly one would require
to have lived in the America of
that period. It must have been a frightful business.
Most of the time die colonists were subject to the cruel necessities
of climate and environment. There was no choice of means. The
Catholic Sovereigns, who by their ordinances abolished slavery
and recommended kindness towards the Indians, nevertheless
demanded that the "royal fifth" should be paid by these same
Indians to their tax-collectors or be levied on the galleons. So,
a contradiction doubtless unconscious, they maintained
through
work in the mines and perpetuated slavery and die cruelties which
they sought to abolish.
At that period, moreover, and in a barbarous country like America,
it was impossible to dispense with servile manual labour. Las Casas
himself proposed to substitute for Indian slavery.
negjrp slavery
There remained, perhaps, the possibility of introducing agricultural
workers, colonists or serfs, brought from Europe into these new
countries for example, the Moors and Moriscos whom, for reasons
of security, it was decided to expel from Andalusia; or, as in modern
times, immigrants from all the European nations, North as well as
South.
But this was contrary to the religious ideas of the period. His-
torians that the Spaniards should not have thrown
profess surprise
their colonies open to the workers and the merchants of the whole
world. They forget the very principles which governed the Spanish
colonisation, and which we must once more recall. It had,
no other object but that of winning the New World for
theoretically,
the Christian and Catholic faith. Accordingly, apart from com-
mercial and self-interested reasons, these propagators of the Faith
could not admit there either Musulmans or Lutherans, or any kind
of pagans or heretics.

188
 CHAPTER XXII

The Psychology of the Conquistador

T*\7THAT were they like, these extraordinary men who had

\ Y/ only to appear, so to speak, in order to bring the whole
VV o f an immense continent into subjection to the crown of
Castile a subjection which, as a matter of fact, was quite superficial,
for the pacification took a long time, was interrupted by terrible
wars and revolts, and may indeed be said to be not yet ended?
For such an adventure, undertaken so far from the motherland,
with the primitive ships and armament of the period, there were
required, as I cannot repeat too often, exceptional courage and
endurance. For these were civilised men, who voluntarily accepted
a return to uncivilised life, and resigned themselves to hunger,
thirst, loss of sleep, and all the hostilities and all the cruelties of a
tropical climate
and of wild men and beasts.
Nor were they insensitive brutes. They suffered cruelly. They
realised their wretchedness and their isolation. "What a terrible
it is/* writes Bernal Diaz, "to go and discover new lands,
thing
and in such a way as we adventured there! Nobody can imagine
our estate, unless he has himself endured these excessive toils.'*
The worst risk was the perpetual one of shipwreck or, for those
who escaped it, slow death on some desert island. Garcilaso de la
Vega tells die story of one of these shipwrecked men who, reduced
to living like the beasts, assumed the appearance of one, becoming
so covered with hair that he looked scarcely human. When another
shipwrecked man was cast away on the same island, the first occu-
was afraid lest he should take him for some diabolical animal,
alf-man and half-beast. To reassure the new arrival, he had the
Eant
touching inspiration of reciting the Credo as he advanced towards
him. Otner castaways, obliged to live naked, changed their skins,
we are told, "twice a year, like snakes."
It has been remarked that the majority of these heroic adventurers
were natives of Andalusia and Estremadura, in other words of the
more southerly provinces of Spain, and also those where the struggle
against the Moors lasted for centuries. They were hardened against
the most burning suns of the Equator and tempered to endure
anything, and at the same time they were already experienced in the
kind of warfare which was to be imposed upon them.
They had practised their hands in guerrilla warfare* It was thesame
kind of war that they had to wage against the Indians : raiding and
marauding, burnings and devastations to starve or scatter the enemy.
Those who had cut down fruit-trees in the orchards of Baza, or
burned farms in the Granadine vega^ had something on which to
exercise their talents in Peru and Chile. In the school of those
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
and cutters-off of heads, the Arabs,
pillagers, seekers after treasure,
they had learned useful lessons in rapacity and cruelty.
They were hard, merciless, bold ana enterprising, as befitted
conquerors and founders who had to battle ceaselessly against the
most unfavourable conditions and against fierce enemies, and were
compelled to exact the maximum of effort from themselves and from
their auxiliaries. They were destined to
perpetual guerrilla war.
Of war on a large scale, as it was beginning to be understood in
Europe, there could be no question in the New World, and those
whose experience of warfare was confined to the campaigns against
the Frencn, the Swiss, or the Germans, found themselves hopelessly
at a loss.
Some newly disembarked recruits, full of the glory of having
campaigned under Gonzalp de Cordova or taken part in battles
such as Marignano or Cerignola, presumed to give advice to the
adventurers in sandals who fought against Indians armed with bows
and arrows and armoured in cotton-wool. Rude misadventures
were not slow in undeceiving them. It was another type of warfare
which they had to learn.
It has been pointed out elsewhere1 that most of the great leaders
of the Conquest were not professional soldiers they were merchants,
:

business men, shipbuilders, navigators, gold-seekers, whose princi-

pal advantage was that they knew the natives well and had adapted
themselves to the climate, as to the customs, of the country. These
Spaniards, or these foreigners for there were Europeans of all
origins among them, and even Africans needed a regular process of
Awericattisatio#,inoihexvrc>i:ds years of acclimatisation and apprentice-
ship, before the Conquest, properly speaking, could be undertaken
with any chance of success.
This preliminary adaptation has to take place at all periods in all
colonial environments. In Algeria the French soldiers and the great
military leaders found themselves immobilised for years before they
learnt how to the Arabs and were in a position to
fight against
advance into the interior.
For the conquistadors Americanisation was a very rapid process.
Historians have noted, indeed, how readily the Spaniards let them-
selves be contaminated by die natives. They explain this con-
tamination by the influence of women and the multiplication of
half-breeds. As Spanish women were very few, at least at the outset
of the conquest, the conquerors had to "take Indian women as
wives or concubines. Those who lived in isolation, in remote
regions, or again certain prisoners of war, by dint of living with the
Indians ended by resembling them. The degraded civilised man let
himself go and became a regular savage.
BetnaJL Dfaa tells us the story of a man, a native of
Palps,
who
was captured by the Indians and became one of their chiefs. An
1 Cf. Carlos Percyra: Las btuIJas & ks Conqwstadores, p. 108 et seq.
190
 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CONQUISTADOR
emissary of Cortes tried vainly to win him back to the Christians.
"I am married here," this man replied to the envojr, "I have three
children, and I am regarded as chief and leader in time of war. So
leave me alone! I have my face tattooed and my ears pierced. "What
would the Spaniards say of me if they saw me decked out like this?
Besides, look at my three little ones how pretty they are! As you
live, give me those green glass beads you have with you, and I will
say that my brothers have sent me them from my country/*
Despite the most pathetic entreaties, there was no doing anything
with hiim. The new savage did not want to become a civilised man
again at any price.

In general, however, they reacted harshly against being mastered

by their environment. As always happens in colonial countries, the
character of the colonist was strengthened by the contradiction,
or the hostility, of his surroundings. When he was subjected to the
influence of foreign customs and new environment, some of his
racial feelings and prejudices, some of his ideas, acquired fresh
It happened also that, as the colonist was no longer in contact
vigour.
with the motherland, where national characteristics were in course of
evolution, his own remained stationary.
The feelings, the instincts, the prejudices which he had brought
with him from his native environment became intensified or
exaggerated without being transformed. Ancestral character mum-
mified in him. The hidalgo, cousin of the Cid or the Great Captain,
became the Argentinian or Peruvian estanciero who, under the out-
ward appearance of the most up-to-date business man, hides the
hardened, set soul of a conquistador.
The two mainsprings of this soul, at the time of the conquest as
still, perhaps, to-day, were pride of race and the instinct of domina-
tion. The Spaniard of
pure blood, not crossed with Jew or Moor,
regarded himself as an individual of higher quality, and could feel
nothing but contempt for other peoples. It was he who had fought
for centuries against Islam, and ended by throwing it back into
Africa who had, in fact, inherited the Empire of the West, and
looked forward to European and world hegemony.
By virtue of Pontifical Bulls, he was the sovereign master of the
New World, the conqueror to whom everybody must bow the
knee, the apostle designated by the Vicar of Jesus Christ to win
millions of souls to the Christian faith. Subject of His August
Caesarian and Catholic Majesty, he was, in his own eyes, the perfect
type of Catholic and Christian. In warrior virtue,
in purity of Wood,
as in purity of faith, he was without rival. He had all the pretensions,
as he had all the rights.
Such feelings could only develop a bellicose and irreducible
individualism. The conquistador was a superb individual. He had a
high idea of his own worth, as also of the worth of his comrades.
191
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
In proportion as he and they felt themselves to be a small number, in
short an ilite, lost amid barbarian hordes, this sense of individual
worth became exalted in them. They were human beings of value,
inasmuch as they were almost unique examples of humanity. They
considered themselves superior even to their compatriots of the
motherland, because their adventurous and perilous life developed
inthem aptitudes unknown to the civilised man.
Personality affirmed itself in characteristics sometimes excessive
and brutal. That is what always happens in colonial countries.
Because of their small number, of the isolation in which they live,
Europeans attribute an extreme importance to the personality of
another European. They all know one another by their names, or,
what is more significant, by their nicknames. In America they knew
one another's birth-places, and were proud of the fact: Hernando
L6pez came from Avila, Juan Velazquez from Leon. Often the
name of origin ended by effacing the family name. One became Juan
the Castilian, or Miguel the Valencian. Spanish waggoners whom I
have met in the South of Algeria carry on the tradition of the con-
quistadors in this respect.
Together with pride in their birth-place, they had an almost
aristocratic sense of the worth of the individual. In their eyes,
as in the eyes of Bernal Diaz, Alonso the one-armed, or Ortiz the
musician, simple manual labourers or porters, were persons on a level
with Captain-General Herndn Cortfe.
The horses themselves and the war-dogs, on account of their
small number, assumed importance and inspired a touching con-
sideration. Akind of personality was acquired by these precious
animals through their contact with men* Their names have been
piously preserved for us, together with their traits of character,
and even their deeds, carefully noted and even celebrated in the
heroic fashion.
Such highly individualised people could not be very well dis-
ciplined, or very obedient. The old Spanish particularism, still more
strengthened by the example of the Berbers and the Arabs, led
directly to anarchy through personal rivalries and quarrels. The
conquistadors made the mistake of their ancestors in the presence
of Islam: they split up into fiercely contending factions and exter-
minated one another in the presence of the enemy.
Little by little, the instinct of independence led them to open
rebellion the motherland. For a long time loyalty to the
against
King was, in America as in Spain, the only link between these
individualists at odds with one another. After fighting with one
another, they ended by turning against the King and the motherland
itself and the ancestral separatism had its way.

It would be a mistake to regard these violent men as rough

veterans, adventurers without education and without culture.
19*
 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CONQUISTADOR
Their leaders and those
among them who were successful, who
conquered or populated countries, were in general hidalgos.
By way of proving their ignorant and destructive barbarism, it is
often recalled that, for example, Pizarro, the conqueror of Peru himself,
did not know how to read or write, and could barely sign his name.
On the other hand/Hernan Cortes, the conqueror of Mexico, was a
former student of Salamanca, and had at least a certain literary culture
which made him a clever and fluent orator, who adorned his dis-
courses with allusions andexamples borrowedfrom classical antiquity.
One even feels in him, as in Bernal Diaz, an anxiety to imitate, if
not to eclipse, the illustrious captains of Greek and Roman history.
Together with that, this fine speaker prided himself on being a
man of good manners, a model of courtesy and elegance, as careful
to observe all the rules of etiquette towards Aztec sovereigns and
caciques as towards a Grandee of Spain. He was, moreover, as
magnificent as he could be in his dress and his retinue.
But these refinements of civilisation, and intellectual culture
itself, are things altogether secondary in colonial countries. The
inborn intelligence of Pizarro, absolutely illiterate, that intelligence
so perfectly adapted to a barbarous environment, was worth more
than any diplomas. Firmness, endurance, strength of will, gift
of command, perfect knowledge of the country, a spirit of initiative
united with all the resources of guile and ingeniousness all this
put Pizarro high above all the present-day products of our Staff
colleges, still more above our universitarian DiafoirL
These conquerors have also been accused of destroying, through
ignorance and barbarism, precious civilisations like those of the
Aztecs and the Incas. This is making civilisation a laughing-stock.
Let me repeat once more those rudimentary civilisations have been
:

overestimated in the most ridiculous way, with the object of lowering

and defaming the Spaniards and Catholicism, held as responsible for
this alleged destruction.
Can one regard as civilised the Peruvians, who did not know
how to write, and who reckoned years and centuries by knots tied
in cords; or the Mexicans who used infantile hieroglyphics for
history and chronology; peoples who had neither draught beasts nor
beasts of burden, neither cows, cereals, nor vines; peoples who were
not acquainted with the wheel, and had not reached the Iron Age;
peoples among whom man was reduced to the role of a quadruped,
whose bloody religion admitted human sacrifices, and who had
markets for human flesh?
If the conquistadors destroyed much and practised needless
cruelties destruction and cruelties which are as nothing beside
those of modern war they blazed the trail for the missionaries
who saved for history everything that was essential in those
embryonic civilisations, and but for whom we should know
absolutely nothing about pre-Columbian America.
 CHAPTER XXIII

The Viceroys and the Missionaries

a little army lost in an im-
against the conquistadors,
mense continent, was the enormous mass of natives, whom
OVER they could not hope to destroy and, indeed,
did not want to
destroy, since they had come expressly to convert them and save
their souls.
Towards these pagan Indians, these new subjects of the Catholic
Sovereigns, what was to be the attitude of the clergy, and of the
government? There was not the least hesitation: they were to be
made Spaniards and Christians. It was a strict duty, an obligation
of conscience. It was for this that the Pope, master of all countries
known and unknown, had given them as subjects to the King.
The men of that time would not have admitted for a moment the
present-day system, which consists in respecting everything in the
customs and traditions of colonial peoples that is not absolutely
contrary to the essential principles of our civilisation, and in allow-
ing them to evolve, as it is said, within the framework of their
own civilisation. They would have regarded it as a monstrosity, a
regular piece of impiety, to make such compromises with obvious
barbarism, and above all to let these peoples wallow in their old
superstitions, their old fierce and bloody idolatries.
These peoples had only to bow down before their new masters,
who brought them truth, humanity, and civilisation, to be, in theory
at least, regarded as brothers. For this colonial imperialism was
entirely impregnated with Christian fraternity: it justified itself
solely by anxiety to save souls and elevate inferior races to the level
of human dignity. Such was the
generous conception generous
despite its narrowness and arbitrariness which in practice was to
collide with almost insuperable obstacles.
If the Church and the King proclaimed that the natives were to
be treated as brothers, the rough men who were to change the face
of the New World regarded the Indian as a being ot incurable
inferiority, who could not be anything but a labour-machine and a
beast of burden, and whom it was essential, for his own good, to
keep in slavery. In practice the native was not to count* These
new countries which had just been conquered could be administered
only by Spaniards ^and their half-breeds. Spain had not come to
America to maintain indigenous rudimentary civilisations, but to
found new Spains there.
This transformation was accomplished with a rapidity which
bordered on the miraculous, if one bears in mind the remoteness of
the motherland and the difficulties of
navigation. In less than half a
century the South American continent, with the addition of Mexico,
was staked out with Spanish towns and covered with a complete
194
 THE VICEROYS AND THE MISSIONARIES
administrative network which, at least on the map, made it, as it

were, a prolongation of the Iberian Peninsula.

There were in the first place simple governors, then viceroys,

to represent the royal authority and exercise its functions. Side by
side with the governors and die viceroys, there was also the im-
portant institution of audiencias, which shared many governmental
prerogatives with them.
The audienda was defined in the first place by its judicial attributes.
It was created essentially to render justice, as much to the natives
as to the Spanish colonists. But it had also other attributes. It
participated in administration properly speaking, in the control of
war and finance, with the governors, the captains-general, and
even the viceroys.
As to the viceroys, they were theoretically the visible image of the
Catholic Sovereign or the Emperor. But in reality their almost
absolute power was limited by all kinds of restrictions a mere
measure of prudence, given the extent of the territories which they
were supposed to administer, equalling or exceeding that of the
greatest European states. At the outset there were only two
viceroyalties that of Mexico and that of Peru. Later there were
:

instituted those of Santa F de Bogota and Buenos Aires.

In the first place the metropolitan authority, fearing lest the viceroys
should come to regard themselves as regular sovereigns of these
distant lands, did not leave them long in their offices six or seven
years at the most. The case of Antonio de Mendoza, who was
viceroy of Mexico for fifteen years, before proceeding to Peru,
where he held the same position, was an exception. In the next
place, the viceroys were sent "visitors" to check their proceedings :
sometimes a general visitation, sometimes an extraordinary visitation
in particular cases.
Finally, when they were recalled, they had to render account of
their administration before a Judge of Impeachment (Ju& de
Resideneia). The visitors and the judge of impeachment summoned
to die sound of trumpets all those who had any complaints to make
against the retiring viceroy. An inquiry was immediately instituted,
which often went on for years and years, with the result that ac-
cusers or accused might die before judgment was delivered.
These minute precautions show how much the Spanish sovereigns
distrusted their administrators, even the most honest and the best
intentioned. We are told that the remedy was often worse than the
disease; but, in any case, these regulations attest how seriously
the sovereigns designed to fulfil their role as protectors and civilisers
of the Indians.
Other institutions organised in the motherland, such as the
Council of the Indies, and the Casa de Contrataci6ny whose seat was
at Seville,
proposed to leave nothing to chance in so far as concerned
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
alike the administration and the exploitation of the ^New World.
The Casa de Contrataciin, created in January, 1503, "inaugurated a
whole system of administration and jurisdiction, a new method of
commerce and of geographical exploration. As emigration office,
trade clearing-house, mercantile tribunal, nautical college, it was
the centre of activity which had the most influence upon American
enterprises. ... As to the Council of
the Indies, it was; like all
the other Councils of the Crown, a consultative and law-making
assembly, as well as a tribunal, an administrative office, and an
academy of studfes. The geography and the history of America
owed much to the services of the Council of the Indies." 1
There were here two administrative organisations which found
no equivalents until modern times. Out of them, in the course of
the sixteenth century, emerged a formidable body of legislation,
comprising no less than six thousand articles dealing with economy,
jusdce,administration, worship,health, education, letters,and the arts,
in short, everything that concerned the regime in the World. New
This solicitude of the Spanish sovereigns towards the Indies
and the Indians was affirmed from the very beginning of the conquest.
One of the most eloquent testimonies which can be adduced among
a swarm of others is this too little known passage in the Testa*
ment of Isabel the Catholic: "When the Apostolic Holy See granted
us the Islands and the Tierra Firms of the oceanic sea, our principal
intention, in soliciting from Pope Alexander VI the concession of the
lands discovered and to be discovered, was to convert their peoples
to our holy Catholic faith. ... I beg the King my lord very
affectionately, I order and command the Princess my (laughter and
the Prince my son, to execute and accomplish this intention*
"Let be their principal end, and let them apply all their
this
it. Let them not
diligence
to permit, or be the cause, that the
Indians inhabiting the said islands and mainland suffer any damage
in their persons or their property. They shall be vigilant, on the contrary,
to see that these be treated with justice and kindness. And if they
peoples
receive any prejudice, let this prejudice be repaired, and let it'be seen
to that the mandate which was confided to us by the Apostolic
letters is faithfully executed."
Isabel's successors respected the wishes of the
pious Queen.
In 15*6, Charles V
issued ordinances at Granada which once more
recalled the religious object of the conquest. Finally, after the
complaints of Las Casas against the tyranny and the cruelties of the
colonists, other ordinances, which were called "the new Laws,"
were issued in 1 542 by the same sovereign. In them it was prescribed
notably: "that no Indian may be reduced to slavery, either for reason
of war or rebellion, or for any other reason,
seeing that all are
vassals of the royal Crown of Castile"; "that none shall
employ an
Indian as servant or in any other capacity against his will"; that no
1
Carlos Percyra: Breite bistoria de America, p. 2*9.
196
 THE VICEROYS AND THE MISSIONARIES
viceroy, or any officer, may grant commanderies of Indians, and that
those which belong to a deceased encomendero be restored to the royal
Crown."
Unfortunately these generous measures were not applied. The
royal ordinances, received with submission, remained a dead
letter. (JLo que el Rejf manda se obedece^ no se cumple: what the King
commands is obeyed, but not executed.) It was the eternal conflict
between colonists and the administrators and legislators of the
motherland.
A motherland, we must recognise, too often legislates to the
detriment of its interests and in complete ignorance of the unfor-
tunate or cruel conditions with which the colonists have to deal
and this on grounds of humanity for which the native is not in the
least grateful to it. On the other hand the colonist, living in a bar-
barous and hostile environment, is only too strongly tempted to
employ reprisals and exploit a disarmed enemy.
Accordingly the viceroys, caught between the royal injunction
and the ill-will of the colonists, found their efforts almost useless.
Their role was only too often confined to deriving the utmost
possible advantage from an always dangerous office. Nevertheless
some among them, who left a reputation as great administrators,
exerted themselves to reconcile the interests of the colonies and the
crown with the principles of humanity recommended or im-
posed by the sovereigns. Such, for example, was Antonio de
Mendoza, who was the first viceroy of Mexico, from 1535 to 1550,
at which date he went to Peru to exercise the same functions there.
Such, again, was Francisco de Toledo, who was nicknamed the
Peruvian Solon, and began by devoting five whole years to visiting
the territories entrusted to him. He never applied a measure until
he had satisfied himself that it was applicable, remembering what his
great predecessor Mendoza had repeated: "that before changing
anything whatsoever in the kingdom, one should see things with
his own eyes, to which purpose he needs good health and, even
more, youth."
But the actions of the viceroys, given their false position and also
the short duration of their exercise of their functions, could not yield
either very solid or very lasting results.

The influence of the clergy an influence not merely religious,

but also civilising in the widest sense of the word was considerable
in a different way.
Inasmuch as the object of the conquest was the propagation of
the faith, it is obvious that the clergy were bound to play a pre-
ponderant role in it. It is difficult for us to realise to-day with what
enthusiasm, what ardour of faith, the Spanish monks threw them-
selves into this spiritual conquest. We must endeavour to imagine
the intoxication of joy and pride, the great outburst of daring, self-
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
confidence, temerity and heroism, which possessed the victorious
nation on the morrow of the taking of Granada. It must have been
faith and conquering
something analogous with the outburst of
which launched the companions of the Prophet to
impetuousness
the attackon the old Greco-Roman world.
The of the Crusades was enlarged indefinitely, so to speak.
field
In the same way as the fever of gold took to America a swarm of
poor men and adventurers hallucinated by
chimerical paradises, so
the fever of evangelisation brought out of their cells armies of monks
for movement and liberty,
thirsting for martyrdom, or thirsting
consumed with desire to win souls, build churches, found monas-
teries, educate and control obedient masses, and be themselves
discoverers and founders.
Accordingly we find enrolled among these conquistadors of
Christ and the Church great lords and personages of royal blood,
such as the Franciscan Peter of Ghent, a relative of the Emperor
Charles V. Elderly men, weak and infirm, men incurably ill, like the
Dominican Louis Bertrand, insisted u^on setting out with the young
and strong. Despite his weakness, his ulcerated leg and the fever
that wasted him, Louis Bertrand devoted himself for years to
converting the Caraibs of New Granada. At the age of eighty
Juan de Zumarraga, the first Archbishop of Mexico, conceived
the idea, together with the Dominican Betanzos and Las Casas, who
was as old as himself, of crossing the Pacific, recently opened to
European navigation, and going and preaching to the Chinese*
Unlike the seekers of gold and the Spanish administrators, these
apostles regarded the Indians as brothers who must be enlightened
and led. The enco#tenderosy to whom territories and whole populations
of Indians were granted on the condition of feeding them and
instructing them in the Christian faith these colonists declared
that there was nothing to be done with the Indians. As lacking in
intelligence as animals, they could be nothing but beasts of burden
and labour.
The religious and the bishops protested indignantly against such
ideas and tendencies. Fray JuLin Garcds, Bishop of Tlascala, stood
out particularly through a letter of protest addressed to Pope Paul ffl,
which made a great impression in Europe as well as America.
"Where/* asked this prelate, "is the man presumptuous and
impudent enough to dare to affirm that the Indians are incapable
of receiving the faith, when we find them the mechanical
practising
arts and when, within the limits of our ministry alone, we can attest
their natural goodness, their fidelity and their diligence? ... It is
but just to recognise them as rational beings, fuUy conscious and
endowed with understanding. Their children surpass ours in their
mental capacity and quickness of intelligence. . . .
To-day they are
so well educated (I speak of the that they write in
happily children)
Latin and in Castilian better than our Spaniards/
198
 THE VICEROYS AND THE MISSIONARIES
The good bishop was, no doubt, generalising from exceptional
cases, or neglecting to investigate these infant prodigies very closely.
In the same way as Las Casas regarded his Indians as "gentle sheep/*
Fray Julidn Garcs attributed to his, for the purposes of nis argument,
aptitudes and talents probably much exaggerated. Be that as it may,
the Sovereign Pontiff re-echoed his protest in a famous Bull, the Bull
Ipsa veritaS) of which the essential passage was as follows :
"He Who is Truth itself and can neither deceive nor be deceived
said to the preachers of His faith, when He sent them to exercise their
ministry: Go and preach to all nations. He said "all nations" in-
differently, because all are capable of receiving this teaching. .
. .

But the Enemy of the human race has persuaded some of his
ministers to affirm, the better to satisfy their cupidity, that the
Indians and other peoples recently come to our knowledge
ought
to be treated as brute beasts and reduced to servitude, as being
incapable of receiving the Catholic Faith. . . .
"Desiring to bring remedy to such a state of things, in the name
of our Apostolic authority we declare by the present letters that the
Indians and other peoples recently known to us, even if they are
outside the Christian faith, be not and cannot be deprived of their
liberty, or of the possession of their property, and that they must
by no means be reduced to slavery."
Unhappily it was the same with the Pontifical Bulls as with the
royal ordinances. They changed nothing, or almost nothing, in an
inveterate evil. Slavery, ill-treatment, and cruelty continued. All
that the religious could obtain was the moderation or the partial
amelioration of the regime.
But let us not be in a hurry to condemn the colonists, for whom
there was a swarm of extenuating circumstances, which anybody
who has lived in colonial countries will understand. The Hfe of
these men was something of a torment as well as a heroism and
that deserves the recognition of their descendants. Let me repeat,
moreover: to judge what they were driven to do, we should need
to have lived that life of theirs and known the dangers of all
kinds by which, and the merciless enemies by whom, they were
surrounded.

In any event, the principal object of the propagators of the faith was
achieved: they won a whole continent for Christianity. In less than
fifty years they obtained what four centuries of crusades had never
accomplished, a conquest which surpassed the wildest dreams of the
most conquering Popes.
In the history of Western humanity, this was a result of extreme

importance. Converted to Christianity, the conquered peoples were

to accept the essential principles of our culture, and not merely the
external or material part of our civilisation, as in the case of Asiatic
or African peoples who remain faithful to their ancestral religions.
199
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
The American Indian or half-breed is closer to us than the most
cultured Musulman, Buddhist, or Shintoist.
Apart from any religious consideration, these missionaries of the
New World must be regarded as great civilisers. Not only did they
abolish human sacrifice and cannibalism, together with fetishism
and idolatry; they also ceaselessly combated slavery in all its forms.
They did not confine themselves to evangelising; they also exerted
themselves to elevate and educate their catechumens. The Fran-
ciscans, the Dominicans, and, after them, the Augustinians and the
Jesuits, were the great
educators of the Americans.
It was the Franciscans who founded the first colleges. Peter of
Ghent, who founded that of Mexico Gty, succeeded, we are told, in
assembling as many as a thousand pupils, to whom
he taught not
only Latin, sacred music, and Castilian, but also all kinds of arts and
crafts. Similar foundations multiplied in Mexico, thanks to the
initiative of the clergy or the viceroys. One of the most remarkable
was that established by Archbishop Juan de Zumarraga, who, in his
grouped a select band of young
college of Santiago de Tlaltelolco,
once they were in possession of the Castilian
natives, in order that,
language, they might teach their own language to future Spanish
preachers.
After that, universities were created in the principal centres:
in Mexico, then in Lima, where, in the middle of the sixteenth
firs*:

century, there was opened the University of San Marcos, a daughter,

like that of Mexico, of the University of Salamanaca, and enjoying
the same privilege. Thanks to its enormous revenues, it was able to
maintain as many as thirty-two Chairs. "There was also to be
found at Lima the Protomedicato, a centre independent of the
1
University."
There were other centres, for example, Sante F6 de Bogotd, which
possessed
two universities. One was that of Santo Tomas, founded
in 1627 by the Dominicans, as a development of a grammar school
created in 1572. For their part the Jesuits had founded the Uni-
versidad Javeriana, placed, as its name indicates, under the pro-
tection of Saint Francis Xavier.
In addition, New Granada numbered twenty-three colleges
and a very large number of primary schools, for every monastery
had one of its own. In Argentina the great university centre was
Cordova del Tucumdn, where the Jesuits established their
Colegio
Maximo in 1613. There was anotner at Charcas, whose teaching
was preferred to that of Tima.
Ail this assumed a learned
equipment: printing-presses and
libraries. The first printing-house in the New World was installed
in Mexico, about the year 1535, by
Ardibishop Zumarraga. There
were early in Mexico, as at Lima and Santa F6, important libraries
founded by the religious, which, together with works of philosophy
1
Cf. Carlos Pcreyra: La obra de Efpafa tn America, p. 130 tt stq.
2OO
 THE VICEROYS AND THE MISSIONARIES
and theology, comprised collections of the Greek and Latin classics
and treatises on physics and mathematics.
But perhaps the greatest service which these monks rendered
America was that of studying its languages and its history in fact,
all its past anterior to Columbus's discovery. In order to preach

directly to the natives, they wanted to know even their humblest

dialects. They composed grammars, lexicons, and dictionaries.
They made themselves not only grammarians and lexicographers,
but also ethnographers and historians. From geography and
mineralogy to the study of religious and political systems they
embraced everything, and poured the treasure-trove of their re-
searches into books which are regular scientific compendia.
Among other capital works of this class, the History of the Incas of
Peru, by Garcilaso de la Vega who, if not one of these monks,
was at least one of their pupils and the General History of the Things
of the New World* by Father Sahagun, are still regarded to-day as
regular monuments of erudition, repertories as abundant as they are
indispensable to anybody concerned with studies of this kind.
I have already referred to the charge so often formulated against
the Spaniards and against the missionaries in general: that of having
destroyed the treasures of the old American civilisations through
fanaticism and ignorance, and we have seen how, in order to
increase the guilt of these iconoclasts and vandals, these civilisations
have been ridiculously overestimated.
Neither the conquistadors nor the missionaries were so much to
blame. It is already some little time since the eminent Mexican
scholar, Joaqufn Garda Icazbalceta, dealt adequately with these
1

monstrously exaggerated accusations.

That destructions of idols, temples, and hieroglyphic paintings
took place was certainly the case. But these destructions in no way
diminished the sum of the ideas that we can form about the history
and religion of the primitive peoples of America those peoples
who did not know the art of writing, and whose history was limited
to rude chronological notations. Everything there was to be known
was obtained by the monks and missionaries, who had the patience
to interrogate the Indians of their time, to collect still
living traditions,
and to describe what they saw in the way of monuments still standing.
I may add that in teaching the Indians to read and write, and
teaching them languages as perfected as Latin or Castilian, they
provided them with mediums of expression of which they had no
previous conception. They enabled them to become conscious of a
past which was on the point of foundering in their memories.

Naturally, in the intentions of the missionaries, all this intellectual

culture was subordinated to religious propaganda. What dominated
* D. Fr. Juart de Zttmarraga> primer
See, in particular, p. 373 ct seq^ in his Bioff-af/a de
^pbirpo de Mljico*
2OI
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
was the propagation of the faith and anxiety to main-
all their efforts
Hence it was that the Inquisition was
tain that faith in all its purity.
not slow to be introduced into the New World, as it had been into
Spain. The first Inquisitor
was precisely that Juan de Zumarraga
who founded the first colleges and the first printing-houses in
Mexico.
Itwould be preposterous and, indeed, absurd, to defend the
Inquisition.But it may be said that the number of its victims in
South America was much less than certain historians have imagined;
that burnings of warlocks and men possessed were also frequent
in Protestant countries ; and, finally, that this persecution of dissi-
dents was rendered obligatory, for the royal officials as for the
religious,by the very terms of the mandate which the Crown of
Spain had assumed in accepting the conquest and domination of the
New World. Their role was to extend and defend the Faith. In
consequence, anybody who opposed this programme must be
treated as an enemy.
This was why the American Inquisition, during the first century
of its existence, persecuted especially Lutheran English and Dutch,
and Jews or Judaisants escaped from Spain and Portugal. From the
political
and commercial point of view, these heretics might also
be dangerous rivals and enemies. The other persons condemned
were bigamists and sodomists or common law criminals, found
guilty ot cannibalism and ritual murders. The Inquisition tended
more and more to assume the functions of an ordinary tribunal or a
secret police organisation.
It is not a question of condemning or whitewashing proceedings
which we regard to-day as absolutely iniquitous and odious. It is a
question of determining what the New World owed to its Spanish
conquerors and its missionaries. It is impossible to dispute that it
owed them everything that we understand by the word "civilisation."
But for the uncompromising and indomitable faith by which these
last Crusaders were carried away, it is certain that America 'would
not have been thrown so widely open to the influence, and to the
immigration, of the Christian peoples, and that the whole of America
would not have become what it is to-day namely, an extension of
our old European world.

202
 CHAPTER XXIV

The Work of Spain in America

E winning of gold, the other motive force of the American
I enterprise, was at first only a mirage, which inflicted cruel
-*-
disappointments on the early colonists. The discovery and
exploitation of the mines demanded considerable time. Before
anything else, it was necessary to win the soil, and render it habitable
and supporting for the European immigrant. But for the planters
and the graziers of Cuba ana San Domingo, it would have been
to equip the expeditions and extend the conquest on the
impossible
mainland.
This conquest and this peopling of American soil were a regular
piece of creation: a Spanish creation. To us, habituated as we are
to our countries of long-standing cultivation, to flora and fauna
domesticated for centuries, it is hard to realise what such an under-
taking meant. We who find the table laid, and have only to stretch
out our hand to pluck a fruit, cannot imagine what life must be like
in countries where human cultivation does not exist.
The conquistadors had to import into America, together with
their food, the animals and the working implements which would
enable them to master the soil* One may say that it was the horse,
steel, and powder which founded Spanish domination in America.
We may add the dogs, which were regular combatants side by side
with the conquistadors. Without them, and without their cavalry
and artillery, the converters sent by His Holiness and His Gesarian
Majesty would have been promptly annihilated by the natives.
The horses brought from Spain multiplied so rapidly throughout
the South American continent that in some regions they rapidly
reverted to the wild state. Asses and mules, also imported from
Castile, took the place of the llamas and the vicunas of Peru for work
in connection with the mines and all kinds of transport.
At the same time as draught beasts, beasts for consumption
were also introduced, especially pigs, whose rearing became the
principal resource of the first colonists, and then cows and sheep.
Goats were also imported, as those of the country were regarded
as inferior to the strains which the Spanish ships brought from
Guinea or the Canaries. Finally the native species were improved
by all kinds of crossings. Casttltan hens, ducks, and turkeys fined the
farmyards of Mexico and Peru.
The most precious gift which Spain made to America was wheat.
It was unknown there befo're the conquest. All that was known was
maize and manioc. I have already recalled the story, or the legend,
of In6s Miinoz planting three grains of wheat, which had come from
Spain, in a flower-pot, and how the ears that came out of this pot
sowed Peru. This story is repeated in other forms in all the American
203
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
countries. Up and down the continent, in the monasteries of Santa
F6 or Mexico, reverend Fathers tell the legend of the first grain of
wheat that came from Castile, and show you the flower-pot which
of the New World.
produced that wheat, the father of the harvests
The vine was not slow to follow corn. It prospered especially
in Peru. At the outset, however, the smallest vine-branch was
worth its weight in gold. Those who had planted a few slips in
their huertas had to have them guarded by armed men, so rare were
the plants. The same applied to the olive tree, which was brought
to Lima by Ines, Mtifioz's second husband, Antonio de Ribera,
who arrived from Spain with a case of young olive trees which
came from the Ajarafe of Seville.
Only one of these olive trees survived, and it became enormous.
It was called the Castilian olive tree, and soon had a whole history.
When it had grown, its owner, on the occasion of a procession, cut a
branch of it and pkced it in the path of the Holy Sacrament: a
proceeding which aroused the greed of everybody present. To save
the precious branch, a monk took possession of it and made a present
of it to the owner of a huerta^ one Gonzalo Guillen, but on the con-
dition that, if the branch took root and grew, they should share the
crop.
The branch grew so well that the colonist thought it more ad-
vantageous to buy out the monk*s interest with a bar of silver.
Having become sole owner of the tree, he sold shoots of it, which
brought him in from four to five thousand pesos. Finally there was a
regular grove of olive trees in the hwrta where the monk's branch
had been planted.
Naturally the first olives were very dear. To offer five or six to
one's guests was regarded as a refinement of generosity. Other
fruits and vegetables imported from Spain and acclimatised in
America produced similar miracles and similar greeds oranges,
lemons, asparagus, and even mere carrots, Garcilaso de la Vega, who
was a half-breed of Inca and Spaniard, tells us with charming
simplicity what an event was the appearance on his father's table
of the first three sticks of Castilian asparagus.
"I remember," he says, "that in the year 1555-1556 Garcia de
Tuelo, a native of Trujttio, then treasurer of savings in the imperial
city of Cuzco, decided to send Garcikso de la Vega, my dear rather
and lord, three asparagus, produce of Spain, of which he made him a
present as something exquisite. . , , These asparagus were very
fine, but unequal, because there were two as oiick as one of the
fingers of the hand, and much longer than a quarter of an ell.
But, as to the third, it was much thicker and also much shorter, and
all three were so tender that
they broke of themselves.
"To do greater honour to these new plants, my father had them
cooked in his room, in the presence of the seven or eight gentlemen
who were supping at his table. When they were cooked, he had
204
 THE WORK OF SPAIN IN AMERICA
vinegar and oil brought, and then my father divided the two longest
among the guests, to every one of whom he gave a little, and he
reserved the third for himself, saying that they would pardon him,
because it was a question of a novelty of Spain"
I have reported this anecdote at length, because it is highly typical
and significant. This ceremonial taking of three sticks of Spanish
in a special room was something like a solemn communion
asparagus
with the motherland. There was more affection than epicurism in the
episode of Garcilaso's father reserving the third stick to himself
alone, because, as he said, it was "a novelty of Spain/* What these
colonists sought was to give themselves the illusion of the home-
land that they missed, to create new Spains in America.
Everything proves this superabundantly, from the names of the
cities which they founded and the viceroyalties which they con-

quered and organised, to the fruits and vegetables which they

exerted themselves to acclimatise in the soil of exile. There are
thousands of other examples to show us that these conquerors,
seekers of gold or hunters of souls, religious or colonists, were
before all else cultivators and graziers, eager to develop the land
as well as its inhabitants, and create there a new fertility and a flora
and fauna which the untilled soil had never known.
The nativeproducts, in their turn, were improved and cultivated
intensively. Tne cultivation of the sugar-cane was not slow in
becoming the main source of wealth of the Antilles. Some colonists
even tried to introduce the silk industry into New Spain. The first
experiments gave excellent results so orilliant, so unexpected, that
Father MotoJunia, in his Historia de los Indios de la Nueva Espana,
went so far as to say that the silks of Mexico would supplant all
others in the markets of Christendom. Unfortunately the dis-
covery of the Philippines and the diffusion of Chinese silks dealt a
fatal blow to the young Mexican industry.

This transformation of the soil by the colonist no

Spanish longer
strikes the eye to-day. His contribution is merged in the native
wealth. But what it is impossible not to see is the profound imprint
which he stamped upon his conquest.
In a few years he changed the face of it. With a kind of joyous
haste, analogous with the transport and delirium of procreation^ he
sowed towns and centres of population wherever he went- These
towns have an individual, unforgettable physiognomy, like that of th
proud individuals who were, indeed, heroes that founded them.
This must obviously be true if even to-day, after a century of
unrestrained Anglo-Saxonism and Germanism, North American
writers find themselves compelled to recognise it. "New Spain,"
writes Sylvester Baxter in his History of Spanish Architecture in
Mexico^ "never experienced the long period of colonial simplicity
of the English possessions. The land was transformed as though
20}
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
it had been illuminated by Aladdin's lamp. Thanks to the st
for wealth and power, animated
energy of the conquerors, greedy
at the same time by a profound faith, the new Spain became flourish-
ing within a few years, and
was metamorphosed into a marvellous
kingdom, whose immensity was dotted with splendid cities which
arose suddenly in the midst of the desert, or occupied the site of an
old native town."
The contemporaries of this heroic period, who were able to com-
the country, before and after the conquest,
pare the two conditions of
express an admiratibn for the Spanish achievement in which national
pnde doubtless plays a large part, but which nevertheless seems to
to the facts of the case.
correspond
"Let curious readers," says Bernal Diaz, "consider how many
cities, towns, and villages peopled by Spaniards
there are in this
country. There are so many that, not knowing all their names, I
shall not speak of them. Let them pay attention to the ten bishoprics,
without counting the archbishopric of the most worthy city of
Mexico, and to the three royal seats. Let them look at the holy
cathedral churches, the monasteries peopled by Dominicans, Fran-
ciscans, Fathers of Charity and Augustinians, the number of hospitals
and their great blessings, and the devout house of Our Lady of
Guadalupe.
"Let them take account also of the University of Mexico, where
are studied and -taught grammar, theology, rhetoric, philosophy
and other arts and sciences; its master-printers and its presses for
printing all kind of books, both in Latin and in the vulgar tongue;
and that here are conferred degrees of licenciates and doctors."
After these foundations of an intellectual or spiritual kind, he
deals with the natural wealth of the country: the mines of gold and
silver brought into exploitation, the industries created by the
conquerors, the transformation effected in the customs of the
natives, who practise all the professions of the Europeans, and have
their own poKce, their local administration, their officers of
justice.
"Every year they elect their ordinary alcades, regidores, registrars,
constables, stewards of taxes and savings. They have their town-
halls with their sheriffs. They assemble there twice a week, rendering
justice, securing payment of debts, and, for some criminal offences,
whipping and chastising/*
The Indians, too, "have their churches very richly provided with
altars and all the accessories of Divine
worship, such as crosses,
chandeliers, candle-sticks, chalices, patines, salvers small and large,
censers, the whole in wrought silver. In rich communities, the copes,
chasubles and frontals are commonly of velvet, damask, satin and
taffetas of varied colours and embroideries, and the ornaments of
the cross subtly worked with gold, silk and sometimes
pearls."
The obliging chronicler does not stop at these splendours. He
vaunts the luxury of the chiefs, who have carriages and horses of
206
 THE WORK OF SPAIN IN AMERICA
He enumerates the festivals devoutly celebrated by these new
?rice.
paniards, who have the same amusements as in Spain: ring-tilting,
single-stick contests, bull-fights. The Castilian colonists might
cherish the illusion that they had never left their native pueblo.
What is certain is that they gave their new cities a profoundly
Spanish character. There is a Spanish colonial architecture. These
men, who were often dying of hunger and short of clothes, possessed
in a high degree the Latin sense of beauty and magnificence. Proud
of their race as of their deeds, proud of their country as of their
sovereigns, they wanted to do honour to Imperial Spain by building
edifices worthy of her greatness in the conquered territory. Nothing
was fine enough or great enough for the glorious subjects of his
Gesarian Majesty.
Other countries may think of economy in their colonies, and be
basely practical and utilitarian. Their buildings may reek of ad-
ministrative parsimony and lack of imagination. The architecture
of the Spaniards in America is truly monumental in character and it
includes some conceptions of genius, such, for example, as the
cathedral and the great square in Mexico City.
In general the churches and the palaces, everything that had to do
with worship or the royal majesty, had an air of grandeur, austerity,
and strength, and, at the same time, a very Spanish appearance.
All South America is full of such churches, palaces, monasteries,
hospitals or schools, and you are immediately reminded of the
university cities or the religious metropoles of Old Spain or,
again, of such-and-such a street-corner, cross-roads, or little square
in a small town of Andalusia or Estremadura.
All the Spanish styles have left examples in Spain, from the
declining Gothic to the severe style of the end or the eighteenth
century, by way of plateresque, baroque, and the most disordered
churrigueresque. Earthcjuakes and revolutions have destroyed
many of these old colonial edifices; but descriptions of some of them
have been preserved for us. We know that on the morrow of the
conquest of Mexico, a few years after the entrance of Cortds into the
Aztec capital, there was a Royal Palace in Mexico City, which served
as the residence of the viceroy.
A contemporary writer vaunts its fa$ade, "with its high galleries
adorned with slender columns and its stone balustrades . . . the
great hall, withits platform hung with rich tapestries and its dais
of damask spangled with gold, where are placed the seats of the
councillors. That of the viceroy is of velvet, provided with a cushion,
also of velvet, for his feet."
A century later another writer, describing the same royal palace,
gives us an idea of the development which it had undergone since
the days of CortSs and Bernal Diaz. It was a whole world to itself,
a labyrinth of courtyards, galleries, and corridors, with monumental
staircases. At die entrance was an octagonal fountain, in white
207
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
marble, surmounted by a bronze horse. Everywhere throughout
the halls there was a profusion of hangings, velvets, crimson
damasks bearing the royal arms embroidered in relief; portraits
of the sovereigns, seats of the councillors, the dais and throne of the
viceroy.
But, more than all this external magnificence, what we must bear in
mind is the moral imprint given to a whole continent by the Spanish
genius. Not only in those American cities where you breathe the air
of Castile and Andalusia, where you rediscover their colour and
their atmosphere, but everywhere else as well, from one end of the
continent to the other, among the natives and the half-breeds no
less than among the colonists of pure Iberian race, you find a spiritual
unity which relates to one another all these peoples separated by
thousands of leagues and subject to the most widely differing
climates: which, in short, relates them with their ancestors or their
Spanish or Portuguese masters of the early period.
With all their defects, which are many, they represent a new form
of Latinity, in otherwords, of Western civilisation in its highest form.
In face of Anglo-Saxon pressure, of the machinism and collectivism
of the North, they represent the resistance of the individual and the
free activity of man.
These people of Buenos Aires, Rio, or Lima are closer to us
Latins than tnose of New York or Chicago. They perpetuate, in a
world younger than our own, a conception of life, traditions of
culture and of intellectual elegance, a sense of pleasure and of beauty,
a need of leisure, even of idleness, which are the condition of great
works of art and thought and do honour to humanity.

208
 CHAPTER XXV

The World Balance-Sheet of the Discovery

us imagine the effect that \sould be created in our modern

world by the discovery in the South Polar seas of an unknown
Er land; a land inhabited by peoples possessing a civilisation of
their own, with a climate and products which upset all our historical
and scientific theories, our geology as well as our philology; a land
reached by a new route which was regarded as impracticable and
we shall have only a faint idea of the emotion which seized hold of
our Old World at the news of the prodigious voyage of Columbus
and his return from it.
We find an echo of this emotion in the enthusiastic letters which
Pedro Martir addressed to his learned and aristocratic correspon-
dents. On September 13, 1493, he wrote to the Count of Tendilla and
the Archbishop of Granada: "Lift up your hearts, veterans of
learning! Columbus announces that he has discovered marvels I**
Again, in a letter to the philosopher Pomponio Leti, he wrote: "You
exulted with joy and you could not restrain your tears when I con-
firmed to you the news of the discovery of the world, hitherto hidden,
of the Antipodes. Your reply enables me to judge your emotion/*
This enthusiasm, this marvelling, have been disputed, as everything
in the least extraordinary or heroic in the story of the Discoverer has
been disputed. We are asked to believe that it was he who provided
all the expenses of his publicity and that he organised it cleverly him-
self. Nevertheless, the mere extracts from letters which I have just

quoted testify to the impression that was produced in literate and

erudite circles.
It is unquestionable that Columbus's exploit enjoyed a popular suc-
cess as well. Otherwise it is not to be explained that he should have
found so many volunteers for his second voyage. We know, moreover,
that within the same year the fame of his exploit spread throughout
all Europe. In Italy and in Germany, poems celebrated the isles of

gold discovered by the intrepid admiral of the oceanic seas.

The fact was that the old Mediterranean world had collapsed.
Millenary barriers were broken. That world was no longer blockaded
by Islam at the two outlets from the Mediterranean. The horizon
expanded, and new ways were opened to human activity, and to
human thought. The world escaped at last from that little inland
sea where there had been so much scuffling and struggling among
European peoples for centuries. Men felt themselves liberated ana,
at the same time, increased in strength. The power of man had
grown, coincidently with the extension of his dominion over new
seas and lands. It was, in short, a New Man who was born.
This New Man, who became the model more or less avowed,
more or less envied, of all Christendom, was the Spaniard of the
H 209
 THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA
sixteenth century. The man of the Renaissance modelled himself,
consciously or unconsciously, upon
the Spaniard of his time. That
model was in the first place a cosmopolitan, inasmuch as he was, in
the first pkce, a great traveller. He had fought in Italy, Germany,
and Flanders. He had conquered islands and continents in the New
World. He had seen strange countries, many strange countries. He
had lived there, he had struck roots there, he had founded cities and
kingdoms there.
This cosmopolitan knew the world better than our tourists or even
our colonial officials of to-day, who merely rush through exotic
countries or see them pass by, at full speed, from the window of a
sleeping-car or the cabin of an aeroplane. Colonist, soldier, or
official, captain-general or viceroy, he was as much at home in Lima
as in Mexico, in Rome or Milan as in Brussels. Hence arose an
assurance and an audacity, a spirit of initiative and enterprise, a need
of adventure, which the Christian world had forgotten.
This Spanish Man was confident in himself and his future. Was it
not he who had vanquished Islam that Islam whose menace had
weighed for centuries upon Christendom and which, even beaten,
was still to be feared? Had he not, with a few ships and a handful of
bold comrades, conquered and subjected a whole new world?
He was very full of the sense or his strength and his valour. He
was bursting with pride and presumption, with a swaggering and a
swashbuckling which bordered upon rhodomontade. Spaniard and
Catholic, he represented the highest aristocracy in the world. So let
nobody dare to dispute his precedence in the ante-chambers of the
Pope or his victory on the battle-field!
It was because he was high-minded as well as strong that every-
thing was due to him: wealth and domination. He wanted luxury,
grandeur, beauty, voluptuousness around him. His manners grew
polished. He became, for the rest of Europe, the type of perfect
gentleman, as much through the elegance and sober distinction of his
costume as through his courtesy and his art of enjoying life.
^
His cities, like his palaces, beautified themselves. Flanders sent
him her tapestries and her linen; Italy her pictures, her statues, her
jewellers* ware, her perfumes; America her timber and her precious
metals* By the end of the sixteenth century, Madrid became a great
cosmopolitan centre a centre not only of politics, but also of
business and the arts. From all parts or the vast Spanish Empire,
men on the make and intriguers flowed thither, together with mer-
chants, bankers, painters, artists, and craftsmen of all kinds, men of
learning and travellers.
The Tower orders themselves acquired polish in their turn, and felt
their pretensions growing
througn contact with such magnificent
and gallant lords. In the seventeenth century, it was not unusual to
see mere craftsmen bearing swords. Menial
occupations were left to
foreigners or to peasants come from the most backward provinces of
210
 THE WORLD BALANCE-SHEET OF THE DISCOVERY
Spain. It was French Auvergnats who cleaned the boots of the
hidalgos and acted as knife-grinders, porters, and water-carriers in
the Spanish capital.
To this enlargement of material life corresponded another enlarge-
ment and of greater importance in the intellectual sphere. Carried
by the navigators and discoverers, propagated by a whole literature
of explorations and voyages, new notions made their way into men's
minds and changed the face of reality, together with the fundamental
axioms of learning. Throughout the sixteenth century and into the
seventeenth, the Spanish writers of the New World among whom
were a certain number of natives diffused an enormous mass of
facts and ideas all through Europe and the whole world: whether
they were historians or linguists, botanists, naturalists, metallurgists,
soldiers or explorers, or even simple travellers who told of their ship-
wrecks and their sufferings in the unknown islands. Spanish-
American literature fills square kilometres of archives and libraries.
The first consequence of this afflux of new ideas was a diminution
of the respect paid to antiquity, sacred as well as profane. Columbus,
through his discoveries, had proved that antiquity was wrong, not
only in its pagan philosophers, but also in its Fathers of the Cnurch
and its theologians. Modern rationalism, so far as it stands opposed
to the slavishness and the superstition of antiquity, derives from this
from the confidence which the man of the sixteenth century dis-
covered in himself; from the liberation and the enlarging of his
intelligence, on the threshold of a new world and of unsuspected
realities.
Here, in something that the Renaissance owed to Spain,
itself, is
apart from her own and literature, whose richness and originality
art
are unrivalled. The share of Italy, and that of Greco-Latin antiquity,
in the work of the Renaissance have been immoderately exaggerated.
The most modern share, the part that was most alive, most full of
promise for the future, obviously belongs to Spain.
What a strange thing it isl the American enterprise, the last
Crusade against Islam, thus itself to us as the final flowering
presents
of the thought of the Middle the liquidation of a whole,
Ages, as
long past. It was out of this religious idea that was born the modern
world, sceptical and rationalist.

211
 VII
THE SPANISH HEGEMONY AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ABSOLUTE
MONARCHY
 CHAPTER XXVI

The Policy of the Catholic Sovereigns. The Wars of Italy. The Royal
Marriages. Settlements in Africa
OTHING can make a prince more esteemed," writes Machia-
"than his great enterprises and the fine examples which
velli,
he gives. We nave in our days Ferdinand of Arag6n, at

present King of Spain* One may almost consider him as a new prince,
inasmuch as, from his being the weak monarch he was, his glory and
his renown have made of him the first monarch of Christendom. It
you consider his actions, you will find them all great and some of
them extraordinary. At the commencement of his reign he assaulted
Granada, and that was the beginning of his greatness."
This eulogy smacks a little of the courtier. There was nothing
great about Ferdinand, who was rather a man of petty means and
tortuous ruses, but of a practical and singularly realist turn of mind.
His chief merit, in the of his compatriots, was that, more or less
eyes
unconsciously, he paved the way for Spanish hegemony, which really
was a great thing and was to last more than a century and a half.
As Machiavelli truly remarks, the beginning of his fortune coin-
cided with the taking of Granada, which occurred on January 2,
1492.
Already, several years earlier, his marriage with Isabel of Castile,
by completing the ae facto unification of Spain, had put in his power
one of the most important States of Christendom. His victory over
the Moors, his
possession
of the kingdom of Granada, the political
marriages of his children, the successes of his arms in Italy, the
fortunate manoeuvres of his diplomacy; and finally the discovery of
America, the sudden enrichment of die Spanisn nation, and the
intoxication of conquest which seized upon it, after all these un-
expected triumphs, gave Spain a prestige such as had not been known
in Europe since the collapse of die Roman Empire.
Such good fortune could not fail to provoke jealousies and
rivalries. At that moment the designated rival of Spain was France,
her nearest neighbour: a kingdom more united than Spain, which
the excellent administration of Louis XI had just made stronger than
she had ever been before.
A struggle between the two nations was inevitable. They had
urgent frontier questions to settle, in the direction of Navarre as
well as in the direction of the Cerdagne and Roussillon. Competition
over heritages was to divide them still more.
Ferdinand of Arag6n and the Charles VIH of France
young King
had more or less debatable rignts over the Kingdom of Naples.
Ferdinand I, bastard son of Alfonso V
of Arag6n, held this kingdom
in defiance of his cousin Ferdinand, the husband of Isabel of Castile.
His exactions had dissatisfied the Neapolitan nobility, who, in order
215
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
to get rid of him, invoked the rights of the Crown of France to the
kingdom of Naples, which had belonged to Charles of Anjou,
brother of Louis XI.
Since an Aragonese dynasty had supplanted the Angevin dynasty,
the rights of France seemed to have lapsed. But Ren6 of Anjou, who
had just died, had revived them by bequeathing his territories and
titles to Louis XI and his descendants. Accordingly Charles VIII
could regard his pretensions to Naples as legitimate, and entertain
the offers which were made to him by the Neapolitan barons.
By way of further justification of an expedition to Italy, the King
of France declared that he would only call at Naples, and that the
real object of the campaign was to go and attack the Turks in Con-
stantinople. He was setting out, he said, on
a new Crusade. It was
this religious pretext which covered all the wars undertaken at that
time, just in the same way as in our time wars require social or
humanitarian ends. It is no longer religion, but civilisation or
humanity, which one is said to be defending.
This war of Italy is usually regarded as a juvenile folly on the part
of the young Charles VIII: the itching of ambition in a feeble mind.
To argue in this way is to ignore the political necessities which made
the possession of Italy a question of the first importance for France
and Spain. According to the manner in which it was decided, one or
the other of the two rivals would be put in a position of inferiority.

Spain could not allow France to gain a footing in Italy, especially

in the kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand of Arag6n was in possession
of Sicily, whence he kept watch over the Barbaresques, the eternal
enemies of Spain and her trade, who, recently expelled from Andalu-
sia, continued to and raid the Andalusian coasts through their
harry
pirates.
Could she tolerate a neighbour as dangerous as the French
installed in Campania, whence they would certainly
attempt to gain
Sicily at the first opportunity? Was it prudent, above all, to let them
occupy southern Italy, the advanced bastion of defence against the
Turks?
Spain, even after the taking of Granada, lived in terror of a descent
by the united Ottoman and Barbaresque fleets. In 1480 the Turks
had seized Otranto and threatened the whole Italian peninsula. But
an even worse danger, in Ferdinand's eyes, was that of seeing the
King of France acquire his rich heritage of Naples and augment his
maritime power by occupying new ports in the Mediterranean, which
would compete with the eastern Spanish ports.
On the French side fears were no less intense. If Ferdinand sup-
planted his cousin in Naples, as he looked like doing, being already
the possessor of the whole of the southern coast of
Spain, together
with Sicily, he would turn the western Mediterranean into a
Spanish
lake. All trade would pass into the hands of the
ship-owners of
Barcelona, Valencia, and Malaga, The King of Spain would become
216
 THE POLICY OF THE CATHOLIC SOVEREIGNS
master of the straits which commanded navigation of the eastern
Mediterranean.
Moreover, if Spain gained a footing in Italy, whence she could lend
a hand to various enemies of France, she would become a very serious
danger. Such a further aggrandisement, after her throwing-back of
the Moors to Africa, would in itself be a great source of anxiety to
France. This anxiety was only increased some years later, when the
Catholic Sovereigns married their children to princes and princesses
whose standing added still more to the prestige of the Spanish
hegemony.
In 1497, the Infante Don Juan married Margaret of Austria,
daughter of the Emperor Maximilian. Shortly afterwards the Infanta
Juana married the Archduke Philip the Fair, brother of Margaret and
son of the Emperor. Through his mother, Marguerite of Burgundy,
the Archduke was sovereign prince of Namur and heir to Brabant,
Hainault, Holland, Zeeland, Luxembourg, in short the whole of
Flanders. Moreover, as the government of Charles VIII had made
the mistake of restoring Artois, the Franche-Comt6 and the Charo-
lais to him, this son-in-law of the Catholic Sovereigns, master of the
French northern and eastern frontiers, could penetrate into the
heart of France when he chose.
Ferdinand set the seal upon his work by giving his daughter
Catherine to Henry, Prince of Wales, the future Henry VIII, who, if
need be, could threaten the King of France in his own kingdom,
should he presume to proceed to Italy with conquering intentions.

France thus ran the risk of being encircled by land and sea. The
astuteness of Ferdinand was in process of creating around her a
barrier which was to last for two centuries- If Spain became, in
addition, master of Naples and in the Milanese, it meant that France
would be reduced to an inferior role in the Mediterranean and,
above all, threatened on all sides by her worst enemies.
This grip upon Italy was of capital importance for Spain. Through
the Milanese she would effect a junction with the Emperor, the
relative and of her sovereigns. When the Emperor was at the
ally
same time King of Spain, as was the case under Charles V, and when
this Emperor married his son to the sovereign of England, as hap-
pened in the case of Philip II and Mary Tudor, the encirclement of
France would be complete. The Spaniards would block all the
French frontiers from the Bidassoa to the Somme, by way of the
Alps, the Jura, the Franche-Comt6, Flanders, and Artois. The two
seas would be in the hands of themselves and their allies.
The wars of Italy were, therefore, a vital necessity for France, and
not, as has been blindly repeated, a mere sport of princes. For
Imperial Spain, the upper hand in Italy was the very condition of the
exercise or power. Without free passage through Italy, she could
not communicate with Germany, the seat of the Empire, or even
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
with her Flemish possessions; for the French privateers made the sea
passage dangerous.
The councillors of the Emperor Charles VCharles I of Spain
understood all these necessities. The remonstrances which
perfectly
they submitted to him at the beginning of his reign very clearly
defined the reciprocal interest which the Kings of France and the
Kings of Spain had in making themselves masters of1 Italy. "The
first consideration," says one of these monitory letters, "is that the
duchies of Milan and Genoa are the keys and the door to the possi-
all Italy, and Italy occupied and duly
bility of holding and dominating
reduced tojour subjection is the true seat and sceptre for dominating the whole
world. And9 inasmuch as the Frenchyour enemies know it very well, and hold
this point in more estimation than the defence of their own kingdom, it must
be contemplated that at all and am times when they find an opportunity of
being able to return there, they will do so."
The councillors of Charles VHI of France, on their side, must have
realised, or at of the situation which was
least sensed, all the gravity
created for France by the successive aggrandisements of Spain from
the marriage of the Catholic Sovereigns down to the taking of
Granada, and by Ferdinand's pretensions to the kingdom of Naples.
Accordingly, in the month of August, 1494, a French army
crossed the Alps under the command of the young King, and, after
traversing Italy, entered Naples almost without striking a blow.
Charles VIII had thought to buy Ferdinand's neutrality by returning
to him Roussillon and the Cerdagne, which had been occupied by
France since the time of Louis XL But, with his usual perndy, the
King of Aragon, after recovering these two provinces, was able to
find a pretest for contesting the legitimacy of Charles's possession of
the kingdom of Naples.
This meant war between the two rivals: the beginning of those
long wars of Italy which were to last nearly a century. After alter-
nating successes and reverses the French, beaten by Gonzalo de
Cordova, Ferdinand's best general, who was known as "the Great
Captain," had to evacuate their too easy conquest, and the King of
Arag6n became in fact King of Naples.
Under Louis XII, Charles VHTs successor, the struggle was
resumed, this time for possession of the Duchy of Milan, over which
the new
King of France had rights through his grandmother, Valen-
tina Visconti, Duchess of Milan. It was a question for him not so
much of asserting his rights to a heritage difficult to keep, which
would always cost more than it paid, as, once more, of preventing
the Spaniards and the Imperialists from
gaining a footing there and
joining hands to invade the French marches.
Hence it arose that Louis XII and Ferdinand both exerted them-
1 Cfc
Ernest Gossart: Charles Qidnt, roi fEspagtu (advice given to the Emperor
CharlesV bythe first lords, councillors and ministers of State for the good government
of hia kingdoms and estates), p. 236.
218
 THE POLICY OF THE CATHOLIC SOVEREIGNS
selves to the utmost to dislodge the other from the Milanese. The
King of France devoted himself to the task until the very eve of his
death, which occurred on January i, 1515. Beaten at Novarra and
definitely expelled from Milan, he was attempting to regain the
advantage, and it was in the midst of warlike preparations that death
surprised him.
He handed on to his successor the heavy heritage of the Italian
wars and this in unfavourable conditions, after territorial losses
which had further weakened the kingdom. On the other hand,
Ferdinand of Arag6n, thanks to the agmty of his diplomacy and the
success of his arms, had scored nothing but gains all along the line.
His wife Isabel had died in i j 06, and he governed both Castile and
Aragon* He was, therefore, the effective master of all the Spains,
including the kingdom of Granada. He held, along with Sicily, the
kingdom of Naples. On the French side, he had recovered Rous-
sillon and the Cerdagne, and, profiting by the excommunication pro-
nounced by the Pope against Jean d'Albret, sovereign of Navarre,
he had seised that country, despite the armed intervention of
Louis XII.

Nevertheless, he did not lose sight of the Musulman danger; for at-
tack by the Turks or the Barbaresques was still possible. For the mari-
time security of Spain, in fact, it did not suffice that the kingdom of
Granada and its ports should be occupied by the troops of the
Catholic King. So long as Africa was in the hands of the Bar-
baresques, more or less aided by the Turks, the Andalusian coast
was always menaced, and, in any case, Spanish trade in the Mediter-
ranean was exposed to the risks of piracy.
For southern Spain to feel safe, it was necessary that the Bar-
baresque ports should be held or watched by the Spaniards. The
Arabs themselves, when they were masters in Spain, and the Visigoth
kings before them had realised the feet. The Visigoths, like the
Caliphs, had always sought to seize the African coast, or at least to
occupy the embarkation points.
To see in such African expeditions evidence of megalomania, un-
bridled ambition or even fanaticism, is to close one's eyes to the
necessities which were imposed upon the Spaniards. Historians who
overlook these necessities proceed to be surprised that the Spaniards
should never have tried to press their conquests into the interior of
Africa, but stopped at the ports and the coast. This wise course of
action is precisely the proof of the absence of any ambition for
conquest in this case. It sufficed to the Spaniards, in the interests of
the coast and
occupy a few strategic positions on
their to
security,
the principal embarkation points. To advance beyond these into the
interior would have been sheer madness and led them nowhere.
The Catholic Sovereigns, doubtless on the advice of Cardinal
Qsneros, felt the force of all this reasoning. This former Franciscan
219
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
seems to have known the Musulmans very well, particularly the
Berbers of Africa. He guessed that at the first favourable oppor-
tunity the Moors, expelled from Spain, would attempt to return.
They must be deprived of the means of doing so. Moreover, the
footholds which the Portuguese had made on the Moroccan coast
might prejudice Spanish influence there. In the course of the
fifteenth century, taking advantage of the difficulties of Castile, they
had seized Ceuta and attempted to establish themselves at Algiers.
For all these reasons several expeditions were organised against
the Barbaresques. In 1497, Melilla was taken by the fleet of the
Duke of Medina Sidonia. In 1509 Qsneros, with the help of Captain
Pedro Navarro, captured the Penon of V61ez, Oran, the Penon of
Algiers, Bougie, and Tripoli: conquests which were precarious, but
for some time at least diminished piracy and reduced the Moors to
impotence.
oo Ferdinand of Aragon, heJped by a number of favourable cir-
cumstances, and fortunate in his collaborators, left when he died, in
1516, a Spain which, if not completely unified, was at least enor-
mously aggrandised and powerful: a Spain, mistress over all her
frontiers, whose hegemony over Western Europe was to go on
developing throughout the course of the new century.

220
 CHAPTER XXVII

The Emperor Charles V. Renewal of the Wars of Italy. The Protestants.

The Barbaresque*
OF ARAGON left as his successor his grandson Charles,
the future Emperor Charles V, son of his daughter Juana
FERDINAND
known as Joan the Mad, owing to her mental weakness and
the Archduke Philip the Fair, son of the Emperor Maximilian.
He would have preferred, however, to hand on his Spanish king-
doms to Charles's younger brother, his second grandson Ferdinand,
for whom he had a predilection, and who, having been brought up
in Spain unlike Charles, who was a regular Fleming seemed to
him, quite rightly, more likely to be popular than his elder brother.
Charles's position, moreover, was delicate in his capacity as heir to the
throne of Castile. While he was the lawful heir to the throne of
Aragon through his grandfather Ferdinand, it was to his mother
Juana, who was still alive, that Castile belonged. Joan the Mad, shut
up in the castle of Tordesillas, had many partisans, hostile to Charles
and his Flemish councillors.
For these reasons, because he had in effect to conquer his Spanish
kingdoms and fight against the ill-will of his future subjects; and also
because he was preparing to assume the succession to his grandfather
Maximilian, and was actively engaged in his election as Emperor, the
young Archduke felt obliged to walk warily with his powerful
neighbour, the King of France, who might still further complicate
the difficulties in which he was involved. Accordingly he began by
negotiating with Francois I and compromising with him. The King
of France hastened to take advantage of these favourable circum-
stances.

Leaving Spaniards and Flemings entangled in their affairs of suc-

cessions, he lost no time in asserting his rights over the Milanese once
more. The wars of Italy were to begin again. I cannot too strongly
insist that this was not for Frangois I a of or of
question vainglory,
personal ambition, or even, as some imagine, the lure of the pleasures
and the arts of Italy. It was a matter of the first importance to the
French Government.
The French could not admit that Spain should be mistress of the
Italian
peninsula.
The Spaniards, who were in possession of Naples
and Sicily, already held the Milanese as well through Duke Maxi-
milian Sforza, their ally. If Charles of Austria, after becoming King
of Spain, succeeded his grandfather Maximilian as of
Emperor
Germany, it was not only Italy, but also the whole or Central
Europe, which would pass under Spanish hegemony, France must
hasten to bar the way to the troops of the future Emperor who, at
the same time, was going to be King of all the Spains and the best
221
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
means of batting his way towards Germany was to seize Genoa and
the Milanese.
So was that, in the month of August,
it 1515, a considerable
army, commanded by Francois I in person, started to cross the
Alps. It was "a great and powerful army," as he put it in the letters
patent which appointed his mother Regent of the kingdom. He was
determined to mike a supreme effort, in view of the importance of
the matter for the destiny of France.
Franjois, victor at Marignano, went so far as to play with the idea
of advancing South and, with the support of the Holy See, on which
he thought that he could count, driving the Spaniards out of Naples.
But Pope Leo X dissuaded him. He returned to France, hugging
the illusion that he had re-established French supremacy in the
North of Italy. The treaty of Cambrai, signed in 1517 between
Charles and himself, seemed to stabilise the status quo.
But matters could not rest there. Neither of the two Powers could
admit the interference of the other in Italy. That the French should
be back in Milan and Genoa was contrary to the most elementary
principles' of Spanish policy. As soon as Charles had suppressed the
revolt of his Castilian subjects the comuntrosy as they were called
and secured his election as Emperor under the name of Charles V
(July, 1519), he concerned himself with renewing the struggle for
hegemony.
a pretext and an occasion by
Francois I provided him with
supporting the pretensions of the Prince of B6arn to the crown of
Navarre, The Emperor concluded a defensive league with Pope
Leo X and the Republic of Florence, and hostilities between France
and Spain began again. The French armies were defeated on the
Bicoque (1522), and then in the battle of Pavia (1525), which was a
regular disaster. Franjois I was captured and imprisoned in the
AldLzat of Madrid.
There he remained for a year, as his adversary laid down un-
acceptable conditions for his ransom. Finally a treaty of peace was
signed at Madrid at the beginning of the year 1526. The King of
France ceded the duchy of Burgundy to the Emperor, and
renounced his rights over Flanders, Artois, and the duchy of
Milan.
He considered himself entitled not to respect this treaty, which he
regarded as extracted from him by force. But he was, in fact,
from Italy. He refused to accept the fact. He
definite^ expelled
returned to the attack several times, but was never able to maintain
himself there.
These Italian wars were not popular in France. Public opinion
was hostile to them on account of the enormous expense which they
entailed. The government itself did not understand the
importance
of them. Accordingly they were never carried on with the energy
and the sense of continuity which were required. This contributed
222
 THE EMPEROR CHARLES V
to the inferiority of France during more than a century, and, at the
same time, confirmed the Spanish hegemony.
Because France had been defeated at Pavia and had not recovered
from that defeat, she was to experience Spanish encirclement on all
her knd frontiers and be exposed to the menace of the House of
Austria, in alliance with Spain, until the end of the seventeenth
century. Italy, definitely withdrawn from French influence and
divided up into Spanish viceroyalties, was to become the corridor
of communication between the two Austrian royal families, that of
Vienna and that of Madrid. It was to demand all the efforts of
Henri IV, Richelieu, and Louis XIV to annul the political con-
sequences of an Italy surrendered to the Spaniards and the
Imperialists.

