People vs. Jalosjos (G.R. No.

132875-76)
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions
of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the
intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted
several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices
to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives,
the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE:
W/N Equal protection is violated that as a Congressman, a substantial differentiation removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by
reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.
RULING:
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.
The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate
badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA; G.R. No. 114714; 21 Apr 1995; 243
SCRA 666
FACTS:

Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an incorporated association of

licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies who
hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-owner-
principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA
and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.

The petitioners contended that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in
ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
The Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) issued
Resolution No. 01, series of 1994 amending and increasing the compensation and other
benefits under Part. II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. POEA also issued Memorandum Circular No. 05,
series of 1994 informing all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies, shipowners, managers and
principals hiring Filipino seafarers of the said adjustments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed issuances violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:
NO. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based
Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment,
safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado 227 SCRA 270

FACTS
This is a petition raised by the members of the lower courts who assails the constitutionality of
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through
its Circular No. 92-28.
It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se to withdraw the franking privilege of the
Judiciary but not on other offices of the government, such as: the President of the Philippines,
the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and
officers.
However, the respondents contend that there is no discrimination since the law is based on the
valid classification in accordance of the equal protection clause. In addition, not only the Judiciary
department will be affected with it but also other offices like Office of Adult Education, the Institute
of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation; the National Historical Commission; etc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 unconstitutional, thus violates the equal protection
clause.
In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
The Court finds its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (86 SCRA 270, 1978)

FACTS:
The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February
22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a
citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind
of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
HELD:
It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval
of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of
50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted
he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial
of an alien employment permit fee.
The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied
only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not
lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus
conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers.

People v. Cayat 60 Phil. 12, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

FACTS:
Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was found
guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle
of gin) which is not a native wine.
Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the non-
Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native
wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and
denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise
of police power.
ISSUES:
Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications.
The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests on real
and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way
to the geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization.
Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes.
The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors
by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of
the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to
apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a
people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and
security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same class.

JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning
it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and
lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
W/N RH Law is violative of the equal protection clause
HELD:
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of
the people.
Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be noted that Section
7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
“promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, et.al. G.R. No. 179267; June 25, 2013

Notes:
In 2004, Congress enacted RA No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children”. It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.

FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be
a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support. The husband now, assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD:
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends
its protection.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
“person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships.

R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences … is the essence of true equality.”
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and Builder’s Association v.
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional Regulation
Commission G.R. No. 197676 | February 4, 2014
The Court will not declare a statute as unconstitutional when its regulation is an unavoidable
consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.
FACTS
This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate Service
Act of the Philippines.
• R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was passed.
• Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners.
• The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC).
• The law required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the employ
of duly licensed real estate brokers.
• Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clause
and infringes the ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the Civil
Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal protection clause as owners of private
properties are allowed to sell their properties without the need of a licensed real estate broker.
•The provisions in question are –
Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service.
Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service.
• The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly
substantive due process as well as the equal protection clause
HELD:
No.
• The requirements for substantive due process are – 1. Lawful government purpose; and 2.
Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose.
• The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase its
standards. The law recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous
flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting national progress.
• The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable
as it merely regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’
ownership rights.
Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and owners of private who
want to sell their private property.
Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate
developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business
which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED and UPHELD.