6.

World nuclear forces

Overview

At the start of 2018 nine states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea)—possessed approximately 14 465 nuclear
weapons, of which 3750 were deployed with operational forces (see table 6.1).
Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert.
Overall, inventories of nuclear warheads continue to decline. This is mainly
due to the USA and Russia, which collectively account for approximately
92 per cent of global nuclear weapons, reducing their deployed nuclear forces
in line with the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limit­
ation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). Despite making reductions
in their arsenals, both the USA and Russia have extensive and expensive pro-
grammes under way to replace and modernize their nuclear warheads, missile
and aircraft delivery systems, and nuclear weapon production facilities (see
sections I and II in this chapter).
The nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear-armed states are considerably
smaller (see sections III–IX), but all are either developing or deploying new
weapon systems or have announced their intention to do so. China, India,
North Korea and Pakistan are thought to be expanding the size of their nuclear
arsenals.
The availability of reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals
and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states varies considerably. The USA has
disclosed important information about its stockpile and nuclear capabilities,
and the UK and France have also declared some information. Russia refuses
to disclose the detailed breakdown of its forces counted under New START
even though it shares the information with the USA, and the US Government
has stopped releasing detailed information about Russian and Chinese nuclear
forces. The governments of India and Pakistan make statements about some of
their missile tests but provide no information about the status or size of their
arsenals. Israel has a policy of not commenting on its nuclear arsenal and North
Korea provides no information about its nuclear capabilities.
North Korea continues to prioritize its military nuclear programme as a
central element of its national security strategy, and conducted its sixth test
explosion in 2017. The test took the total number of nuclear explosions recorded
worldwide since 1945 to 2058 (see section XI).
The raw material for nuclear weapons is fissile material, either highly enriched
uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium. China, France, Russia, the UK and the

SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

www.sipriyearbook.org
2 3 6 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.1. World nuclear forces, January 2018

All figures are approximate. The estimates presented here are based on public information
and contain some uncertainties, as reflected in the notes to tables 6.1–6.10.
Year of first Deployed Stored Other Total
Country nuclear test warheadsa warheadsb warheads inventory
United States 1945 1 750 c 2 050 d 2 650 e 6 450
Russia 1949 1 600 f 2 750 g 2 500 e 6 850
United Kingdom 1952 120 95 – 215
France 1960 280 10 10 300
China 1964 – 280 – 280
India 1974 – 130–140 . . 130–140
Pakistan 1998 – 140–150 . . 140–150
Israel . . – 80 . . 80
North Korea 2006 – . . (10–20) (10–20)h
Totali 3 750 5 555 5 160 14 465
. . = not applicable or not available; – = zero; ( ) = uncertain figure.
a These are warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces.
b These are warheads in central storage that would require some preparation (e.g. transport

and loading on to launchers) before they could become fully operationally available.
c This figure includes approximately 1600 strategic warheads (about 1300 on ballistic mis-

siles and nearly 300 on bomber bases), as well as c. 150 non-strategic (tactical) nuclear bombs
deployed in Europe for delivery by US and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization combat
aircraft.
d This figure includes c. 50 non-strategic nuclear bombs stored in the USA.
e This figure is for retired warheads awaiting dismantlement.
f This figure includes approximately 1400 strategic warheads on ballistic missiles and about

200 deployed on heavy bomber bases.

g This figure includes c. 920 warheads for strategic bombers and nuclear-powered ballistic

missile submarines (SSBNs) in overhaul and c. 1830 non-strategic nuclear weapons for use by
short-range naval, air force and air defence forces.
h There is no authoritative open-source evidence to confirm that North Korea has produced

or deployed operational nuclear warheads.

i Total figures assume the highest estimate when a range is given. Figures for North Korea

are not included.

USA have produced both HEU and plutonium for use in their nuclear weapons;
India and Israel have produced mainly plutonium; and Pakistan has produced
mainly HEU, but is increasing its ability to produce plutonium. North Korea
has produced plutonium for use in nuclear weapons but may have produced
HEU as well. All states with a civilian nuclear industry are capable of producing
fissile materials (see section X).
shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen
 world nuclear forces 2 37

I. US nuclear forces
hans m. kristensen

As of January 2018, the United States maintained a military stockpile of

about 3800 nuclear warheads, a reduction of nearly 200 warheads com-
pared with the total in early 2017.1 The stockpile included approximately
1750 deployed nuclear warheads, consisting of about 1600 strategic and
150  non-strategic warheads. In addition, about 2050 warheads were held
in reserve and around 2650 retired warheads were awaiting dismantle-
ment, giving a total inventory of approximately 6450 nuclear warheads (see
table 6.2). The reduction in warheads was due to the USA’s implementation
of its warhead life-extension programmes and continuing implementation
of the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) during 2017. 2

Nuclear modernization

The USA has initiated a large-scale nuclear modernization programme

(known as the ‘program of record’), which aims to replace or upgrade (a) US
land-, sea- and air-based nuclear delivery systems; (b) the command and
control systems at the US Department of Defense; and (c) the nuclear war-
heads and their supporting infrastructure at the US Department of Energy’s
National Nuclear Security Administration. 3 According to an estimate
published in February 2017 by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
modern­izing and operating the US nuclear arsenal and the facilities that
support it will cost around $400 billion for the period 2017–26 (a 15 per cent
increase on the CBO’s estimate covering the period 2015–24). 4 The nuclear
modernization (and maintenance) programme will continue well beyond
2026 and, based on the CBO’s estimate, will cost $1.2 trillion for the period
2017–46. Notably, although the CBO estimate accounts for inflation, other
estimates forecast that the total cost will be closer to $1.7 trillion. 5 The CBO
estimates that the planned modernization would increase the total costs of
US nuclear forces for 2017–46 by roughly 50 per cent when compared with

1 Kristensen, H. M., ‘Despite rhetoric, US stockpile continues to decline’, FAS Strategic Security

Blog, Federation of Atomic Scientists, 22 Mar. 2018.

2 For a summary and other details of New START see annex A, section III, in this volume. On the

implementation of New START see chapter 7, section II, in this volume.

3 Kristensen, H. M., ‘US nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017, pp. 413–15.
4 US Congressional Budget Office, ‘Projected costs of US nuclear forces, 2017 to 2026’, Feb. 2017,

p. 1.
5 See e.g. Reif, K., ‘US nuclear modernization programs’, Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet,

Mar. 2018.
2 3 8 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.2. US nuclear forces, January 2018

No. of Year first Range Warheads No. of
Type Designation launchers deployed (km)a x yield warheadsb
Strategic forces 3 600
Bombers 60/107c 880 d
e
B-52H Stratofortress 44/87 1961 16 000 20 x ALCM 5–150 kt 528
B-2A Spirit 16/20 1994 11 000 16 x B61-7, -11, B83-1 282
bombsf
ICBMs 400 800 g
LGM-30G Minuteman III
Mk-12A 200 1979 13 000 1-3 x W78 335 kt 600 h
Mk-21 SERV 200 2006 13 000 1 x W87 300 kt 200 i
SSBNs/SLBMs 240 j 1 920 k
UGM-133A Trident II (D5/D5LE)
Mk-4 . . 1992 >7 400 1-8 x W76-0 100 kt 216
Mk-4A . . 2008 >7 400 1-8 x W76-1 100 kt 1 320
Mk-5 . . 1990 >7 400 1-8 x W88 455 kt 384
Non-strategic forces 200 l
F-15E Strike Eagle . . 1988 3 840 5 x B61-3, -4m 70
F-16C/D Falcon . . 1987 3 200 n 2 x B61-3, -4 70
F-16MLU Falcon (NATO) . . 1985 3 200 2 x B61-3, -4 30
PA-200 Tornado (NATO) . . 1983 2 400 2 x B61-3, -4 30
Total stockpile 3 800 o
Deployed warheads 1 750
Reserve warheads 2 050
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement 2 650
Total inventory 6 450 p
. . = not available or not applicable; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; ICBM = inter­
continental ballistic missile; kt = kiloton; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SERV =
security-enhanced re-entry vehicle; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile; SSBN =
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.
Note: The figures in the USA’s New START Treaty declaration do not necessarily correspond
to those contained in the table because of the treaty’s counting rules.
a Maximum unrefuelled range. All nuclear-equipped aircraft can be refuelled in the air.

Actual mission range will vary according to flight profile and weapon loading.
b The number shows the total number of warheads assigned to nuclear-capable delivery

systems. Only some of these warheads are deployed on missiles and aircraft bases.
c Bombers have 2 numbers: the first is the number assigned to the nuclear mission; the

second is the total inventory. The US Air Force has 66 nuclear-capable bombers (20 B-2As and
46 B-52Hs) of which no more than 60 will be deployed at any given time.
d Of the bomber weapons, c. 300 (200 ALCMs and 100 bombs) are deployed at the bomber

bases; all the rest are in central storage. The total bomb inventory is listed as higher than in
SIPRI Yearbook 2017 to compensate for a recount of the ICBM warhead estimate, but many of
the gravity bombs are no longer fully active and are slated for retirement after the B61-12 is
fielded in 2020.
e The B-52H is no longer configured to carry nuclear gravity bombs.
f Strategic gravity bombs are only assigned to B-2A bombers. The maximum yields of stra-

tegic bombs are: B61-7 (360 kt), B61-11 (400 kt), B83-1 (1200 kt). However, they also have lower
yields. Many B83-1s have been moved to the inactive stockpile. The administration of Presi-
dent Barack Obama decided that the B83-1 would be retired once the B61-12 was deployed, but
 world nuclear forces 2 3 9

the administration of President Donald J. Trump has indicated that it might retain the B83-1
for a longer period.
g Of these ICBM warheads, only 400 are deployed on the missiles. The remaining warheads

are in central storage.

h Only 200 of these W78 warheads are deployed. The rest are in central storage.
i Another 340 W87s are possibly in long-term storage outside the stockpile for planned use

in future so-called interoperable warheads.

j Of the 14 SSBNs, 2 are normally undergoing refuelling overhaul at any given time. They

are not assigned weapons. Another 2 or more submarines may be undergoing maintenance at
any given time and may not be carrying missiles. The number of deployable missiles has been
reduced to 240 to meet the New START limit on deployed strategic missile launchers.
k Of these warheads, only about 900 are deployed on submarines; all the rest are in cen-

tral storage. Although each D5 missile was counted under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty as carrying 8 warheads and was initially flight tested with 14, the US Navy has down-
loaded each missile to an average of 4–5 warheads. All deployed W76 warheads are of the new
W76-1 type. Once production of the W76-1 is finished in 2019, all remaining W76-0s will be
retired.
l Approximately 150 of the tactical bombs are deployed in Europe. The remaining bombs

are in central storage in the USA. Once the B61-12 is deployed, all other B61 versions will be
retired.
m The maximum yields of tactical bombs are as follows: B61-3 (170 kt) and B61-4 (50 kt). All

have selective lower yields. The B61-10 was retired in 2016.

n Most sources list 2400 km unrefuelled ferry range but Lockheed Martin, which produces

the F-16, lists 3200 km.

o Of these weapons, approximately 1750 are deployed on ballistic missiles, at bomber bases,

and in Europe; all the rest are in central storage.

p In addition to these intact warheads, there are more than 20 000 plutonium pits stored at

the Pantex Plant, Texas, and perhaps 4000 uranium secondaries stored at the Y-12 facility at
Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Sources: US Department of Defense, various budget reports, press releases and documents
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act; US Department of Energy, various budget
reports and plans; US Air Force, US Navy and US Department of Energy, personal communi­
cations; ‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and authors’ esti-
mates.

the costs of operating and sustaining only the forces that are already fielded. 6
It remains to be seen to what extent the US Congress will agree to fund these
expensive projects (instead of building cheaper life-extended versions of
existing designs) or whether it will decide to delay some of them.

Bombers

The US Air Force currently operates a fleet of 169 heavy bombers: 62 B-1Bs,
20  B-2As, and 87 B-52Hs. Of these, 66 (20 B-2As and 46 B-52Hs) were
declared to be nuclear-capable as of 1 September 2017, although only
60  (18  B-2As and 42 B-52Hs) are thought to be assigned nuclear delivery

6 US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Approaches for Managing the Costs of US Nuclear Forces,

2017 to 2046 (CBO: Washington, DC, Oct 2017), p. 1.

24 0 military spending and armaments, 2 017

roles.7 The bombers are being equipped with new command and control
systems to improve interconnectivity with other forces and the US National
Command Authority. 8
The development of the next-generation long-range strike bomber, known
as the B-21 Raider, is well under way. The B-21 is scheduled to enter service
in the mid-2020s.9
To arm its bombers, the Air Force is developing a controversial new
nuclear air-launched cruise missile, known as the LRSO (Long-Range
Standoff missile), for deployment from 2030.10 The Air Force plans to acquire
1000 missiles, of which about half will be nuclear-armed and the rest used
for test launches. The weapon is intended for integration on the B-2A, the
B-52H and the new B-21.11

Land-based ballistic missiles

As part of its implementation of New START, in 2017 the USA completed the
reduction of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force from 450 to
400 deployed Minuteman  III missiles, which are deployed in silos across
three missile wings. Following the reduction, each of the three ICBM bases
has 133–34 deployed missiles. The 50 emptied silos are being kept in a state
of readiness and can be reloaded with stored missiles if necessary.
Each Minuteman III ICBM is armed with one warhead: either a
335-­kiloton W78/Mk12A or a 300-kt W87/Mk21. Missiles carrying the
W78 can be uploaded with up to two more warheads for a maximum of three
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The entire
Minuteman III force completed a decade-long upgrade in 2015 to extend its
life through the 2020s. Moreover, an upgrade is under way of the W87/Mk21
re-entry vehicle to a new fuze (arming, fuzing and firing unit).12

7 US Department of State, ‘New START Treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms’,

Fact Sheet, 12 Jan. 2018.