In short, Charles V had triumphed over his rival. He had expelled

him from the Empire and driven him put of Italy. Spain, unified not
without resistance, ended by accepting Charles's domination and
even, dazzled by the Imperial Majesty, by becoming proud of it.
But the authority of the Germanic Caesar was more brilliant than
real. Germany, torn by religious quarrels which masked grave

political and even social conflicts, was in a state of perpetual war and
anarchy* The preaching of Luther had unleashed a regular revolution
there. The Emperor might have him condemned by the Diet of
Worms (1521); he found himself nevertheless obliged to make all
kinds of compromises with the Reformer and with the princes who
were his partisans.
After a long period of such compoundings, interrupted by recon-
ciliations and ruptures with the rebels a period which lasted from
1530 to about 1546 Charles made up his mind to strike a great
blow. This effort ended in the victory of Miihlberg (1547), won by
the
Spanish
and Italian troops. But the Emperor, betrayed by his ally
Maurice of Saxony, was forced to accept the convention of Passau
(1552), which was in effect a defeat for the imperial authority.
After that, he could not even assure to his son Philip his succession
to the Empire, which he had wanted to make hereditary. He found
himself confronted by the hostility of the German princes, whom the
King of France, Henri II, hastened to support in their resistance.*
The results of this new conflict were frankly unfavourable to the
Emperor. The Due de Guise seized the Three Bishoprics of Lorraine
(1553) and constrained Charles to withdraw.
The Emperor had to accept the fait accompli and leave things as
they were. Once the religious sovereignty of every Germanic princi-
pality or republic had been recognised by him, the unity of the
Empire became a chimera, and Germany slipped between his fingers.
He was scarcely more successful in his struggle against the Turks
and the Barbaresques. The Musulman danger was no sooner con-
223
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
jured away than it reappeared again. This time it seemed more
threatening than ever. The Sultan Selim I, after subjugating all the
East, from Persia to Egypt, turned his arms against the West once
more. He advanced as far as the walls of Vienna, and the Pope was
he should organise an expedition against Italy.
afraid lest
In Africa the renegade Barbarossa, having succeeded in seizing
Algiers and Tunis, had acknowledged himself a vassal of the Sultan.
The Spanish coasts were more than ever exposed to raids and descents
by the Barbaresque pirates. In the hope of making an end of this
centuries-long peril, Charles V organised an expedition against
Tunis (1535). He succeeded in expelling the usurper Barbarossa
from it and seizing the port of La Goulette.
Master of Tunis, he delivered thousands of captive Christians.
This fortunate operation had a resounding effect throughout
Christendom. But its results, like those of all campaigns against the
Barbaresques, were very superficial and lasted a very short time. In
1541 Charles V had to equip another fleet against Algiers. This
suffered a regular disaster, and it was only with great difficulty that
the Emperor was able to reach Spain again.
The Islamic danger, therefore, was far from being suppressed.
We shall meet it again in the reign of Philip II. Meanwhile the
Moriscos of Andalusia were restless, and their attitude demanded the
greatest vigilance on the part of the Spanish Government.
In short, the magnificent hopes which had been brought to birth
when the Imperial throne was mounted by the grandson of the
Catholic Sovereigns were frustrated. Despite his tireless efforts,
seconded by collaborators of the first order, Charles V, by the time
he passed Ins fifties, experiencedthis sense of disappointment him-
self. He felt himself no longer equal to the task or governing such
vast possessions. The most humiliating thing for him was that he
could not secure the Empire for his son.
For all these reasons and perhaps for religious reasons also,
to prepare himself for death he decided to abdicate and retire to a
monastery in Estremadura, at San Yuste. The act of abdication took
place solemnly in Brussels in 1555. Charles laid aside the Imperial
crown in favour of his brother Ferdinand, and passed on to his son
Philip, together with Flanders and his rights over Burgundy, his
kingdoms of Aragon, Castile, the Two Sicilies, and all his Italian
possessions.
This abdication of Charles V
marked the separation of Spain and
the Germanic Holy Roman Empire. But the alliance subsisted
between the two royal families and the two states. The sovereigns of
Vienna and those of Madrid continued to constitute, and to repre-
sent, that House of Austria against which France was to fight until
the dawn of the eighteenth century, and which was to
weigh so
heavily upon the destinies of Europe.

Z24
 CHAPTER XXVIII

Philip II. The Apogee of the Spanish Monarchy and the Counter-
Reformation
E succession to Charles V
was a very heavy burden; but,
when one thinks of the difficulties of all kinds, financial as well
as religious, which weighed at that time upon all the European
states, one may regard it as still
privileged and singularly brilliant.
Even after the death of the Emperor, the King of Spain still remained
the first sovereign of Europe.
Since his father had abdicated the Empire, Philip II might naturally
fear a diminution of his prestige. As a matter of fact, he was relieved
of a very onerous title, which would have conferred upon him only
the most precarious authority. The Empire, having passed into the
hands of Charles V's younger brother, assumed the appearance of a
mere delegation of power granted by the head of tne family, and
became in a sense an extension of the Spanish monarchy.
This monarchy in itself presented a most imposing fafade. The
mere enumeration of its kingdoms, yiceroyalties, fiefs, and posses-
sions filled whole pages in diplomatic documents. Henceforth the
Iberian Peninsula was completely unified under the same sceptre.
Philip, heir through his mother to the crown of Portugal, annexed
this kingdom to his states (1581). Apart from Castile and Aragon,
he had inherited the kingdoms of Valencia, Naples, and the Two
Sicilies, Tuscany, the Milanese and Liguria. From his father, heir of
the House of Burgundy, he held Flanders.
To put the corner-stone upon this colossal political edifice, Charles
had married him to Mary Tudor, daughter of Henry VIII, and,
until the death of this princess, he was regarded as the rightful King
of England. Finally, he was the master of the Americas, of their
mines of gold and silver, and of any number of unknown lands
which remained to be discovered and conquered.
So Spain continued to cut a great figure in the world. She con-
tinued also to encircle France- her rival. More than ever France was
blockaded by land and sea. The treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, con-
cluded in 1 5 59 between Philip II and the King of France, in addition
to leaving the French northern and eastern frontier open, and in
addition to securing the restitution to Philip of a number of small
fortresses, accorded Philip the right to intervene in French affairs,
in his capacity as heir
through his wife to the throne of France, if
the sons of Henri II died without children. Under the terms of this
treaty the Catholic King was to marry Elizabeth de Valois, daughter
of Henri II and Catherine de Medici.

What was to be the

policy
of the new monarch at the head of this
great empire, whose principal disadvantage was that it was dis-
225
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
jointed and severed by arms of the sea or foreign states, but which
presented such an imposing fafade"} He might well have been
intoxicated by the excess of his power and conceive a thousand plans
of aggrandisement and conquest.
Philip II, however he repeated it over and over again, and with
all the sincerity in the world contemplated nothing but preserving
the heritage which had been handed down to him by his father, and
maintaining it in its territorial integrity and in the purity of its faith.
He regarded himself as the great protector of Catholicism, In the
same way as he would not yield an inch of his territories, so he would
not permit heresy to contaminate his states. The whole of Philip II
is summed up in this twofold role of defender of the faith and

maint^iner of the Spanish monarchy.

He was not an ambitious or a violent man. Fundamentally he did
not like men of war. He always distrusted them and their appetites.
It must be recognised that most of the time he was right. He resorted
to war only in the last extremity, being convinced that diplomacy
and compromise achieved much more than force. Nobody could
have been more impregnated with the idea that time works in favour
of policy. Hence arose his slowness in action and in administration.
He prided himself upon his kindliness and clemency, and it is
quite certain that in doing so he believed himself to be sincere. He
aid not like fuss, disturbance, disorder, bloodshed, and execution.
When the crime was secret, the punishment, in his opinion, ought to
be so, too; he had a horror of scandal. He resorted to the scaffold or
the stake only when he thought that he ought to make an example.
He was a man of the study, extraordinarily painstaking, obstinate,
and self-willed, who believed in the efficacy of calculation and craft,
in their superiority over brute force, and who therefore exhausted
himself in abstruse and tortuous schemings. A dissembler, sur-
rounded by spies, he certainly added to the hypocrisy of manners as
well as to the sinuosity of the diplomacy of his time. But, to judge
him in this respect, we must first of all bear in mind what the
diplomacy of that time was, the perfidy of heads of states, and the
unscrupulousness and brutality of his contemporaries. In such a
world, dissimulation was prescribed as a royal virtue.
Passionate in his youth and very fond of pleasure, he forced him-
self to kill all passion in himself. In proportion as he grew older, he
sought to make himself more unmoved, more detached than ever.
He sacrificed himself completely to affairs of State and religious duty.
In perfect good faith, he tried to imitate Saint Louis of France by
exerting himself to become the perfect type of Christian monarch.
In any case, nobody could rival him in being a master. With Louis
XIV, his great-grandson, he was the model of absolute sovereign,
who not only knew how to make ujp his mind, govern, and foresee,
but also proposed to direct everytmng himself, see everything that
was going on to the smallest detail, decide everything and sign
226
 PHILIP II

everything with his own hand. As he was at the same time a man of
uneasy mind, tortured by scruples, and as he wanted to leave nothing
to chance persuaded as he was that everything ought to be sub-
ordinated to mental processes he was slow in arriving at his smallest
decisions. In consequence, this grimly determined man has been
regarded as weak and irresolute.
As a matter of fact, he never strayed from his programme: to
maintain the Spanish monarchy and defend the faith. Whatever dis-
appointments, whatever reverses he experienced, one may say that he
realised his twofold design and that, on the whole, this man of strong
will made events yield to it.

We can recognise the perseverance, finally victorious, of this

design in all Philip's external policy. In the first place, so far as con-
cerned Italy, the perpetual object of French desires, he succeeded in
keeping her, despite all the efforts of France and of Pope Paul IV.
This Pope, who was a Neapolitan, and as such detested the
Spaniards, the oppressors of his country, exerted himself from the
beginning of Philip IFs reign to organise a league against him.
Paul IV told the ambassador of Venice, which he tried to bring
into this league: "Be sure of this, the Spaniards intend to make Italy
their colony. They are beginning at the weakest point. After the
Papal States, they will attack you. Do you not see all that they
possess already the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, Tuscany, the
part of Lombardy and Liguria? They lack nothing but ycur
freater
tate."
Some days later Henri II, in concert with the Pope, declared war on
the King of Spain. Philip, who could not abandon Italy without
weakening his close alliancewith the House of Austria, sent the
Duke of Alba to oppose the French armies commanded by the Due
de Guise, who was defeated in Italy. The struggle continued in
France, and, after a series of reverses, which included the taking of
Saint-Quentin and the battle of Gravelines, Henri II, with his king-
dom invaded, found himself obliged to treat with his adversary.
The result was the famous treaty of Cateau-Cambr6sis, by which
France renounced Italy, apart from a few fortresses in Piedmont.
It amounted to recognising a situation which in fact had lasted for
nearly a century.
The presence of Spain in the Milanese was to render the struggle
of France against the House of Austria much more difficult under
Henri IV and Louis XHL Not only did Philip II yield nothing in
Italy; he also consolidated himself there from one end of the penin-
sula to the other, and maintained a threat to the French Alpine
frontier. In fact, he reduced France to a minor role throughout his
reign, and ceaselessly intervened in her afiairs in the course of the
wars of religion.
At the time of the League, a Spanish garrison occupied Paris.
227
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
Alexander Farnese defeated Henri IV under the walls of the French
capital. After the assassination
of Henri III, Philip even conceived
the idea of having his daughter Isabel Clara Eugenia elected Queen
of France, as the legitimate and most direct heiress through her
mother Elizabeth de Valois. The Infanta, married to the Archduke
Albert of Austria, would have founded a new dynasty, and thus
France, under the hegemony of Philip, would have become a
Spanish viceroyalty.
This project, which was incapable of realisation because it
wounded French national feeling too deeply, may have failed, despite
the complicity of the League. Philip nevertheless maintained his
position completely. The treaty of Vervins, concluded in 1598
between him and Henri IV, made no change, in effect, from the
situation created by the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, which had been
regarded as so disastrous for France. While it confirmed the French
acquisition of the Three Bishoprics, it left the French frontier still
open to the North and East. France still began at the Somme. The
Duke of Savoy, Philip's ally, was at Annecy and Chambery, and
Spain had viceroys in Naples and Milan.
In short, if Philip had gained nothing from France, neither had he
lost anything which was in conformity with his programme and
he had obtained from her the renunciation of Italy; a renunciation
purely formal, no doubt, but whose moral effect might be con-
siderable.
In Germany, despite the fact that he was not loved there, Philip
was also able to maintain the position which he had acquired. There
were some disagreements between him and his relatives in Vienna
on the subject of the Lutherans. But the alliance between the two
branches of the House of Austria became, if possible, closer than
ever. Ferdinand, Philip's uncle, had received the Empire at the
hands of Charles V. The King of Spain finally married his cousin,
the Archduchess Anne, daughter of the Emperor Ferdinand. He
gave his own daughter, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, to the
Archduke Albert, his nephew, son of the Emperor Maximilian II.
Thus the family pact which linked the Habsburgs of Vienna with
those of Madrid, and was to last two centuries, became consolidated.
This matrimonial policy, which served them so well, nearly gave
England to Philip II as well. This ascetic man this man, at least,
who early became one, and married four wives for reasons of State
had married Mary Tudor, daughter of Henry VIII, in 1554. But in-
compatibility between husband and wife immediately manifested
itself, and Philip, for reasons which are only too easy to understand,
made himself unpopular with his wife's subjects. He wanted to win
them over to Catholicism and his indiscreet zeal had only the effect
of
exasperating the majority of the English.
In this case it was defeat for him all
along the line. Completely
unsuccessful in re-establishing the Catholic religion in England, he
228
 PHILIP II

was no more successful in giving the throne to Mary Stuart. 1 The

great expedition which he organised in 1 588 to punish Elizabeth for
the execution of Mary Queen of Scots was a lamentable disaster.
"The invincible Armada," as it was called in derision by the Pro-
testant enemies of Spain, left on record in history the memory of the
most resounding defeat that the world has ever seen. The crowning
humiliation was that the English fleet pursued the Spaniards even
into their own waters, and Cadiz was taken and sacked.
Meanwhile the English privateers had been giving chase to the
galleons coming from America, and inflicting serious losses upon
Spanish trade, as well as compromising the security of Spanish
communications. The expedition of the Armada, therefore, had not
merely a religious object; it was designed also to defend the ship-
owners of Seville, and the revenues of the Crown. Despite the most
intense and persistent efforts, Philip never succeeded in suppressing
this danger.
Those who refuse to see in him anything but a fanatic ignore the
practicaland national character of most of his actions and his warlike
undertakings. He attacked England for reasons of security and to
protect the trade of his subjects. Religious reasons were undoubtedly
uppermost in his mind; but we should not ignore the other reasons.
It was the same thing in America. He did not concern himself with
it only as a converter; he exerted himself also to improve its
administration.
During his reign the conquest was consolidated and extended,
despite the obstacles which were put in the way of the Spanish
advance by the rivalries of all the European nations and the con-
tinual attacks of the privateers. Colonisation proceeded from Peru
and Chili in the direction of Paraguay and the North of Argentina.
Audiencias 9 bishoprics, new cities, and seats of government were
established.
Though the production of the Peruvian and Mexican mines has
been exaggerated, it is nevertheless true that Spain under Philip II
was the richest nation in gold in Europe. She preserved this
superiority throughout the seventeenth century a superiority
which was recognised, not without acrimonious jealousy, by Colbert
himself. Even apart from this, the mere possession of immense
dominions in the New World conferred a very great prestige upon
the Spain of Philip II, of which we must take account in drawing up
the balance-sheet of his reign. This prestige was so real that no

1
It must also be remembered that in the early years of Philip's reign the accession
of Mary to the English throne would have strengthened the international position not
of S{>ain, but of France, owing to the dynastic ties which united the Houses of Stuart,
Valois, and Guise. This possibility explains much of Spanish policy towards England,
and not least the postponement, at Philip's request, of the excommunication of Elizabeth
until 1570. Of these divisions among her enemies the English Queen took full advan-
tage both at home and abroad, so that when Philip could afford to strike it was too
late, C.P.

229
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
doubt with the object of maintaining the Imperial dignity which his
father had abdicated Philip contemplated asking the Pope for the
title of Emperor of the Indies.

Islam still remained the great European danger. Spain, in contact

with the Barbaresques through her southern coasts and her African
and at the same time exposed to attack by the Turks in
possessions,
ner Italian viceroyalties, was especially menaced.
Philip had to resist these secular enemies
to the best of his ability;
but his activity against them was hampered by a thousand and one
difficulties in the first place the necessity which was imposed upon
him of fighting on sevei^l fronts at the same time, and, above all, the
incoherence of European policy.
France, in pursuance of Frangois FS example, intrigued with Stam-
boul. She did something more serious, ana scarcely credible: at the
beginning of Philip IFs reign, she came to an understanding with the
Holy See to launch the Ottoman squadrons against the Spanish
dominions in Italy. The coasts of Campania were devastated, and
thousands of captives were carried away to the galleys and the
harems of the Levant.
In order to bar the passage of the Turks into the Western Mediter-
ranean, Philip endeavoured in the first place to occupy the island of
Djerba and Tripoli, He recovered the PeSon of V61ez, and delivered
the Island of Malta, which was an excellent observation-post for
pursuit of Ottoman or Barbaresque corsairs. In 1 5 72, in concert with
the Pope and the Republic or Venice, he organised against the
Turkish fleet an enormous maritime expedition, under the command
of Don John of Austria, an illegitimate son of Charles V, which
ended in the victory of Lepanto: a regular disaster for the Turks,
which made a great impression throughout Christendom. The
Turks had to set numbers of captives at liberty.
But, as usual, the effect of the victory of Lepanto was moral rather
than definite in the practical sphere. The Turks and the Barbaresques
soon resumed the offensive. The Spaniards were driven from Djerba
and La Goulette, as they had already been from Bougie and Algiers*
They retained only Oran, Mers el Kebk, and Melilla. In 1 5 77 Philip,
who was heavily committed elsewhere, made a truce with the Sultan.
Clearly the results of his long and hard struggle against Islam were
not brilliant. But, here again, he had more or less maintained his
position, and what was more important he had demonstrated to
the Turks,
through the victory of Lepanto, that any attempt to invade
the Western basin of the Mediterranean was doomed to disappoint-
ment. All that they could do on one side or the other was to pillage
one another by sea, and carry on a stealthy little war of piracy. The
Catholic King, distracted from this field of battle by the grave revolt
in Flanders, nad nevertheless shown that he could hold his own
against Islam. That was all he wanted for the moment.
250
 PHILIP II

In Flanders the struggle was a much more serious matter. Here

Spain had not merely great political interests to be defended, but
other matters of principle of the highest importance. Over and above
local quarrels, the very existence of Catholicism was at stake.
What was at issue between Philip II and his Flemish subjects was,
in fact, the defence of the Catholic faith. The Reformation had
invaded all the North of the Low Countries, it found adherents and
sympathisers in the Belgian provinces, and it was supported by the
French Huguenots. The situation became more and more disquieting
for the King of Spain. Liberty of conscience played only a very
minor part in this affair: it was a pretext which was invoked for the
moment, to be cast aside as soon as the upper hand was gained.
Liberty of conscience involved political liberty, and, in Philip's eyes,
therefore, every Huguenot was a rebel and so, as a matter of fact,
he was.
At the same time, this revolt constituted a menace for all the
neighbouring countries. Under the cloak of heresy, it was agitating
and dividing France after doing the same thing in Germany. If it
triumphed in France after contaminating all Flanders, Spain herself
would be exposed to the contagion: Spain still precariously unified,
where whole populations of Moriscos asked nothing better than to
make common cause with the enemies of the Spanish monarchy,
whoever they might be. It is understandable that Philip should have
bestirred himself to arrest the conflagration, or at least to
localise it.

He endeavoured to do so to the utmost of his power, and by any

means, even the most cruel. The Flemings, as I nave said, were in
his eyes not merely heretics, but also the most dangerous rebels.
What they wanted was their more or less complete independence
under the nominal suzerainty of Spain. At the back of the religious
question, there was the matter of privileges, immunities, and pofitical
rights.
The Flemings wanted to preserve their communal liberties, the
sovereignty of their states in the matter of taxes. They protested
against the introduction of the Spanish Inquisition and against the
creation of new bishoprics ana new universities all measures
intended to strengthen the royal authority. In other words, they
would not admit that Flanders should be subject to the Spanish
regime. Below the middle-classes and the nobles fermented a lower
order eager to sack the monasteries and churches under the cloak of
religion.
movement carried the day, it was necessary
It this revolutionary
to contemplate the complete independence of the Low Countries.
But it was a dogma of Castilian policy that, without Flanders, Spain
would cease to be a European Power. This territory was the
guarantee of her hegemony over Europe.
As early as the time of Charles V, his ministers had assured him
231
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
that Flanders was "a citadel of steel" for his House, "a shield which
enabled him to receive the blows of England, France, and Germany
far away from the head of the monarchy." It was by way of the
Flemish frontier that France was most vulnerable; it was in that
direction that Spain could keep her "under perpetual restraint."
Finally, if Spain lost thisadvanced post, whence she could watch the
whole of Central Europe, she would lose also her right to intervene
in European affairs. The possession of Italy itself had no value for
her unless she simultaneously possessed the Low Countries, which
enabled her to bear upon France, England, and Germany at one and
the same time.
For all these reasons Philip II found himself obliged to keep
Flanders at any price. He tried all means: kindness, conciliation,
craft and duplicity, and finally force. Force proved to be the most
efficacious. The Duke of Alba, appointed governor, drowned the
revolt in blood, as it was said. He struck in the first place at its chiefs.
The Counts of Egmont and Homes were beheaded, the Baron de
Montigny was strangled in his prison, the Prince of Orange was
compelled to take refuge in Germany,
But, though these drastic measures might indeed terrorise the
country, they did not pacify it. The revolt dragged on. One may say
that it 'lasted throughout the reign *of Philip n, who used up his
governors and his generals in the thankless task of mastering the
Flemings. By dint of temporising, "he ended by tiring them out.
Though the provinces of the North, the Low Countries properly
speaking, succeeded in detaching themselves from Spain under the
leadership of William of Orange and proclaiming themselves inde-
pendent by the abjuration of The Hague (1581), the Belgian pro-
vinces remained faithful both to the Catholic King and to Catholic-
ism. To give them a semblance of satisfaction, by conceding them a
semblance of autonomy, Philip II decided to hand over Flanders to his
son-in-law, the Archduke Albert on the condition that he should
forbid Protestantism in his States. Moreover, if the Archduke
died childless, Flanders would revert to the crown of Spain.
In reality, Philip had given away nothing. Spanish domination
continued, almost as rigorously as before. The authority of the
Archduke was nullified by that of the military governors, and
Spanish garrisons maintained obedience in the country. Philip II
had localised the conflagration by resigning himself to the loss of
Holland. Apart from these Protestant provinces of the Low
Countries, he had lost nothing of his paternal heritage. By way of
compensation, he had added Portugal to the Spanish Monarchy.
Finally, he had maintained both Catholicism and his own authority
in the southern provinces.

At the same time as he was combating the Reformation in Flanders,

he was trying also to conquer it in France. He proposed to profit by
232
 PHILIP II

his intervention in the religious quarrels of France to such good

purpose as to establish Spanish suzerainty there, as in the Low
Countries.
He began by forming a defensive league with Henri n, who, like
Francois I, realised that Protestantism was becoming more and more
a danger to French unity. Then, when Henri II died prematurely, he
attempted to persuade Catherine de Medici and Charles IX to take
drastic measures against the Huguenots. He supported the Guises
and the Catholic party, and later the Due de Mayenne and the
League.
He protested against the policy of Henri III, who ended by recog-
nising the Protestant Henry of Bourbon, the future Henri IV, as heir
to the throne. He caused the latter to be defeated under the walls of
Paris by Alexander Farnese. He intrigued against Pope Sixtus toV
prevent him from recognising Henri IV and accepting his abjura-
tion, and even threatened the Pontiff with deposition by a national
council if he insisted upon recognising a Huguenot as King of
France.
When Henri III died without children, Philip put forward his
daughter, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, as claimant to the
succession to the last Valois. In this connection he multiplied offers
of military support and subsidies, always finding very active partisans
in the League. But for this persistence, this tenacity of Philip, the aid
which he never ceased to give the Catholic party, it is probable that
Henri IV would have still further deferred his conversion, and so
prolonged the division and weakness of France.
The French Catholics, as a matter of fact, did not want either a
Spanish king or a Protestant king like William of Orange or his
brother, Louis of Nassau. But it is nevertheless true that at a
certain moment, at the instance of Coligny, Charles IX was on the
point of making an alliance with the Protestants of England and the
Low Countries against the King of Spain, and that at this moment
there was a possibility of France's becoming Protestant.
No doubt, if Philip II intervened in French religious quarrels, it
was with the idea of definitely reducing France to the role of a
satellite of Spain at the back of his mind. But to refuse to admit

anything but these political intentions is to misconstrue the man of

ardent faith that he was. Above all it was for the sake of his religion,
for the triumph of his religion, that he interested himself the
in^
affairs of France. It is cpiite certain that, if France remained
Catholic, it was partly to his energetic influence that she owed the
fact.
To the utmost of his ability, therefore, he fulfilled his role as
Defender of the Faith. In acting as he did in Flanders, he raised a
barrier against the Reformation, he prevented it from* invading the
Latin countries, and, by doing so, he saved the spirit of Latinity and
Latin civilisation. It may perhaps be said that he had no intention of
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
doing so, that he never thought of doing so. That makes no differ-
ence, if the result was obtained indirectly through his efforts.
This man of faith, moreover, was a connoisseur and a collector, a
lover of fine things, a lover of books and a lover of learning. The
new art which was to develop in the Catholic countries, under the
inspiration of the Council of Trent, had no more fervent patron than
Philip DL
 CHAPTER XXIX

The Government of Philip II. The Absolute Monarchy. The

Inquisition

X-^TTITHIN Spain, despite some resistance, despite some

rebellions
\X/ which were crushed with merciless rigour, one may say that
*V the authority of Philip II was uncontested and absolute. The
modern monarchical regime, in its autocratic and centralised form,
had been established, at least in fact, by Ferdinand and Isabel.
V
Under Charles it was further perfected. Under Philip II, it assumed
that definitive shape which it preserved in Spain until the extinction
of the Habsburg dynasty. This Castilian autocracy served as model
to all the reigning houses of Europe.
Henceforth the King was the master of peace and war, and of
alliances and negotiations with foreign countries. and
Diplomacy
external affairs were in his hands. He
alone had the right to issue
money. He deprived the nobility of all the prerogatives which had
made any fief of importance a State within the State. Having epis-
copal sees at his disposal, he held the bishops at his discretion, and
tended more and more to make them mere officials of the crown. He
restricted the fueros of the provincial communities as much as he
could, and also the influence of the Cortes by assembling these
parliaments as seldom as possible.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to suppose that the mon-
archy thus constituted knew no limitations in the exercise of its
power. As a matter of fact, this so-called absolute authority en-
countered a swarm of hindrances and restrictions, a swarm of little
local authorities which refused to abdicate, and only sought an
opportunity to make themselves completely independent. Neither
the aristocracy nor the provincial communities resigned themselves
to State discipline,
To understand Philip's severity we must bear all this in mind. It
may be said that, to obtain the smallest war subsidy from his Catalan
or Aragonese subjects, he was compelled to go and beg for it in
person before their Cortes. Hence arose his persistent efforts to
suppress or diminish these troublesome bodies little by little. He
proposed to govern by himself. He would have no more ministers,
who ended by usurping the royal authority. The Spanish autocrat
confined himself to consulting councils or juntas with which he
-,

shared the various departments of administration.

Under the Catholic Sovereigns, apart from the Council of State,
the Council of Justice, and the Council of Finance, which were
already in existence, those of the Holy Brotherhood, of the Inquisi-
tion, of the Military Orders, and of the Indies were created. The
most important was the Council of Justice, which was reorganised
by the sovereigns. They introduced into it jurists belonging to the
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
middle classes and trained in the principles of the old Roman law,
who, inasmuch as they owed their elevation to the sovereigns,
became docile instruments in their hands.
Philip, perfecting the governmental mechanism,
added to these
councils those of Castile, Aragon, Fknders, and Italy. Each of these
organisations, together with the Council of
the Indies, corresponded
to the divers regions of his vast Empire. It must, however, be
emphasised that these juntas had only a consultative voice, and that
it was the sovereign who decided in the kst resort. Philip, very

jealous of his authority, never

shared his right of deciding and
ordering with anybody,
I have already indicated some of the inconveniences of this
regime, the chief of which were arbitrariness and, above all, slowness
in the conduct of affeirs. Contemporaries were keenly alive to all
these defects and criticised them. But, in substance, they accepted
this terrible power. One might almost say that they were flattered at
with God, had become a Majesty.
obeying a prince who, on equality
The tide of Majesty, then in all its novelty for the Kings of Spain,
was repeated by his subjects at every opportunity, and with a strange
accent of devotion. This majesty was as sacred as the person of the
sovereign. The throne was approached only with trembling.
Philip inspired a regular terror in the unfortunate people who
obtained audience of him. His icy coldness, his fixed stare, his silence
or the fewness of the words he spoke, unintelligible as those of an
oracle all this made him a fearful person to approach. Besides,

beyond the majesty of the royal person was to be sensed the majesty
of an Empire which embraced two continents. Only Napoleon,
conqueror of Europe, ever enjoyed such a prestige.
On the whole this autocracy, with its centralisation, its police, its
which guaranteed security at home and abroad,
tribunals, its armies,
struck contemporaries as a considerable advance upon the Middle
Ages, If the regime was not exactly loved, it was surrounded by
much respect and obeyed with pride. The royal power was regarded
as the source of all legitimate authority. The conquistadors, who
made themselves masters of kingdoms greater than all the Spains,
did not consider themselves entitled to control them unless they had
obtained the royal note of hand conferring the title of viceroys or
governors upon them. They did not hesitate to cross the ocean to
solicit this title. *

They might among themselves, but each claimed to cover

fight
himself with the royal authority. The name of the king was over and
above all quarrels. In his tragedy The Cid, Corneille well translated
this profoundly Spanish sentiment, when, he
put into the mouth of
Don Diego these humble and proud words :

"It is the respect which absolute power demands

-That none should question when a king commands."
236
 THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIP II

One of Philip II's shrewdest achievements was to add the prestige

of religion to the royal prestige. Like the Musulman caliphs, ms
predecessors, he proclaimed himself Defender of the Faith. He ended
for that matter with the best intentions in the world by making
out of religious authority an instrument of royal authority.
This instrument was the Inquisition. It had, indeed, existed long
before him; but nobody ever used it so cleverly, or in a more effective
and terrifying way. Doubtless Philip would always have defended
himself against the charge of subordinating spiritual interests to
temporal interests. He never proposed to act except to the greater
glory of God. But the result was the same as though he had acted
solely in order to strengthen his power and in the interests of the
State, as he understood them.
Nowadays nothing is more repugnant to us than religion put at
the service of politics and used as a cover for atrocities. That secret
police of minds and souls, as it was organised in Spain in the six-
teenth century, that vast organisation of spying and informing, that
bloody tyranny over thought, inspired a veritable horror even in con-
temporaries. Neither France nor the Low Countries were prepared
to tolerate it.
The issue is decided. There is no question of
rehabilitating the
Inquisition. The roh of the historian to try and understand, and
is
make understandable, how it was that such a regime was able to
secure toleration and even acceptance by the Spaniards, and to what
necessities of the moment its institution answered.
In a sense it had always existed, among the Christians as well as
among the Musulmans and in the pagan world of antiquity. At all
times the Church reserved the right to seek out and judge neretics and
inflict punishments upon them in proportion to their offences.

Throughout Christendom bishops were invested with this right. It

was only in the thirteenth century, at the time of the rising of the
Albigenses, that there appeared a special organisation charged with
persecuting heresy: an organisation superior to all local jurisdictions
and directly answerable to the Pope. This was the Roman Inquisition.
The Spanish Inquisition was only a delegation of the Roman
Inquisition. For the reason that it was responsible to no kind of
constituted authority, it might have been a great source of disturb-
ance in Spain unless the royal power succeeded in
laying
hands upon
it. That was what
Philip II succeeded in doing; and it is unquestion-
able that in doing it he aimed at employing this terrible tribunal for
the greater good of religion and the Spanish nation.
Under the Catholic Sovereigns, the Inquisition was already func-
tioning in Arag6n. It seems probable that it was Ferdinand who
decided Isabel to introduce it into Castile. The Dominicans of
Seville, supported by the Papal nuncio, took the initiative in demand-
ing from the sovereigns exceptional measures against the converses
who swarmed in Andalusia: in other words, the Jews who claimed
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
to be converts and the Musulmans who had followed their example.
Ferdinand counted especially in this matter
upon lucrative confisca-
tions,which would fifl the treasury opportunely on the morrow and
on the eve of costly wars.
Isabel, influenced by her confessors, but foreseeing possible in-
justices
with which she did not want to charge her conscience,
nesitated for some time. She ended by yielding. In the month of
November, 1478, Pope Sixtus IV promulgated a Bull which author-
ised the introduction of the Roman Inquisition into Castile, with the
object of bringing heretics and Judaisants back to the Christian faith.
Startled by the excesses which followed as soon as the Bull was
promulgated, the Pope manifested an intention to withdraw it.
What influences intervened? In any case, two years later, in 1480,
a new Pontifical Bull organised this exceptional tribunal which, for
the next century, was to play the role of the French revolutionary
tribunals of public safety: in other words, paralyse any reaction by
terror, hunt down the guilty and even the suspect, and exterminate
them with merciless rigour.

How is it to be explained that such a monstrosity could be estab-

lished and could last? What was happening in Spain what grave
events were there which made these odious means of repression seem
the only ones possible? It is quite obvious that the regime of the
stake, like that of the guillotine, could only be imposed with the
assent of a whole section of the nation.
When one studies this question, two facts are particularly striking.
In the first place, it was the Dominicans of Seville who obtained
these drastic measures against the converses. In the next place, these
measures had already been demanded on several occasions by the
local populations themselves. Numerous petitions were addressed to
Isabel by the Old Christians, denouncing the proceedings of the
Marranos to her and demanding their punishment and expulsion.
It is to be noted, moreover, that Isabel, in her struggle against the
partisans of La Beltraneja, her rival for the throne of Castile, was
supported by the Old Christians and consequently opposed more or
less openly by the cowersos. She therefore had some reason for
resentment against them.
But the most significant fact is the intervention of the Dominicans
of Seville. It was the eve of a decisive war against the Moors the
final attack, with the object of
wresting the kingdom of Granada
from them and throwing them back to Africa* The monks, vigilant
guardians of orthodoxy, realised with alarm that Seville and
Andalusia that is to say, the region nearest to Granada were full
of false converts, Jews and Moors, who, under cover of Catholicism,
continued to practise their religions more or less openly, setting a
bad example to the Christian people and scandalising them by the
display or their wealth.
 THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIP II

In short, they divided the people and favoured a state of rebellion:

a state the more dangerous on the eve of an enterprise which
demanded unanimity on the part of the Spanish people. Moreover,
by reason of their affinities or race, they were regarded as the secret
allies of those Moors whom it was proposed to expel from Granada.
On its side, the government reckoned upon the proceeds of fines
and confiscations. The money of the Marranos would be excellent to
pay for the war. Besides, the government wanted to withdraw from
the Moors the possibility of support by the conversos. Accordingly,
the regime of terror began to function in Seville and throughout
Andalusia.
At the outset, therefore, the Inquisition was not directed against
the orthodox Jews who remained faithful to their beliefs and were

were suspected, not without reason, of seeking to ally themselves

with the Moors and the Jews of Granada.
It was only after the taking of this last citadel of Islam in Spain
that the general expulsion of the Jews was decreed, for the reasons,
both religious and political, which I have already indicated. What
was specially feared was the alliance of the Jews with the Granadine
Moors who remained in Spain. Such an alliance was, so to speak,
traditional whenever the Jews were persecuted.
Resentments of very long standing were gratified against them.
They were accused of having summoned the Arabs to Andalusia at
the time of the Visigoths. The Jews of Narborme were especially
accused of having delivered Septimania over to them. Montesquieu
notes, in his 'Esprit des Lois, that the Spanish Inquisitors only re-
newed against the Jews the measures already framed against them by
the Visigoths.

Once the Jews were gone, there remained to occupy the Inquisi-
tion only the Judaisants, the Moriscos, the Lutherans, and those
mysterious dissidents who were called the "illuminati" "/os
alumbrados"
Astonishment and indignation have been expressed that there
should have been such determination in persecuting the Moriscos
and the Lutherans. To find an explanation of this cruel repression,
we must try and imagine what that still inadequately unified Spain of
the sixteenth century was like: a Spain in which the very numerous
Moriscos constituted a people apart, especially in certain regions such
as Andalusia and the kingdom of Valencia; in which the coast
populations lived in perpetual dread of raids by Barbaresque or Otto-
man pirates; and for which a Musulman invasion, a disembarkation
of Turks or Africans, was a constant obsession and often a very real
danger.
Trie monks continued to see in these dissidents more or less secret
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
their way of life they set a
corrupters of the public faith. Merely by
contagious example. Together with their vices or their loose morals,
the Christians acquired Som them a tendency to jeer at their own
clergy and their own religion, without imitating the dissidents* ardent
faith.
The men responsible for the government of Spain were afraid of
these people who gnawed their ropes in silence, while they awaited
the hour propitious for deliverance foretold by their prophecies. It
was obvious that the Moriscos would turn traitors; there was daily
the fact. It is true that they had good reasons for doing so;
proof of
but, even if they had been well treated, they would nevertheless have
turned traitors at the first favourable opportunity.
It was this fear of the internal enemy the fear of adding to the
Musulman peril that of Spaniards or foreigners who were accom-
plices of the Protestants of France, England, Germany, and Flanders
which, in a more or less subconscious way, made the Inquisition so
suspicious and so stern towards Protestants during the reign of
Philip II. Bishops such as the Archbishop of Toledo, Bartolome
Carranza, and monks such as Fray Luis de Leon, were arrested and
imprisoned because the Inquisition, like the King himself, suspected
them of favouring the new doctrines. The worse matters went in
Flanders and the more formidable the Huguenots became there, the
more Philip II felt himself bound by conscience to put Spain beyond
the risk or contagion.
Despite the strictest vigilance, Protestant propaganda nevertheless
1
penetrated into the Peninsula. The number of Protestant books
which were printed outside the kingdom in the Spanish language
was larger than, or at least equal to, those printed in other languages.
From the printing-houses of Germany these books were sent to
Flanders and thence to Spain at the outset by sea, and then, when
the governmental surveillance became stricter, in the first place to
Lyons, whence they were introduced into Spain by way of Navarre
and Aragon. The centre of this smuggling traffic was to be found at
Frankfort, where twice a year, during the fairs, Spanish and Flemish
merchants came to renew their stocks, which they then dispatched to
their correspondents in Spain.
Propaganda books arrived by the bale. certain Wilmann, aA
bookseller of Antwerp, had branches at Medina del Campo and at
Seville, where Latin and Spanish translations of Protestant writings
could be procured. These books, printed at Frankfort, were sold
at a very low price in order to promote their circulation. From
Spain
money was sent to these clandestine printing-houses, and was passed
on to Spanish refugees who had fled to Germany.
These imigfes were the most active agents of propaganda. They
made continual journeys between Frankfort and the Low Countries,
despite the risk of falling into the hands of the Brussels police. The
1
Of. Dowmtntos iniditos para la bistoria de Espana, Vol. V, pp. 399-400.
240
 THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIP II

provinces of Spain where this* proselytism made the most progress

were Andalusia and Aragon. Matters came to such a point that
Calvin's famous work, The Christian Institution, was actually printed
at Saragossa.
It is easy tounderstand why Aragon and Andalusia were chosen
by the Protestants as centres of propaganda .It was because these
provinces were full of Moriscos and Judatsants, upon whose com-
plicity they counted; and also because they were the two provinces
where rebels could most easily come to an understanding with
foreigners and receive help rirom them the Aragonese from
France, and the Andalusians from Morocco and the Barbary States.
In any event, heresy was pitilessly strangled. The atrocity of the
means employed is only too evident. What is most repugnant to us
in these measures of repression, I repeat, is religion put at the service
of a bloodthirsty policy. But the result, dearly bought though it
was, is also incontestable.
These executions and these expulsions en masse saved the still
weak plant of Spanish unity. They spared Spain the horrors of
interminable civil wars, anarchy and division and perhaps another
attempt at invasion, as at the time when the Berbers crossed the
Strait of Gibraltar to put everything to fire and sword in the
Peninsula.

241
 CHAPTER XXX

The Golden Century

T yNDER Charles V and under Philip Spain's internal prosperity

II,

^
I did not
1 means correspond with the
by any which
brilliant role

she played in the world. This was for many reasons. The first
was her conquering and colonising expansion.
the taking of Granada, one
During all that period which followed
that was deserted by the Spaniards. Immense
might say Spain
horizons opened before them, which lured them out of their mother-
land. It became nothing more than the old ancestral home where one
went to rest and die, after spending his life
fighting
on all the battle-
fields of Europe, or to enjoy the small fortune gained by exploiting
the sugar-canes of Cuba and San Domingo, or the gold and silver
mines of Mexico and Peru.
Exodus of soldiers, exodus of colonists-^-this explains first the
progressive decrease of the population,
and next the impoverishment
of tne soil and the decay of the few industries which had previously
cities of the Peninsula. For that matter, except in
prospered in some
Catalonia and in the southern provinces, Spain had never been a
country of intensive cultivation
and highly industrialised. I may add
that the expulsion en masse of the farming and industrial Moriscos and
the trading Jews completed the decline.
Nevertheless, the gold of the New World flowed into Spain. The
greatest wealth
rubbed shoulders there with extreme poverty, and
itself in the midst of sordid wretchedness.
magnificence displayed
The government was embarrassed in its finances, like governments
of all periods and particularly those of that period. It was embar-
rassed in its finances because its fiscal regime was extremely lenient
positively paternal by
contrast with our present-day regimes and
because taxes were imposed only upon the least rich part of the
nation, with the result that their yield was very small.
Driven to address itself to financiers who robbed it, the Spanish
Government found the greater part of the ingots which were
brought to it by the galleons or
America disappearing into the
coffers of thebankers of Antwerp, Augsburg, and Genoa. The dealers
in gold, expelled from Spain, revenged themselves by emptying her
purse and starving
her people.

But, by way of compensation, this period of Spanish expansion

and hegemony coincided with an extraordinary intellectual, literary,
and artistic development. This great movement maintained its
impetus for nearly two hundred years,
and its influence extended all
over Europe and even to the New World. It was what the Spaniards
called their "Golden Century/*
Z42
 THE GOLDEN CENTURY
At this period a number of universities were founded, side by side
with the old university centres of Alcala and Salamanca. There were
more than thirty of them in the Peninsula. Inasmuch as these
universities, like the Musulman universities, and for that matter like
all those of the Middle Ages, were above all theological colleges,
whose degrees led to ecclesiastical benefices, the multiplication of
them ended by creating a regular intellectual proletariat, since the
Church could not support all its bachelors and ail its licentiates. The
starveling student then became a literary type.
It was the Jesuits who modernised teaching, by giving a larger
place in it to the study of the humanities and By reviving the study
of classical antiquity. Colleges of theirs were established in the
principal cities ofthe kingdom. In Spain, as elsewhere, they educated
generations of humanists.
For reasons of a practical kind, schools of law political law,
international law, above all canon law were more flourishing than
ever in the universities. Philosophy, as among the Spanish Musul-
mans of the time of the Caliphate, was a timid enough follower of
theology, which dominated the intellectual field for two centuries.
The necessity of replying to the learned men ofthe Reformation gave
a new impulse to studies of this kind.
The unique contribution of Spanish theology was its mysticism,
which is really incomparable. Saint Theresa of Avila, Saint John of
the Cross, to mention only the greatest among the Spanish mystics
and to consider them only on the purely intellectual side of their
work, veritably opened unknown worlds to psychological intro-
spection. They corresponded, in the spiritual sphere, with the
discoverers of America and the conquistadors.
Science properly so-called did not flourish in the Spain of the
sixteenth century. But it was the same thing in all the other
countries of Europe. Science was barely at its birth. Only cosmo-
graphy and astronomy were seriously studied. Spain at that time had
excellent
cosmographers, but none of the first rank. At the same
time it must not be overlooked that Philip n devoted much attention
to the discoveries of his time and their scientific application.
Not only did he have bridges, aqueducts, and fortifications con-
structed in all directions, but he also encouraged the projects ofthe
boldest inventors and engineers of that period. He tried to bring the
water of the Tagus right up to Toledo by means of a system of
hydraulics. He even thought of canalising this river and making it
navigable from Lisbon and the Ocean. Toledo as a port was one of
his dreams. 1
If the positive sciences had little place in the "Golden Century/*
the intellectual sciences, on the other hand, were exceedingly
flourishing. Historians and monograph-writers were legion, and
they have left us a very considerable array of work, admirable for the
1 Sec A
my Philippe II t'Estoriaf, pp. 195 ef seq*
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
most part, especially their contributions on American and pre-
Columbus antiquities.
But all this pales beside the purely literary production of this
Spanish Renaissance. All literary forms are represented in it in extra-
ordinary profusion. After the romances of chivalry, the pastoral
genre enjoyed a prodigious success. The
seven books of Monte-
Diana enamorada were imitated by all European literatures,
mayor's
and in particular by the French. The play and the novel, not to speak
of lyric poetry and epic poetry, had a vogue still greater and more
lasting than the pastoral. For two centuries they provided subjects
for French dramatists and novelists, among them Corneille and
Lesage.
This Spanish drama, especially that of Lope de Vega, was astonish-
ing in its wealth of imaginativeness. While Cervantes created an
immortal figure in his Don Quixote, and was a moralist and a depicter
of customs of the first order in his Novelas Ejemplares, he did not
exhaust, or nearly exhaust, the whole range of conception of the
Spanish school of fiction. Side by side with him and after him, there
was a very large number of novelists and short-story writers,
especially the ^picaresques," who, despite certain conventional
characterisations imposed upon them by public taste, have left us
the most authentic paintings of Spanish society at all its levels.
This tradition persists even to-day. The novel, the short story,
are among the most alive, the most fertile genres in present-day
Spanish literature. It was a genre that developed, even under Philip
n, with a liberty, a freedom of thought and expression, which sur-
prise those who see nothing in the Spain of that period but the
country of the Inquisition.

Finally therewere architecture, the plastic arts, jewellers* work,

painting the last of them absolutely It is a current pre-
unequalled.
judice among tourists, and even art critics, that there is nothing
in Spain in the way of architecture except Moorish archi-
interesting
tecture. Apart from the Alcazar of Seville, the Alhambra of Granada,
and the Mosque of Cordova, there is nothing worth even a glance,
so we are tola.
Nevertheless not to speak of Roman and Visigoth architecture,
which has left monuments worthy of admiration from one end of the
country to the other, such as the cathedrals of Burgos and Seville
and the monasteries of Ripoll and Poblet if we confine ourselves
only to the period of the Golden Century, there was during that
period an architectural flowering which can challenge comparison
with that of the most privileged Latin countries.
All styles are represented in it, from the expiring Gothic to the
"grotesque/' by way of the plateresque, the churrigueresque, and
the neo-classic of Herrera. The cathedrals of Salamanca, Santiago de
Compostela, Jaen, Murcia, and Granada are magnificent edifices
244
 THE GOLDEN CENTURY
which have nothing to yield to the most prodigious creations of
Gothic art. Among any number of civil and religious* edifices, con-
temporary with it, the Escorial of Philip II stands out as the most
complete expression of Imperial Spain and Castilian character,
soldierly and Catholic at one and the same time.
It is the same in the case of sculpture, which is absolutely
unique
of its kind. This also is one of the most imposing and revealing
manifestations of the national genius. From the second half of the
fifteenth century to the first half of the sixteenth, it maintained
itself at about the same level. This long sustained achievement
demonstrates its strength and the fact that it drew its
sufficiently
inspirationfrom the inmost springs of Spanish consciousness.
Doubtless it is not to be compared with the idealist art of the
French sculptors of Chartres, Amiens, and Rheims. But it is closer to
reality. It is realist as Spain herself, as her literature, her painting, her
mysticism. Like all true and great realists, beginning with Saint
Theresa, it carries its realism through to the end. It takes the
humblest thing as its starting-point, by no means despising it and
often lingering over it lovingly; and it culminates in the most
transcendental thing, in which it expires seemingly with the same
satisfaction. From hell to Heaven, by way of the terrestrial globe
such is its progress, such is its domain.
With evident predilection, this sculpture employs wood
polychrome wood because this material, which can be carved
more readily than stone or marble, lends itself to the expression of
everything that is violent and passionate in the human body, all of
the paroxysms of pleasure and pain, and indeed of everything that is
most subtle and most sublime in the human soul. It starts from
commonplace reality to end in ecstasy. One may even say that it is
concerned with form only for the purpose of stirring the soul. It is
Catholic art at its most ascetic and its most orthodox, and as such it
was practised by all those wonderful workers in wood, Becerra,
Montanez, Alonso Cano.

This integral realism, this specifically Spanish realism, which

embraces all aspects of reality, from the humblest realities that fall
within the sphere of the senses to the supra-sensuous realities that
,
are accessible only to mystics this realism also inspires the painting
of Morales, Zurbardn, El Greco, and Murillo, as well as that of
Ribera and Velazquez.
Spanish painting is perhaps the most original that the world has
ever seen. Trained, in the school of the Flemings and the Italians,
it has all the
sumptuousness of the one, all the virtuosity of the
other, but together with something unique: the sense of life. It is
living reality, life in action, life surrounded with splendour and zest.
In writing this I am thinking especially of Veldzquez, that great
realist who in any fragment of reality, isolated as it were at random,
 THE SPANISH HEGEMONY
succeeded in discovering and expressing this sense of splendour in
life to such a point that, under his brush, a blacksmith, a spinner at
work assume an epic grandeur, and his picture The Ladies in Waiting
is as intensely, as profoundly poetical as a great historical and

military canvas such as his famous Surrender of 'Breda.

This taking possession of life has such a sovereign, such a trium-
phal air in Velazquez that other painters, by comparison with him,
descend to the level of mere picture-makers. At one time his prin-
cipal works were exhibited in the great central gallery of the Prado,
side by side with the canvases of Raphael, Titian, and Van Dyck.
All of them were eclipsed by his own, all of them seemed trifling
beside his. Only his work appeared to express the seriousness and
the magnificence of life.
His portraits have the same epic air about them. Those of his
emulators, if they do not possess the same grandeur of style, have at
least realism, psychological penetrationand sometimes exact lyricism.
These Spanish portraitists were painters of the very first rank. All of
them, the mystics as well as the realists, handed on to their modern
descendants, together with the sense of life, a vehemence in execution
and a colourist's gift which have perpetuated, right down to our own
time, the mastery of El Greco and Veldzcjuez.

246
 PART II
THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE
DEATH OF PHILIP II
248
 CHAPTER XXXI

The Reigns of Philip III and Philip IV (1598-1 665)

death of Philip II ushered in a new period in Spanish
history. The old monarch had been his own minister, and there
THE was no department of the State which was not under his
personal supervision. This policy was completely reversed by his
son and grandson. The accession of Philip III initiated the reign of
the favourites, who exercised the royal authority in the name of the
monarch.
This change was partly due to a lack of application on the part of
the later Habsburg Kings of Spain, but the early age at which they
succeeded to the throne was also not without its influence. Philip III
became King when he was twenty, and Philip IV when he was
sixteen, while Charles II, when his father died, was only a boy of
four. It is not without interest to note that Philip II had foreseen
this development, for just before his death he said, "God, who has
given me so many kingdoms, has denied me a son capable of ruling
them. I fear that they will govern htm."
In spite, however, of the indolence of her sovereigns, the medio-
crity of her ministers, and the reverses which had marked the last
years of Philip II, Spain still held the hegemony of Europe, and her
prestige was very high indeed. Apart from the United Provinces,
which had detached themselves from the Spanish monarchy, but
to which the latter had not yet by any means abandoned its rights,
Philip II passed on to his son the same wide dominions that he had
inherited from his father. The King of Spain was still master of
Naples and Sicily, the Milanese, the Franche Cpmte, Artois, and
Flanders, while all of the New World that was yet inhabited by white
men was subject to his rule. Philip n had even added to this vast
heritage by the annexation of Portugal, which also meant the incor-
poration in the Spanish Empire of Brazil, as well as of the various
Portuguese colonies in the East.
The problem which faced the successors of Philip II was the
preservation of these dominions, and particularly of that portion of
them which lay in Europe. Spain had pkyed no part in the world
until she had acquired possessions outside the Iberian Peninsula, and
if she was to retain her supremacy she must continue to hold her
Italian dominions, as well as the inheritance of the Dukes of Bur-
gundy. For centuries she had been too absorbed in her battle against
the Moslem invader to take a hand in European politics as such,
and although her final victory over the Crescent had vitally affected
the destiny of Europe, she had not reaped any immediate benefit.
In short, Spain had fought for Christendom, but she had no voice in
its counsels.
The acquisition of Naples, Sicily, and the Milanese, combined
249
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

with the marrkges which brought the Burgundian ^heritage, had

changed all this. She was the mistress of Italy she was installed upon
;

the Rhine; and, above all, by her possession of the Low Countries she
was able to dominate the most vulnerable frontier of her great rival,
France. Her situation was indeed an advantageous one, and on the
sole condition that she had the adequate military and naval strength
at her disposal, she was mistress of Europe.
The preoccupation of Spanish policy throughout the seventeenth
century was to perpetuate this state of affairs at all costs- To main-
tain the closest connection with Austria, and to let nothing be
decided in Europe without the consent of Madrid and Vienna; to
preserve free communication with Germany and Flanders through
the Tuscan ports and the Milanese (this was especially important in
view of the growth of English and Dutch naval power); and to hold
France in check by the menace of the Flemish garrisons these were
:

the objects of Spain during the reigns of her last three Habsburg
monarchs.
Above all, France was the enemy whose growing power must be
curbed, and to do this the Spanish watch upon her frontiers must
never be relaxed. In consequence, the whole century was one long
struggle between France and the two branches of the House of
Austria, until, finally, the former broke the bonds which held her,
and Louis XIV set a French prince upon the throne of Ferdinand
and Isabel.

Philip III was a well-meaning man, and was certainly not a fool,
but, wnile amiable, he was both weak and idle, with the natural
result that he was a tool in the hands of others throughout his life.
During his reign the real ruler of Spain was not the King, but Don
Francisco de Sandoval y Rojas, Duke of Lerma. From the accession
to the death of Philip HI the favourite controlled every department
of State, and he secured his hold over the monarch by pandering to
the latter's weaknesses.
In marked contrast with the austerity of Philip II, ostentation now
became the order of the day, and full vent was given to that love of
display which ere long provoked the biting satire of Quevedo.
Madrid made no secret of its dislike of Lerma, who accordingly
persuaded his master to transfer the capital for a time to Valladolid,
where there was less criticism of his methods of government. Some
idea of the
extravagance which prevailed can be gleaned from the
fact that while Philip II spent upon his household 400,000 ducats a
year, the cost of his son's establishment was more than three times
that amount. Even allowing for the steady fall in the value of
money
during this period, it is clear that the Cortes had considerable reason
for its repeated complaints of the royal expenditure.
Throughout the reign of Philip II the problem of the Low
Countries had transcended in importance every other international
250
 THE REIGNS OF PHILIP III AND PHILIP IV

question, and shortly before his death that King had attempted to
settle it by handing over the provinces concerned to his daughter,
Isabel, and her husband, the Archduke Albert, as a semi-autonomous
principality under Spanish protection. Unfortunately this proved to
be no solution at all, firstly, because the Archdukes, as they were
called, could not maintain themselves without Spanish money and
troops, and secondly, because, as they were childless, it was only a
question of time when the Low Countries would revert in full
sovereignty to the King of Spain. In actual fact, Philip III found
himself as fully committed to war against the Dutch as ever his father
had been.
When the Archdukes arrived at Brussels they found the situation
critical in the extreme. In their absence the Archduke Andrew and

Juan de Mendoza had occupied the hitherto neutral territories of

Cleves and Westphalia, with the consequence that the Protestant
princes of Germany had made common cause with the Dutch, who
were also receiving a certain amount of support from England and
France. In desperation, the Archdukes opened negotiations with
their enemies, and a conference was held at Boulogne in 1600. This
proved abortive, and when war was renewed Maurice of Nassau,
though he failed in an attack on Nieuport, swept the Spaniards out
of Cleves. These events clearly established the fact that the Arch-
dukes would never be able to maintain themselves with their own
resources, and accordingly every effort was made to retrieve the
situation
by the despatch of money and reinforcements from Spain
and from tne Spanish possessions in Italy.
Fortune, which had so long favoured the Dutch, now began to
incline towards the Spaniards. In 1603 Elizabeth of
England died,
and as much of her animosity towards Spain was personal, there was
little in obtaining from her successor, James I, a promise
difficulty
that he would "not succour the Hollanders or allow English ships to
trade in the Indies." Furthermore, in the Marquis of Spinola the
Spaniards found a general capable of making head against Maurice of
Nassau.
In these circumstances the war began to pursue a different course.
Ostend surrendered to Spinola after a siege of three years, and the
Spaniards pushed the campaign across the Rhine, and along the
Dutch eastern frontier, from where, in the autumn of 1605, Spinola
threatened Friesland with invasion. In spite, however, of these
successes, it was clear that neither side could hope for a final victory,
and a truce was made in 1607. Two years later another truce, this
time for a period of twelve years, was concluded, and Spain at last
admitted tne United Provinces to be a government de facto.
At the expiration of this time hostilities were renewed, and
Spinola gained several more triumphs, notably the surrender of
Breda in 1625. He was, however, required for the campaign in
Italy, and his successors were not so fortunate. The war against the
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN" SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Dutch had now also become merged in the Thirty Years' War, and
the varying fortunes of the one affected the other. Finally, by the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Philip IV recognised the United
Provinces as an independent state, and this brought to a close a
conflict which had been in existence for eighty years.
Spain was forced to give up the struggle against the Dutch, partly
because she was unable to supply the men and money required, but
also because communications with the Low Countries became
increasingly more difficult with the passage of time. The defeat of
the Armada, and a series of Dutch naval victories, rendered the sea
route highly insecure, while the growth of French power threatened
the line of communication from the Milanese through the Franche
Comte. At the same time, the recognition of the independence of the
United Provinces, if inevitable, was a heavy blo\fr to the prosperity
of those which remained in Spanish hands, for the Dutch held the
mouth of the Scheldt, and they closed it to international navigation.
Antwerp was ruined, and the Spanish Netherlands were deprived of
their natural outlet to the sea.
In addition to these commitments in the Low Countries, Philip III
had also inherited from his father the burden of a war with England,
and he and Lerma determined to make one more effort to detach at
any rate Ireland from Elizabeth's dominions. Messages from that
country came in to the effect that now was the time to strike, but
that unless the Earl of Tyrone and The O'Donnell were supported
by Spain the chance of expelling the English from Ireland would be
lost for ever. Lerma agreed with the Irish representations, and he
induced the Cortes to vote an extraordinary tax of 24,000,000 ducats
spread over six years.
The expedition sailed from Lisbon early in September, 1601,
under the command of Diego Brachero, and consisted of thirty-three
ships, carrying 4,500 men, commanded by Don Juan del Aguila, and
a large quantity of war material. As so often in the history of Spanish
attempts upon England, a storm drove many of the vessels back to
port, and although del Aguila effected a landing, it was not long
before he found himself invested in Kinsale by an English army under
Lord Mountjoy.
In reality nisposition was hopeless in view of the failure of Tyrone
to give any effective helj). Reinforcements were sent from Spain,
but these were unable to join del Aguila, and they accordingly dis-
embarked at Castlehaven, Baltimore, and Dunboy, only, however, to
be invested in these places in their turn. In 1602, therefore, the
Spanish commander came to terms with Mountjoy, and evacuated
Ireland.
For all
practical purposes this terminated the hostilities between
Spain and England in Europe, for although there was a project to
dethrone Elizabeth by means of an army commanded by Spinola, it
was never put into execution. The proposal to substitute Arabella
252
 THE REIGNS OF PHILIP III AND PHILIP IV

Stuart for James VI of Scotland as the Tudor Queen's successor

was also favoured by Spain, but Elizabeth died before the necessary
arrangements could be made. The new King of England realised
that no useful purpose was being served by the continuance of the
war, for all danger of England becoming a Spanish province had
been averted, while the existing situation seriously hampered English
trade with the Low Countries. Lerma, too, was weary of the struggle,
and in 1604 peace was signed.
The Treaty of Vervins in 1 598 had already brought the war with
France to an end, though had Henry IV not been murdered twelve
years later, it would probably have been renewed, for Spain could
hardly have remained unaffected by the contest which then appeared
to be inevitable between that monarch and the Emperor. His
murder, however, completely changed the situation, and under the
regency of Marie de Medici French policy was definitely favourable
to Spain. This state of affairs continued until the outbreak of the
Thirty Years' War, and the rise of Richelieu to power.
There can be no question but that Lerma was right in putting an
end to these foreign wars which were draining the resources of
Spain, but he did not know how to utilise peace once he had secured
it. His main difficulty was that it was an
age when the value of
money was falling, while prices were consequently rising, as a
result of the stream of gold from the New World, and the unsatis-
factory nature of Spanish financial administration rendered the crisis
more acute. An infinite number of petty taxes upon industry, com-
merce, and food hampered trade without producing the necessary
revenue, and Lerma's extravagance, and the corruption of those by
whom he was surrounded, only made matters worse. By 1605 every
source of revenue had been pledged for years ahead at ruinous rates
of interest, while the Milanese and Naples could no longer pay their
way, but had to be subsidized by Spain.
Fundamentally, the problem was the same as in every other
European country, but it was aggravated in Spain by the incom-
petence of the government, and by the particularly futile financial
system. In these circumstances peace did not result in the national
revival that might have been expected.
The most important event in the Peninsula itself during the reign
of Philip III was the expulsion of the Moriscos, that is to say of the
Moors who still lived on Spanish soil and were converts to the
Christian religion. The Moriscos were for the main part engaged in
agriculture, partly because other occupations were closed to them,
and partly because the Old Christians regarded farm-work as menial
and beneath their dignity. At the same time, it should be remem-
bered that the Moors had not brought their processes of agriculture
and irrigation with them from Africa, but had merely employed those
which had been in use in Spain for centuries before their arrival.
The charges against them were that they still practised Islam
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

clandestinely, and that during the recent wars they had entered into
treasonable relations with the national enemies. That the latter
accusation was justified can hardly be doubted, and in view of their
number the Moriscos thus constituted a very real danger. More-
over, they were chiefly to be found in the kingdom of Valencia,
whence they could easily communicate with the Turks and the
Barbary corsairs. In the reign of Philip II it had been found neces-
sary, for these reasons, to expel the Moriscos from Andalusia, and
their resistance had resulted in the war of the Alpujarras. In 1609
they once more seemed so dangerous that it was decided to take
drastic measures against them, and in that year Philip III signed an
edict for their total expulsion from the Peninsula.
This decree is usually treated as having been issued by a weak
administration, which, without due consideration, had yielded to the
of a fanatical clergy. In actual fact the whole question had
pressure
teen pondered and discussed for years, and the final decision had
only been taken after considerable hesitation. Furthermore, the
problem of the Moors had been calling for settlement for over a
century, so that whatever charges may be preferred against the
Spanish government the latter cannot be accused of acting pre-
cipitately. The Church certainly called attention to the importance
of the problem, for in its eyes the secret practice of Mohammedan
rites by those who were receiving Christian sacraments was sacrilege,
and the lead was taken by the Archbishop of Valencia, in whose
diocese the Moriscos were most numerous.
Accordingly, a junta was convoked at Valencia to consider the
question solely from a theological standpoint, and to decide whether
it was
possible to continue administering the sacraments to those who
manifestly treated them as a mockery. The answer was in the
negative, and as this was equivalent to putting the Moriscos out-
side the pale of the Church, the problem of expulsion became
critical.
Even then, the measure seemed so grave that the government was
reluctant to adopt it. The Pope, as well as a certain number of the
Spanish bishops, declared against it. Needless to say the great landed
proprietors, who had Moriscos working on their estates, adopted
the same course, and some of them went so far as to declare that if the
religious education of the Moriscos was at fault, the blame must rest
with the clergy themselves.
What finally decided the government was the danger of invasion
from abroad coinciding with an insurrection in the Peninsula, as may
be seen from a letter which Philip III sent to the deputies at Valencia :
e<
Desiring to reduce the New Christians by means of conciliation and
kindness, I ordered the junta about which you are informed to
assemble at Valencia, in order to proceed a second time to their
instruction and conversion, for the greater ease of my conscience,
and to see whether it was possible to avoid expelling them from the
 THE REIGNS OF PHILIP III AND PHILIP IV

kingdom. But I have learned through divers channels, all of them

sure, that those of Valencia and Castile pursued their evil courses,
since, at the moment when we were concerned with their conversion,
they sent emissaries to Constantinople and Morocco to treat with the
Turk and King Mouley-Sidan, asking them to send their forces in aid
and support next year; and assuring them that they would find a
hundred and fifty thousand men in arms, ready to adventure life and
property in this enterprise; and that the difficulties were not great
in
view or the fact that our kingdoms were lacking in men, arms, and
trained soldiers. In addition to this, I have learned also that they are
in communication, and are plotting, with the heretics and with other
princes, enemies of our monarchy, and that both have offered to-aid
them with all their strength." 1
The expulsion of the Moriscos en masse was clearly disastrous, but
from the national point of view it seems to have been inevitable.
While the Spanish armies were fighting in Flanders, Italy, and
Germany, the government could not allow an important section of
the population to intrigue with the enemy, and plot to throw open to
them tne best ports of the kingdom. Even if the :he Moriscos had been
be
left free to their own religion, which would have been
practise
contrary to all the ideas of the period, they would never have ceased
to regard themselves as a separate people, and to conspire against the
Spanish government with their co-religionists abroad.

Philip III died in 1621, and his death meant the downfall of Lerma.
For some years the opposition to the minister had been growing,
since his extravagance annoyed the Cortes, while the expulsion of the
Moriscos ranged the landed proprietors against him. The Prince of
Asturiaswas completely under the influence of Don Gaspar de
Guzman, the Count-Duke of Olivares, who was the enemy of Lerma.
The moment that Philip III was dead, Olivares obtained from his
successor full powers to deal with the minister. Lerma and his
partisans were put to death or exiled, and Spain was henceforth
ruled by Olivares in the name of Philip IV.
Olivares was an abler man than Lerma, but he did not possess the
talents necessary to rescue Spain from the slough into which she
was sinking. Edicts against luxury were issued, and Philip IV set
an example by a reduction in the expense of his court. All this,
however, was to no purpose, for prices were steadily rising, while
the whole financial and economic system was antiquated. The cost of
collecting the taxes was frequently in excess of the amount obtained,
and every monopoly, of which there were many, had its own

1
Evidence in support of this charge is to be found in a letter addressed by the
Moriscos to Henry IV of France. It was discovered in the archives of the Due ae La
Force, and was published by the Marquis de Lagrange, in his edition of the Memoirts
atttb&ttiques d* Jacques Notnpar de Cawnont* due de La Force, Paris, Charpentier, 1843,
Vol. I, p. 341.
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Owing to the akabalas or taxes on sales, tolls, inland

officials.
customs-dues, and octrois to which goods in transit were subject, it
was quite out of the question for them to compete with those of
foreign origin, except at first-hand in the place
where they were
produced,
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that there was con-
tinual friction between the government and the Cortes in Castile,
Arag6n, Valencia, and CatSonia over the granting of subsidies,
and these differences had much to do with the separatist movements
that marked the middle years of the reign.
Three years before Philip IV came to the throne the Thirty Years*
War had begun, and into that struggle Spain was inevitably drawn,
both on account of the close family relationship between the Emperor
and the Spanish King, and of the necessity of maintaining the
encirclement of France. In the ktter country the rise of Cardinal
Richelieu to power in 1624 meant a return to the policy of Henry IV,
and consequently a renewal of war.
On the other hand, both the contemporary Kings of England,
James I and Charles I, realised the importance of friendship with the
master of the Spanish Netherlands too well to sacrifice it. Accord-
the visit of Charles, when still Prince of Wales, to
ingly, although
Madrid did not result in a marriage with a Spanish princess, there
were, save for an English attack on Cidiz in 1625, no serious
hostilities between the two countries until Cromwell revived the old

policy of Elizabeth. A formal peace was made in 1629, and was

ratified by Rubens as a special envoy to England in the following
year.
The war with France began in Italy. During the kst years of the
reign of Philip III the Spanish forces had occupied the Valtellina,
the valley wnich connected Lombardy with the Tyrol, for the
purpose of keeping open the communications with Vienna. The
victories of Spinola in the Low Countries, and the success of the
Imperial arms in Germany and Bohemia, determined Richelieu to
strike before it was too late, and the French accordingly invaded the
Valtellina.
In spite of the exhausted condition
of Spain the energy she dis-
played was remarkable, and notwithstanding early French successes
Kichelieu was compelled by the Treaty of Monzon, in 1626, to relax
his hold upon the disputed valley, whose inhabitants recovered their
independence on payment of a tribute to the Swiss canton of the
Orisons. The interests of France and Spain were, however, too
strongly opposed for this settlement to be anything more than a
truce, and the succession to the duchy of Mantua Ted to another
outbreak of hostilities. In this struggle the Spaniards were not so
fortunate, and by the Treaty of Casale, in 1630, the claimant sup-
ported by France obtained the duchy, though subject to the suzerainty
of the Emperor, while the French received the fortress of Pinerolo.
256
 THE REIGNS OF PHILIP III AND PHILIP IV

In spite of a heavy expenditure both of men and money Spain gained

nothing.
Meanwhile, in Germany the fortune of war had changed with the
intervention of Gustavus Adolphus and the Swedes, and even after
the death of the former in the hour of victory at Lutzen the Im-
perialists
were unable to make any effective head against their oppo-
nents. In these circumstances Philip IV and his minister determined
to strike a blow at France by checking the progress of her allies, the
Swedes and the German Protestants, for the re-establishment of the
Imperial power in Germany would perpetuate her encirclement, the
basis of Spanish policy, and also prove a standing menace to the
Dutch. Accordingly, Philip's brother, the Infante Don Fernando,
who was on his way to Brussels to take up his governorship of the
Spanish Netherlands, on his own initiative went to the aid of the
incomparable Spanish infantry. The stroke was brilliantly success-
ful, for at Nordlingen, in 1634, the Swedes and the German Pro-
testants were routed, leaving 8000 dead on the field and 4000
prisoners in the hands of the enemy.
The defeat was a serious blow to the policy of Richelieu, but the
Spanish victory rendered it more important than ever that France
should break the bonds which imprisoned her. Hitherto, she had not
taken a direct part in the Thirty Years' War, but had acted through
the Swedes and the German Protestants. Nordlingen made it
imperative that she should intervene directly, or see the Habsburg
hegemony in Europe more firmly established than ever.
Accordingly, Richelieu declared war against both Spain and the
Emperor, and encouraged the Dutch to attack Don Fernando in the
rear. Flanders, Germany, and Northern Italy were the scenes of the

fighting, and in these three theatres the war dragged on with varying
fortunes. In 1636 the Spanish armies advanced so far as to threaten
Paris itself, and two years later Lombardy was completely cleared
of the French, who had occupied it: successive efforts on the part of
Richelieu to invade Spain were also unsuccessful. On the other
hand, the Dutch finally wrested from the Spaniards the command
of the sea, for in October, 1639, a Spanish fleet of 70 ships, carrying
10,000 men, was destroyed by Van Tromp in the Downs.
At this point the energy of Spain was still further distracted by
the outbreak of revolts in Portugal, Andalusia, Biscay, and
Catalonia.
The old jealousy between the Spaniards and the Portuguese had in
no way diminished as the result of their allegiance to a common
crown. On his conquest of the country in 1 5 80 Philip II had done his
best to conciliate his new subjects, and had kept his word to preserve
all their national
privileges, to respect their autonomy, and not to
burden them with Spanish taxation: official posts were filled entirely
by Portuguese, and the nobles of Portugal were always made welcome
at the
Spanish court. Philip III followed his father's policy, and
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

almost his last act was to attend a meeting of the Portuguese Cortes.
Indeed, had these conciliatory methods continued to be employed,
it is
possible that the union of the two countries might have endured,
but with the accession of Olivares to power all discretion was thrown
to the winds.
In the first place his followers were installed in the more lucrative
Portuguese posts, for there were not enough Spanish sinecures
to satisfy their greed. Then, again, the continual wars in which
Spain was engaged were definitely harmful to the interests of
Portugal, which saw her old possessions in America, Africa, and the
East harried by enemies with whom she had no sort of quarrel,
while at home Cadiz was taking away from Lisbon much of its
commerce. This was the moment chosen bv Olivares to introduce,
in 1636, the Spanish tax of 5 per cent upon all property, movable and
immovable, and a rising was the result. This was suppressed, but
instead of taking the warning to heart, Olivares imposed a fresh
special tax upon the Portuguese as a punishment, ana announced a
plan for abolishing the Portuguese Cortes, and bringing the repre-
sentatives to sit in the Cortes at Castile, of which kingdom Portugal
was in future to be a province.
The strongest claimant to the Portuguese throne was the Duke of
Bragan2a, and his popularity among his fellow-countrymen was
great. As the rule of Spain became more unpopular, all eyes were
turned towards him, and at the instigation of the Archbishop of
Lisbon an organization was formed for the purpose of placing the
crown upon his head. The Regent for the King of Spain was Mar-
garet, the widowed Duchess or Mantua, but although she knew that
die storm was brewing, she had not the necessary resources at her
disposal to do anything.
When the revolution did take place, on December ist, 1640, it
was carried through with consummate ease. The conspirators, not
above four hundred in number, rushed the palace in Lisbon, com-
pelled the Regent to surrender the citadel, and the Duke of Bra-
ganfca, after a three hours* revolt in which he had himself done
nothing, found that he was King of Portugal under the title of
John IV. Subsequent Spanish attempts to regain the country were
unsuccessful, but the war dragged on for years. Finally, in 1665,
the Portuguese won a decisive victory at Villaviciosa, and three
years afterwards, by the mediation of Charles II of England, a treaty
was made in which Spain recognised the independence of Portugal
and her colonies, Ceuta alone remaining in Spanish hands.
In the state of the Peninsula at this time separatism was highly
contagious, and hardly had Portugal established her freedom than
Andalusia attempted to follow suit. The Duke of Medina Sidonia
was not only the greatest landed proprietor in that province, but he
was the brother of the new Queen of Portugal. His project was
to make himself King of Andalusia with Portuguese help, but like
258
 THE REIGNS OF PHILIP III AND PHILIP IV
his ancestor who commanded the Armada, he was a poor creature,
and had not the resolution necessary to carry out his project. The
details of the plot leaked out, and Olivares, determined to prevent a
repetition of the Portuguese revolution, heavily reinforced the
garrison of Cadiz. Medina Sidonia thereupon made his submission,
and although his life was spared, he was not allowed to return' to
Andalusia.
A few years earlier, in 1631, Biscay had also broken out in revolt
against what it held to be a violation of its
privileges by the proposed
creation of a salt monopoly, and order was not restored until the
project had been abandoned.
Most serious of all was the rebellion of Catalonia. For years
there had been difficulty with Madrid over financial matters, as well
as over the billeting of Spanish soldiers in the province, and it was
this latter grievance that precipitated the outbreak. The Spanish
troops were in arrears with their pay, and they proceeded to live on
the country in the same manner as they did in Italy and the Low
Countries. The Catalan peasants retaliated, and the trouble spread
to Barcelona, where, in June, 1640, a rising took place in which the
Viceroy was killed.
The insurgents at once realised that they could not stand alone,
and invoked the aid of Richelieu, who sent envoys to treat with them
on the basis of the creation of a Catalan republic under French
protection, or of the recognition of Louis XIII as Count of Barcelona.
It was the latter alternative that was finally adopted.
The Catalan rebellion, and the proclamation of Louis XIII as
Count of Barcelona, meant that the war against France had been
transferred to the soil of the Peninsula, and Olivares quickly grasped
the danger which this implied. An army was hastily assembled at
Tortosa, and it advanced in triumph to Barcelona, only, however, to
be routed at the battle of Montjuich (1641). French troops poured
into Catalonia, and by the end of 1642 the outlying provinces of
Cerdagne and Roussillon had been lost, in spite of the gallant defence
of Perpignan by its Spanish garrison.
Philip IV took the field in person, and this did much to restore his
subjects' spirits, while the failure of Conde to reduce Lerida after
attempts which lasted for three years served to discourage his
opponents. Furthermore, the Catalans discovered that they did not
really like the French any better than the Spaniards, and it was not
long before there was party among
a them in favour of returning to
their old allegiance. Nor was this all, for the death of Richelieu in
1642 ushered in a period of instability in France which proved highly
advantageous to her enemies.
Finally, Philip IV entrusted the command of the Spanish forces to
his illegitimate son, Don John of Austria, and the latter captured
Barcelona in October, 1652, after a siege which lasted for fifteen
months. The pacification of Catalonia, however, cannot be con-
259
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

sidered as complete until the signature of the Treaty of the Pyrenees

with France in 1659.
The immediate consequence of these separatist movements in the
Peninsula was the fall of Olivares. His enemies were numerous, and
Philip could no longer refuse to listen to them. Accordingly, one
morning in January, 1643, the King went out hunting, having left a
note behind him dismissing the minister in the most friendly manner,
and that was the end of the long ministry of Olivares.
There can be little doubt that the favourite had been influenced
by the example of Richelieu to pursue in Spain that same centralising
policy
which the Cardinal was putting into effect in France, but he
lacked the ability of his French contemporary, and in place of unifica-
tion he merely achieved revolution. His manner was too arrogant to
allow of his becoming popular, while his ignorance in economic
matters made his task the more difficult in an age of economic crisis.
After the dismissal of Olivares the King for a time took a more
active personal share in the administration, but gradually the power
passed into the hands of Don Luis de Haro, a nephew of the fallen
minister, and it was not long before he was as powerful as his uncle
had been.
The death of Richelieu, shortly afterwards followed by that of
Louis XIII (May, 1643), encouraged Spain to strike another blow at
France. The Infante Don Fernando had died in Brussels in 1641,
and he had been succeeded in command of the Spanish forces in the
Low Countries by Don Francisco de Mellp, a Portuguese noble
faithful to Spain. This general was at first highly successful, for he
captured Lens, and in 1642 inflicted a crushing defeat upon the French
at Honnecourt.
In the following year, after a feint on Picardy, he entered Cham-
pagne through the Ardennes, and laid siege to Rocroi. Cond6 deter-
mined to attack the besiegers, in spite of the fact that the bulk of
them consisted of the veteran Spanish infantry which was acknow-
ledged to be without a rival in the world. The French won the day
by the adoption of new tactics. The solid mass of pikemen, which
constituted the military strength of Spain, wedged together in close
formation, could resist all cavalry attack by their stubborn endur-
ance, and by sheer weight could bear down all opposition. If,
however, the mass became once disorganised, it could never reform.
Gustavus Adolphus had shown at Breitenfeld how it could be
broken by artillery, and Condi applied the lesson at Rocroi. He
alternated his squadrons of cavalry with musketeers, and used the
one or the other against the Spanish phalanx as the situation
demanded.
Time after time the Spaniards drove the French back, but at last
their formation broke, and they were slaughtered where
they stood.
They lost 7000 killed and wounded, 5000 prisoners, and all their
stores. The battle of Rocroi is notable in that it sounded the death-
260
 THE REIGNS OF PHILIP III AND PHILIP IV

knell of Spanish military prestige, though it was far from bringing

the war to an early conclusion.
The immediate effect of Rocroi was the French penetration of the
Low Countries. Conde lost no time in entering Hainault, and he
pushed his scouts almost as far as Brussels. He then turned to the
East and captured Thionville, but his further progress was stopped
for the moment by a victory of the Spaniards and the Imperialists
over the French at Tuttlinghen, which threatened to open the Alsace
frontier to invasion. Nevertheless, the succeeding years saw the loss
to Spain of a great part of Western Flanders, and of Dunkirk, while
in 1648 Condd won another resounding victory at Lens. In Italy,
too, the Spaniards lost ground, and were driven out of Mantua,
Tuscany, and the islands of Porto Lonzone and Piombino.
By this time the Thirty Years' War had exhausted not only
Germany, in which it had for the most part been fought, but also
the other countries that had participated in it. Negotiations for its
termination had been begun as early as 1641, and they were now
brought to a conclusion by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Of the
three treatieswhich were made at this time only one concerned Spain
directly, namely that with the Dutch, which was signed at Minister.
By this document Spain formally recognised the United Provinces
as an independent state, together with the colonies in the East which
the Dutch had conquered.
The Peace of Westphalia did not terminate the struggle with
France. Mazarin, who now controlled the policy of that country in
place of the dead Richelieu, was desirous of exchanging Roussillon
and Catalonia, which were in French hands, for the Spanish Low
Countries and the Franche Comt6. This proposal was unacceptable
to Spain, and it was also the reason why the Dutch made a separate
peace with Philip IV, for it revealed French ambitions so clearly
that henceforth the United Provinces are to be found on the side of
their ancient enemy in opposition to their old friends, the French.
In consequence, the war between France and Spain lasted another
eleven years, and owing to the outbreak of the Fronde, which
paralysed the French arms, the Spaniards were able to recover much
of the ground which they had lost in previous campaigns. For a
time, too, Cond6 was in the Spanish service, and in 16 56, he and Don
John of Austria severely defeated a French army under Turenne
which was besieging Valenciennes. This reverse drove Masarin to
make an effort to come to terms, but the intervention of England on
the side of France so encouraged the latter that the French govern-
ment refused to consider any terms which Spain could accept.
The causes of this sudden hostility on the part of Engknd were
many. The English republican ambassador in Madrid had been
murdered by supporters of the Stuarts; there were complaints of the
maltreatment of English subjects by the Inquisition; and there was
the desire to compel Spain to open her American possessions to
261
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

English trade. Above all, Cromwell looked at Europe through the

eyes
of Elizabeth, and to him Spain constituted the same threat as in
the previous century.
The appearance of England on the side of France involved the
loss of Jamaica, the victory of an Anglo-French army at the battle
of the Dunes in 165 8, and the recapture by the French of all that the
Spaniards had recovered during the preceding years. In Italy, too,
the armies of Philip were worsted by the combined forces of France,
Savoy, and Modena. At the same time, Spanish privateers inflicted
enormous damage upon English trade, and Cromwell's mistaken
policy in regard to Spain precipitated
an economic crisis that had
much to do with bringing about the restoration of the monarchy.
In spite of these successes, however, France was weary of the war,
and in 1659 the Treaty of the Pyrenees brought it to an end. Louis
XIV married the daughter of Philip IV, but she renounced her right
to succeed to the Spanish throne on condition of receiving a dowry
of 500,000 crowns. Spain surrendered Roussillon and Cerdagne to
France, and also all Artois except St. Omer and Aire. Gravelines,
Bourbourg, St. Venant, the Sluys, Landrecy, Quesnoy, Thionville,
Montm6dy, Damvilliers, Irovy, Marienberg, Philippeville, Rocroi,
Chatelet, and Limcbamp remained in the hands of the French, while
to the English was ceded Dunkirk. The fortresses in Burgundy
were returned to Spain, with Oudenarde and Dixmude in Flanders,
and France renounced all claim to Catalonia.
The Treaty of the Pyrenees undoubtedly strengthened France, but
itdid not enable her to break the circle of Spanish possessions by
which she had been surrounded ever since the clays of Charles V. The
peace was only an expression of the lassitude of the two countries
which had been at war for so long. Spain came to terms because
she had no more men or money, and because Philip IV, although not
old, was an invalid ; France was glad of the opportunity to profit by
an advantageous military situation that might change, and also
because, in the event of the King of Spain dying without male heirs,
she wished to make in peace the necessary preparations to grasp the
Spanish heritage.
The Treaty of the Pyrenees did not mark finality. The governors
of the Catholic King continued to command in Lille and Besanon,
while his viceroys held the Two Sicilies and the Milanese, and could,
in case of need, effect a junction with the Emperor. In short, France
still
possessed
no guarantee of security except the financial im-
poverishment and the military weakness of the government at
Madrid.
Philip IV only survived the Treaty of the Pyrenees for six years,
for he died in September, 1665. His letters to the nun Maria de
Agreda have enabled posterity to form a better estimate of his
character than was possible for his contemporaries. They reveal a
passionate man whose outward impassivity was but a mask. Indolent
262
 THE REIGNS OF PHILIP III AND PHILIP IV

and self-indulgent, Philip was very far from being a fool, and his
failing was not a lack of ability, but a want of application,
ifortunately for Spain, Philip II had devised a system of govern-
Seat
ment which imposed a life of unremitting toil upon the monarch,
and neither his son nor his grandson had the will to shoulder this
burden.
In spite of the decline of Spanish power during the reigns
of Philip III and Philip IV, both Kings were the patrons of
literature and art, in which Spain continued to lead the world.
The Spanish theatre was the pattern upon which the European stage
still modelled itself, and the great Lope de Vega did not die until

1635, or Tirso de Molina until 1648, while Calderon was at the

zenith of his fame in the last years of Philip IV. Cervantes himself
died a subject of Philip III, and it was in that monarch's reign that
both Don Quixote and the Novelas Ejetvplares were published.
Spanish literature at this time could also boast the great satirist,
Quevedo. In art the period was distinguished by El Greco, Ribera,
Zurbardn, Murillo, and above all, Velazquez.
In fine, the reverses suffered by the Spanish arms, and the growing
poverty of the country, were entirely without influence upon its
literature and art, which continued to enjoy their old supremacy,
and the seventeenth century may justly be described as the golden
age of Spanish civilisation.
 CHAPTER XXXII

Charles the Bewitched, and the Succession Question

(1665-1700)

Spain in a state of decadence on the accession of Charles II

was
the fact her inhabitants profoundly indifferent. If the national
left
IF finances were in disorder; it poverty was increasing; with the rise
in the cost of living; and if the population was declining, as always
happens after a period of great prosperity, it does not appear that the
Spanish people were particularly unhappy during the reigns of
Philip IV and his son.
In Madrid, at any rate, leisure was general. With sword and dagger
at their sides, the members of the lower orders jostled those of the
upper cksses in the streets, and, by their swagger, maintained their
pretension to be treated on the same footing as the aristocracy. It is
true that there was no longer any industry worth the name, but one
went very elegantly dressed in cloth and linen that came from Holland
and Flanders. Most professions were in the hands of foreigners, and
the few ships that plied between the Spanish ports were Dutch.
Under Philip IV there were already 40,000 French in the capital; a
fact which shows that there was still money to be made there, or
they would not have come. Moralists might groan about the public
depravity, the frivolity of all classes, and the increasing number of
prostitutes, but it made little difference, for the theatres and pleasure-
resorts were always full.
Nevertheless, beneath this external light-heartedness there re-
mained the conviction that Spain was the greatest country in the
world; so great, in fact, that the loss of an outlying province might
pass as an accident of no importance.

Charles II was a boy of four when his father died, and he was a
very delicate boy at that. He was the son of Philip IV by his niece,
Mariana of Austria, and he was the only one of that monarch's
legitimate children to survive, with the exception of Maria Theresa,
the wife of Louis XIV, and Margaret, who married the Emperor
Leopold L
He possessed the physical peculiarities of his family to an extent
that made him a monstrosity. His chin was so enormous, and stood
out to such an extent, that he could masticate nothing; while his
speech was almost unintelligible owing to the abnormal size of his
tongue. Up to the age of ten he was treated as an infant, and in
order not to endanger his feeble health his education was neglected,
with the result that he was incapable of transacting the ordinary
business of the State.
This weakness of body and mind, combined with the fact of his
extreme youth when he came to the throne, condemned Charles
264
 CHARLES THE BEWITCHED
from the beginning to constant tutelage. Philip IV had nominated
hiswidow as Regent, and he had appointed a council to assist her, but
from the outset there was jealousy and intrigue. That Charles would
be the last of his branch of the House of Habsburg was generally
believed both in Spain and abroad, and the shadow or the succession
began to darken the politics of Europe. Such being the case, it was
not long before French and Austrian parties were formed at Madrid,
Although the Regent deckred that the era of favourites was at an
end, but a short time passed before her confessor, the Jesuit, Father
Nithard, became all-powerful, and was appointed both Inquisitor-
General and a member of the Council of Regency. Father Nithard
was a Tyrolese of good family; he was a man of ability; and as a
foreigner he was disinterested, but it was this very fact of being a
foreigner that made him unpopular. Furthermore, he attempted to
curb the extravagant display in the capital, which roused its pleasure-
loving inhabitants against him, and by making proposals for a
reform of taxation he alienated the innumerable and powerful indivi-
duals who had a vested interest in the existing system.
From the beginning the Queen and Father Nithard were faced
with the opposition of Don John of Austria, the son of Philip IV
and an actress named Maria Calder6n. For the time being Don
John was under a cloud owing to the failure of his attempts to
reconquer Portugal, but it was clear that he would avail himself of
the first opportunity of attacking the Regent and her minister.

The death of Philip IV, and the unconcealed partiality of his

widow for her relatives of the Austrian branch of the Habsburg
dynasty, was an occasion for the renewal of the war with France. The
dowry of the French Queen had not been, paid as stipulated in the
Treaty of the Pyrenees, and Louis therefore set up a claim, based
upon a custom in Brabant called devolution, on her behalf to the
Netherlands. He also cited in his favour the precedent of the
Spanish
elder daughter of Philip II, the wife of the Archduke Albert, who had
succeedea to Flanders upon her father's death.
The claim was rejected by the Regent, and in May, 1667, the
French invaded the Low Countries, where the Spaniards were
unable to offer any effective opposition to the advance. Charleroi,
Courtrai, Oudenarde, Tournai, Lille, Alost, and a number of
smaller towns fell into the hands of France, while in the East the
Franche Comtd was likewise wrested from Spain.
At this point, however, the Regent was saved by the intervention
of England, Holland, and Sweden, who had no desire to see Louis
XIV become too strong. Under pressure from these Powers, there-
fore, peace was made at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668. France restored the
Franche Comt, though with its fortresses dismantled, to Spain,
but retained Charleroi, Binche, Ath, Douai, Scarpe, Tournai,
Oudenarde, Lille, Armentiferes, Courtrai, Bergues and Fumes.
265
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

The termination of hostilities wasthe signal for an attempt on the

part of Don John of Austria to obtain control of the government.
By order of the Regent one of his friends was arrested, and sub-
sequently murdered in prison, without any charge having been pre-
ferred against him. This gave Don John his opportunity, and after a
fruitless effort on the part of Nithard to arrest him, he advanced on
Madrid at the head of a considerable force, and amid the undisguised
sympathy of a large part of the population. The Regent was obliged
to yield, and the Jesuit withdrew to Rome, where he spent the
remainder of his days.
Protracted negotiations then took place between the Queen and
Don John, during the course of which several reforms were promised
by the Regent, and at last a reconciliation was effected: Don John
was made Viceroy of Arag6n, and after making his submission to the
Regent he departed to Saragossa. For the moment there was no
minister who was pre-eminent, but the tradition of a royal favourite
at the head of affairs had become so firmly rooted that it was clear no
long time would elapse before another made his appearance.
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had hardly been signed before
French diplomacy set to work to undo it. The alliance of the three
Powers that had forced its signature was broken by the secret Treaty
of Dover between England and France in 1670, while a subsidy to the
Swedes brought them once more, as in the days of Gustavus
Adolphus, within' the French orbit.
At the same time Louis XIV endeavoured to obtain possession of
the Spanish Low Countries by direct negotiation with Madrid. First
of all ne made an offer to buy them for cash, and when this suggestion
was rejected he proposed to exchange them for Roussillon, Cer-
dagne, and part of French Navarre. The Regent refused to entertain
this proposal either, and Spain concluded, in 1671, the treaty with
the Dutch, by which the two countries promised to come to one
another's aid if attacked by France.
Unfortunately for Spain, the result of this was to precipitate war.
Charles II of England, who wished to destroy the maritime *power
_ r i_i_ _ TT_;^___a T-I.TL _ ____
: f__ __ ________ ;_i _______
. ______ r_ i i

war

Spain was unprepared, and all she could do during the first year
of hostilities was to send 4000 men to the Low Countries, and
reinforce the garrisons in Catalonia. At sea the Dutch managed to
hold their own, chiefly owing to the lack of co-operation between
the French and the English, but on land they were clearly powerless
to make head against the magnificent armies of Louis XIV. The
danger of the total subjugation of the United Provinces by France
was obviously so great that in 1673 the Treaty of The Hague ranged
Spain, the Emperor, and the Duke of Lorraine on the side of the
Dutch.
266
 CHARLES THE BEWITCHED
The reply of Louis was a declaration of war against Spain and the
Emperor, and the concentration of his efforts upon the conquest
of the Franche Comt. The 15,000 Spanish troops there were quite
unable to resist French forces of more than thrice this number, and
before the summer of 1674 was far advanced the province was
once more, and this time finally, in the possession of France. At last
Louis had put an end to the encirclement that had lasted since the
days of Charles V, and it was no longer possible for the Spanish
armies in the Low Countries to be directly reinforced from the
Milanese.
The succeeding years were equally disastrous for Spain. An
offensive in Roussillon, which promised to be successful, had to be
abandoned owing to the outbreak of an insurrection in Sicily, aided
by the French, and this absorbed all the energies of Spain in the
Mediterranean, more particularly after the defeat of the combined
Spanish and Dutch fleets by the French off Palermo in 1676.
Negotiations for peace began in the following year, but the Spanish
terms were too high, and it was not until a further series of reverses
had placed Ghent and Ypres in the Low Countries, and Puigcerda in
Catalonia, in French hands, that Spain gave way. Peace was signed
at Nimwegen in 1678, and by it the Franche Comte was added to
France. On the other hand, Spain actually recovered Charleroi and
some of the smaller towns she had surrendered by the Treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle.
In view of her defenceless condition, Spain came out of the
struggle better than might have been anticipated, but this was largely
due to the conditions in which warfare was carried on at this time.
It was extremely difficult to crush an enemy owing to the fact that
it was only on the rarest occasions that a general had enough troops
to follow up a victory, and so wars went on for years. In this way,
Spain was enabled to hold out decade after decade, risking only a
very small number of men, and reducing her territorial losses to the
minimum.

The progress of the war had not put an end to the intrigues at
Madrid, and before long a successor to Nithard had appeared in the
person of Fernando de Valenzuela. It was the story of Lerma and
Olivares over again, though on this occasion the enemies of the
favourite were in a stronger position in that they had Don John of
Austria to help them.
Charles II came of age in 1675, and a decree appointing Don John
as chief minister was all ready for his signature on the morning that
he attained his majority. Don John's partisans had persuaded the
king to sign it, but under the influence of his mother he changed his
mind, with the result that Valenzuela became more powerful than
ever. Two years later an attempt on similar lines was made again,
and this time it was successful. The Queen was ordered to leave
267
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
Madrid, Valenzuela was sent to the Philippines, and Don John
became dictator of Spain.
Once in power he proved no more competent than the fallen
minister, but before his opponents had gathered sufficient strength
to overturn him, Don John died, in 1679. The immediate con-
sequence of this was a reconciliation between the King and his
mother, and the return of the latter to the capital, where she -resumed
her old sway over the feeble monarch.
The question of the succession was now beginning to loom ever
larger in the eyes, not only of Spain,
but of all Europe, and Don
John had, shortly before his death, taken the necessary steps to
ensure that the King's marriage should weaken, rather than
strengthen, the party of his mother. The bride selected for Charles
was Princess Marie Louise of Orleans, the child of the brother of
Louis XIV and Henrietta of England, the daughter of Charles I.
The marriage took place in l4ovember, 1679, but it was a failure
from the start. Marie Louise had been brought up in the gay court
of the early days of her uncle's reign, and the rigid etiquette that
surrounded the Spanish throne was antipathetic to her. She made no
effort to reconcile herself to her surroundings, and she did not take
the trouble to acquire the mastery over her husband, which she
could easily have done. Worst of all, the royal couple remained
childless. In short, Marie Louise was a complete failure from every
point of view, and her want of tact played completely into the hands
of her mother-in-law, so that the triumph of the Austrian faction was
complete. Ten years after her marriage Marie Louise died, in 1689,
and the problem of succession was no nearer settlement than it had
been when she first entered Spain.

While this struggle between Austria and France had been taking
place in the palace, the administration of the country had, since the
death of Don John, been carried on, first of all by the Duke of
Medina-Celi, and then by the Count of Oropesa. Both did what they
could in the matter of reforming the most obvious abuses, and the
latter, realising the danger to Europe of the Turkish siege of Vienna,
sent an army of 12,000 men to the aid of the Emperor; but the designs
of Louis XIV were their preoccupation.
War with France broke out again in 1681, and lasted till 1697,
save for the Truce of Ratisbon (1684-1686). The diplomacy of
Oropesa was successful in bringing to the aid of Spain, by the
formation of the League of Augsburg, Sweden, Austria, the Pope,
and eventually, England and the Dutch. The war was fought on
many fronts, and Spain had to defend herself in Flanders, Catalonia,
and the Balearic Islands. At first she was successful, but by the time
that the Treaty of Ryswick was signed in 1697 the French had
conquered most of Catalonia, including Barcelona. In Flanders,
though it was Spanish territory, the contest was mainly one between
268
 CHARLES THE BEWITCHED
the English, Dutch, and the allies on the one side, and the French on
the other, for Spain was unable to make any serious effort in that
theatre.
What finally brought the war to an end was not the victory of one
side or the other, or even the exhaustion of both, but rather the fact
that the King of Spain could obviously not live much longer. He
had been married again, this time to Princess Mary Anne of Neuburg,
a sister of the Empress, but there was no heir, nor the likelihood
of any, and it was clear that Charles II would be the last male of his
line.
In these circumstances the Powers preferred to divide his heritage,
and so the Treaty of Ryswick was concluded.
if possible, peacefully,

By thisthe French restored Catalonia, Luxembourg, Mons, Ath, and

Courtrai to Spain, but it was also agreed that the Dutch should
garrison the chief frontier fortresses in the Spanish Low Countries,
since their nominal master had proved so incapable of defending
them against French attack.

The claimants to the Spanish throne were three in number, viz.,

the Dauphin, the Electress of Bavaria, and the Emperor Leopold I.
The Dauphin was the nearest heir to Charles II by blood, for he was
the son of the eldest daughter of Philip IV, but his mother had re-
nounced all claim to the Spanish crown when she married Louis
XTV. The Electress of Bavaria, the daughter of Charles's younger
sister, and of the Emperor Leopold I, was next in succession, but her
mother had likewise renounced her rights when she married the
Emperor. Lastly, there was Leopold himself, for his mother, the
aunt of Charles II, had made, unlike her nieces, no renunciation. If,
therefore, the renunciations held good, the Emperor's claim was
the best, but if not, then the Dauphin was the lawful heir.
It was, however, clear from the beginning, that in the regulation
of the succession to the Spanish throne, legal interpretations would
have to give pkce to practical considerations. The Spanish monarchy
was still by far the greatest of all Christian realms. In Europe it
included Spain, the Milanese, Naples and Sicily, Sardinia, and the
Spanish Low Countries, and in the New World all South America
(except Brazil and Guiana), Central America, Mexico, Cuba, and
other West Indian islands, while in the East Indies the Philippines
also belonged to Spain. If the Emperor succeeded to this inheritance
the empire of Charles V would be revived, whereas if France obtained
these vast dominions the rest of Europe would feel its very inde-
pendence threatened.
Accordingly, Louis XIV entered into direct negotiations with
William HI of England, and in 1698 the First Partition Treaty was
signed. This stipulated that the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, the
weakest of the three claimants, should have Spain, the Indies, and the
Low Countries; Naples, Sicily, the Tuscan ports, and Guipiizcoa
269
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

were to fall to the Dauphin; and the Milanese was to go to Leopold's

son by his second wife, the Archduke Charles. In February, 1699,
however, the Electoral Prince died, and the negotiations had to be
begun afresh.
In the following year the Second Partition Treaty was made
between England, France, and the Dutch, and by this the Archduke
Charles was given Spain, the Low Countries, and the Indies, while
the Dauphin was to have the Two Sicilies, the Milanese, the Tuscan
ports, and Guiptizcoa. The Emperor protested against this arrange-
ment when the news of it leaked out, while the Spanish ambassador
in England used such strong language that he was requested to leave
the country.
Meanwhile, in Madrid all was confusion. The Queen Mother had
died in 1696, and Oropesa had been dismissed, recalled, and dis-
missed again. The Queen inclined to the party which favoured
Austria, but the partisans of France, headed by Cardinal Porto-
carrero, steadily gained ground. All Spaniards were opposed to a
partition of the empire, and it was obvious that, if any one could
prevent its dismemberment, it was Louis XTV.
So far as Charles n could appreciate any argument, this carried
great weight with him, although his natural inclinations were in
favour of his relatives at Vienna. Finally, he signed a will leaving
the whole of his dominions to Philip, Duke of Anjou, the younger
son of the Dauphin, and appointed a council to carry on the govern-
ment until the new King arrived in Spain. If Philip refused to accept
the inheritance, the right to it was to pass wholly to the Archduke
Charles.
On November ist, 1700, Charles died at the age of thirty-nine.
Louis XIV, anxious above all things to prevent that fresh encircle-
ment of France which the accession of an Austrian to the Spanish
throne would imply, accepted the will, and the Duke of Anjou was
presented to the assembled courtiers at Versailles as Philip V of
Spain.

270
 CHAPTER XXXIII

The Spanish Domination in Italy and America

Spanish dominions in Italy consisted of the Duchy of Milan,

THE the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the "PresidL" The last-
named were five coast places which Cosimo I of Tuscany
had been obliged to leave in Spanish hands as pledges for his loyalty,
and they provided Spain with a ready means of access to the Italian
peninsula should Genoa ever be closed to her. The "Presidi," there-
fore, possessed great strategic, but no other, importance.
The supreme authority was the Council of Italy, a mixed body of
Spaniards and Italians, which sat at Madrid, but in actual fact the
Viceroys in Naples and in Milan had things very much their own
way. It is usually stated that the administration of the Spanish
dominions in Italy is one of the scandals of history, and it certainly
left a good deal to be desired. At the same time, the same financial
and economic problems, owing to the steady rise in prices, were
present there as in Spain itself, and their consequences were equally
serious.
It is true that sinecures were found in Italy for the rektives of a
Lerma and an Olivares, but Spain, at any rate in the seventeenth
century, made no profit out of her Italian possessions. Far from
contributing to the Spanish exchequer, the Milanese was run at a
loss, and the deficit there usually had to be made up out of the surplus,
if any, in Naples. What the Kings of Spain did get out of Italy was

generals, sucn as Parma and Spinola, and soldiers, and at the death
of Philip HI, for example, no less than thirteen of the tercios into
which the Spanish army was then divided were composed of Italians.
The Milanese was regarded primarily as a place farmes. Its
strategicalimportance was very great indeed, for it not only linked
Spain with Austria, and, through the Franche Comte, with die Low
Countries, but it served as a barrier against a French advance into
Central or Southern Italy. In consequence, the Lombard towns
were all strongly fortified, as were also the frontiers of the Duchy.
There was a permanent garrison of about 5000 of the famous Spanish
infantry, besides Italian troops, which included a native militia., for
which each Lombard commune had to provide and equip its quota
of recruits. The military power was always predominant over the
civil, and although the Senate of Milan continued to exist, it was
invariably beaten in any trial of strength against the Spanish Vice-
roys. There was, however, a considerable measure of municipal self-
government, and in the rural districts there was a great deal of local
patriotism in the communes.
The chief event, unfortunately, in the history of Lombardy in the
seventeenth century was the plague in 1630, which depopulated
several districts. The inability, too, of the King of Spain to pay his
271
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

troops regularly resulted in the latter pillaging the inhabitants upon

whom they;
were billeted, though eventually barracks were built,
and this relieved the situation somewhat. Nevertheless, in spite of a
good deal of grumbling, the Lombards made no determined effort
to overthrow the rule of Spain, for they realised that independence
was out of the question, and that they would merely be exchanging
government from Madrid for government from Paris.
In Naples the position was somewhat different. The Viceroy, at
least in theory, was supposed to consult the Collateral Council,
and the old Neapolitan Parliament, with its three estates, was still
summoned to vote supplies. In the city, the municipal administra-
tion was conducted by district councils, called Piaqge, five for the
nobles and one for the people, each of which chose an ehtto to
transact business with the Viceroy. Actually, the country was so
divided against itself that this machinery never functioned properly.
The memories of the old feuds between Ghibelline and Guelf,
and between Aragon and Anjou, prevented any common action on
the part of the aristocracy, while the people were too fickle to
remain united long enough to achieve any one object. A good deal
of money was, it must be admitted, spent by the Viceroys upon
public works, and the military element was not supreme in Naples
as it was in Milan. The real trouble, as elsewhere, was finance
(taxation was trebled between 1558 and 1620), and the cumbrous
and wasteful Spanish fiscal system.
Sicily was in a happier position, in spite of the fact that it suffered
from many of the same disadvantages to which Naples was subject.
It had belonged to Aragon for centuries before Spain herself had
become united, and it retained its medieval constitution, and con-
sequent independence of political life, which enabled it to resist
the bureaucratic tendencies of Spanish rule. Moreover, the memory
of the Sicilian Vespers was sufficiently fresh to make the Spaniards
cautious, so Parliament continued to make laws and vote taxes, and
the nobles to retain their feudal authority.
The towns were specially active and independent, and the export
of corn made them wealthy. The rivalry between them, particularly
between Palermo and Messina, was bitter, and for their own ends
this was encouraged by the Spaniards, who, however, eventually
allowed it to go so far that it ultimately led to the most dangerous
Italian revolt which they had to face in the seventeenth century. For
the rest, Sicily was specially useful to Spain as an outpost against the
Turks.
The reign of Philip HI witnessed a struggle between Spain and the
Duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel I, who claimed Montferrat on the
death of Francis I of Mantua in 1613. At first the Governor of Milan
was prepared to assist Charles Emmanuel, but orders arrived from
Lenna that the Savoyard claim was to be opposed, and this so
annoyed the Duke that hostilities broke out in 1614. Charles
272
 THE SPANISH DOMINATION IN ITALY AND AMERICA
Emmanuel hoped to annex the Milanese, and he called upon the
Italian States to aidhim in driving the foreigner from the country,
but his appeal fell upon deaf ears. The fighting went on with alter-
nating success, partly in Piedmont and partly in the Milanese, until
it was terminated by the Treaty of Pavia in 1617.
The unexpected strength displayed by Charles Emmanuel un-
doubtedly shook, for a moment, the hold of Spain over Italy, but the
Italian States were too divided to make the concerted effort which
alone could have rendered success possible, and the peninsula had to
wait more than two centuries for its unification.

About this time took place the plot which is known in Venetian
history as the "Bedmar Conspiracy," and which well illustrates the
practical independence enjoyed by the representatives of the King of
Spain in Italy. To this day it is by no means clear exactly what was
intended, but it is certain that the Duke of Osuna and Don Pedro of
Toledo, respectively Viceroys of Naples and Milan, in conjunction
with the Marquis of Bedmar, the Spanish ambassador in Venice,
were meditating some desperate act against the Republic of St. Mark.
The Council of Ten was informed of what was afoot, and it
announced that the real object of Osuna was to make himself King of
Naples, Philip III and Lerma may not have believed this charge,
but it seems to have aroused their suspicions, for Osuna was shortly
afterwards recalled to Spain. In any event, the Thirty Years* War
was just beginning, and Lerma had no desire to see protracted hos-
tilities with Venice added to his other difficulties. The departure of
Osuna was welcomed in all quarters, and not least by the Neapolitans,
who preferred, as the ultimate resident authority, a Viceroy who
could be removed to a monarch who would of necessity be
permanent.
Yet it was in Naples that Spain encountered most opposition,
and it was there that took pkce one of the most famous insurrections
in history, namely that led by Masaniello. This revolt had, however,
been preceded by several earlier disturbances.
Philip HE was hardly seated upon his father's throne when, in 1600,
the peasants of Calabria rose at the bidding of a mystic called
CamjDanella, but the movement was suppressed. In 1621 there w^re
riots in Naples itself owing to the rise in the cost of living, but these,
too, were put down. By 1646 the cost of Spanish participation in the
Thirty Years* War made it necessary to impose fresh taxation upon
Naples, and die Viceroy put a gabelle upon fruit, the staple article of
Neapolitan diet.
This provoked an explosion, and Masaniello, a fishmonger,
became the symbol, rather than the leader, of the agitation which
followed. The Viceroy had but few troops at his disposal, and being
himself of a timid nature, he conceded all the demands of the
insurgents. The consequence of this was mob-law both in town and
K 273
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

country, and in the anarchy Masaniello, whose arrogance had

become insufferable, was murdered. At Don John of
this point,
Austria arrived with a fleet, but his bombardment of Naples, far from
inducing the insurgents to surrender, drove them to abandon the
last pretence of loyalty to the Spanish throne, and to proclaim a
republic.
With Conde winning victories in the Low Countries, and with
Portugal and Catalonia in revolt, Spain was in no position to coerce
Naples, and she must have lost that kingdom had the Neapolitans
not been so fickle, or had they received adequate support from
France. Henry, Duke of Guise, did come to Naples, where he passed
as the heir of the Angevins, and at first he met with an enthusiastic
reception. He could, however, get no serious assistance from
Mazarin, who distrusted him, and he soon quarrelled with the
Neapolitans, who wanted him to be a kind of Stadtholder on the
Dutch pattern, while he was determined to be King.
In these circumstances all who had anything to lose saw that the
only hope of restoring order lay in the re-establishment of Spanish
rule, and the revolt soon afterwards collapsed. The Spaniards re-
turned without conditions, and when the new Viceroy reduced the
gabelles, the Neapolitans allowed him to hang the leading rebels
without protest. The Duke of Guise made another attempt in 1654,
but received no support. For the remainder of the reign or Philip IV,
save for a severe outbreak of plague in 1656, and during the whole of
that of his son, the history of Naples was uneventful: indeed, there
was a definite revival of prosperity owing to the energy of the Vice-
roys at this time in reforming taxation and suppressing brigandage.
In Sicily the most serious rising against Spanish rule took place in
1 674, and it was to no small extent due to the
rivalry between Palermo
and Messina. The latter had been allowed a monopoly of silk, and
when this was cancelled there were riots. The Viceroy declared that
these constituted a revolt, which he was determined to crush, but
the people of Messina fortified their town, and invoked the aid of
France. In 1675 Louis XIV sent troops to Sicily, but although they
might have conquered the whole island, they in fact did very little.
France regarded the expedition merely as a method of distracting
Spanish attention from the other theatres of war, and as soon as the
Messinese discovered this they refused to obey the French generals.
The struggle dragged on until 1678, when the French evacuated
Sicily. The victorious Spaniards were unexpectedly moderate in
their hour of victory, though all the privileges of Messina were taken
away. So long as Charles II lived the Sicilians gave no further
trouble to Spain, and when, early in the eighteenth century, they
were separated from the Spanish monarchy they were dissatisfied.

Whether there was war or peace in Europe, hostilities never ceased

in theNew World and in the East Indies.
 THE SPANISH DOMINATION IN ITALY AND AMERICA
The reign of Philip III witnessed the Dutch expansion in the East,
and with Spain, who owned the Philip-
this naturally led to conflicts

pines. The object of the Dutch was to cut the communications

between Manila and Mexico, and to embroil the Spaniards with the
Javanese, in the hope of eventually securing the Philippines for
themselves. However, the power of the United Provinces began to
decline before this purpose could be accomplished, but to Spain
this brought no real relief, for the threat from the Dutch was
succeeded by the far greater danger from the Buccaneers in the West
Indies.
Their origin may be dated from 1625, when a band of English and
French adventurers founded a settlement on St. Christopher, from
which they made raids into San Domingo. In 1630 they moved to
Tortuga del Mar, which lay in the main route of trading vessels. Here
they were joined by kindred spirits from all parts of Europe, and for
many years were a terror to Spanish ships and to the Spanish settle-
ments on the mainland. The Buccaneers were greatly aided by the
British capture of Jamaica in the days of the Commonwealth, for
they obtained considerable, if unofficial, assistance from that island,
and it was in the reign of Charles II that they did the greatest
damage.
Hitherto the Buccaneers had generally operated separately, but
about this time they found in Henry Morgan a leader wno possessed
the necessary ability to induce them to act together. One of his
earlier exploits was the sack of Puerto Bello, but in 1671 he accom-

plished
the feat which has made him famous. He crossed to the main-
land with a fleet of thirty-nine vessels, and after marching across
the isthmus, he fought a pitched battle, and then sacked Panama in
circumstances of the greatest barbarity. Morgan's later career was
equally notable, for he was knighted by Charles II of England, and
appointed deputy-governor of Jamaica. The success of Morgan
caused him to have many imitators, and for some years no town in
America was safe from attack. In 1680 John Coxon captured Santa
Maria, and took several vessels in the Bay of Panama, while three
years later Van Horn sacked Vera Cruz, and Davis and Swann
harried the Pacific coast at will.
This, however, was the high- water mark of the Buccaneers* power,
for the breach between England and France in Europe soon pre-
vented any co-operation between their respective nationals even in
the pursuit of piracy. The other Powers, too, gradually realised that
the Buccaneers were a public menace, and assisted to curtail their
activities. Pirates, of course, there were on the Spanish Main until
well into the nineteenth century, but they never again became as
formidable as they had been in the days of Charles the Bewitched.

In spite of wars in Europe, and of the raids of the Buccaneers, the

work of exploration and colonisation in America was steadily pur-
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

sued. In the reign of Philip III, Sanchez Vizcaino explored the coast
of California in the hope of finding a suitable harbour for ships
coming from the Philippines, and one result of his expedition was
the foundation of the city of Monterey. Fernandez de Quiros about
the same time discovered the New Hebrides, and the coast of New
Guinea and Australia, while in 1605-1609 the Northern part of
Florida was opened up and in 1617-1618 Cape Horn was explored.
The remainder of the century witnessed the progress of these
explorations. The Spaniards gradually worked their way North in
California, and up the great rivers of South America, adding vast
tracts of territory to the known world. Other nations, too, en-
deavoured to obtain a permanent footing in this part of America,
but without success, save in Guiana, and at the mouth of the
Mississippi, where the French established the colony of Louisiana*
It was during the seventeenth century that the administration of

Spanish America attained the form which, with some modifications,

was to characterise it until it was finally overthrown in the reign of
Ferdinand VII. For this reason it is convenient to give an account
of it here, indicating at the same time the changes which were made
when the House of Bourbon succeeded that of Habsburg on the
Spanish throne.
The basic principle of the administration was that it should
approximate as closely as possible to that in Spain itself, and this
hiad been clearly laid down by Philip II, The kingdoms of Castile
and Aragon on the one hand, and the Indies on the other, belonged
to the same monarch, and their laws and
government were to be auke
in so far as their natural differences would permit.
These instructions were obeyed, but, unfortunately, by the time
that America had been settled on any considerable scale the machin-
ery of government in the Peninsula itself was breaking down under
the strain of supplying the needs of a world-empire, and the natural
consequence was state of confusion that was transplanted to
America, where, since everything was on an infinitely bigger scale
than in Europe, the results were even more disastrous,
Spain was not, as has been shown, a unitary State after the
fashion of England and France it was rather a collection of king-
:

doms and duchies whose only link was the fact that they belonged
to the same monarch. These different units had their own laws and
customs, and the memory of past strife was still fresh. Furthermore,
the system of administration which had, on the whole, worked well
enough in the Middle Ages was collapsing, and it was not until the
accession of the House of Bourbon to the throne in the person of
Philip ^V that administrative reforms were undertaken; even then the
more important ones had to wait for another half-century, and the
succession of Charles III.
The fact is that at the time when she was exercising the greatest
influence over her American possessions, Spain herself was beginning
276
 THE SPANISH DOMINATION IN ITALY AND AMERICA
to decline, and it was the seeds of her own decay that were in too
many instances transplanted across the Atlantic. At the same time,
there is no justification for the charge that the Spanish government
paid no attention to the Americas. The }&copilacion de las leyes de las
Lndias in nine books, published in 1680, is in itself a refutation of this
accusation, and the earlier ordinances display an equal care for the
New
affairs of the World. In fact, the intentions of the home govern-
ment were excellent, but the machinery for carrying them out was
defective, and was quite unable to overcome the opposition of local
vested interests. It is an arguable proposition that Spain lost
America because she interfered too much, and in the wrong way, but
on the evidence it is quite impossible to maintain that her chief sin
was indifference.
During the rule of the House of Austria the Spanish possessions
on the mainland were practically divided between the Viceroyalties
of New Spain (Mexico) and Peru, but with the advent of the
eighteenth century several important changes took place.
First of all, two new Viceroyalties were created, New Granada
and Buenos Aires. The former, which was finally established in 1 73 9,
consisted of part of Tierra Firme and the kingdoms of Santa F6 de
Bogotd and Quito, while the latter, which came into existence in
1776, was composed of the provinces del Plata, Paraguay, Tucuman,
and four Peruvian districts. In 1731 Venezuela was separated from
San Domingo, and created a Captaincy-General by the name of
Caracas. Chile and Puerto Rico were granted the same status, which
was also that of Louisiana with Florida. There were thus at one time
four Viceroyalties (New Spain, Peru, New Granada, and Buenos
Aires), and eight Captaincies-General (Guatemala, San Domingo,
Cuba, Chile, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Louisiana, and the Philippines).
This creation of smaller governmental units ultimately provided a
great impetus towards independence, for it became possible for those
who lived in them to think and act together in a way that was quite
out of the question in the enormous Viceroyalties of earlier
times*
The Viceroy was at the head of the whole administration, and he
was usually a nobleman whose possessions in the Peninsula were such
as to constitute a guarantee that he would not attempt to establish an
independent kingdom in the Americas. There were few men of out-
standing ability among the Viceroys sent out by the Habsburgs,
but with the accession of the Bourbons there was a decided change
for the better, and the viceregal office was held by administrators of
the standing of Vertiz, Ceballos, Amat, Manso, Buccarelli, Galvez,
Azanza, O'Higgins, and the Marquis of Croix.
Beside, rather than beneath, the Viceroy was the audiencia 9 which
was composed of lawyers, and whose members were known as
oidores. Tnis body had two separate functions, for it was at once the

Viceroy's privy council and a court of law, from which the appeal
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

lay to the Supreme Council of the

Indies at Seville: when it met in
the former capacity the Viceroy presided, and when in the latter
its own president took the chair.
The audiencia had certain rights with regard to the Viceroy,
which severely circumscribed his authority. When his term of
office expired, it could inspect and pass his accounts, and at any time
it could make a report upon his conduct to the authorities in Spain,
while if he died it carried on the administration until the arrival of
his successor. Furthermore, a decree of Charles I authorised the
return to the Peninsula of any Spaniard who wished to inform the
King personally of abuses in the colonial administration, though, as
may be supposed, those who desired to take advantage of this per-
mission were likely to find every possible obstacle placed in their
path by the Viceroy and the audiencia.
In effect, then, the administration of the Americas was based upon
a system of checks and balances calculated, not so much to produce
government in the colonies, as to prevent any tendency to
reak away from Spain. On the other hand, it must be admitted that
food
the Spanish government was by no means unmindful of the interests
of the native population, though the measures which it enacted on
their behalf were liable to be honoured rather in the breach than in
the observance on the other side of the Atlantic.
Beneath the Viceroys, the Captains-General (for all practical pur-
poses the powers of the latter were the same as those of the former),
and the audiencia was an elaborate municipal system, for the Spaniard,
like the Roman, colonised from and through the towns. The
cabildos, or town councils, soon became self-electing, and at the end
of their year of office the outgoing regidores, or councillors, nominated
their successors. The alcalde, or corregidor, i.e., the mayor, could not
hold office again for two years, while twelve months had to elapse
before the re-election ot * regidor. In actual fact, long before the end
of the seventeenth century these offices were bought and sold, and
the same corruption characterised the municipalities of the Americas
as marked those of every country at this period. 1
The cabildos enjoyed considerable judicial and administrative
power. The alcalde presided over a court of first instance for both
civil and criminal cases, and the cabildo could act as a court of appeal
in civil cases where the amount in dispute did not exceed a cercain
sum, but the jurisdiction of both alcalde and cabildo was liable to be
severely circumscribed by that of the judges appointed by the
audiencia. In administrative matters the municipalities were, theoretic-
ally, autonomous, but, in fact, they generally took into account the
wishes of the higher authorities. When any unusually important
decision affecting the municipality had to be taken a kind of town's
1
In this connection it is not without interest to note that the Corporation of Oxford,
which was heavily in debt, offered to secure the election of
1766 f the sitting membeis
in return for a loan of 4000 free of interest.

278
 THE SPANISH DOMINATION IN ITALY AND AMERICA
meeting, known as a cabildo ablerto^ was summoned, and it was
attended by the more influential citizens.
At one time it even appeared possible that this municipal system
might afford a basis for self-government in some form, for as early as
i j 30 Charles I had laid down regulations for convening a congress of

representatives from the various cabildos^ and during the course of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were about forty such
meetings. The difficulties of transport and of communication, com-
bined with the jealousy which always existed between the Viceroy,
or Captain-General, and the audiencia on the one hand, and the
cabildoson the other, effectively prevented any development of this
tendency, which may be said to have been checked by that feeling of
suspicion which pervaded every part of Spanish colonial admini-
stration.
The closing decades of the eighteenth century witnessed, in
addition to the fresh grouping of the Americas for administrative
purposes, the introduction of intendentes and subdekgados. Even
before this there had existed visitadores^ whose duty it was to inspect
the public administration, and to call attention to abuses. The power
of the inttndentt* however, was greater, for he possessed a jurisdiction
in matters of police, justice, finance, and war, so that he could inter-
vene in all those departments of government that had formerly been
the preserve of the Viceroys, Captains-General, and audhndas> and
what he was to them the subdelegados were to the corregtdores. The
first legislation on this matter was enacted in 1782, and it attained its
final form in 1803.
In effect, the centralised administrative system of France, which
Philip V had introduced into Spain, was being transplanted by his
son and grandson to the colonies at the very time when the Spanish
Crown, upon which in the last resort everything was to depend to
an even greater extent than in the past, was itself on the eve ofeclipse.
To this may be attributed much of what was to follow.
The preoccupations of the Spanish government in Flanders, Italy,
and the Americas in no way caused it to abandon the age-long cam-
paign against the Turks and the Barbary corsairs, and throughout
the whole of the seventeenth century the fight went on in the
Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as on
the African coast in Tunis and Algeria. Lerma attempted to distract
the forces of the Sultan by an agreement with the Shah of Persia,
and at one time he seriously considered the conquest of Algeria,
but nothing came of the project in the end. Raids were made on the
Moroccan coast, where Larache was captured, and also on Tunis,
Egypt, and Albania, while Turkish attacks on Messina and Malta
were repelled.
All this, however, did little to curb the activity of the Barbary
corsairs, who were continually raiding the Spanish coast, and pushed
279
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

their forays as far as Galiciaand Asturias. The reign of Philip IV

was too troubled for Spain to spare any great enort against the
Moslems, though the latter were growing increasingly more bold,
and the plate-fleets from America were often attacked. In spite of
the weakness of Spain under Charles II the struggle was continued,
and in 1673 the Island of Alhucemas was captured by the Spaniards.
This success was offset by the fact that in 1689 Larache fell into the
hands of the Moors, though an attack on Ceuta four years later was
driven off.
The century closed with the issue still undecided, and with the
threat from Africa still formidable: indeed, in 1688 the French
ambassador in Madrid wrote to Louis XIV that if the Moors again
invaded the Peninsula they would meet with little resistance. These
circumstances explain, if they do not justify, the expulsion of the
Moriscos by Philip III.

280
 CHAPTER XXXIV

The Early Bourbons (1700-1759)

Louis XIV presented the new King of Spain to his
court, he said to him, among other recommendations, "Be a
WHEN good Spaniard, but remember that you are French by birth,
so that you may maintain union between the two nations."
Philip V certainly became a good Spaniard, but he was inclined to
be a little too mindful of his French birth. He remembered it, that
is to say, in the sense that, despite all written renunciations of the
French throne, he long cherished the hope of becoming King of
France. He was the most direct heir after Louis XV, and so long as
that monarch had no children Philip nourished this ambition, and
did not hesitate to further it by intrigue. The consequence of this
was that for many years he regarded his residence in Madrid as
temporary, and this, in its turn, made the pursuit of a consistent
policy
on the part of Spain very difficult, and placed serious obstacles
in the path of reform. Before, however, Philip could cast eyes on the
throne of France he had to settle himself firmly on that of Spain,
and this was only accompEshed after a long European war, usually
known as the War of the Spanish Succession.
The new King arrived in Spain in January, 1701, and his first act
was to remove the members of the old Austrian party from all
positions of responsibility. The widow of Charles II was required
to leave the capital, and the
nephew of Cardinal Portocarrero was
appointed Viceroy of Catalonia in the place of the Prince of Hesse-
Darmstadt. To strengthen still further the French connection the
Duke of Harcourt, the French ambassador, was made a member of
the Council, while the national finances were entrusted to another
Frenchman, Orry. Above all, there was the Princesse des Ursins,
whom Louis XIV had sent for the express purpose of guiding the
steps of his grandson and his wife, Maria Luisa of Savoy.
The King himself was only seventeen when he ascended the
Spanish throne, and in his youth his vigour and activity gained him
the affection of his subjects ; in later life he became the victim of acute
melancholia, and thus belied, to some extent, the promise of his
earlier years.

At first it even appeared as if the

acceptance
of the will of Charles
would not be seriously opposed by the other Powers, with the
exception of the Emperor. William III of England was, as usual,
ready to fight, but his ministers, and still more his subjects, were not;
and so, in April, 1701, Great Britain recognised Philip V, and the
Dutch and the smaller states were compelled to do likewise.
Unfortunately for the new King of Spain his grandfather soon
afterwards committed a technical violation of the Treaty of Ryswick
281
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

by recognising James III as King of England on his father's death,

and this provided William with an excuse for plunging his country
into war with France once more. The Whig oligarchy which con-
trolled England became alarmed for its possessions, and the repre-
sentations of the Emperor met with a cordial reception in London.
The reply made to the French King was the formation, at The
Hague in September, 1701, of the Grand Alliance between the
Emperor, England, and the United Provinces, who accordingly
declared war on France and Spain, an action in which they were soon
joined by Savoy and Portugal, in spite of the fact that the Duke of
Savoy was Philip's father-in-law. At the same time the Emperor
ceded his rights to the Spanish throne to his younger son, the Arch-
duke Charles, who was thereupon acknowledged as King of Spain
by the members of the Grand Alliance.
The first hostilities took pkce in Italy, where the Emperor
fomented a rising in Naples, and sent an army under Prince Eugene
into the Milanese. Philip, leaving the Queen as Regent, went to the
rescue of his threatened Italian possessions, and success attended his
efforts. Prince Eugene was defeated at Santa Victoria and Luzzara
by the French and Spaniards under the Duke of Vendome and the
Count of Aguilar, while an outward appearance of calm was re-
established in Naples. Further progress was rendered impossible by
the course of events in Spain itself, which necessitated the King's
return to that country.
In August, 1702, an Anglo-Dutch fleet, under the command of Sir
George Rooke, appeared off Cadiz, and demanded the submission of
the town to the Archduke Charles. The plan, which owed its
inception largely to the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, was to use Cddiz
as a lever to provoke a general insurrection in Andalusia. Before
this threat the Queen fell back upon the support of Castile, which
had already perceived that this was no mere dynastic struggle, but
the real issue was the unity or the dismemberment of Spain.
Faced with the certainty of determined opposition, Rooke made
off to Vigo, where he attacked the plate-fleet, which was lying in the
harbour protected by French men-of-war: he captured one or two
galleons, but the majority were sunk by those in charge of them.
Two years later the Archduke himself landed at Lisbon, and it was
this news that brought Philip back from Italy. Once more he was
successful, for the Franco-Spanish troops invaded Portugal, and
compelled the Archduke to abandon his intention of an advance
upon Madrid from that quarter.
The year 1704, however, was not wholly fortunate for Philip, for
although Rooke failed both to organise a rising in Catalonia and to
capture Ceuta, he did succeed in taking Gibraltar, not, it is to be
noted, in the name of the Archduke, but on behalf of his own
country. The subsequent attempt of the Spaniards to recover the
fortress resulted in failure.
282
 THE EARLY BOURBONS
The following year, 1705, was a disastrous one for Philip. In the
spring the Earl of Peterborough succeeded in bringing about a
Catalan rising, which was nominally in favour of the Archduke,
but was actually more a revolt against Castile. In October the
Habsburg entered Barcelona as Charles III of Spain, and before the
end of the year he had been acknowledged by the greater part of
Aragon and Valencia. Philip made an effort to retake Barcelona at
the beginning of 1706, but he was unsuccessful, and the Anglo-Portu-
guese forces in the West, under Lord Galway, took advantage of his
preoccupation to pass from the defensive to the offensive, and to
invade Spain, where they made themselves masters of Ciudad Rod-
rigo and Salamanca.
Meanwhile Louis XIV was in no position to send help to his
grandson. Two years before his German schemes had been check-
mated at Blenheim, and the summer that saw Galway on Spanish soil
also witnessed the defeat of the French at Ramillies by the Duke of
Marlborough, and before Turin by Prince Eugene. The Spanish
aristocracy thereupon inclined to what seemed to be the winning side,
and Philip was forced to leave Madrid for Burgos. The Archduke
entered the capital in July.
What appeared to be the darkest moment of Philip's fortunes was
to prove the commencement of their revival. The North-west of
Spain, the Castiles, Estremadura, and Andalusia declared for Philip,
and against his rival, who came to claim their allegiance at the head
of an army chiefly composed of their old Portuguese enemies, of
foreign Protestants, ana of Catalan separatists. The energy of the
King in the defence of his crown also touched a sympathetic chord in
the hearts of his people, and he became known as elanimoso^ or "the
spirited." The struggle became national, and it was one of the
Gothic-Celt-Iberians against the men of Romance blood.
The first evidence of this development was the frigid reception
with which the Archduke met in Madrid, and which, taken in con-
junction with the threat from Philip's army under the Duke of
Berwick, induced him to abandon the city not long after he had
entered it. The King thereupon returned to his capital, in October,
and was received with the warmest of welcomes by its inhabitants.
The army of the Archduke under Galway withdrew from Madrid
to Valencia, and Berwick took up a position at Almansa, where he
proposed to await the arrival of reinforcements which the Duke of
Orleans was bringing'from Italy before taking the offensive. Galway
determined to attack his adversary before such a junction had been
effected, and he did so in April, 1707. The result was an overwhelm-
ing victory for Berwick, who immediately followed up his success
by the reconquest of Valencia and Aragon, whose privileges were
immediately abolished by Philip as a punishment for their rebellion.
The same year witnessed the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo, but in
1708 Sardinia and Minorca were lost, and the Algerines took Otan.
285
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
The war had now reached a point at which all the combatants
were desirous of its termination, but when negotiations to this end
were commenced it was found that the Powers of the Grand Alliance
were still insistent upon the renunciation by Philip of the Spanish
throne. Peace was clearly impossible on these terms, and both sides
made preparations to fight to a finish.
The Archduke and his English allies determined to strike what it
was hoped would prove the final blow in the Peninsula, and in the
summer of 1710 Philip's forces were beaten at Almenara and Sara-
gossa. Once more the Archduke entered Madrid, but
he was so badly
received there, and in Castile generally, that it was clear his cause was
hopeless. Louis XIV, too, was not inactive, and he sent Vendome
to put an end to the Spanish war. The Archduke was forced to leave
the capital, but even retreat could not save his troops and those of his
allies.

Stanhope and the English were overthrown at Brihuega on

December 9th, and on the following day the Imperialists who were
to their aid met a like fate at Villa Viciosa. The Archduke
marching
managed to reach Barcelona in safety, but his last hope of becoming
King; of Spain had vanished. Nor was this all, for in 1711 his elder
brother, the Emperor Joseph I, died, and the Archduke succeeded
him as Charles VI. This completely changed the whole international
situation, for neither the English nor the Dutch had any desire to see
the re-creation of the empire of Charles V, even in favour of their
ally.
Accordingly, negotiations were opened in London, and sub-
sequently carried on at Utrecht, where the Treaty of that name was
signed in April, 1713. The Emperor refused to be a party to this
settlement, but French victories at Freiburg and Landau convinced
him of his inability to continue the struggle alone, and in March,
1714, he concluded the separate Treaty of Rastadt.
By these treaties Philip was recognised as King of Spain and the
Indies, but he had to waive his rights of succession to the French
throne. To Great Britain he had to cede Gibraltar and Minorca, as
well as certain commercial privileges in the Americas. The Duke of
Savoy obtained Sicily, but the island was to revert to Spain if ever
the Savoyard male line should become extinct. The Emperor
obtained the Spanish Netherlands, with the exception of the frontier
towns, which were to be occupied by the Dutch, and of Gueldres,
which went to Prussia. The Milanese, Naples, and Sardinia were also
ceded to the Emperor.
Neither Charles nor the English did anything for the Catalans,
who, however, continued their resistance. Barcelona was stormed
in September, 1714, and with the capture of Palma, in Majorca, in
the following year Philip was at last master of his own
kingdom. The
privileges of Catalonia then met the same fate as those of Arag6n and
Valencia.
284
 THE EARLY BOURBONS
During the years of the war the predominant influence in the
government had been the Princesse des Ursins, while Orry had done
his best to restore the finances.At the beginning of 1714 the Queen
died, and before the year was out the King had married again, this
time Elizabeth Farnese, the daughter of the Duke of Parma. This
marriage marked the commencement of a new period in the reign
of Philip V, for it brought the French influence to an end, at any rate
in its old form.
Even while Louis XIV was alive his grandson had not in-

frequently refused to take his advice, but as soon as he was dead

relations between Paris and Madrid became very strained. Philip
himself as the heir presumptive to the French throne, in
regarded
spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, and he was on the
worst of terms with the Regent, the Duke of Orleans. The new
Queen influenced her husband to attempt the reconquest of the lost
Spanish possessions in Italy, and as time went on this became the
of her life.
ruling passion
Philip's sons by his first wife, Louis and Ferdinand, would succeed
to the Spanish crown, and as Elizabeth Farnese began to bear children
of her own, she grew more determined that they should eventually
occupy Italian thrones* Accordingly, the Princesse des Ursins was
sent away, and Cardinal Alberoni was brought from Italy to enable
Spain to tear up the Treaty of Utrecht.
Alberoni is one of the greatest names in Spanish history, and he
would have been able to effect more had time been allowed him. He
revived the army and navy, and the abolition of the internal customs'
barriers went a long way towards restoring the economic situation,
but it was in foreign affairs that he displayed the greatest skill. His
object was to isolate the Emperor, and then to over-run his Italian
provinces.
With this end in view James III was invited to Spain, and an
expedition prepared to place him on his throne, while all the enemies
of the French Regent were goaded into activity. By this means it was
hoped to prevent England and France from coining to the assistance
of the Emperor. At &st all went well, and in August, 1717, Sardinia
was occupied without difficulty. Soon afterwards the Duke of Savoy
was driven out of Sicily, but this was the high-water mark of Spanish
success.
The rest of Europe grew alarmed at the obvious revival of the
power of Spain, and there came into existence the Quadruple
Alliance of France, England, tl e Emperor, and Savoy. In August,
1718, the Spanish fleet was defeated by the English off Syracuse, and
Austrian troops were poured intc Sicily.
Nothing daunted, Alberoni conceived the grandiose scheme of
persuading Charles XII of Sweden and Peter the Great of Russia to
ky aside their differences, and invade Scotland for the purpose of
restoring the Stuarts. The death of Charles XII in December nipped
285
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

this project in the bud, and there was nothing for it but a direct
Spanish attack upon Great Britain, while evefy effort was made to
provoke a rising in Brittany against the Duke of Orleans.
James III arrived in Spain in March, 1719, and was received with
all the honours due to a reigning monarch. At Cadiz a fleet of five

warships and twenty-two transports was ready to convey 5000 men,

and arms for' 30,000 more, to England, under the command of the
Duke of Ormonde, and James was to join the expedition at some
northern Spanish port. While this was taking place, a smaller force,
with the Earl Marischal, was to go to Scotland, and rouse the clans.
However, hardly had the expedition put to sea than it was dispersed
by a storm, and all idea of a direct invasion of England had to be
abandoned. The attempt in Scotland, known in British history as the
Nineteen, also failed, and the few Spanish troops which had landed
were compelled to lay down their arms. Meanwhile, the same lack of
success attended the efforts to rouse the Bretons, and French troops
began to occupy strategic points in Guipuzcoa and Catalonia.
Philip and Elizabeth Farnese had to give way,
and peace was made
at The Hague in 1720. By this treaty Spain had to yield both
Sardinia and Sicily, the former to the Duke of Savoy and the latter
to the Emperor, but the son of Philip and Elizabeth, the Infante
Don Carlos, was recognised as heir to the duchies of Parma, Piacenza,
and Tuscany. Cardinal Alberoni was dismissed before the treaty was
signed.
The immediate effects of the treaty were a revival of friendship
with France, for the Queen had come to the conclusion that her
Italian ambitions would be easier of achievement with the aid of that
Power, rather than in the teeth of its opposition. In order to cement
this alliance it was arranged that the Prince of Asturias should marry
the daughter of the French Regent, and that the infant daughter of
Philip and Elizabeth should in due course marry Louis XV. The two
princesses were duly exchanged at the frontier, and the Prince of
Asturias was married to his bride in January, 1722.
Two years later Europe was startled by the news that Philip had
abdicated in favour of his son, Louis, but the event proved of no
ultimate importance, for the new King only lived for seven months
afterwards, and his father then reascended the throne. This brief
reign nevertheless had a definite constitutional importance, for
the Cortes that was summoned to recognise Ferdinand as the new
heir to the crown for the first time contained representatives from all
the Spanish kingdoms.
The second reign of Philip V lasted twenty-two years, and Spanish
policy was as tortuous as it had been in the earlier period, and for the
same reason. The ambition of the King to play a part in French
politics, and the determination of the Queen to seat her sons on
Italian thrones, were the determining motives of the government of
Spain in its relations with other powers.
286
 THE EARLY BOURBONS
There was sitting at this time at Cambrai a European conference
which was endeavouring, amongst other things, without much
success, to settle the outstanding differences between the Emperor
and Spain. The former was demanding that the European Powers
should guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, which declared his
daughter, the Archduchess Maria Theresa, to be his heir, and
should recognise the duchies of Parma, Piacensa, and Tuscany as
Imperial fiefs. This last request was a direct blow at the rights of
Don Carlos, and could not be admitted by Spain for a moment.
However, Elizabeth Farnese determined to see what could be done
by a definite reversal of all Spanish policy since the death of Charles
II, namely direct negotiation with Vienna.
The minister who was entrusted with this task was the Baron
Ripperdd, who had originally come to Spain as the representative
of the United Provinces, and was the very type of an adventurer.
This individual was accordingly sent on a secret mission to the
Austrian capital in November, 1724.
Ripperda's visit to Vienna coincided with the rupture of the
marriage contract between France and Spain, and the Duke of
Bourbon, whom the death of the Duke of Orleans had placed at the
head of the French government, sent the prospective bride of Louis
XV back to her own country. This affront angered Philip to such an
extent that he ordered Ripperda to accede to almost any terms to bring
about an alliance with Austria, and the first Treaty of Vienna was
signed in November, 172 j . The InfanteDon Carlos was acknowledged
as heir to the duchies, but in return all the Spanish ports in Europe
and America were to be thrown open to Austrian trade, and the
companies established at Trieste ana Ostend were to conduct it.
Unfortunately, the news of this agreement leaked out prematurely,
and at once the Alliance of Hanover was formed to frustrate it by
Great Britain, France, the United Provinces, and Prussia, all of
whom felt thek interests to be adversely affected in some way.
Ripperdd's garrulity was the cause of this disclosure, and when the
fact came to the ears of the King and Queen his fall was clearly but a
question of time. Finally, it was discovered that the Emperor had no
intention of marrying Maria Theresa to Don Carlos, as Ripperdd
asserted to be the case, and the minister was arrested. Eventually he
managed to escape, and after embracing Islam, became Grand Vizier*
to the Sultan of Morocco.
Ripperdd had gone, but the fruits of his policy remained. The
Spaniards once again besieged Gibraltar, and the English attempted
to blockade Puerto Bello, but in neither case did success attend the
attackers. The Emperor made no effort to assist his Spanish allies,
and Walpole, on the other hand, had no desire to see hostilities
become general, for he knew that war on a large scale would mean
the overthrow of the Hanoverian dynasty, and of the Whig oligarchy
that governed England in its name.
287
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

In these circumstances an arrangement was not difficult, and at the

Congress of Soissons Cardinal Fleury took the lead in promoting a
settlement. What the French government desired was to bring
Spain over to its side, and at the same time to drive in a wedge
between England and her old ally, Austria, and all this was accom-
plished by Fleury in the Treaty of Seville in November, 1729. This
treaty, which left the Emperor isolated, was signed by England,
France, Spain, and the United Provinces, and it provided for the
sending of Spanish garrisons to the Italian duchies to support the
claims of Don Carlos, when he should succeed. At the same time all
the commercial privileges which England had obtained at Utrecht
were restored.
The death of the Duke of Parma, the last male Farnese, in 1731,
precipitated another crisis, and enabled Walpole to have his "tit for
tat" with Fleury. Austrian troops had marched into the duchy, and
once more there appeared to be every prospect of war, but Patino,
the new Spanish minister, had no mind for adventures. In any
event, the Infante could not get his troops easily to Parma without
the aid of the British fleet, so active negotiations ensued between
London and Madrid. The outcome was the second Treaty of Vienna
in 1731 between Spain, England, the United Provinces, and the
Emperor.
The Pragmatic Sanction was guaranteed on condition that Maria
Theresa did not marry a Bourbon; the Ostend East India Company
was abandoned; and Don Carlos was recognised as Duke of Parma,
and heir to Tuscany. France was, for the moment, isokted, as the
Emperor had been two years before. In October, 1731, the 6000
Spanish troops to occupy the duchies sailed from Barcelona with an
escort of English men-of-war, and the new Duke of Parma met with
an enthusiastic reception from his subjects upon his arrival among
them.

The restoration of Spain to her old place in the councils of

Europe> which these events amply proved, was very largely due to
the work of Jose Patino. A Galician, he had originally been a Jesuit
novice, but had forsaken the ecclesiastical profession, and had
played an important part in the organisation of the army during the
War of the Spanish Succession. Alberoni transferred Patino from
Seville to Madrid, and on the fall of
Ripperda, he was appointed
Minister of Marine and the Indies, and later, Minister of Finance.
His first care was to reorganise the navy, and so successful was he
that in 1732 a fleet of no less than 600 sail, with an
army of 30,000
men, went from Alicante, and recovered Oran from the Moors. By
means of a system of bounties Patino encouraged Spanish trade with
the Americas and the Philippines, while his financial reforms carried
on the work that had been initiated by Alberoni. When he died in
1736 he had enabled Spain to conquer two kingdoms in Italy, and he
288
 THE EARLY BOURBONS
had restored her prestige almost to what it had been in the days of
Philip II.