8 US Air Force, Presentation to the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee,

Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Subject: FY19 Posture for Department of Defense Nuclear Forces,
Statement of Rand, R. (Gen.), Commander Air Force Global Strike Command, 22 Mar. 2018.
9 Gertler, J., Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber, Congressional Research Service

(CRS) Report for Congress R44463 (US Congress, CRS: Washington, DC, 7 June 2017).
10 For background and context on the LRSO see e.g. Kristensen, H. M., ‘LRSO: the nuclear cruise

missile mission’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 20 Oct. 2015; Kris-
tensen, H. M., ‘Forget LRSO: JASSM-ER can do the job’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of
American Scientists, 16 Dec. 2015; and Reif, K., ‘Examining the flawed rationale for a new nuclear
air-launched cruise missile’, Arms Control Today, vol. 8, no. 2 (12 June 2016).
11 US Air Force, ‘USAF awards contracts for new nuclear missile to Lockheed, Raytheon’, 23 Aug.

2017; Stone, M., ‘US Air Force picks Raytheon, Lockheed for next-gen cruise missile’, Reuters,
24  Aug. 2017; and Majumdar, D., ‘B-52, B-2 and B-21 bombers are getting nuclear-tipped cruise
missiles’, National Interest, 24 Aug. 2017.
12 Woolf, A. F., US Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, Congressional

Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress RL33640 (US Congress, CRS: Washington, DC, 6 Mar.
2018), pp. 24–26.
 world nuclear forces 241

The Air Force has begun development of a next-generation ICBM, known

as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), which is scheduled to
begin replacing the Minuteman III in 2028. It plans to buy 642 missiles, of
which 400 would be deployed, 50 stored and the rest used for test launches
and as spares.13 The expected cost of developing and producing the GBSD is
increasing, and in 2017 it was projected to be around $100 billion, up from an
initial projection of $62.3 billion in 2015.14
The Air Force conducted four test launches of the Minuteman III in 2017.
The tests took place on 8 February, 26 April, 3 May and 2 August.15 All four
missiles were launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB) in Cali­fornia
with re-entry vehicle impact some 6760  kilometres away at the Ronald
Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site in the Kwajalein Atoll in the Mar-
shall Islands. Several simulated ICBM launches were also conducted in 2017,
including one at F. E. Warren AFB in Wyoming that involved six missiles.16

Ballistic missile submarines

In 2017 the US Navy completed the reduction of missile launch tubes (from
24  to 20) on each of its Ohio class nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub­
marines (SSBNs). The reduction was necessary to meet the New START
Treaty limit of no more than 700 deployed strategic launchers. Following the
reductions, the navy’s SSBN fleet can deploy up to 240 strategic missiles.17
All of the 14 Ohio class SSBNs, 8 of which are based in the Pacific and 6 in
the Atlantic, carry Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs). Of the 14 SSBNs, 12 are normally considered to be operational and
2 are typically undergoing refuelling overhaul at any given time. Around 8 to
10 SSBNs are normally at sea, of which 4 or 5 are on alert in their designated
patrol areas and ready to fire their missiles within 15 minutes of receiving
the launch order.
In 2017 the navy started replacing the Trident II (D5) SLBMs with an
enhanced version known as the D5LE. The D5LE is equipped with the new
Mk-6 guidance system, designed to improve the D5LE’s effectiveness. The
D5LE will arm Ohio class submarines for the remainder of their service lives
(up to 2042), and will also be deployed on British Trident submarines (see

13 Reif, K., ‘Air Force drafts plan for follow-on ICBM’, Arms Control Today, 8 July 2015.
14 Reif, K., ‘New ICBM replacement cost revealed’, Arms Control Today, Mar. 2017.
15 US Air Force, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 30th Space Wing Public Affairs, ‘Minuteman III
launches from Vandenberg’, 9 Feb. 2017; US Air Force, Global Strike Command, ‘F. E. Warren tests
Minuteman III missile with launch from Vandenberg’, 26 Apr. 2017; US Air Force, Global Strike
Command, ‘Malmstrom tests Minuteman III missile with launch from Vandenberg’, 3 May 2017;
and US Air Force, Global Strike Command, ‘F.E. Warren tests Minuteman III missile with launch
from Vandenberg’, 2 Aug. 2017.
16 US Air Force, ‘90th MW provides unwavering nuclear deterrence’, 13 Apr. 2017.
17 Woolf (note 12).
242 military spending and armaments, 2 017

section III). The D5LE will initially also arm the new Columbia class SSBN,
the first of which is scheduled to start patrols in 2031, but will eventually be
replaced with a new SLBM in the early 2040s.18
The Trident SLBMs carry two basic warhead types: either the 455-kt W88
or the 100-kt W76. The navy has almost completed deployment of a life-­
extended version of the W76, known as W76-1. The W76-1 is equipped with
a new fuze that improves its targeting effectiveness. Each SLBM can carry
up to eight warheads but normally carries fewer. The navy does not disclose
how many warheads it carries on each submarine but, in practice, each
missile carries an average of four to five warheads, depending on mission
requirements. The New START data indicates that the SSBN fleet carried a
total of 945 warheads as of September 2017.19
The navy test launched four Trident II (D5) SLBMs from one SSBN in 2017.
As part of Follow-on Commander Evaluation Test number 53, the missiles
were launched in the Pacific from the USS Kentucky (SSBN-737) over the
course of three days. 20 The event marked the final test launch of the original
Trident II (D5). All future Trident II test launches will be for the D5LE.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

The USA has one type of non-strategic weapon in its stockpile—the B61 grav-
ity bomb. The weapon exists in two modifications: the B61-3 and B61-4. A
third modification (B61-10) was retired in late 2016. There are an estimated
200 tactical B61 bombs in the US stockpile. Approximately 150 of these are
deployed at six North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airbases in five
European countries: Aviano and Ghedi, Italy; Büchel, Germany; Incirlik,
Turkey; Kleine Brogel, Belgium; and Volkel, the Netherlands. The Belgian,
Dutch and possibly Turkish air forces (using F-16 combat aircraft) and
German and Italian air forces (using PA-200 Tornado combat aircraft) are
assigned nuclear strike missions with the US B61 bombs. In peacetime, how-
ever, they are kept under the custodial control of US Air Force personnel.
Concerns were raised about the security of the nuclear weapons at the
Incirlik base during the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, and
reports emerged in late 2017 suggesting that the weapons might have been
‘quietly withdrawn’. 21 These reports have not been confirmed, and Incirlik is
still included in scheduled nuclear storage base upgrades for 2019. 22

18 Woolf (note 12).

19 US Department of State (note 7).
20 Daniels, J. M., US Navy, Strategic Systems Programs Public Affairs, ‘FCET success: SSBN
launches fleet ballistic missile’, NNS170216-21, 16 Feb. 2017.
21 Hammond, J., ‘The future of Incirlik Air Base’, Real Clear Defense, 30 Nov. 2017.
22 For background and context see Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Building a Safe, Secure, and

Credible NATO Nuclear Posture (NTI: Washington, DC, Jan. 2018).

 world nuclear forces 24 3

The remaining 50 B61 bombs are stored in the (continental) USA for poten-
tial use by US fighter-bombers in support of allies outside Europe, including
in East Asia and the Middle East.
NATO has approved a modernization of its nuclear posture in Europe
through deployment, beginning in 2022–24, of the US B61-12 guided
nuclear gravity bomb. 23 The B61-12 will use the nuclear explosive package
of the B61-4, which has a maximum yield of approximately 50 kt, but will be
equipped with a new tail kit to increase its accuracy and standoff capabil­
ity. The B61-12 will be able to destroy hardened targets that could not be
destroyed by the B61-3 or B61-4. It will also enable strike planners to select
lower yields for existing targets, which would reduce collateral damage. 24
Integration flight tests have begun of the B61-12 bombs on F-15E, F-16
and Tornado combat aircraft. The B61-12 will also be integrated on the
US-built F-35A combat aircraft, which is expected to be nuclear certified in
2024–26. 25 Italy and the Netherlands have received the first of their
F-35A combat aircraft, some of which will later be designated for a nuclear
delivery role. 26 Belgium is considering whether to buy the F-35A. Although in
early 2018 the US State Department approved a possible sale of 34 F-35A air-
craft, Belgium has not yet officially announced a decision to buy the F-35A. 27
Germany does not currently have a plan to replace the PA-200 Tornado in its
nuclear role and is expected to extend its service life into the 2020s, despite
the German Air Force’s apparent preference for the F-35A. 28

23 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Nuclear Weapons: DOD and NNSA Need to Better

Manage Scope of Future Refurbishments and Risks to Maintaining US Commitments to NATO, Report
to Congressional Requesters, GAO-11-387 (GAO: Washington, DC, May 2011), p. 13.
24 For a description of the B61-12 and its implications see Kristensen, H. M., ‘B61 LEP: increasing

NATO nuclear capability and precision low-yield strikes’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of
American Scientists, 15 June 2011.
25 Kristensen, H. M. and Norris, R. S., ‘The B61 family of nuclear bombs’, Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, vol. 70, no. 3 (2014).

26 Seligman, L., ‘Dutch F-35s land in the Netherlands’, Defense News, 23 May 2016; and Peruzzi, L.,

‘Italy receives first Cameri-assembled F-35A’, Flight Global, 8 Dec. 2015.

27 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ‘Belgium: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft’, News

Release 17-80, 18 Jan. 2018.

28 Reuters, ‘“F-35” für die Bundeswehr? Luftwaffe benennt Anforderungen an “Tornado”: Nach-

folger’ [‘F-35’ for the Bundeswehr? Air Force calls requirements on ‘Tornado’ successor], Der Spiegel,
8 Nov. 2017.
244 military spending and armaments, 2 017

II. Russian nuclear forces

hans m. kristensen

As of January 2018, Russia maintained an arsenal of approximately

4350  nuclear warheads. About 2520 of these are strategic warheads, of
which nearly 1600 are deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and
at bomber bases. Russia also possessed approximately 1830 non-­strategic
(tac­tical) nuclear warheads, all of which are in central storage sites.1 An
estimated additional 2500 warheads were retired or awaiting dismantle-
ment, giving a total inventory of approximately 6850 warheads (see table 6.3).
The reduction in Russia’s deployed strategic warheads from the estimated
total of 1950 in early 2017 was due to its continuing implementation of the
2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms (New START) during 2017. 2

Strategic bombers

Russia’s Long-range Aviation Command operates a fleet of approximately

13 Tu-160 (Blackjack), 30 Tu-95MS16 (Bear-H16) and 25 Tu-95MS6
(Bear-H6) bombers. Some of these may not be fully operational and others
are undergoing various upgrades. The maximum loading on the oper­
ational bombers is more than 600 nuclear weapons, of which approximately
200 might be stored at the two strategic bomber bases. Modernization of
the bombers is well under way. Nearly all of the Tu-160s and some of the
Tu-95s will be upgraded to maintain a bomber force of 50–60 aircraft. The
upgraded bombers are capable of carrying the new Kh-102 (AS-23B) nuclear
air-launched cruise missile. 3 The Russian Government has also announced
plans to resume production of the Tu-160 to produce up to 50 modified
aircraft known as Tu-160M2, with serial production starting in 2023. 4 The
additional bombers would probably replace many of the old Tu-95 (MS16 and
MS6) aircraft and provide a bridge to the future next-generation bomber,
known as PAK-DA, which is scheduled to begin fielding in the late 2020s. 5

1 For a recent overview of Russia’s nuclear weapon storage facilities see Podvig, P. and Serrat, J.,

‘Lock them up: zero-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe’, United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2017.
2 For a summary and other details of New START see annex A, section III, in this volume. On the

implementation of New START see chapter 7, section II, in this volume.

3 Roblin, S., ‘The Tu-95 Bear: the 60-year-old Russian bomber America still chases all over the

world’, National Interest, 11 June 2017.