The later years of Philip V were marked by more cordial relations

between France and Spain. It was clear now that Louis XV would
not die without offspring, and his uncle was forced to reconcile him-
self to the fact that the French throne would never be his. In 1733
the King of Poland died, and in the complications which ensued it
became clear that the interests of France and Spain were much alike.
At first the Queen was in favour of an attempt to secure the Polish
crown for Don Carlos, but as France wanted it for the father-in-law
of Louis XV, this would have caused dissension between the two
Bourbon Powers. Patino therefore suggested that while the Emperor
was busy about Poland, Don Carlos should seize Naples and Sicily,
where the inhabitants were weary of Austrian rule.
This project was particularly agreeable to France, for it meant the
diversion of some of the Emperor's energies from Central Europe.
In November, 1733, a treaty on these terms, usually known as the
First Family Compact, was made between France and Spain, and in
May of the following year Don Carlos entered Naples, after having
encountered resistance only at Gaeta and Capua. Sicily proved to be
an equally easy conquest, and in 1736 the Third Treaty of Vienna
recognised him as King of the Two Sicilies, though at the price of
relinquishing the duchies.
Spain was not, however, destined to remain at peace for long.
Quite apart from the Queen's determination to place her children
upon Italian thrones, there were the complications attendant upon
the British trade with the Americas, which was a perpetual cause of
friction.
By the Treaty of Utrecht the monopoly of the slave trade had been
given to Great Britain, as well as many commercial privileges in
America. British factories in one form or another existed at Panama,
Vera Cruz, Buenos Aires, and Cartagena, and ships trading with
slaves were exempt from examination or duty. Tnis enabled the
colonists in Jamaica, who had already enriched themselves by the
plunder accumulated by the Buccaneers, to carry on an active contra-
band trade to the great loss of the Spanish government.
Recriminations and reprisals followed, and in the course of them
an English merchant captain named Jenkins was said to have had his
ear cut off by a Spanish officer. At any rate, he produced a severed
ear in a box on his return to London, and in the public mind Jenkins's
ear became the symbol of the ill-treatment to which British citizens
were subject in the Spanish dominions.
Spain did not want war, and made every effort to avoid it. By the
Convention of the Pardo in January, 1739, she agreed to pay an
indemnity of 95,000 pending a peaceful settlement of the questions
outstanding between the two countries, namely the right of search
289
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

and the delimitation of Georgia. In return, Spain pressed for the

payment of certain claims made by her against the South Sea Com-
pany. England, however, was intent upon hostilities, and the Wai-
pole administration, which was tottering to its fall, was forced to
declare war on the most flimsy pretexts*
The campaign that followed showed how well Patino had done his
work. The war began with a Spanish reverse, for Admiral Vernpn
sacked Puerto Bello, but the news of this disaster roused all Spain.
Within a few months Spanish privateers had captured English
shipping to the value of 234,000, and Gibraltar and Minorca were
being threatened. The British government determined to strike its
principal blow in America, and Vernon was sent to attack Cartagena
with the assistance of 10,000 troops.
The Viceroy, Sebastian de Eslava, himself conducted the defence,
and after an initial British success the invaders failed to capture the
citadel in spite of their vastly superior numbers. Soon afterwards,
the climate compelled the abandonment of the attempt, and when
Vernon subsequently tried to capture Santiago de Cuba a similar
failure attended his efforts. In October, 1740, the death of the
Emperor Charles VI, and the seizure of Silesia by Frederick the
Great, caused the struggle between Spain and Great Britain to be
merged in the War of the Austrian Succession.
For Elizabeth Farnese, except during the period immediately after
the first Treaty of Vienna, the Empire's extremity had been her
opportunity, so she persuaded her husband to claim the whole
inheritance of Charles VI on the ground that he was the senior
descendant of Charles V. In actual fact the Spanish claim was only
intended as a lever for obtaining the Austrian dominions in Italy,
that is to say, the Milanese, Parma, and Tuscany (the last now
possessed by Maria Theresa's husband, who had exchanged Lorraine
for it on the extinction of the male line of the Medici in 1737), which
would make a kingdom of respectable size for Philip, the second son
of the King and Queen of Spain.
Italy was invaded by the Spaniards, and the plan of campaign
was that they should be joined by die Neapolitans, but it miscarried
from the start. The King of Sardinia, as the Duke of Savoy had now
become, sided with Austria, while the British fleet appeared in the
Bay of Naples and gave Charles III an hour to agree to withdraw
the Neapolitan contingent from the Spanish army under the threat
of an immediate bombardment of the capital. The King agreed,
much to the detriment of the Spanish cause, which was still further
jeopardised by the Treaty of Breslau in July, 1742, when Prussia
withdrew from the war, and Austria was proportionately
strengthened.
Fortune was not long in favouring Spain again, for in the follow-
ing year the death of Cardinal Fleury, the French Prime Minister,
proved the signal for the adoption of a more vigorous policy on the
290
 THE EARLY BOURBONS *

part of
France. In October, 1743, the Treaty of Fontainebleau was
made between the two Powers, which were henceforth to stand
shoulder to shoulder: Gibraltar and Minorca were to be taken from
the English; and Parma, Piacenza, and Milan were to be won for
young Philip. As a result of this treaty the war was carried on in
Italy with great energy,
but with varying success. In 1744 the
Franco-Spanish forces invaded Piedmont, but were driven out again,
and the same experience befell them in the Milanese in 1745-1746.
At this point Philip V
died, and his successor, Ferdinand VI,
had no particular interest in waging war in Italy for the benefit of his
stepmother's children. In 1740, too, a popular rising in Genoa
against the Austrians permanently checked the latter's victorious
career, and all the belligerents were ready for peace, which was made
at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Philip did not get the Milanese, but he
was recognised as sovereign Duke of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla,
while, by the Treaty of Aquisgran in the next year, the outstanding
differences between England and Spain were duly settled. Elizabeth
Farnese now retired into the background, but she had succeeded in
her object of placing her sons upon Italian thrones.

In spite of the many wars in which she was involved, Spain made
enormous progress during the reign of Philip V. It is true that the
old uneconomic system of taxation had not been fundamentally
altered, and the alcabalas of 14 per cent on all sales were still supposed
to be collected, but many modifications had been introduced. Mono-
polies and exemptions were granted, while bounties were paid to
certain industries, which in many cases counteracted the effect of the
high taxation. The abolition of the internal customs-houses also had
a beneficial result in increasing production, and the Valencian
textiles, for example, were once more able to supply the home
market, the number of looms increasing from 300 in 1717 to 2000 in
1722.
The revenue was naturally the gainer by this revival of prosperity,
and it rose from 142,000,000
reals in the year of Philip's accession to
211,000,000 reals in 1737. Spain was not a country in which it was
possible to proceed with reforms except by very easy stages, but the
succession of the Bourbons to her throne undoubtedly initiated a
revival, as Great Britain had learned to her cost when war came.

By his first wife Philip had had four children, of whom

only his
successor, Ferdinand VI, survived him. By Elizabeth Farnese he had
six children, of whom
four were living at the time of his death,
including
the King of Naples, the Duke of Parma, and the Cardinal
Don Luis. The new King was thirty-four years old, and both he
and his wife, Barbara of Braganza, were determined that once the
War of the Austrian Succession was at an end Spain should pursue a
policy of neutrality in international politics.
291
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Ferdinand was above all else a patriotic Spaniard, and unless the
interests of his country demanded that he should fight he was
resolved to keep the peace. The King's task was not an easy one,
for the two leading ministers, Jose de and the Marques de k
Carvajal
Ensenada, were desirous of taking sides, the one for England and
the other for France, and they were naturally encouraged by the
British and French ambassadors, Sir Benjamin Keene and Duras, In
spite even of the outbreak of the Seven Years* War in 1756, Spanish
neutrality was preserved until Ferdinand's death, and it is at home
rather than abroad that the real importance of his reign is to be
found.
Ensenada had held various important offices during the latter
years of Philip V, but it was not until the accession of the new King
that "his power became supreme. He told Ferdinand quite frankly
that it would be madness to suggest an army equal to that of France,
and a navy of the same size as the British; what he aimed at was to
raise the military, naval, and financial strength of Spain to a position
which would enable her to make her neutrality effective, and to
maintain her independence in the councils of the world. The King
thoroughly agreed with this policy, which was energetically carried
out. New regiments were called into existence, and Barcelona,
Majorca, Cadiz, Ferrol, Corunna, and the Portuguese frontier were
carefully fortified. Six ships were laid down every year in Cadiz,
Ferrol, Cartagena, and Havana, and before long both the Atlantic and
the Mediterranean fleets of Spain were of formidable proportions.
This activity aroused the hostility of Great Britain towards
Ensenada, and in consequence he became more and more closely
identified with the French party at Madrid. Finally, his zeal outran
his discretion, for Keene discovered that he had given secret instruc-
tions to the Viceroy of Mexico to molest English traders, and upon
this being represented to the King, the minister was dismissed.
Both Ensenada and Wall, an Irishman who succeeded him, con-
tinued the financial and economic policy of Patino. Agriculture was
revived, roads improved, canals made, and manufactures assisted in
every possible way. The Spanish mines were re-opened, and the ban
on the export of metal was removed, while a royalty of 3^ per cent in
Spain and 6 per cent in America was imposed. The farming of taxes
was abolished, and the revenue rose by 5,000,000 ducats a year.
In addition, the intellectual progress of the country at this time
can hardly be exaggerated. The foundation of academies and learned
bodies went on apace; subsidies and scholarships were granted
liberally to scientists, artists, and men of letters to enable them to
pursue their researches both in Spain and abroad, and foreign
scholars were welcomed. When Ferdinand VI died in 1759,
Spain
was once more a prosperous nation, with a powerful fleet, and three
millions sterling in the treasury.

292
 CHAPTER XXXV

The Reign of Charles III (1759-1788)

vi was succeeded by his half-brother Charles III, the
King of the Two Sicilies, who was already exceedingly popular
FERDINAND
with his Italian subjects. By the Treaty of Aquisgran it had been
provided that the throne of Naples should pass to the Duke of Parma
if Charles came to that of Spain, and that Parma, Piacensa, and
Guastalla should be divided between Austria and Sardinia. By a
combination of skilful diplomacy and a cash payment, Charles per-
suaded the Powers concerned to waive this stipulation, and in its
place an arrangement was made by which Naples was to pass to his
third son, Ferdinand. The eldest, Philip, was excluded from the
succession in consequence of his insanity, and the second son,
Charles, became Prince of Asturias on the accession of his father to
the Spanish throne.
Charles III was an excellent example of those "enlightened
despots" who were so prominent a feature of the ktter half of the
eighteenth century. He was easily the best and the most intelligent
of the Bourbon Kings of Spain. With something of the yokel about
his appearance, and with a long, pointed nose and piercing blue eyes,
he had a strange mask of a face which recalled Louis XI. There was
much of the dilettante about him; he was a lover and patron of the
arts; and he was a man of taste upon whom his long residence in
Italy, amid the monuments of an ancient civilisation, had made a
profound impression,
Charles was greatly under the influence of French ideas, and this
fact also goes far to explain his Francophil policy. His motto, and
that of several contemporary monarcns, might well have been
"Everything for the people, but nothing by the people/' which is by
no means an unsatisfactory doctrine. Nevertheless, as will be seen,
the people revolted more than once against the improvements which
the King and his ministers sought to impose upon them.

The Seven Years* War was at its height when Charles came to the
throne, and in 1761 he made another Family Compact with France.
This necessitated hostilities with Great Britain, but instead of the
support given by Spain to the French cause doing anything to restore
the balance, it merely involved the former country in the series of
misfortunes which France was
experiencing.
In the West Indies, the British captured Grenada, St. Vincent,
St. Lucia, and Tobago, and in August, 1762, Havana itself fell into
theirhands with 1 5,000,000 dollars of treasure, an enormous quantity
of arms and stores, and twelve men-of-war. In the Pacific the
Spaniards were also unfortunate, for another English expedition
captured Manila. In Europe there had been a Spanish invasion of
295
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Portugal, but although it met with some success at first, the arrival
of English troops to reinforce the Portuguese soon compelled the
Spaniards to withdraw to their own side of the frontier. The only
compensating advantage gained by Spain was the conquest of some
Portuguese territory on the River Plate.
Charles realised that in coming to the aid of France at such a time
he had made a mistake, and he accordingly opened negotiations for
peace, which a change of government in England now made possible.
The Treaty of Paris in 1763 brought the war to a termination. Spain
had to cede St. Vincent, Tobago, and Grenada, though St. Lucia
was restored to her. The British also obtained Florida, the right to
cut logwood in Honduras Bay, and the Spanish renunciation of all
fishing claims in relation to Newfoundland. In return Great Britain
surrendered her conquests in Cuba and the Philippines, while France,
unable to secure the restitution of Minorca, handed over to her ally
New Orleans and all Louisiana West of the Mississippi.
Charles III had made no change in Ferdinand's ministers, beyond
the addition of the Marquis of Squillaci (Esquilache as the Spaniards
called him) to their number, but after the conclusion of the Treaty
of Paris, Wall resigned on account of bad sight. He was replaced by
Grimaldi, and the two Italians proceeded to accelerate the pace of
reform. They made no secret of their determination to limit very
drastically indeed the power both of the Church and of the Inquisi-
tion, and they united against them elements capable of precipitating
a revolt which came within an ace of being a revolution,
The immediate cause of the outbreak was a trifle. For many years
the Spaniards had worn wide-brimmed hats, side-locks, and long
cloaks (in which daggers were too often and too easily concealed),
and they disliked the cocked hats, bag-wigs, and coats in which
Charles wished them to appear. In March, 1766, an order was issued
forbidding the wearing or cloaks beyond a certain length and of wide-
brimmed hats, and officials were posted in the streets to cut offending
garments to the required dimensions. The attempt to enforce this
pragmatic led to rioting, and to a demand for the head of Squillaci,
who was forced to fly. During the disturbances the Walloon guards
fired on the crowd, and this roused the latter to a frenzy. The
Walloon guardsmen were killed at sight, and the capital was in the
hands of the mob the
King was forced to give way, but immediately
:

he had done so he left Madrid for Aranjuez.

Charles took care that Squillaci got safely out of the country, and
then he reformed the administration, placing at its head the Count
of Aranda. The latter was a man of great ability, but also of con-
siderable vanity, and, like his predecessor, he was anti-clerical.
During the summer of 1766 the agitation continued, and a plot to
murder the King was alleged to have been discovered. Finally,
however, Charles got his way, and in December he re-entered Madrid
to find his subjects, if still discontented, attired after the new fashion.
294
 THE REIGN OF CHARLES III

Both King and minister were convinced that the clergy in general,
and the Jesuits in particular, had been at the bottom of the trouble,
and they were determined to put an end to clerical opposition to their
reforms. In this resolution they were greatly influenced by con-
temporary events in Portugal, where an attempt to murder King
Joseph had been laid at the door of the Jesuits, and where the
Marquis of Pombal had already adopted strong measures against them.
In April, 1767, an order was suddenly issued for the expulsion of
the Jesuits from Spain, and it was executed in a manner which
inflicted the greatest hardship on those concerned. The priests were
not allowed to take anything with them but their personal belong-
ings, and they were conveyed in unseemly haste to the coast, whence
they were shipped to such foreign countries as were willing to
receive them. The same procedure was adopted in America, with the
result that the work of civilisation which the Jesuits had been
doing
in Paraguay came to an end, and the Indians in that country relapsed
into savagery.
In his attack on the Jesuits the King of Spain secured the support
of his son in Naples and, for a time, of his nephew in Parma. Louis
XV adopted analogous measures, for Choiseul was then in power in
France, and he was responsible for the policy, which subsequently
had to be reversed, of endeavouring to placate the Parkments.
Charles was, however, the moving spirit in the attack, which he
continued after Louis XV had wearied of it, and the Duke of Parma
had changed his mind. In the end he gained his point, and in 1773
Clement XIV signed the decree suppressing the Society of Jesus
throughout Christendom.
The campaign against the Jesuits was only part of a general offen-
sive against the Church, for Aranda was completely under the sway
of the French Encyclopaedists. The Inquisition also became the
object of attack, and in 1780 its last victim, an old witch, was burnt
alive at Seville. Education, too, which had been taken out of the
hands of the Jesuits, was nationalised and secularised.
Whether these measures were wise from the point of view of the
monarchy is another matter. For centuries the Spanish throne had
been invested with a religious sanction, and Church and State had
been almost indistinguishable. Charles undoubtedly increased the
power of the Crown, but he placed the monarch in a position of
dangerous, if splendid, isolation. The Cortes was nothing but a
name, the Inquisition was powerless, and the very foundations of the
Church were undermined. When the storm came, the monarchy had
no outside support upon which it could rely.
It is a curious coincidence, if nothing more, that less than two
decades after the suppression of the Jesuits the oldest throne in
Europe came crashing to the ground, and that the violence of the
subsequent upheaval has been most severely felt in those countries
which had adopted the attitude of Charles III of Spain.
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

The Aranda in civil matters was much less open to

policy of
criticism, was largely an intensification of that of Ensenada. In
and it

particular, rural depopulation was arrested by

internal colonisation,
and Bavarian immigrants to the number of 6000 were settled in
thirteen new villages in the Sierra Morena. The import and export of
grain were permitted under certain restrictions with regard to price
levels in the home market. A government registry for titles and
mortgages was created to render the transfer or land both easy and
cheap, and the coinage was reformed and unified. Raw material was
allowed to enter the country free, but a prohibitive tariff was put
upon such manufactured articles $s were likely to compete with
Spanish products. The social services also received attention.
Hospitals, asylums, and alms-houses were established all over Spain,
as well as savings banks, benefit societies, and philanthropic institu-
tions of one sort or another.
The glass factory of La Granja, the porcelains of Buen Retiro, the
cotton velvets of Avila, the fine leathers of Seville and Cordova, and
the fancy goods of Madrid, all became famous at this time. During
the reign of Charles III the population of Spain rose to 10,250,000,
which represented an increase of 1,500,000 since the death of
Ferdinand VI, while the revenue during the King's last years had
grown to 616,300,000 reals, or more than three times what it had
been a century before, and that in spite of a definite decrease in
taxation.

If remained quiet in Europe after the Treaty of Paris, the

all

rivalry of Spain and Great Britain in America continued unabated.

Choiseul was determined to precipitate a conflict between the two
countries if it were in his power to do so, and in 1770 he persuaded
Charles to make effective the Spanish claim to the Falkland Islands.
An expedition was accordingly sent from Buenos Aires, and the
English were ejected. War appeared imminent, but Louis XVhad no
desire to engage in a Spanish quarrel, and he made it clear that if
Spain fought she would fight alone; he also dismissed Choiseul.
Charles had hoped that France would aid him by virtue of the Family
Compact, but when Louis washed his hands of the matter he had to
evacuate the islands in dispute.
In consequence, Aranda's many enemies succeeded in bringing
that minister down, and his successor was, first Figueroa, and then
the Count of Gampomanes. This was not the first difficulty that
Spain had experienced in America since the Treaty of Paris, for the
colonists of Louisiana had objected to the transfer of
sovereignty,
and they finally had to be reduced to obedience by force.
In 1775 the Spanish arms met with a reverse in Africa. The Moors
had for some time been besieging Ceuta and Melilla, and an expedi-
tion was sent to relieve both
places, which it did very successfully.
This encouraged Charles to attempt to
capture Algiers, which was
290
 THE REIGN OF CHARLES III

the headquarters of the Barbary Corsairs. A force of 20,000 men

under Count O'Reilly was despatched for this purpose, and it was
hoped to take the Algerines by surprise. Unfortunately the news of
what was afoot had already leaked out, and O'Reilly was defeated
with heavy loss. The rout of the general caused the fall of his
patron, Grimaldi, who was replaced by the Count of Floridablanca.
Nevertheless, Charles did not renounce the historic Spanish
mission of fighting Islam, and in 1783-1784 Algiers was severely
bombarded by his fleet. By the end of his reign treaties had been
extorted by force or diplomacy from the Sultan of Morocco, the Dey
of Algiers, and the Bey of Tunis in which those rulers not only
pledged themselves to refrain from attacking the ships and coast of
Spain, but also agreed to the establishment of Spanish consulates
in their territories, and to freedom of worship for Spanish subjects.
A treaty of peace was also made with their suzerain, the Ottoman
Sultan. In this way Charles III put an end to a menace which had
threatened the Peninsula for centuries.
The year following O'Reilly's defeat was marked by an outbreak
of hostilities with Portugal over the vexed question of the frontier of
Brazil. Pombal, the energetic minister of that country, embarked
upon a policy of expansion in America that very soon brought the
Portuguese into conflict with Spain. Charles ordered a counter-
offensive, and in 1776-1777 the Spaniards captured various places in
Rio Grande do Sul.
What might have developed into a serious war was terminated,
however, by the death of the King of Portugal, Joseph, and the
subsequent fall of Pombal. A treaty was then made between the
two Powers by which Sacramento, as well as the navigation of the
rivers Plate, Parana, and Paraguay, became Spanish, while Spain
also acquired the islands of Annobon and Fernando Po in the Gulf of
Guinea. In exchange, Charles recognised the Portuguese right to
some territory on the Amazon which was in dispute.
While these events were taking place in the Mediterranean and in
South America the relations between Great Britain and her American
colonies were getting steadily worse, and in 1776 came the Declara-
tion of Independence. From the first the temptation to Spain to take
advantage of this opportunity to reverse the verdict of the Seven
Years*. War was and when, in the spring of 1778, France
great,
recognised the United States, the pressure upon the King to adopt a
similar policy was overwhelming. Charles, however, was mindful
of the disasters which had attended the last appearance of Spain in the
field as the ally of France, and he had not forgotten the latter's
attitude at the time of his dispute with Great Britain over the
ownership of the Falkland Islands. If Spain fought, it would be for
her own hand, and not to suit the convenience of Louis XVI. Accord-
ingly, Charles waited to see how the struggle was going, and in the
meantime he offered to mediate, but England refused to listen to him.
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Saratoga convinced him that the British without Pitt to lead them
a
were not a very formidable proposition, and when news arrived that
attacks were pending on Nicaragua and the Philippines, Spain de-
clared war (June, 1779). A few weeks previously, when hostilities
were already certain, a secret treaty had been made with France by
which that Power promised to aid in the reconquest of Gibraltar,
Florida, and Minorca, and in the expulsion of the British from
Honduras.
Spain had never been so well-prepared for war as she was on this
occasion. In Europe alone she had sixty-eight ships of the line
afloat, as well as many smaller craft, and in the Americas both her
naval and military power was considerable. Moreover, the friendship
of Portugal deprived England of an ally, and of a base of operations,
which had proved of inestimable advantage to her in previous wars.
The Franco-Spanish plan of campaign had as its immediate objec-
tives the invasion of Great Britain, and the capture of Gibraltar and
Minorca. The British fleet was reduced in numbers through the
usual neglect in time of peace, and the coast was badly defended.
Accordingly, the Franco-Spanish armada swept up the Channel with-
out encountering any serious opposition, but it made no use of its
opportunities, and not a soldier was disembarked. Nevertheless,
something had been attained, for the loss of the command of the sea
had prevented the English from interfering with the arrival of the
fleet from America, and it had deprived the armies that were

ghting Washington of the reinforcements which they so urgently

glate
required.
In the other theatres of war the Spaniards were more fortunate.
They invested Gibraltar, expelled the English from Honduras, and
co-operated with the Americans in Florida and on the Mississippi,
with the result that by March, 1780, Mobile was in their hands. At
this point the British Government opened negotiations for peace,
but its terms were still too high for Spain to accept, and the war
went on. Floridablanca left no stone unturned in his efforts to bring
England to her knees, and he was largely instrumental in forming the
Armed Neutrality, which refused to accept the British view of block-
ades and the right of search. In 1782 the Spaniards, this time in
co-operation with the French, achieved a further success with the
capture of Minorca.
The most notable event of the war was the siege of Gibraltar,
defended by Lord Elliot. The fortress had been blockaded at the
very commencement of hostilities, but it was relieved for a time by
Rodney in January, 1780. After the reduction of Minorca the attack
was begun again, and in the attempt to reduce the place floating
batterieswere employed by the besiegers. They were constructions
of enormous size, very heavily armed, and great results were
expected
from them. At first they caused considerable damage to the defence,
but the British used red-hot shot against them, and with the most
 THE REIGN OF CHARLES III

disastrous consequences. Finally, in October, 1782, Howe ran the

Franco-Spanish blockade, and the re-victualling and re-arming of the
fortress rendered its capture hopeless.
Meanwhile, the American cause was victorious on the other side
of the Atlantic, and the object of the war was achieved. Peace was
made by the Treaty of Versailles in September, 1783. In so far as it
concerned Spain, she was confirmed in her conquest of Minorca and
Florida, but she agreed once more to allow the English to cut log-
wood in Honduras Bay.
The Treaty of Versailles gave Spain her revenge for the humilia-
tion of twenty years before, and her power in the New
World was at
its zenith, for in addition to the possession of all South and Central

America, except Brazil and Guiana, she was mistress in North

America of Mexico, California, Louisiana, and Florida. Neverthe-
less, the establishment of the United States was an encouragement to
the Spanish colonies themselves to revolt, and the results of this were
not long in being felt.
^Five years later,
on December i4th, 1788, Charles III died, and
with his death an epoch of Spanish history came to an end.

From the point of view of internal policy the reigns of Philip V,

Ferdinand VI, and Charles III may be regarded as a whole. The
Spanish monarchy at this period approached very closely to the
French type, not in the sense that tne royal power became more
absolute, but rather that centralisation tended to become more com-
plete through the restriction of local privileges. As has been shown,
regular ministers replaced the favourites of the previous century, and
the juntas or councils of government, disappeared, giving place to
',

regular departmental ministries. The nobility and the clergy found

themselves more and more subjected to the central authority, and,
so far as the latter were concerned, a Concordat with the Holy See
was made in 1754, by which ecclesiastical nominations depended
almost entirely upon tne King.
In the intellectual, literary, and artistic spheres there was, in spite
of the efforts of successive monarchs, certainly a decline in com-
parison with the great preceding age, namely that "Golden Century"
which in reality embraced a period of nearly two hundred years.
Literature was less original,
although in certain aspects of it, particu-
larly in the drama, there was still a very widespread activit^.
On the other hand history more than maintained its position. The
study of antiquity and the examination of archives gave birth to
such learned publications as Espana Sagrada> which was begun by
Father Enrique Flores. Mention has already been made of the
foundation of learned societies. The Royal Spanish Academy was
founded in 1713, the Academy of History in 1738, and the Academy
of Fine Arts of St. Ferdinand in 1744. Charles III, in particular, was
distinguished by his taste for architecture and for painting, and the
299
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

patronage which he accorded to the arts and to artists was very

considerable indeed.
At the same time there was no longer the exuberance or genius
of the great period, but architecture, in its new forms, maintained
itself on a level that was still sufficiently high. There has been much
criticism of the style which was popular at this period with its orna-
mentation, its luxuriance, and its overloading, and it has been called
"the romanticism of rococo" Yet we owe to it some charming
1

creations, for example, the Palacio del Marquds de Dos Aguas at

Valencia. The same observation applies to baroque in its classical and
grandiose form. Italian, and above all, French influences are certainly
recognisable in it, but the native genius is still preponderant. The
Royal Palace in Madrid and the Castle of San Ildefonso at La Granja
are very fine specimens of architecture, and can bear comparison
with the best work that was being done at that time in other
European countries.
Painting also held its own. If it had produced nothing more than
an artist fike Goya, it couldstill, thanks to him, be said to have
maintained its own prestige. Spanish realism finds its expression in
the work of this harsh Aragonese, with a strength and intensity and a
hitherto unknown. The new reveals
psychological penetration spirit
itself in his creations, and in the whole range of his philosophical
symbolism.
Nevertheless, it is no longer the national realism, the realism of
Velazquez, with its depth, and its classical qualities of proportion and
complete impersonality. It is a deviation from it, often impetuous
and verging on frenzy, towards the fantastic, the grotesque, and the
macabre. In short, it is no longer purely Spanish.
What may be observed in the art of Goya is the keynote of the
reigns of the earlier Bourbons. The same deviation from the old
realism began to affect the national spirit. Under outside influences,
especially those of France, the Spanish soul lost its moral and
intellectual unity, which, in the domain of art as in that of thought,
had produced unique works. Foreign ideas began to have their
effect upon the national genius; they were to serve as the ferment of

approaching revolutions, and they have distracted the Peninsula

throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, and down to
the present day.

300
 CHAPTER XXXVI

Evolution and 'Restoration (1788-1833)

ry
was a worthy man full of good intentions, somewhat
like Louis XVI. He was, unhappily, timid, and his character
CHARLES
was weak, while he was completely under the domination of his
wife, Mark Luisa of Parma. She, in her turn, was influenced by her
lover, Manuel Godoy, the guardsman whom she caused to be created
successively Duke of Alcudia and Prince of the Peace,
The King's accession was almost immediately followed by the
outbreak of the French Revolution, and the whole of the reign was
overclouded by the shadow of this upheaval. Spain was pulled
hither and thither by France and by the Powers, notably Great
Britain, opposed to her, until she became a mere plaything in their
strife. At last her navy was destroyed by the English and her inde-

pendence by the French. The whole reign of Charles IV led up to the

tragedies of Trafalgar and the Dos de Mayo.
The new King had hardly succeeded to the throne before a dispute
with England proved that Spain could pkce no reliance upon the
support of revolutionary France, and that the days of the Family
Compact were over. In May, 1789, an expedition sent by the Viceroy
of Mexico discovered that the British had established a
trading-
station at Nootka Sound, in Vancouver, and seized the shijDS that it
found there. The British Government demanded satisfaction, but
Floridablanca refused on the ground that all land on the West coast
of America as far as 60 degrees North latitude belonged to Spain,
and that in any event Nootka had first been discovered by a Spaniard,
Pitt replied that these pretensions were inadmissible, for there had
been no effective occupation, and both sides began to prepare for
war.
Floridablanca thereupon called upon the French Government to
fulfil its obligations under the but the National
Family Compact,
Assembly, after grandiloquently declaring that the French nation had
renounced wars of conquest, proceeded to offer assistance on terms
which included the restitution of Louisiana. The Spanish ministry in
this dilemma preferred to treat with England, and a settlement was
effected on the basis of a declaration that Nootka was a free port, and
of compensation for damage done. The alliance between France and
Spain was clearly at an end.
These events, and the progress of the revolution, caused Florida-
blanca to abandon the of reform which he had pursued during
policy
the reign of Charles III, and an attempt which a Frenchman made on
his life in June, 1790, caused him to impose a rigorous censorship
upon all books and pamphlets that came from the other side of the
Pyrenees. Nor was this all, for the dangerous position of the French
Royal Family soon began to alarm their relatives in Madrid, and
301
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Floridablanca at the time of the Sight to Varennes attempted to

intercede with the National Assembly on behalf of Louis XVI.
His mediation was indignantly rejected by that body, and he then
had a census made of all the foreigners in Spain, after which they were
compelled to swear fidelity to the King, the laws, and the religion of
Spain. This infuriated the French, and when
the Spanish Govern-
ment went on to demand that Louis XVI should be allowed to
depart to a place of safety their anger at so humanitarian a proposition
knew no bounds. Immediate war appeared inevitable, but Charles
was persuaded to dismiss Floridablanca in February, 1792, and
Aranda was appointed to succeed him.
For a time this change of ministers preserved peace, but when the
Convention demanded that Spain should recognise the Republic,
and gave her the choice of an alliance or war, Aranda found himself
in the same position as his predecessor a few months before. In
November of the same year he was suddenly relieved of his office,
not for political reasons, but because the Queen desired to see Godoy
at the head of affairs.
Godoy was an adventurer with more ambition than brains, and his
appointment signified a return to the days of Lerma, Olivares, and
Valenzuela. It alienated public opinion, accustomed to the able
ministers of the previous monarch, and it caused serious dissensions
in the Royal Family itself, where the Prince of Asturias strongly
resented the relations of Godoy with his mother. The policy of the
new minister was to save the life of Louis XVI, and to avoid the
alternatives put forward by the Convention, but in the end he failed
to do either. In March, 1793, France declared war, and a few days
later Spain signed a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, thus joining
the First CbaHtion.
The outbreak of hostilities was popular in the Peninsula, where
the revolution had alarmed all classes. Three armies were formed:
one in Guipiizcoa and Navarre under Don Ventura Caro; another in
Arag6n commanded by the Prince of Castellfranco; and a third in
Catalonk with Don Antonio Ricardos at its head. The campaign
of 1793 was very favourable to the Spaniards. Ricardos conquered
Roussillon, and won several victories over the French Caro repulsed
:

all attacks, and

captured Hendaye : while the Prince of Castellfranco
frustrated a determined attempt at invasion. At sea, the Spanish fleet
aided the British in the occupation of Toulon, until the fire of
Napoleon's cannon compelled its evacuation.
The next year witnessed a complete reversal of fortune, largely
owing to the death of Ricardos. Not only did the French sweep the
invading Spaniards out of Roussillon, but they assumed the offensive
in their turn,and captured Figueras, which was defended by 10,000
men and 200 pieces of heavy artillery. In 1795 the Spanish arms
fared even worse, for
though the French advance in Catalonia was
checked, at the western end of the Pyrenees, where Irun, Fuenter-
302
 REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION
rabia, San Sebastian, and Tolosa had already been captured in the
preceding year, Bilbao and Vitoria were lost, and by June the French
had reached Miranda de Ebro.
These reverses, combined with the defection of Prussia from the
Coalition, decided Godoy to make peace. By the Treaty of Basle the
French gave up all their conquests, while Spain ceded to France her
half of the island of San Domingo, and also allowed her neighbour
certain commercial advantages in the Peninsula. For his share in this
treaty Godoy was created Prince of the Peace.
Save during the reign of Ferdinand VI it had always proved im-
possible for Spain to remain neutral when England and France were
at war, and so it was on the present occasion. Spain had to side with
one or the other, and as the British had shown themselves to be very
unsatisfactory allies, Godoy concluded in August, 1796, the Treaty
of San Ildefonso with the Directory. The English reply was a declara-
tion of hostilities, and the Spaniards were heavily defeated in the
following February off Cape St. Vincent, while in America the island
of Trinidad was captured by the British. On the other hand, attacks
on Puerto Rico, Cadiz, ana Santa Cruz de Tenerife were repulsed.
In the following year Godoy was replaced at the head of the ministry
by Saavedra and Jovellanos, though he remained at court, and
continued to exercise great influence in the administration.
In 1 80 1 three further treaties were made with Fiance, where
Napoleon was now First Consul, as a corollary to the Treaty of
Luneville, which had just been concluded between France and the
Emperor. By the first of these the kingdom of Etruria was created
for the son of the Duke of Parma, who had married a daughter of
Charles IV, and it was stated that the new realm was to be a depen-
dency of Spain, while Louisiana was ceded to France. By the other
treaties Charles promised to supply ships for the formation of four
Franco-Spanish squadrons, and to declare war on Portugal if that
Power would not terminate her alliance with England.
The command of the Franco-Spanish forces that were to bring the
Portuguese to reason was entrusted to Godoy, and the short cam-
paign which ensued is known as the War of the Oranges, from the
bough of this fruit which Godoy sent to the Queen from Olivenza.
The allies occupied almost the whole of Alemtejo without much
difficulty, and Portugal sued for peace, which she obtained on pay-
ment of an indemnity to France, and on the cession of Olivenza to
Spain. In the following year the Treaty of Amiens brought about a
general pacification, and Spain recovered Minorca, which she had
again lost, but she was compelled to relinquish Trinidad to the
British.
The Treaty of Amiens was a mere truce, and when war was re-
newed between England and France in 1803, Napoleon compelled
Spain, as the price of her neutrality, to pay a monthly subsidy, and to
negotiate a commercial treaty. The British thereupon proceeded to
30}
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

treat her as an ally of France, and seized the plate-ships from America
whenever an opportunity occurred. The result was a Spanish declara-
tion of war, and in October, 1805, the allied fleets of France and
Spain were destroyed by Nelson at Trafalgar.
Spain was always unfortunate in her affiances, and she was now
inextricably entangled in the meshes of the Napoleonic web. The
French Emperor, having failed to effect a direct invasion of England,
was determined to bring that country to its knees by means of
economic pressure, and he therefore instituted the Continental
Blockade, in die winter of 1806-1807. To make this complete it was
essential that all countries on the mainland of Europe should close
their ports to British ships, and as Portugal refused to do so Napoleon
decided to apply compulsion. Moreover, he wished to obtain pos-
session of the Portuguese fleet to compensate him to some extent for
the loss of his own ships at Trafalgar.
The Emperor resolved to act with Spain as he had done in 1801,
and in October, 1807, the Treaty of Fontainebleau was signed, by
which it was agreed that the combined armies of France and Spain
should conquer Portugal. That kingdom was then to be divided into
three parts; the northern provinces were to be given to the King of
Etruna in exchange for his dominions in Italy, which were to be
annexed to the French Empire; the central portion was to be held by
France until the conclusion of peace; while the southern district was
to be formed into an independent kingdom for Godoy. In pur-
suance of this treaty a French army unoer General Junot marched
across the Peninsula, and by the beginning of 1808 Portugal was in
French hands.
Meanwhile the strife of parties at the Spanish court was growing
ever more bitter, and it soon provided Napoleon with an opportunity
for meting out to Spain the same treatment that Portugal had re-
ceived. The Prince of Asturias took part in a plot against Godoy,
and was thrown into prison. He appealed for help to Napoleon,
and the King also applied to the French Emperor to arbitrate upon
his differences with his son. This afforded Napoleon an excuse for
sending further troops into Spain, and an army under Murat
approached Madrid. These events gave rise to the rumour that
Charles was about to leave the country in the same way that the
Prince Regent of Portugal had done, and an insurrection broke
out in Madrid: Godoy was maltreated, and the King abdicated in
favour of the Prince of Asturias, who took the title of Ferdinand VII.
Napoleon refused to accept this abdication, and summoned both
the King and his son to Bayonne. When the Spanish Royal
Family
were all assembled in that town, both Charles and Ferdinand were
forced to resign their rights to the Spanish throne, which was at once
conferred by Napoleon upon his brother, Joseph, until then
King of
Naples. On May 2, 1808, Madrid rose against the French, and the
War of Independence began.
304
 REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION
The desperate nature of the struggle which began at this date is
apt to obscure the fact that Spain was not unanimously 'in arms on
behalf of the absent Ferdinand. It is true that there were few who
desired the restoration of Charles IV, but among the educated classes
Napoleon did not fail to make some converts to the idea of substitu-
ting for the Bourbons a Bonapartist dynasty in the person of Joseph.
The French Emperor endeavoured to cover his acts with the cloak
of legality by convening at Bayonne a meeting of the Spanish
notables, who received at his hands a constitution on the French
model, while Ferdinand -sank so low as to offer his congratulations
to his supplanter.
Napoleon's clemency was useless. In spite of the fact that Joseph
was superior to Ferdinand both as a man and as a monarch, and that
the new constitution was far in advance of anything that Spain had
hitherto possessed, the country would tolerate neither the "rey
intruso" nor his methods. It soon became obvious that a new pheno-
menon was being witnessed in the shape of a popular rising, and
although the French armies easily overcame all organised resistance,
the methods which had been so successful in other parts of Europe
were quite ineffective in Spain.
The provinces fought for themselves, and if the struggle was
everywhere carried on in the name of the absent Ferdinand, the
leaders in the field took little notice of any central authority. Those
Spaniards who were prepared to acquiesce in a change of dynasty
were held up to the universal execration of their fellow-countrymen
under the title of "Jos afrancesados" while the notables who had
refused Napoleon's invitation to Bayonne became at once objects of
popular adoration.
The insurrection on May 2 had compelled the French to retire
beyond the Ebro, but the Emperor placed such forces at his brother's
disposal as to enable him to reach his capital with ease. Marshal
Bessieres defeated the best Spanish army under General Cuesta at
Medina del Rio Seco, and Joseph entered Madrid on July 20. On
that very day, however, the French sustained the worst defeat with
which their arms had met since the Revolution, for General Dupont
was compelled at Bailen to surrender to General Castanos with
20,000 men.
In had been achieved by the regular Spanish
reality this victory
infantry, always renowned for its hard-fighting qualities, but it was
generally believed to have been won by armed peasants, and the news
that the French veterans had been defeated by such means roused the
greater enthusiasm. All over the Peninsula men sprang to arms.
In Portugal, too, there was disaster, for the country had risen against
the French, and the arrival of a British army compelled Junot, by the
Convention of Cintra in August, 1808, to evacuate that kingdom.
It hardly need be said that Napoleon was far from
expecting such
disasters, for he had become so accustomed to victory that he could
L 305
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
not understand the change in his affairs. He looked, however, on
these two events as of merely temporary importance, and proceeded
to the Congress of Erfurt. When this was over he determined to
visit Spain himself, and put an end to the opposition to Joseph.
at the head of an army of
Accordingly, he invaded the Peninsula
135,000 men, the pick of the French forces, and joined his brother,
who had left Madrid after the capitulation of Bailen, and had retreated
behind the Ebro. Napoleon marched straight upon the capital:
Marshal Soult defeated the Spanish army of the centre at Burgos;
Marshal Victor routed the Spanish army of the left at Espinosa;
and Marshal Lannes overwhelmed the Spanish army of the right at
Tudela. In spite of the snow, the Emperor forced the pass of the Somo
Sierra, and on December 4, 1808, received the capitulation of Madrid.
These victories, combined with the rapid and successful advance
on the capital, convinced Napoleon that the difficulties of the Spanish
war had been exaggerated, and the result of this impression was that
in after years he neglected to strengthen his armies in Spain suffi-
ciently, and attributed all failures to the incompetence
of his generals
instead of to the warlike qualities of his opponents.
After occupying Madrid the French Emperor next determined to
turn his strength against the English forces in the Peninsula. Almost
the first thought of the Spanish patriots had been to look to Great
Britain for help, and already in June the representatives of the
Province of Asturias had arrived in London. Canning and his
colleagues in the Cabinet at once realised the importance of what had
happened, and it was decided to send to the Peninsula an army that
had originally been intended for Venezuela. Peace was made with
Spain, and Hookham Frere, who had been British minister at Lisbon
for some years, was appointed to act as intermediary between the
Foreign Office and the Spaniards.
Sir John Moore had assumed the command of the British forces in
October, and his instructions were to co-operate with the Spanish
armies that were then holding the line of the Ebro. Owing to such
circumstances as the difficulty of securing the necessary transport,
Moore's advance was extremely slow, and by the middle of Novem-
ber the British army had not got any farther than Salamanca. By that
time, as has been shown, the whole position had changed for the
worse. Moore, somewhat unaccountably, spent four whole weeks at
Salamanca, where the news of the successive disasters reached him,
and he determined to make an attack upon the French lines of
communication. The only result of this was to postpone, rather than
prevent, the French occupation of Andalusia, while Moore eventually
had to retreat to Corunna. A battle was fought there in January,
1
809, to protect the embarkation of the British, and in it Moore
himself was killed.
While these events were taking place in the West, Saragossa had
been holding out in a manner wfich augured ill for the final success
306
 REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION
of the French, and it was only after the most desperate resistance
that the city was captured in February, 1809. In Aragon and Cata-
lonia the campaign chiefly consisted of the reduction of small fort-
resses, which invariably resisted fiercely, although in the open field
the Spaniards were always defeated. From Madrid Joseph acted in
two different directions. Marshal Moncey took Valencia; Marshal
Victor defeated Cuesta at Medellin; and General Sebastian! prepared
to invade Andalusia.
In order to prevent this last stroke, Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was
now British commander-in-chief, invaded Spain from Portugal, and
in July defeated the French at Talavera. He was not, however, able
to effect his object. In November the Spaniards were routed at
Ocaria, and the whole of Andalusia, with the exception of Gibraltar
and Cadiz, fell into the hands of the French.
The years 1810-1811 marked the height of French power in Spain.
During almost the whole of this period Wellington, as Sir Arthur
Wellesley had now become, was forced to remain on the defence in
Portugal. On the other hand, Joseph only exercised his sway over
the districts where his brother's bayonets were present to support it.
He had even less hold over the country than the Archduke Charles a
century before, for there was no province upon which he could
count. The French lines of communication were constantly being
cut, stragglers were killed, and so active were the guerrilleros that
before long it was unsafe to send a letter from France with an escort
of anything less than two hundred men.
Even so, it might have been possible for Joseph to have established
himself had Napoleon appreciated the true nature of Spanish warfare,
but, as it was, the Emperor tried to direct the
campaigns from Paris,
and he never trusted any one of his marshals enough to give him a
free hand. For the rest, all the benefits conferred by Joseph counted
for nothing, and the Spaniards would accept neither the abolition of
the Inquisition nor of feudalism, neither refigious tolerance nor good
laws, from a foreign monarch imposed by Napoleon.
In the South only Cddiz still held out, but in the East there were
still a few organised Spanish forces in the field. In 1810 and 1811
Suchet campaigned in Aragon and Valencia, and defeated a Spanish
army under General Blake at Albufera. In the next year Napoleon's
pre-occupation with Russia gave Wellington and the Spaniards their
chance.
First Ciudad Rodrigo, and then Badajoz, were taken from the
French, and in July, Wellington won an important victory over
Marmont at Salamanca. This caused Joseph to evacuate Madrid,
and after withdrawing all his troops from Andalusia he fell back
behind the Ebro. Wellington occupied the capital, and then advanced
upon Burgos, which, however, aefied all attempts to capture it.
Once more the British had to retire to Portugal, and Joseph returned
to Madrid for the last time.
3<>7
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

While campaign was being fought Lord William Bentinck,

this
who commanded the British forces in Sicily, was requested to make
a diversion on the East coast of Spain. The operations, however,
were badly combined, for Sir John Murray was driven from before
Tarragona, and subsequently Lord William
himself failed to make
any impression on Sucnet's position at Alicante.
When the campaigning season opened in 1813 it was clear that
Napoleon's sun was setting, and the progress
of events in Central
rendered it impossible for any further assistance to be given
Europe
to Joseph by his brother. Wellington accordingly broke up his
quarters in the early summer,
and marched North-East with the
intention of cutting the communications between Madrid and
France. This move had the desired effect. Joseph fled from the
capital with all the troops
he could collect, and attempted, as on
previous occasions, to hold the line of the Ebro. Wellington, how-
ever, turned the French positions on that river, and in June he over-
threw Joseph and Marshal Jourdan at Vittoria.
This victory sealed the fate of the French in the Peninsula, for not
only did Joseph retreat at once into France, but Suchet had to
abandon Valencia, and fell back through Aragon and Catalonia to the
French frontier. In the West the advance or Wellington was rapid*
San Sebastian fell into his hands on the last day of August, and by
the end of the year Bayonne was invested. The War of Independence
was over.
The efforts of the Spaniards themselves in this war have rarely
received recognition. When it began, the military establishment of
the country consisted of 80,000 troops of the line, including 16,000
cavalry, and 30,000 militia; but the ranks were far from being
complete, and the total effective force, including; the militia, was under
100,000 men. From this number were to be deducted 16,000 under
the Marquis of Romana in Holstein, 6,000 in Tuscany, or on the
march from there to the North of Germany, and the garrisons of the
Canary and Balearic Islands, so that the actual number of troops that
could be brought into the field did not at the utmost exceed 70,000.
When it is further remembered that the departure of the Royal
Family had thrown the whole administration into chaos, the resis-
tance made to the French in the first year of the war is the more
remarkable. The Spaniards were left to bear alone the brunt of the
attack by the Europe, for Sir John Moore signally
finest troops in
failed to co-operate with them. Thereafter, with their old army
broken up, they were forced to fight as irregulars, and in this
capacity the Spaniards were invaluable. What is surprising, in view
ofthe history of the two previous decades, is not that the Spaniards
did so little in the War of Independence, but that they were able to do
so much.
Meanwhile, the struggle against Napoleon was not without impor-
tant results from the constitutional point of view. The whole admini-
308
 REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION
stration of the government had for so long been centred in the
monarch that when he was removed no one knew 'who was to
exercise authority in his place. The Council of Castile made a
hesitating attempt to secure the reins of power, but it was too
uncertain of its position, and some of its members were too strongly
suspected of sympathy with the invader for the effort to be successful.
Meanwhile/ftw/rfj- sprang up all over Spain as the struggle against the
French proceeded, and they owed a more or less nominal allegiance
to a Junta Central^ which cnanged its place of meeting according to
the vicissitudes of the military situation. This body, be it noted, was
intensely loyal to Ferdinand, and all business was transacted in his
name.
In 1 8 10 the Junta Central repaired to Cddiz., which at that time was
one of the few towns still in the hands of the patriots, and resigned
its power to a Council of Regency ; but before doing so it convoked a
Cortes of all Spain in two houses, which were later reduced to a
single chamber. This was a purely revolutionary measure, since no
such body was known to the constitution, for the union of the
crowns of Aragon and Castile had not been followed by the forma-
tion of a single Cortes as had been the case when Leon and Castile
became united.
When the assembly met in September, 1810, it at once became
evident that two parties were for mastery: on the one side
struggling
were those who realised how little Spain desired representative
government, and how angry Ferdinand would be at such a step
having been taken in his absence, while on the other were the men
who were infected with the ideas to which the French Revolution
had given birth, and who were determined to take advantage of the
suspension of all regukr government to put them into practice. The
strength of this latter lay in the seaports, which have always been
the home of Radicalism, and, as they were at that time almost the
only part of Spain able to send representatives to the Cortes, it is
not surprising that the extremists had a
majority
on that body.
The Council of Regency soon found itself unable to work with the
new masters of the country, and resigned, only, however, to be
succeeded by another more in harmony with the views of the larger
part of the deputies. At length, in 1812, the Cortes completed the
work upon which it had been engaged, to the almost complete
neglect of the conduct of the war against Napoleon, and promulgated
the memorable Constitution which has since taken its name from the
year that saw its birth.
The main points of this extraordinary document were that Spain
was to be governed by a moderate hereditary monarchy, with the
right of making laws vested in the Crown and one chamber, and for
the election of the latter all males over twenty-five were to possess
the franchise, while the actual selection of the deputies was indirect,
and involved four separate processes. Whether this constitution
309
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

would have worked in a country that had been accustomed to

several centuries is a moot point,
representative government for
but that it was totally unsuited to Spain at the beginning of the
nineteenth century cannot for a moment be in doubt. It placed in
a subordinate position both the King and the Church, and yet these
were the only two institutions which the country had known since
the days of Ferdinand and Isabel.
More important thfr^ the actual details of the Constitution of 1812,
for proved quite useless when put in practice, is the influence
it
which it came to exercise over the politics of Southern Europe. For
nearly a generation after the fall of Napoleon every popular rising,
not only in Spain itself, but in Portugal, Piedmont, and Naples,
demanded the immediate enactment of the Constitution of 1812,
and it was not until the rise of Republicanism in the middle of the
century that it began to pass into oblivion.
It soon became apparent that the opponents of this measure had

gauged the feelings of their countrymen more accurately than those

who supported it, for, as the provinces were liberated from the
French, and their deputies began to attend the Cortes, the Liberal
majority rapidly sank, while the members of that party became
more violent in their demands when they realised that power was
passing from them. Such was the case when the Cortes was dissolved
and a new one was elected in October, 1813. The most desperate
efforts of the Liberals had only secured them a very narrow majority
in the new house, and they were at once faced by the prospect of
Ferdinand's immediate return from exile.
In vain they attempted to regulate his movements, and to compel
him to take an oath to observe the Constitution of 1812. Ferdinand
temj>orised until he had ascertained for himself the state of public
opinion, but his journey through Catalonia was so triumphal a
progress that he realised there was no further need for procrastina-
tion, and at Valencia, in May, 1814, he condemned the Constitution,
restoring the old order in its entirety. The step was accompanied
by the arrest of all the leading Liberals, and thus brought to an end
a by no means unimportant epoch in Spanish history.
Ferdinand returned to the Peninsula almost entirely unknown to
his subjects, and himself realising little of the changes which had
been brought about by six years of war. He had, of course, made a
serious blunder in not withdrawing into Andalusia in 1808, and so
putting himself at the head of the national resistance to the invader.
The French invasion, however, had obliterated from the memory of
most Spaniards the behaviour of the Royal Family in 1808, and of the
even more disgraceful events which had
preceded it, and few restored
monarchs have returned from exile with greater advantages than
Ferdinand VII.
Unfortunately, he was not the man to avail himself of the favour-
able circumstances in which he was placed, for, although he was not
310
 REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION
the monster his opponents have painted, he was obstinate and
narrow-minded. He was also addicted to low company, and replaced
the ministers by a personal council, consisting, for the most part, of
men of little worth. The King's anger after his return was princi-
pally directed against the afrancesados and the Liberals. The former
must have repented bitterly of the step they had taken, for during the
reign of Joseph the burden of taxation had fallen entirely upon them,
since it was from them alone that it was possible for the invader's
government to collect the revenue, while after the return of Fer-
dinand they were treated as public enemies, and those who had not
taken the precaution of following Joseph into France were left* to
face the prison and the scaffold.
The King's hand was no less heavy upon the Liberals, and he
made no difference between the moderates and the extremists, so
that the same dungeon held both the Jacobin and the supporter of
constitutional monarchy. In short, Ferdinand had neither the men
nor the skill to govern the country on the old lines, and although
sporadic Liberal revolts were easily crushed, it soon became evident
that some change must take place before long*
In international aflkirs Spain stood alone, and at the Congress of
Vienna she was refused the position and the vote of a first-class
Power. No support was given to the claim of a member of. the
Spanish Royal Family to the Duchy of Parma. The district and
fortress of Olivenza, near Badajoz, was assigned to Portugal in spite
of Spanish protests. The slave trade, on which the prosperity of a
large part of her colonies depended, was abolished. The small con-
tingent under Castafios which she sent to France during the Hundred
Days was scornfully sent back to its own side of the frontier.
Meanwhile, the American colonies were in revolt, and Ferdinand
was thus unable to gain any laurels abroad which might restore his
prestige at home. In addition, the country was exhausted by the long
struggle to regain its independence, and the moral and social anarchy
was even more marked than the political and economic chaos. At the
same time, Ferdinand was not personally unpopular with the large
majority of his subjects, and it was not the despotism of the restored
monarchy which precipitated the crisis, but its stupidity; and the
first blow was struck by its own chosen implement, the army.
In 1819, Ferdinand determined to make one last attempt to re-
assert his authority in America, and for that purpose all the available
forces were concentrated at Cadiz. Unfortunately, the Spanish
marine had been so that there were no transports available,
neglected
and the troops were kept in idleness pending the arrival of some
ships which nad been sent by the Czar of Russia. The army was
honeycombed with masonic lodges and secret societies, which had
penetrated into Spain and spread there as a result of the French
invasion, and during this period of enforced inactivity, revolutionary
propaganda was particularly effective.
31*
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

On New Year's Day, 1820, Rafael Riego, an Asturian battalion

commander, raised the standard of revolt, by proclaiming the Con-
stitution of 1812. At first the attempt met with little success, and its
author was compelled to take to flignt, but at the very moment when
the Liberal cause appeared to be most hopeless the towns began to
rally to it. Ferdinand was too astute
not to realise that opposition
would be futile, and might prove dangerous, so he took an oath to
observe the Constitution. There was little or no popular feeling
behind the revolutionary movement, which was, in fact, the first of a
long series of prontmdamientos> which have ever since marred the
progress of Spain.
The Cortes met in July, and among its members were thirteen
deputies who had been chosen to represent the American colonies,
although most of the latter had already asserted their independence.
At first men of moderate views were in the majority, but, as in the
case of all revolutionary movements, the power soon passed into
the hands of the extremists, Riego was the hero of the Radical mobs,
and the position of Ferdinand was becoming perilous when a Liberal
attack on the Church gave the Royalists an opportunity to recover
much of the ground which they had lost.
To the pohtical demands of the Liberals the majority of the nation
was indifferent, and those who took any interest in such matters
probably supported the reformers, but when the Church was called
into the question every peasant realised that a vital principle was at
stake, Ferdinand's adherents formed ^s, junta apostolica^ and com-
menced to harass their opponents at all points.
The progress of events in Spain soon attracted the attention of the
other Powers, not least because the Spanish rising had been followed
by revolts in Naples and Piedmont: in the former the Constitution
or 1812 had been proclaimed by the revolutionaries, although there
was not a single copy of it in the kingdom. It was in these circum-
stances that the Congress of Verona met in October, 1822, and the
story of its transactions may be briefly told.
The French representative opened the proceedings by asking for a
definition of the attitude which the other countries would adopt if
France found herself compelled to intervene in the Peninsula. To
this Austria, Prussia, and Russia replied that they would
support such
action by withdrawing their representatives from Madrid, but they
hesitated to promise any material aid, which suited the policy of the
French government very well indeed, as that was the last thing it
wanted.
Wellington, who represented Great Britain, took the opposite
line, and declared that his government would not be committed in
advance to the approval of the attitude of any other Power. This
attitude convinced both Louis XVIII and the Holy Alliance that
nothing was to be expected from England, and when Wellington
declared that the British Minister at Madrid would confine himself to
 REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION
allaying the ferment which the communications of the other Powers
must inevitably excite, they excluded him from the more private
deliberations. Finally, the Holy Alliance gave France a free hand in
Spain, of which she was not slow to avail herself,
The moment was extremely propitious for intervention. Once
they had attained power the Spanish Liberals had proved themselves
just as intolerant as Ferdinand, and considerably more incompetent.
While their leaders were corresponding with Bentham as to the
principles upon which the new code was to be based, anarchy pre-
vailed all over the laiid and in every branch of the administration.
The which followed fat pronunciamiento of Riego were marked
years
by a of coups d*etaty clianges of ministry, riots, and revolts
series
which, combined with the anti-clericalism of the country's new
rulers, helped to fan the flames of civil war.
The Inquisition, which had been revived by Ferdinand, was,
indeed, again abolished, but when the Madrid mob broke into its
prisons to release the martyrs for civil and religious liberty, all they
found there, apart from a few hams and some barrels of wine, was a
French priest, whose extravagant royalism had culminated in a crazy
mysticism; this individual was comfortably housed in an attic, which
he was most reluctant to forsake.
Intervention in Spain was popular with almost all sections of
French opinion* The more extreme Royalists wished to lend aid to
a King in difficulties with his subjects; the army clamoured for a re-
newal of the glories it had known under Napoleon; and the bour-
geoisie was anxious for the fate of the 200,000,000 francs which it had
invested in a Spanish loan. In January, 1823, Louis XVIII announced
to the Chambers that he had withdrawn his ambassador from Madrid,
and that about 100,000 Frenchmen were about to march "invoking
the God of St. Louis, for the sake of preserving the throne of Spain
to a descendant of Henry IV, and of reconciling that fine kingdom
with Europe,"
In April the French army, under the command of the Duke of
Angouleme, crossed the Bidassoa. It was the first time for thirty-four
years that French troops had marched under the Bourbon lilies, and
there was some doubt how they would behave. At the frontier they
were met by a party of Bonapartist exiles carrying the tricolour, but
they showed no hesitation at firing upon the flag of the Revolution,
and from that instant the result of the campaign was not in doubt.
The French progress proved to be little more than a military
promenade. Angouleme's plan was to press forward to Madrid as
rapidly as possible, leaving corps of observation to mask the fortified
cities on his road, in order to allow the government no time to
mature its pkn of defence, and, above all, to prevent the assembling
of guerrilla bands. This strategy, which is said to have been sug-
gested privately by Wellington during the Congress of Verona, was
entirely successful.
313
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

The Cortes, taking Ferdinand with them, fled to Seville, and by

the end of May, the French were in Madrid. In other parts of the
Peninsula the scattered Spanish forces were dealt with in detail, and
by the middle of June the Cortes had retired to Cadiz, where they
the French, who had been
kept the King in captivity. In August
in earnest, and on
blockading Cadiz for some weeks, began the siege
1 stormed the Trocadero, the key to the city. Fighting
August 3 they
continued for a little longer, but by the end of September all resist-
ance was at an end, and Ferdinand was at liberty.
Before the King was released he had taken an oath to grant a
general amnesty, but as soon as
he was free he ignored it on the
that it had been obtained from him by force. The most
ground
all who had been impli-
rigorous methods were adopted towards
cated in the recent disturbances, and such severity was used as thor-
oughly to disgust the Duke of Angouleme, who finally showed his
disapproval of the King's proceedings by refusing
the decorations
offered him for his services.
The principal figure in the administration during
the last ten
years was Calomarde, who, as Minister of Justice, was responsible
for the persecution of the Liberals. That the means he employed
were violent cannot be denied, but they were no worse than those
of his opponents during their tenure of power, and at least the
country was not troubled by civil war. Indeed, there was a very
krge section of Spanish opinion which held that Ferdinand was too
moderate, and the "Society of the Exterminating Angel" was formed
for the purpose which its title sufficiently indicates. This develop-
ment left the King midway between the more extreme Absolutists
and the Constitutionalists, and he endeavoured to retain this position.
It was not without considerable justification that he told a French
ambassador that in upholding absolutism he was in agreement with
the majority of his subjects, and that it was only with the greatest
difficulty that he had been able to prevent a second revival of the
Inquisition.
The personal popularity of Ferdinand was never in question. The
French troops were finally withdrawn in 1828, but the King had no
difficulty in maintaining himself even after the triumph of Liberalism
in France in July, 1830. He spent the winter of 1827-1828 in Barce-
lona, and then took an extended tour of the kingdom, being every-
where received with acclamation. Nor was the administration during
this latter period of the reign by any means contemptible. The court
was not at all extravagant, and the skilful finance of Ballesteros
gradu-
ally repaired the damage caused by a generation of war and revolu-
tion. This minister drew up a code of commercial law, appointed
consuls to represent the country abroad, founded an Exchange, and
promoted the first exhibition of Spanish industries. Economy was
the order of the day, and in its interests Ferdinand even allowed a
considerable reduction in the army, although he appeared to run
3*4
 REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION
great risks in so doing. Prosperity was followed by contentment, and
those who desired a change were a mere handful.
Although Ferdinand had been married three times he was still
childless, and the heir to the throne was his brother, Don Carlos,
to whom the Absolutists looked as their leader. In 1830, however,
the King entered into matrimony once more, on this occasion with
Maria Cristina of Naples, and in due course it was announced that
the Queen was expecting a child. This event at once raised a con-
stitutional problem of the first importance, for the principle of the
succession to the crown'had not been settled; indeed, it was still very
much open to question.
The Sietc Partidas of Alfonso X had recognised the right of
females to succeed to the throne of Castile and Leon in default of
male heirs of an equally near degree of consanguinity, and that this
right had also been admitted in practice is proved by the succession
oflsabel I : it was recognised, too, in Aragon, for the claim of Charles
I was through his mother, Juana the Mad. With the advent of the
Bourbons a change was made, and in 1713 Philip V introduced the
Salic Law, which established the French procedure. The matter
was still further complicated by the fact that, for some obscure
reason, Charles IV, in 1789, convoked the Cortes in secret session,
and, on his initiative, a resolution was passed asking him to revert
to the old order of succession, but the necessary decree had never
been promulgated.
In March, 1830, Ferdinand VII promulgated the Pragmatic Sanc-
tion of Charles IV, and in June of the same year, he made a will in
which he left the crown to his unborn child. Don Carlos could not,
and did not, object to the principle of leaving the crown by will, for
it was owing to an act of this nature on the part of Charles II that
the Bourbons were in the Peninsula, but he protested against the
promulgation of the Pragmatic Sanction. He denied that it was
genuine, and declared that, in any case, since he was alive at the date
of its enactment it could not be retrospective. Ferdinand at one time
gave way, and revoked the Pragmatic Sanction, but he eventually
destroyed the revocation, and when his daughter, Isabel, was born,
he recognised her as his heir.
In 1833, the King died, and thus, in his own words, the cork
was removed from the fermenting and surcharged bottle of Spain.
Ferdinand VII was certainly not the inhuman monster of Liberal
historians, but he did his country a great disservice when he altered
the order of succession, even if his act may to some extent be
extenuated on the score of parental affection.

315
 CHAPTER XXXVII

The Loss of America

later years of the eighteenth century were marked by more

than one rising in America against Spanish rule. It is true that
THE there had always been sporadjf revolts due to local or tem-
the reign of Charles III and his son talk
porary causes, but during
of independence first began to be heard. Not only had the reforms
of the former monarch, as has been shown in an earlier chapter,
created smaller units of government, but by abolishing many of the
old restrictions upon commerce they had whetted the appetite of the
colonists for unshackled trade with all the world.
The most formidable rebellion, however, was not of the Creoles
but of Tupac Amaru, who claimed descent from the Incas, and
wished to revive their empire. The struggle lasted during the greater
part of 1780-1781, and at one
time more than jo,ooo Indians were in
arms, and the rising was only suppressed with the greatest difficulty.
The establishment of the United States was also by no means
without its influence upon Spanish America, and Aranda, in 1783,
advised Charles III to make such concessions as might serve to
prevent this growing feeling of nationalism from becoming hostile
to the Spanish connection. His project was to bring direct rule in
America to an end, and to create kingdoms in Mexico, Peru, and
New Granada for the Infantes. The King of Spain was to take the
title of Emperor, and to make a Family Pact with these new
monarchs: there was also to be a commercial treaty to which
France, but not Great Britain, was to be a party.
Nothing came of this scheme, but it was revived in 1804 by
Godoy in a slightly different form; there was to be no commercial
treaty, and the Infantes were merely to be regents. The series of
catastrophes that befell Spain shortly afterwards caused this plan, too,
to be consigned to oblivion.
Great Britain had not failed to take advantage of the growing
discontent in Spanish America, and Francisco Miranda, the Vene-
zuelan patriot, had for some time been urging Pitt to assist his fellow-
countrymen to break with Spain. In 1806 a British force under Sir
Home Popham captured Buenos Aires, but was soon driven out
again, not by regular troops, but by the colonists themselves, a
fact which gave an enormous impetus to the separatist movement.
At the beginning of the following year fresh troops came out from
England, and Montevideo was taken. General Whitelocke then
arrived to take supreme command, but he proved so incompetent
that within a few short weeks not only had he failed to retake Buenos
Aires, but he had lost the greater part of his army, and had been
forced to surrender Montevideo.
These failures, together with the arguments of Miranda, caused
 THE LOSS OF AMERICA
the British Government to direct its attention farther North, and as
soon as Canning was installed at the Foreign Office it was decided to
send a large force to Venezuela under the command of Sir Arthur
Wellesley. The outbreak of the War of Independence, of course,
put an end to these schemes, for Great Britain could not encourage
her ally's colonists to revolt, but the little aid that Spain had been able
to afford the latter when danger threatened was not forgotten.
The greater part of the Spanish colonies in America were, there-
fore, ripe for revolt in the early years of the nineteenth century,
and it only required a.spark to cause a conflagration. The attitude of
Spain towards Napoleon revealed only too clearly the weakness of
the government in the Peninsula, while the confusion which resulted
in America from orders sent simultaneously by Charles IV, Joseph
Bonaparte, and Ferdinand VTI served materially to loosen the ties
between the colonies and the mother country. To give the junta
central\te due it realised the danger, and by a decree of January, 1809,
it was announced that the American colonies were an integral part
of the monarchy, and, as provinces, were entitled to direct representa-
tion on the Cortes. Three individuals from each capital were to be
selected by the municipalities, and from them the representative to
the Cortes was to be chosen. Ordinances were also enacted to
mitigate the restrictions which existed in respect of the commerce
and trade of the colonies.
Whether this change of policy would have prevented the spread of
separatist feeling it is impossible to say, for a year later the Regency
abolished the ordinances. This emboldened the independence party
among the colonists to make a supreme effort to obtain for them-
selves that freedom which they now considered it hopeless to expect
under Spanish rule.
Caracas, where Miranda had already secured many followers, was
the scene of the origin of the movement which culminated in the
independence of the Spanish colonies. In April, 1810, the municipal
council of that town was constituted into a junta > and refused to
recognise the authority of the Regency, though it still expressed
itsloyalty to Ferdinand VII. Further complications were caused by
the arrival of emissaries from Joseph, who demanded the recognition
of his right to the crown on the part of Venezuela.
The real leader of the rebellion in this part of America was Simon
Bolivar, a man who came from the highest ranks of the colonial
aristocracy. Although he had been born as recently as 1783, Bolivar
had travelled extensively in Europe, and shortly after the outbreak of
the Venezuelan revolt he visited/ England in the hope of obtaining
aid against the Spaniards. In this he was unsuccessful, as the British
Government was the ally of Spain, but when he returned to Vene-
zuela he managed to bring a small supply of arms and ammunition
with him.
For some years the war was marked for both sides by alternating
317
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

triumphs and defeats* At first the Spaniards

were quite unable to
with the revolutionary movement, but two years later General
cope
Monteverde recovered control of the greater part of Venezuela, and
by 1812 the cause of the rebels appeared gloomy in the extreme.
What was taking place was, in fact, civil war, and this explains the
vicissitudes which marked the struggle. This aspect of the revolu-
tionary movement has become obscured owing to the latter's
triumph, but almost to the end no inconsiderable number of
Americans remained loyal to the Spanish connection, and, as in all
civil wars, a change of sides on the part of the combatants was by
no means infrequent.
More and more the cause of the rebels became personified by
Bolivar. When Monteverde appeared to have Venezuela in his grip
Bolivar, who had sought asylum in Curagoa, collected all the refugees
from Venezuela and New Granada, and landed with some 800
followers at Cartagena. He marched from that town into Venezuela,
where he was joined by many thousand volunteers, and in a series of
battles routed the Spanish forces. In August, 1813, Bolivar entered
Caracas in triumph, and was proclaimed dictator until such time as
Venezuela could unite with New Granada.
Once more there was a reverse of fortune, for in an energetic
campaign the Spanish General Boves caused Bolivar to evacuate
Venezuela and retire to Cartagena. By this time the War of Inde-
pendence in the Peninsula was at an end, and Ferdinand VII,
restored to his throne, made the necessary preparations to re-estab-
lish his authority in America. Venezuela and New Granada, being
the parts of that continent most easy of access, were indicated as
the first field for these efforts at'reconquest, and Bolivar was accord-
ingly appointed Captain-General of both provinces.
At this point those differences which so often divided the colonists
during their struggle with Spain once more made their appearance,
with the result that, in spite of some early successes, Bolivar was
compelled to retire to Jamaica, and by the end of 181 5 the Spaniards
were in occupation of Cartagena itself. This catastrophe impressed
upon the rebels the necessity of union, and they once more turned to
Bolivar. He organised a naval expedition, which succeeded in
defeating the Spaniards, and he then landed in Venezuela, where he
wasjoined by Paez.
The latter was one of the most remarkable figures in the American
revolt against Spain, and he has become something in the nature of a
legend in Venezuela. On one occasion he captured a whole flotilla of
Spanish gunboats on the Apure river by swimming his cavalry out
and ordering them to board the ships on another he was credited
:

with having killed forty Spaniards himself in one fight. The com-
bination of Bolivar and Paez was a fortunate one for the insurgents,
though it was not until the end of 1818 that the fortune of war
definitely inclined in their favour. In that year L6pez M6ndez re-
318
 THE LOSS OF AMERICA
cruited in Europe some 9000 men for the revolutionary cause, and
their arrival definitely turned the scale.
From 1818 the success of the rebels was never in doubt. Victory
after victory was gained by the revolutionary armies, and in Decem-
ber, 1819, New Granada and Venezuela were united under the name
of the Republic of Colombia. For a time the Spaniards struggled
to retrieve the situation, but in 1821 they were crushed at the battle
of Carabobo and the remnants of their force retired to Puerto Cabello,
where they eventually surrendered. In the same year the constitution
of Colombia was formally ratified, and Bolivar was proclaimed
President.
He realised, if the
however, that independence of Colombia was
to be maintained was essential that the Spaniards should be entirely
it
driven out of America, and his first act was to organise an expedition
to Ecuador. The turning-point of this campaign was the battle of
Kchincha in 1822, where General Sucre overthrew the Spaniards,
and by the end of that year Spanish rule in Ecuador was a thing of the
past.
Bolivar was determined to do in Peru what he had effected in
Ecuador. Peru was the citadel of Spanish rule in America, and
unless it were captured the provinces which had already achieved
their independence would never feel safe. The insurgents in Chile
and Argentina had already made some impression in that quarter,
and in 1820 a fleet under the command of Lord Cochrane had
defeated the Spaniards at sea, with the result that a force of 5000 men
commanded by the Argentine General San Martin had been able, in
1821, to capture Lima. Nevertheless, the Spaniards maintained a
stout resistance at Callao and elsewhere, and it could still be said
that they were in effective occupation of Peru.
In 1824 the final battles were fought which put an end to the
Spanish rule in this part of America. In August, Bolivar gained a
decisive victory at Junin, and in December, General Sucre at Aya-
cucho completely overthrew the Spanish forces, capturing the Vice-
roy himself, and all the principal civil and military officials. Sucre
then proceeded to Bolivia, or Upper Peru as it was then called, and
in a very short time he had completed the subjugation of that pro-
vince, which in 1825 became an independent republic with Sucre
as its President.
In the South of the continent the struggle was prolonged, not so
much owing to the resistance of the Spaniards and their supporters,
as because of the differences in the ranks of the insurgents. In 1810 a
revolt broke out in Argentina, when the French conquest of the
mother-country appeared complete, and the Viceroy retired from
Buenos Aires to Montevideo, which remained in Spanish hands for
four years longer. Fighting continued between the partisans of
Spain and those of separation until 18x6, when a congress at Tucu-
mdn proclaimed Puyredon dictator, and in July of that year the Act of
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Independence of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Pkta was

ratified.