4 TASS, ‘Russia’s upgraded Tu-160M2 bomber to remain state-of-the-art for four more decades’,

1 Nov. 2017.
5 TASS, ‘Russia to develop first prototype of next-generation strategic bomber by early 2020s’,

13 Apr. 2017.
 world nuclear forces 24 5

Land-based ballistic missiles

As of January 2018, Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces—the branch of the

armed forces that controls land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs)—consisted of 12 missile divisions grouped into 3 armies and deploy-
ing an estimated 318 ICBMs of 7 different types and variations. These ICBMs
can carry a total of 1138 warheads but SIPRI estimates that they have been
downloaded to carry just under 800 warheads, nearly 50 per cent of Russia’s
deployed strategic warheads. In contrast to the frequent claims in recent
years about a Russian nuclear ‘build-up’, the US Air Force’s National Intelli­
gence and Space Center (NASIC) estimates that ‘the number of missiles in
the Russian ICBM force will continue to decrease because of arms control
agreements, aging missiles, and resource constraints’. 6
Russia’s ICBM force is in the middle of a significant modernization pro-
gramme to replace all Soviet-era missiles with new types, albeit not on a one-
for-one basis. The replacement programme, which started in 1997, appears
to be progressing more slowly than planned. About 60 per cent of the force
had been upgraded by the end of 2017. All the remaining Soviet-era ICBMs
are scheduled to be withdrawn by 2024, three years later than previously
announced. In addition to the procurement of new missiles, the modern­
ization involves substantial reconstruction of silos, launch control centres,
garrisons and support facilities.7
Russia’s current ICBM modernization is focused on the multiple-warhead
version of the RS-12, known as RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2). Three mobile
divisions have already been completed, with two more in progress, and two
more to begin upgrade by 2020. The first silo-based RS-24 regiment with
10 missiles is operational at Kozelsk and a second regiment is in the early
stages of construction. 8 Russia is developing a third modification of the
RS-12M, known as the RS-26 Yars-M (SS-X-28), which will be lighter than
the RS-24. However, final development and deployment of the RS-26 has
been delayed.9 In addition, Russia is developing a new ‘heavy’ liquid-fuelled,
silo-based ICBM, known as the RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-29), as a replacement
for the RS-20V (SS-18). According to Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister,
Yuriy Borisov, the RS-28 will carry ‘new types of warheads’, including

6 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile

Threat (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2017), p. 27. On the alleged Russian
nuclear ‘build-up’ see e.g. Gertz, B., ‘Russia sharply expanding nuclear arsenal, upgrading under-
ground facilities’, Washington Free Beacon, 13 Dec. 2017.
7 Azanov, R., ‘Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces as its decisive defense’, TASS, 19 Dec. 2017.
8 Azanov (note 7); and Andreyev, D. and Zotov, I., [The nuclear shield is reliable], Krasnaya Zvezda,

14 Dec. 2017 (in Russian).

9 Kristensen, H. M., ‘Review of NASIC Report 2017: nuclear force developments’, FAS Strategic

Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 30 June 2017.

24 6 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.3. Russian nuclear forces, January 2018

All estimated figures are approximate. Figures may not add up to stated totals due to the
conventions of rounding.
Type/
Russian designation No. of Year first Range Warhead No. of
(NATO designation) launchers deployed (km)a loading warheadsb
Strategic offensive forces 2 520c
Bombers 50/68 d 616 e
Tu-95MS6 (Bear-H6) 14/25 1981 6 500– 6 x AS-15A or 84
10 500 AS-23B ALCMs,
bombs
Tu-95MS16 (Bear-H16) 25/30 1981 6 500– 16 x AS-15A or 400
10 500 AS-23B ALCMs,
bombs
Tu-160 (Blackjack) 11/13 1987 10 500– 12 x AS-15B or 132
13 200 AS-23B ALCM,
bombs
ICBMs 318 1 138 f
RS-20V (SS-18 Satan) 46 1992 11 000– 10 x 500–800 kt 460
15 000
RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) 20 1980 10 000 6 x 400 kt 120
RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) 72 g 1985 10 500 1 x 800 kt 72
RS-12M2 Topol-M 60 1997 10 500 1 x 800 kt 60
(SS-27 Mod 1/silo)
RS-12M1 Topol-M 18 2006 10 500 1 x (800 kt) 18
(SS-27 Mod 1/mobile)
RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2/ 90 2010 10 500 4 x (100 kt) 360
mobile)
RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2/silo) 12 2014 10 500 4 x (100 kt) 48
RS-26 Yars-M (SS-X-28) .. (2018) 5 500+ MIRV (. . kt) ..
RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-29) .. (2020) 10 000+ MIRV (. . kt) ..
SLBMs 11/176 h 768 h
RSM-50 Volna 2/32 1978 6 500 3 x 50 kt 96
(SS-N-18 M1 Stingray)
RSM-54 Sineva 6/96 1986/2007 9 000 4 x 100 kt 384
(SS-N-23 M1)
RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) 3/48 2014 >8 050 6 x (100 kt) 288
Non-strategic forces 1 830i
ABM, air/coastal defence 898 373
53T6 (SH-08, Gazelle) 68 1986 30 1 x 10 kt 68
S-300 (SA-10/20) 800 j 1980/1992 . . 1 x low kt 290
3M-55 Yakhont (SS-N-26) 20 (2014) 400+ 1 x (. . kt) 10
SSC-1B (Sepal) 10 1973 500 1 x 350 5
Air Force weaponsk 358 498
Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) 100 1974 . . 3 x ASM, bombs 250
Su-24M/M2 (Fencer-D) 150 1974 . . 2 x bombs 150
Su-34 (Fullback) 98 2006 . . 2 x bombs 98
MiG-31K (Foxhound) 10 1983 . . 1 x ASM ..
Army weapons 148 148
Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) 12 1981 120 (1 x 10–100 kt) 12
 world nuclear forces 247

Type/
Russian designation No. of Year first Range Warhead No. of
(NATO designation) launchers deployed (km)a loading warheadsb
Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) 120 2005 350 l (1 x 10–100 kt)
120
9M729 (SSC-8) 16 2016 (2 500) 1 x . . kt
16
Navy weapons 810
Submarines/surface ships/air LACM, SLCM, ASW, SAM, depth bombs,
torpedoesm
Total stockpile 4 350
Deployed warheads 1 600 n
Reserve warheads 2 750
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement 2 500
Total inventory 6 850
. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = uncertain figure; ABM = anti-ballistic missile; ALCM =
air-launched cruise missile; ASM = air-to-surface missile; ASW = anti-submarine warfare;
ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; kt = kiloton; LACM = land-attack cruise missile;
MIRV = multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty
Organization; SAM = surface-to-air missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile;
SLCM = sea-launched cruise missile.
Note: The table lists the total number of warheads estimated to be available for the delivery
systems. Only some of these are deployed and they do not necessarily correspond to the New
START Treaty data counting rules.
a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

b The number shows the total number of available warheads, both deployed and in storage,

assigned to the delivery systems.

c Approximately 1600 of these strategic warheads are deployed on land- and sea-based bal-

listic missiles and at bomber bases. The remaining warheads are in central storage.
d The first number is the number of bombers estimated to be counted under the New START

Treaty. The second number is the total number of bombers in the inventory. Because of
ongoing bomber modernization, there is considerable uncertainty about how many bombers
are operational.
e Of the 616 weapons estimated to be assigned to long-range bombers, only 200 weapons are

thought to be present at the 2 strategic bomber bases. The remaining weapons are in central
storage facilities.
f Of the 1138 warheads available for operational ICBMs, nearly 800 are thought to be

deployed on the missiles, with the remaining warheads in storage.

g The number is uncertain because several SS-25 garrisons are upgrading to the
SS-27 Mod 2.
h Two of the Delta SSBNs are in overhaul at any given time and do not carry their assigned

nuclear missiles and warheads. It is possible that only 1 Delta III is operational.
i Non-strategic nuclear warheads are not deployed with their delivery systems but are kept

in a central storage facility, according to the Russian Government. Some storage facilities are
near operational bases.
j There are at least 80 S-300 sites across Russia, each with an average of 12 launchers, each

with 2–4 interceptors. Each launcher has several reloads. The SA-10 has almost been replaced
by the SA-20.
k The numbers show total nuclear-capable aircraft but only some of them are thought to

have nuclear missions. Most can carry more than 1 nuclear weapon. Other potential nuclear-­
capable aircraft include Su-25 Frogfoot and MiG-25 Foxbat.
24 8 military spending and armaments, 2 017

l Although many unofficial sources and news media reports say the SS-26 has a range of
nearly 500 km, the US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) lists the
range as 350 km.
m Only submarines are thought to be assigned nuclear torpedoes.
n Note that the number is different from the New START Treaty number for deployed war-

heads because of the treaty’s counting rules.

Sources: Russian Ministry of Defence, various press releases; US Department of State, START
Treaty Memoranda of Understanding, 1990–July 2009; New START aggregate data releases,
various years; US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and
Cruise Missile Threat (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2017); BBC Monitor-
ing; Russian news media; Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces website; International Institute
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (Routledge: London, various issues); Cochran, T. B.
et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 4, Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Harper & Row: New York,
1989); IHS Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, various issues; Proceedings, US Naval Institute,
various issues; ‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and authors’
estimates.

‘manoeuvrable warheads’.10 Test launches of the 200-tonne missile have

begun and will be followed by serial production, before eventual deployment
in upgraded RS-20V silos in a few years. Production of a rail-based ICBM
seems to have been delayed or cancelled.11
Russia normally conducts two large-scale exercises with road-mobile
ICBMs each year. The biannual exercises in 2017 involved RS-12M Topol
(SS-25), RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) and RS-24 mobile launchers from all
the operational missile divisions. The launchers were deployed further from
their bases and for longer periods than in previous years. Russian ICBMs
also participated in broader strategic exercises along with nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and bombers.12 These included several
test launches of strategic missiles, some of which took place around the time
of the Zapad-17 exercise in western Russia and Belarus in September 2017.13

Ballistic missile submarines and sea-launched ballistic missiles

The Russian Navy has a fleet of 11 deployable nuclear-armed SSBNs. The

fleet includes 9 Soviet-era SSBNs and 3 (of a planned total of 8) SSBNs of a
new class that will gradually replace the old SSBNs over the next decade. A

10 Gavrilov, Y., ‘Sarmat will fly over pole: Russia designing unique missile’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta,

2 June 2014. Translation from Russian, BBC Monitoring.

11 TASS, ‘Russia excludes rail-mobile ICBM system from armament, focuses on Sarmat missile’,

6  Dec. 2017. For further detail on the planned rail-based ICBM see Kristensen  H.  M., ‘Russian
nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017, p. 423.
12 See e.g. TASS, ‘Some 20 Topol-M, Yars mobile ICBM systems take part in massive Central Rus-

sian drills’, 28 Mar. 2017; TASS, ‘Eleven strategic missile regiments to hold large-scale drills across
Russia’, 4 Sep. 2017; and TASS, ‘Topol ballistic missile test launched from range in Russia’s south’,
26 Sep. 2017.
13 For further detail on the Zapad-17 exercise see Johnson, D., ‘Zapad 2017 and Euro-Atlantic

security’, NATO Review, 14 Dec. 2017.

 world nuclear forces 24 9

former SSBN has been converted to a test-launch platform for sub­marine-

launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) but it is not nuclear armed.
The current backbone of the Russian SSBN fleet is made up of six Project
667BDRM Delfin (designated Delta IV class by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, NATO) submarines assigned to the Northern Fleet. Two Pro-
ject 667BDR Kalmar (Delta III) SSBNs are believed to be operational with
the Pacific Fleet, although reports in early 2018 suggested that it is possible
that only one of these is still operational.14 A third Project 667BDR Kalmar
SSBN is held in reserve. All three will be decommissioned in the near future.
Three of the new Borei class SSBNs (Project 955/A) are operational: two
with the Pacific Fleet and one with the Northern Fleet. Five more of an
improved design, known as Borei-A (Project 955A), are under construction
and scheduled to enter service between 2018 and 2022. Each Borei class
SSBN carries 16 RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) SLBMs. It is possible that Russia
will buy four more Borei class SSBNs to maintain an SSBN fleet comparable
in size to that of the United States.15

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

According to SIPRI data, as of January 2018, Russia had approximately

1830  warheads assigned for potential use by non-strategic forces. Many
more Soviet-era non-strategic warheads have been retired and are awaiting
dismantlement (see table 6.3).
Russia’s large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons chiefly serves to
compensate for perceived weaknesses in its conventional forces. There has
been considerable debate about the role that non-strategic nuclear weapons
have in Russian nuclear strategy, including potential first use.16 Develop-
ment of new dual-capable weapons demonstrates that Russia continues to
see non-strategic nuclear weapons as important in its military strategy. As
targeting accuracy has improved, some weapons have been equipped with
warheads with lower yields than they had during the cold war. Others are
likely to be replaced with advanced conventional weapons over the next
decade.
The most significant naval development is the fielding of a nuclear ver-
sion of the new long-range, land-attack Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile

14 The scheduled defuelling was first published by Rosatom and reported on Twitter by @7FBTK.

The Rosatom notification is no longer available, but a description is available at the Russianforces.
org website. Podvig, P., ‘Two Project 667BDR submarines withdrawn from service’, Russianforces.
org, 14 Mar. 2018.
15 Bogdanov, K., [‘Great Fleet’ on the horizon], Lenta, 23 Jan. 2015 (in Russian).
16 See e.g. Scaparrotti, C. M., ‘NATO’s military commander concerned about Russia’s tactical

nuclear weapons in Europe’, Atlantic Council, NATO Source, 3 May 2017; and Ven Bruusgaard, K.,
‘The myths of Russia’s lowered nuclear threshold’, War on the Rocks, 22 Sep. 2017.
2 5 0 military spending and armaments, 2 017