Paraguay, on the other hand, secured her freedom from Spain with-
out a fight. Isolated as she was in the centre of the continent, and
with the respect for authority which the Jesuits had inculcated still a
did not take readily to the idea of revolu-
powerful factor, Paraguay
tion. When, therefore, in 1810, an Argentine army attempted to
free Paraguay, that country showed no desire to be freed, and the
invaders were defeated in a pitched battle some forty miles from
Asuncion. The course of events elsewhere, however, soon began to
exercise its influence, with the result that in the summer of 1811
Paraguay too proclaimed its independence, and Rodriguez de
Francia entered upon his long dictatorship.
In Chile the movement in favour of independence may be said to
have begun in 1 8 10, and at first the insurgents appeared to be carrying
everything before them. Three years later General Paroja re-estab-
lished the authority of Spain, and it became clear that without
outside help Chile would never be able to overthrow Spanish rule.
Accordingly, the aid of Argentina was invoked, and in 1817 San
Martin crossed the Andes with an army 4000 strong. The Spaniards
were defeated at Chacabuco, and the independence of Chile was
officially proclaimed. The war, however, was not yet over, for a
Spanish army from Peru inflicted a serious defeat on San Martin,
which came within an ace of robbing him of the fruits of his cam-
paign, before it was itself routed at Maypti. in April, 1818. This
victory finally secured the independence of Chile.
In Mexico the rule of Spain had been undermined for many years
before the final collapse took place, and it is difficult to resist the
conclusion that it was the policy of Charles HI which made inde-
pendence possible. There, even more than in the rest of the
Americas, the Spanish domination rested on the Church, and the
suppression of the Jesuits struck a blow at its very foundations. The
treatment meted out to them shocked the leading colonists, who were
mostly their old pupils. The mass of the population remained un-
affected, and the Jesuits had a sufficient number of enemies even
among the clergy, who were only too pleased to assist in their
destruction. The King thus received plenty of support at the time,
but in attacking the Jesuits he was in reality weakening the position
of the Church as a whole, for the royal authority and the ecclesiastical
were inseparable.
Then came the War of American Independence, which, for geo-
graphical reasons, meant far more to the Mexicans than to those who
fived in distant South America. Finally, in order the better to protect
the Viceroyaltv against British attack, Charles permitted the forma-
tion of a creole and mestizo militia.
Spanish regular officers might,
and did, sneer at this force, but the militia provided the nucleus of the
armies that established Mexican independence.
320
 THE LOSS OF AMERICA
Such was the position when the news that Spain was a mere
puppet in the hands of Napoleon began to filter out to Mexico, and
there were unmistakable signs that Spanish rule was approaching its
end. One of the later Viceroys even entered into a conspiracy with
the Creoles to bring about colonial but the audiencia
self-government,
deposed him, and sent him back to Spain. In 1807 Mexico remained
loyal to Ferdinand VII, but there were no Spanish troops in the
country, and it began to act for itself.
Independence would probably have been proclaimed, as in
Argentina, two years later when Napoleon appeared finally to have
made himself master of the Peninsula, but for the revolt of a half-
crazy priest called Hidalgo. This individual led an Indian rising
against the Creoles and mestizos^ and he committed such excesses
during the course of it as to rally the menaced classes to the Viceroy
and the existing order. Hidalgo was eventually defeated and put to
death, and for a little time longer the fiction of Spanish rule
continued.
What caused the final breach was the events of 1820. The revival
of the Constitution of 1 8 1 2 alarmed the clergy, for the men who were
now in power in Spain were the declared enemies of the Church,
whose property it was their known intention to secularise. In these
circumstances the Mexican clergy hesitated no longer, but threw in
their lot with the party of independence. The Spanish
regime
collapsed like a house of cards. A few soldiers continued to hold the
fortress at San Juan de Ulloa for a time simply because the Mexicans
had no naval force, and the castle stands on an island, opposite Vera
Cruz. The Viceroy himself, however, signed a document which
announced the end of the old order which he represented. There
can also be little doubt but that the sale of Florida to the United
States by Ferdinand in 1819 had been regarded by the Mexicans as
further proof of the weakness of Spain, and so had the more en-
couraged those who desired separation.
As soon as the Spanish colonies began to rise against the mother-
country it was only natural that the other Powers should begin to
fish in the troubled waters. The Holy Alliance desired that the rule
of Spain should be restored in some form as iin assertion of the
legitimist principle; France was influenced by much the same
motives, though in her case the wish to obtain commercial advan-
tages in the Americas was the predominant factor in her policy;
and Great Britain and the United States were determined that if
Ferdinand could not reduce his rebellious subjects to obedience by
his own efforts, no other monarch should aid him in the task.
Many schemes were discussed at one time or another, and in 1820
France was in negotiation both with Madrid and Buenos Aires for
the establishment of the Duke of Lucca, who had been temporarily
dispossessed of Parma in favour of Napoleon's widow, the
upon
throne of Argentina. Castlereagh protested vigorously against this

321
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

proposal, and one of his last acts before his death was to recognise
the Spanish colonial flags.
The year 1823 was decisive, for the French invasion of the Penin-
sula determined Canning, who had succeeded Castlereagh at the
Foreign Office, to prevent the Duke of AngoulSme from repeating
his Spanish triumph on American soil. Accordingly, he made adroit
use of President Monroe's message to Congress to impress upon
Europe the fact of Anglo-American solidarity, which was non-
existent, and he gained his point. The British command of the sea
prevented France or the Holy Alliance from coming to Ferdinand's
assistance in the New World, and in 1824 the issue was decided at
Ayacucho. Many years, however, elapsed before Spain officially
recognised the independence of her late colonies.
In view of her own internal weakness it is remarkable that Spain
should have been able to maintain the struggle in America for so
long, and she would not have been able to do so had it not been for
the strength of the royalist party among the colonists. In short, the
contest which resulted in the independence of the Spanish colonies
was a civil war, and the support which the King of Spain was able to
afford to those who were fighting his battles was at all times negli-
gible from a military standpoint.

322
 CHAPTER xxxvrn

Isabel II (1833-1868)

the will of Ferdinand VII his widow, Cristina, who was her-
only twenty-seven years of age, became Regent for their
BY self
infant daughter, Isabel II. From the first it was clear that the
Carlists, as the supporters of Don Carlos were called, would contest
the succession of the new Queen, but they were handicapped by the
refusal of their leader to take any steps on his own behalf while his
brother was still alive.
In consequence, all the most important positions in the State were
already in the hands of the supporters of the Regent, who thus
enjoyed the enormous initial advantage that the whole machinery of
government was at her disposal. Don Carlos was a man of un-
compromising frankness and straightforward honesty, and his
absolute refusal to countenance any manoeuvring for position before
Ferdinand's death probably lost him the throne. One of the first
acts of the Regent was to outlaw her brother-in-law, and to confiscate
his property; to which Don Carlos, who was himself still in Portugal,
replied in November by calling upon his followers to take up arms.
This breach in the Royal Family was the cause of most of the
troubles which have afflicted Spain during the past century. It
weakened the monarchy by depriving it of the support of those who
were its natural defenders, and the throne was forced to rely upon
politicians and generals who wished to impose upon Spain a method
of government which was quite alien to her genius and to her
traditions. Moreover, the interference of the army in life
public
dates from the death of Ferdinand VII, and the pronunciamtento would
in all probability not have been so prominent a feature of Spanish
history had the throne been occupied by Don Carlos and his heirs.
The dependence of Isabel upon the Liberals also necessitated the
adoption of their anti-clerical policy, and this widened the gulf
between throne and altar which had existed since the days of Charles
III. In 1834-1835 there took place the first of those assaults on
convents and churches which have since been repeated on more than
one occasion. It marked the end of that close association between
Church and State which had been the keynote of the policy of Spain
in the days of her greatness.
Before considering the political history of the reign, however, some
account must be given of the efforts of the CarHsts to place their
leader on the throne
The summons to arms issued by Don Carlos precipitated the first
Carlist war. This was in the main a confused struggle, and was
carried on by small bodies of guerrilleros. Like all civil wars it was
marked by extremes of heroism and savagery, and on more than one
occasion local and personal jealousies played a greater part than
3*3
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

the principles which underlay the struggle. The war was centred in
two districts, one comprising the three Basque provinces, namely
Biscay, Alava, and Guiptizcoa, together with Navarre, and the other
comprising parts of Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon.
Tine force behind the Carlist cause was the wen-grounded fear of
the Basques that the establishment of a Liberal regime at Madrid
would result in the abolition of their fueros, or special privileges.
There was also the religious fervour which was excited by the anti-
clerical policy of the Regency, while the cause of Don Carlos also
appealed to the monarchical instincts of many Spaniards. In the
districts that supported his claim Don Carlos was recognised as
Charles V, and for some time regular administration existed in the
Carlist provinces. The was supplied by contributions from
treasury
the provinces which favoured Don Carlos, fines levied on Liberal
families and villages, customs-dues collected on the French frontier,
and gifts from foreign legitimists.
The war may be divided into two main periods, namely before and
after the first siege of Bilbao in June, 1835. In Biscay and Navarre
the Carlist leader was Tomds Zumalacdrregui, who had sacrificed his
commission in the army for the sake of Don Carlos. He was a man
of the finest character, and his support of the Carlist cause brought it
many adherents. In Castile and Arag6n the Carlist leaders were
Merino and Cabrera. For some months the war continued in a
fashion. The government generals endeavoured to draw
desultory
the CarHsts down to the plains, where they would be at a dis-
advantage in conflict with regular troops, while Zumalacarregui
resisted all attempts to conquer the provinces which were the
stronghold of Don Carlos.
The summer of 1835 was the high-water mark of Carlist success.
In May Don Carlos established his court at Estella, and in the follow-
ing month General Espartero was routed by the Carlists at Descarga.
This tempted the CarHsts to undertake the offensive, and was
siege
laid to Bilbao. The reason for this step was the urgent need for a
seaport through which to obtain supplies, and it was also believed
that in the event of its capture, Austria, Prussia, and Russia would
recognise the Carlists as belligerents.
Unfortunately on the fifth day of the siege, Zumalacirregui was
wounded, and he died nine days later. His death marked the turning-
point of die Carlist fortunes, for there was nobody to take his place.
The cause of Don Carlos was henceforth on the defensive, and a
rebellion in such circumstances is foredoomed to failure.
^
The war also degenerated in character, and was marked by atroci-
ties of the most
revolting type. A
government general had the
mother of Cabrera shot, while in Barcelona the mob was allowed
to break into the prison and massacre the Carlist prisoners. For a
brief space success once more attended the Carlist arms, and under
General G6me2 the supporters of Don Carlos actually reached the
3*4
 ISABEL II

gates of Madrid. There was, however, no general rising, as had been

anticipated, and Gomez fell back to the mountains of the North.
A similar attempt under the command of Don Carlos himself met with
a like failure, though for a few days it was anticipated by friends and
foes alike that Charles V would enter his capital.
After two years of desultory fighting the Convention of Vergara
in 1 8 3 9 put an end to the war in the Basque provinces, but it was not
until the following year that hostilities were terminated in
Aragon
and Valencia by the withdrawal of Cabrera into France. The first
Carlist war was over, but the divisions which it had caused in Spanish
national life remained.

When Ferdinand died the Prime Minister was Zea Bermiidez,

and he and the Regent showed little inclination to change the
at first
method of government; but, as has been said, Cristina soon dis-
covered that without the support of the Liberals she would be
unable to withstand Don Carlos, and to gain the help she needed
she was compelled to move to the Left. Zea Bermtidez made way for
a Prime Minister of more moderate tendencies, and in 1834 the Royal
Statute was promulgated; but this document was little more than a
translation of the Charfc which Louis XVlll had issued on his restora-
tion, and
it failed to satisfy the Liberals.
More serious still was the disaffection which, about this time,
became noticeable among the troops, and resulted in the pronuncia-
mientos. The apostles of Liberalism in the
army were the sergeants,
and owing to the incompetence of the officers (due to the absence in
the Carlist ranks of thosewho would have held commissions) their
influencewas even greater than is usually the case. The mob of the
large towns also became infected with the extreme views which were
preached in their midst, and, as in the French Revolution, this fact
was responsible for much of the violence that took place. The
struggle, however, did not become a social one until a much later
date, and on the Liberal as well as on the Conservative side there were
to be found some of the noblest families of Spain throughout the
whole of the nineteenth century.
In September, 1835, Mendizabal became Prime Minister, and he
possessed one advantage over his predecessors in that he was a
convinced Liberal, and consequently desired to make constitutional
a reality; but he proved as incompetent as most of the
fovernment
panish ministers of this period, and was replaced by a statesman,
Isturiz, whose views were more in accordance with those of the
Regent. The Radicals, however, had now become definitely revolu-
tionary, and in their efforts" to secure a constitution of which they
approved they did not hesitate to use force.
Risings took place everywhere, and in a mutiny at La Granja the
Regent and Isabel were captured, with the result that the former was
compelled to assent to the re-establishment of the Constitution of
3*5
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

1812, and Radicals were appointed to all places of trust. A Con-

stituent Cortes met and passed a measure suppressing nearly two
thousand religious houses; but even among its most fervent sup-
porters it was now realised
that the Constitution of 1812 was un-
workable, and a new one was drawn up. This proved to be much
more moderate than had been expected, since it increased the power
of the Crown, and also made provision for two chambers; 'in fact,
it was a modification in the Liberal sense of the Charte.
The central government, however, was so shaken by mutinies and
rebellions that it was quite incapable of performing its duties under
any circumstances, and Spain had much to suffer before she ob-
tained a settled administration. The elections held under the new
constitution resulted in a Conservative majority, and a measure was
at once introduced to limit the franchise. This act caused a military
revolt, headed by Espartero, who overthrew the government, and
was soon afterwards appointed Regent in place of Cristina.

The history of the reign of Isabel is largely a record of the struggle

for power between the three generals, Narvaez, O'Donnell, and
Espartero. All three worked with various groups in the Cortes,
and used their military influence to further the objects of themselves
and their political friends, but there was, nevertheless, a considerable
difference between them, in character, if not in methods. It has
been said that "Espartero rose by making himself the servant of the
mob, Narvaez by obedience to an earnest but limited sense of duty,
O'Donnell tortuously by intrigue and open-eyed pursuit of self-
aggrandisement/*
Narvaez was, above all else, a man of honour, and in an age when
treason was the order of the day, his personal integrity remained
unquestioned. Espartero was the typical Spaniard, a creature of
spasmodic energy, broken by long periods of lethargy, and it was to
the fact that he possessed to the full all the virtues and all the failings
of his fellow-countrymen that he owed his position among them.
As a general he was lucky rather than skilful, and his victories were
due not so much to his strategy, as to his popularity with the troops
he commanded. O'Donnell was a courtier, and in his pursuit of
power he changed sides even more often than most of his contem-
poraries. In matters of internal policy Narvaez leaned to the Right,
and Espartero to the Left, while O'Donnell flitted between the two
extremes.
The regency of Espartero lasted for two troubled years, and in
1843 he was overthrown by a coalition of Conservatives and dis-
contented Liberals. The decade which followed was marked by a
Conservative policy for which first General Narvdez, and then
Murillo, was responsible, and in 1845 a revision of the Constitution
took place which considerably narrowed the bases of the Cortes.
It soon, however, became clear that the reign of Isabel, who had
326
 ISABEL II

by now come of age, would resemble the regency of her mother in all
its There was the same desire on the part of the ruler
essential details.
to be absolute, and only to accept Liberal measures in the hope of
being able to reverse them in the near future. Isabel's position in any
case was not an easy one, for the traditions of government which had
existed since the days of Ferdinand and Isabel had been rudely
broken by the French invasion, and the restored absolutism had
proved too inefficient when compared with that of Charles III to win
men's minds back to the old ways. On the other hand, the Radicals
and the growing republican party declared that in democracy alone
would Spain find salvation, and as their remedy had never been
tried it was hard to deny their argument.
Above all, there was the difficulty that the larger part of the popula-
tion was politically apathetic, and those who took any interest in the
government of their country were either Carlists or Radicals. Isabel
had no principle upon which to base her rule, and there was no
section of the community to which she was able to turn for support
with any certainty of finding it, since the middle classes were hardly
yet in existence, and those whose creed was "Church and King" did
not rally round her throne, but marched under the standard of Don
Carlos. In these circumstances the monarchy was forced to rely
on some chance grouping of factions in the Cortes. As if this was
not enough, the army was in a perpetual state of mutiny, and the
generals thought more of seizing the reins of government than of
enforcing discipline among their men.
Isabel's position would thus in any case have been extremely
difficult, but she rendered it hopeless by her scandalous method of
living; the ancient Spanish loyalty to the royal line had been shaken
by the Carlist movement, and the Queen came very near to destroy-
ing it altogether.

Meanwhile, the question of the Queen's marriage had given rise

to serious complications both in Spain and abroad. Isabel, together
with her younger sister Luisa, was, by the year 1846, of an age to
marry. The Regent, in default of a suitable Austrian Archduke,
desired to unite both the Queen and her sister with French Princes.
It was, however, objected by the Powers, and chiefly by England,
that the Treaty of Utrecht was still in force, and that Europe could
never tolerate a union betweefi the crowns of France and Spain,
even although both were at that time in possession of monarchs
whose thrones were not based upon the principle of legitimacy.
At first the matter was discussed between the British and French
Governments, and between Queen Victoria and King Louis Philippe.
Lord Aberdeen made it clear that Great Britain would raise no
objection to themarriage of Queen Isabel to one of the descendants
of Philip V, and would refrain from pressing any other candidate;
moreover, in the event of the Queen having children it would not see
3*7
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
any objection to a union between the Duke of Montpensier, a
younger son of the King of France,
and the Infanta Luisa. On this
oasis an agreement was reached.
Of the five available Bourbon Princes three were rejected for
various reasons, and the choice lay between two cousins of the
Queen, namely Francis, Duke of Cddiz, who was favoured by
France, and his brother, Henry, who was- preferred by England.
Isabel herself preferred the latter, but he was hated by the Queen-
Mother on account of his Liberal views, and Cristina, therefore, made
overtures to Prince Leopold of Coburg. By this means she hoped to
create a breach between France and England, and thus secure a
French match for both her daughters.
Guizot, who was at that time Prime Minister of France, could not
resist the temptation of scoring a diplomatic success, and when
Palmerston, who succeeded Aberdeen at the Foreign Office in June,
1846, announced his intention of leaving the Spanish Government
free to choose between any of the candidates, Guizot regarded the
neutral attitude of England towards the Coburg candidature as a
breach of the agreement, and persuaded Louis Philippe to agree to
the policy which he desired.
In consequence, the simultaneous marriage took place of the
Queen with the Duke of C&diz and the Infanta with the Duke of
Montpensier. This was the famous affair of the "Spanish Marriages,"
which broke the Entente between England and France, and was also
a powerful factor in precipitating the fall of the July Monarchy. In
spite, however, of the diplomacy of Louis Philippe and Guizot, the
French Prince was not destined to wear the crown of Spain, for
Isabel had children of her own.

In 1854 the Conservative regime came to an end owing to a

military revolt headed by O'Donneli, and Espartero became Prime
Minister for a time, only, however, shortly to be overthrown by
O'Donnell, who then governed Spain for five years with greater
success than had marked the efforts of any of his immediate pre-
decessors. In many ways O'Donnell's government fnay be compared
with that of General Primo de Rivera two generations later, and it
gave the country a much-needed rest from pronunciamientos and the
strife of parties.
A settlement was reached with the Church in regard to its property
and other matters which had been in dispute since the beginning of
the reign. By this agreement the Pope recognised the validity of the
sale of such Church lands as had akeady been sold, and he consented
to the disposal of the remainder on condition that the proceeds
should be handed over to the Church in the form of inalienable 3 per
cent bonds.
Meanwhile, the prosperity of the country had increased even
during the disturbed period which followed the termination of the
528
 ISABEL II

Carlist War, and the rate of increase was now

considerably acceler-
ated. Between 1848 and 1864 Spanish commerce more than trebled,
many railways were built, and extensive public works were under-
taken.
The weakness of the Liberal Union, as the administration of
O'Donnell was termed, was its finance. The budgets of 1 8 5 9 and 1 8 60
showed a surplus as usual, but it was entirely fictitious. The floating
debt amounted to seven million pounds, and taxation was excessive.
As for the huge sums which had been obtained by the sale of Church
lands, in accordance with the agreement with the Pope, they simply
faded away.
O'Donnell realised that his position was by no means so secure
as might appear on the surface, and he decided to strengthen it, as
well as distract his fellow-countrymen from their internal dissen-
sions, by adopting a spirited foreign policy. Already in 1 8 5 7 a small
expedition had been sent to co-operate with the French in avenging
the murder of missionaries in Cochin China, and the Spanish troops
had fought with the valour which they always display when properly
led.
Asit happened, there was a force of some 100,000 men available.
A threat of intervention by the United States in Cuba had necessi-
tated the strengthening of the Spanish army, while on the outbreak
of war in Italy in 1859, a further increase had been made. Spain,
however, although she protested against the dethronement ot the
Duke of Parma, did not interfere to prevent it, and O*Donnell
decided to use the troops for a war against Morocco. Relations
between Spain and the Moors were even worse than usual, and
O'Donnell seized his chance of embarking upon a crusade. The
Sultan of Morocco was conciliatory, but O'Donnell was determined
upon war, although, even before it was declared, he had to give a
promise to Great Britain that Spain would seek no territorial

aggrandisement.
The war began in October, 1859, an^ &it Spaniards advanced from
Ceuta under the command of O'Donnell himself. The campaign
was sadly mismanaged, but the Spanish troops, as usual, fought well,
in spite of bad generalship, and after capturing Tetudn, they arrived
within a short distance or Fez. Meanwhile a Carlist rising had taken
place in the Peninsula, and Great Britain was drawing the Spanish
Government's attention to its promise. In these circumstances peace
was made in April, 1860, and Spain obtained little more than an
indemnity and a treaty of commerce.
Nevertheless, O'Donnell's taste for adventure had been whetted
rather than satiated, and in 1861 two further opportunities came his
way. The republic of San Domingo had grown weary of the attempt
to govern itself, and, in the hope of obtaining protection against its
neighbour, Haiti, it applied for re-admission to the Spanish mon-
archy. Accordingly, the repentant republic was re-incorporated by
3*9
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

decree, and it was hoped in Spain that this marked the first step in the
re-establishment of Spanish rule in America. These hopes were
completely ruined by the tactlessness of those who were sent to
administer the country, for a swarm of functionaries from Cuba
swooped down upon the island, and treated it as if it were a con-
quered province. The result was a general insurrection against the
Spaniards, and after having wasted the lives of 10,000 soldiers and a
sum of 4,000,000, Spain was, in 1865, obliged to relinquish her
hold upon San Domingo.
In the same year that saw San Domingo temporarily re-united to
Spain, O'Donnell joined with Great Britain and France in sending a
force to Mexico to preserve the rights of the foreign bond-holders.
Spain, however, withdrew from this venture at the same time as
Great Britain, and left the French to attempt the conquest of Mexico
on their own.
In February, 1863, O'Donnell resigned on account of the Queen's
refusal to recognise the new Italian kingdom. He left the country
restless in spite of his spirited foreign policy, for not one of the
questions that vexed it had been solved, and the old animosities were
unappeased.
The five years that intervened between the resignation of O'Don-
nell and the of the dynasty saw several governments in office.
fall

They also witnessed the emergence of new men, such as General

Prim, Antonio Canovas del Castillo, Emilio Castelar, and Serrano;
the last of these had, it is true, been closely connected with the Queen
personally, but it was only now that he made his appearance in the
political arena. Unfortunately, the successors of O'Donnell shared
his partiality for foreign adventures, and a needless conflict with
Chile and Peru was the consequence in 1865-1866.
Admiral Pareja bombarded Valparaiso and Callao, but all that
Spain gained from these operations, which revived the old colonial
hatred of her in full force, was an indemnity from Peru on condition
that the latter's independence was formally recognised. These wars
also reduced Spanish credit abroad to the lowest ebb, and when the
government of the day endeavoured to float a loan in Paris and
London it was met with a blank refusal.

During these years the position of the throne was growing steadily
weaker. In the earlier art of Isabella's reign the Left had been
content to attack the ministers, but now it began to direct its fire
upon the dynasty itself. There were several reasons for this. The
private life of the Queen had become more scandalous than ever, and
if her children were undoubted Bourbons on their mother's side
there was only too much reason for conjecture where their father was
concerned. At this time, too, both Narvaez and O'Donnell died.
With all their faults, both were loyal subjects of Isabel, while Castelar
was a republican, and Prim had been personally offended by the Queen.
33
 ISABEL II

More than ever did the monarchy feel the want, owing to the
Carlist schism, of its natural supports. The Church, weakened by its

divisions, had lost much of its old influence, as well as most of its

wealth, and the most fervently monarchist part of the country, the
Basque Provinces and Navarre, watched with glee the increasing
difficulties of her whom they regarded as a usurper. By 1868 the
monarchy had become a mere j^v&&.
When the end came it came, as was also to be the case in 1931,
quickly. In 1866 a mutiny of the artillery, the corps d'elite, in Madrid
was only suppressed with the greatest difficulty, and after much
blood had been shed on both sides. Narvaez was called to power to
stem the rising tide of disorder; but he died, and Gonzalez Bravo
was installed as Prime Minister, or rather dictator, in his place.
A man of strong views and great courage, he declared that he
would make the generals bend their gaudy backs before his plain
coat, and he proceeded to banish all the leaders of the Liberal Union
who were still in Spain. His next step was to alienate the navy by
drastic economies, and this drove Admiral Topete and his officers
to make common cause with the exiles.
By now the throne was quite isolated. The Duke of Montpensier
and were negotiating with the revolutionaries in the hope of
his wife
securing the succession for themselves, while Sagasta, one of the
leaders of the Left, went to
England to see Cabrera in the hope of
enlisting
the support of the Carlists : the latter, however, would not
conclude an alliance with the Liberals, and placed their principles
before expediency.
The final blow to the regime was struck by Topete, who first of
all arranged for the return of the revolutionaries, and then, on

September 18, 1868, he made his pronunciamiento at Cddiz. Together

with Serrano, Prim, Sagasta, and some others, he issued a manifesto
which was sufficiently vague to unite all the opponents of Isabel,
but which carefully refrained from stating whom or what it was
proposed to put in her place. It naturally declared that an era of
social and political regeneration had been inaugurated, and it
curiously observed that the considerations which decided the most
important questions should be such as could be named before
mothers, wives, and daughters.
Once the movement became known it spread, and the Queen,
who was at San Sebastian, realised its seriousness, if not its danger.
The issue was decided by a skirmish, for at the Bridge of Alcolea,
on the Guadalquivir, General Pavia was forced by the insurgents to
fall back, and this opened to the latter the way to the capital. No
further resistance was attempted in any quarter, and on September 30
Isabel crossed the Bidassoa into France, exclaiming, "I thought I had
struck deeper roots in this land."

The revolution of 1868 marked the end of old Spain. Isabel and,
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

before her, Cristina had endeavoured to hold the balance even

between it and the forces which had been unloosed by the French
Revolution, and for which the way had to no inconsiderable extent
been paved by. the earlier Bourbons. Circumstances, due almost
entirely to the CarKst split, had
been too much for them, and hence-
forth the destinies of the country were to be in the hands of those
who, whatever the regime, based their government upon a set of
ideas that were, not Spanish, but foreign, in their origin.

33*
 CHAPTER XXXIX

The Troublous Times (1868-1885)

long as the work of those who were opposed to the Bourbons

was merely destructive it was not difficult to get them to agree,
So but when the time came to put forward definitely constructive
proposals the fundamental differences of opinion among them were
at once revealed. While the streets of Madrid were adorned with

posters announcing "the everlasting downfall of the spurious Bour-

bon race/' a Provisional Government was formed with Serrano at its
head, and consisting of Prim, Topete, Sagasta, Ruiz Zorrilla, and
L6pez de Ayala.
When this had been accomplished two manifestoes were issued by
the Cabinet, one for the benefit of the Powers, and the other addressed
to the Spanish people. The first was a long and verbose account
of the causes and aims of the revolution which had dethroned
Isabel, while the second was little more than a general statement
of Liberal principles, with an occasional reference to the political
situation in Spain. It did, however, make clear that the new con-
stitution was to be monarchical, though the throne was to be
occupied by another dynasty than the Bourbons, and whoever was
chosen as King would exercise very little power.
The next step was to convene a Constituent Cortes, and in the
elections for this body the Provisional Government obtained an
overwhelming majority. A few republicans, such as Castelar, and
Carlists were returned, but there was hardly a
deputy who would
confess himself an avowed supporter of the fallen dynasty. As
soon as the Constituent Cortes had met, it proceeded to draw up a
constitution, a task which it accomplished in the remarkably short
space of a month.
The document in question contained nothing original, and it was
little more than an amalgam of the various Liberal constitutions
which had been adopted at one time or another since 1812. Spain
was declared to be a strictly limited monarchy, with the real power
vested in two Chambers. The influence of the Church was directly
attacked in the clauses which established civil marriage and guaran-
teed freedom of worship. The jury system was also adopted, and
individual liberty was declared inviolable. The new constitution was
in due course voted by 214 to 55 votes, and it was promulgated in
June, 1869.
As the Constituent Cortes had voted in favour of a monarchy
Serrano proceeded to call himself Regent, and Prim became Prime
Minister. It was not before it became obvious that
long, however,
the new constitution had not satisfied anybody. The vast majority
of the nation was revolted by its anti-clericalism, and in their despair
333
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

of the restoration of Isabel many leaders of the Right turned to the

Carlists as their only hope.
At the same time those who had been most prominent in the
revolution of the preceding year derided the provisions of the
constitution as hopelessly inadequate, and began to drift into the
ranks of the republicans. Castelar, incomparably the greatest orator
in Spain, addressed enormous gatherings, and the Cabinet 'did not
dare to take any measures against him. The prevailing unrest made
itself felt in all quarters, and at Cadiz and Malaga there were risings.

Spain was breaking up.

The constitution having been voted, it now became necessary to
find a King, and in the autumn of 1869 Serrano and Prim began the
search for one. There were several obvious candidates, namely
Alfonso, the Prince of Asturias, and son of Isabel; Don Carlos, the
grandson of the original claimant, and now the head of the Carlist
branch; the Duke of Montpensier; and Espartero.
The first two were barred, among other reasons, by the recent law
which excluded the Bourbons from the throne. This exclusion also
applied to Montpensier, who was also generally unpopular, and who
was shortly to set the seal upon the suspicion with which he was
regarded by killing in a duel the Duke of Seville, the brother-in-law
or Isabel. As for Espartero, he could have had the throne for the
asking, but he was an old man, and it is to his credit that when he
had to make the choice he refused to supplant her whom he had
always considered to be his lawful sovereign. The Spanish candi-
dates having been all eliminated, it remained for the king-makers to
try their luck abroad, and the crown of Spain was accordingly
hawked round Europe.
The Pan-Iberians persuaded Serrano and Prim to offer the throne
to King Luis of Portugal, but he refused, and announced his inten-
tion or dying, as he had been born, a Portuguese. The next to be
approached was the King-dowager of Portugal, Ferdinand of Saxe-
Coburg, a cousin of Queen Victoria. For a time he entertained the
proposition, and both Napoleon HI and the Spanish Provisional
Government pressed him to accept. Finally, he, too, refused, chiefly
because of the violent opposition that was beginning to manifest
itself in Portugal towards any possible union of the crowns. This

obliged Serrano and Prim to go even farther afield, and they then
offered the vacant throne to Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.
He also declined, but his candidature was the cause of the Franco*
German War and the fall of the Second Empire.
By this time two years had passed since the flight of Isabella, and
Spain was becoming restless. In despair recourse was had to the
Royal Family of Italy, and, after the Duke of Genoa had declined the
crown, Amadeo, the second son of Victor Emmanuel II, accepted it.
In spite of the strongest pressure in the Constituent Cortes only 191
votes out of 3 1 1 were cast in his favour, while of the minority 63
334
 THE TROUBLOUS TIMES
voted for a republic, 27 for the Duke of Montpensier, i for the
Duchess, 8 for Espartero, 2 for Alfonso, and there were 19 blanks.
Meanwhile, in June, 1870, Isabel had abdicated, and those who had
remained loyal to her saluted the young Prince of Asturias as King
Alfonso XII.
King Amadeo was twenty-six years of age when, in January, 1871,
he arrived in his capital. He was, like all the members of the House of
Savoy, supremely conscientious, and he was determined not to over-
step the limits which the constitution prescribed. In spite of his
admirable personal qualities his position was hopeless from the start.
The first news that greeted him was that Prim, who would have been
the mainstay of his throne, had been murdered in the streets of
Madrid, and there was no one to take his place.
The King himself was anathema to innumerable Spaniards as the
scion of a dynasty that had risen to power on the overthrow not only
of two Spanish sovereigns, the King of Naples and the Duke of
Parma, but also on the seizure of the Pope's dominions. The aristo-
cracy boycotted the new court from the beginning, and although the
republicans, Carlists, and Alfonsists had nothing else in common,
they united to make any prolonged occupation of the throne by
Amadeo an impossibility. The second rey intruso was no more
popular than the first.
The King entrusted Serrano with the formation of a ministry
which should be a coalition of all those who supported the regime.
A Cabinet on these lines was constituted, but an appeal to the
country resulted in the return of an increased number of Carlists
and republicans, and the government was defeated in the Cortes on
the reply to the address from the throne. The result of this was a
split in the ranks of Amadeo's supporters, and the short-lived
administrations of Ruiz Zorrilla and Malcampo followed.
The next Prime Minister was Sagasta, who was determined to
retrieve the situation if that were possible, and at the elections in
April, 1872, he exerted an official pressure hitherto unknown even
in Spanish history. He secured a majority of sorts, but on the
morrow of his victory he had to resign owing to a charge of
embezzlement in respect of a sum of 20,000 which had disappeared
from the Colonial Office. Sagasta was succeeded by Serrano, who
almost immediately had to give place to Zorrilla. The new Prime
Minister dissolved the Cortes, and obtained a majority, but it was in
no way representative of the true sentiments of Spain, which was
for the most part either Carlist or republican by this time. The
supporters of Don Carlos were already in arms, and the republicans
now proceeded to riot both* in Madrid and Ferrol.
There can be little doubt but that by now Amadeo had realised
that he could not remain on the throne much longer, and he had
already narrowly escaped one attempt to murder him, at the instiga-
tion, it was rumoured, of the Duke of Montpensier.
335
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

What brought the experiment to an end was not a clash of

finally
Zorrilla had per-
general principles, but a departmental squabble.
suaded the King to confer a high command upon General Hidalgo,
who had sided with the rebels at the time of the mutiny in the artillery
in 1866. He was accordingly detested by his brother officers, who
refused to serve under him in his new capacity, and proceeded to
resign their commissions. Zorrilla's reply was to- dissolve the artillery
corps, and to promote non-commissioned officers to
fill the vacancies.

Amadeo signed the necessary decree, although he did not approve

of it, and at the same time he announced his own abdication. On
February 12, 1873, he left Spain, and among the papers which he did
not sign before his departure, although presented for his signature,
was one conferring the Golden Fleece upon Zorrilla.

As soon as the abdication of the King became known, the two

Chambers of the Cortes quite illegally coalesced, and declared them-
selves to be the National Assembly. In spite of the fact that only four
months before their members had, with a few exceptions, been
elected as monarchists, they then voted a republic by 258 votes to
32, and on the very day on which Amadeo left Madrid four of his
late ministers were already holding office under the First Republic.
The establishment of a republican regime met with no opposition,
but by the time that it took place the state of Spain was chaotic.
Almost the whole of the North acknowledged Don Carlos Barcelona
;

had become practically autonomous; and in Andalusia the wildest

anarchy prevailed, and Socialist agitators were the real rulers of that
As if this were not enough, the republicans were hope-
issly divided among themselves. Pi y Margall wished a federal
Erovince.
republic, like the United States. Castelar wanted the republic to be
unitary but Radical, as France was soon to become. Salmer6n and
Serrano were for a conservative republic, such as France actually was.
Lastly, Pavia desired a military dictatorship under republican forms.
First of all a government of concentration was formed, with ,

Figueras at its head, but after a few weeks it broke up, and the
federalists came into office. The President, Figueras, thereupon left
the country without even the formality of announcing his intentions
to his colleagues, and his place was taken by Pi y Margall. Mean-
while, fresh elections had been held for the Cortes, but only a
third of those entitled to vote had done so. Nevertheless, the
Constituent Cortes, the sixth of the century, decided by 210 votes
against 2 that Spain should be a republic.
While these events were taking place in Madrid the anarchy in the
provinces was growing steadily worse, and by July the cities of
Milaga, Seville, Cddiz, and Granada had become almost inde-
pendent under the name of cantons. Catalonia and Valencia took the
necessary steps to cut themselves off from the rest of Spain, and the
latter established its own fiscal frontiers.
Everywhere the troops
 THE TROUBLOUS TIMES
mutinied (in many cases shooting their officers), priests were attacked
and murdered, and in many instances private property was abolished.
The worst scenes were enacted at Cartagena, where the army and
fleet joined the revolutionaries, and the latter was only prevented by
British men-of-war from embarking upon a course of piracy. Finally,
in the interests of international peace, the British authorities took

possession
of the Spanish ships, and interned them at Gibraltar after
landing their crews. In the midst of this confusion there were two
more changes of ministry Pi y Margall was replaced by Salmeron,
:

and two months later, in September, 1873, the latter, in his turn, had
to make way for Castelar.
Both Salmeron and Castelar realised, unlike their predecessors,
that order must be restored, and the former sent Pavia into Andalusia
with a handful of troops that could still be trusted. In a few weeks
Cordova, Seville, Cddiz, and Granada were in Pavia's hands, and the
general was only prevented by the timidity of Salmer6n from cap-
turing Mdlaga at the same time. Castelar proved bolder, so that by
the end of September that sea-port was in Pavia's possession, and
cantonalism in Andalusia was at an end.
These measures were by no means pleasing to the majority in the
Cortes, and Pavia urged <3astelar to execute a coup d'etat, but the
President refused. On January 2, 1874, Castelar was defeated in the
Cortes, and a few hours afterwards Pavia's soldiers cleared the
deputies out of the Chamber. For a moment the general thought
of making himself dictator, but he finally handed the reins of power
over to Serrano, who proceeded to try to run the republic along the
conservative lines which he had always advocated.
The state of the country by this time was desperate. At Cartagena
the red flag still floated over the city and the arsenal. There were
200,000 troops in arms against the Carlists, who were nevertheless
masters of three provinces, and there were 80,000 more in Cuba,
vainly attempting to suppress a rebellion which had broken out
there. As the year went on the situation grew steadily worse, and the
credit of Spain abroad reflected the chaos at home. By the end of
December, 1873, the 3 per cent Exterior Debt had already sunk to
17 J on the London Stock Exchange, and the coupons on this issue
remained unpaid for eighteen months, having to be refunded latei>
by the government of the Restoration.
Serrano suspended the constitution, dissolved the Constituent
Cortes, and announced that elections would not be held until the
country was completely pacified. He then took the field against the
Catlists, and it was the danger from that quarter which kept the
republic alive until the end of the year, for the Alfonsists had no
desire to overthrow the existing regime until
they were quite certain
that its successor would not be Charles VII, but Alfonso XII. As for
the mass of the population, it was only weary of the anarchy which
had become synonymous with republicanism, and it was prepared to
M 337
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
accept either Don Carlos or Don Alfonso in return for the blessings
of peace and security.
When it became clear by the autumn that the Carlists had shot
their bolt the Alfonsists began to stir, and Serrano took no effective
measures to restrict their propaganda. Alfonso himself issued a
manifesto, drawn up by Glnovas, in which he declared himself a good
Spaniard, a good Catholic, and a Liberal, but Canovas deprecated
anything in the nature of precipitate action, and he desired, above all
else, that his master should be restored by civilians. The monarchist
generals refused to consult the wishes of Canovas, and on Decem-
ber 29, 1874, General Martinez Campos proclaimed Alfonso XII
at Sagunto. The troops in that part of Spain at once accepted the

pronunciamiento, and the Captain-General of Valencia, though not

adhering to the movement himself, placed no obstacles in its
way.
When the news of what had happened reached Madrid, the acting
head of the government, Sagasta, consulted with the Captain-
General, Primo de Rivera. The latter declared that he was astonished
at what had taken place, so Sagasta put Canovas in prison, and
issued a proclamation to reassure the country. Within a few hours,
however, the garrison of the capital declared for the pronunciamiento^
and Primo de Rivera compelled the resignation of me Cabinet. As
for the President, Serrano, he refused to return to Madrid, and
when he saw the course which events were taking, he despatched a
large number of telegrams to Sagasta, and then left the country.
A provisional council, with Canovas as its head, was formed to
take over the administration, and the newspapers were full of
protestations of loyalty to the new King from those who forty-eight
hours before had telegraphed their determination to defend the
republic with their lives. Alfonso himself was in Paris when the
news reached him, but he arrived at Barcelona on January 9, and
entered his capital five days later.

The new King had been born in 1857, and was thus little more
than a boy when he came into his inheritance. He had been educated
.it Sandhurst, and had also travelled
extensively. During his short
reign he gave evidence of qualities which would have made him an
extremely capable monarch had his life been prolonged.
From the beginning he showed himself to be a patriotic Spaniard,
and he never hesitated to do all in his power to alleviate the sufferings
of his people. He had little opportunity to show what he could do,
for Canovas dominated the Spanish scene during the ten years he was
on the throne, but by the time of his death he had already proved
himself to be an apt pupil of that great statesman. On all occasions
he displayed a marked inclination to moderation and mercy, and in
this way he rallied to the
support of the monarchy many who had
previously been numbered among its enemies. Above all, his
338
 THE TROUBLOUS TIMES
example did much to revive that respect for the throne which his
mother's public and private life had unhappily alienated.
The first task of the restored monarchy was to put an end to the
Second Carlist War.
There had been more than one Carlist rising, notably in 1846 and
1848, since the first Don Carlos had been compelled to abandon the
fight, and in 1860 two of the Carlist Princes had been captured during
an abortive attempt in Catalonia, In 1872, the Basque Provinces
again took up arms, and Don Carlos was soon at the head of 14,000
men, but he was defeated by Serrano at Oroquieta, and the Con-
vention of Amoravieta brought the insurrection to an end. The
proclamation of the republic rekindled it, and for some months it
seemed as if Don Carlos must inevitably achieve his purpose.
The republicans were soon holding even the line of the Ebro
with the greatest difficulty, and although the Carlists failed once
more to take Bilbao, their position in the Basque Provinces and
Navarre was quite unshaken. In Catalonia and Valencia, too, Don
Carlos had many adherents, and he sent his brother, Don Alfonso, to
command in this quarter. At one moment the latter actually got as
far as Cuenca, only twenty-two leagues from Madrid, but the out-
rages of his followers prevented those who would have joined him
from doing so. Don Alfonso, despairing of making his Catalan
supporters obey the rules of civilised warfare, withdrew from the
field, and henceforth the war was confined to the North, though for
some time longer there continued to be bands of marauders, who
called themselves Carlists, in the other provinces.
The restoration of the monarchy proved that Don Carlos had
missed his chance. It also deprived him of the support of many who
were prepared to accept him as the only method of overturning the
republic, while the Papal recognition of Alfonso XII weakened his
position with the clergy and with no inconsiderable section of the
laity. The King appeared among his troops in person, and in March,
1875, Cabrera deserted the Carlist cause.
This defection was the beginning of the end, although there was
much hard fighting before the insurrection was crushed. All through
the year 1875 the Carlists were pushed steadily back, but it was not
until the beginning of 1876 that Primo de Rivera succeeded in"
capturing Estella, their headquarters. In March, Don Carlos, who
had never failed to show himself worthy of the sacrifices that were
made for him, was obliged to cross the frontier, and the Second
Carlist War was over. The Basques lost their fueros for ever, but
they were accorded certain privileges in the matter of taxation.
Nevertheless, if Carlism had been defeated in the field, its spirit
survived, and was to prove an important factor when another
republiccame into being*
It was not until March, 1876, that the new Constitution was
brought forward by Cdnovas in the Cortes, and it was to a large
339
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

extent modelled upon that of Great Britain. Legislation was vested

in a Cortes of two Chambers with the King, and the Chambers were
of equal authority. The Senate consisted of eighty senators in their
own right, ahundred nominated by the Crown, and a hundred and
eighty elected by local bodies, the universities, and taxpayers of the
highest class. One half of the elected senators were renewed every
fifth year. The Chamber was elected by districts of 5 0,000 inhabitants,
but it was not until 1890 that there was adult suffrage, and even
then the vote was limited to men. There was also, in the larger
towns, a form of proportional representation. The King alone
had the right to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the Cortes, but a
dissolution had to be followed by the assembly of a new Chamber
within three months. The King was irresponsible, but his decrees
had to be countersigned by a responsible minister.
The Constitution remained in force until the coup d'etat of General
Primo de Rivera in 1923. Theoretically it left little to be desired,
but in the last resort it depended for successful working upon the
willing co-operation of the Spanish people, and this condition was
never fulfilled. Canovas himself did not believe that his fellow-
countrymen were ready for such a Constitution, but he hoped that
with the passage of time it would take root. In this he was dis-
appointed. What happened was that the political life of Spain
became a hollow sham. There were two main parties in the Cortes,
the Conservatives and the Liberals, led respectively by Canovas and
Sagasta, and they alternated in office as parties of the same name
were doing in contemporary England. The elections were shame-
lessly "made" in order to give a majority to one side or the other,
for the two leaders were working together to ensure that there
should be an outward appearance of normal constitutional life. So
long as Cdnpvas and Sagasta lived this illusion was sustained, but
when they died the parties began to break up into groups, and as the
system had no secure foundations it was very soon completely
undermined.
The end at which Canovas aimed may, or may not, have justified
the means which he employed to achieve it, but the means remained
long after the end had been forgotten, and the means were the
"making" of the elections. The vast majority of the electorate was
unable to read or write, and power in the constituencies was in the
hands of the cacique^ who resembled the "boss" of American, and the
"great elector" of Italian, politics. The corruption which this system
produced can easily be imagined, and it extended to the local authori-
ties as well. During the course of an
enquiry held by the Directory
of General Primo de Rivera, for example, it was found that in
Murcia there had been no entry in the day-books or of the
ledgers
municipal accounts for years; in Orense the windows of the hospital
were never mended; and in PaJencia there was no heating in the local
maternity hospital, although it was 3,000 feet above sea-level Such
340
 THE TROUBLOUS TIMES
examples might be multiplied indefinitely, and all over Spain only a
small proportion of the money voted for any particular purpose ever
reached it. There was no awakening of the national consciousness
to these abuses, though it is to be noted that the personal honesty
of the ordinary Spaniard remained uncontaminated by the venality
of his politicians.
On the whole the country was quieter than it had been since the
death of Charles III. In 1883 there was an attempted republican
jwonunciamiento at Badajoz, krgely due to the machinations of Ruiz
Zorrilla, who had completely boxed the political compass since the
days when he was an aspirant for the Golden Fleece, but the move-
ment met with no support elsewhere. More serious was the agitation
in Andalusia of the Mano Negra and Tribunal Popular, anarchical
secret societies that preached Communism, and reinforced their
teaching with murder and arson. Sagasta was in power when the
propaganda was most serious, but the Liberal leader showed no
hesitation in adopting strong measures against it.
In 1885 there were severe earthquakes in the South, and in the
province of Granada alone 5400 buildings were destroyed, and
nearly 700 lives were lost. A
few months later there was a serious
outbreak of cholera, in which over 100,000 people perished. On both
occasions the King visited the afflicted areas, at great personal risk,
and in the second instance in direct opposition to the wishes of his
ministers. In spite, however, of these visitations Spain continued to
progress, and the funest inheritance of the republic was gradually
liquidated.
In foreign both Cdnovas and Sagasta looked towards
affairs

Germany rather than towards France, and in 1883 a commercial

agreement with the former Power was considered as the prelude to a
political understanding, and to the inclusion of Spain in the Triple
Alliance. In the same year the King attended the German manoeuvres,
and accepted the colonelcy of a Uhlan regiment stationed at Strass-
burg. French irritation became fiercer than ever, and on his return
through Paris the King met with so frankly hostile a demonstration,
that diplomatic relations between France and Spain came within an
ace of being suspended. Wiser counsels happily prevailed, and the
incident was soon
forgotten.
Two years later Spain came dangerously near to war with Germany
herself. The commander of a German gun-boat hoisted his flag on
the Caroline Island of Yap, and alleged in support of his action that
the Spanish claim to the archipelago had never been rendered effec-
tive by occupation, while his fellow-countrymen had long had a
factory there. When the news of what had happened reached Spain
the Press set itself out to rouse with the result
popular indignation,
that the Madrid mob attacked tne German Legation, tore down its
flagstaff and escutcheon, and burned them in the Puerta del Sol.
Bismarck, however, had no desire to throw Spain into the arms of
34*
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

France, and he showed himself most conciliatory. Germany there-

fore accepted the Spanish apology for the insult in Madrid, and the
question of the ownership of the Caroline Islands was referred to the
arbitration of the Pope, while the Spanish flag was to fly at Yap
pending the Papal verdict.
In the autumn of 1885 the King's health, never very robust,
began to fail. His visit to the zone affected by the earthquakes,
made in the midst of a very hard winter, and to the districts stricken
with cholera, had been too much for him: when he caught bronchitis
in November, 1 8 8 5 , he had not the strength to shake it off, and on the
2 jth of that month he died.
Alfonso was twice married. In 1878 he married Mercedes, his
cousin, and the second daughter of the Duke of Montpensier. It was
a popular match, for the new Queen was a Spaniard, and it had
clearly been dictated, so far as Alfonso was concerned, by affection
rather than by considerations of policy. The rejoicings at the wed*
ding had hardly ended when Mercedes died of fever. The King was
overwhelmed with grief, and he seemed to lose interest in life from
that moment. In November, 1879, he married Maria Cristina,
daughter of the Archduke Ranier of Austria, and the wedding took
place at the same time that great floods were devastating Murcia and
Orihuela, so, in accordance with the royal orders, the money that
was to have been spent upon the marriage festivities was diverted to
aid the sufferers in the disaster.
When the King died he left two daughters, while the Queen was
with child. That his widow was able to overcome the domestic
difficulties of her Regency, as well as the complications of the
Spanish-American War, was in no small measure due to the support
which her husband had won for the throne, and for the old respect
which he had so successfully revived. It is true that he was fortunate
in his ministers, especially Cdnovas and Sagasta, but he had the good
sense to appreciate their worth. In fine, Alfonso XII found Spain
in a state of chaos, moral, social, and political, after her republican
experience; he left her at peace, and making considerable material
progress, so that he well deserved his title of J5/ Pacificador.

34*
 CH.M-TER XL

The Regency (1885-1902)

E death of Alfonso XII caused a momentary drop of thirteen

points in the Spanish funds, but it called forth all the innate
-*-
chivalry in the national character. The leaders of the various
parties agreed upon a political truce, and Sagasta took office at the
head of a ministry that lasted with little change for five years.
The Carlists were restless at first, but the strong support which
the Powers and the Vatican gave to the Regency obliged them to
refrain from any attempt to turn the existing situation to their advan-
tage. As for the republicans, not only was the memory of their
failure still too fresh to make them a danger, but they were divided
into four sections, led respectively by Castelar, Salmeron, Pi y Mar-
gall, and Ruiz Zorrilla. Castelar alone might have united them, but
he flatly refused to consider even a provisional scheme for common
action. Nevertheless, the only disturbance that did take place came
from this quarter, for, in January, 1886, some civilians unsuccess-

fully tried to bring about a rising at Cartagena, and in the following

September General Villacampa attempted a republican pronuncia-
miento.
For the rest, the peace of the country was undisturbed, and the
birth of Alfonso XIII on May 17, 1886, was acclaimed by a nation
that was more united than it had been for a century.
The fact that the political truce lasted not only for a year or two,
but for the whole of the Regency, was mainly due to the Regent.
Maria Cristina was one of the most remarkable women of her age.
She was a foreigner, and at the time of her husband's death she was
unknown, but gradually she won the respect of all classes of the
Spanish people. The most selfish of politicians came to serve her
loyally, and by her tolerance and her wisdom she continued the work
of her husband in rallying to the monarchy many who had been its
bitterest enemies. Castelar himself gave his support to Sagasta.
Evidence of the Regent's popularity was seen when the King had
a severe illness, in early childhood, for all Spain rejoiced with h^
mother at his recovery.
Her only enemies were certain members of the Royal Family. The
Infanta Isabel was asked to leave the country in 1888, and the Duke
of Seville was banished to the Balearic Islands for some years for
libelling the Regent. In spite, however, of these intrigues the Queen
succeeded in weathering the storms which she encountered, and it
was largely due to her nobility of character that, when Alfonso XIII
came of age in 1902, he found the throne even mote secure than it
had been at the death of his father.

In domestic affairs the period of the Regency was uneventful.

543
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Both Canovas and Saeasta showed a firm front to all attempts on the
part of the army to place itself above the ordinary law, and they re-
fused to allow cases in which the army and newspapers were con-
cerned to be tried by court-martial, as the military chiefs were de-
manding. In 1890 universal suffrage was established, but it made
little difference in the general political situation except in Madrid,
where in 1893 the republicans captured six out of the eight seats.
The fact was that the Conservative and Liberal parties had been in-
dulging in rnock-fighting for so long that there was now little dif-
ference between them, and a change of government meant but little
change of policy.
Moreover, with the grant of universal suffrage political questions
ceased to agitate the country, and the real danger to the existing order
was the rise of Socialism of a particularly violent type in the nineties.
Barcelona became the headquarters of this movement, and in 1892
there took place the first caj>e of bomb-throwing in that city. In the
following year Martinez Campos was wounded there by the explo-
sion of a bomb, while another thrown into a theatre killed twenty
people. At the elections in 1893 there were twenty-one Socialist
deputies returned to the Cortes.

Foreign affairs were dominated by the problem of Cuba and the

embittered relations with the United States which resulted from it, but
there were also complications in Morocco during the period of the
Regency. In 1887 the probable death of the Sultan caused Spain to
increase her African garrisons, and when this event did not take place
the Moors themselves appealed to the Spanish government to re-
assemble the conference which had met in Madrid in 1880 and had
fixed the relations of Morocco and the Powers. This was done, and
as a reward for the initiative displayed by Spain her legations in
London, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome were raised to the status of
embassies.
Unfortunately the relations between Spain and the Sultan of
Morocco did not remain for long on a friendly basis, and some acts
of aggression by the Riffs in the neighbourhood of Melilla in 1893
very nearly caused a breach. An army of 25,000 men under twenty-
nine generals was hastily assembled, and Martinez Campos was ap-
pointed to the supreme command. This display of force induced the
Sultan to disown the action of the Riffs, and he sent envoys to
Madrid to ratify an agreement by which he had promised an indem-
nity. Unhappily an inebriated Spanish general struck one of the
Moors in the face on his way to an audience of the Regent, and as
compensation for this affront Spain had to be content with a reduced
indemnity. In other matters, in view of the dangers at home, the
Regency abandoned the active foreign policy by which Alfonso XII
had sought to raise the prestige of the country.
The Cuban problem had perplexed more than one government
344
 THE REGENCY
before the Regency, and in 1868 an insurrection broke out in the
island which was not suppressed for ten years. In the middle of the
struggle the United States complained in a note to the Powers of the
continued anarchy in Cuba, and although it took no further action,
this step was sufficiently significant. In due course slavery was
abolished, but there were too many sinecures in the island to allow
any government seriously to tackle the question of administrative
reform.
Almost the first political event of the Regency had been the rejec-
tion by the Cortes, by 227 votes to 17, or a proposal in this sense
brought forward by the Cuban deputies. This vote proved to the
Cubans that it was quite hopeless for them to expect redress by legal
means, for the vested interests were too strong. Furthermore, Cuba
was a closed market for the Catalan manufacturers, and no Spanish
government would dare to defy Catalonia.
In 1895 another rebellion broke out, and Martinez Campos was
sent from Spain with an army to repress it. He completely failed
in this task, and was succeeded by General Weyler, who established
a system of concentration camps. These events seriously affected
public opinion in the United States, for American investments in
Cuba were considerable, and it was plain that it would require but
very little to precipitate war. It was not long before the clash
came.
On the night of February 15, 1898, the United States battleship
Maine, which had been in Cuban waters for some months for the
purpose of protecting American citizens, was destroyed by an ex-
plosion in the port of Havana, and 266 of her crew perished. This
event roused excitement in both Spain and the United States to
the highest pitch. The American Consul reported that the explosion
was due to a submarine mine, which the Spaniards denied, but offered
to assist an enquiry into its causes. The United States refused to
participate, and its experts reported that the explosion took place
outside the ship. The Spanish experts, on the other hand, declared
that it had taken place inside, through the ignition of the Maine* s
ammunition.
By this time war was inevitable, and the United States, largely under
the influence of its Press, had been preparing to fight for some
months past. All attempts at mediation had been made in vain. On
April i the President reported that Spain had sent an unsatisfactory
reply to his message which had demanded an armistice in Cuba,
the abandonment of the system of concentration camps, and the
proper distribution of relief funds subscribed in the United States.
On April 1 1 he asked Congress for permission to use the army and
navy to put an end to the war in Cuba, and nine days later the desired
powers were granted. Congress declared the Cubans a free people,
and called upon Spain to evacuate the island, but at the same time
disclaimed all intention of acquiring territorial rights. A state of
345
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

war existed virtually from April 21, though it was not formally
declared by Spain until three days later.
There was a large, but disorganised, Spanish army in Cuba, and
there was a considerable force in the Philippine Islands, while three
Spanish squadrons were at sea. Admiral Camara
commanded the
reserve squadron at home, Admiral Cervera the Atlantic squadron off
the Cape Verde Islands, and Admiral Montojo the Pacific squadron
in the Philippines. It was upon the last named that the first blow
fell. Admiral Dewey, who had been stationed at Hongkong with the
American squadron, received orders to take the offensive, and on
May i, Montojo's ships, hopelessly outmatched, were destroyed in
Manila Bay. The victors, who had only lost seven men wounded in
the battle, landed, captured the arsenal at Cavite, and blockaded
Manila, while Aguinaldo, the leader of the native insurgents (a
rebellion had broken out two years before), attacked on the land side.
When this news reached Spain it was at first decided to send
Admiral Camara to the rescue, but he had only reached the Suez
Canal when he was recalled. The government realised that the
situation in the Far East was hopeless, and that the squadron
might
well be wanted nearer home, while in any event Spain had no coaling
station between her coast and the Philippines. The first week of the
war had thus been disastrous for Spain, but there was worse to
follow.
Cervera proceeded to Cuba on the outbreak of war, and after
coaling at Cura9oa he reached Santiago on May 19. For a week he
continued to hide his presence from the enemy, but on June i he
was blockaded by a vastly superior American fleet. The Americans
then attempted to bottle up the port by sinking a collier in the
narrow channel, but this stratagem was unsuccessful.
Meanwhile an American army was landed at Guantamo, forty
miles to the east of Santiago, and contact was established with the
Cuban insurgents. At El Caney and San Juan Hill the Spaniards
were driven back after a desperate resistance, and in spite of an out-
break of fever in their ranks the Americans began to shell Santiago.
This made the position of Cervera untenable, and he accordingly put
to sea with great gallantry, although he had no illusions about the
fate which awaited him. On July 3 he steamed out of Santiago, and
in the combat which followed all his ships were either sunk, burnt, or
captured. A fortnight later General Toral surrendered Santiago to an
inferior American force, having stipulated for the
repatriation of
himself and the garrison under his command.
The war was now, in fact, over, and Spain had lost the last
remains of her colonial empire, for the Americans had also gained
possession of the greater part of Puerto Rico. Sagasta, who was then
Prime Minister, accordingly opened negotiations for peace on the
basis of an
agreement as to the political status of Cuba. The
American President refused to consider any such limitation, and he
346
 THE REGENCY
declared his government's terms to be the immediate evacuation of
Cuba, the surrender of Puerto Rico to the United States in lieu of an
indemnity, and the possession of Manila pending a settlement of the
ownership of the Philippines. The Spaniards demurred at the last
clause, but were finally forced to accept it, and a preliminary agree-
ment was signed on August 12,
The commissioners to arrange the terms of peace met in Paris at
the beginning of October, and the two disputed points were the
Cuban debt and the sovereignty of the Philippines. With regard to
the former the Spanish contention was that the debt was attached to
the island, and that its change of ownership did not affect the matter.
As for Manila, it had been captured by the Americans after the
signature of the preliminaries of peace, and Spain demanded posses-
sion of the city and the archipelago. The Americans refused to
consider these arguments, and the Spanish government was given
the alternative of a surrender or a renewal of the war. As Spain was
in no position to fight again she had to give way, and the treaty was
signed on November 28. The United States paid a sum of 4,600,000
for the Philippine archipelago.
The immediate result of the war was a great increase in the
Spanish debt, for the country was obliged to take over more than a
hundred millions sterling of colonial and war loans. Nevertheless
bankruptcy was avoided, and in due course her credit improved.
Ultimately, the moral effect of the war was more important than the
political, for from the defeat came that "generation of 1898'* which
has since exercised so great an influence upon every aspect of the
national life. The complete failure of the regime to defend the
colonies produced a reaction of which pessimism and criticism were
the keynote, and the intellectuals raised the cry that there must be a
fresh start.
All this, however, was for the future, for the immediate effect
of the disaster was small, and the storm which it was feared might
overturn the dynasty did not even produce a change of ministry.
There was a feeling of relief that the drain of men and money to Cuba
was at an end, though the soldiers who had proved so signally
incapable of defending the country were soon to show that they had
no intention of abandoning their claim to control its destinies.
Yet when the Regency came to an end in 1902 the Parliamentary
System upon which the restored monarchy was based had already
begun to disintegrate. Cdnovas had been murdered by an anarchist
in 1897, and Sagasta had but one year more to live. Neither left a
successor equal to himself, and the parties they had led began to
split up into groups. The lapse of a generation had not sufficed to
enable the principle of Representative Government to take root in
Spain, and the disappearance of Cdnpvas and Sagasta deprived the
country of the men who could give it at any rate an appearance of
reality,
347
 CHAPTER XLI

The Earlier Years of Alfonso XIII (1902-1923)

King had not long attained his majority before the weakness
of the Parliamentary System without a Canovas or a Sagasta to
THE make it work became apparent. During the first four years
after the termination of the Regency there were no less than fourteen
political crisesand eight Prime Ministers.
The Catalan question became even more embittered, and there was
a violent feud between the Catalan Nationalists and the Radical
Centralists led by Lerroux. The generals, top, in spite of the poor
show which they had made in the war against the United States,
began to interfere in politics once again, and they obtained a law
by which military tribunals were allowed to try offences against
military institutions. Above all, Socialist doctrines of the most
advanced type were making considerable progress in the larger
centres of population, and on the day of the King's marriage in
May, 1906, with Princess Victoria Eugenia of Battenberg, a par-
ticularly daring attempt was made to murder the royal couple.
In due course the Liberals gave place to the Conservatives, and
Don Antonio Maura became Prime Minister. His ministry coincided
with a period of widespread disorder, and for a time it appeared as if
revolution was inevitable. In 1909 there was an anticlerical and
anarchist rising in Barcelona, which was only suppressed with the
greatest difficulty and after considerable bloodshed. An intellectual
of the name of Ferrer was accused of complicity in this outbreak, and
Maura had him shot. This act made the Spanish government very
unpopular with Liberals and Socialists all over Europe, and Maura
finally resigned. For some years afterwards he was anathema to the
parties of the Left, and the mere suggestion that Maura was going to
take office again was sufficient to produce a storm.
Maura was succeeded by the Liberal Moret, who was soon re-
placed by Canalejas, one of the very few men of the first rank in this
period. He was at once an ardent Catholic and a convinced reformer,
and he agreed with the King probably better than any other Prime
Minister during his reign.
In 1910 Alfonso, in a speech from the throne, declared that his
government would insist on the reduction and control of the
Religious Orders, though there would be no interference with their
spiritual independence. In consequence of this attitude relations with
the Vatican became strained, and the ambassador to the Holy
Spanish
See was withdrawn. The anti-dynastic Left hoped that the King
would yield to the clamour which these events had raised against the
minister, for in that case they could reckon upon the support of
Canalejas in their attack upon the throne. Alfonso refused to play
into his enemies* hands, and when the Prime Minister offered his
348
 THE EARLIER YEARS OF ALFONSO XIII

resignation, the monarch declined to accept it, pointing out that

Canalejas still had a majority in the Cortes.
In November, 1912, the co-operation of King and minister was
brought to an end by the latter's murder in the street in Madrid,
Of the many successors of Canalejas as Prime Minister none was of
more than mediocre ability with the exception of the Conservative
Dato, who did much in the way of social reform, but in March, 1921,
he, too, perished by thebullet of an anarchist.
By this time the disintegration of the parties was complete. Onthe
assassination of Cdnovas an attempt had been made oy Silvela to
succeed him as the undisputed Conservative leader, but he failed to
impose his authority on the Duke of Tetuan or Romero Robledo,
and the groups led by them formed alliances to the Right or to
the Left as the needs of the moment appeared to dictate, villaverde
was no more successful, but for a time he was head of a section of
Liberal-Conservatives which by no means always voted with the
supporters of Antonio Maura, known as the Mauristas. In 1915 the
Liberal-Conservatives elected Dato as their leader, and under his
influence their policy became more progressive, for it was then that
measures dealing with Workmen's Insurance, Compensation for
Accidents, and Regulation of Women's and Children's Work were
passed by the Cortes. Dato also received a certain amount of support
from the Mauristas, but on his death all unity was again lost.
The nominal Conservative leader was Sdnchez Guerra, but the
Left wing of the party followed the political heirs of Dato, the Right
wing adhered to Maura, and in the Centre was Juan de la Cierva.
There were other groups, of which the principal were those led by
Burgos Mazo, Ossorio Gallardo, and Bugallal. The difference
between these groups was purely one of personalities and of shades
of opinion.
The Liberals were in no better plight. Even before the death of
Sagasta his leadership was not always accepted by Gomazo and
Canalejas, and before twelve months had elapsed since that event
there were three Liberal groups, led by Montero Rios, Moret, and
Canalejas respectively. As in the case of the Conservatives there
were no fundamental distinctions between these groups, but in
spite of that the Liberal party was never united again, though from
time to time there were unions, blocs, and cartels. Canalejas, with
his Liberal-Democrats, commanded the allegiance of most Liberals
until his death, and his successor was Garcia Prieto, Marquis of
Alhucemas, who co-operated when he could with the Reformists and
the republicans. The more moderate Liberals chose the Count of
Romanones as their leader, but there continued to be other groups
which looked to Alcald Zamora, Rafael Gasset, and Santiago Alba.
Farther to the Left were the Reformists. They were a fragment
which had, under the leadership of Melquiades Alvarez, broken
away from the republican party in 1913, when their leader had
349
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

declared in a speech at Murcia that he would no longer raise the

question of the regime. Melquiades Alvarez was President of the
Chamber of Deputies at the time of the establishment of the
Directory.
Fortunately for the monarchy, the anti-dynastic parties were, if
anything, still more divided than those which nominally supported
the throne. The republicans, until the last years of the reign, were
easily the weakest of all the political organisations, for the defection
of Melquiades Alvarez left Lerroux with a mere handful of followers.
They also lost many supporters to the Socialists, who made rapid
progress during the early years of the century, more particularly in
the larger towns. In 1888 there were 16 Socialist groups, in 1906
there were 115, and in 1912 there were 216. The Socialists were
also fortunate in possessing an extremely able leader in Pablo
Iglesias.
At the other extreme stood the Carlists or Jaimists, as they became
in 1909 when Don Jaime succeeded his father, Don Carlos, as legiti-
mist claimant to the throne. They were still strong in the Basque
Provinces and Navarre, and, like the Socialists, they had a leader of
outstanding ability in Vazquez de Mella, but they were never the
danger to Alfonso XIII that they had been to his father and grand-
mother. Nevertheless, they prevented many strong monarchists
from rallying to the support of the throne.
Of the other groups in the Cortes the only one of importance was
that of the Catalan autonomists. In 1913 their demands were to some
extent granted by the ministry of Sanchez Guerra, which gave the
Catalans a limited form of local government, but this policy was
subsequently reversed by the Directory.

In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that on an increasing

number of occasions the King had not only to reign but also to
govern. More than once a considerable period elapsed between the
fall of one administration and the formation of another, and unless
the whole machinery of government was to come to a standstill
someone had to take the initiative. When a ministry resigned
consultations had to be held with the leaders of the various groups in
the Cortes, and even when a new Prime Minister had been appointed
there was a further delay while he carried on his negotiations with
this faction or that with a view to obtaining a majority.
One result of this was to render any bold programme impossible,
and another was to increase the personal power of the monarch,
who alone represented continuity amid tne welter of changing
groups. Unfortunately this state of affairs encouraged the King,
though from the most patriotic of motives, to play one politician
off against another, and this policy became in course of time so
much second nature to him that in the end no one really trusted
him. There had been too many constitutions during the past
350
 THE EARLIER YEARS OF ALFONSO XIII

hundred years for any particular respect to be paid to the existing

one, and in any event half the electorate was illiterate.
When the European War broke out Spain remained neutral, and
while it lasted she became very rich. Money poured into the country
as the demands of the Allies were met, and Spain experienced to the
full all the advantages of neutrality in a world that was at war, in

spite of the fact that she lost 140,000 tons of shipping.

No account of the position of Spain during these years would be
complete without some reference to the work of the King on behalf
of the prisoners. For this purpose he maintained, at his own expense,
a secretariat of forty clerks, and the cost of postage alone was over
a million pesetas. His initiative led to the cessation of reprisals in
Germany against French prisoners, he took up strongly the case of
the civil population of Lille, and he never ceased to protest against
the horrors of submarine warfare. Eight sentences of death on
women, and twenty on men, were commuted in consequence of his
intervention, while had the Spanish minister at Brussels had time to
communicate with Madrid, Edith Cavell would not have been shot.
King Alfonso XIII may have committed mistakes which cost him
and his subjects dear, but his work for suffering humanity during the
Four Years* War is a big item on the credit side of his account.
Increased wealth, however, caused a spread of discontent, and the
period 1914-1918 was extremely disturbed. The unrest came to a
head in 1917, when there took place a general strike with the object
of establishing a republic on the new Russian model.
The movement was suppressed mainly owing to the army, which,
in consequence, began to exercise a dominating influence in politics
with the connivance of the King, and militaryy#/tf.f were formed. By
1920 their power was such that they compelled the resignation of the
Conservative ministry of Sanchez Toca, and it had already become a
mere question of time when a military regime, for which there were
many precedents, would come into being. In many ways the army
was more representative of public opinion than the Cortes, and it
enjoyed the favour of the King, This development was accelerated
by the course of events in Morocco.

The opening years of the nineteenth century had witnessed a

considerable degree of rivalry between Great Britain, France, and
Spain in Morocco, but on the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale
Great Britain renounced her interest there, and at the Algeciras
Conference in 1906 France and Spain were entrusted with the general
supervision of the country. By a further Franco-Spanish agreement
in 1912, the dominions of the Sultan of Morocco had, with the
exception of Tangier, been divided into two zones, and it was the
efforts of the Protecting Powers to establish order in their respective
zones that precipitated the conflict. France was the first to succeed
in the task, partly owing to the geographical configuration of the
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

and partly owing to the fact that in Marshal

territory assigned to her,
Lyautey she possessed one of the greatest colonial administrators
that any nation has yet produced, though it is to be noted that she
made no effort to pacify that portion of the Riff area which was
included in her zone.
The Spaniards, on the other hand, were hampered not only by the
mountainous nature of their Protectorate, but also by the paralysis
which affected every branch of their administration during the last
decade of the Parliamentary regime. Such being the case, it is not
surprising that the Spanish forces should have made comparatively
little headway, or that when, in the summer of 1921, a general
offensive was at last begun it should have ended in the disaster of
Anual, a debacle unparalleled in colonial history since the rout of the
Italians at Adowa twenty-five years before.
The Spanish forces had first marched out of the old stronghold of
Melilla in the spring of 1909. After three years of hard fighting they
had established themselves permanently on the line of the Kert
River, and in all the territory comprised between its right bank and
the French zone. By the first months of 1921 they had, however,
advanced far beyond the Kert, but only after difficulties with the
Beni Said and Beni Ulchek tribes. Both of these had submitted,
but incompletely, and not in a way to inspire confidence.
During the years between 1909 and 1921 some 300 miles of roads
had been built behind the line of the Kert, and also two railways
towards the interior. The rich iron-ore mines of Beni Ifrur on
Mount Uixan had been opened, a large agricultural colony estab-
lished at Monte Arruit, and a model farm at El Zaio, overlooking the
Muluya River on the East. Dispensaries and Mohammedan schools
had been established at every important military base, springs
covered in, while Spanish doctors were frequently sent for by the
tribes, or visited by the natives at the weekly markets.
No rising or threatened rebellion had taken place during these
twelve years, and it was generally thought that the natives under-
stood the benefits of civilisation sufficiently to accept the Protec-
torate, which, moreover, meant for them light and regular taxation,
fair administration of justice, and the preservation of order. On their

part the Spanish troops were beginning to become accustomed to

the country and its ways, and under the influence of this false senti-
ment of security were leading the life of soldiers in time of peace
between the Kert and the Muluya. Frequent leave was granted to
the officers and men, who naturally took advantage of their proximity
to their own country.
The Spanish zone in Morocco is North of a line drawn from a
point a little South of Larache on the Atlantic coast, running North
of Fez, and then to Cabo de Agua on the frontier of Algeria; it does
not include Tangier with its immediate hinterland, which is inter-
national. Two armies were operating in this area in the summer of
35*
 THE EARLIER YEARS OF ALFONSO XIII

19*1 one under General Berenguer, based on Tetudn, was engaged in

:

the encircling of Raisuli; and the other, under General Silvestre,

was advancing from Melilla in the direction of the Bay of Alhucemas,
with the intention of uniting with General Berenguer's forces as
soon as the pacification of the western sector was complete. It
was this latter army under General Silvestre that met with disaster at
Anual.
General Silvestre had under his command 25,790 men of all arms.
These troops were, however, scattered in detachments among some
seventy different posts, of which a number were held by only thirty
or fifty men. Of artillery there was a mountain and a field battery at
Anual, and the same in the neighbourhood of Dar-Drius, with small
detachments at some other posts; there were also three companies of
machine gunners at Anual and two at Dar-Drius. Such were the main
Spanish dispositions in the eastern sector when the fighting began.
By the end of May, 1921, General Silvestre had advanced along the
coast as far as Sidi Dris, and on the ist of June he sent a detachment
to occupy Abarran at the express request of the Temsaman tribe to
whom it belonged, This detachment was treacherously attacked by
the natives, assisted by their fellow-countrymen in the Spanish
ranks, after the occupation of the village, and the Spaniards were
compelled to withdraw. On receiving news of this disaster, General
Silvestre reinforced Sidi Dris by land, and revictualled it by sea,
while, on the 3rd, he occupied Talilit without opposition, although a
considerable concentration of Moors could be seen in the hills in the
immediate vicinity.
The reverse at Abarran had caused considerable uneasiness at
Madrid, and General Berenguer, the High Commissioner, accordingly
proceeded to the eastern sector of the Protectorate where, on the
5th, he had an interview with General Silvestre on board the Princesa
de AsturiaSy off Sidi Dris. As a result of this meeting the High Com-
missioner reported to the Minister of War that in view of the
hostility of some tribes and the doubtful attitude of others the situa-
tion required care, but was not disquieting. General Berenguer then
returned to Tetuin.
During the following week matters changed for the worse. On the
yth, the Spaniards occupied Igueriben for the better defence of
Anual, and, on the i4th, General Silvestre reported great enemy
activity together
with the presence of Abd-el-Krim, the Riff leader.
Two aays later the Moors made an unsuccessful attack on the Anual
position, where they suffered heavily, and for a month the whole
sector was quiet.
Abd-el-Krim's brother entered into negotiations with the Spanish
authorities, and General Silvestre, who had abandoned, on the
instructions of General Berenguer, all idea of a further advance until
after the surrender of Raisuli, was so far deceived by the apparent
calm that he allowed a number of officers and men to proceed on
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
leave to the Peninsula. On July 15 the High Commissioner received
his usual monthly report from General Silvestre, but that officer had
nothing to relate. Two days later the Moors attacked the Igueriben-
Anual line, but were repulsed. There was still no indication of what
was coining, and even General Silvestre treated the fighting as
nothing more serious than a mere demonstration like that against
Anual a month before. On July 19 the storm burst.
The High Commissioner up to this date had not received any
communication from General Silvestre which could lead him to
suppose that the latter took a serious view of the situation, but, on
the evening of the I9th, there arrived a message which was distinctly
alarming. In it General Silvestre announced that Igueriben was
surrounded, and that after fighting all day a relief column had been
driven back with casualties amounting to six officers and seventy-
one other ranks; an urgent appeal for reinforcements was also made.
It cannot be too strongly emphasised in view of the disaster which
was to follow that this was the first warning which General Berenguer
had received that the situation was in any way critical, and that even
General Silvestre did not grasp the true position is proved by the
fact that he did not go to Anual himself until two days later.
The High Commissioner at once sent General Silvestre's telegram
to Madrid, and within forty-eight hours such reinforcements as he
"could spare from the western sector were on the march to their
point of embarkation. Meanwhile, the most contradictory messages
were arriving from General Silvestre. On the zoth he suggested
that a naval demonstration should be made off Alhucemas in order to
relieve the pressure on his front and to reassure friendly natives,
and he also asked for more aeroplanes. General Berenguer trans-
mitted both these requests to Madrid.
On the zist, the culminating; day of the tragedy, three messages
were received from General Silvestre. The first merely announced
that Igueriben was still surrounded, and that, so far as the situation
was concerned, there was nothing to report. The second pressed for
the naval diversion, stated that the strength of the required reinforce-
ments should be two mountain batteries, one regiment of infantry,
as well as auxiliary troops, and contained an account of the Spanish
dispositions which showed that there were eighteen companies of
infantry in close reserve, an arrangement which General Berenguer
considered satisfactory. The third telegram contained the disturbing
information that the Spanish morale was bad, but gave no reasons for
this statement.
On the zist General Silvestre proceeded to Anual with all the
forces he could muster, but it was already too late. The Moors on
that day stormed Igueriben, and a convoy which had been sent to
relieve it was surprised in a drift by tactics closely resembling those
employed by Hannibal in his defeat of Flaminius at Lake Trasimene.
These disasters determined General Silvestre to fall back upon Lzzu-
354
 THE EARLIER YEARS OF ALFONSO XIII

mar, and he accordingly telegraphed his decision to General Beren-

guer, who received the report at 10.50 a.m* the following day, the
2znd, and he replied, "I hope that in these critical moments all will
think of the prestige and honour of the country before everything
else." No further news reached the High Commissioner until the
evening, when he heard that General Silvestre was dead and that his
troops were in flight.
It is clear that General Silvestre's first intention was to hold Anual
until reinforcements reached him, and had he carried out this plan
it is more than likely that the
subsequent disaster would never have
taken place. As it was, however, he changed his mind for reasons
that have never been properly elucidated, and gave the order for an
immediate evacuation of Anual. The morale of his men left, accord-
ing to his own report of the day before, much to be desired, and it is
consequently not surprising that the order to retreat was almost
immediately followed by one of those sudden panics from which no
army is invariably exempt. The Ca^adores de Alcantara formed an
honourable exception and endeavoured to cover their comrades*
retreat, but for the rest of the troops it was a veritable sattve qui peut.
As soon as he realised what had happened, General Silvestre put an
end to his life.
General Navarro met the fugitives at Dar-Drius and tried to rally
them, but so complete was their demoralisation that out of four
mountain batteries which had left Anual only one could be formed at
Dar-Drius. It was found impossible to make a stand, and the retreat
was continued in a little better order to Monte Arruit, where the main
body arrived on July 29.
The rest is soon told. The Spanish forces in the
of the story
eastern zone were practically annihilated, for General Silvestre had
taken every available man to Anual, Monte Arruit fell on August 9,
seventy posts were captured, and by the second week of August the
Moors were six miles from Melilla. The total Spanish losses were
estimated at 14,772 men, 19,504 rifles, 392 machine guns, and 129
guns. Much of the territory abandoned was, however, recovered by
General Berenguer before the end of the year in a campaign which
proved that the panic at Anual was a very rare event in Spanish
military history.

Such was the disaster at Anual which was destined to affect the
history of Spain most profoundly. Had it not occurred there might
have been no Directory, had there been no Directory there might
have been no Second Republic, and in consequence no Civil War.
A careful study of the available evidence can only lead to the
conclusion that the immediate culprit was General Silvestre. He was
impetuous by nature, and, like so many people of this type, was apt
to lose his head in an emergency. In the present instance he com-
mitted three blunders of the first magnitude, for he failed to realize
355
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

that the Moors were concentrating against him, he placed undue

reliance upon his native levies, and he evacuated Anual when he
should have remained there at all costs. These mistakes in them-
selves are enough to explain the disaster, but the circumstances of his
rash advance appeared, to those unacquainted with Silvestre's im-
petuous character, so inexplicable that the revolutionary parties
found no difficulty in spreading the rumour that he must have acted
under secret instructions from the King.
The effect of Anual upon Spain itselfwas to drive the last nail into
the coffin of the Parliamentary System. It is true that Vizconde de
Eza, in his Mi T&sponsabilidad en el Desastre de Melilla como Minisfro de
Guerra, made a very able defence of himself and his colleagues, but
contemporary opinion put the blame upon the politicians in Madrid.
The Army, in particular, deeply resented the affront that had been
placed upon it, and it was not long before circumstances enabled the
military to have their revenge. Anual brought to a head the dis-
content that had long been growing in the Peninsula, and as the
murdered Dato had not left any successor of his own ability it was
inevitable that a change of regime must take place, and to this the
King was reputed to be by no means opposed. In addition to the
strain of the Moroccan campaign, the country was suffering severely
from the disorders attendant upon feeble administration. Maura,
Sdnchez Guerra, and Alhucemas were successively Prime Ministers,
but none of them proved capable of suppressing the growing dis-
orders that were afflicting Spain.
All the native anarchy of the race came to the surface,and there
were repeated revolutionary strikes, generally accompanied by
bloodshed. Communist emissaries would appear at a factory, and
compel those employed there to cease work without giving any
reason for their action: such was the terror they inspired that they
were rarely disobeyed. Murders were perpetrated with impunity,
and even on the rare occasions when the culprits were caught no jury
could be found to convict. In June, 1923, these disorders reached
their climax in the brutal assassination of the Cardinal Archbishop of
Saragossa.
Retribution was not slow to follow. In the first days of September
two of the generals in Madrid went to the King, told him that the
existing state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, and that the
whole system must be changed. It was not surprising that they
should have acted in this manner, for the Army had by no means
remained unaffected by the prevalent anarchy. Quite recently the
colonel of a regiment stationed in Barcelona had come to Madrid
and reported to the commander-in-chief that he had seized six men
in the barracks distributing anarchist leaflets to their comrades in
which they were told to kill the King, shoot their officers, and pull
down the flag. The colonel in question was duly referred by the
commander-in-chief to the relevant article of the Military Code
356
 THE EARLIER YEARS OF ALFONSO XIII

which prescribed a court-martial and the death penalty, but when

this was reported to the Minister for War he declared that action of
this nature was inconsistent with his principles. Accordingly, the
men were tried by a civil tribunal, and sentenced to imprisonment for
life; but in six months
this was reduced to twenty years, in another
six months to fifteen years, and by the end of eighteen months the
men were released altogether.
King Alfonso listened to what the generals had to say, and he
informed the Prime Minister, Garcia Pneto, of what had happened.
The King then went to Santander, where he was rung up a few
days later by Garcia Prieto, who told him that the garrison at
Barcelona under the command, of General Primo de Rivera had
revolted. In reply to a question the Prime Minister admitted that he
had taken no action whatever in the light of the information given to
him before the King's departure from the capital. Thereafter events
moved rapidly. All over the country the troops followed the
example of the Barcelona garrison, and in face of a movement which
they were powerless to control the ministers resigned, whereupon
the King called upon Primo de Rivera to form a government. Such
was the pronunciamiento of September 13, 1923.
There can be little doubt but that one ot the main reasons for the
collapse of the Parliamentary System was the neglect of education.
Parliamentarianism was not, in any case, a plant of native growth as
Cdnovas had sown it, and if it was to take root an educated electorate
was essential. A
few pioneers, such as Giner and Castillejo, realised
this, but the mass of the politicians found that the illiteracy of their
constituents was very definitely to their advantage. Without states-
men to work
it, or an enlightened public opinion to support it, the
Constitution, excellent as it was in many respects, was doomed.

357
 CHAPTER XL1I

The Directory and the Revolution (1923-1931)

E head of the Directory, Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja,
Marquis of Estella, was a man of fifty-three, for he had been
Jerez de la Frontera on January 8, 1870. He was a
-* born at

nephew of that General Primo de Rivera, also Marquis of Estella,

who played so prominent a part at the restoration or Alfonso XII,
and was twice Governor-General of the Philippines. It was at this
uncle's hands that Miguel received his early training.
He adopted a military career almost as a matter of course, and at
the age pf twenty-three was awarded the Cross of San Fernando
(First Class) for conspicuous bravery in
the field in Morocco, while
he subsequently saw service both in the Philippines and in Cuba.
The close of the war with the United States brought a period of
peace to the Spanish army, but, as soon as hostilities commenced in
Morocco in 1909, Primo de Rivera asked to be sent to the front, and
he remained in Africa until he was severely wounded two years later.
This early experience of Moorish warfare was to stand him in good
stead in later years, and the skilful use which he made of his personal
knowledge was proved in 1925 by his handling of the operations at
Alhucemas.
The talents of Primo de Rivera now began to attract the attention
in 1915 he was appointed Governor
of successive
governments, and
of Cddiz, while four years later he became Captain-General of
Madrid. His tenure of both these posts, however, terminated
abruptly because his outspokenness was distasteful to those in
authority. For example, he severely censured the Moroccan policy of
successive administrations, and he demanded the opening of negotia-
tions with Great Britain for the restitution of Gibraltar: with regard
to this latter point it is not without interest to note that he changed his
mind in later years, having come to the conclusion that Ceuta had a
greater strategic
value in modern warfare than Gibraltar, for which
it was
proposed to exchange the Moorish port. In spite of these
checks his upward career was only temporarily delayed, and in 1922
he became
Captain-General of Catalonia, where, as has been shown,
he organised his bloodless coup eTitat of September 1 3 in the following
year,
Primo de Rivera was a soldier above all else; that was both his
strength
and his weakness. He possessed all those Andalusian charac-
teristics which have enabled the men of the South to
play so large a
part in the history of Spain. An unfailing courtesy, a power of
leadership, and a very sincere devotion to his Church were his most
notable qualities. The impression which he made those who
upon
came into contact with him was that of a man absolutely sincere, and
prepared to make any personal sacrifice for what he believed to be
358
 THE DIRECTORY AND THE REVOLUTION
right. He was also completely fearless, and he walked about the
streets of Madrid in the same careless way after he had seized power
as he did before that event. A true aristocrat, he deliberately
avoided all ostentation, and when he returned to the capital after his
victorious campaign in Africa, he entered it as a private citizen.
When he went to his club or to a theatre, in nine cases out of ten
his presence was unknown.
Unfortunately there was another side to the picture, and his
defects in the end proved to be the undoing both of himself and of
Spain. Like so many soldiers, Primo de Rivera recognised only
two colours, black and white, while in politics the distinction is
rarely as clear as that. With the passage of time and the emergence
of fresh problems, social and economic, with which his early training
had not equipped him to deal, he got out of his depth, and therein
lies the explanation of the blunders which marked the later years
of his tenure of office. He estranged all the old politicians, the best
of whom would otherwise have helped him, and his relations with
the King were never good. In these circumstances Primo de Rivera
became increasingly more isolated, and only a genius, which he
neither was nor claimed to be, can afford to stand alone.
At the same time there can be no shadow of doubt but that the
pronmciamiento^ and the closing of the Cortes which followed it,
were exceedingly popular. Had a plebiscite been taken the Directory
would have obtained an overwhelming majority. The fact that the
change had been effected by the Army in no way disturbed public
opinion, for Spain had become accustomed to military intervention
in politics, and thearmy was at this moment more representative of
the country than was the Cortes. Primo de Rivera himself never lost
his popularity with the masses, however much the middle classes and
the intellectuals might sneer at him, and the King's apparently
callous treatment of him after his fall undoubtedly contributed not a
little to undermine the monarch's own position.
As has been shown, when the pronunciamiento was made at Barce-
lona the King was at Santander, whence he at once returned to
Madrid. He had no choice but to accept a military Directory, and
it is
impossible to censure him for the action which he took at
this exceedingly difficult moment, more particularly in view of the
fact that he had previously warned the Government what to expect*
Where he did make a mistake was in not insisting upon the convoca-
tion of the Cortes, within the three months prescribed by the Con-
stitution, to sanction what had been done. Had this course been
adopted the General could easily have obtained from the Cortes not
only the ratification of what had happened, but a completely free
hand in the future: in that event the charge of being unconstitu-
tional, later to be used against the monarch with such damning
effect, could never have been made. King Alfonso considered that
the Constitution was suspended, and such was indeed the case, but, as
359
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

it contained no provision for its temporary suspension, he was, in

kw, acting in an unconstitutional manner. Of course, the Constitu-

tion had so often been disregarded in the past that one more breach
of it did not seem to matter, but the King had sworn to uphold its
provisions, and this violation of his oath placed
a very effective
weapon in the hands of the enemies of the throne.
TTiis mistake was primarily due to the kck of sympathy between
the King and Primo de Rivera. The General, as we have seen, had
serious limitations, and one of them, not uncommon in dictators,
was his failure to appredate the force of tradition. He thus tended to
ignore the Crown, and had actually arranged to replace King Alfonso
by the Infante Don Juan if the former showed any signs of opposing
his wishes. In time the relations between the two men improved
somewhat, though they were never cordial, and the result of the
treatment which the monarch received from his minister was to
weaken the prestige of the throne; on the other hand, the King
became identified with the minister's policy in the eyes of every enemy
of the Directory.
The first task of the new regime was to re-establish respect for the
law, and tins was speedily accomplished by a few exemplary sentences
on wrongdoers. It was proved in this way how much could be
effected by firm government. Within a few weeks, too, of his arrival
in office, Primo de Rivera accompanied the King and Queen to
as a result, many analogies were drawn both in the
Italy, and,
Peninsula and elsewhere between the regimes in the two countries.
In actual fact there was nothing in common between them, for
Fascism had grown up from below, while the Spanish Directory was
imposed from above. On his return Primo de Rivera tried to create
a body in his support called the \3ni6n ~Patri6ticay but it never
obtained any strong hold. It was joined by place-seekers, anxious
to stand well with the authorities, but it was the palest reflection of
Fascism.
The preoccupation of the Directory, however, in its earlier years
was Morocco, and Primo de Rivera spent two long periods in that
country, leaving the Marquis of Magaz, the Vice-President of the
Directory, in charge of afiairs in Spain. The situation in North
Africa certainly demanded his attention. As soon as the news of
General Silvestre's overthrow had reached Spain, troops were
hurried to Morocco in large numbers, and much of the lost ground
was recovered, but all attempt to occupy the whole zone was aban-
doned. The Spaniards still relied upon a series of more
very largely
or less isokted posts, planned on much the same principle as the
British block-houses in the South African War. As a rule, however,
these were not sufficiently strong to hold out for any length of time,
while the difficulty with regard to an adequate water supply was
almost insuperable. In these circumstances Primo de Rivera decided
to cut his losses, and withdraw behind the so-called Estella Line until
360
 THE DIRECTORY AND THE REVOLUTION
such time as an offensive should be practicable. It can hardly be
denied that the adoption of this policy was a proof of the GeneraPs
courage, for it involved the temporary abandonment of a good deal
of territory, and in view of the general political situation in Spain it
was a daring move to make.
During these operations the French zone, it may be observed,
had enjoyed a period of complete calm, and the authorities at Rabat
had not realised that the conflagration might spread. By the end of
1924, therefore, the situation was that the Spaniards were on the
defensive behind the Estella Line, which did little more than cover
Tetudn in the West, while the vast area of the French zone, more
than twice the size of Great Britain, was held by very weak forces,
often of inferior quality, and split up into innumerable small
detachments.
As soon as the weather permitted, Abd-el-Krim began his advance.
He contained the Spaniards, who were still in the throes of re-
organisation, with the minimum number of men that would suffice
for the purpose, and with the rest of his levies he invaded the French
zone. The Moorish objectives were Fez and Taza, the former
because it is the old capital of Morocco, and the latter in order to cut
the railway which connects the town with Algeria, and in a short
time the Moors were within gunshot of both places. The numerous
fortified posts, upon which the French had relied for the defence of
the country, proved useless, and their garrisons merely served to
swell the number of prisoners in Moorish hands, while the morale of
the native troops proved to be extremely bad in the hour of danger.
The first effect of this onslaught upon the French military
authorities was an urgent appeal to Paris for reinforcements, and
by the end of June, 1925, the forces in Morocco had been increased
by some fifty per cent, a step, however, which was only rendered
possible by the evacuation of the Ruhr. In this connection it is only
fair to state that the French Government almost from the beginning

appreciated the seriousness of the situation, and the Prime Minister

himself, M. Painlev, visited the scene of operations. Largely as a
result of his investigations two very important decisions were taken,
namely to entrust the command of the French forces in Morocco to
Marshal Petain, and to enter into negotiations with Spain for the
final pacification of the whole country. Accordingly, Marshal Petain
arrived at Rabat in July, though Marshal Lyautey remained in
Morocco in a purely administrative capacity. It was a measure of
Abd-el-Krim*s importance that two Marshals of France should be
arrayed against him. In July, also, a Franco-Spanish conference was
held at Madrid, when the plan of campaign was drawn up.
On the eve of the Franco-Spanish offensive in August, 1925, the
whole of the Moroccan coast from the mouth of the River Lau to
that of the River Kert was in the hands of the rebels, whose hold
upon the interior was also effective from within a few miles of
361
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Ouezzan in the West to a similar distance North of Taza in the East.

On the Spanish front operations were at a standstill, but the offensive
against the French was still held up rather than definitely halted
when Marshal Petain and General Primo de Rivera delivered their
counter-stroke.
It. had been decided at the conference in Madrid that the two
Powers should strike a simultaneous blow at two separate points,
the French at Biban and the Spaniards at the enemy's capital Ajdir by
means of a landing at Alhucemas. For this latter operation Primo de
Rivera formed two columns under Generals Fernandez Perez and
Saro, consisting of some six thousand men each, while the remainder
of the Spanish forces were held in reserve at Ceuta and Melilla.
By far the harder task fell to the Spaniards. Not only had they to
land upon a hostile and difficult coast, but they had so to co-ordinate
their movements that columns starting from bases so far apart as
Ceuta and Melilla should arrive before their objective simultaneously.
Nor was this all, for the covering fleets were composed of both
Spanish and French squadrons, so that Primo de Rivera, who was in
supreme command, had the added anxiety which is the invariable lot
of a commander whose forces are drawn from different nationalities.
In these circumstances the fact that the whole operation was carried
out without a hitch, except for that caused by exceptionally bad
weather, is the highest tribute to the Spanish forces, who showed on
this, as on many another subsequent occasion, that when well led
they have lost none of their ancient valour, and are equal to any
troops in Europe. The landing at Alhucemas took place on Sep-
tember 8, and after a month's hard fighting in which, to quote
The "Times, "the Riffs were fairly and squarely beaten,** the standard
of Spain floated over Ajdir. Anual was avenged.
If the task allotted to the Spaniards gave them the chance to show
their fine fighting qualities, that which fell to the French was equally
well performed. Marshal Petain thrust now at one sector of the
enemy's line and now at another, compelling him to give ground on
each occasion. The Moors fought as well when fortune was against
them as when it was in their favour, but they had neither the men nor
the equipment to enable them to hold their own, and when the rain
suspended operations in November they had been hustled out of
most of what they had occupied in the spring. Realising that be was
nearing the end of his resources, for the harvest had failed and
typhus was ravaging his ranks, Abd-el-Krim attempted to secure
favourable terms by negotiation, and there was an armistice for this
purpose in April, 1926. The discussions, however, broke down over
the question of the autonomy of the Riff, which the
Protecting
Powers refused to recognise, and fighting was resumed early in May.
The Franco-Spanish plan of campaign was a repetition of that of
the previous year, with Targuist, the Moorish headquarters since
the fall of Ajdir, as the objective. Abd-el-Krim concentrated his
362
 THE DIRECTORY AND THE REVOLUTION
chief effortson stopping the Spanish advance, but General Sanjurjo,
who had by this time succeeded Primo de Rivera as commander-m-
chief, broke the Moorish lines by a frontal attack after some very hard
fighting indeed. This proved to be the last act of the campaign, for on
May 20 the French and Spanish forces joined hands on the River
Nekor a few miles east of Targuist, and a week later Abd-el-Krim
surrendered to the French. The war was over, though the final
pacification of the Spanish zone was not effected until a few months
later.
The victorious termination of the Moroccan campaign enor-
mously enhanced the prestige of the Directory, of which it may be
said to have marked the apogee. Originally the Government had
been composed exclusively of generals and admirals, but in Decem-
ber, 1925, it was remodelled with the addition of such distinguished
civilians as Calvo Sotelo, at the Ministry of Finance, and the Count of
Guadalhorce, at the Ministry of Public Works. Unhappily it did not
proceed to the abolition of conscription and the creation of an
efficient professional army, which would have been to the advantage
both of itself and of Spain. On the other hand, there can be no
gainsaying the fact that the Directory did more for the country in
the six years of its existence than had been effected in the previous
sixty, and for a brief space it did seem as though there were a new
spirit in the land. Trains ran to time, means of communication and of
transport were improved out of all recognition, and Spain seemed
well on the road to a veritable renaissance. Unhappily this revival
proved to be a mere flash in the pan, and it is difficult to resist the
conclusion that such was the case almost entirely because, as in the
days of Charles III, the impulse came from above rather than from
below.
A serious blunder was also made by the Directory in its handling
of the Catalan problem. As in more than one similar case elsewhere,
a little autonomy at the beginning would have prevented virtual
independence in the end. The King of Spain was also Count of
Barcelona, and much use might have been made of this fact, but
Primo de Rivera set his face against any policy that savoured of
concession. Yet the more moderate section of Catalan opinion,
which was alarmed at the friendly relations existing between such
extreme separatists as Colonel Macia and the Communists, would
have welcomed co-operation with Madrid on any terms that recog-
nised their point of view. The result of the Government's obduracy
was to throw the Catalans into the arms of the Republicans and
Socialists in opposition, first to the Directory, and eventually to the
monarchy itselL It was a suicidal policy, and totally unnecessary.
The year 1926, which witnessed the triumph of the Directory,
also marked the commencement of its decline. The failure of Spain
to obtain a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations
was a bad start, and the lack of success which attended her claim
363
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

to Tangier did nothing to enhance the prestige of the administration.

Curiously enough, the first sign of decay within
was a revolt of those
in the last resort for
very military elements upon which it depended
support. The artillery objected
to the Government's interference
with their system of promotion, and it was only the personal inter-
vention of the King that made them give way without resorting to
violence. Even so, martial law had to be proclaimed all over Spain.
In the same month, September, the Union Patriotica organised a
national plebiscite, and although the conditions precluded the
six million people
recording of any adverse votes, the fact that
pronounced in favour of the Directory was significant.
The most striking successes were those of the young and energetic
Ministers of Finance and Public Works. Great progress was made in
the matter of hydro-electric development by the establishment of
autonomous corporations, each of which controlled one of the great
river-basins of the country; particularly successful was the Con-
federation del Ebro y which dealt
with an area covering a seventh of
and with half the latter's rainfall. Contracts were given out
Spain,
for the construction of nearly 400 miles of railway and over 4,000 .

miles of road, while the telephone service was entirely reorganised

by the Compania Telefdnica National. The problem of financial reform
was also attacked at its root by drastic changes in the system of
taxation. Nevertheless, Calvo Sotelo was gravely hampered by the
expensive schemes of Primo de Rivera, which eventually increased
the National Debt by over fort^ per cent, with a consequent rise in
the annual expenditure to meet interest charges.
The military and naval authorities, too, distinguished themselves
this year by the organisation of Commandante Franco's flight to
South America, and by a no less successful one from Madrid to the
Philippines. Both these events created enormous enthusiasm in
Spain, and were made the occasion for a reaffirmation of Hispano-
American friendship, which the Directory did everything in its power
to foster.
In spite of the benefits which the regime was conferring upon the
country its fundamental weakness became every day more apparent.
It had not created a new system; indeed, it was not possible for
it to do so, for although it still enjoyed the passive
support of the
majority of Spaniards, there was no dynamic popular force behind
Primo de Rivera. In effect, the passage of time showed ever more
clearly the difficulty of reforming a nation from above. The Govern-
ment itself began to feel this, and in 1927 a National Assembly was
convoked to replace the Cortes. The deputies were to some extent
representative of various corporations, but they had no legislative
power. All that was effected by calling this body into existence was
to prove that the Directory did not feel sure of its position, for the
National Assembly was never regarded as anything more than a
rather poor joke. Primo de Rivera was also
decidedly unfortunate
364
 THE DIRECTORY AND THE REVOLUTION
in his dealing with the intellectual classes, and the harsh treatment
which was too often meted out to men of international reputation
created the worst possible impression abroad. A
further blunder was
the favour which was shown to the regular clergy, particularly in the
matter of teaching, for this irritated their old rivals, the seculars,
while it enraged lay educationalists.
In 1929 there took place the magnificent exhibitions at Barcelona
and Seville, but they proved to be the
swan-song of the Directory.
The health of Primo de Rivera was obviously giving way beneath
the strain to which it was subjected, an extravagant economic
nationalism had sent up the cost of living, and repeated conspiracies
were being discovered by the police. At the beginning of 1930
Primo de Rivera, ill and worried, instituted a referendum of the
commanders of the various military districts as to the advisability
of his retention of office. It is to be noted that General Carmona, the
Portuguese dictator, had adopted this expedient a few months
before, and it may well be that Primo de Rivera was influenced by
this example. The difference between the two cases lay in the fact
that Spain was a monarchy and Portugal a republic, and Primo de
Rivera's action was a definite violation of the rojral prerogative.
This left the monarch no choice but to dismiss his minister, and it is
greatly to the General's credit that he was the first to admit the
mistake he had made.
A few weeks afterwards Primo de Rivera died in a Paris hotel,
and the fact that King Alfonso was not present at his subsequent
funeral in Madrid told heavily against the Crown. With all his faults,
the General was one of the greatest statesmen Spain has produced
since the sixteenth century, and the tragedy was that circumstances
did not allow of his government remaining in power for twenty
years. Had his relations with the King been better, or had he
managed to raise the nation actively to support the Directory, his
achievements might well have been permanent. Probably his
greatest handicapwas his own character.
The fall of the Directory left King Alfonso face to face with the
enemies of his late minister. There were many who censured the
monarch more than the General, for they held that whereas the King
had sworn to observe the Constitution the dictator had assumed no
such liability. Such being the case, King Alfonso had two alter-
natives before him: he could either, like King Alexander in con-
temporary Jugo-Slavia, himself become dictator, or he could en-
deavour to return to the Constitution of 1876. The first course was
rejected on the ground that it would mean staking the monarchy
upon the result of what was a gamble: events, indeed, were soon to
show that the regime- was in question anyhow, but this was not yet
realised either in Spain or abroad. Furthermore, the whole tradition
of the reigning branch of the Bourbon dynasty was against absolu-
tism, and to nave gone back on it in this way would have been to
365
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

accept the Carlist programme. The King, therefore,

decided to
return to normal conditions at the earliest possible moment, and he
charged General Berenguer with the formation of a government for
this purpose.
The situation was one of peculiar difficulty, for during the period
of the Directory the old Conservative and Liberal groups had been
reduced to mere shadows, and all that remained of them was their
erstwhile leaders. On the other hand, the Socialists and Com-
munists had gained considerable ground, and their organisation was
intact, if subterranean. Berenguer was not slow to appreciate
these facts, and he realised that as he had been appointed to bring
the country back to normal the sooner he did so the better. He
therefore wished to hold the elections at once, before the revolu-
tionaries had gathered sufficient strength to become a real menace,
and before they had been provided with the cry that the new
administration was but the old under another name. Not the least
of the many weaknesses of the Government was its essentially
palatine composition, and this meant that the old monarchist
politicians, who too often had the King's ear, enjoyed power with-
out any sort of responsibility. They opposed General Berenguer,
because they wished to have time to jerrymander the constituencies
in the traditional manner in such a way as to secure the return of a
majority of their own adherents. With this end in view they exerted
such pressure as to obtain the removal all over the country of those
who owed their appointment to the Directory (very often the best
men in the district), and so still further undermined the regime
which they pretended to support.
The ostensible reason for this attitude was that the only constitu-
tional course was to hold the local elections first, and it was this plea
that convinced King Alfonso. It is, however, impossible not to
attribute some measure of blame to General Berenguer. His probity
.
was above question, but he had never been able to control others
successfully, and in the present instance he proved as helpless at
checking such politicians as the Count of Romanones as he had been
incapable of making General Silvestre obey his orders in the Riff
nearly ten years before. Furthermore, both monarch and minister
made a serious mistake in taking the old party hacks at their own
valuation, for events were soon to prove that they had no followers
worth the name. Nor did General Berenguer gain any gratitude for
the policy he was adopting, for in due course the with
politicians,
the object of compelling his resignation, announced that what they
really wanted was a Cortes Constituyentes. In this way the General
Election was repeatedly postponed throughout the year 1930,
while the Left gained in strength every day by asserting that the
Government never intended to hold the elections at all.
In addition, Berenguer's administration had all the vices, with few
of the virtues, of the Directory. It moderated the censorship, but did
366
 THE DIRECTORY AND THE REVOLUTION
not abolish it altogether; it cut down expenditure on public works,
thus throwing many people out of employment; and it tinkered with,
but failed to control, the national finances. Nor was this all, for
Berenguer was himself associated in the public mind with Anual,
and his critics claimed that he had been a failure in his own pro-
fession as a soldier. The Government, too, was completely out of
touch with public opinion, and if ever a ministry
played into the
hands of those who had sworn to destroy it, that ministry was the
one of which Berenguer was the head.
The Opposition parties, that is to say the Republicans, Socialists,
and Catalans, came to an understanding, known as the Pact of San
Sebastian, in August, 1930. The anti-dynastic Left was still under the
shadow of the failure of the First Republic, while no inconsiderable
success had attended the efforts of Canovas to rally its more moderate
members to the support of the monarchy. In 1913, as has been
shown, Melquiades Alvarez, one of the most prominent Republicans,
publicly withdrew his opposition to the regime. This defection had
proved a severe blow to his old associates, and the Republicans con-
tinued the weakest of all the parties for many years. The driving
force of the Left was Socialism, and the Republican ranks did not
begin to attract recruits again until the later days of the Directory.
As the Crown became increasingly associated with the policy of
Primo de Rivera, so those who disapproved of the latter began to
declare themselves Republicans. The failure of Berenguer to hold
the elections gave an added fillip to this tendency, and so the Repub-
lican party reappeared as a force in the country with the veteran
Lerroux as its leader. In reality, however, a large proportion of its
members were Republicans rather by necessity than by choice, and
when the Second Republic did finally come into existence this was a
cause of serious weakness.

The rise of Socialism in Spain has already been traced, and its able
leader, Iglesias, died in 1925. Under his direction the Socialists had
paid more attention to industrial than to political action, and they
returned only six deputies to the last Cortes of the monarchy. The
party's main support was derived from the Union General de Trabaja-
dores, of which Francisco Largo Caballero was secretary and which
had a membership of a quarter of a million. The rule of the Directory
had not been unpropitious to the Socialists, for Primo de Rivera
dealt more kindly with them than with the other parties, and Largo
Caballero was made a member of the Council of State; at the same
time their ranks were swelled by the adhesion of many who were,
for one reason or another, dissatisfied with the government of the
day. On the other hand, Communism, as in every country, was
making its appearance to the Left of Socialism, and the Confederation
National del Trabajo was formed in opposition to the Union
General de Trabajadores. There was also the Bolshevist Sindicato
36?
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Unico which had as its aim the incorporation of all workers in one
big union.
The third party to the Pact of San Sebastian, namely the Catalans,
were on a rather different footing, for they regarded Spain's extremity
as Catalonia's opportunity. The Catalan autonomists were divided
into two groups, the moderates under Cambo and the extremists
under Mack. It was the latter who pledged themselves to co-operate
with the Republicans and Socialists, and the failure of Cambo to
induce either Primo de Rivera or Berenguer to make any concession
to Catalan aspirations strengthened the hands of Macia and his
group. Nevertheless, even the extremists could not demand too
much, for the Spanish market is essential to Catalonia. In short, the
alliance, between the three revolutionary parties was an uneasy one,
but it was to achieve its immediate purpose, namely the overthrow
of the monarchy. That it took place at all is the measure of Beren-
guer's incompetence.
Such was the position in December, 1930, when the garrison at
Jaca revolted. The rebels were led by Captain Fermin Galan
Rodriguez and Angel Garcia Hernindez, and several people were
killed before the rising was suppressed. The ringleaders were shot
after trial by court-martial, and at once became martyrs in the eyes
of the Left. Four days later the Republicans seized some aeroplanes
at the Cuatro Vientos aerodrome outside Madrid, and flew over the
capital,dropping leaflets which called upon the troops stationed there
to mutiny. The hero of this exploit was Commandante Franco, but
it met with no more success than the attempt at Jaca. The ease with
which these risings were crushed should have strengthened the
Berenguer administration, but it had just the opposite effect, for the
mere tact that they had happened was regarded as a sign of its weak-
ness. The Government also made a serious blunder in its handling
of them, for it gained all the odium for stamping the revolts out in
blood without the advantage which would have accrued from such a
policy, that is to say, fear on the part of the disaffected. Moreover,
these troubles meant a further
postponement of the elections.
The opening of the year 1931 witnessed another false step on the
part of the Government, for early in January the entire Flying Corps
was disbanded, and forbidden to wear its distinctive uniform. This
to the number of Berenguer's enemies, and to those of
merely added
the King, who had given his consent to such a measure. By now the
Government was so thoroughly unpopular that the old politicians
realised their chance had come to get rid of Berenguer. Accordingly,
the Count of Romanones, the Marquis oLAlhucemas, and Senor
Cambo informed the Prime Minister that while they would, as
promised, take part in the General Election, as soon as the Cortes
met they would demand a Cortes Constittyentes. Berenguer had now
reached the limits of his patience, and on February 1 5 he resigned,
The King realised the gravity of the situation thus created, and
368
 THE DIRECTORY AND THE REVOLUTION
endeavoured to get a ministry "formed on the widest possible basis.
He declared himself ready to summon a Cortes Coiistituymtesy and
Sdnchez Guerra and Melquiades Alvdrez even tried to enlist the
support of Alcala Zamora, who was in prison for his complicity in
the December rebellion. It was all in vain, for personal and party
feeling was too strong to allow of co-operation, and what proved to
be the last ministry of the monarchy was constituted with the
inclusion of such old party leaders as tne Count of Romanones, the
Marquis of Alhucemas, Don Juan de la Cierva, and the Count of
Bugallal, as well as General Berenguer.
The constitution of the new Government made revolution in-
evitable, for it marked the return to power of those very politicians
whom the vast majority of Spaniards, whatever their political
opinions, hoped the Directory had driven out of public life for ever.
Now they had returned at the King's request, and from the moment
they took office the fate of the throne was sealed. Even the most
convinced monarchists had no desire to fight for those whom they
profoundly distrusted, while the ministers themselves had no sort of
following in the country. The issue had become narrowed to a vote
for or against the Crown, and all the advantages were with the
opponents of die latter. They had managed, partly by their own skill
but chiefly owing to the blunders of Berenguer, to unite against the
monarchy all those who had disapproved of the Directory, all who
had lost their jobs under the administration of its successor, and all
who were determined to prevent the Government falling once more
into the hands of the old politicians. It was a masterpiece of political
strategy, though this cannot disguise the fact that had King Alfonso
possessed reasonably competent advisers the scheme would have

The new Prime Minister, Admiral Aznar, and his colleagues

decided to hold the local elections on April 12, but before that date
two events took place which well illustrate the incurable levity of the
Spaniard in matters political, and the consequent difficulty which
confronts those who have to govern Spain. The Queen returned
from a visit to England, and both at the station in Madrid and during
the progress through the streets she and the King were with
greeted
the most tumultuous reception. A week before the elections was
Easter Sunday, and the elaborate ceremonial associated with that
event at the Spanish Court was carried out without a hitch, in the
midst of popular approval. The Spaniard was apparently quite ready
to acclaim the King one day and to vote Republican the next, so
that in the circumstances it is hardly surprising that no Power
abroad, with the exception of the Holy See, should have foreseen
what was about to happen.
The local elections were duly held on the day fixed, and they
resulted in the return of 22,150 Royalists and 5,875 Republicans,
but the opponents of the regime swept the larger towns. Never was
N
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

the old saying that revolutions are made in the towns and restora-
tions in the country better exemplified than in this instance. It is
probable that many of those who voted Republican did so because
there was no other way open to them of expressing their disapproval
of the Ministry, but, however that may be, the Government com-
pletely lost its head. Aznar
announced to the Press that the country
had gone Republican overnight, while Berenguer, without consulting
his colleagues, sent the following instructions to the Captains-
General throughout the country :

The Municipal elections have given the result your Excel-

may suppose from what has happened in the district of
lency
your command. The poll indicates the rout of monarchist
candidates in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and the principal
capital towns.
The elections have been lost. This creates a most
delicate situation, which the Cabinet will have to consider when
full data are to hand. At this supreme juncture your Excellency
will appreciate the absolute necessity of maximum serenity,
with hearts raised in the service of the highest interests of the
natioiv which the Army is called upon to defend at all times.
Your Excellency should maintain close contact with the
garrisons under your orders, calling upon all to have complete
confidence in the higher command, maintaining discipline at all
costs, ready to give what help may be needed to maintain law
and order. This will be the guarantee that the destiny of Spain
shall continue without grave disturbances along the lines
imposed by the supreme national will.
Perhaps the best comment upon this document was that of the
Madrid correspondent of The Times: "If the Republican Committee
itself had been called upon to circularize the military commanders,
it would hardly have drawn up instructions better calculated to
serve the purpose of paving the way for a peaceful monarchist
surrender."
In the monarchy was not overthrown, it collapsed, as in
effect,
1868. When the result of the elections became known the Repub-
licans in Madrid began to demonstrate, and as the authorities did
'nothing to stop them they became bolder every hour. The King
realised that the monarchy could at this stage be saved only
by
bloodshed, and to his creoit he refused to order the troops to fire
upon his subjects. The Republican leaders, for their part, were only
anxious to take advantage of the existing situation to get the Royal
Family out of Spain before there was a revulsion of feeling in its
favour. In consequence,
King Alfonso departed by way of Carta-
gena, and the Queen and her children by that of Irun. The victorious
Republicans were in such a hurry to see the monarch on foreign soil
that he was able to leave Spain without
signing any deed of
abdication,
370
 CHAPTER XLIII

The Second ^public (1931-1936)

most notable fact about the advent to power of the Second

Republic was the ease with which it took place, and this had no
THE little connection with its ultimate
undoing. In no quarter was
there the slightest opposition; on the contrary there was a general
desireamong all classes to give evidence of long-standing Republican
sentiments. The Royalists might have utilised their strengthen the
countryside to embarrass the new rulers of Spain, but they did
sort. They were too dazed to act, while their complete
nothing of the
kck of a leader, once the King had gone, was a further handicap.
It must also be confessed that at this moment there was, owing to the
events of the previous decade, little enthusiasm for Don Alfonso
XIII, in whom the cause of monarchism was personified. It was, too,
believed, with that facile optimism which always attends the morrow
of a revolution, that the change which had occurred must necessarily
be for the better: even on the Right it was taken for granted that the
Republic would be a very moderate afikir, which all save the extreme
die-hards would be able to support.
This state of affairs certainly enabled the victorious Republicans
to assume control with the minimum of inconvenience to them-
selves, but it was soon to be a serious embarrassment. The revolu-
tionaries were, as has been shown, composed of different elements,
and the one thing that might have welded them together would have
been a hard fight against a common enemy. This they never had,
and the resulting weakness soon became apparent. The last years of
the monarchy witnessed the general formation of a coalition of
Radicals, Socialists, and Catalan autonomists, while the history of the
Second Republic was to be that of the disintegration of this coalition
with civil war as the ultimate consequence.
The Spanish Revolution of 1931 suffered from the further dis-
advantage of being an anachronism. Its leaders proved themselves
in only too many cases to be men with the outlook of the nine-
teenth century, and they were thus in conflict with the spirit of their
age, which was variously interpreted as Fascist or Communist, but
which was certainly not in sympathy with bourgeois Liberalism, or
even with conventional Socialism; yet these were the forms of
government which the victorious revolutionaries were, for the most
part, pledged to establish. Without casting any reflection upon the
motives ot the leading Spanish Republicans it is impossible to resist
the conclusion that they were living in the world of 1848, and the
course of events which led up to the fall of the monarchy is certainly
reminiscent of an earlier age. The Republic did not introduce any
fresh ideas of government, and no revolution is worthy of the name
which has not a spiritual as well as a material aspect. This was not,
371
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

however, apparent in the spring of 1931, save to a few foreign

observers, and the change of regime was generally interpreted as a
step forward along the paths of progress.
The Provisional Government which was constituted on the fall
of the monarchy contained representatives of the various groups
which had been parties to the Pact of San Sebastian. The Prime
Minister was Alcali Zamora, who had previously been a monarchist,
and had held office in more than one aoministration during the reign
of King Alfonso XIII. At the Interior was Miguel Maura, son of
Antonio Maura, the Conservative leader, and he had previously
professed his father's opinions: his conversion to the Republican
cause had influenced a great many waverers in the same direction.
Manuel Azana, at the Ministry of War, was almost unknown at this
time, but in revolutionary circles he had already acquired a reputation
for bitterness. Lerroux was Minister of Foreign Affairs, ana he was
probably the ablest man in the Cabinet, but he was old, and suffered
from a constitutional lack of energy. There were three Socialists in
the Government, namely Prieto, de las Rios, and Largo Caballero,
the last of whom, as we have seen, had served under Primo de
Rivera as a member of the Council of State.
One of the first tasks of the new Government was to solve the
problem of Catalonia. In that province the revolution had taken
the form of the proclamation of Catalan independence, but even
autonomists of the school of Macia realised this was an impossibility.
Accordingly, after some wrangling between Barcelona and Madrid,
the province was declared to be a Generalitat^ and in due course an
Act was passed constituting her what a British lawyer would have
described as a more or less autonomous body with a status some-
where between that of a colony, with an unofficial majority in the
legislature, and a dominion. The immediate effect was to whet the
appetite for self-government of other regions of Spain where centri-
fugal influences were still powerful.
* / / . t i i / 1

ministers <

the Cortes Constituyentes '.

course to pursue cannot be denied, but it at once roused the hostility

of the extremists. These had not gone into the streets merely to
put
Alcald Zamora in the place of King Alfonso, and they determined to
force the hands of the Government. As the monarchy was gone, the
most prominent representative of the old order was the Church,
and in May the storm against her broke all over Spain. Convents
and churches were sacked and burnt, while the police made no
attempt to interfere. In many districts the inhabitants, once they
realised that those who were nominally responsible for the preserva-
tion of law and order intended to do nothing, banded themselves
together in defence of the clergy and of their property, and thus put a
stop to the perpetration of fresh excesses; while elsewhere the out-
37*
 THE SECOND REPUBLIC
rages ceased only when there were no more religious buildings to be
gutted.
Some idea of the damage can be gained from the fact that in
Mdlaga^alone nearly fifty churches were sacked, in Madrid libraries
containing upwards of 135,000 books were destroyed, while many
valuable pictures, including at least one Titian, perished in the flames
in different parts of the country.
At this point it must be stressed that the Church in Spain before the
advent of the Second Republic was not an institution of almost
boundless wealth, upon which the clergy lived in idleness, if not in
actual vice. It had been disendowed early in the of Isabel II,
reign
after scenes of violence to which such majestic ruins as those of
Poblet bear testimony, and the small sum which was earmarked
in the budgets of the monarchy for ecclesiastical purposes repre-
sented compensation of a sort for the vast revenue which the State
had taken from the Church.
The case of the Order of Jesus, whose members were expelled by
the new regime, is not without interest in this connection. The
Jesuits had six centres of higher or university studies; twenty secon-
dary schools or colleges, of which fifteen were boarding-schools;
two observatories, at Tortosa and Granada respectively; and a leper
colony at Fontilles; there were also ten seminaries. These establish-
ments were all closed by the republican authorities, although the
State had not the means of providing the necessary educational
facilities itself, as may be seen by a contemporary statement of the
Minister of Public Education to the effect that the State schools in
Madrid catered for only 37,000 children as against 44,000 who were
taught in private schools, of which the vast majority were controlled
by the religious orders.
This outbreak showed that the anarchic forces in Spain were as
N
strong as at any time in the past, and that the mere advent of the
Second Republic had not solved the problem which has always been
one of even greater difficulty in the Peninsula than elsewhere, namely
that of reconciling liberty with order. It also had the effect of
inaugurating a reaction, not necessarily against the Republican
regime, but against the type
of Republic that seemed to be the object
or the Government. Those who had been content to see the
monarchy go down without raising a finger became seriously
alarmed when an attack was made on the Church, and this in spite of
the fact that the Pope, through the nuncio in Madrid, had given proof
of his desire to cultivate friendly relations with the Spanish Govern-
ment. The manifest unwillingness of the authorities to interfere had
the double disadvantage of encouraging the extremists on the one
hand, while on the other it frightened moderate opinion into a belief
that the Government was far farther to the Left than had been
It cannot be denied that there was a good deal of truth in
supposed.
this latter view, for the driving force behind the Cabinet was
exercised to no inconsiderable extent by the Socialists, who were
373
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

determined that the establishment of the Republic should mark the

beginning, not the end, of the revolution.
The elections for the Cortes Constituyentes were held at the end of
June, 1931, and they resulted in the return of an overwhelming
majority of deputies pledged to support the Republic. Indeed, the
majority was far too large, for it soon began to break up, while it
was a genuine misfortune for Spain that the Right, which was
in the country under the leadership of
beginning to gather force
Senor Gil Robles, should hardly have been represented at all. The
first sign of this reaction was at a by-election in Madrid in the

autumn, when Jos Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the late Marquis
of Estella, stood as a candidate of the Right, and halved the previous
Socialist majority. In October, too, there was a disagreement in the
Cabinet between Maura, who represented the moderate wing of the
Republicans, and his more advanced colleagues on the question of
the separation of Church and State, and a partial reconstruction of the
ministry took place in consequence.
The preoccupation of the Cortes was naturally the elaboration
of a new Constitution, and this task was completed by December,
1931. It was essentially a Liberal document, though the influence of
the Socialists was obvious in many of its provisions. Freedom of
conscience was established, no person was to be imprisoned for more
than twenty-four hours without being tried, the right of meeting
was guaranteed, confiscation of property was forbidden, the irre-
movability of magistrates was stated, and the deportation or exile of
Spanish citizens was declared to be illegal. Government was vested
in the President and one Chamber. In accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution, Alcala Zamora was elected to the Presidency
of the Republic, and Azafia became Prime Minister at the head of a
Cabinet which was predominantly Radical-Socialist and Socialist in
its composition.
Before the Constitution had been voted there had been passed
a Law for the Defence of the Republic, which became part of the
Constitution by virtue of an additional clause. This was one of those
exceptional measures which are generally adopted on the morrow of a
revolution, and it empowered the Minister of the Interior and the
Civil Governors of the provinces :

1.
Suspend newspapers indefinitely.
2. Close meeting-houses and clubs, whether political or not.
3. Imprison citizens indefinitely.
4. Compel them to change their domicile.
5. Force them to reside indefinitely at a given spot within
national territory, or deport them to places outside the Penin-
sula.
6. Seize any works or industrial concerns.
7. Forbid any kind of public meeting.
374
 THE SECOJSTD REPUBLIC
8. Impose fines up to a maximum amount of 10,000 pesetas.
9. Dismiss civil servants, or suspend them from the execution
of their duties.

An appeal lay to the Cabinet against any action taken under this
law, but the decision of the Government was final. It will be seen
that in many material points the Law for the Defence of the Republic
was in conflict with the Constitution of which it formed part.
The enactment of the Constitution and the formation ofthe Azana
administration brought to a close what
may be termed the pre-
liminary stage in the life of the Second Republic. Between Decem-
ber, 1931, and the outbreak of the Civil War in July, 1936, the
regime was to experience three very distinct phases. The first of these
lasted during the years 1932 and 1933, and was marked by the adop-
tion on the part of the Government of a policy even farther to the
Left, which, in its turn, began to result in a crowing Catholic,
Conservative, and Royalist reaction. This period was also charac-
terised by the progressive disintegration of the forces that had
brought the Republic into existence; a disintegration that was only
temporarily arrested by the alarm created in Republican circles by the
attempted pronunciamiento of General Sanjurjo in August, 1932. The
swing to the Right first became noticeable at the localelections in the
spring of 193 3, and was most pronounced in the General Election at
the end ot the same year. This state of aflairs rendered Azafia's
position impossible, and the second phase began. It lasted until
February, 1936, and its chief characteristic was a series of ephemeral
Centre administrations which, under pressure from the Right,
retraced some ofthe steps of their more revolutionary predecessors.
Finally, in February, 1936, the third phase was ushered in by a
General Election which revealed the real weakness of the Centre:
this period was marked by a growing anarchy which finally de-
generated into civil war in the summer of the same year.
The most important measures of the Ajzana administration were
those dealing with agrarian reform and with the Church. It cannot
be denied that under the monarchy the land, at any rate in some
provinces, was not developed in the way it should have been, and
there were a number of absentee landlords; indeed, there were tens
of thousands of tenants who had never seen the man to whom they
rent. King Alfonso had done what he could to make land-
paid their
lords take an interest in their property, but his efforts had proved
unavailing in face of the opposition of what was, with a few out-
standing exceptions, the most selfish and short-sighted aristocracy in
Europe. What was required, if the true interest of agriculture alone
was to be considered, was the enactment of some law whereby
owners of land must develop their property up to a certain standard
under penalty of confiscation.
The scheme put forward by Marcelino Domingo, the Minister for
375
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

Agriculture, was a complicated one, and appears to have been

modelled on the Russian code of 1923. By this measure the land
became the property of the State, and was to be let out at an agreed
rental to committees, which were to be chosen from the rural popula-
tion all over the country. They determined whether the land was to
be divided into allotments to be worked by different members
of the local population, or whether it was to be developed com-
munally. The committees also had the sole right of buying all
necessary tools and agricultural implements, and they disposed
of the produce. This project made the worst of both worlds, for it
neither gave the land to the peasant nor did it establish a workable
system of large-scale farming. Moreover, the confiscation of the
estates of the Grandees was an act of injustice which cast grave
suspicion upon the motives of the Government in respect of its
agrarian policy. The definite failure of the scheme was proved by the
fact that within two years the land under cultivation in Spain had
diminished to the extent of 750,000 acres.
More disastrous even from its ownpoint of view was the anti-
clerical attitude of the Government. The feeble defence put up by
the mass of the population on behalf of the monarchy appears to
have decided the Prime Minister and his colleagues into the belief
that no more serious opposition would be made to an attack on the
Church, though the reaction initiated by the riots in May, 1931,
should have warned them to the contrary. Here, again, there was a
case for reform along moderate lines. There were too many priests,
monks, and nuns in Spain, and their intellectual standard was none
too high. Education, too, was largely in the hands of the Church,
yet the percentage of illiterates was one of the highest in Europe,
while the number of schools was hopelessly inadequate. In these
circumstances the Government had an excellent opportunity of
undertaking the needful reforms by raising the level of the State
schools, and then insisting upon those controlled by the Church
attaining the same standard. In effect, it was clearly a case for a
programme spread over a period of years, and as far as possible put
into
practice
with the co-operation of the religious authorities. Un-
these lines was too slow for the extremists
happily, procedure along
of the Left, upon whom the administration depended for support,
and an immediate attack was made upon the Jesuits, who were
expelled from the country in spite of the fact that they were the one
Order against the quality of whose teaching no objection could be
made. In addition, Azafia also suppressed the sum earmarked in the
budgets of the monarchy for ecclesiastical purposes, and confiscated
all property bequeathed to the Church since the earlier dis-
endowment.
Equally damaging to the Government was its readiness to inter-
fere with the course of justice as a result of pressure by the extremists.
Two examples of this will suffice. Orie of those implicated in the
376
 THE SECOND REPUBLIC
murder of Dato in 1921 was a certain Casanellas, who had escaped to
Russia after the perpetration of that crime, and was there converted
to Communism. On the fall of the monarchy he returned to Spain,
and proceeded to work for the establishment of a Soviet regime.
When nearly a year had elapsed he was arrested, not, as might be
supposed, to be put upon his trial for his share in Dato's murder, but
to be deported for his Communist activities; indeed, he actually
received a free pardon for the former offence. Equally flagrant was
the case of the three Miralles brothers, sons of a well-known Madrid
lawyer. These youths were arrested in May, 1931, after some local
disorders, and were kept in prison for two years without being
brought before a magistrate. When they were tried not a shred of
evidence was produced against them, and the court ordered their
immediate release.
In view of the growing opposition which the measures of the
Government were encountering, it is not surprising that the
numerous enemies of the Prime Minister should have arrived at the
conclusion that the time had come for his overthrow. Accordingly,
in August, 1932, General Saniurjo made a pronundamiento at Seville,
where the garrison supportea him. It is not clear what he intended
to do, or upon what promise of support from other parts of the
country he was relying. In any event, the attempt was a complete
fiasco, for his collaborators in Madrid proved quite incompetent,
and such leaders of the Right as Gil Robles held themselves entirely
aloof. Sanjurjo surrendered, and was condemned to death, but the
sentence was commuted to one of imprisonment, and he was actually
released in the general amnesty in the spring of 1934.
The immediate effect of this ill-advised attempt was greatly to
strengthen the Government by rallying to its side all who feared the
overthrow of the regime. For the moment all the forces which had
brought the Republic into existence were again united. AzaSa took
advantage of this revulsion of feeling in his favour to secure the
enactment of two measures which further safeguarded his position.
The first of these gave the Government power to dismiss, finally
and summarily, civil and military officials who might commit acts
hostile to the Republic, or calculated to bring it into contempt. The
second enabled the Government to confiscate the estates of those
who, in the opinion of the Minister of the Interior, had taken part in
Sanjurjo's revolt, or had expressed themselves in sympathy
with its
object. It was, indeed, only natural that on the morrow of a revolt
the Government should arm itself with the powers necessary to

prevent another outbreak of a similar nature, but where Azafia made

his mistake was in his extensive use of those powers. Like James II
after the failure of Monmouth, he threw away all the advantages
which victory had conferred on him, and within a short space nis
administration was even more unpopular than, it had been before the
Sanjurjo conspiracy*
377
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

It was not only that a large number of suspected persons were kept
in prison for long periods without trial, and that the Opposition
Press was suspendedfor weeks at a time, which aroused indignation,
but also the deportation by the Government of its political opponents
to Africa in defiance of the provisions of the Constitution. Nearly
140 men were, in the autumn of 1932, deported with every refinement
of brutality to Villa Cisneros on the order of the Minister of the
Interior, and of this number hardly any had even appeared before a
court, or had a definite charge preferred against them. Villa Cisneros
is a barren and unhealthy spot on the edge of the Sahara, to which
water is brought twice a month from the Canaries; it is likewise
devoid of all sanitation. When the deportees arrived there they found
no mattresses, blankets, furniture, or even habitable dwellings; they
slept on planks covered with straw, and they were obliged to buy
tables and chairs at their own expense. In the end, twenty-nine of the
prisoners escaped in an open boat to Portugal, while the rest, after
six months in Africa, were brought back to Spain, where most of
them were released as the authorities had nothing against them. No
reason was given for their deportation, nor were they indemnified
in any way. Another political opponent of the Government, Dr.
Albifiana, was relegated to Las Hurdes, the most desolate region
in the Peninsula, where he was
compelled to live in a stable, while
the ex-Rector of Saragossa University was interned in a remote
hamlet in the province of Granada.
Early in January, 1933, the Communists and Anarchists rose in
revolt in many parts of the country, and were suppressed only
after some hard fighting, in which about a hundred
people were
killed. The Government showed as much vigour, let it be frankly
stated, on this occasion against the Left as it had displayed in the
previous August against toe Right, but, as then, it alienated public
sympathy in the hour of victory oy excessive severity. The incidents
at Casas Viejas, a small
village in the province of CAdiz, for example,
roused a storm of indignation among all parties. There had been a
clash in which two of the Civil Guard were killed, and the Shock
Police were sent into the village to make an example of it. This they
did with characteristic thoroughness, and at least twenty peasants
met their death as a result. The methods employed to restore order
can best be gauged from the fact that a woman was beaten to death;
a cottage was set on fire, and the occupants, including a young girl,
were mowed down by
machine-guns as they endeavoured to escape;
and an old man was shot dead in his bed. When the news of these
events reached Madrid and questions were asked in the Cortes, the
Government made the great mistake of resisting inquiry. The result
was that Azafia and his colleagues were at once held responsible for
the atrocities committed by their subordinates, and thus became as
unpopular on the Left as they already were on the Right.
In April, 1933, the local elections, at which women voted for the
 THE SECOND REPUBLIC
firsttime, were held, and they served to show how unpopular the
Government had become. Of the councillors elected, 4,586 were
classed as supporters of Azana, and 11,742 as opponents, while the
percentage of votes polled -by the Government candidates was only
28. This defeat was the more remarkable in that the Law for the
Defence of the Republic made all Royalist propaganda impossible,
while it was a notorious fact that, as always in Spain under any
regime, the authorities had exerted the greatest pressure upon the
electors. The result was that although the Government was not, of
course, directly affected by these local elections, it lost what moral
influence it still possessed, for it was clear that they were prophetic
of what would happen when the Cortes itself was dissolved. In these
circumstances it was only natural that Azana's agricultural and anti-
clerical policy should meet with increasing opposition.
Further evidence of the Government's unpopularity was forth-
coming in September, when the elections were held for the Court of
Constitutional Guarantees, appointed to supervise the proper work-
ing of the Constitution. Out of fifteen members elected to the
triounal by specified regions of Spain only five of Azana's supporters
(two of them very doubtful ones at that) were returned, as against
four of Lerroux's Radicals and six Conservatives of the extreme
Right. When the College of Advocates, composed of the lawyers of
Spain, chose its two representatives to the tribunal, it elected Calvo
Sotelo, the Finance Minister of the Directory, and Cesar Silio, both
avowed Royalists. Faced with this rising tide of opposition, Azana
resigned.
After making every allowance for the difficulties of the position,
not easy to reach any other conclusion than that Azana in power
it is
was a disaster both for the Republic and Spain. He settled nothing
and he unsettled everything. He practised violence, forgetting that
in violence begets violence. He was dependent upon the
politics
Socialists for support, and he did not hesitate to use all the machinery
of the State against their enemies, both to Right and Left. The Casas
Viejas incident filled the Communist and Anarchist ranks, and drove
them to fury. When he took office the Right was crushed; when he
resigned it was a growing force. As for the Church, he acted in such
a way that every practising Catholic was forced into opposition to
the Government, if not to the regime. He had the chance of con-
solidating opinion in support of the Republic, but he behaved in
such a manner as to prepare the way for civil war. As for the
interests of the country as a whole, Azana's stewardship is best
illustrated by the fact that during the course of it the value of shares
in first-class Spanish enterprises fell by 50 per cent, and that the
export trade of Spain decreased by two-thirds.
The fall of Azana, who was succeeded as Prime Minister by
Lerroux, ushered in the second phase of the Republic, and the
elections, which were held in November, 1933, were marked by a
379
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
sharp swing to the Right, who obtained 217 seats,
as compared with
162 gained by the Centre and 93 by the Left, Unfortunately what
this meant so far as the government of the country was concerned
was that the pendulum did not swing far enough to the Right for a
stable administration to be formed. The result was a series of
ministries of the Centre dependent upon the Right. The latter, it
should not be forgotten, consisted ot several groups, of which by
far the strongest was Atcion Popular , headed by Gil Robles, who
for some time was regarded by Jbis fellow-countrymen as a second
GLnovas. The son of a Carlist professor at Salamanca, he had stood
as a monarchist in 193 1, and since then he had worked at perfecting
the organisation of his party. Closely allied with Accitfn Popular
were the Tradicionalistas and Acci6n Espanola. The Tradicionalistas
represented the old Carlist element, and were particularly strong in
the North and North-east: their leader was the Count of Rodezno.
Acci6n Espanola was composed of the supporters of Don Alfonso
XIII, and was led by Antonio Goicoechea: its strength in the new
Cortes was thirty-seven. Aloof from these groups stood the Spanish
Phalanx, headed by Jos Antonio Primo de Rivera: they already had
branches all over Spain, and claimed 80,000 adherents in Madrid
alone.
The failure of the Left at the elections shook its faith in the parlia-
mentary system, and some sections of it soon passed from propa-
ganda to direct action. A Communist revolt broke out in October,
1934, but it was at once suppressed in Madrid and many other
pkces. In Asturias, however, it soon assumed the character of civil
war, for the extremists succeeded in persuading the miners to take
up arms, and there was heavy fighting in and around Oviedo. The
insurgents were not overcome until there had been considerable
loss of life and many outrages had been committed, for the A^aSa
administration had so starved the Army that it was incapable of doing
its work in an
emergency. During the course of these disturbances,
it may be added, the rebels stole 400,000 from the banks to finance
their operations.
When the revolt had been put down, the Government gave
abundant proof that it had learnt nothing from the mistakes of its
predecessor in similar circumstances. Instead of shooting the
ringleaders, and letting the rank and file go free, it put a couple of
obscure individuals to death, released
any rebels of prominence,
and kept hundreds of others in prison without bringing them to
trial. The
consequence was that the Government, not its opponents,
received the chief odium, owing to the tendency of the public to
place the blame, not upon those whose sins are the worst, but upon
those who have sinned the most recently. At the same time the fact
cannot be ignored that the insurrection had been directed
against
the lawfully constituted Government of Spain, which had a majority
in the Cortes. If it was justified, then so was that of Franco two
380
 THE SECOND REPUBLIC
years later; if the latter is indefensible, so was the Communist revolt
in Asturias in the autumn of 1034.
Thereafter matters were allowed to drift. For some months
Lerroux was Premier with Gil Robles as Minister of War, and if the
general situation was better than it had been in the days of Azafia,
the lull but preceded another storm. The Right was by now no means
satisfied with the influence it was able to exert. It is true that Gil
Robles secured the repeal of two measures which were particularly
obnoxious to his supporters, namely the expulsion of the Religious
Orders and the confiscation of private property, but in his position,
and with his following, he could scarcely nave done less. The Left
was taking full advantage of the blunders of the Government on the
morrow of the rising in Asturias, and began to close its ranks under
the name of the Popular Front in a way that its opponents would have
done well to regard as significant. Finally, several members of the
Lerroux administration became involved in financial scandals, and
Lerroux had to resign. The President refused to call the Right to
power, and conferred the premiership on one Portela Valladares,
who was not only without followers, but had not himself a seat in
the Cortes. In February, 1936, recourse was had to new elections
with a view to finding a way out of what had become a deadlock.
The result was to make the situation a great deal worse, for the
practical elimination of the Centre left the two extremes of opinion
face to face. The result of the voting was as follows :

Popular Front .
4,356,000 votes and 270 seats.
Centre . .
449,000 votes and 60 seats.
Right . . 4, i z 8, ooo votes and 140 seats.

The proportion of seats won to votes obtained requires no comment.

In addition, there is considerable evidence of interference with the
voting by the supporters of the Popular Front, particularly in
Valencia, Cuenca, and MAlaga, It was already clear that only a
miracle could avert civil war.
The immediate result of the election was the return of Azafia to
the Premiership, but he was unable to secure the support of the
extreme Left owing to the opposition of Largo Caballero, who was
demanding the dictatorship of the proletariat: he was thus com-
pelled to form his administration upon a basis so narrow as seriously
to curtail its influence even with the groups composing the Popular
Front. Similarly, on the Right the prestige of Gil Robles was on the
wane owing to the growing lack of confidence in his powers of
leadership, and there were already whispers that the only solution
was a pronunciamicnto.
One of the first acts of the Popular Front was to dismiss the
President, and in so doing it certainly had the support of all sections
of public opinion. The Republic's ambassador in London, Perez de
Ayala, said of him, "Our political repertory swarms with picturesque
581
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

and theatrical figures. For instance, Sefior Zamora who with his
clownish eloquence and satisfied smile is reminiscent of the tradi-
tional clown in the Spanish theatre/* He had resigned the Premier-
ship as a protest against the anti-clerical policy
of the new rulers of
but the offer of the Presidency, with its annual income of
Spain,
60,000, reconciled him to a programme of which he had previously
disapproved. While President he alienated and no one
all parties,

regretted it when he followed

into exile the monarch whom he had
supplanted. He lived on until 1949. Alcala Zamora was succeeded
by Azana.
Meanwhile Spain was relapsing into chaos. To quote Salvador de
Madariaga: "Neither life nor property was safe anywhere. ... It
was not only the owner of thousands of acres granted his ancestors
by King So-and-So whose house was invaded, and whose cattle were
left bleeding with broken legs on the smoking fields of his lands. It
was the modest Madrid doctor or lawyer, who had a villa of four
rooms and bath, and a garden as big as three handkerchiefs, who saw
his house occupied by land-workers, by no means homeless and by
no means hungry, who came to harvest his crop ten men to do the :

work of one, and to stay in his house till they had finished. It was
the secretary of the local gardeners* union who came to threaten the
young girl watering her roses that all watering had to be done by
union men; it was a movement to prohibit owner-drivers from
driving their own cars and to force them to accept a union driver.
. . No wonder that Fascism grew. Let no one argue that it was
.

Fascist violence which developed Socialist violence. *

A judge who had given a sentence of thirty years to a Fascist
for the murder of a Socialist newspaper boy was shot dead in Madrid
on April 13. The following day, during a parade to celebrate the
anniversary of the Republic, a lieutenant of the Civil Guard was shot
dead by Socialists. His funeral was regarded by the Fascists as an
excellent opportunity for displaying their strength, and a running
battle developed in the very centre of Madrid, through which the
procession was, incidentally, passing in defiance of the orders of the
Government. Such incidents were typical, not exceptional.
On June 16, 1936, Gil Robles indicted the Government for its
failure to maintain order. During the first four months of Popular
Front rule 269 people had been murdered, and 1,287 injured, in
political disturbances; 160 churches had been completely destroyed
and 231 partly damaged; 69 Right Wing political headquarters had
been wrecked and 312 were damaged; there had been 113 general
and 228 partial strikes; while 10 newspaper offices had been sacked
and 3 3 damaged. On July 8 there came another fierce attack on the
Government, this time from Calvo Sotelo. As he sat down, Dolores
Ibarruri, better known as La Pasionaria, a Communist deputy,
shouted at him, "That is your last speech/'
1
Spain, pp. 346 and 349.
3 82
 THE SECOND REPUBLIC
Four days later an officer of the Shock Police by name Castillo,
noted for his Communist sympathies, was murdered by Fascist
gunmen outside his house in Madrid. At three o'clock on the
following morning a detachment of the Shock Police came in uniform
to the home of Calvo Sotelo, took him away, murdered him, and left
his body at the gates of a cemetery. Another body of police visited
the residence of Gil Robles, but he was already in hiding. The
Government arrested the ninety men of the company to which
Castillo belonged, but 'did nothing more. On the 1 8th the army in
Morocco revolted, and the Civil War had begun.