(SLCM), known as the 3M-14 (SS-N-30A).17 While the conventional version

is being fielded on a wide range of ships and submarines, the nuclear version
will probably be integrated on front-line nuclear-powered attack sub­
marines to replace the S-10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM. However, it
is possible that the nuclear 3M-14 might also be integrated on some surface
ships. It is estimated that there are about 810  warheads for non-strategic
naval nuclear weapons, which include land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship
cruise missiles, anti-submarine rockets, depth charges, torpedoes, and naval
aviation.
The 3M-55 Yakhont (SS-N-26) SLCM has been included in the estimate of
Russia’s non-strategic forces for January 2018 because NASIC designates it
as ‘nuclear possible’ and notes that it is used to arm submarines, ships and
coastal defence units (see table  6.3).18 The 3M-55 is replacing the SS-N-9
(P-120), SS-N-12 (P-500) and SS-N-19 (P-700) anti-ship cruise missiles,
which are dual-capable.19
The Russian Air Force has an estimated 498 weapons for use by Tu-22M3
(Backfire-C) intermediate-range bombers, Su-24M (Fencer-D) fighter­ -
bombers and the new Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bomber. A new air-to-surface
missile (Kh-32) is in development to replace the Kh-22N (AS-4) used on the
Tu-22M3. The Air Force also appears close to deploying a hypersonic air-
launched ballistic missile, known as the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal. 20
It is estimated that a total of around 373 nuclear warheads are in use by
dual-capable air defence forces, the Moscow A-135 missile defence system
and coastal defence units (although only a small number of warheads are
assigned to the coastal defence units). All these defensive systems are being
modernized. 21
It is estimated that there are approximately 148 warheads assigned to
Russian short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and ground-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs). Ground-based non-strategic nuclear forces include the
dual-capable Iskander-M (SS-26) SRBM, which is replacing the Tochka
(SS-21) SRBM in 10 or more missile brigades. Deployment started in 2004

17 There is considerable confusion about the designation of what is commonly referred to as the

Kalibr missile. The Kalibr designation is actually not a missile but a family of weapons that, in addi-
tion to the 3M-14 (SSN30/A) land-attack versions, includes the 3M-54 (SS-N-27) anti-ship cruise
missile and the 91R anti-submarine missile. For further detail see US Navy, Office of Naval Intelli-
gence (ONI), The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition (ONI: Washington, DC, Dec. 2015), pp. 34–35;
and US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (note 6), p. 37.
18 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (note 6), p 37.
19 US Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence (note 17), p. 34.
20 TASS, ‘Russian Aerospace Forces test launch Kinzhal hypersonic missile’, 11 Mar. 2018.
21 TASS, ‘Russia’s missile early warning system helps ward off any threat’, 29 June 2017; and Novi-

chkov, N., ‘Russian Defence Minister summarises modernisation progress in 2017’, Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 4 Jan. 2018.
 world nuclear forces 2 51

and, by the end of 2017, the army had received 10 Iskander-M brigades. 22
Facilities in the Kaliningrad oblast were nearing completion at the end of
2017 and were expected to receive the Iskander-M in early 2018. 23 Con-
struction of a missile storage facility, similar to those constructed at other
Iskander bases, has yet to be identified in Kaliningrad.
Army non-strategic nuclear weapons also include a new dual-capable
GLCM, known as the 9M729 (SSC-8), which is a modified version of the
9M728 (SSC-7) used on the Iskander-M system. 24 According to the USA, the
new cruise missile violates the 1987 Soviet–US Treaty on the Elimination of
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). 25 Russia has
rejected the accusation. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the 9M729 has
been deployed in at least one garrison and it appears that further deploy-
ments are planned. 26

22 Interfax, ‘Ten brigade sets of Iskander-M missile systems delivered to Russia’s ground forces:

commander’, 22 Dec. 2017.

23 Blank, S., ‘Baltic build-up’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 29, no. 5 (May 2017), pp. 6–13.
24 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, ‘INF Treaty: at

a glance’, Fact Sheet, 8 Dec. 2017, p. 1.

25 For a summary and other details of the INF Treaty see annex A, section III, in this volume.

On the INF Treaty controversy see chapter 7, section II, in this volume; and Kile, S., ‘Russian–US
nuclear arms control and disarmament’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017, pp. 477–78.
26 Gordon, M., ‘Russia deploys missile, violating treaty, and challenging Trump’, New York Times,

14 Feb. 2017.
2 52 military spending and armaments, 2 017

III. British nuclear forces

shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen

As of January 2018, the British nuclear stockpile consisted of approximately

215 warheads (see table 6.4). In its 2015 Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR), the British Government reaffirmed its plans to cut the size
of the nuclear arsenal. The number of operationally available nuclear war-
heads has been reduced to no more than 120. The overall size of the nuclear
stockpile, including non-deployed warheads, will decrease to no more than
180 by the mid-2020s.1
The British nuclear deterrent consists exclusively of a sea-based compo-
nent: four Vanguard class Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub-
marines (SSBNs). 2 In a posture known as continuous at-sea deterrent, one
British SSBN is on patrol at all times. 3 While the second and third SSBNs
can be put to sea rapidly, the fourth would take longer because of the cycle of
extensive overhaul and maintenance. In September 2017, the British Minis-
try of Defence (MOD) marked the 350th nuclear deterrence patrol conducted
by Royal Navy submarines since 1969. 4
The Vanguard class SSBNs can each be armed with up to 16 UGM-133
Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The United
Kingdom does not own the missiles but leases them from a pool of 58 Tri-
dent SLBMs shared with the United States Navy. Under limits set out in the
2010 SDSR, when on patrol, the submarines are armed with no more than
8 operational missiles with a total of 40 nuclear warheads. 5 The missiles are
kept on a reduced operational alert status and would require several days’
notice to be able to fire. 6
In January 2017 the Trident programme became the centre of controversy
when a newspaper revealed that the British Government had not publicly
disclosed the failed test launch of a Trident SLBM the previous summer,
shortly before a vote in the British House of Commons on the Trident sub­
marine successor programme (see below).7 US officials confirmed that a
missile test fired in June 2016 at a US test range off the Florida coast had

1 British Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015:

A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161 (Stationery Office: London, Nov. 2015), para. 4.66.
2 HMS Vanguard entered service in Dec. 1994, while the last in class, HMS Vengeance, entered

service in Feb. 2001. Mills, C. and Dempsey, N., ‘Replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent: progress of
the Dreadnought class’, Briefing Paper 8010, House of Commons Library, 19 June 2017, p. 7.
3 British Government (note 1), para. 4.65.
4 British Royal Navy, ‘UK marks 350th UK deterrent patrol’, Press release, 29 Sep. 2017.
5 British Ministry of Defence, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and

Security Review, Cm 7948 (Stationery Office: London, Oct. 2010), pp. 5, 38.
6 British Ministry of Defence, ‘UK nuclear deterrent’, Fact sheet, updated 24 Mar. 2016, p. 1.
7 Sunday Times, ‘Nuclear cover-up’, 22 Jan. 2017.
 world nuclear forces 2 53

deviated from its programmed course and crashed into the sea. 8 The MOD
declined to comment on the cause of the failure, which marked its first
unsuccessful Trident missile flight test.9 The UK had previously conducted
successful flight tests in 2000, 2005, 2009 and 2012.

The Trident submarine successor programme

In 2016 the House of Commons approved by a large majority a motion sup-

porting the government’s commitment to a ‘like-for-like’ replacement of the
current Vanguard class SSBNs with four new SSBNs.10 While recognizing
that the UK’s nuclear deterrent would ‘remain essential to the UK’s security
today as it has for over 60 years’, the motion did not give final approval for
the new submarine programme. In order to control costs, the government
had previously announced that approval of the investment would be made in
stages rather than as a single ‘main gate’ decision.11
The new class of SSBN, which has been named Dreadnought, will carry
the new life-extended Trident II D5LE SLBMs but will have a missile com-
partment that holds 12 missile launch tubes, a reduction from the 16 carried
by the Vanguard class. As a cost-saving measure, a common missile compart-
ment is being designed in cooperation with the US Navy that will also equip
the latter’s new Columbia class SSBNs.12 The replacement of the Trident II
(D5) missile is not part of the Dreadnought development and acquisition
programme. However, the UK is participating in the US Navy’s current pro-
gramme to extend the service life of the Trident II (D5) missile to the early
2060s.13
The Dreadnought submarines were originally expected to begin to enter
into service by 2028 but are now expected to enter into service in the early
2030s. The delay was part of the extended development and acquisition pro-
gramme announced in the 2015 SDSR. The service life of the Vanguard class
SSBNs was commensurately extended.14

8 Star, B. and Masters, J., ‘US official confirms Trident missile failure’, CNN, 23 Jan. 2017.
9 Kuenssberg, L., ‘Trident: defence secretary refuses to give test missile details’, BBC News,
23 Jan. 2017; and MacAskill, E., ‘How did the Trident test fail and what did Theresa May know?’, The
Guardian, 23 Jan. 2017.
10 British Parliament, House of Commons, ‘UK’s nuclear deterrent’, House of Commons Hansard,

col. 559, vol. 613, 18 July 2016; and Kuenssberg, L., ‘MPs vote to renew Trident weapons system’, BBC
News, 19 July 2016.
11 British Government (note 1), para. 4.75.
12 British Ministry of Defence, ‘The United Kingdom’s future nuclear deterrent: the Dreadnought

programme’, 2017 Update to Parliament, 20 Dec. 2017; Allison, G., ‘A guide to the Dreadnought class
nuclear submarine’, UK Defence Journal, 3 Jan. 2018; and US Navy, ‘United States Navy: fact file:
Trident II (D5) missile’, 11 May 2017.
13 Mills, C. and Brooke-Holland, L., ‘The costs of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent’, Briefing

Paper 08166, House of Commons Library, 8 Dec. 2017, p. 9.

14 Mills and Dempsey (note 2).
2 54 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.4. British nuclear forces, January 2018

No. Year first Range Warheads No. of
Type Designation deployed deployed (km)a x yield warheads
Submarine-launched ballistic missilesb
D5 Trident II 48 1994 >7 400 1–3 x 100 kt c 215 d
kt = kilotons.
a Range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight

profile and weapon loading.

b The operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carry a reduced

loading of no more than 8 Trident II missiles and 40 nuclear warheads. One submarine is on
patrol at any given time.
c The British warhead is called the Holbrook, a modified version of the United States’

W76-1 warhead, with a lower-yield option.

d Of the estimated 215 warheads currently in the stockpile, 120 are operationally available.

The process to reduce the stockpile to 180 warheads by the mid-2020s is under way.
Sources: British Ministry of Defence, white papers, press releases and website; British House
of Commons, Hansard, various issues; ‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
various issues; and authors’ estimates.

The 2015 SDSR also postponed the replacement of the current British­
manufactured Holbrook warhead for the Trident II missiles, at least until
the late 2030s.15 A decision on a new warhead is planned for the current
parliament, and work continues on developing replacement options.16 In the
meantime, the British Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) has begun
a programme to improve the performance and extend the life of the cur-
rent Trident warhead—which is modelled on the US W76-1 warhead and
incorpor­ated into the US-produced Mk4A re-entry vehicle—in collabor­ation
with US nuclear weapon laboratories.17
The MOD has estimated the cost of the Dreadnought programme to be
£31 billion ($47.4 billion), including defence inflation over the life of the pro-
gramme. It has set aside a further contingency of £10 billion ($15.3 billion)
to cover possible increases.18 In its 2017 update to parliament, the MOD con-
firmed that the programme remained within budget, and that £4.3 billion

15 British Government (note 1), paras 4.72, 4.76.

16 Mills and Dempsey (note 2), p. 3; and British Ministry of Defence (note 12).
17 Nuclear Information Service, ‘AWE: past, present, and possibilities for the future’, June 2016,

pp. 26–28.
18 British Government (note 1), para. 4.76.
 world nuclear forces 2 5 5

($5.5  billion) had been spent so far on the design and early manufacture
phases.19 However, there were reports during the year of significant cost
overruns related to the submarine’s next-generation nuclear reactor pro­
pulsion plant. 20 As the year ended, concerns were raised in parliament about
the impact of the Trident successor programme on the affordability of the
MOD’s overall equipment plan. 21

19 British Ministry of Defence (note 12).

20 Hookham, M. and Ripley, T., ‘“Red alert” over Trident reactor costs’, Sunday Times, 23 July

2017.
21 MacAskill, E., ‘Trident may be removed from MoD budget, MPs told’, The Guardian, 18 Dec.

2017; and Haynes, D., ‘Defence cuts: take expensive Trident out of MoD budget, Hammond urged’,
Sunday Times, 25 Nov. 2017.
2 5 6 military spending and armaments, 2 017

IV. French nuclear forces

shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen

France’s nuclear arsenal contains approximately 300 warheads, a number

that has remained stable in recent years. The warheads are earmarked for
delivery by 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and 54 air-
launched cruise missiles, which provides France with both strategic and
tactical nuclear capabilities.1
The main component of France’s strategic nuclear deterrence force con-
sists of four Triomphant class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs), each of which carries 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs). The submarines began to enter operational service in 1997. The
French Navy maintains a continuous at-sea deterrent posture, whereby one
SSBN is on patrol at all times. The SSBN force is complemented by nuclear-­
capable land- and sea-based combat aircraft (see table 6.5).
France continues to modernize its Strategic Oceanic Force (Force
Océanique Stratégique, FOST). The French Navy is modifying the Triom-
phant class submarines to carry the M51 SLBM, which has replaced the
M45 missile. 2 As of December 2017, all four submarines had been upgraded
to the M51.1 SLBM. 3 Each of the M51 missiles is capable of carrying up to
six multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) TN-75 war-
heads. The number of warheads on some of the missiles is believed to have
been reduced in order to improve targeting flexibility.
The French SSBN fleet will be equipped with a longer-range version of the
missile, the M51.2, by 2020. An M51.2 missile was successfully test launched
under operational conditions from Le Triomphant in July 2016, after which
the missile was certified and commissioned for service. 4 The French Minis­
ter of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, confirmed in December 2017
that the M51.2 was operational. 5 The M51.2 is designed to carry the new,
stealthier tête nucléaire océanique (TNO, oceanic nuclear warhead) with a

1 Hollande, F., French President, ‘Discours sur la dissuasion nucléaire: Déplacement auprès des

forces aériennes stratégiques’ [Speech on nuclear deterrence: visit to the strategic air forces], Istres,
19 Feb. 2015.
2 French Navy, ‘Modernisation de la force océanique stratégique: le SNLE Le Triomphant adapté

au M51’ [Modernization of the strategic naval force: the SSBN Le Triomphant adapted for M51],
13 Aug. 2015.
3 French Ministry of the Armed Forces, ‘Madame Florence Parly, Ministre des armées Visite

de l’usine des Mureaux: Ariane Group’ [Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, Visit to the
Mureaux factory: Ariane Group], Mureaux, 14 Dec. 2017, p. 6.
4 Groizeleau, V., ‘DCNS débute la refonte du Téméraire’ [DCNS begins the recasting of Le

Téméraire], Mer et Marine, 8 Dec. 2016; and French Ministry of Defence, ‘Le système d’armes SNLE
Le Triomphant/M51 validé en conditions opérationnelles’ [Le Triomphant/M51 SSBN weapon
system validated under operational conditions], Press release, updated 20 Sep. 2016.
5 French Ministry of the Armed Forces (note 3).
 world nuclear forces 2 57

Table 6.5. French nuclear forces, January 2018

No. Year first Range Warheads No. of
Type deployed deployed (km)a x yield warheads
Land-based aircraft
Mirage 2000N 20 1988 2 750 1 x up to 300 kt TNA 20
Rafale F3b 20 2010–11 2 000 1 x up to 300 kt TNA 20
Carrier-based aircraft
Rafale MF3 10 2010–11 2 000 1 x up to 300 kt TNA 10
Submarine-launched ballistic missilesc
M51.1 32 2010 >6 000 4–6 x 100 kt TN-75 160 d
M51.2 16 2016 >6 000 e 4–6 x 150 kt TNO 80
M51.3f 0 (2025) >(6 000) (up to 6 x 150 kt) TNO 0
Reserves 10 g
Total 300 h
. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = uncertain figure; kt = kiloton; TNA = tête nucléaire
aéroportée (airborne nuclear warhead); TNO = tête nucléaire océanique (oceanic nuclear
warhead).
a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

b The Mirage 2000N and Rafale carry the air-sol moyenne portée-améliorée (ASMP-A,

improved medium-range air-to-surface) air-launched cruise missile. A mid-life upgrade of the

ASMP-A is scheduled to begin in 2022.
c France has only produced enough submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to equip

3 operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); the 4th SSBN is out of
service for overhaul and maintenance work at any given time.
d Although the M51 SLBM can carry up to 6 warheads, the number of warheads is believed

to have been reduced on some of the missiles in order to improve targeting flexibility.
e The M51.2 has a ‘much greater range’ than the M51.1, according to the French Ministry of

Defence.
f The M51.3 is under development and has not yet been deployed.
g The reserve includes 4 ASMP-A missiles.
h President François Hollande confirmed a cap of 300 warheads in a speech in Feb. 2015.

Sources: French Ministry of the Armed Forces, ‘Madame Florence Parly, Ministre des armées
Visite de l’usine des Mureaux: Ariane Group’ [Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces,
Visit to the Mureaux factory: Ariane Group], Mureaux, 14 Dec. 2017; Hollande, F., French
President, ‘Discours sur la dissuasion nucléaire–Déplacement auprès des forces aériennes
stratégiques’ [Speech on nuclear deterrence: visit to the strategic air forces], Istres, 19 Feb.
2015; Sarkozy, N., French President, Speech on defence and national security, Porte de Ver-
sailles, 17 June 2008; Sarkozy,  N., French President, ‘Presentation of SSBM “Le Terrible”’,
Speech, Cherbourg, 21  Mar. 2008; Chirac, J., French President, Speech during visit to the
Strategic Forces, Landivisiau–L’lle Longue, Brest, 19 Jan. 2006; French Ministry of Defence,
various publi­cations; French National Assembly, various defence bills; International Institute
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (Routledge: London, 2018); Air Actualités, vari-
ous issues; Aviation Week & Space Technology, various issues; ‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, various issues; and authors’ estimates.
2 5 8 military spending and armaments, 2 017

reported yield of up to 150 kilotons. 6 France has commenced design work

on a new M51.3 SLBM with improved accuracy.7 It is scheduled to become
operational in 2025. 8 France is also beginning preliminary design work on
a third-­generation SSBN, designated the SNLE 3G, which will be equipped
with the M51.3 SLBM. The goal is to have an operational successor to the
Triomphant class submarine by 2035.9
The airborne component of the French nuclear forces consists of two
squadrons of the land-based Mirage 2000N and Rafale F3 combat aircraft.
The remaining Mirage 2000Ns will be replaced by Rafale B aircraft by
2018.10 The French Navy also operates a single squadron of Rafale MF3 air-
craft deployed aboard its aircraft carrier the Charles de Gaulle.
The Rafale aircraft are equipped with the extended-range air-sol moyenne
portée-améliorée (ASMP-A, improved medium-range air-to-surface) cruise
missile, which entered service in 2009. There are 54 ASMP-As in France’s
nuclear arsenal.11 A mid-life refurbishment programme for the ASMP-A is
scheduled to begin in 2022.12 The missiles are armed with the tête nucléaire
aéroportée (TNA, airborne nuclear warhead), which has a reported yield
of up to 300 kt. The French Ministry of Defence has initiated research on
a successor missile, designated air-sol nucléaire (air-to-surface nuclear)
fourth-generation (ASN-4G), with enhanced stealth and manoeuvrability to
counter potential technological improvements in air defences.13
The French Government’s commitment to the long-term modernization of
the country’s air- and sea-based nuclear deterrent forces will require a sub-
stantial increase in military nuclear expenditure.14 The draft law on military

6 French Senate, ‘Avis présenté au nom de la Commission des Affaires Étrangères, de la Défense et

des Forces Armées (1) sur le Projet de Loi de Finances pour 2014, adopté par L’Assemblée Nationale:
Défense: equipement des forces et excellence technologique des industries de défense’ [Opinions
submitted on behalf of the committee on foreign affairs, defence and the armed forces (1) on the
draft finance law for 2014, adopted by the National Assembly: defence: equipment of the forces and
technological excellence of the defence industries], no. 158, 21 Nov. 2013, pp. 51–52.
7 Loi relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 [Law on military planning

for the years 2014 to 2019], French Law no. 2013-1168 of 18 Dec. 2013.
8 French Ministry of the Armed Forces (note 3).
9 Hollande (note 1); and Le Drian, J. Y., French Minister of Defence, ‘Discours de clôture du

colloque pour les 50 ans de la dissuasion’ [Conference closing speech on the 50th anniversary of
deterrence], French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 20 Nov. 2014.
10 Hollande (note 1).
11 Hollande (note 1).
12 French Senate (note 6), p. 52.
13 Le Drian (note 9); and Tran, P., ‘France studies nuclear missile replacement’, Defense News,

29 Nov. 2014.
14 Guisnel, J., ‘Le casse-tête financier de la modernisation de la dissuasion nucléaire’ [The finan-

cial puzzle of modernization of nuclear deterrence], Le Point, 12 May 2016.

 world nuclear forces 2 59

planning for 2019–25 has allocated €37 billion to maintain and modernize
France’s nuclear forces and infrastructure.15 This is a significant increase on
the €23 billion allocated to nuclear forces and infrastructure in the military
planning law for 2014–19.16

15 Agence France-Presse, ‘La France va consacrer 295 milliards d’euros à sa défense entre 2019

et 2025’ [France will spend €295 billion on defence between 2019 and 2025], Le Figaro, 7 Feb. 2018.
16 Collin, J. M., ‘Dissuasion nucléaire: l’obstination française’ [Nuclear deterence: French obsti-

nance], Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP), Report, 19 Feb. 2015.
2 6 0 military spending and armaments, 2 017

V. Chinese nuclear forces

shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen

China maintains an estimated stockpile of about 280 nuclear warheads.

The size of the stockpile has remained fairly stable over the past decade
but is now increasing slowly. Around 234 warheads are assigned to China’s
land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. The remainder are assigned to non-­
operational forces, such as new systems in development, operational systems
that may increase in number in the future and reserves. China may also have
some residual nuclear air-strike capability (see table 6.6). China’s nuclear
warheads are believed to be ‘de-mated’ from their delivery vehicles—that is,
stored separately and not available for immediate use.1
China continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal as part of a long-term
programme to develop more survivable and robust forces consistent with
its nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. The Chinese Government’s stated
goal is to ‘strengthen [China’s] capabilities for strategic deterrence and
nuclear counterattack’ by improving the ‘strategic early warning, command
and control, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection’ capabilities
of its nuclear forces. 2 In accordance with its self-declared minimum deter-
rence posture, China has focused on making qualitative improvements to
its nuclear arsenal rather than significantly increasing its size. 3 These have
included the development of new capabilities in response to the ballistic
missile defences and precision-guided conventional strike systems being
deployed by the United States and other countries. 4
The Chinese Government has reorganized the country’s nuclear forces
as part of a larger move to restructure and modernize the military under
a streamlined command system. 5 At the beginning of 2016 it established a
new People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force (PLARF) as the fourth
service in China’s military. It has command responsibility for all three legs
of China’s nuclear triad and maintains custodial and operational control
over the country’s nuclear warheads. 6 While remaining the ‘core force of
strategic deterrence’, the PLARF has also been put in charge of conventional

1 Stokes, M. A., China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System (Project 2049 Institute:

Arlington, VA, 12 Mar. 2010), p. 8; and Bin, L., ‘China’s potential to contribute to multilateral nuclear
disarmament’, Arms Control Today, vol. 41, no. 2 (Mar. 2011), pp. 17–21.
2 Chinese State Council, China’s Military Strategy, Defense White Paper, section 4 (Information

Office of the State Council: Beijing, May 2015).

3 Cunningham, F. and Fravel, M. T., ‘Assuring assured retaliation: China’s nuclear posture and

US–China strategic stability’, International Security, vol. 40, no. 2 (fall 2015), pp. 12–15.
4 Saalman, L., ‘China’s calculus on hypersonic glide’, SIPRI Commentary, 15 Aug. 2017.
5 Chinese Ministry of National Defense, ‘China establishes Rocket Force and Strategic Support

Force’, 1 Jan. 2016.

6 Cordesman, A. and Kendall, J., The PLA Rocket Force: Evolving Beyond the Second Artillery

Corps (SAC) and Nuclear Dimension (Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington,
 world nuclear forces 2 61

missile systems and tasked with strengthening China’s medium- and long-
range precision strike capabilities.7
Chinese officials have emphasized that the reorganization of the country’s
nuclear command structure does not herald changes to its nuclear policies
or strategy. China remains committed to its no-first-use policy on nuclear
weapons and has pledged to keep its ‘nuclear capability at the minimum
level required for safeguarding its national security’. 8 Nor has the Chinese
Government given any indication that it will change its long-standing policy
of maintaining nuclear forces at a low level of alert in peacetime. In recent
years there have been internal discussions within the Chinese military about
raising the alert level and moving towards a more launch-ready posture in
order to ensure responsiveness.9

Land-based ballistic missiles

China’s nuclear-capable land-based ballistic missile arsenal is undergoing

gradual modernization as China replaces ageing silo-based, liquid-fuelled
missiles with new mobile solid-fuelled models. China’s shift towards more
survivable mobile missiles has been motivated by concerns that US advances
in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and in
precision-guided conventional weapons pose a pre-emptive threat to fixed
missile launch sites and supporting infrastructure.10
In its most recent annual report on Chinese military developments,
the US Department of Defense (DOD) estimated that China deployed
75–100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017.11 The silo-based,
liquid-fuelled, two-stage Dong Feng (DF)-5A and the road-mobile, solid-­
fuelled, three-stage DF-31A are currently China’s longest-range operational
ICBMs and the only missiles in its arsenal capable of targeting all of the con-
tinental USA.
China is developing another longer-range ICBM: the road-mobile, solid­
fuelled, three-stage DF-41, which has an estimated range in excess of
12 000  kilometres, making it capable of striking targets throughout the

DC, 13 Oct. 2016); and Tiezzi, S., ‘The new military force in charge of China’s nuclear weapons’, The
Diplomat, 5 Jan. 2016.
7 Chinese Ministry of National Defense (note 5).
8 Xinhau, ‘China’s nuclear policy, strategy consistent: spokesperson’, 1 Jan. 2016.
9 See Heginbotham, E. et al. (eds), China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for

the United States (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 2017), pp. 131–33; and Kulacki, G., ‘China’s
military calls for putting its nuclear forces on alert’, Union of Concerned Scientists, Jan. 2016.
10 O’Connor, S., ‘Sharpened Fengs: China’s ICBM modernisation alters threat profile’, Jane’s

Intelligence Review, vol. 27, no. 12 (Dec. 2015), pp. 44–49.