3*3
 CHAPTER XLIV

The Civil War (1936-1939)

E struggle which began with the revolt of the Melilla garrison
I on July 1 8 had in its to do with the clash be-
-*-
origin nothing
tween conflicting ideologies which was so prominent a feature
of the contemporary international scene. The movement against the
Government was purely military in its nature, and there were many
for in the nistory of Spain. General Franco and his col-
it
precedents
leagues were thinking in terms of %. pronundamlento similar to that of
Primo de Rivera thirteen years before, and it was only when their
plans miscarried that they were forced to prepare for a civil war
which had assuredly not entered into their original calculations. Cer-
tainly the movement was not monarchist in origin, for whatever the
views of Franco himself, most of his generals, especially Queipo de
Llano, were strong republicans at one time, and even Franco in the
earlier days of the republic had refused to commit himself on the
question of regime. Nor did the rising owe anything to the Spanish
Phalanx, for Jos6 Antonio Primo de Rivera had been arrested and
imprisoned some months before it took place, so that he could hardly
have been implicated. In fact, his fate was for long in doubt, and he
was referred to by his followers as ElAusente the absent one until
it was established that having been condemned to death by a
popular
tribunal he was shot in Alicante prison in November, 1936.
On the other hand, it is dear that Franco's blow forestalled one by
the Communists. Documents which fell into the hands of the
Nationalists proved that the plans of the extreme Left were complete,
and from them it would appear that the signal was probably the mur-
der of Calvo Sotelo. At any rate, very early in the programme occurs
the ominous phrase, "execution of those who figure on the black
lists". Further items of interest were the
provision for a pretended
Fascist attack on the Socialist headquarters, and the appointment of

Largo CabaUero as the President of the Spanish Soviet. Russian com-

plicity, it be was fully established. The Communist rising
may added,
was originally to have taken place between May 3 and June 29, but
it was
subsequently postponed until the end of July, ana this change
of plan enabled the Nationalists, as they soon came to be termed, to
get their blow in first. In these circumstances Franco and his asso-
ciates could surely claim to be
following the advice given by no less
a statesman than Gladstone, who once said that "irno instructions
had ever been addressed to the people of this country, except to re-
member to hate violence and love order and exercise patience, the
liberties of this country would never have been attained".
However this may be, the original pkn of campaign was to paralyse
the action of the Government by the seizure of all the more important
centres of population at a single blow* General Franco, who was
384
 THE CIVIL WAR
Captain-General of the Canaries, flew to Morocco, where he assumed
command of the troops, with whom he was personally popular owing
to his service there in the days of the monarchy. Even more remark-
able was the exploit of Quiepo de Llano, who bluffed Seville into
surrender at the head of one hundred and fifty men he first captured
:

the radio station, from which he constantly sent out news that he was
advancing on the city with an army of forty thousand : he then put
his handrul into lorries, and sent them out again and again to various
districts to create an impression of overwhelming strength* Else-
where Mola obtained control of a large part of the North of Spain,
while Cabanellas seized Zaragosa.
These were, indeed, considerable successes, but they were far from
constituting final victory, and they were counterbalanced by serious
reverses. In the capital General Fanjul hesitated too long, and thus
gave the Government time to arm the Workers* Unions, who over-
powered him on July 20, and stormed the barracks of La Montafia.
Much the same happened in Catalonia: for General Goded, who
commanded in the Balearic Islands, went to take charge
of the rising
there, but was captured and shot. Finally, General Sanjurjo was
killed in an air accident as he flew from Lisbon to join the National-
ists. Had he lived, he would have assumed the leadership of the
movement, which now passed into the hands of Franco and Mola.
Thus a few days after the first blows had been struck it had become
obvious that the rising had neither failed nor succeeded, and that a
civil war, possibly of a protracted nature, was inevitable. Such being
the case, both sides began to take stock of theirposition.
Geographically they were curiously placed. The Government held
Madrid, the whole eastern coast, La Mancha, New Castile, and Estre-
madura. This cut the Nationalists in the North 08 from those at
Seville, but Guipuzcoa, Biscay, and Santander, which still acknow-
ledged the Government, were in their turn separated from the rest of
the territory under the control of Madrid. It was significant of what
lay ahead that in the main this had been the line of division in previous
civil conflicts. It had been so in the seventeenth century when the
Catalans accepted Louis XIII as their ruler: it was the same again
kter when the Archduke Charles held Catalonia and much
sixty years
of Aragon against Philip V; and in the War of Independence the
afranctsados were particularly strong in the East of Spain. It was the
old struggle of the Gothic-Celt-Iberians against the men of Romance
blood.
In several respects the Government had an advantage over its op-
ponents. Since it had not been overthrown in the initial attempt it
was in possession of the resources available to constituted authority:
and the machinery of administration was in its hands, whereas the
Nationalists had to improvise everything. Then, again, its enemies
did not possess command of the sea, and this meant that it was highly
dangerous to bring troops over from Morocco, although the Pro-
385
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II
tectorate was entirely in Franco's hands. To some extent, however,
this advantage was offset by the fact that the crews of the Govern-
ment men-of-war had murdered their officers, generally in circum-
stances of revolting barbarity, and in consequence the ships were
often unable to put to sea. On the other hand, the Government had
practically no regular troops
and hardly any officers. From the be-
therefore, it was compelled to rely upon the workers, whom
ginning,
it provided with arms from the State arsenals. The effect of this upon
the political situation was not long in being felt, and power began to
shift even farther to the Left. At the beginning of September, 1936,
the Premiership passed to Largo Caballero, and his Cabinet included
men of extreme views such as Alvarez del Vayo, Indalecio Prieto, and
Juan Negrln. This development was accelerated by Communist
activities with the support of Russia, which had for long been de-
sirous of fishing in the troubled waters of Spanish politics. As early
as April, 1936, for example, a party of over a hundred Spaniards and
pseudo-Spaniards, who had been living in Moscow, passed through
Faris, and were forwarded to Madrid with every care and attention
on the part of the Spanish embassy.
As summer began to merge into autumn the military situation
gradually improved from the point of view of the Nationalists, for
whatever their difficulties might be they were careful never to allow
the strategic initiative to pass into the hands of their opponents* Be-
fore the Powers placed an embargo on the sale of munitions to either
side they managed to obtain a considerable number of aeroplanes,
and by this means it proved possible to get Franco's forces from
Morocco across the Straits of Gibraltar. During these months, too,
the command of the sea passed from the Government to the Nation-
alists, who were able to complete the construction of some ships
which were being built at Ferrol, and after the end of September the
Government men-of-war had suffered such losses that for all prac-
tical purposes they ceased to exist as an effective force. After a few

days* siege Badajos was taken, and Estremadura was cleared of

Government troops, so that communication was established with the
Nationalists who were operating in the North. The next step was the
capture of Irun and San Sebastian, thereby closing the western end of
the Franco-Spanish frontier, and so stopping the provision of sup-
plies to the enemy forces round Bilbao. Finally, there was the relief
of the garrison of the Alcazar at Toledo. When all this had been done
the way was clear for an advance on Madrid.
Meanwhile an important political event had taken place, for on
November i the Nationalists had appointed Francisco Franco as
Generalissimo of their armies and Head of the Spanish State for the
duration of the war. At that time, although he was only forty-three
years of age, he had a distinguished and varied career behind him.
His father was a naval officer, and Francisco was a second son. He
joined the infantry academy at Toledo in 1907, and five years later
386
 THE CIVIL WAR
first saw service in Morocco. In 1920 he assisted Millan Astray in the
formation of the Spanish Foreign Legion, and he^erved with it until
the end of the war, when at the age of thirty-three he was already a
Brigadier-General. Franco's next appointment was that of com-
mandant of the new military academy at Zaragoza, and he held that
post when the monarchy fell in 1 9 3 1 He served the Second Republic
.

in several capacities as loyally as he had the preceding regime, saying

that "soldiers should stand aside from politics and think of the
nation". All the same he gradually came under suspicion as power at
Madrid shifted to the Left, and he was virtually exiled to the Canary
Islands, where, as has been shown, he was Captain-General in the
summer of 1936. The death of Sanjurjo, it may be added, did much
to bring Franco to the fore.
What may be described as the purely Spanish phase of the Civil
War ended in the first week of November, 19(36. During this period
it is true that France, then under a
Popular Front administration, sup-
plied the Government, and Italy the Nationalists, with a number of
aircraft, but no political colour was thereby given to the struggle,
nor was there any serious foreign attempt to interfere with its con-
duct. After November the nature of the contest changed, and for
a space there was a real danger that, as at the beginning of the
eighteenth century, a Spanish quarrel might develop into a European
war. That this did not take place was largely due to the efforts of
British diplomacy, but, in spite of all the exertions of London, inter-
vention there was, and Spain experienced, though happily only to a
modified extent, the fate of Germany in the Thirty Years' War: that
is to say she became the place where were tested the ktest theories in

strategy and politics.

It had been generally believed abroad that the pronunciamiento
would either succeed or fail in a relatively short period what had not
:

been anticipated, either in Spain or out of it, was a prolonged civil

war. When this proved inevitable it was only natural that, given the
existing division of Europe into two armed camps, the various
Powers should take active steps to see that the conflict terminated
in a manner favourable to their interests. France was the first in this
field, and it was estimated that by June, 1938, more than a hundred
of the aeroplanes brought down by the Nationalists were French.
Nor was this all, for during the course of a debate in the French
Chamber of Deputies in December, 1938, it was stated that from
twenty to thirty thousand Frenchmen had gone to fight against the
Nationalists in Spain. In effect, French intervention was probably
more powerful than that of any other country on either side, and it
was just as much official intervention as that of Italy and Germany:
the only difference was that no secret was made of the Activity of the
Axis Powers, while France posed all the time as the protagonist of
non-intervention. What finally caused the Popular Front admini-
stration in Paris to change its policy was a realisation of the fact that
387
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

arms could not be spared for Spain in face of the rapid rearmament
of Germany, as the events of the late spring of 1940 were abundantly
to prove.
Russia contented herself, largely in view of her remote geographi-
cal situation, with the provision of a few senior military officers, a
number of experts, and airmen in considerable quantity. By the end
of June, 1938, the Nationalists claimed to have brought down eight
hundred Russian aeroplanes, and at the beginning or that same year
there were said to have been over three thousand Russian prisoners
in captivity. In every country in the world the efforts of the Soviet
in aid of the Spanish Left were unceasing, and this fact was fully
recognised, for when the first units of the International Brigade
marched through Madrid in October, 1936, they were greeted with
shouts of "Viva Rusia". Everybody knew who had sent them, al-
though there were very few actual Russians in their ranks. The
greatest contribution to the Government cause was, indeed, this same
International Brigade, though its exact strength is not easy to deter-
mine in the absence of reliable statistics. The official Nationalist
figure put them at 100,000, but other observers estimated them at
anything between 50,000 and 150,000. In any event they seem to
have been at least as numerous as the foreigners who fought for
Franco.
Germany and Italy recognised the Nationalist Government on
November 18, 1936, and thereafter reinforcements from those two
countries arrived in not inconsiderable numbers, though there were
never more than 46,000 Italians and 7,000 Germans, the latter being
entirely airmen and technicians; these forces, it may be added, were
openly kept up to strength by their respective countries until
April 1938.
In effect, the war began to take on a different complexion, and in
its new form it did not at once go well for the Nationalists, who
suffered several reverses during the ensuing winter. Franco at first
endeavoured to end the contest by combining his forces for ^n attack
on Madrid at the beginning of November, but the first units- of the
International Brigade arrived in the capital just in time to forestall
him. In March, 1937, Franco's Italian allies, who were not of high
quality, were routed at Guadalajara, and this convinced the National-
ist leader that before anything more was attempted on this of the
part
front his troops required further training. In this connection he had
the great advantage over his opponents that it was never necessary
for him to guard his lines of communication, which was proof where
the sentiments of the people lay, and so he was able to make the most
effective use of his man-power. In February, 1937, the Nationalists
captured Malaga, but during the rest of that year they concentrated
their energies on Mola's campaign in the North, and this was highly
successful; by the end of October the towns of Bilbao, Santander,
and Gijon, with the surrounding country, had been lost to the
388
 THE CIVIL WAR
Government. It is to be noted that while these events were taking
a Russian General Staff, headed by General Goriev, had installed
pkce
itself in the War Office in Madrid*
By this time the danger of the conflict becoming an international
one was very great indeed, and it could only be avoided with con-
siderable difficulty. The initiative in this matter was taken by Great
Britain, for it was by no means to her interests that Europe should be
divided into two armed camps. What was required was clearly a
lightning-conductor of some sort. The League of Nations would
have been the natural instrument for this purpose, but Germany was
no longer a member, and Italy viewed Geneva and all its works with
the gravest suspicion and disfavour. Therefore the Non-Interven-
tion Committee was called into existence in London under the chair-
manship of Lord Plymouth: it first met on September 9, 1936, and in
the following December the Council of the of Nations ex-
Leagjue
pressed is approval of the policy pursued by the British Government,
what all this really amounted to was that intervention was only to be
on a scale which was unlikely to result in an extension of the struggle
beyond the frontiers of Spain.
As time went on even this modest aim became extremely difficult
of attainment. On May 24, 1937, an Italian patrol-ship was bombed
by Spanish Government aeroplanes, while five
off the Balearic Islands
days later the German
cruiser Deutschlan^ on patrol service in the
same area on behalf of the Non-intervention Committee, was also
attacked, and several of her crew were killed. As a reprisal Hitler
ordered the bombardment of Almeria, while both Italy and Germany
withdrew from the patrol service and the Non-intervention Com-
mittee. This step was followed by a number of mysterious sinkings
in the Mediterranean, and in September a conference of the Powers
interested was held at Nyon to consider the question of appropriate
action. Italy was to have been present, but she foolishly allowed her-
self to become the victim of a Russian manoeuvre. Stalin felt that
something must be done to restore Soviet prestige, reduced as it was
almost to vanishing-point by the repeated executions of his oppo-
nents, and the readiest method seemed to be to convert the Nyon
Conference into a court-martial on Italy, whose submarines were sus-
pected in many quarters to be guilty of the acts of piracy in question.
The first thing to do was to prevent Italy's attendance, and this was
achieved by die
presentation at
Rome of two insulting notes: the
Italians very stupidly played into the Russian hands, and stayed away,
which was exactly what Moscow wanted. However, the British
Government had no intention of becoming a partner in the Franco-
Soviet Pact, which was the Russian manoeuvre, and its representative
made no reference to general politics, but confined himself to the
subject for which the conference had been summoned, namely the
suppression of piracy in the Mediterranean. The upshot was that
Great Britain and France decided to patrol specific areas of that sea,
389
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

and Italy soon associated herself with them: any submarine encoun-
tered in suspicious circumstances by the warships of any of the
Powers represented at the conference was to be attacked immediately.
By this time the attitude of Berlin towards the Spanish struggle had
become extremely equivocal. Hitler had recognised Franc6, and was
apparently giving him every assistance to procure an early victory,
but as the year 1^37 drew to a close the question began to be asked
whether German diplomacy was not in fact being directed towards a
of the contest. It was remembered that tension in the
prolongation
Mediterranean had always suited the German book since the French
occupation of Tunis had thrown Italy into the arms of Bismarck;
therefore credence was given to the growing rumours that German
relations with Russia were resuming something of their old cordial-
ity, and that Berlin was supplying arms to Franco's opponents as well
as to the Nationalists. It was, too, Germany which put pressure on
Italy to cease co-operation in the naval cordon which prevented
contraband from reaching Spain, and the abolition of this form of
control was, in the existing military situation, not in the interests of
Franco. Of course, the ideologists on both sides resolutely shut their
eyes to these developments, but they were straws to show which way
the wind was beginning to blow, as was proved two years later when
the conclusion -of the Russo-German Pact was announced.
As the war progressed without victory inclining to either side,
both the Nationalists and the Government were increasingly affected
by the course which it was taking. It was soon apparent that Franco's
followers had widely different aims. The requetesy who were among
the best of the Nationalist troops, and whose main recruiting-ground
was Navarre, were the heirs of Carlism, and were inspired by its re-
ligious and political ideals. Then there were the Alfonsists it is true
:

that only a minority of them wished for the restoration of Don Al-
fonso XIII, but they all supported his branch of the House of Bour-
bon, and looked forward to the reign of his son, Juan, with Franco
as a second Primo de Rivera. Lastly, there were the Phalangists, who
had no use for a monarchy at all, but who desired the establishment
of a totalitarian state on the model of the Third Reich. In these cir-
cumstances, and with victory still postponed, it is hardly surprising
that in the spring of 1937 there should have been conspiracies against
Franco botn in Mdlaga and in Morocco. They were easily crushed,
but the Generalissimo did not neglect the warning, and he en-
deavoured to make the best of the three worlds of his supporters by
combining them in one organisation called the Falange Espanola
Tradicionalistay de las Juntas ae Ofensiva National Sindicalista. In Jan-
uary, 1938, a further step was taken, and Franco set up a regular
Cabinet, consisting of three generals and eight civilians, presided
over by himself. At the Interior was his brother-in-law, Serrano
Sufier, a convinced Phalangist and a zealous of the closest
partisan
co-operation with Germany and Italy. la view of the assistance
390
 THE CIVIL WAR
which the Nationalist movement was receiving from these two
Powers, some approximation to their ideological standpoint was in-
evitable, but the events of the Second World War were to show that
it was nothing like so close as was
generally believed by foreigners*
At no time, for instance, was Franco prepared to consider the barter-
ing of Spanish territory for foreign help.
A not dissimilar situation developed among the followers of the
Government, with Negrin as a far more powerful Serrano Suffer.
Although the extreme Left was by now in effective control, Russia
had to move more cautiously than Germany and Italy, not only for
the geographical reasons to which allusion has already been made,
but also because many of the Spanish Communists looked to Trotsky
rather than to Stalin, while a not inconsiderable number of the
Government's supporters were Anarchists. Accordingly, Moscow,
to use a phrase ot Madariaga, "always kept the Spanish Revolution-
ists on short commons so as to have them well in hand", though she

by no means neglected her own material interests, for as early as the

autumn of 1936, while Negrin was Minister of Finance, about fifteen
hundred millions of pesetas in gold were transferred from Spain to
Russia. Gradually Azana and Largo Caballero receded into the back-
ground, and by the summer of 1938 all real power on the Govern-
ment. side was in the hands of Negrin. The hold of Russia increased,
too, as French support dwindled: it had become clear that the Span-
ish Government's aims were actually Communist, whatever might be
alleged to the contrary, and this in no way appealed to the vast
majority of the French people, whose gaze in any case, as the whole
international horizon grew steadily darker, was directed across the
Rhine rather than across die Pyrenees.
By time the conflict had already
this
proved itself to
be the most
bitter and the most bloody of all the civil wars ever fought in the
Peninsula. It was not that the
fighting
was at any time on the scale
which characterised the American Civil War, but rather that, as the
Nationalist forces advanced, the evidence of the atrocities com-
mitted by the more extreme supporters of the Government accumu-
lated rapidly until it amounted to a tale of horror which the outside
world long found it difficult to credit. In particular, the Church was
subjected to a persecution without parallel for several centuries.
From the beginning of the war it had been the object of relentless
severity, and between fourteen and sixteen thousand priests were
murdered in the territory controlled by the Government. No Catho-
lic worship was allowed there, and many a church and cathedral was
used as a market or as a thoroughfare for animal-drawn vehicles. Nor
did the few Protestants fare "any better, and all the Church of England
chaplaincies in republican Spain were closed at the beginning of the
war, and they remained in that condition until it came to an end. In
this connection it is not without significance that when the Deans of
Rochester and Chicheste* visited Barcelona in 1937 they did not dare
39*
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

to appear in the streets in clerical garb. Yet by Article 27 of the con-

stitution, liberty of conscience and freedom of worship were
guaranteed.
Prisons were only too often a synonym for torture-chambers, and
the Gestapo had nothing to teach those responsible for the revolting
crimes perpetrated in such cities as Barcelona upon all suspected of
Nationalist sympathies. Exact figures are impossible to ascertain, but
in 1943 the Minister of Justice estimated that the cases of murder ac-
tually investigated amounted to 85,940, and 'it is probable that the
number of those slaughtered in cold blood reached at least a quarter
of a million. In Nationalist Spain, on the other hand, where the
ordinary courts of law continued to function, there is no evidence of
execution without trial according to the law. This does not,
proper
of course, mean that au administration of justice was perfect in the
territory controlled by the Nationalists, for feeling naturally ran high,
especially among people whose friends and relatives had been mur-
dered, but in this case the judges were trained lawyers and profes-
sional men: in the Government area men and women were sent to
thek death by self-constituted tribunals drawn from the dregs of the
population.
In these circumstances it is in no way surprising that the conduct of
the war in the field should also have deteriorated. Contemporaries,
little knowing what was to be common practice on both sides during
the Second World War, were particularly horrified at the bombing
of the civilian population from the air. This was begun at Toledo by
Largo Caballero, and in December, 1938, the Duke of Alba presented
a note to the British Foreign Office stating that in the first two years
of the war Government planes had, in two thousand raids, caused
18,985 deaths, mostly among the civilian population. The German
allies of the Nationalists, however, soon proved more expert at this
form of warfare than the Government supporters; indeed, to what
extent a good deal of this bombing was carried out by foreign air-
men in defiance of Spanish wishes is not easy to determine, and
Valladolid was unquestionably raided by the Communists in
nuary, 1937, in opposition to the orders of the Air Minister,
dalecio Prieto.
The opening of the year 1938 found the issue of the war still in
doubt, in spite of the foreign assistance which was reaching both
sides. It began with an offensive on the part of the Government
forces, who successfully attacked at Teruel, which formed the spear-
head of a dangerous salient into their eastern lines the Nationalists,
:

however, soon launched a counter-offensive, and Teruel was recap-

tured in the last week of February. In the following month there
took place the attack which Franco had long been in fact
preparing,
ever since the defeat of his Italian allies at Guadalajara had opened
chiefly depend upon his own right
his eyes to the fact that he must
arm. Once the offensive in Aragon had been commenced it pro-
392
 THE CIVIL WAR
gressed rapidly: Caspe
was captured on March 17, and the National-
ists then turned North, occupying Ldrida at the beginning of April.
A few days later they reached the Mediterranean, with the result that
the territory still in Government hands was cut in two. As in the
autumn of 1936, for a brief space it looked as if the Nationalists had
final victory within their grasp, but their opponents counter-attacked
on the Ebro, and Franco's advance on Valencia was held up. For the
rest of the year there was in this theatre some of the fiercest fighting
of the war, and it was not until November that the Government
troops were driven from their last bridge-head on the Ebro. Losses
were heavy on both sides, and the Nationalist General Staff announced
that on this sector they had killed thirteen thousand of the enemy,
captured twenty thousand, and shot down some three hundred
aeroplanes.
Franco had long ago decided not to make another frontal attack
on Madrid, partly because of the casualties which would be involved,
and partly because he did not wish to damage the city. In any case,
it was no longer the enemy capital, for this had been moved first to
Valencia and then to Barcelona. In these circumstances everything
pointed to an offensive against Catalonia. For this purpose the
Nationalists could now
put into the field an army of 3 50,000 men, of
whom 16,000 were Italians, and the attack began on December 23,
1938, along the rivers Segre and Noguera PaLLoresa. Artesa fell on
January 4, 1939, and although the Italians were held up at Borgas
Blancas for a few days, the place was taken when the Navarrese came
to their assistance. On January 25 the city of Tarragona was occu-
pied, and on the following day the requetes and the Moorish troops
entered Barcelona, closely followed by the Foreign Legion and tne
Arrow Mixed Division, which consisted both of Italians and
Spaniards. By this time both the Catalan and Spanish Governments
had fled north.
The war had by now been won by the Nationalists, but it had still
two months to run. The supporters of Negrln, for it would be ab-
surd to describe them any longer as Government forces, were still in
possession of a considerable part of the country from Sagunto to
Almaden, and they held Madrid: they also had several thousand men
in arms, and they had disposal of a certain amount of war material.
On the other hand, they had lost Catalonia with seventy per cent of
their industrial resources and a large proportion of their armed
forces, while they no longer possessed any land communication with
the rest of Europe. All the same they decided to fight on, for reasons
which have been well stated by Madariaga: "Dr. Negrfn was not
free. He was attached to Moscow by a chain of gold. . One thing
. .

is certain: at that moment, none but Dr. Negrln and the Communists
were for fighting. It is obvious that the Communists had instructions
to carry on the war and to hold fast to Dr. Negrin."
Events began to move with considerable rapidity. On February 27
393
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

the British and French Governments officially acknowledged Franco,

and on the foUpwing day Azana, who had fled to France, announced
that he had resignedthe Presidency of the Spanish Republic. Mean-
while, the Nationalist armies began to gather in force round Madrid,
and watched the intensive conflict which broke out in the ranks of
their opponents. After sharp fighting and a number of atrocities the
Communists in the capital were crushed, and negotiations for peace
were initiated by the victorious Council of Defence. Franco's terms
proved to be complete surrender combined with promises of gener-
osity and pardon to those not guilty of any crime. On March 29 the
city surrendered, and the date is held to mark the end of the Civil
War.

394
395
 CHAPTER XLV

Spain and the Second World War (1939-1945)

c-rT-THEN the termination of the Civil War gave Franco and his

W
\X/ colleagues leisure to regard the international scene, they
Europe divided into two armed camps, and events were
saw
to
prove that an early dash between them was inevitable. Spain was
utterly exhausted, and it was the primary task of her new rulers to
take care that she did not become involved in any conflict which
might break out. The difficulties were not inconsiderable. The
Nationalists owed a great deal to the German and Italian dictators,
and there was a strong body of Phalangist opinion which admired
the existing order in Berlin and Rome; on the other hand, the Church,
whose support meant much to Franco, regarded the Third Reich
with disapproval and Fascism with suspicion, while the Army and
the monarchists could be relied upon to take a side opposed to the
Phalangists in any dispute which might arise.
The complications, however, were not only of Spanish origin. In
two of the tnree major wars of the previous centuries Spain had been
a battle-field, and it behoved Franco to walk extremely warily if he
was to avoid that false step which might so easily have completed the
ruin of his countcy, worn out as she was by her long internal struggle.
The possession of the Peninsula would be of the greatest importance
to either group of combatants, but if that was out of the question
Spain had a number of overseas territories, such as Spanish Morocco
and the Balearic and Canary Islands, which might well tempt the
appetite of one of the combatants.
Fortunately all the foreign troops had left the country by the time
that the Second World War began in September, 1939. In this con-
nection it may be pointed out that, in spite of innumerable prophecies
to the contrary, not an inch of Spanish territory was ceded to Berlin
or Rome in return for services rendered, and the archives of the Ger-
man Foreign Office prove that at no time were the Nationalists pre-
pared to give way on this point. It is true that in April, 1939, Spain
signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, but in the light of the history of
the previous three years it is difficult to express surprise at her action.
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that when war did come
the task of the Spanish Government in preserving the country's
neutrality was rendered a great deal easier by the conclusion of the
Russp-German agreement, which had a profound effect upon public
opinion all over Spain, for Spanish hatred of Communism was not
unnaturally far stronger than Spanish gratitude to Germany.
For Spain, as for the rest of the world, the war fell into several
sharply defined periods. As soon as it began the Spanish Govern-
ment issued a declaration of neutrality, but Spanish diplomacy was by
no means inactive during what was termed the "phoney war every :

396
 SPAIN AND THE SECOND WORXD WAR
effortwas made to second the Pope's attempts to secure a negotiated
peace, while the country's views of Germany's Communist aUy were
clearly revealed by the assistance given by the Spanish Red Cross to
Finland, both in supplies and volunteers during the war between
Finland and Russia. In March, 1940, an Anglo-Spanish trade agree-
ment was signed covering the settlement of outstanding debts and
balances by Spain, and granting to her credits in London for four
million pounds. A few months earlier a Franco-Spanish trade agree*
ment had been signed, and the two events were evidence of an in-
creasing cordiality in die relations between Madrid and the Western
Powers.
Then in May there came the German invasion of Holland, Bel-
gium, and France, followed, with lightning rapidity, by the collapse
of France and the entry of Italy into the war. This last event caused
the Spanish Government to change its official attitude to one of "non-
belligerency" this was widely interpreted as foreshadowing Spain's
:

appearance in the field on the side of the Axis, but it proved to have
no meaning at all. In any event Spanish neutrality was in the gravest
danger. At any moment Hitler might demand a passage for his
armoured divisions through the Peninsula to Gibraltar and North
Africa, while in preparation for just such an eventuality Great
Britain began to assemble an expeditionary force to seize the Canary
Islands. The parallel with the events of 1 807-9 was ominously close.
Nor was this all, for, as on previous occasions, there was no incon-
siderable body of opinion in Spain itself which inclined to Germany
as against the Western Powers, and in the present instance this was
reflected in the attitude of the Phalangists, upon whose support the
Franco regime so largely depended.
Franco nimself made no secret of his belief that a German victory
was inevitable, but he was determined to remain neutral at all costs.
Whether he would be allowed to do so was another matter, and Sir
Samuel Hoare, who was at this time appointed British ambassador to
Spain, had an aeroplane continually standing by in case of need. In
pursuit of his policy of neutrality Franco haoto gain time at all costs,
and to prevent any precipitate act on the part of Hitler; this implied
the appeasement of Germany on a considerable scale. In September
the Fiihrer presented Franco with a high German decoration, and in
reply the Caudillo referred to the friendship which existed between
the two nations and their strife against the common enemy of Com-
munism. The moving spirit on the Spanish side in the appeasement
of Germany was Serrano Suner, and he paid personal visits at this
time both to Hitler and to Mussolini when he made flattering
speeches about the identity, of aim of Spain and the Axis.
Mr. Churchill was indeed right when he said that Spain "seemed
to hang in the balance between peace and war", and also when he
wrote that Franco "only thought about keeping his blood-drained
people out of another war". The result of the battle of Britain in the
397
 THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

late slimmer did not make the situation any easier where Spain was
concerned. Hitler had failed in his direct attack upon his main enemy
it is true, but he was now devising other methods of getting at her.
Franco hastened to bow to the storm. At the end of October not
only did Himmler visit Madrid but Sufier replaced Beigbeder as
Foreign Minister, and on the 23rd of the month there was a meeting
between the Fiihrer and Franco atHendaye. Great pressure was put
upon the Caudillo to allow the German army a passage through the
country, but he'refused, and Spain remained neutral. This was by no
means to the liking of the German Government, and in November
the Fiihrer summoned Sufier to Berchtesgaden, where he expressed
his annoyance at the failure of Franco to enter the war, while three
weeks later Admiral Canaris, the Chief of the German Secret Service,
was sent to Madrid to make the final arrangements. Still Franco
made excuses, and at the beginning of February, 1941, the Fiihrer
wrote in the strongest possible terms to urge immediate intervention.
One man, however, was certainly not deceived by the attitude of the
Spanish Government, namely Ribbentrop, and he told Hitler that he
was convinced Franco had no intention of fighting. The Fiihrer
seems to have held the same opinion, for he said of the Hendaye
meeting, "We shall get nothing out of that man."
The rektions between Spain and Germany continued on this
somewhat uneasy basis during the first six months of the year 1941.
Hitler, contrary to general expectation, contented himself with vague
threats, possibly because he was already committed to the invasion of
Russia, and mindful of the fate of Napoleon he did not wish to have
a Peninsular campaign on his hands, for he had been left in no doubt
by Franco that Spain would resist invasion from whatever quarter it
came. Then, in June, came the German attack on Russia. Tnis event
gave a great impetus to the influence of the Reich, for the pro-Ger-
man element was able to forget the Russo-German agreement of two
years before, and to acclaim Hitler as the champion of civilisation
against Communism. Sufier, in particular, distinguished himself by
a number of violent speeches in favour of Germany, and in dis-
paragement of Great Britain and the United States. Evidence of the
strength of pro-German feeling was further afforded by the recruit-
ment and despatch to Russia ofthe "Blue Division", which was com-
posed of volunteers from the ex-combatants ofthe Civil War, under
General Munoz Grande. This was dearly a violation of Spanish
neutrality, but there was a recent precedent in the International
Brigade, which had intervened against the Nationalists in 1936. Fuel
was added to the fire in the middle of July by Franco himself in a
speech to the Spanish Phalanx, when he restated his hatred of Russia
and Communism, and declared that Great Britain had already lost the
war.
This was probably the point in the Second World War when the
situation between Spain and the Western Powers was most critical,
398
 SPAIN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The German invasion of Russia had naturally roused the greatest
enthusiasm in a country which had recently had so much experience
of Communist violence, and the early successes of the German armies
there and in North Africa were generally regarded as presaging final
victory for the Reich. Still, however, it is to be noted mat Franco did
not take the decisive step of bringing; his country into the war on the
side of the Axis. Certainly Suner did nothing to improve Spanish
relations with the West, but it was otherwise with the ambassadors,
and to them must go most of the credit for the fact that there was no
open breach. Especially was this the case with the Duke of Alba, the
Spanish ambassador in London, and it was largely due to his wisdom
and untiring efforts that Spain did not, like Italy, espouse the losing
cause: her debt to him is very great indeed. A like service was per-
formed by Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes, who represented the
United States in Madrid, and by the British ambassador there, Sir
Samuel Hoare, in spite, it may be added, of what he subsequently
wrote.
The danger of a conflict with the Western Powers at this time was
enhanced by the fact that they were themselves making preparations
for extensive operations in the Mediterranean, and were therefore
watching the attitude of Spain more carefully than ever. Once again
the Spanish Government became fearful for the Canaries, more par-
ticularly in view of the declaration of President Roosevelt that the
Azores were in the sphere of American interests. At the end of
August, 1942, however, the tension was eased by the replacement at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Suner by General Count Jordana,
and when, in November of the same year, British and American
troops landed in North Africa, he was notified by Sir Samuel Hoare
that "the operations in no way threaten Spanish territory, metro-
politan or oversea". The worst was over, and Spain could breathe
more freely than at any time since the fall of France.
There was, however, one cause of friction with the West, and that
was the position in Tangier. That port had, as has been shown on an
earlier page, not been included in either the French or the
Spanish
Zone by the settlement of 1912, and it had since then been subject to
an international regime. During the First World War it appeared
more than once likely to pass into Spanish hands, but in actual fact
that conflict came to an end without any change taking in its
place
status. On June 14, 1940, Spanish troops
occupied Tangier, and the
Spanish Government declared that the occupation was of a tempor-
ary nature with the object of guaranteeing the neutrality of the town.
It is probable that the step was taken to forestall a similar act on the
part of Great Britain. In November matters were taken a stage
farther, for Colonel Yuste somewhat unexpectedly assumed the
governorship of Tangier in the name of the Spanish Government,
and abolished the existing legislative assembly and committee of con-
trol. This action was in direct violation of international settlements,

399
t
THE HISTORY OF SPAIN SINCE THE DEATH OF PHILIP II

and were made by London and Washington. As a result, a

protests
temporary arrangement was
reached in February, 1941, by which
British rights and interests in Tangier were safeguarded, and an
undertaking was given that the zone would not be fortified: the
whole question was to be reviewed at the end of the war.
Hardly was the ink dry on this document than, in the following
month, the Sultan's representative in Tangier was ejected, and his
residence was handed ovet to Germany for use as a consulate. In
January, 1943, it was announced that Tangier had been incorporated
in the Spanish Zone, and this was met by a reminder from the British
Government that it refused to recognise any unilateral act on the part
of Madrid. Soon afterwards the military situation in the Mediter-
ranean changed to the disadvantage of the Axis, and in September,
1944, the German consulate in Tangier was closed. It only remains
to add in this connection that in August, 1945, an international con-
ference on the problem was convened at Paris, to which
Spain was
not invited, and the old international regime was restored with some
modifications: the Spanish Government accepted this settlement
under protest.
This, however, is to anticipate. Nothing succeeds like success, and
itwas only natural that the progress of Allied arms in the Mediter-
ranean should have impressed Spanish opinion, and should have
diminished greatly the influence of the pro-German element in the
Peninsula. At the same rime it was not easy for a Spaniard to become
enthusiastic for an alliance which included Soviet Russia among; its
more important members. The fall of Mussolini at the end of July,
1943, caused alarm in Phalangist circles, and this was not greatly
lessened by Franco's argument that there was all the difference in the
world between the Spanish Phalanx and Italian Fascism. Then the
virtual
imprisonment of the Pope by the Germans created a final re-
vulsion of feeling, and affected still further the relative sympathies of
the Spanish people towards the belligerents. Lastly, came the col-
lapse of the Third Reich as the British and Americans drove across
France in the latter part of 1944, and every Spaniard had to realise
that his country must henceforth conciliate London and Washington.
Not unnaturally, as the Western Powers came nearer to final vic-
tory their attitude stiffened towards what they considered to be
Spanish infractions of neutrality, and the culmination of their pres-
sure was reached by the application to Spain of sanctions in the form
of the cessation of oil shipments.
Of the main points at issue during the last phase of the Second
World War, two turned on the vexed question of the interpretation
of a neutral's rights. The first problem was that of wolfram supplies
to Germany, which Spain was perfectly justified in sending, but which
the Western Powers were equally justified in endeavouring to stop.
The second was concerned with some eleven Italian men-of-war and
merchant ships which had taken refuge in Spanish ports for one
400
 SPAIN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
reason or another at the time of the surrender of Italy.The Spanish
Government alleged its obligation as a neutral to intern any warship
which remained more than a specified time in its harbours, while it
laid claim to the merchantmen as compensation for Spanish ships
previously sunk by Italian submarines. Great Britain and the United
States, on the other hand, claimed the ships on the ground that they
had been surrendered to them by Italy. The third problem was of a
different nature, for itconcerned the Blue Division, which, with the
open approval of the Spanish Government, was fighting for the Ger-
mans against the Russian ally of the Western Powers. A fourth cause
of friction was the question of German activities in Tangier, which
has already been discussed.
After extensive negotiations through the regular diplomatic
channels a settlement was reached in May, 1944, of the outstanding
questions at issue. Wolfram supplies to Germany, except for a small
monthly token shipment, ceased; the Italian merchant ships were to
be released with the exception of two, and the fate of the men-of-war
was to be settled by arbitration; while as regards the Blue Division it
was announced that this had now been withdrawn. On the other
side, the renewal of oil shipments to Spain was granted.
Such was the position when the Second World War came to an end
twelve months later. Franco had kept his country out of the war, but
to what extent this state of affairs was due to his patriotism or his
cynicism, to his ability or his luck, is likely to remain a matter of
opinion.

401
 CHAPTER XLVI

The Past and the Future

strikes us especially, in course of the study, is the slowness

of Spain to achieve her political unity a unity always preca-
WHAT :

rious, and often called in question. The separatist tendency is

to some degree congenital in Spain, and anarchist and revolutionary
movements are certainly more frequent there than in the other coun-
tries of Europe.
There is in this a curious survival of mediaeval and Arab-Berber
mentality, of the taifas of the South, and the little Christian kingdoms
of the North, of the Peninsula. The particularist spirit which so
long kept Spain in a condition of dispersion and internal division is
While this spirit manifests itself in Catalonia, in Navarre,
still alive.
and in the Basque Provinces, as well as in the Provinces of the South,
it seems that Socialist and Communist tendencies are more peculiar
to Andalusia and the old kingdom of Valencia, that is to say in the
regions which were most profoundly affected by Islam.
These tendencies in the agricultural masses have been explained
by the persistence of great landed estates, a legacy of the latifundios of
the Visigoth and Roman period: the serf attached to the soil has only
one ambition, which is to possess himself of his lord's land. But one
also see here the old spirit of sof9 brought to Andalusia by the
may
African Berbers, Le. the land as the indivisible property of the tribe.
This is Socialism in its rudimentary and barbarous form. Far from
being modern, or as is improperly said "advanced", these tendencies
are, on the contrary, as retrogade as they can possibly be, and repre-
sent a return to the Arab mentality of the Middle Ages.
Be that as it may, it is another fact no less striking that the political
unity of Spain, in a more or less ephemeral form, was never realised
except by foreign dynasties first by the Visigoth kings, then by the
:

Arab caliphs, next by the princes of the House of Habsburg, and

finally by the Bourbons. The Catholic Sovereigns, Ferdinand and
Isabel, while they paved the way for this unity, still maintained the
division of the Peninsula into two great kingdoms, Arag6n and Castile.
Spain seems, therefore, refractory to the idea of centralisation,
under any regime. The regionalist idea is extremely popular there,
despite all the dangers which regionalism involves, especially in a
country where the political education of the masses remains to be
accomplished. The most apparent of these dangers is anarchy, and
it is a re-assuring fact that of late
years the vigorous individualism of
the nation has triumphed over Socialist and Communist tyrannies,
whose rules of life are, for that matter, absolutely contrary to the
temperament of the Latin peoples and especially of the Spanish people.
Moreover, to conjure away the peril of national dissolution through
excess of individualism and regionalism, any
government can de-
402
 PAST AND THE FUTURE

pend upon that sense of Race which is so strong throughout the

Iberian world. During the reign of Alfonso XIII this racial solida-
rity developed in the most extraordinary fashion, thanks to
the re-
birth of Americanism. This Americanism has marched step by step
with the progressive industrialism of the country during the last
half-century.
Once more the Spaniards have acquired the habit of turning
towards Latin America, towards their old Empire of the Indies, not
merely to find markets there, but also to restore the moral and in-
tellectual unity of the Race. In solemn festivals, of a highly national
character, the immortal Race has been glorified as a divinity. To-
gether with the ties of blood, the spiritual ties that unite America to
the old metropolis have been recalled. An effort has been made to
re-establish the fraternal relationship of Spain with the lands of the
Conquistadores\
There is here, as it were, the sketch of another Latinity, a Latinity
wider than the French. In vain do the French appeal to these Latins
in the name of a problematic consanguinity. These Latins are West-
erners, whose eyes are turned elsewhere: elsewhere than towards our
little Europe. Separated from France by their mountains, at the ex-

tremity of the European continent, they look towards the West,

beyond the Ocean. One might think that they were seeking to raise
the lost Atlantis by renewing Pan-Iberian solidarity with the Western
Indies.
In any case, the mentality of these Occidental Latins is not that of
the French, or even that of the more imperialist Italians. The Race,
of which they are the living consciousness, has no need to be warlike
or conquering. It concerns itself neither with literature, nor with
aesthetics, nor with ideology, nor with hurnanitarianism to be pro-
pagated. It knows only that it exists; that it covers two continents;
and that it manifests itself in a very specialised human type, who re-
gards himself more or less openly as superior to all others, and,
whatever happens, and despite all unfavourable hazards, is per-
suaded that he will survive them, and that he cannot die.
Pride of blood, even among the most humble an obscure con-
;

sciousness of a whole heroic past, of a great role once played in- the
world, of Christendom and Western civilisation saved by their
ancestors, of a world immensely enlarged by the audacity of their
navigators and their conquerors consciousness also of having been
;

a people of masters and aristocrats in a Europe subject to Spanish

hegemony, and of having created, through generations of artists,
dramatists, novelists and poets, a whole world of plastic forms and
ideal figures these feelings live in the depths of all Spanish souls.
Relying upon them, and upon the proud individualism of her
people, a Spain united under a regime of authority and liberty, and at
the same time of social foresight, may once more be ready to-
morrow for a great destiny.
403
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405
 PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SPAIN
711. Spain conquered by the Arabs
718. Battle of Cavadonga
755. Arrival of Abd er Rhaman I
929. Caliphate established at Cordova by Abd er Rhaman III
997. Sack of Compostela by El Mansour
1031. Abolition of the Caliphate
1043 . Birth of Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar, the Cid Campeador (d. 1099)
1085. Conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI
1094. Conquest of Valencia by the Cid Campeador
1 1 1 8.
Conquest of Zaragoza by Alfonso I (el Batallador)
1195. Battle of Alarcos
1 21 2. Battle -f Las Navas de Tolosa
1236. Conquest of Cordova
1238. Reconquest of Valencia by James I
1248. Conquest of Seville by Ferdinand III (el Santo)
1478. Inquisition introduced into Castile
1492. Conquest of Granada by Ferdinand and Isabella
1492. Expulsion of the Jews from Spain
1492. Discovery of America by Christopher Columbus
1494. Naples conquered by Gonzalo de Cordova
1519. Charles V elected Emperor
1519. Hernan Cortes begins conquest of Mexico
1 5 24. Discovery of Peru' by Francisco Pizarro
1525. Battle of Pa via
1 5
3 5 *
Conquest of Tunis
1557. Battle of Saint Quentin
1559. Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis
1563. Foundation of the Monastery of the Escurial by Philip II
1 5 72. Battle of Lepanto
1581. Annexion of Portugal
1588. Expedition of the Invincible Armada
1 5
99. Birth of Velazquez (d. 1 660)
1605. First edition or Don Quixote
1609. Expulsion of the Moriscos
1 64 3 . Battle of Rocr oi
1 648 . Peace of Westphalia
1659. Treaty of the Pyrenees
1 66 8 .
Independence of Portugal
1701. War of Succession Formation of the Grand Alliance
:

1713. Treaty of Utrecht

1763. Treaty of Paris
1767. Expulsion of the Jesuits
1796. Alliance with France against England
1805. Battle of Trafalgar
1808. War of Independence
1808. Battle of Baflen
1812* Constitution promulgated at Cadiz
1820. Revolt of Riego
406
 PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SPAIN
1823. French army enters Spain under the Duke of AngoulSme
1 8 24. Battle of Ayacucho
1834. First Carlist War
1859. Tetuan taken by General O'Donnell
1865. War against dole and Peru
1868. Outbreak of revolution; Isabella II leaves Spain
1871. Amadeo of Savoy becomes King of Spain
1873. King Amadeo leaves Madrid; first Republic proclaimed
1874. Cortes dissolved by General Pavia
1874. Proclamation of Alfonso XII by General Martinet Campos
1876. End of third Carlist War
1898. War with the United States; loss of Cuba and the Philippines
1909. Hostilitiesbreak out in Morocco
1 92 1 . Disaster of Anual
1923. General Primo de Rivera forms a Military Directory
1925. Spanish forces land at Alhucemas
1925. Civil Directory formed under General Primo de Rivera
1926. End of hostilities in Morocco
1930. End of Dictatorship under Primo de Rivera
1931. Second Republic proclaimed in Spain
1936. Civil War begins
1939. Civil War ends; Second World War begins
1941. Death of Alfonso XHI
1945. Second World War ends

407
 CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE SOVEREIGNS
OF SPAIN
L MUSULMAN SPAIN
Principal Rxkrs only

EMIRS OF CORDOVA ALMOHADE SULTANS (continued)

A.D. A,D.
Abd er Rhaman I 75 6 Yacoub ben Yousouf 1178
Hisham I 788 Mohammed ben Yacoub 1
199
Hakam I 799 Abou Yacoub 1213
Abd er Rhaman II 822 Abou Malik 1223
Mohammed I 852 Mamoun 122;
Mondhir 886
Abdallah 888

CALIPHS OF CORDOVA KINGS OF GRANADA

Abd er Rhaman III 912 Mahommed I 1238
Hakam II 961 Mahommed II 1273
Hisham II 976 Mahommed III 1303
Mohammed II 1008 Nazar 1309
Ismail I 1312
Soleyman 1009
Hisham II (second time) 1010 Mahommed IV 1325
Soleyman (second time) 1012 Youcefl 1333
Ali benHamoud 1017 Mahommed V 1354
Abd er Rhaman IV 1021 Ismail II 1359
Alcasim 1022 Abou-Said 1361
Abd er Rhaman V 1022 Mahommed V (second time) 1362
Mohammed III 1023 Youcefll 1391
Yahya ben Ali 1024 Mahommed VI 1396
Hisham III 1027 Youceflll 1408
Mahommed VII 1425
ALMORAVID SULTANS Mahommed VIII 1427
Yousouf ben Teshoufin 1067 Mahommed VII (second time) 1429
Ali ben Yousouf 1 107 Ebn Alhamar 1431
Teshoufin ben Ali 1 144 Mahommed VII (third time) 1432
Ebn Ostman 1445
ALMOHADE SULTANS Ebn Ismail I4J4
Abd el Moulmin 1147 Muley Hacen 1456
Yousouf abou Yacoub 1163 Abou Abdilehi (Boabdil) 1482

II, CHRISTIAN SPAIN

Principal Rulers only

KINGS OF ASTURIAS A.D. KINGS OF ASTURIAS (continued)

Pelayo 718 A.D.
Favila 738 Fruela I 756
Alfonso I 739 Aurelio 768
408
 KINGS OF SPAIN KINGS OF SPAIN (continued)
A.D. A.D.
and Ferdinand V
Isabel I 1474 Ferdinand VI 1746
Philip
and Dona Juana
I 1504 Charles III
Ferdinand V (as Regent) 1506 Charles IV 1788
Cardinal Cisneros (as Regent) 1516 Ferdinand VII 1808
Joseph Bonaparte 1808
House of Austria
Ferdinand VII (again) 1814
Charles I 1517 Isabel II 1833
Philip II 1556
Philip m 1598
Provisional
Amadeol
Government 1868
1871
Philip IV 1621
First
Charles n 1665
Republic
Alfonso XII
1873
1874
House of Bourbon Maria Cristina (as Regent) 1886
Up V 1701 Alfonso XIH 1886
LuisI 1724 Second Republic 1931
Philip V (again) 1724 Franco regime 1936

INDEPENDENT COUNTS OF BARCELONA

A.D. A.D.
Wi&edo the Hairy 874 Ramon Berenguer I 1035
Borrel y Suniario 989 Ramon Berenguer II 1076
Borrel y Miron 954 Ramon Berenguer II 1082
Ram6n Borrell HI 992 Ramon Berenguer III 1096
BerenguerRam6n I 1018 Ramon Berenguer IV 1131

KINGS OF MAJORCA
A.D. A.D.
James I (the Conqueror) 1231 Sancho I 1311
James II 1276 James III 1324

410
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411
 INDEX
Aix-la.-Chappelle, Treaties of, 265, 266,
Abarran, 353 267 291
Abbas, Ibn, 100 Ajdir, 262
Abbasids, 41, 44i 49 Ajerquia> 64
Abdallah, King of Granada, 159 Akbar Madfmoua, 23, 24, 25, 30
Abdallah, son of El Mansour, 5 1 Alamyria, 66
Abd el Asiz, son of Mousa, 36, 48 Alarcos, Battle of, 126, 129
Abd el Krim, 353, 361, 362, 363 Alava, 324
Abd el Malik, 37 Alba, 2nd Duke of, 227, 232
Abd el Moumin, 126, 127 Alba, i7th Duke of, 392, 399
Abd er Rhaman, son of Hakam II, 56 Alba, Santiago, 350
Abd er Rhaman 1, 41-7, 48, 5 2, 68 Albania, 165, 279
Characteristics, 46 Alberoni, Ordinal, 285, 288
Abd er Rhaman II, 49, 5 i, 69, 76 Albert of Austria, Archduke, 228, 232,
Abd er Rhaman III (The Victorious), 48, 251,265
50 58, 60, 66
ff, ff, 72, 76, 77, 89-90, Albigenses, 237
91, 93, 160 Albret of Navarre, Jean d', 219
Abd er Rhaman ben Abd Allah, 36 Albufera, Battle of, 307
Abdilehi, Abou. See Boabdil. Alcala, 243
Aben Pascual, 65 Alcantara, Francisco Martin, 184
Aberdeen, Lord, 327, 328 Alcolea, 331
Abou Amir Mohamed. See El Mansour. Alcudia, Duke of. See Godoy, Manuel.
Abou Hasssan, King of Grenada, 135, Alemtcjo, 303
Alexander, King of Jugo-Slavia, 365
Abou Mohamed Ben Hazam, 48 Alexandria, 59, 60, 85
Abou Obeyda, 68 Alfonso, Don, brother of Don Carlos ITT,
Abyssinia(ns), 167, 168, 170 339
A.cci6n Hspanola, 3 80 Alfonso, Warrier of Arag6n, 38, 60, 126,
Aceitn Popular, 380 ff *33> X 34
Acropolis, 143 Alfonso III of Le6n, 88
Adhari, Ibn, 17, 20, 24, 28, 36, 48, 53, 57, Alfonso V of Aragdn, 167, 215
66, 67, 68, 70, 78, 90, 93 Alonso V of Le6n, 114
Adowa, 352 Alfonso VI of Castile, 106 ff, 114 ff, 125,
Adriatic, 279 159
Aegean, 279 Alfonso VIII of Castile, 126, 129, 133
Aemilius, Saint, 58 Alfonso X of Castile, 133,315
Africa : Alfonso XI of Castile, 133, 134
Spanish fear of invasion from, 54, 85-6, Alfonso XII of Spain, 334 ff, 343, 344, 358
in, 115, 122, 147, ijo $
164. 167, *i6, Characteristics, 388-9; Death, 342
219, 220, 230, 239, 279; Spanish Jews Alfonso XUI of Spain, 343, 348-57, 363,
and, 19, 154, 155, 164-5, 173; Islam 365, 366, 368, 369, 372, 380, 390
triumphant in, 20, 25 ; Spanish posses- Abdication, 370
sions in and expeditions against, 14, 49, Algave, 101, 103, no, 133
54, 219, 224, 232, 258, 279, 296, 344, Algeciras, 125, 134, 351
551 ff; Influence on Spain, 31, 34, 37>43> Battle of, 17, 24, 29, 125
49, 61, 63, 73, 99, 108, 126, 127 flf, 133, Algeria. ^Algiers.
139-40, 154, 158 ff; Roman archi- Algiers, 30, 37, 54, 92, 116, 138, 139, 17$,
tecture in, 69-70, 208; Mass expulsions 190, 192, 220, 224, 230, 279, 296, 297,
from Spain, 85, 126-7, 154-6, 239; 352, 361
Portuguese discoveries in, 167-8, 174 Alhambra. See Granada.
Agreda, Maria dc, 262 Alhucemas, 280, 353, 354, 356, 358, 362,
Agriculture, 32, 33-4, 59, 73-4, 137-40, 368
143, 160, 184, 188, 203-4, 205, 242, Marquis of. See Prieto, Garcia*

25J, 292, 296, 352, 376 Alicante, 134, 288, 308

Agua, Cabo de, 352 Almaden, 393
Aguila, Juan deJ, 252 Almansa, Battle of, 283
Aguilar, Count of, 282 Almenara, Battle of, 284
Aguinaldo, 346 Almerfa, 99, 100, 107, 139
Aire, 262 Almohades, 31, 78, 99-105, 125-9, 133,
Aissa, Prophet, 94, 93 134, 149

413
 INDEX
Almoravids, 31, 62, 78, 9^-105, 116, 122, War of Independence and, 306-7;
125-9,159 First Republic and, 336, 337
Almotatid, 78 Andes, 320
Alonso, the One-armed, 192 Andrew, Archduke, 251
Alost, 265 Angevins, 216, 274
Alps, 217, 222, 227 Angouleme, Duke of, 313, 322
Alpujarras, 137, 141, 165, 254 Anjou, 216, 272
Alsace. See Lorraine. Annalists (see also Arabs, Annalists), 60, 72,
Alvarez, Melquiades, 350, 367, 369 73, 9, 95, no, "7> "6, 136, 137
Amadeo of Spam, 334, 335 Anne of Austria, 238
Abdication, 336 Annecy, 228
Amat, 277 Annobon, 297
Amazon, River, 297 Anti-Comintern Pact, 393
America (see also United States) :
Antilles, 177, 178, 184, 205
Musulman influence on conquest of, Antwerp, 240, 242, 252
163 ff; Christopher^
Columbus and, Anual, 352 ff, 367
169 ff, 201; Discovery of, 163 ff,
176 ff, Apurc, river, 318
i69ff, 176 209-11; Spanish conquest
ff, Aquisgran, Treaty of, 291, 293
and colonisation of, 175 ff, 189 ff, 194 ff, Arabia, 77, 112, 172
276; Civilisation of by colonists, 194 ff; Arabic languages, 31, 32, 74, 75, 77, 78,
First printing press, 200, 202; In- 100, 112, 121
,
fluence of conquest on Spain, 210, 242; Arabs (see also Musulmans) :

Spanish trade monopoly in, 261-2, 287; Annalists, 17, 22, 24, 36, 43, 47, 51, 62,
Buccaneers in, 275, 289; Spanish admin- 84, 89, 91, 100, no
115, 136, 140;
istration in, 194-202, 203-8, 269, 274- Dazzled by Visigoth Spain, 17-18 ;
80; English commercial privileges in, Limitations of, 21-2, 41, 136-7 ; Fancy
284, 289; Slave trade with, 289; War of and Fact of Arab conquest of Spain,
Austrian Succession and, 290; Expul- 23 ff; A
minority in Musulman Spain,
sion of Jesuits from, see Jesuits; 30; "Arab" civilisation and art mis-
French and English rivalry in, 296; nomers, 31, 72, 76-7; Agriculture and,
Declaration of Independence, 297; 33-4; Barbarism of, 33 ff, 51, 59, 72,
Revolt of South and Central Ameri- 1 60,
190; Rivalry with Berbers, 36-7,
can Colonies, 311, 317 ff; War of 99; Anarchy of, 36-7, 99; Arab proph-
American Independence, 320 ff, ecies, 41, 58, 78, 107, HI-I2, 153, 240;
Spanish- American war, 329, 342, 345 ff, Reliance on Berbers and other for-
5 ?* eigners, 44 52, 55, 57, 92, 125-9;
A
Amiens, 245 Arab-Spanish civilisation, 32, 59 ft,
Treaty of, 56 72-80, 157 ff; Feudalism in Spain, 32;
Amirites, 56 Music, 49, 51, 61, 127; Philosophy, 58,
Ammar, Ben, 101 ff, 121, 158 61, 75, 77> "I, "8, 157-8, 171, 211, 245,
Amorevieta, Convention or, 339 293 Poetry, 22, 46-7, 49, 52, 61, 76, 79-
;

Arnrous, 84 80, 84, 101-3, 106, 121, 125, 129, 157, 158
Anarchism, 160, 336-7, 347~9, 35$, 364-5*
373, 378-8o, 382 Christian reconquest, 133-5; United
A
Anatolia, 30 with Castile, 135, 219, 309; Muddjares
Andalusia: and, 153; Moriscos and, 155; Naples
Tank's invasion of, 23 ff, 30; Tarif's and, 216, 218, 272; Separatism in, 235,
raid on, 25, 30; Arab occupation of, 36, 256; Reformation and, 240, 241;
60 ff;Climatic influence of, 49-50, 68, Rebels against Philip V, 283, 284;
99, 105; Musulman culture in, 60 ff, Suppression of privileges, 283; War of
75 ff, 158; Paganism in, 61, 62, 68, 157; Spanish Independence and, ^07, 308;
Agriculture in, 73, 138; Irrigation in, Carlists and, 323, 324; Council of, 236;
72-3, 137; Emigration to Morocco Civil War and, 390
from, 73, 85; Almoravid and Almo- Aranda, Count of, 294, 296, 302, 316
hade invasions of, 99 ff, 125 ff, 133, 149; Aranjuez, 294
Attempted Merinide invasion of, i 3 3-4; Architecture, 54, 60, 63 ff, 73, 80, 89, 90, 120,
Barbaresque raids on, 20, 149, 153; 141-2, 143-6, 157 ff, 244-5, 299-300
Moriscos in, 224, 238-40, 254; Inquisi- Ardennes, 260
tion and, 239; Protestantism and, 241; Argentina, 200, 229, 319, 320, 321
Expulsion of Moriscos from, 188; Re- Anans, 20
bellion against Philip IV in, 257, 258-9; Aristotle, 78, 128, 158
Attempted insurrection in favour of Armada, 229, 252, 259
Archduke Charles, 282, 283; Spanish Armentieres, 265
414
 INDEX
Army (see also Pronunciamentos), 26, 29, Barbary, 19, 20, 27, 29, 57, 85, 137, 139,
38, 57, 106, 108, 156, 257, 259, 260, 142, 151 ff, 165, 166, 173, 216, 219,
262, 263, 271, 285, 288, 292, 311, 323, 223, 232, 239, 241, 254, 279, 297
3 2 5-7, 329, 33i, 33 6 , 338, 344, 347, Barbastro, 62
348, 351-2, 355, 359, 368, 370, 377 ff, Barcelona (see also Catalonia), 17, 88, 158,
388 ff 259, 268, 283, 284, 288, 292, 324,
Arruit, Monte, 352, 355 336, 338, 348, 356, 357, 359, 365, 370,
Art, 22, 31, 52, 59, 61, 68, 74, 80, 85, 89, 384, 389, 393
120, 142, 143-6, 158, 211, 221, 234, Ban, 1 66
244-6, 263, 292-3, 299-300 Basle, Treaty of, 303
Artois, 217, 222, 249, 262 Basque Provinces, 27, 37, 56, 60, 100, 159,
Asia, 22-3, 35, 3 6 , 49, 5*, 61, 65, 67, 70, 259,3*4, 3-5,331,35
7 1 , 72, 77, 104, i3 6 , J 53, 159, 167, 171, Bassam, Ibn, in, 112
176, 199 Bavaria, Electoral Prince of, 269; Electress
Asia Minor, 89, 149 of, 269, 270
Astunas, 21, 36, 59, 60, 88, 255, 279, 286, Bavarian immigrants, 296
293, 34> 334, 380, 381 Baxter, Sylvester, 205
Asunci6n, 320 Bayano*I-Mogrib, J5/, 50
Ataliba, 179, 181 ff Bayonne, 304, 305, 308
Ath, 265, 269 Baza, 150, 189
Atdhneias, 195 ff, 229, 277, 278, 279 Beam, 222
Augsburg, 242 Becerra, 245
League of, 268 "Bedmar Conspiracy", 273
Augustine, Saint, 171 Bedmar, Marquis or, 273
Augustinians, 200, 206 Beigbeder, 398
Aurora, Sultana, 48, 56-7 Belgium, 231, 232
Australia, 276 Beltraneja, la, 238
Austria, 250, 268, 270, 271, 287, 290, 293, Beni Houd, 120
312, 324 Beni Ifrur, 350
House of (see also Habsburgs), 221, 223, Bern Said, 352
224, 227, 233, 235, 249, 250, 265, Bern Ulchek, 352
276, 277 Bensuade, Joachim, 168
Austrian Succession, War of, 290, 291 Bentham, Jeremy, 313
Auvergne, 89 Bentinck, Lord William, 308
Averroes, Arab philosopher, 77, 78, 128, Berbers (see also Arabs, Musulmans) :

158 Barbarism of, 26, 33-4, 36 ff, 160, 186;

A vila, 192, 296 Dazzled by Visigoth Spain, 17-18, 128,
Avis, no 142; Predominant in Arab conquest of
Axis. See Fascism, Spam, 27-8, 31, 36, 57, 60, 99, 100, 125
Ayala, L6pez de, 333 ff n, 138; Predominant in South, 99;
Ayala, Perez de, 381 Arab rivalry with, 34, 3 6-7, 43-4, 5 3, 99,
Azana, Manuel, 372, 374, 375 ff, 391, 394 100; Repeatedly summoned to Musul-
Azanza, 277 man Spain, 45, 52, 57, 125 ff, 135;
Aznar, Admiral, 369, 370 Hereditary enemies of Spaniards, 54-5,
Azores, 174 83, 85-6, loo-i, 134-5, 138, 148-9, 153,
Aztecs, 159, 183, 193 220, 297; Agriculture and, 24; Later
attempts at invasion of Spain, 31, 125-9,
133, 279-80
Jjacry, 173 Bercnestcsgaden, 394
Badajoz, 99, 106, 307, 311, 341, 386 Berenguer of Barcelona, Count, 115, 119
Badis, King of Granada, too ff Berenguer, General, 352 ff, 366 ff
Badr, 42 Bergues, 265
3,23, 49, 59,60,72 Bermudez, Zea, 325
liphate, of 43, 48-9 Bermudo, King of Galicia, 94, 95
Bailen, Battle of, 305, 306 Bertrand, Fray Louis, 186, 198
Baladts, 33 Berwick, Duke of, 283
Baldj, Arab Governor, 33, 37 Besalu, 88
Balearic Islands, 134, 268, 284, 290, 292, Besancon, 262
293, 298, 303, 308, 343, 384, 388 Bessieres, Marshal, 305
Ballesteros, Francisco, 314 Betanzos, Domingo, 198
Baltimore (Ireland), 252 Betica, 63, 73, 138
Barbara of Braganza, 291 Biban, 362
Barbarossa, 224 Bicoque, Battle of the, 222
415
 INDEX
Bidassoa, 217, 3*3 33* x Caesaria Augusta, 1*0
Bilbao, 303, 324, 339, 386, 387 Cairo, 23, 54, 60, 72
Binche, 265 Calabria, 273
Biscay, 90, 153, 257, 259, 324, 385 Calderdn, 263
Bismarck, Prince von, 341, 390 Calder6n, Maria, 265
Black Sea, 55 California, 276, 299
Blake, General, 307 Caliphate, 48-58
Blenheim, Battle of, 283 Callao, 319, 330
Blue Division, 398, 401 Calotnarde, Francisco Tadeo de, 314
Boabdil, 144, 150 Calvin, John, 240
Bobastro, 88 Calvo, Lain, 112
Bohemia, 2^6 Cdmara, Admiral, 346
Bokhara, 76 Cambo, Francisco de Asis, 368
Bolivar, Simon, 317 ff Cambrai, 287
Bolivia, 319 Treaty of, 222
Bolshevism, 368 Campanella, 273
Bone, 139 Campania, 216, 229
Borgas, Blancas, 393 Campo de la Verdad, 71, 85
Bougie, 54, 128, 220, 230 Campomanes, Count of, 296
Boulogne, 251 Campos, General Martinez, 343, 344, 345
Bourbon, Duke of, 287 Canalejas y M&idez, Jose, 349, 350
Bourbons, 55, 233, 276, 281-92^29
.29?, 3 Canaris, Admiral, 394, 398
505, 3i3>3i5 3*8* 330. 35*$ 35 3^8
F,365,2 Canary Islands, 177, 308, 378, 394, 399
Bourbourg, 262 Caney, El, battle of, 346
Boves, General, 318 Canning, George, 306, 317, 322
Brabant, 217, 265 Cano, Alonso, 245
Brachero, Diego, 252 C&novas del Castillo, Antonio, 330, 337 ff,
Braganza, Duke of. See John IV of Portu- 3,49 357, 367, 380
gal. Cantabria, 38, 59, 89, 90
Bravo, Gonzales, 331 Cape Verde, 174, 346
299
Brazil, 249, 297, "Captain Great". JW Cordova, Gonzalode.
Breda, 251 Capua, 289
Breitenfeld, Battle of, 260 Carabobo, battle of, 319
Breslau, Treaty of, 290 Caracas, 277, 317
Battle of, 284 Caraibs, 198
Bnhue^a,
Brindisi, 166 Carinthia, 165
Brittany, 286 Carlists, 323, 324, 333 fF, 343, 350, 366,
Brussels, 210, 240, 251, 260, 261
Buccaneers, 275, 289 Carlos, Don (I), 287, 288, 289, 315, 323 ff,
Buccarelli, 277
Buenos Aires, 195, 208, 277, 289, 296, 316, Carlos, Don (HI), 334, 336, 338, 339, 350
321 Carmona, 44
Buen Retiro, 296 Carmona, General, 365
Bugallal, Count of, 349, 369 Carniola, 165
Buitrago, pass of, 24 Caro, Ventura, 302
Burgos, in, 119, 120, 244, 283,206, 307 Caroline Islands, 341, 342
Burgundy, 222, 224, 225, 249, 262 Carranza, Bartolom, 240
Busnach, 173 Cartagena (Spain), 133, 292, 337, 370
Byzantines (Byzantium), 18, 19, 60, 67, 69, Cartagena (Venezuela), 289, 290, 318, 343
72, 74, 88, 126 Carthage, 66, 67
Fall of, 20
CxabaUero, Francisco Largo, 367, 372, Carvajel, Jos de, 292
381, 384, 386, 389, 391, 392 Casale, Treaty of, 256
Cabanellas, 385 Casas, Las, Bartolomd de, 163, 171, 173,
Cabrera, Juan, 173, 174 186-7, l88 > I 9^> X 9 8 > X 99
Cabrera, Ram6n, 324, 325, 339 Casas Viejas, 378, 379
Cadafal, no Caspe, 393
Cadir, King of Toledo, later of Valencia, Castanos, General, 305
106, 116, 117, 122 Castelar, EmiHo, 330, ^33, 336, 346
Cadiz, 133, 177, 256, 258, 259, 282, 286, Castelfranco, Pnnce of, 302
292, 303, 307, 311, 314, 331, 336, 337, Castile:
Vassal to Musulmans, 57-8 ; Unites with
Sack of by English, 229 Leon and heads Spanish Nationalism,
416
 INDEX
107, 309; Asserts military suj>eriority Ceballos, 277
over Musulmans, 106 fT; Typified by Centre Party, 375, 380 ff
Cid Campeador, in 8; Rivalry with Cerdagne, 88, 215, 218, 259, 262, 266
Aragon, 134; Advances southwards in Cerignola, battle of, 190
alliance with Arag6n, 133 ff; United Cervantes, Miguel de, 244, 263
with Arag6n by marriage of Isobel and Cervera, Admiral, 346
Ferdinand, 132, 135, 219; Imposes Ceuta, 24, 25, 37, 42, 54, 220, 258, 280, 282,
costume on Moriscos ; and Capture of 296, 320, 362
Granada, 146, 147 ff, 153; Attitude to- Chacabuco, battle of, 320
wards Moors, 148, 153 ff; Divides dis- Chambery, 228
coveries with Portugal, 174; Colonisa- Champagne, 149, 260
tion of America and, 184-5, *9 2 > 2 *6; Charcas, 200
Adds Indies to Crown, 139; Expels Charlemagne, 44
Moriscos, 254-5; Archduke Charles Charleroi, 265, 267
and, 283, 284; Salic Law and, 315; Charles of Anjou, King of Naples, 216,
CarHsts and, 324; Council of, 236
Castillejo, 357 Charles I of England, 256, 268
Castillo, Lieutenant of Assault Guard, 383 Charles II of England, 258, 266, 275
(t
Castlehaven, 252 Charles II of Spain ( the Bewitched"),
Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount, 321 249, 264-70, 274, 280, 287
Castro, 1 66 Charles III of Spain (King of Naples),
Catalonia: 276, 282, 290, 291, 293-300, 301, 304,
Separatism in, 235, 236, 248, 256, 350, 316, 320, 323, 3^7,341, 3^3
363, 368, 372; Industrialism, 242; Characteristics, 293 ; Death, 299
Rebels against Philip IV, 257, 259-60; Charles IV of Spain, 301 ff, 317
Restored to Spain by Treaty or Pyre- Characteristics, 301; Abdication, 304
nees, 260; Rebels against Philip V, 282, Charles V, Emperor (Charles I of Spain):
283, 284, 286, 385; War of Spanish Spanish monarchy and, 18, 55, 235;
Independence and, 307, 308; Carlists Conquest of America and, 179-82,
and, 324, 339; Cuban market and, 345; 194-5, 196, 198; Italy and, 217, 218,
Civil War and, 390-1 222-3; Accession to throne of Spain,
Cateau-Cambresis, Treaty of, 225, 227, 228 221; Election as Emperor, 222; Reign
Catherine of Aragdn, 217 of, 221-4, 2 4 Z Comtmerot and, 222;
Catherine de Medici, 225, 233 Reformation and, 223 ; Turks and, 223 ;
Catholicism (see also Christianity) :
Abdication, 224, 225
Clergy under the Visigoths, 19, 20, 28, Charles VI, Emperor (Archduke Charles),
31; Annalists, 21, 60, 168; Under the 270, 282 ff, 290, 307, 385
Musulmans, 61, 74~J, 87 ff; In Northern Death, 290
Spain, 87 rT, 133; Spanish monks, 21, Charles VIII of France, 215, 216, 217, 218
59-60, 61, 94, 96, 135, 163, 166-7, 171-2, Charles IX of France, 233, 315
174, 181, 186, 193, 197, 204, 207, Charles XII of Sweden, 285
238, 239-40, 326, 349; Spanish theolo- Charles Emmanuel I of Savoy, 228, 272,
gians, 29, 51, 128, 169-72, 186, 211, 243, 273, 282, 284, 285, 290
254; Spanish bishops, 31, 87, 171, 181, Charles Martel of France, 36, 90
197-9, 229, 235, 240, 254; Conquest of Charolais, 217
America and, 165 ft, 176 ff, 180, 185 ff, Cbarte of Louis XVHI, 325
194 ff; Charles III and, 294, 320; Span- Chartres, 245
ish anti-clericalism and, 294-5, 324, 334, Chatelet, 262
336, 348, ?49, 372-3* ?76, 379, 3.8*, Chichester, Dean of, 391
382; Expulsion of Jesuits, see Jesuits; Chile, 189, 229, 277, 319, 320, 330
Spanish mysticism, 184, 243, 244-6,' China, 171
274, 313; Second Republic and, 372-3, Choiseul, 295, 296
374, 376, 382*. 39i Cborta, 51, 57
^ , JB
Catholic Sovereigns (see also Ferdinand
,
V alto Catholicism) :
Christianity (see
of Arag6n and Isabel (the Catholic)) : Conversion of Recardo, last Visigoth
Marriage of, 135, 215, 218; Conquest of King of Spain, 18; Jews and, 19-20,
Americaand, 1648, 169 ff, 186,188, 194 28, 55, 154, 155, 164, 338-9; Northern
Caumont, Jacques Nompar de, Due de la Spain as stronghold, 21, 36, 38, 45, 53,
Force, 255 57-8, JSHSo, <T? , 83, 87-96, 09, 106-9;
Cava, La, 21, 25 Spanish Christians under the Musul-
Cavadonga, battle of, 38 mans, see Musulmans; Spanish rene-
Cavell, Edith, 348 gades from, see Musulmans; Christian
Cavite, 346 reconquest of Spain, 37, 70, 88-9, 106 fi,
417
 INDEX
129, 133 fF, 147 fF; Christian contri- Conde, Prince de, 259, 260, 261, 274
bution to Arab-Spanish civilisation, 63, Condotiiero, 99-100
77-8, 145; Pilgrimage to Santiago de Confederation National del Trabajo, 367
Compostela, 89; Sack of by El Man- 184 fF, 189-93, 2OI > 2O 3 2 43
Conqtttstaaores',
sour, 51, 58, 95; Endangered by Islam, Conservatism, 325-6, 328,341, 344, 348-9,
126 fF, 163 ft, 268; Destruction of 350, 366, 371 fF, 384fF
churches by Musulmans, 126; Con- Constantinople, 25, 66, 67, 153, 165, 216,
2 55
quest of Granada by Christians,
see
Granada; Conquest of America and, Constitution (1812), 209-10, 312, 321,
165 fF, 176 fF, 180, 185 fF, 194 fF; Modem 325-6
rationalism and, 210, 211; Inquisition Constitution (1876), 333, 339-40, 357
359, 360
Qiurchill, Winston S., 397 Contratacton, Casa ae, 195 -6
Gd Campeador: Conversos, 237, 238, 239
Characteristics, no
Origin, 111-12;
fF, Copts, 89
Education, 112; Campaigns, 113, 114, Cordova:
Dazzles Arab invaders, 17-60; Visi-
155 fF; Rise of, 113 fF, 121 fF; Religion,
118; Exile, 118-19; Conquest of goths and, 21, 22, 63, 68; Siege of by
Valencia, 122-3; Death, 123 Tank, 27; El Mansour and, 55-8, 69;
Cidt /&, 1 14, 236 Spanish clerics in under Musulmans,
6 1 -2, Appearance of under Musul-
Cierva, Juan de la, 349, 369
Cintra, Convention of, 305 mans, 63 ft; Romans and, 63-4, 68 Abd ;

er Rhaman I and, 68-9; Abd er Rhaman

Cisneros, Cardinal, 51, 219
III and, 69; Later Emirs and, 69, 75,
Cisneros, Villa, 378
Ciudad Rodrigo, 283, 307 Mosque o 54, 58, 63, 68 fF, 85, 95, 107,
Civil War, Spanish (1936), (see a/so Eng- 120, 142, 145, 157, 244; Byzantium and,
land, France, Italy, Madrid, Russia), 74 ; Revolt of the suburb, 85; As centre
335> 371, 375, 3 8 4~9*, 393 of raids and commerce, 90-5, 108;
Astunas and, 380; Outbreak in Republic of, 99; Ben Amar and, 102;
Morocco, 383-4; Origin, 384; Bar- Averroes and, 128; Granada compared
celona and, 384, 389; Spanish Phase, with, 141 Scholasticism, 157-8 Colum-
; ;