11 US Department of Defense (DOD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s

Republic of China 2017, Annual Report to Congress (DOD: Washington, DC, May 2017), p. 31.
2 62 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.6. Chinese nuclear forces, January 2018

Type/Chinese designation Launchers Year first Range Warheads No. of
(US designation) deployed deployed (km)a x yield warheadsb
Land-based ballistic missilesc 131d 186
DF-4 (CSS-3) 5 1980 5 500 1 x 3.3 Mt 10
DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) 10 2015 12 000 3 x 200–300 kt 10
DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3) 10 . . . . MIRV 30
DF-15 (CCS-6 Mod 1) . . 1994 600 (1 x 10–50 kt) . .e
DF-21 (CSS-5 Mods 1/2) <50 1991 2 100 f 1 x 200–300 kt 80
DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 6) . . 2016 2 100 f 1 x 200–300 kt . .
DF-26 (CSS-. .) 16 (2018) >4 000 1 x 200–300 kt 16
DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) 8 2006 >7 000 (1 x 200–300 kt) 8
DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) 32 2007 >11 200 (1 x 200–300 kt) 32
DF-31AG (CSS-10 Mod . .) . . (2018) . . . . . .
DF-41 (CSS-X-20) . . (2018) (12 000) MIRV . .
Sea-based ballistic missilesg 48 48h
JL-2 (CSS-NX-14) 48 (2016) >7 000 (1 x 200–300 kt) 48
Aircrafti (20) (20)
H-6 (B-6) (20) 1965 3 100 1 x bomb/ (20)
(ALCM)
Attack (. .) . . 1972–. . . . 1 x bomb . .
Cruise missilesj . . . .
Total 280 k
. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = uncertain figure; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile;
kt = kiloton; Mt = megaton; MIRV = multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle.
a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading.

b Figures are based on estimates of 1 warhead per nuclear-capable launcher, except the

MIRVed DF-5B, which is estimated to have 3 warheads. The DF-4 and DF-21 have reload
missiles with additional warheads. The warheads are not thought to be deployed on launchers
under normal circumstances but kept in storage facilities. All estimates are approximate.
c China defines missile ranges as short range, <1000 km; medium range, 1000–3000 km;

long range, 3000–8000 km; and intercontinental range, >8000 km.

d The estimate only counts nuclear launchers. Some launchers might have 1 or more reloads

of missiles.
e The US Central Intelligence Agency concluded in 1993 that China had ‘almost certainly’

developed a warhead for the DF-15, although it is unclear whether the capability was ever
fielded.
f The range of the nuclear DF-21 variants (CSS-5 Mods 1, 2, and 6) is thought to be greater

than the 1750 km normally reported.

g The JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which dates from the 1980s, is no

longer considered to be operational.

h The estimate is based on the assumption that warheads have been produced for the

JL-2 SLBMs on China’s 4 Type 094 (Jin class) nuclear­-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). The operational status of the missile is unclear.
i Chinese aircraft do not currently have a nuclear weapon delivery mission but it is assumed

here that some residual nuclear capability exists.

j The US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center ’s (NASIC) 2013 assessment

on ballistic and cruise missile threats listed the DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile as
 world nuclear forces 2 63

‘conventional or nuclear’ and the US Air Force Global Strike Command’s command brief
from 2013 listed the CJ-20 as nuclear. These designations were not used in the NASIC 2017
assessment on ballistic and cruise missile threats but it is possible that China is developing
nuclear-capable cruise missiles.
k As well as the c. 254 warheads thought to be assigned to operational forces (which includes

the estimate for residual air-strike capability), a further 26 or so warheads are believed to be in
storage or production to arm additional DF-26s and future DF-41 missiles. The total stockpile
is believed to comprise c. 280 warheads and is slowly increasing.
Sources: US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise
Missile Threat, various years; US Air Force Global Strike Command, various documents; US
Central Intelligence Agency, various documents; US Defense Intelligence Agency, various
documents; US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, various years; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 2018 (Routledge: London, 2018); Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. and McKinzie, M. G.,
Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning (Federation of American Scientists/Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council: Washington, DC, Nov. 2006); ‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, various issues; Google Earth; and authors’ estimates.

continental USA.12 It is also believed to be developing rail- and silo-based

versions of the missile.13 According to a Chinese state media report in 2017,
the DF-41 could enter service in the first half of 2018.14 The PLARF carried
out a flight test of a DF-41 ICBM, apparently carrying two dummy warheads,
near the South China Sea on 6 November 2017. This was the eighth test of the
system since 2012.15
After many years of research and development, China has modified a small
number of ICBMs to deliver nuclear warheads in multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). China has prioritized the deploy-
ment of MIRVs in order to improve its warhead penetration capabilities in
response to advances in US and, to a lesser extent, Indian and Russian missile
defences.16 The missile identified as being MIRV-equipped is a modified
version of the liquid-fuelled, silo-based DF-5A ICBM, the DF-5B.17 In Febru­
ary 2017 the Chinese Ministry of National Defense acknowledged the test
launch of a new variant of the missile, the DF-5C, and cited US media reports
that it might carry as many as 10 warheads. However, it did not confirm the
reports.18 The deployment of MIRVs on the ageing DF-5 missiles may have

12 Gady, F. S., ‘China tests new missile capable of hitting entire United States’, The Diplomat,

19 Aug. 2015.
13 O’Halloran, J. (ed.), ‘DF-41’, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015–16 (IHS Jane’s: Coulsdon,

2015), pp. 21–22.

14 Deng, X., ‘Missile Dongfeng-41 matures considerably, will serve PLA within months: analysts’,

Global Times, 19 Nov. 2017.

15 Gertz, B., ‘China confirms DF-41 missile test’, Washington Free Beacon, 6 Dec. 2017.
16 Lewis, J., ‘China’s belated embrace of MIRVs’, eds M. Krepon, T. Wheeler and S. Mason, The

Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age (Stimson Center: Washington,
DC, May 2016), pp. 95–99.
17 US Department of Defense (note 11).
18 Chinese Ministry of National Defense, ‘China says its trial launch of DF-5C missile normal’,

Press release, 6 Feb. 2017; and Gertz, B., ‘China tests missile with 10 warheads’, Washington Free
Beacon, 31 Jan. 2017.
2 64 military spending and armaments, 2 017

been an interim arrangement necessitated by delays in the develop­ment of

the DF-41 mobile ICBM.19 Chinese analysts have speculated that the DF-41
can carry 6–10 MIRVed warheads , although there is significant uncertainty
about the actual capability. 20 In 2017 Chinese state media reports indicated
that a new variant of the DF-31A ICBM, the DF-31AG, might be armed with
MIRVed warheads. 21 However, MIRVed warheads would require a signifi-
cantly modified DF-31A missile, which according to the US Air Force National
Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) carries only one warhead. 22 The
DF-31AG might therefore be an improved launcher for the existing DF-31A.
In 2016 China began deploying the new DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM), which is capable of precision conventional or nuclear strikes
against ground targets, as well as conventional strikes against naval targets.
It has an estimated maximum range exceeding 4000 km and can reach
targets in the western Pacific Ocean, including the US territory of Guam. 23
The PLARF currently deploys one nuclear-capable medium-range bal­
listic missile. The DF-21 is a two-stage, solid-fuelled mobile missile that was
first deployed in 1991. A modified version, the DF-21A, was deployed begin-
ning in 1996. 24 Reports indicate that a new version of the DF-21 was deployed
in 2016. 25

Ballistic missile submarines

China continues to pursue its long-standing strategic goal of developing

and deploying a sea-based nuclear deterrent. According to the US DOD’s
2017 annual report on China’s military power, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has
commissioned four Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). 26 A fifth submarine with a modified hull structure, designated by
some sources as the Type 094A, may be under construction. 27

19 Minnick, W., ‘Chinese parade proves Xi in charge’, Defense News, 6 Sep. 2015.
20 Deng (note 14); and Gertz (note 15).
21 Fisher, R., ‘DF-31AG ICBM can carry multiple warheads, claims China’s state media’, Jane’s
Defence Weekly, 16 Aug. 2017, p. 9.
22 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile

Threat (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2017), p. 29.
23 US Department of Defense (note 11), pp. 31, 49; and Wilson, J., ‘China’s expanding ability to con-

duct conventional missile strikes on Guam’, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Staff Research Report, 10 May 2016, p. 8.
24 O’Halloran, J. (ed.), ‘DF-21’, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015–16 (IHS Jane’s: Coulsdon,

2015), pp. 15–17. Two subsequent versions of the missile were designed for conventional anti-ship
and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions.
25 US Department of Defense (DOD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s

Republic of China 2016, Annual Report to Congress (DOD: Washington, DC, May 2016), p. 58.
26 US Department of Defense (note 11), p. 24. The Type 094 SSBN is designated the Jin class by the

United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

27 Fisher, R., ‘Images show possible new variant of China’s Type 094 SSBN’, Jane’s Defence

Weekly, 15 July 2016.

 world nuclear forces 2 6 5

The Type 094 submarine can carry up to 12 three-stage, solid-fuelled

JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The JL-2 is a sea-based
variant of the DF-31 ICBM. It has an estimated maximum range in excess
of 7000 km and is believed to carry a single nuclear warhead. The PLAN is
thought to have deployed the JL-2 SLBM. According to the US DOD’s 2017
annual report, the four operational Type 094 SSBNs are equipped to carry
up to 12 JL-2s. 28
There has been considerable speculation about when a Type 094 SSBN
carry­ing nuclear-armed JL-2 SLBMs will begin deterrence patrols. Although
there were media reports in 2016 that China would soon commence patrols,
there was no evidence in 2017 that they had begun. 29 In May 2017 the Dir­ector
of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stew-
art, stated that, when armed with a JL-2 SLBM, the PLAN’s Type 094 SSBN
‘will provide Beijing with its first sea-based nuclear deterrent’. 30 The annual
US DOD reports on China’s military power have been predicting since 2014
that commencement of submarine deterrence patrols was imminent, but the
2017 report does not refer to the issue. The routine deployment by China of
nuclear weapons on its SSBNs would constitute a significant change to the
country’s long-held practice of keeping nuclear warheads in central storage
in peacetime.
The PLAN is developing its next-generation SSBN, the Type 096. In 2017
the US DOD assessed that construction is likely to begin in the early 2020s. 31
Reports vary widely on the design parameters, but the new submarine is
expected to be larger, quieter and equipped with more missile launch tubes
than the Type 094. The Type 096 will reportedly be armed with a longer-
range successor to the JL-2, the JL-3 SLBM. 32

Aircraft and cruise missiles

According to the US DOD’s 2017 annual report on China’s military power,

the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) ‘does not currently have a nuclear mission’. 33
However, it is likely that some residual nuclear capability exists. In 2016 the

28 US Department of Defense (note 11), p. 60.

29 Borger, J., ‘China to send nuclear-armed submarines into Pacific amid tensions with US’, The
Guardian, 26 May 2016.
30 Stewart, V. R., Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, ‘World-

wide Threat Assessment’, Armed Services Committee, US Senate, 23 May 2017, p. 10.
31 US Department of Defense (note 11), p. 24.
32 Dempsey, J. and Boyd, H., ‘Beyond JL-2: China’s development of a successor SLBM continues’,

Military Balance blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 7 Aug. 2017.
33 US Department of Defense (note 11), p. 61. Medium-range combat aircraft were China’s earliest

means of delivering nuclear weapons and were used to conduct more than 12 atmospheric nuclear
tests in the 1960s and 1970s. Norris, R., Burrows, A. S. and Fieldhouse, R. W., Nuclear Weapons
Databook, vol. 5: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, National Resources Defense Council
(Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1994), pp. 367–68.
2 6 6 military spending and armaments, 2 017

PLAAF confirmed reports in the Chinese state media that it was building a
long-range strategic bomber. 34 According to Chinese military sources, the
aircraft, known as the H-20, will have stealth characteristics com­parable to
those of the US B-2 bomber. 35 The PLAAF was reportedly assigned a ‘stra­
tegic deterrence’ mission in 2012. 36 However, it has not confirmed whether
the new aircraft will have a nuclear role.
The PLA currently deploys or is believed to be developing several types
of ground-, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. In its 2017 assessment of
ballistic missile and cruise missile threats, NASIC did not list any Chinese
cruise missile as being nuclear-capable. 37 In its previous assessment, pub-
lished in 2013, NASIC had listed the ground-launched Donghai-10 (DH-10,
also designated Changjian-10, CJ-10) as a ‘conventional or nuclear’ (dual-­
capable) system. In his statement in May 2017, Stewart noted that China
was developing two new air-launched ballistic missiles, ‘one of which may
include a nuclear payload’, but he did not identify the systems. 38

34 Zhao, L., ‘PLA Air Force commander confirms new strategic bomber’, China Daily, 2 Sep. 2016;

and Zhao, L., ‘Long-range bomber may be in China’s plans’, China Daily, 7 July 2015.
35 Tate, A., ‘Details emerge about requirement for China’s new strategic bomber’, Jane’s Defence

Weekly, 4 Jan. 2017, p. 4.