384-91; International Brigade, 387; bus and, 170

Non-intervention Committee, 388, 389; O5rdova, Caliphate of, 41 fF, 48 fF, 99, 108,
Aragdn and, 390; Catalonia and, 390-1 122, 128, 133, 137, 141, 149, 159-60,
Cleves, 251 219, 237, 243; Reliance on African
Clunia, 90 support, 27-8, 31, 45; Population
Cluniacs, 133 under, 30, 57, 74-5, 92; Civilisation
Coalition, 302, 303 of, 31, 47 fF, 59-80; Establishment of,
Cochin China, 329 48, Influence on Spanish character,
Cochrane, Lord, 319 92, 109; Abolition of, 99; Ferdinand
Coimbra, 32, 38 III ana, 133
Cohgny, Gaspard de, 233 Cdrdova, Gonzalo de, 190, 218
Colombia, 3 1 9 Cdrdova del Tucuman, 200
Colonies, Spanish, 176, 184 fF, IQO fF, Cona, *8, 94
203 229-30, 242, 253, 267, 269-70,
rT, Corneifle, Pierre, 114, 236, 244
275 fF, 284, 290-1, 294, 295, 297-9, Cortes, 235, 250, 252, 255, 256, 258, 286,
301, 303, 311, 316 fF, 330, 341-2, 2 95, 393*o 3i 2 , 3*4 3M, 3 1 ?,
344 ff 326, 3*3 fF, 344, 345, 349 fF, 359,
Columbus, Christopher, 163-4, 167-78, 364, 368, 374, 378, 379, 380
201, 209, 244 Cortes, Hernan, 159, 178 fF, 191, 192, 193,
Journal^ 163,, 164 207
Comija, Youssef A ben,
146 Corunna, 292
Commerce, 31, 63, 139-40, 151-2, 163, Cosimo I of Tuscany, 271
167, 174, 188, 196, 210, 216, 219, Courtrai, 265
229, 242, 251, 253, 261, 264, 266, Coxon, John, 275
275, 284, 287, 288-90, 291, 292, Crete, 85
296, 301, 303-4, 316, 317, 330, 341, Croix, Marquis of, 277
365. 393 Cromwell, Oliver, 256, 262
Commonwealth, English, 275 Crusades, 163 fF, 198
Communism, 241, 356, 363 fF, 371 fF, Cuba, 171, 203, 242, 269, 294, 329, 330,
384-94 ^ 337, 343 #> 358
Compostela. See Santiago, Cuenca, 339, 381
Cbmuneros. See Charles V, Emperor. Cuesta, General, 305
418
 INDEX
Curacoa, 318, 346 Augsburg and, 269, 270; Expansion in
Cuzco, 2.04 the East, 275 ; Grand Alliance and, 282;
Cyrcnaica, 60 War of Spanish Succession and, 283;
Treaty of Utrecht and, 284; Alliance of
Hanover and, 287; Treaty of Seville
Uamascus, 18, 20, 42, 59, 60, 68, 72 and, 288; Treaty of Vienna (second)
Caliphate of, 20, 24, 26, 30, 31, 36-8 and, 288
Damvdliers, 262 Dyck, Anthony Van, 246
Danube, river, 165
Dar-Druis, 353, 355
Darro, river, 140, 144 Ebro, river, 24, 90, 122, 305, 306, 307,
Dato, Irradier Eduardo, 349, 356, 377 339* 393
Dauphin, the, son of Louis XIV, 269, 270 Ecija, 27, 29
Davis, Edward (Buccaneer), 275 Economic conditions, 31, 33-4, 49, 52, 60,
"Day of the Ditch", 84 ff 63, 73-4, 89,92-3, 107-8, 139-4,
Deforestation, 91-2, 93, 160, 189 142-3, 151-2, 155-6, 160, 184-5, 1 88,
Denia, 117 210-11,229,236,242,250,253,255-6,
Descarga, battle of, 324 260, 262, 271, 285, 291-2, 296, 311,
Deutscbland^ cruiser, 388 314-15, 328-9, 336-7, 341, 342, 343,
Dewey, Admiral, 346 ^ 347, 35 1> 363* 364, 375, 37<5, 382, 393
Deza, Diego de, 172, 173 Ecuador, 319
Dla2, Bartholomew, 168 Edrisi (Arab geographer), 66
Dfaz, Bemal, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 189 Education, 19, 22, 59-60, 75-6, 112, 156-7,
rT, 192, 193, 206, 207 193, 200-1, 231, 243-4, 295, 299,
Dfaz, Jimena, 114, 119, 123
Directory, 350, 355, 358-70 Egilona, daughter of King Rodrigo, 36, 48
Divine Comedy, 80 Egmont, Count of, 232
Dixmude, 262 89, 138, 153, 224, 279
Djafar, 48
Djahaf, Ibn, Cadi of Valencia, 116, 117 Elizabeth of England, 229, 251, 252, 253,
DjebelTarik. J><f Gibraltar. 256, 262
Djemila, 73 Elizabeth de Valois, 225, 228
Djerba, 230 Lord, 298
Elliot,
Djonds, 57 42
Elvira, 27,
Domingo, Marcelino, 375 Empedocles, 77
Dominicans, 166, 170, 171, 172, 173, 198, Encomiendas, 185, 186, 197, 198
200, 206, 237, 238 Encyclopaedists, 295
"Dos de Mayo", 301, 304 England:
Douai, 265 Inquisition and, 202, 240, 261; Marri-
Dougga, 73 age of Henry VIII to Catherine of
Dover, treaty of, 266 Arag6n, 217, 228; Marriage of Mary
Downs, battle of the, 257 Tudor to Philip II, 217, 225; Philip II
Dozy, Reinhart, 23, 24, 31, 33, 34, 60, 62, and, 228, 233 ; Armada and, 22, 252, 259 ;

72, 1 10 Flanders and, 232, 251, 252, 256;

Drama, 236, 244, 263, 264, 299 Growth of naval power, 250; Spanish
Duero, river, 90, 100, 107 expedition to Ireland and, 252; Attitude
Dunboy, 252 to Spain under James I and Charles I,
Dunes, battle of the, 252 251; Mediates between Spain and Portu-
Dunkirk, 261, 262 under Charles II, 258; At war with
gal
Dupont, General, 305 Spain under Cromwell, 261-2; Peace of
Duras, Duke of, 292 Aix-la-Chapclle and, 265; Treaty
of
Dutch: Dover and, 266; At war with Spain
Inquisition and, 202, 237; Philip II and, under Charles II, 265; League of
231 rT, 250-1; Reformation and, 231 rT, Augsburg and, 268; Partition Treaties
240; Abjuration of the Hague, 232; ana, 270; Buccaneers and, 215; Recog-
Growth of naval power, 25o; Philip III k
nises Philip V, 28 1 ; Grand Alliance and,
and, 251; Thirty Years* war and, 252, 282; Capture of Gibraltar, 282; Invasion
256; Philip IV and, 252, 2?4, 257; of Spain, 283; Treaty of Utrecht and,
Recognition of United Provinces by 284; Quadruple Alliance and, 285 ; "19"
Spain, 252, 261; Battle of the Downs rising and, 285, 286; Titular James II
and, 257; Treaty with Spain against supported by Spain, 285, 286; Alliance
France, 261, 266; Allied with Spain of Hanover and, 287; Treaty of Seville
against Louis XIV, 265-6; League of and, 288; Treaty of Vienna (second)
419
 INDEX
and, 288; Slave trade and, 289; War of Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, 334
Austrian Succession and, 290-1 ; Treaty Ferdinand, son of Christopher Columbus,
of Aquisgran and, 291; Seven Years' 170, 171
War and, 29345 Falkland Islands and, Ferdinand I of Naples, 215-16
296; War of American Independence Ferdinand II of Naples, 293, 295
and, 298 ff; First Coalition against Ferdinand I of Galicia and Castile, 106 ff,
French Republic and, 302; Battle of 120
Trafalgar and, 304; War of Spanish Ferdinand III of Castile, 133
Independence and, 306 ff; Revolt of Ferdinand V (the Catholic) pf Aragon,
American colonies and, 3^6-17; "Span- 28, 51 137, 139; 143, 150, 152, 154,
ish Marriages" and, 2*7-8; Spanish 158, 164, 165, 172, 215 ff, 235, 237,
Constitution of 1876 and, 334; Moroc- 250, 310
can interests, 351; Spanish Civil War Marriage to Isabel of Castile, 135, 215,
and, 387, 389; Tangier and, 195; 218; Death, 220
Canary Islands and, 397 Ferdinand VI of Spain, 285, 286, 291, 292,
Bnsenada, Marquis de la, 292, 296 29*, 296, 299, 303
"Entente Cordtah, 351 Death, 292
Erfurt, Congress of, 306 Ferdinand VTI of Spain, 276, 293, 304 ff,

Escalante, Juan de, 185 310,311 315, 317,318,321,323

Escorial, 58, 71, 123, 128 Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, 334
Eslava, Sebastian de, 290 Fernando, Infante, 257, 260
Espafia Sagraday 299 Fernando Po, 207
Espartero, General, 324, 326, 328 Ferrer, J. Guardia Francisco, 348
Espinosa, battle of, 306 Ferrol* 2 9 2 > 335
Esquilach. See Squallaci. Feudalism, 32, 87, 96, 99, 108, 307
Estella, 324, 339 Fez, 85, 134, 140, 320, 352, 361
Estella, Marquis of. See Rivera, Miguel Fez Djedid, 140, 143
Primo de, Figuera, 302
"Estella Line", Figueras, y Moracas, Estanislao, 336
^61,362
Estremadura, 36, 185, 189, 224, 283, 285, Figueroa, 296
386 Fihrites, 42, 43
Ethiopia, 89 Finland, 396
Etruria, 303, 304 Flaminius, 354
Eugene, Prince, 282, 283 Flanders, 210, 217, 222, 224, 225, 231 ff,

Euphrates, river, 41 237, 240, 249, 250, 257, 261, 262, 264,
Europe: 265, 268, 279
Western culture and Arabs, 6r, 72, 79, Council of, 230
157-8; Spain as outpost against Islam, Fleury, Cardinal, 288, 290
17, 88, 156, 192, 249; Endangered by Florence, 222
Islam, 126, 167, i 8; Discovery of Flores, Father Enrique, 299
America and, 209 ff; Spanish prestige in, Florida, 276, 277, 294, 298, 299
215, 220, 224-5, 229, 231, 242, 244, 249, Floridablanca, Count of, 297, 298, 301, 302
257, 269, 285-7, 2 9 8 J Spanish auto- Florinda (La Cava), 21, 23
cracy and, 265 Spanish isolation from,
; Foix, Count de, 167
254, 313, 348 Fontainebleau, treaties of, 291, 301
European War. See World War, first. Fontilles, 373
Exarch of Africa. 3>* Julian, Count. Fortunate Islands, 171
Eza, Vizcondc de, 356 France:
Arab invasions of, from Spain, 24, 36;
Invasion of Spain under Charlemagne,
.Falkland Islands, 296, 297 44; Moriscos and, 15 5, 250; Christopher
Family Compact, First, 289 Columbus and, 172; Kingdom of Naples
Family Compact, Second, 293, 296, 301 and, 215 ff, 274; Milanese and, 217 ff,
Fanez, Alvar, 107, 122 221 ff; Spanish hegemony and, 221 ff,
Fanjul, General, 385 250 ff; Italian wars, 215 ft, 221 ff, 227;
Faquis. See Musulmans. Wars of religion and, 228, 231, 232-3,
Farnese, Alexander, 228, 233 237; Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis and,
Farnese, Elizabeth, 285, 286, 287, 290, 291 227; Turks and, 230; Aragonese and,
Fascism, 360, 382, 383, 384-90, 393 ff 241; Influence of Spanish art and
Fatimides, 53 literature on, 244; Thirty Years* War
Favourites, Royal, 249, 250, 255, 265, 266, and, 253, 256 ff; Invasion of Catalonia,
267, 29^ 268; Defeat of Spaniards at Rocroi,
Ferdinand, Emperor, 221, 228 260-1; Treaty of Pyrenees and, 260;
420
 INDEX
French Party at Spanish Court, 265; Gallardo, Ossorio, 349
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and, 265; Galvez, 277
Peace of Nimwegen and, 267; Spanish Galway, Lord, 283
succession and, 268; Partition Treaties Garces, Fray Julian, 298-9
and, 279, 280; Duke of Anjou as Garcia, Lord of Biscay, 90
Philip Vof Spain, 270 ; Buccaneers and, Gasset, Rafael, 350
275; Foundations of Louisana, 276; Generalife. See Granada.
Spanish centralisation and, 279; War of Genoa, Duke of, 334
Spanish Succession and, 281 ff; Philip V Georgia, 290
and, 281 ff; Quadruple Alliance and, Geraldini, Alessandro, 171
285; Alliance of Hanover and, 283; Germany (see also Holy Roman Empire) :

Treaty of Seville and, 287 ; Family Com- Charles Vand, 217, 223, 232; Refor-
pact (first) and, 289; Charles III and, mation and, 223, 231, 240, 251; Philip II
293 ; Jesuits and, 295 ; War of American and, 228, 232; Protestant princes* co-
Independence and, 298; Influence of operation with the Dutch, 251, 257;
French Revolution on Spain, 300 ff, Thirty Years' War and, 256 ff, 261;
308 ff, 325 473 331-2; Spanish Louis XVI and, 283; War of Spanish
Directory and, 302; Spanish Consulate Independence and, 308; Alfonso XH
and, 303 ; Continental Blocade and, 304; and, 341; Third Reich, 387, 388, 393;
Abdication of Charles III and, 304; Spanish Civil War and, 387, 390, 396;
Accession of Joseph Bonaparte to Second World War and, 396 ff;
Spanish throne, 304; War of Spanish
Independence and, 305 ff; Ferdinand Gharbib, Toledan poet, 84
VII and, 312 ff, 322; Revolution, 301 ff; Ghazzali (Arab philosopher), 128
Spanish colonies and, 317, 319, 321-2; Ghent, 267
"Spanish Marriages'* and, 328; Alfonso Ghibellines, 272
XII and, 341 ; Moroccan zones and, 351; Gibraltar, 24, 26, 134, 284, 290, 291, 308,
Moroccan campaign, 361 ff; Riff and,
360-3; Spanish Civil War and, 386-7, Capture of by English, 282; Siege of,
389 287, 298; Strait of, 30, 241, 386
Franche-Comt 149, 217, 249, 252, 261, Gijon, 387
265, 267, 271 Giner, 357
Franchise, women s, 378-9 Gobineau, Joseph, 22
Francia, Rodriguez de, 320 Coded, General, 385, 386
Francis, Duke of Cadiz, 238 Godoy, Manuel, 301 ff, 316
Francis I of Mantua, 272 Goicoechea, Antonio, 380
Francis, Saint, 172 "Golden Century", 242 ff, 299
Franciscans, 166, 167, 171, 172, 198, 200, Gomazo, 349
206, 220 Gomez, General, 324, 325
Franco, General, 364, 368, 384$ 393, 394, Gongora y Areote, Luis, 158
395, 396, 397, 40 1 Good Hope, Cape of, 168
Becomes head of Spanish State,
j86; Goriev, General, 389
Conspiracies against, 390; Cabinet, Gossart, Ernest, 218
390 Goulette, La, 224, 230
Francois I of France, 147, 221 ff, 230, 233 Goya, Lucientes Francisco, 300
Franco-German War (1870), 334 Granada:
Frankfort, 240 Last refuge of Spanish Islam, 75, 239;
Franks, 62 Alhambra, 67, 137 ff, 140 ff, 151, 157,
Frederick the Great of Prussia, 290 163, 165, 1 66, 244; Kingdom of, 99, 100,
Freemasonry, in Spanish army, 189, 311 107, 112, 134, 136-46; Rebels against
Freiburg, battle of, 284 Arabs, 90; Rivalry with Seville, 100;
Frere, Hookham, 306 Badisand, 100-1; City of, 126, 136, 137,
Fricsland, 251 140 ff, 150; Trade and industry, 135 ff;
Fnuli, 165 Fertility, i&etscg^ 145, 215, 216, 218;
Fronde, 261 Population, 138, 141, 153; Campaign
Fuenterrabia, 302 against, 149, 152, 348; Generalife, 140,
118,235, 324, 339
Ftteros, 143, 144; Conquest of by Christians,
Fumes, 265 135, 139, 146, 210; Albaycin, 140 ff, 151,-
153, 165; Alcazaba Djedid, 141;
Alcazaba Kadima, 141, 151; Ante-
Vjraeta, 289 queruela, 141; Bibarambla, 141; Zen-
Galicia, 27, 28, 36, 38, 88, 89, 93, 94, 106, ete, 141; Boabdil, Palace of, 144;
279 Catholic Sovereigns and, 146, 150 ff,
421
 INDEX
163 ff, 170-1, 173, 198, 242; Situation Henrietta of England, daughter of Charles
after surrender, 147 ff, 167; Terms of 1,268
surrender, 151-2; Expulsion of Moors, Henry II of France, 223, 225, 227, 233
147 ff, 153-4; Expulsion of Jews, 154, Henry III of France, 228, 233
239; Expulsion of Monscos, 155, 239; Henry IV of France, 155, 222, 227, 228,
Discovery of America and, 163 ff, 196; TT 233,2, 255, 256,318
Republicanism and, 336, 337 Henry the Navigator, Prince, 167
Grand Alliance, 282, 284 Henry of Trastamare, 160
Granja, La, 296, 298, 325 Henry VIII of England, 217, 222, 228
Graus, battle of, 113 Hercules, pillars of, 107
Gravelines, 227, 262 Hernandez, Angel Garcia, 368
Great Britain. See England. Hesse Darmstadt, Prince of, 281, 282
Greco, El, 85, 245, 263 Hidalgo, Father, 321
Greece, 14, 41, 47, 64, 67, 73, 74, 76, 78, Hidalgo, General, 336
no, 149, 157, 193, 198, 201, 204 Himmler, Heinrich, 398
Grenada, 293, 294 Hisham, Caliph of Damascus, 41, 42, 47
Grimaldo, Marquis de, 294, 297 Hisham I, Emir of Cordova, 5 1, 83
Grisons, 256 Hisham Caliph of Cordova, 55, 57, 99
II,
Guadalajara, 18, 24, 38, 126, 388, 392 Hitler, Adolf, 389, 390, 397, 398
Guadalhorce, Count of, 363 Hoare, Sir Samuel, 397, 399
Guadalquivir, 37, 42, 46, 63, 85, 102, 331 Holland. See Dutch.
Guantamo. 346 Holstein, 308
Guardarrama, Sierra de, 90 Holy Alliance, 312, 313, 32.1, 322
Guastalla, 291, 293 Holy Brotherhood, 235
Guatemala, 277 Holy Places, 167, 172, 176
Gudila, 126 Holy Roman Empire, 171, 217-18, 222 ff,
Gueldres, 284 253, 256-7, 260, 262, 267, 269 ff,
Guelfs, 272 TT , ,

Guerra, Sanchez, 349, 356, 369 Holy Sepulchre, 172

Guiana, 276, 299 Honduras, 294, 298, 299
Guillen, Gonzalo, 204 Hongkong, 346
Guinea, ^03 Honnecourt, battle of, 260
Guinea, Gulf of, 297 Horn, Cape, 276
Gmpuzcoa, 269, 270, 286, 302, 323, 385 Horn, Van, 275
Guise, Dukes of, 223, 227, 232, 274 Homes, Count of, 232
Guizot, Frangois, 328 Horr, El, 36
Gustavus Adolphus, 257, 260, 266 Howe, Earl, 299
Guzman. See Olivares. Huelva, 169, 178
Huesca, 84
Huguenots. See Protestants.
Jhlabib, Ibn, 41, 42 "Hundred Days*', 311
Habous, King of Granada, zoo Hurdes, Las, 378
Habsburgs. See Austria, House of. Hussein, 44
Hague, the, 282 Hydro-electric development, 364
Abjuration of, 232; Treaty of, 266;
Treaty of (Second), 286
Hainault, 217, 261 Ibarruri, Dolores (La Pasionaria), 382
Haiti, 329 Icazbalceta, Joaquin Garcia, 201
Hakam I, Emir of C6rdova, 52, 83, 85 Ifrikia, 23, jo, 32, 41, 42, 66
Hakam II,Caliph of Cordova, 52, 55, 56, 350
Iglcsias, Pablo,
57, 58, 60, 69, 70, 72, 75, 76, 77, 85 Iguenban, 353, 354
Hannibal, 354 Wuminati, 239
Hanover, Alliance of, 287 Incas, 150, 178, 193, 204, S*6
Hanoverian Dynasty, 287 Independence, Declaration of. See United
Harcourt, Duke of, 281 States.
Haro, Luis dc, 260 India, 139, 163, 164, 167
Haroun al Rashid, 49
Indians, American, 182 ff, 189 ff, 194 ff,
Harris, Henry, 171 201, 206, 295, 316
Havana, 292, 203, 295 Indies, Council of the, 195, 196, 235, 236,
Hayes, Dr. Carlton J. H., 399 278
Hazam, Ibn, 77, 78, 79 "Indies, Plan of the", 168, 172
Hedjaz, 74 Indies, East, 163, 164, 167, 168 ff, 269, 270,
Hendayc, 394 274, 276, 284
422
 INDEX
Indies, West, 168 ff, 176, 269, 270, 275, Javanese, 275
276, 295 "Jenkins's Ear", 289
Industry, 31, 139, 142-3, 205, 206, 209, Jerez 127, 358
242, 264, 291, 296, 314 Jerusalem, 89
Inquisition, 154, 172, 173, 202, 231, 235, Jesuits, 200, 243, 265, 288, 320
237 ff, 244, 261, 284, 294, 295, 307, Expulsion from Spain, 295, 373, 376;
313 Expulsion from America, 295
International City. See Tangier. Jews:
Invasions of Spam, foreign, 17, 20, 23 ff, Visigoths and, 19, 20, 28, 154, 164-5,
30, 122, 125-9,259, 269, 283-4, 286, 241; Arab invaders and, 28, 154; Ex-
302-3,3045; 313-14 pulsion of, 19, 20, 154, 164, 174, 242;
Irovy, 262 Musulmans and, see Musulmans; Arab-
Irrigation, 33-4, 73-4, 138, 243, 253, 364 Spanish civilisation and, 72, 74-5, 76-7,
Irun, 302 370, 386 120, 157; Discovery of America and,
Isabel, Infanta, 343 164, 173, 174; Inquisition and, 173, 202,
Isabel I (the Catholic) of Castile, 51, 135, 238
137, 143, 150, 152, 154, 158, 164, 165, Joan (Juana) the Mad of Castile, 221, 315
170, 172, 196, 215, 235, 237, 238, 250, John of Austria, Don, son of Charles V,
310, 315, 373 230, 267
Marriage of to Ferdinand V
of Arag6n, John of Austria, Don, son of Philip IV,
135, 215; Death, 219 T ,
25 ?'t 26i> 26y f> * 74
Isabel H of Spain, 315, 323-32, 333 ff; John of the Cross, Saint, 243
Abdication, 3^5 John, Infante, son of Isabel 3tid Ferdinand,
Isabel Clara Eugenia, Infanta, 228, 233, 243 U2
Ishmael, 46 John I of Arag6n, 167
Isidore of Seville, Saint, 19 John IV of Portugal, 258
Islam. See Musulmans. ordana, General, 393, 3^9
Islamic Islands, 160 'oseph Bonaparte, 304 ff, 317
Isruriz, Francisco Javier de, 325 'oseph of PortugaX 295, 297
Italy: oseph I, Emperor, 284
Turkish invasions of, 165-6, 223, 230; ourdan, Marshal, 308
Rival claims of Spain and France to ovellanos, Caspar, 303
Naples, 215 ff; Rival claims of Spain uan, Infante Don, 360, 390
and France to Milan, 217, 218; Import- uan Manuel, Infante, 103
ance of for Spain and France, 218 ff; ugo-Slavia, 365
Charles V
and, 218; Philip Hand, 217. uHan, Count, 21 ff, 50
232, 236; Philip IV and, 255 ff, 274; Junin, Battle of, 319
Thirty Years* War and, 261, 273; Junot, General, 304, 305
Council of, 236, 271; Partition Treaties Ar, 170, 171, 235, 236, 254, 299, 309,
and, 269, 270; Administration of T 3" 3I7, 35 1
Spanish possessions in, 271-80; Pia%gp, Jura, 217
272; Philip V
and, 282, 285; Accession
of Charles, King of Two Sicilies to
Spanish throne, 293; Napoleon and, JXaaba, the, 89
304; Spain and United Kingdom of, Kairouan, 41, 42, 54, 60, 69-70
334 ff; Amadeo of, King of Spain, 334; Kaishites, 36, 37, 42
Spanish Civil War and, 386, 387, 388, Kaldoun, Ibn, 23, 48
3*9, 39, 393 Keene, Sir Benjamin, 292
354-5 Kemal, Mustapha, 149
Kert, river, 352, 362
Khalid,68
Khan, Great, 163, 168, 170, 171, 172
Jaen, 42, 244 K&aradf, 53
'faime, Don, son of Don Carlos ]
350 Khatib, Al, 136, 137, 138
Jaimists, 350 Kboms, 32, 33
Jamaica, 262, 275, 279, 318 Kinnesrin, 42
Tames Saint, 89, 94, 95 Kinsale, 252
James I (the Conqueror) of Arag6n 133, Koran, the, 58, 68, 75, 101, 126
134
James I of England, 251, 253, 256
James III (Titular) of England, 282, 285, La Montana, 384
286 Lagrange, Marquis of, 25 5

Japan, 171 Lakam, 37

4*3
 INDEX
Landau, battle of, 284 Luis of Portugal, King, 334
Landrecy, 262 Luis, Cardinal Infante, 291
Languedoc, 149 Luisa, Infanta, 327, 328
Lannes, Marshal, 306 Luneville, treaty of, 303
Larachc, 279, 280, 352 Luther, Martin, 223
Latin documents on Spain, 21 Lutherans. See Protestants.
Lau, river, 361 Lutzen, battle of, 257
League of Nations, 363, 388 Luxembourg, 217, 269
Council, 388 Luzzara, 282
Lecci, 166 Lyautey, Marshal, 352, 361
Leinez, Diego, 112 Lyons, 240
Lens, 260, 261
Leon, 17, 36, 38, 51, 57, 88, 96, 107, 184,
114,118, 120,153,192,309 JMUadites. See Kaishites.
Leon, Fray Luis de, 240 Macari, Al, 139
Leopold of Coburg, Prince, 328 Machiavelh", 215
Leopold of Hohenzollem-sigmaringen, 3 34 Macia Llusa, Francisco, 368, 372
Leopold I, Emperor, 264, 269, 270 Madariaga, Salvador de, 382, 384,391,393
Lep>anto, battle of, 230 Madrid:
Lerida, 11$, 259, 380, 393 Abd el Moumin and, 126; Cosmopoli-
Lerma, Duke of, 250, 252, 253, 255, 267, tan centre, 210; Treaty of, 222; Capital
271, 272, 273, 279, 302 removed from, 250, 390; Charles I of
Lerroux, 348, 350, 372, 379, 381 England and, 256; PhUip IV and, 264;
Lesage, Alain, 244 Charles III and, 264; Archduke Charles
Leti, Fomponio, 209 and, 28^, 284; Philip V
and, 283 ; James
Levant, 30, 55, 60, 75, 155, 230 III (Titular) of England and, 286;
Liberal Union, 329, 331 Charles IIFs dress reform and, 294;
Liberalism, 310 ft, 323, 325-7, 329, 331, Royal palace in, 300; Joseph Bonaparte
8 34i, 344, 348-5, 3<&, 37* and (*T)os de Mayo)*', 304; War of
Y .^ 333, 33
Libya, 60 Spanish Independence and, 305 ff;
Liguria, 225, 227 Prisons broken into, 313; French oc-
Lille, 262, 205, 348 cupation under Ferdinand VII, 314;
Lima, 184, 208, 210, 319; University of Artillery mutiny in, 331, 336; Prim
San Marcos, 300 murdered in, 335; Attack on German
ProtofncdtfatO) 200 legation, 341-2; Conference of, on
Limchamp, 262 Morocco, 344; Canalejas murdered in,
Lisbon, 167, 169, 243, 252, 258, 282, 306, 349; Franco-Spanish conference in,
384 361, 362; Proclamation of Second
Literature, 22, 52, 57, 60-1, 77, 78-80, Republic and, 370; Civil War and, 385 ff
no, 112-13, I2 8, 211, 242-6, 263, Magaz, Marquis of, 360
292, 299 Mahomet, the Prophet, 35, 49, 58, 66, 189,
Llano, General Quiepo de, 384, 385 198
Lombardy, 227, 256, 257, 271 Mahomet II, Sultan, 165
London, 284, 288, 289, 344, 381 Maica, General, 363
Lopez, Hernando, 192 Mane> warship, 345
Lorraine, 149, 223, 261, 266, 290 Majera, 93
Loti, Pierre, 166
Maprca, 73, 284, 292
Louis I of Spain, 285, 286 Mdlaga, 27, 92, 107, 133, I37 , 138, 139,
Louis XI of France, 215, 216, 218, 293 150, 216, 336, 337, 381, 387
Louis XHof France, 218, 219 Malcampo, 335
Louis XIII of France, 227, 259, 260, 385 Malik, An. See Saim.
Louis XIV of France, 74, 159, 223, 226, Malta, 230, 279, 283
240, 262, 265 ff, 268, 269, 270, 274, Mamelukes, 52
&8o, 281, 283, 284, 285 Mamoun, King of Toledo, 106, 109
Louis -XV of France, 281, 286, 287, 289, Mancha, La, 36, 1 60, 385
Louis XVI of France, 297, 301, 302 Manila^ 275, 293, 346, 347
Mano Negra, 341
Louis XVIII of France, 31 2, 31 3, 315 Manso, 277
Louis Phillippe of France, 327, 328 Mansour, El, Abbasid, Caliph, 44
Louisiana, 276, 277, 294, 206, 209, 301, 303 Mansour, El, Conqueror of Spain, 51, 52,
Low Countries. See Dutch and Flanders. 55> J7> 58, 59 <$6, 6g, 7*, ?8, 9
&Az#0r, owtt 103
93. ft ioo, I2i, 150,160
Lucca, Duke of, 32
321 Origin, 56; Death, 99
4*4
 INDEX
Mantua, 165, 256, 261 Meknes, 127
Marcais, Georges, 145 Meldla, 54, 220, 230, 296, 344, 352, 353,
Marchena, Father de, 172
Margaret of Austria, 217 Mella, Vazques de, 350
Margaret of Mantua, 258 Mello, Francisco de, 260
Marguerite of Burgundy, 217 Mendez, L6pez, 318
Maria Cristina, second wife of Alfonso Mendizabal, 325
XII, 243, 343 Mendoza, Antonio de, 195, 197
Maria Cristina of Naples, wife of Ferdi- Mendoza, Cardinal de, 173
nand VII, 315, 323, 325, 326 Mendoza, Juan de, 251
Maria Louisa or Savoy, wife of Philip V, Mercedes of Orleans, first wife of Alfonso
281
Maria Luisa of Parma, wife of Charles IV, Merida, 17, 18, 60
301 Merinides, 133, 134, 140
Maria Theresa, Archduchess, 264, 268, 288 Merino, 324
Mariana of Austria, wife of Philip IV, 264 Mers el Kebir, 230
Marie de Medici, 253 Messina, 272, 274, 279
Marie Louise of Orleans, first wife of Mexico, 160, 185, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198,
Charles II, 268 202, 203-7, 210, 229, 242, 275, 316,
Marignano, battle of, 190, 222 320, 321, 330
Marlborough, Duke of, 283 Conquest of, 178 fi, 193, 207, 269, 299,
Marmol (Carvajal), Luis del, 75, 136, 140, 301 ; Jesuits and, 200; University, 200;
141, 142 Declaration of Independence, 321
Marmont, Marshal de, 307 Milan, 210, 217 fT, 221 ff, 225, 227, 228,
Marrakesh, 133 249, 250, 252, 253, 262, 267, 269 ff,
Marrafceshi, 126, 127, 128 291
Marranos. See Jews. Milanese, 271, 273, 282, 284, 290
Marseilles, 172 Millan, Astray, 387
Martir, Pedro, 154, 209 Minorca, 284, 290, 291, 294, 298, 299,
Mary Anne of Neuberg, second wife of 303
Charles II, 269 Miralles, Brothers, 377
Mary Queen of Scots, 229 Miranda, Francisco, 316, 317
Mary Tudor, 217, 225, 228 Miranda de Ebro, 303
Masaniello, Tommaso, 273, 274 Mississippi, river, 277, 294, 298
Masarra, Ibn, 77, 78 Mobile, 298
Masdeu, Juan Francisco, no Moctaair, King of Saragossa, 119, 120,
Maslama Ben Abd el Malik, 41 121
Masmoudites. See Almohades. Modena, 262
Maura, Antonio, 348, 349, 356, 372 Moghit, 27, 35 44, 63
Maura, Miguel, 372, 374 Moghreb, 17, 46, 55, 60, 92, 126, 128
Maurice or Nassau, 251 Mohallab, 115
Maurice of Saxony, 223 Mohammed Ben Abou Djoma, 78
Maximilian, Emperor, 221, 228 Mohammed Ben Said, 50
Mayenne, Duke of, 233 Mohammed I, Emir of Spain, 52
Maypii, battle of, 320 Mola, General, 385, 388
Mazarin, Cardinal, 261, 274 Molina, Tirso de, 263
Mazo, Burgos, 349 Monarchy, 18, 27, 38, 43, 51, 55, 58, 88,
Mecca, 69, 72 96, 99, 100, 106, 123, 127, 133, 134,
Medellin, battle of, 307 148, 175, 179-82, 185* 188, 191,
Medicine,. 76, 128, 157, 352 194-7, 202, 203, 215-20, 222, 225 ff,
Medina, 64 249-50, 262, 269, 274, 276, 279,
Medina Celi, 58, 99 . 282,, 286,, 293, 295,, 299,, 305, 307,
Medina Celi, Duke of, 268 308 flf, 317, 320 ff, 326-7, 331 F,
Medina az Zahara, 54, 57, 66, 67, 74, 90, 337 ff, 342, 343, 347, 349, 363 ff, 371,
*43 ^ 372, 377, 3?o, 384, 388
Medina az Zahira, 66 Moncey, Marshal, 307
Medina del Campo, 240 Monroe, President, 321
Medina del Rip Seco, 305 Mons, 260
Medina Sidonia, Duke of, 220, 258-9 Montanez, Juan Martinez, 245
Medinitcs, 36 Montemayor, Jorge, 244
Mediterranean, 20, 48, 55, 59, 60, 71, 80, Monterey, 276
138-40, 209, 216-17, 219, 230, 267, Montesquieu, Baron, 239
279, 292, 297 Monteverde, General, 318
425
 INDEX
Montevideo, 316, 319 assimilate, 29, 34-5, 55, 85, 87-8, 121,
Montezuma, 180, 183 127, 147-56, 157; Spanish national dis-
Montferrat, 272 unity and, 30, 55, 55, 7, 99, 133, IJ5 ;
Montigny, Baron de, 232 Spanish renegades to and, 0,
Montjuich, battle of, 259 33 ff, 53, 73 83 ff, 99, 138; Si ._
Montm&ly, 262 Christians and, 32, 33, 59 ff, 68, 83, 87 ff,
Montojo, Admiral, 346 95 ff,i26 ff; Christians of the North
Montpellier, 76 aad, 32, 53, 57, .55 ff, 157; Alleged
Montpensier, Duke of, 328, 334, 335, 342 tolerance in Spain of, 33,51, 147-8, 152,
Monzon, treaty of, 256 153; Contempt for refinement, 48-9;
Moore, Sir John, 306, 308 Andalusian climate and, 49-50, 68, 99,
Moors. See Musulmans, Arabs and Ber- 105; Religious fanaticism, 51, 57-8,
bers. 126 ff, 134-5 ; Theologians (faqtds] and,
Morales, Luis de (Painter), 245 51, 58, 61, 62, 76, 78, 83 ff, 126, 128, 151;
Morena, Sierra, 133, 296 Culture, 52, 59 ff, 72 ff; Architecture,
Moret, *48, 349 54, 57, 60-1, 70 74^ 90, 143 ff, I5 8;
Morgan, Henry, 275 Intermediaries of culture for Western
Monscos (see also Musulmans), 29, 35, Europe, 50, 60, 72; Paganism, 59-71,
142, 154, 155, 188, 224, 231, 239, 241, 157; Art, 60, 74, 158; Education under,
253-5, 280; Expulsion of, 154-0, 188, 75-7; Scholasticism, 75 ff, 157 ff;
239 $253-5,280 Influence on Spanish character, 93,
Moroccan Campaign, 352-7, 35*;, 360 104-5, 108, 158 ff, 180-90; Military
Morocco, 24, 42, 77, 85,151, 167, 220, superiority of Christians over, 100;
*55> *79 **7, 329, 344? 35 *> 35 8, Sulbjects of Spaniards, 108, 147, 151 ff;
361, 383, 385. 386, 396 Destruction of Christian churches, 126;
Moscow, 380 Kingdom of Granada as refuge, 1 34-5,
Mostain, King of Saragossa, 120 137; Expulsion from Spain, 147, 148,
Motadid, King of Seville, 101 fl
114, 118, 133, 155, 1 88, 238; Relations with Spain
121, 125, 158, 159 after reconquest, 147 ff, 165, 219, 223-4,
Motolinia, Father, 205 279, 288, 2^6, 329, 344, 351 ff, 358,
Moudhir, Ballouti, 68 360 ff; Inquisition and, 154, 238-40
Moulev-Sidan, King, ,255
Mount joy, Lord, 252
Mousa, IbnNosair, 18 ff, 30, 3 1, 33, 35 36, Naza,42
9 Namur, 217
Moutamin, King of Saragossa, 120 Naples (see also Italy), 165, 215 ff, 221 ff,
Mozarabs, 33, 75, 120, 126 225, 228, 249, 253, 269, 271, 272, 274,
Mudtjares, 147, 153, 158 282, 284, 289, 290, 293, 295, 304, 335
Muez, 90 Republic, 274, 312
Miihlberg, battle of, 223 Napoleon I, 236, 303 ff, 317, 321
Muluya, river, 352 Napoleon EQ, 334
Munoz Grande, General, 398 Narbonne, 239
Muftoz, Ines, 184, 203 Narbonne, Bishop of, 147
Munster, 261 Nardi, 166
Murat, 89, 304 Narvdez, General, 326, 330, 331
Murcia, 27, 93, 104, 107, 121, 244, 340, Nasir, En. See Abd er Rhaman III.
342,350 Nassau, Louis of, 233
Murillo, Bartolome" (Painter), 245 Nassentes, 136, 141
Murillo National Assembly (1873), 336, 364
(politician), 326
Murray, Sir John, 308 Nationalists, Spanish, 384 ff, 393
Murviedo, 116 Navagero, Andrea, 138, 142
Mussolini, Benito, 397, 400 Navarre, 21, 37, 57, 59, 88, 91, 93, 94, 108,
Musulmans (see also Arabs, Berbers and in, 215, 222, 240, 266, 302, 323, 324,
Cordova, Caliphate of): ,
33*> 3? 9* 350, 388, 390
Spanish Jews and, 9, 28, 31, 74, 83, 87, Navarro, General, 3 5 5
i oo, 126, 154, 164; Harems and, 20, Navas de Tolosa, Las, battle of, 129, 133,
46,
49, 52, 100, 101, 106, 159; Conquest of 147
Visigoth Spain, 21-35, 36, 157-60; Navy, 136, 168, 169, 177 ff, 220, 229, 230,
Destruction of Latin culture in Nor- 252, 257, 259, 266, 275, 279, 282, 285,
thern Spain, 21 ; Preservation of Latin 288, 292, 294, 297, 298, 302, 346, 388
in Southern Spain, 21 ; Docu- Negrfn, Juan, 386, 391, 393
culture^
mentation, 21 ff; Impermanency in Negroes, 187, 1 88
Spain, 28 ff; Inability of Spain to Nekor, river, 363
426
 INDEX
Netherlands. See Dutch, Flanders and Otranto, 165, 216
Belgium. Ottoman Empire. See Turks.
New Castile, 385 Oudenarde, 262, 265
New Granada, 186, 198,200,277,316, 318, Ouezzan, 362
319 Oulban. See Julian, Count.
New Guinea, 276 Oviedo, Count of, 1 14
New Hebrides, 276 Oxford, 278
New Orleans, 294
New Spain. See Mexico.
New York, 208 1 aclfic,, * 275, 293, 346
:

Newfoundland, 294 Padrtfn, 94

Niebla, 133 Paestum, 143
Nicaragua, 298 Paez, Jose Antonio, 318
Nicholas of Lyra, 171 Painleve^ Paul, 361
Nieuport, 251 Palencia, 340
Nimwegen, Treaty of, 267 Palermo, 267, 272, 274
Nithard, Father, 265, 266, 267 Palestine, 30, 42, 75, 172
Nobility, 19, 23, 27, 32-3, 34, 65, 96, 136, Palma, 284
,
155 > I??r 5 > 255 > 264,277,283,299, 325 Palmerston, Lord, 328
Noguera Palloresa, river, 393 Palos, 169, 190
Nootka Sound. See Vancouver. Pampeluna, 17, 38, 93, 94, 95
Nordlingen, battle of, 257 Panama, 275, 289
Normans, 62 Pancorbo, in
Nosair, Ibn. See Mousa. Papacy (see also Popes), 165, 166, 170, 174,
Novarra, battle of, 219 175, 180, 182, 187, 191, 194, 196, 199,
Nubia, 89 203, 210, 219, 222, 224, 227, 230, 238,
Numidia, 34 254, 268, 292, 328, 339, 342, 343, 349,
Nyon, conference at, 389 369
Paraguay, 229, 277, 295, 297, 320
Parana, 297
(Jcana, battle of, 307 Pardo, convention of the, 289
Occult sciences, Judeo-Arab, 76, 157-8 Pare a, Admiral, 330
j

O'Donnell, Leopoldo, Conde de Lucena, Farias, the, 108

326, 328, 329, 330 Paris, 227, 257, 272
O Donnell, the, 252 Treaty of, 294, 296,347
O'Higgins, Bernado, 277 Parma, 287, 290, 291, 321
Okteban, "the Caesar", 17 Parma, Duke of, 285, 288, 291, 293, 295,
Olivares, Count-Duke of, 255, 258, 259, 3>3"3*9> 335
260, 267, 271, 302 Paroja,, General, 320
Olivenza, 303, 311 Parthenon, 143
Olmedo, Fray Bartolome de, 1 8 1 Partition Treaties, 269, 270
Omar Ben Abd el Aziz, Caliph, 28 ff, 91 Passau, convention of, 223
Omar Ben Khatab, 68 Patino, Jose", 288, 289, 290, 292
Omayyads, 36, 41, 42, 43, 45, 55, 56 Pavia, battle of, 222, 223, 331
Character of dynasty, 48, 5 1 Pavia, General, 337
Oran, 54, 1^8, 139, 220, 230, 283, 288 Pavia, Treaty of, 273
Orange, William of, 232, 233 Pedro the Cruel, 160
Oranges, war of the, 303 Pelayo, *8
Ordonez, Count Garcia, 114 Percstrello, 169
Ordono I of Leon, 60, 90 Pereyra, Carlos, 184, 190, 196, 200
Ordono II of Le6n, 92, 93 Perez, Father Juan, 172
O'Reilly, Count, 297 Perez, General Fernandez, 362
Orens, 340 Perpignan, 259
Onhuela, 342 Persia(ns), 72, 224, 279
Dukes of, 283, 285,
Orleans, 286, 287 Peru, 160, 179, 184, 193, 195, 197, 203,
Ormonde, Duke of, 286 204, 242, 277, 320, 330
Oropesa, Count of, 268, 270 Conquest of, 181,189,193,229; Declara-
Oroquicta, battle of, 339 tion of Independence, 321
Orry, Philibert, Count dc Vignori, 281,285 Peru, Upper. See Bolivia.
Ortiz, 185, 192 Petain, Marshal, 361, 362
Ostcnd, 251, 287, 288 Peter of Ghent, 198, 200
East India Company, 288 Peter the Great, 285
Osuna, Duke of, 273 Peterborough, Earl of, 283
4*7
 INDEX
Petrarch, 80 Pope Paul HI, 198
Phalanx, the Spanish, 380, 384, 390, 396, Pope Paul IV, 227
t ,
397, 39 8 > 400 Pope Pius II, 165
Philip, son of Charles HI, 293 Pope Pius XII, 400
Philip the Fair, Archduke, 221 Pope Sixtus IV, 166, 238
Philip, Duke of Parma, 291, 293, 295, 303 Pope Sixtus V, 23 3
Philip II, 55, 58, 71, 128, 158, 160, 217, Popham, Sir Home, 316
82
223, 224, 243, 254, 265, 276, 288 Popular Front, 381,
Spanish monarchy and, 55, 225 ff, 232, Population, 19, 27, 30 ff, 36, 55, 57, 59>
235 ff, 263, 276; Moriscos and, 155; 7*, 74-5> 83, 8 9> 9 9 2 > 108, i, 125

Marriage to Mary Tudor, 225 ; Acces- 4 133. 134-5, 137-8, 140-1, 147 ft
sion, 225 ;Reign of, 225 ff, 235 ff, 242 ff, 152 ff, 160, 164-5, 209-11, 238 ff,
257; Annexes Portugal, 225, 249; 254-5, 264, 283, 296
Character, 225-6, 234, 236; Italy and, Portocarrero, Cardinal, 270, 281
227, 232, 236; France and, 227 ff; Porto Lonzone, 261
Germany and, 228 ; England and, 228-9 > Portugal:
America and, 229 ff; Islam and, 230; Aba el Aziz and, 36; Discoveries in
Flanders and, 231 ff; Reformation and, Africa, 167-8, 174; 'Tlan of the Indies"
231 ff ; Government, 235 ff ; Death, 249 and, 167-8, 172; Divides discoveries
Philip IH, 249 ff, 257, 271, 272, 273, 275, with Spain, 174, 180; Annexed to
276, 280 Spain Sy Philip II, 225, 232, 249;
Character, 250; Death, 255 Recovers independence from Philip IV,
Philip IV, 249 ff, 264, 269 257-8, 265; Allied with England r
Character, 262-3, *74 *79 28 i against Philip V, 282 ; Seven Years War
Death, 262 and, 294; Jesuits and, 295; Annexed by
Philip V, 55, 270, 276, 279, 281 $ 299, France, 304; War of Spanish Inde-
pendence and, 305
Prado, 170
262 -
Pragmatic Sanction, 287, 288, 315
Philippines, 205, 268, 269, 275, 276, 277, "Presidi", 271
288, 204, 298, 346, 347, 358, 364 Prieto, Garcfa, 350, 357, 369, 372
Pi y Margall, 336, 337, 343 Prieto, Indalecio, 386,, 392
Piacenza, 287, 291, 29*3 Prim, General, 330, 331, 333 ff
Picardy, 260 Princtsa de Astttrias^ Warship, 353
Piccolomini. See Pope Pius H. Proconsulate, 34
Pichincha, battle of, 319 Vronunciamentos, 312, 313, 323, 325, 328,
Pidal,Menendez, 74, 118 331, 338 341, 343 357> 359 375,
Piedmont, 227, 273, 290, 310, 312 377, 381, 384
Pilar, Virgin of, 120 Protestants :
Pinerolo, 256 Exclusion from America, 188; In-
Pinz6n, Brothers, 169 cpisition and, 202, 239-40 Reforma- ;

Piombino, 261 tion, 223

13 *3i> 2 4i, 243; CharlesV
^3, Charles V
Piracy, 137, 150, 153-4, 166, 216, 219-20, and, 223; Philip II and, 228, 231 ff,
23 * 39 275 ' 537 235 ff; France and, 231 ff, 240; Hugue-
. J* Dutch
Pitt, William, 298, 301, 316 nots, 231, 233, 240; and, 231,
Pizarro, Francisco, 159, 179 ff, 193 240, 251; Germany and, 231, 240;
Plata, el, 277, 297 Lutherans, 239; England and, 240, 283;
Plate, River, 294 Spain and, 240
Poblet, 244, 373 Provence, 149, 166
Poetry (see also Arabs, Poetry), 89, 103, 1 10, Prussia, 284, 287 200 303, 312, 324
. .? J58.
battle
*44 Puerta del Sol, Madrid, 341
Puerto Bello, 275, 278, 290
Poitiers, of, 36, 90
Poland, 288 Puerto Rico, 277, 303, 346
Polop, 117 Puigcerda, 267
Pombal, Marquis of, 295, 297 Puroja, General, 319
Pompeii, 73 Puyred6n, 319
Ponce de Le6n, Hernan, 179 Pyrenees, 28, 36, 44, 59, 87 ff, 90, 94, 95,
Pope Alexander VI, 174, 196 108, 147, 301, 302, 389
Pope Clement XIV, 295 Treaty of, 260, 262, 265
Pope Eugene IV, 165
Pope Innocent VIII, 166
Pope Leo X, 222 V^uadruple Alliance, 285
Pope Nicholas V, 167, 174 Quesnoy, 262
428
 INDEX
Quevedo, 250, 263 Rodezno, Count, 380
Quiros, Fernandez de, 276 Rodney, Admiral, 298
Quito, 277 Rodrigo, Visigoth King of Spain, 17,
last
Quixote, Don, 244, 263 21 ff, 48 JO, III, IJ3
36, 38,
Rodriguez, Captain Fermfn Galan, 368
Roland, Chanson de T&jDland, 44, 61
JKabat, 361 Romaiquia, 48, 103, 106
Rabida La, 172 Roman Empire, influence on Spain, 3-4,
Race, Spanish cult of the, 402-3 18, 19, 21, 24-5, 29, 34, 37, 41, 46,
Raisuh, 353 49. 5 2 59, 60-1, 64-5, 67, 68, 69, 71,
Ramadan, 61, n8 73-4, 75, 77, 7, 88, 90, 109, 120, 133,
Ramillies, Battle of, 283 138, 142, 193, 197, 211, 215, 235^6,
Ramiro of Aragpn, 113 278
Ranier of Austria, Archduke, 342 "Roman" language, 74, 75, 163
Raphael, 246 Romana, Marquis of, 308
Rastadt, treaty of, 284 Kotttancero, poems of the, 21,110, 113, 114,
Ratisbon, truce of, 268 158
Recaredo, King, 18, 19 Romanones, Count of, 350, 366, 368, 369
Red Sea, 168 Rome, 165, 210, 266, 344
Reformation. See Protestants. Rooke, Sir George, 282
Religion. See Catholicism, Christians, etc. Roosevelt, Franklin D., 399
Renaissance, 60, 80, 85, 143, 210, 211, 244 Roums, 24
Renan, Ernest, 77, 128 Roussillon, 215, 218, 259, 261, 266, 267,
Rene of Anjou, 216
Republic, First (1873), 336 ff, 367 Rovalists, 369, 371, 375, 379
Republic, Second (1931), 355, 371-^3 Rubens, Peter Paul, 256
Provisional government, 372; Anti- Ruhr, 361
clericalism, 272-3; 376, *79, 381,
389 Agrarian
; reform, 375-6; Deport-
ation of political opponents, 378;
Anarchy under, 382 World War, 398 ff
Republicanism, * 10, 327, 330, 333 ff, 343, Russo-German Agreement (1939), 396
350, 3 6 3, 367 ft 371 ff Ruzafa,47
s, 3 88 39 Ryswick, Treaty of, 268, 269, 281
Restoration. See Ferdinand VII.
Revolution (1931), 370, 37*> 374
Rheims, 245 Oaavedra, Angel, Duque de Rivas, 303
Rhine, river, 149, 250, 251, 389 Sacralias, battle of, 125
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 398 Sacramento, 297
Ribera, Jose (Spagnoletto), 245, 263 SaetaS) 158
Ricardos, Antonio, 302 Sagasta, Praxades, 331, 333 rT, 343, 344,
Richelieu, Cardinal, 223, 253, 256, 257, 347, 349
259, 260, 261 Sagunto, 338
Riego, Rafael, 312, 313 Sahagun, Father, 201
3, 54, 344, 35 2 353, *, 3^3, 3< Sahara Desert, 378
Rio de Janeiro, 208 Saim ibn Malik, 32
Rio de la Plata, United Provinces of, 320 Saint-Arnaud, Marshal de, 116
Rio Grande do Sul, 297 St. Christopher, 275
Rios, Fernando de los, 372 St. James of Compostela (see Santiago)
Rios, Montero, 350 St. Lucia, 293, 294
Ripoll,244 St. Mark, Republic of, 273
Ripperda, Baron, 287 St. Omer, 262
Rivera, Primo de, the Captain General, Saint-Quentin, battle of, 227
St. Thomas, 167
Rivera, General Miguel, Primo de, Marquis St. Venant, 262
of Estrella, 328, 340, 357, 358 ff, 384, St. Vincent (Cathedral"), 37, 293, 294
389, 390 St.Vincent Cape, battle of, 303
Rivera, Jose" Antonio Primo de, 374, 380, Salamanca, 90, 158, 170, 172, 193, 200, 243,
384 244, 283, 306, 307, 380
Robledo, Romero, 349 127
Robles, Gil, 374, 377, 380, 381, 382, 383 Salerno, 76
Rochester, Dean of, 391 Salmerdn, Nicolas, 337, 343
Rocroi, 262; Battle of, 260-1 Salzburg, 165
4*9
 INDEX
Samarkand, 76 288, 295, 296, 314, 336, 337, 377,
Samuel of Granada, 100 ^ 384> 3?5
San Domingo, 169, 203, 240, 275, 277, 303, Treaty of, 288, 365
329, 330 Sforza, Duke Maximilian, 221
San Ildcfenso, 503 Sicilian Vespers, 272
San Juan Hill, battle of, 346 Sicily (see also Italy), 166, 216, 221, 224,
SanLucar, 133 225, 227, 249, 262, 267, 269, 270, 271,
San Marcos University. See Lima. 272, 274, 284, 285, 286, 289, 293, 308
San Martin, General, 319, 320 Sidi Bou Medine, 140
San Sebastian, 303, 308, 331, 386 Sidi Dris, 353
San Sebastian, pact of, 367, 368, 372 Sierra Morena, 133, 296
Sanchez, Alonso, 169, 178 Silesia, 290
San Yuste, 224 Silio, Cesar, 379
Sancho of Castile, 112, 113 Silos, de (Monk), 95
Sancho of Navarre, 90, 93 Silvela, Francisco, 349

Sandoyal. See Lerma. Sdves, 101, 102, 103

Sanjurjo, General, 363, 375, 377, 385 Silvestre, General, 353 ff, 360, 366
387 Sindicato Umco, 368
Santa Cruz de Tenenfe, 303 Sisebut, King, 19, 20
Santa F (Granada), 150, 170, 172 Slavery, 31, 34, 49, 50, 59, 63, 67, 70,92,
Santa Fe de Bogota, 195, 200, 204, 277 *39 H5, *49-5 185-7, 188, 194, 196,
University of J a venana, 200; University 190, 224,230,289,311, 345
of Santo Tomas, 200 "Slavs', 5 2, 55, 57,99
Santa Maria, 177, 275 Sluys, 262
Santa Victoria, 282 Socialism, 336, 343, 348 ff, 363 ff, 371 ff

Santander, 357, 359, 385, 387 W, 99 402

Santangel, Luis de, 173, 174 Soissons, Congress of, 288
Santarem, 32 Soleyman, Caliph, 20
Santiago de Compostela, 57, 89, 90, 244 Solomon, Table of, 1 8
Sack of by El Mansour, 04-5 "Solon, Peruvian". See Toledo, Fran-
Santiago de Cuba, 290, 346 cisco dc.
Santiago de Tlaltelolco, 200 Somail, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44
Saragossa, 18, 24, 43, 44, 87, 99, 103, 104, Somme, 217, 228
106, 107, 113, 117 ff, 125, 134, 157, Somo Sierra, 306
241, 266, 284, 306, 378 Sorbonnc, 22, 83
Musulman capital, 120-1 Sotelo, Jose Calvo, 363, 364, 379, 382, 383,
Saragossa, Cardinal Archbishop of, 356 384
Sardinia, 269, 283, 284, 285, 286, 290, 293 Soult, Marshal, 306
Saro, General, 362 South African War, 360
Savoy (see also Charles Emmanuel I), 202, South Sea Company, 290
282 Soviets, 149, 377
Saxons, 44 Spanish-American War, 329, 342, 345 ft,

Scarpc, 265 358

Scheldt river, 252 Spanish Independence, War of, 305-8, 318
Science, 22, 52, 60, 77, 157, 169, 170-1, "Spanish Marriages*', 328
201, 200, 243, 292 Spinola, Marquis of, 251, 252, 256, 271
Scotland, 285, 286 Squillaci, Marquis of, 294
Sculpture, 67-9, 74, 80, 158, 245 Stalin, Josef, 391
Sebastiani, General, 307 Stamboul, 230
Secunda, 37, 64, 85 Strassbourg, 341
Segre, river, 393 Stuart, Arabella, 253
Segunto, 393 Styria, 165
Selirn I, Sultan, 224 Succession, War of the Austrian, 290-1,
Separatism, 55, 99, 256, 258, 283, 317, 372, 292
402 Succession, War of the Spanish, 268 ff,

Septimania, 30, 239 281 ff, 288

Sepulveda, Ginds de;-i86, 187 Suchet, Louis Gabriel, 307, 308
Serrano y Dominguez, Ramon, 330, 333 ff Sucre, General, 319
Seven Years' War, 292 ff, 293-4, 297 Suez Canal, 346
Seville, 17, 19, 22, 29, 35, 42, 60, 78, 92, Suner, Serrano, 390, 391, 397, 398, 399
99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107, 112, 114, Swabians, 19
117, 127, 133, 139, 142, 157, 172, 195, Swann, the Buccaneer, 275
204, 229, 237, 238, 239, 240, 244, 278, Swedes, 256, 257, 265, 266, 268
430
 INDEX
Swiss, 256 Tucumin,277, 319
Syracuse, 285 Tudela, 38, 90
Syna(ns), 30, 72, 73, 138, Tuelo, Garcia de, 204, 306
Tunis, 54, 60, 66, 139, 224, 279, 297
Tupac, Amaru, 316
1 abasco, 179 Turenne, 261
Tagus, river, 21, 23, 107, 243 Turin, 283
Taifas, 52 Turks, 126, 149, 153, 156, 165, 166, 216,
Talavera, 38, 307 223, 230, 239, 254, 255, 268, 272,
Talavera, Hernando de, 152, 170, 172 279
353
Talilit, Tuscany (see also Italy), 225, 227, 250, 261,
Tangier, 23, 24, 25, 26, 54, 351, 352, 364, 269, 270, 287, 288, 290, 308
399, 400 Tuttlingen, Battle of, 261
Targuist, 302, 363 Tyrol, 256, 265
Tarif, 26 ft* Tyrone, Earl of, 252
Tarifa, 26, 107
Tank Ibn Ziyad, 23, 26 ff, 56, 90
Tarragona, 17, 308, 393 Ubeda, 147
Taza, 361, 362 Ucles, 126
Temsaman, 353 Uixan, Monte, 352
Count
Tendilla, of, 146, 209 Ulloa, San Juan de, 321
Terud, 392 Unify General de Trabajadores> 367
Tetudn, 329, 352, 353, 361 I3m6n Patnotica, 360, 364
Tetuan, Duke of, 349 United Provinces, 249, 251, 252, 261, 266,
Theotoc6puh. See Greco, El. 275, 282, 287, 288
Theresa of Avila, Saint, 243, 245 United States (see also America) :
Thionville, 261, 262 Declaration of Independence, 297;
Thirty Years' War, 252, 253, 256 ff, 273, Spanish support in War of American
386 Independence, 297-9, 321; Spanish co-
Timgad, 73 operation with in Florida, Mississippi
Tipasa, Basilica, 69 and Mobile, 298; Spanish co-operation
Titian (Painter), 246, 373 in armed neutrality, 298; Treaty of Ver-
Tlascala, 198 sailles and, 299; Spanish colonies and
Tlcmcen, 140, 142, 150 Declaration or Independence, 299, 316,
Tobago, 293, 294 321; Purchase of Florida, 321; Monroe
Toca, Sanchez, 351 Doctrine and, 322; Cuba and, 329, 345;
Toledo, 17, 19, 21 ff, 35, 38, 43, 44, 74, 84, Spanish-American war, 343 ff; Sinking
85, 87, 91, 93, 106, 114, 118, 165, 172, of Maine, 345 ; Declaration of war, 346;
240, 243, 386, 390 Battle of Manila Bay, 346; Blockade of
Toledo, Francisco de, 197 Manila, 346; Landing in Cuba, 346;
Toledo, Pedro de, 273 Battle of El Caney, 346; Battle of San
Tolosa, 303 Juan Hill, 346 Battle of Santiago Bay,
;

Topete, Admiral, 331 346; Surrender of Santiago, 346;

Toral, General, 346 Treaty of Paris, 347
Tordesillas, 221 Ursins, Princesse des, 281, 285
Tortosa, 259, 373 Utrecht, Treaty of, 284, 285, 289, 327
Tortuga del Mar, 275
Toumert, Ibn, 128
Tournai, 265 V alencia(ns), 62, 93, 99, 106, 107, 112,
Tradicionalfstas, 380 115, 118, 122, 123, 129, 134, 135, 167,
Trafalgar, Battle of, 301, 304 216, 225, 239, 254, 255, 256, 261, 28$,
Trasimene, Lake, 354 284, 299, 307, 308, 310, 321, 325, 336,
Trastamare, Henry of, 160 , , 33.8, 3?9> 370, 381* 393. 399
Trent, council of, 234 Valenciennes, 261
Tribunal Popular, 341 Valenzuela, Fernando de, 267, 268, 302
Trieste, 287 Valladottd, 170, 250, 390
Trinidad, 303 Valparaiso, 330
Triple Alliance, 341 Valtellina, 256
Tripoli, 220, 230 Valverde, Bishop Francisco de, 1 81

Trocadero, 314 Vancouver, 301

Tromp, Cornelius Van, 237 Vandals, 19
Trotsky, Leon, 391 Varenncs, 302
Trujillo, 204 Vayo, Alvarez de, 386
431
 INDEX
Vega, Gartilaso de la, 169, 178, 189, 201, Washington, George, 298
202, 204, 205 Sir Arthur. See Wellington,
Wellesley,
Vega, Lope de, 244, 263 Duke of.
Ve&squez (Painter), 245, 263, 300 Wellington, Duke of, 307, 308, 312, 313,
Velazquez, Diego (Governor of the 3*7
Antilles), 178, 187 Westphalia, 251
Velasquez, Juan, 192 Treaty of, 252; Peace of, 261
Velez, Pefion of, 220, 230 Weyler, General, 345
Venddme, Duke of, 282, 284 Whigs, English, 282, 287
Venezuela, 277, 306, 316 fF, 319 Whitelocke, General, 316
Venice, 183, 230, 273 William III of England, 269, 281, 282
Vera Cruz, 275, 288, 321 Wilmann, 240
Verde, Cape (Islands), 346 Wolfram, 400, 401
Verdun, 5 5
World War, first, 348,351,394
Vergara, convention of, 325 World War, second, 380, 389
Vernon, Admiral, 290 Spanish position at outbreak, 393;
Verona, Congress of, 312, 313 Spanish Neutrality, 393-5; Spanish
Versailles, treaty of, 299 non-belligerency, 394, 395
Vertiz, 277 Worms, diet of, 223
Vervins, treaty of, 218, 253
Viceroys, 187, 194-202, 230, 266, 271, 272,
273, 274, 277, 279, 281, 290, 292, 319, yvavier, Saint Francis, 200
321 Xenophon, 183
Victor, Marshal, jo6, 307 Xlmenes, Garcia, 107
Victor Emmanuel II of Italy, 334
Victoria Eugenia of Battenburg, wife of
Alphonso XIII, 348, 369, 370 1 acoub el Mansour, Sultan of Morocco,
Victoria of England, 327, 334 126, 128
Vienna, 227, 228, 250, 256, 268, 270, 287, Yahya ibn Yahya, 51, 83, 84
Yap, 341
Turkish siege of, 268 ; Congress of, 31 1 ;
Yemenites), 30 36, 37, 42, 44, 46, 56
Treaty of (First), 287, 290; Treaty of Yousouf Ben Abd er Rhaman, 42, 43, 44
(Second), 288; Treaty of (Third), 289 Yousouf Ben Teshoufin, 62, 122, 125, 126,
Vigo, 282 127, 128, 158
Viguera, 93 Ypres, 267
ViDacampa, General, 343 Yucatan, 178
ViUaverde, Fernandez, 349 Yuste, Colonel, governor of Tangier, 399
Vincent^ Saint, 64, 68, 69
Duchess of Milan, 218
Vjsconti, Valentina,
Viseu, 94 , Favourite of Abd er Rhaman HI,
Visigoths, 21, 23 flf, 33, 36, 38, 49, 52, 54, 54
59, 63, 65, 68, 73, 74, 84, 89, 90, 96, Zahra, 135
105, 107, in, 138, 219 Zaida (daughter of Motamid), 159
Visigothic art, 143, 144, 145, 244 Zaio,EU 5 2
Vkoria, 303, 308 Zallaca. j^Sacralias.
Vivar, in, 114 Zamora, Alcala, 350, 369, 372, 374, 382
Vivar, Rodrigo de. See Cid Campeador. Zarate, Augustin de, 179
Vizcaino, Sanchez, 276 Zeeland, 217
Ziryab (Arab musician), 49
Ziyadlbn. See Tarik.
YY alid, brother of Abd er Rhaman 1, 45 Zobeyda, Sultana, 40, 117
Walid, Caliph of Damascus, 31, 32 Zorrilla,Ruiz, ? 33ff, 341, 343
Wall, Richard, 292, 294 Zumalacdrregui, Tomas, 324
Walloons, 294 Zumarraga, Archbishop Juan de, 198,
Walpole, Sir Robert, 287, 288, 290 200, 201, 202
Wamba, Visigoth King, 25 , 16, 27 Zurbaran, the painter, 245, 263
continuedfrom frontflap]

Seville, the churches of Mexico and the New

World, as unworthy of examination without
prejudice. This it is the purpose of the present
history to provide.
Sir Charles Petrie, who has written the latter
part of the book from the death of Philip IE
down to 1945, made no alterations to Monsieur
Bertrand's text.He has, however, considerably
revised the second part and has provided three
additional chapters, including a summary of
the campaign which left General Franco master
of the country and chapters on Spanish foreign
policy. Sir Charles, whose Diplomatic History is
well known, has considerable first hand know-
ledge of Spain and its problems. In his additional
chapters he has drawn on all the available docu-
ments, and his account of the Civil War and its
aftermath must be regarded as the most author-
itative, within the framework of its scope and

intention, which it has so far been possible to

write.
The present impression reprints the revised
and enlarged second edition with some correc-
tions and additions.