36 US Department of Defense (note 25), p. 38.
37 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (note 22).
38 Stewart (note 30).
 world nuclear forces 2 67

VI. Indian nuclear forces

shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen

India is estimated to have a growing arsenal of 130–40 nuclear weapons

(see table 6.7). This figure is based on calculations of India’s inventory of
weapon‑grade plutonium and the number of operational nuclear-capable
delivery systems. India is widely believed to be gradually expanding the size
of its nuclear weapon stockpile as well as its infrastructure for producing
nuclear warheads.

Military fissile material production

India’s nuclear weapons are believed to be plutonium-based. The plutonium

was produced at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Trombay,
Mumbai, by the 40-megawatt-thermal (MW(t)) heavy water CIRUS reactor,
which was shut down at the end of 2010, and the 100-MW(t) Dhruva heavy
water reactor. India operates a plutonium reprocessing plant for military
purposes at the BARC.1
India plans to build six fast breeder reactors by the 2030s, which will
significantly increase its capacity to produce plutonium that could be used
for building weapons. 2 An unsafeguarded 500-megawatt-electric (MW(e))
prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) is being built at the Indira Gandhi
Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) complex at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu.
The PFBR is expected to be commissioned in mid-2018 following a series of
technical delays. 3 The IGCAR has announced that a fast reactor fuel cycle
facility will be built at Kalpakkam to reprocess spent fuel from the PFBR and
future fast breeder reactors. The plant is scheduled to be commissioned by
2022. 4
India is currently expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities. It con-
tinues to enrich uranium at the small gas centrifuge facility at the Rattehalli
Rare Materials Plant (RMP) near Mysore, Karnataka, to produce highly
enriched uranium (HEU) for use as naval reactor fuel. India has begun con-
struction of a new industrial-scale centrifuge enrichment plant, the Special
Material Enrichment Facility (SMEF), at a site in Karnataka. This will be a
dual-use facility that produces HEU for both military and civilian purposes. 5

1 International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM), ‘Facilities: reprocessing plants’, 12 Feb. 2018.
2 Ramana, M. V., ‘A fast reactor at any cost: the perverse pursuit of breeder reactors in India’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 3 Nov. 2016.

3 Deccan Herald, ‘Plan to make 6 N-reactors operational by 2039’, 5 Nov. 2017.
4 The Hindu, ‘HCC to construct fuel processing facility at Kalpakkam’, 7 Aug. 2017; and World

Nuclear News, ‘India awards contract for fast reactor fuel cycle facility’, 8 Aug. 2017.
5 Albright, D. and Kelleher-Vergantini, S., India’s Stocks of Civil and Military Plutonium and Highly

Enriched Uranium, End 2014 (Institute for Science and International Security: Washington, DC,
2 6 8 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.7. Indian nuclear forces, January 2018

Type Launchers Year first Range Warheads No. of
(US/Indian designation) deployed deployed (km)a x yieldb warheadsc
Aircraftd 48 48
Mirage 2000H 32 1985 1 850 1 x bomb 32
Jaguar IS 16 1981 1 600 1 x bomb 16
Land-based ballistic missiles 60 60
Prithvi-II 24 2003 250 1 x 12 kt 24
Agni-I 20 2007 >700 1 x 10–40 kt 20
Agni-II 8 2011 >2 000 1 x 10–40 kt 8
Agni-III 8 2014 >3 200 1 x 10–40 kt 8
Agni-IV 0 (2018) >3 500 1 x 10–40 kt 0
Agni-V 0 (2020) >5 200 1 x 10–40 kt 0
Sea-based ballistic missiles 14 16
Dhanush 2 (2013) 400 1 x 12 kt 4e
K-15 (B05)f (12) g (2018) 700 1 x 12 kt (12)
K-4 (4) g .. 3 500 1 x 10–40 kt 0
Cruise missiles . . . . . . . . . .
Nirbhay ALCM h .. .. (>700) .. ..
Total 130–140 i
. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = uncertain figure; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile;
kt = kiloton.
a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading. Missile payloads may have to be reduced in order to achieve
maximum range.
b The yields of India’s nuclear warheads are not known. The 1998 nuclear tests demonstrated

yields of up to 12 kt. Since then it is possible that boosted warheads have been introduced with
a higher yield, perhaps up to 40 kt. There is no open-source evidence that India has developed
2-stage thermonuclear warheads.
c Aircraft and several missile types are dual-capable. Cruise missile launchers carry more

than 1 missile. This estimate counts an average of 1 warhead per launcher. Warheads are not
deployed on launchers but kept in separate storage facilities. All estimates are approximate.
d Other fighter-bombers that could potentially have a secondary nuclear role include the

Su-30MKI.
e Each Dhanush-equipped ship is thought to have possibly 1 reload.
f Some sources have referred to the K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) as

Sagarika, which was the name of the missile development project.

g The K-15 and K-4 use the same 4 launch tubes on the INS Arihant nuclear-powered bal­

listic missile sub­marine (SSBN). Each launch tube can hold either 3  K-15s contained in a
triple­-missile canister or 1 of the larger K-4 SLBMs (once the K-4 becomes operational). Thus,
according to the US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), the K-15
has 12 possible launchers and the K-4 has 4.
h There are reports that the Nirbhay, which is in development, might have a nuclear capabil-

ity, but the Indian Government has not confirmed them.

i In addition to the 124 warheads estimated to be assigned to fielded launchers, warheads

for additional Agni-III and future Agni-IV medium-range ballistic missiles may already have
been produced giving a total stockpile of 130–40 warheads.
 world nuclear forces 2 69

Sources: Indian Ministry of Defence, annual reports and press releases; International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (Routledge: London, 2018); US Air Force,
National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,
vari­ous years; Indian news media reports; ‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
various issues; and authors’ estimates.

India’s expanding centrifuge enrichment capacity is motivated by plans to

build new naval propulsion reactors. However, the HEU produced at the
plants could also hypothetically be used to manufacture thermonuclear or
boosted-fission nuclear weapons. 6

Aircraft

Aircraft constitute the most mature component of India’s nuclear strike

capabilities. The Indian Air Force has reportedly certified the Mirage
2000H multi-role combat aircraft for delivery of nuclear gravity bombs.7 It
is widely speculated that the Air Force’s Jaguar IS fighter-bomber may also
have a nuclear delivery role. 8

Land-based missiles

Under its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, which began

in 1983, India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
has developed two families of nuclear-capable, land-based ballistic missiles:
the Prithvi family (although only the Prithvi-II is thought to be nuclear-­
capable), consisting of three types of road-mobile, short-range missiles; and
the Agni family of longer-range, solid-fuelled ballistic missiles. The latter
are designed to provide a quick-reaction nuclear capability and have taken
over much of the Prithvi’s nuclear delivery role.
The Agni-I is a single-stage, road-mobile missile that has a range of
700 kilometres. The nuclear-capable missile was first deployed in 2007. The
Agni-II is a two-stage, solid-fuelled rail-mobile ballistic missile that can
deliver a 1000-kilogram payload to a range exceeding 2000 km. The missile
is in service with the Indian Army under the Strategic Forces Command
(SFC), which is the body responsible for exercising operational command
and control over the country’s nuclear weapons. The Agni-II appears to
have been plagued by technical problems; according to estimates in 2017,

2 Nov. 2015).
6 Levy, A., ‘India is building a top-secret nuclear city to produce thermonuclear weapons, experts

say’, Foreign Policy, 16 Dec. 2015.

7 Kampani, G., ‘New Delhi’s long nuclear journey: how secrecy and institutional roadblocks

delayed India’s weaponization’, International Security, vol. 38, no. 4 (spring 2014), pp. 94, 97–98.
8 Cohen, S. and Dasgupta, S., Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (Brookings

Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2010), pp. 77–78; and India Defence Update, ‘SEPECAT Jaguar is
India’s only tactical nuclear carrying and ground attack aircraft’, 13 Dec. 2016.
270 military spending and armaments, 2 017

fewer than 10 launchers have been deployed.9 On 4 May 2017 a user trial of
an Agni-II failed when the test had to be aborted shortly after the launch
of the missile. Indian defence officials did not comment on the cause of the
failure.10
The Agni-III is a two-stage, rail-mobile missile with a range exceeding
3200 km. It was inducted into service in 2011 but, according to estimates in
2017, fewer than 10 launchers have been deployed.11 On 27 April 2017 the SFC
successfully test launched an Agni-III as part of a user training exercise. The
missile was randomly chosen from the production lot.12
India is developing two longer-range ballistic missiles, the Agni-IV and
the Agni-V, which would give it the capability to strike targets throughout
China for the first time. The two-stage, road-mobile Agni-IV missile, which
has a range of over 3500 km, is in development and undergoing user trials.
An Agni-IV was successfully test launched by the SFC on 2 January 2017—
the sixth consecutive successful test of the missile.13
The DRDO has prioritized the development of the three-stage, road-­
mobile Agni-V missile with a range in excess of 5000 km. Unlike the other
Agni missiles, the Agni-V is designed to be stored in and launched from a
new mobile canister system, an arrangement that, among other things,
increases operational readiness by reducing the time required to place the
missiles on alert in a crisis.14 On 18 January 2018 an Agni-V missile was test
launched from a sealed canister mounted on a truck located at the Integrated
Test Range complex on Abdul Kalam Island (formerly Wheeler Island). The
missile flew on a programmed trajectory for 4900 km. This was the third
consecutive launch from a canister on a road-mobile launcher and the fifth
successful flight test of the Agni-V since 2012.15 The missile will undergo
several additional test flights before it is inducted into service.
India is pursuing a technology development programme for multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). However, there are
conflicting statements from DRDO officials as to whether India will deploy
MIRVs on the Agni-V or a future Agni-VI with an even longer range.16 The

9 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile

Threat (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2017), p. 25.
10 Pandit, R., ‘Trial of Agni-II ballistic missile fails: sources’, Times of India, 4 May 2017.
11 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (note 9).
12 New Indian Express, ‘India successfully test fires nuclear capable Agni-III missile off Odisha

coast’, 27 Apr. 2017.

13 Subramanian, T. S., ‘Agni-IV test a “grand success”’, The Hindu, 2 Jan. 2017.
14 Aroor, S., ‘New chief of India’s military research complex reveals brave new mandate’, India

Today, 13 July 2013.

15 Gurung, S. K., ‘India successfully test-fires nuclear-capable Agni-5 ballistic missile’, Economic

Times, 18 Jan. 2018.

16 Basrur, R. and Sankaran, J., ‘India’s slow and unstoppable move to MIRV’, eds M. Krepon,

T. Wheeler and S. Mason, The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age
(Stimson Center: Washington, DC, May 2016), pp. 149–76.
 world nuclear forces 271

Agni-VI is in the design phase and awaiting approval but may begin testing
as early as 2018.

Sea-based missiles

India continues to develop the naval component of its triad of nuclear forces
in pursuit of an assured second-strike capability. It is building a fleet of up
to five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as part of its
four-decade-old Advanced Technology Vessel project.
India’s first indigenously built SSBN, the INS Arihant, was launched
in 2009 and formally commissioned in 2016.17 According to Indian media
reports in January 2018, the Arihant had been out of service for 10 months for
repairs after its propulsion compartment suffered significant flood damage
when a hatch was left open by mistake while leaving harbour.18 A second
SSBN, the INS Arighat (originally thought to have been named Aridhaman),
was launched in November 2017.19 Construction work has reportedly begun
on a third and fourth submarine, with expected launch dates in 2020 and
2022, respectively. 20
The Arihant is equipped with a four-tube vertical launch system and
will carry up to 12 two-stage, 700-km range K-15 (also known as B05)
sub­marine-­launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Unconfirmed reports have
claimed that the Arighat is equipped with eight launch tubes to carry up
to 24 K-15 missiles (three per launch tube), but the United States Air Force
National Air and Space Intelligence Center made no mention of additional
launch tubes on a second submarine in its 2017 assessment of ballistic missile
and cruise missile threats. 21 In November 2015 the SFC and the DRDO con-
ducted an under­water ejection test of a dummy missile, reportedly from the
Arihant, but the maiden flight test of a K-15 from the submarine had not been
conducted as of the end of 2017. 22
The DRDO is developing a two-stage, 3500-km range SLBM, known as
the K-4, that will eventually replace the K-15. 23 The Arihant will be capable
of carrying four K-4s but the Arighat and subsequent SSBNs will be able

17 Dinakar, P., ‘Now, India has a nuclear triad’, The Hindu, 18 Oct. 2016.
18 Peri, D. and Joseph, J., ‘INS Arihant left crippled after “accident” 10 months ago’, The Hindu,
8 Jan. 2018.
19 Gady, F. S., ‘The Indian Navy’s second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine was quietly

launched in November’, The Diplomat, 13 Dec. 2017.

20 Unnithan, S., ‘A peek into India’s top secret and costliest defence project, nuclear submarines’,

India Today, 10 Dec. 2017.

21 Indian Defence Update, ‘India’s 2nd nuclear submarine “INS Aridhaman” to be deadlier than

INS Arihant’, 27 Dec. 2016; and US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (note 9).
22 Indian Defence News, ‘Confirmed: first ejection test of K-15 (B-05) SLBM from INS Arihant

SSBN’, 28 Nov. 2015.

23 Jha, S., ‘India’s undersea deterrent’, The Diplomat, 30 Mar. 2016; and US Air Force, National Air

and Space Intelligence Center (note 9), p. 33.

272 military spending and armaments, 2 017

to carry eight. On 17 December 2017 the test launch of a K-4 missile from
an underwater pontoon in the Bay of Bengal failed. Indian officials did not
release information on the cause of the failure. 24 The missile had previously
been tested four times, including a test launch from the Arihant in 2016. 25
The DRDO is currently developing a K-5 SLBM, which is expected to have
a range in excess of 5000 km, and has announced plans to develop a longer-
range K-6 SLBM. 26
The nuclear-capable Dhanush missile is a naval version of the Prithvi-II
that is launched from a surface ship. It can reportedly carry a 500-kg war-
head to a maximum range of 400 km and is designed to be able to hit both
sea- and shore-based targets. 27 The Dhanush has been inducted into service
with the Indian Navy on two Sukanya class coastal patrol ships based at the
naval base near Karwar on the west coast of India.

Cruise missiles

The DRDO has been developing a long-range subsonic cruise missile since
2004. Known as the Nirbhay, it has a range exceeding 700 km and is believed
to have ground-, sea- and air-launched versions. Development of the missile
has been delayed by technical problems with its flight control software
and navigation system. Following a second consecutive failed test flight in
December 2016, sources within the DRDO indicated that the Nirbhay pro-
gramme was likely to be terminated. 28 However, on 7 November 2017 the
Indian Ministry of Defence announced that the DRDO had conducted a
successful test flight of a Nirbhay cruise missile at the Integrated Test Range
on Abdul Kalam Island that ‘had achieved all the mission objectives’. 29 The
Indian Government has not confirmed media reports that the Nirbhay has
the capability to carry nuclear warheads. 30

24 Pubby, M., ‘Setback for Indian missile programme: two failures in a week, submarine version

stuck’, The Print, 24 Dec. 2017.

25 Rout, H. K., ‘Maiden test of undersea K-4 missile from Arihant submarine’, New Indian Express,

9 Apr. 2016.
26 Unnithan (note 20); and Jha (note 23).
27 Mallikarjun, Y., ‘Dhanush missile successfully test-fired from ship’, The Hindu, updated 3 Nov.

2016; and US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (note 9), p. 33.
28 Subramanian, T. S., ‘Nirbhay missile test “an utter failure”’, The Hindu, 21 Dec. 2016; and

Rout, H. K., ‘DRDO’s cruise missile project Nirbhay on verge of closure’, New Indian Express, 23 Dec.
2016.
29 Indian Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, ‘DRDO conducts successful flight trial

of “Nirbhay” sub-sonic cruise missile’, 7 Nov. 2017.

30 Pandit, R., ‘India successfully tests its first nuclear-capable cruise missile’, Times of India,

8 Nov. 2017; and Gady, F. S., ‘India successfully test fires indigenous nuclear-capable cruise missile’,
The Diplomat, 8 Nov. 2017.
 world nuclear forces 273

VII. Pakistani nuclear forces

shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen

Pakistan continues to prioritize the development and deployment of new

nuclear weapons and delivery systems as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence
posture’ vis-à-vis India. It is estimated that Pakistan possessed 140–50 war-
heads as of January 2018 (see table 6.8). Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal is
likely to expand significantly over the next decade, although estimates of the
increase in warhead numbers vary considerably.1
Pakistan is believed to be gradually increasing its military fissile material
holdings, which include both plutonium and highly enriched uranium
(HEU) (see section X). Pakistan’s plutonium production complex is located
at Khushab in the province of Punjab. It consists of four operational heavy
water nuclear reactors and a heavy water production plant. 2 Pakistan
appears to be increasing its capacity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel—that
is, to chemically separate plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. A small
reprocessing plant has been expanded at the New Laboratories facility of
the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Rawal-
pindi. A larger reprocessing plant has been constructed at the Chashma
Nuclear Power Complex in Punjab and may already be operational. 3
Uranium enrichment takes place at the gas centrifuge plant in the Khan
Research Laboratories (KRL) complex at Kahuta in Punjab and at a smaller
plant located at Gadwal, also in Punjab. A new uranium enrichment centri­
fuge plant may be under construction in the KRL complex at Kahuta. 4
Pakistan’s capacity to produce HEU for nuclear weapons is constrained by
its limited indigenous supply of natural uranium. 5

Aircraft

The Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) Mirage III and Mirage V combat aircraft
are the most likely aircraft to have been given a nuclear delivery role. The
Mirage III has been used for developmental test flights of the nuclear-­capable

1 Dalton, T. and Krepon, M., A Normal Nuclear Pakistan (Stimson Center and Carnegie Endow-

ment for International Peace: Washington, DC, Aug. 2015); and Kristensen, H. M. and Norris, R.,
‘Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 72, no. 6 (Oct.–Nov. 2016),
pp. 368–76.
2 Burkhard, S., Lach, A. and Pabian, F., ‘Khushab update’, Institute for Science and International

Security, Report, 7 Sep. 2017.

3 Albright, D. and Kelleher-Vergantini, S., ‘Pakistan’s Chashma plutonium separation plant: pos-

sibly operational’, Institute for Science and International Security, Imagery Brief, 20 Feb. 2015.
4 Cartwright, C. and Dewey, K., ‘Spin strategy: likely uranium facility identified in Pakistan’,

Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 28, no. 11 (Nov. 2016), pp. 48–52.
5 International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM), ‘Pakistan may be building a new enrichment

facility’, IPFM Blog, 16 Sep. 2016.

274 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.8. Pakistani nuclear forces, January 2018

Type Launchers Year first Range Warheads No. of
(US/Pakistani designation) deployed deployed (km)a x yieldb warheadsc
Aircraft 36 36
F-16A/Bd 24 1998 1 600 1 x bomb 24
Mirage III/V 12 1998 2 100 1 x bomb 12
or Ra’ad ALCM
Land-based missiles 102 e 102
Abdali (Hatf-2) 10 (2015) 200 1 x 12 kt 10
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) 16 2004 290 1 x 12 kt 16
Shaheen-I (Hatf-4) 16 2003 750 1 x 12 kt 16
Shaheen-IA (Hatf-4)f . . (2017) 900 1 x 12 kt . .
Shaheen-II (Hatf-6) 12 2014 1 500 1 x 10–40 kt 12
Shaheen-III (Hatf-6)g . . (2018) 2 750 1 x 10–40 kt . .
Ghauri (Hatf-5) 24 2003 1 250 1 x 10–40 kt 24
Nasr (Hatf-9) 24 (2013) 60–70 1 x 12 kt 24
Ababeel (Hatf-. .) 0 . . 2 200 MIRV or MRV 0h
Cruise missiles 12 12
Babur GLCM (Hatf-7) 12 (2014) 350 i 1 x 12 kt 12
Babur-2 GLCM (Hatf-. .) . . . .j 700 1 x 12 kt . .
Babur-3 SLCM (Hatf-. .) 0 . . k 450 1 x 12 kt 0
Ra’ad ALCM (Hatf-8) . . (2017) 350 1 x 12 kt . .
Ra’ad-2 ALCM (Hatf-. .) . . (2018) >350 1 x 12 kt . .
Total 140–150
. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = uncertain figure; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile;
GLCM = ground-launched cruise missile; kt = kiloton; MIRV = multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicle; MRV = multiple re-entry vehicle; SLCM = sea-launched cruise missile.
a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to

flight profile and weapon loading. Missile payloads may have to be reduced in order to achieve
maximum range.
b The yields of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are not known. The 1998 nuclear tests demon-

strated a yield of up to 12 kt. Since then it is possible that boosted warheads have been intro-
duced with higher yields. There is no open-source evidence that Pakistan has developed
2-stage thermonuclear warheads.
c Aircraft and several missile types are dual-capable. Cruise missile launchers carry more

than 1 missile. This estimate counts an average of 1 warhead per launcher. Warheads are not
deployed on launchers but kept in separate storage facilities.
d There are unconfirmed reports that some of the 40 F-16 combat aircraft procured from the

USA in the 1980s were modified by Pakistan for a nuclear delivery role.
e Some launchers might have 1 or more reloads of missiles.
f It is unclear whether the Shaheen-IA has the same designation as the Shaheen-I.
g It is unclear whether the Shaheen-III has the same designation as the Shaheen-II.
h According to the Pakistani armed forces, the missile is ‘capable of delivering multiple war-

heads’, using MIRV technology.

i The Pakistani Government claims the range is 700 km, double the range reported by the

US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).

j The Babur-2, which was first test launched on 14 Dec. 2016, is an improved version of the

original Babur GLCM.

k The first test launch of a Babur-3 SLCM was carried out from an underwater platform on

9 Jan. 2017.
 world nuclear forces 275

Sources: Pakistani Ministry of Defence; various documents; US Air Force, National Air and
Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, various years; Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (Routledge: London, 2018);
‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and authors’ estimates.

Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), while the Mirage V is believed to

have been given a strike role with nuclear gravity bombs. 6
Pakistan is acquiring the JF-17 Thunder aircraft, a multi-role lightweight
fighter jointly developed with China, to replace the ageing Mirage aircraft.
There are reports that the PAF intends to integrate the dual-capable Ra’ad
ALCM (see below) on to the JF-17, although whether this signifies a nuclear
delivery role for the aircraft is unclear.7
Pakistan procured 40 F-16A/B combat aircraft from the United States in
the mid-1980s. There are unconfirmed reports that some of these aircraft
were modified by Pakistan for a nuclear delivery role. 8

Land-based missiles

Pakistan is expanding its nuclear-capable ballistic missile arsenal, which

consists of a series of short- and medium-range systems. It currently deploys
the Ghaznavi (also designated Hatf-3) and Shaheen-I (Hatf-4) solid-fuelled,
road-mobile short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). An extended-range ver-
sion of the Shaheen-I, the Shaheen-IA, is still in development.
Pakistan deploys two types of nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM): the liquid-fuelled, road-mobile Ghauri (Hatf-5) with a
range of 1250  kilometres; and the two-stage, solid-fuelled, road-mobile
Shaheen-II (Hatf-6) with a range of 1500 km.9 A longer-range variant, the
Shaheen-III, is currently in development and was first test launched in
2015.10 The missile has a declared range of 2750 km, making it the longest-­
range system to be tested by Pakistan to date.
Pakistan’s National Defence Complex is developing a new MRBM, the
nuclear-capable Ababeel, based on the Shaheen-III’s airframe and solid-fuel
motors.11 On 24 January 2017 Pakistan announced that the first test launch

6 Kerr, P. and Nikitin, M. B., Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Report for Congress RL3248 (US Congress, CRS: Washington, DC, 1 Aug. 2016), p. 7.
7 Fisher, R., ‘JF-17 Block II advances with new refuelling probe’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 27 Jan.

2016; and Ansari, U., ‘Despite missile integration, nuke role unlikely for Pakistan’s JF-17’, Defense
News, 7 Feb. 2013.
8 For further analysis on the role of the F-16 see Kristensen and Norris (note 1).
9 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile

Threat (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2017), p. 25.
10 Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations, ‘Shaheen 3 missile test’, Press Release PR-61/2015-

ISPR, 9 Mar. 2015.

11 The National Defence Complex (also referred to as the National Development Complex or

National Development Centre) and its supervisory organization, the National Engineering and
Scientific Commission (NESCOM), are the principal bodies responsible for Pakistan’s missile
276 military spending and armaments, 2 017

of the Ababeel, aimed at ‘validating various design and technical para­meters

of the weapon system’, had been successfully carried out.12 According to the
armed forces’ press service, the missile is ‘capable of delivering mul­tiple
warheads, using Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) tech-
nology’ and is being developed to ‘[ensure the] survivability of Pakistan’s
ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
environment’.13 Pakistan’s National Defence Complex is reportedly develop-
ing the technology to deploy MIRV-equipped missiles as a countermeasure
to India’s prospective ballistic missile defence system.14
Pakistan has prioritized the development of nuclear-capable short-range
missiles that appear to be intended for tactical nuclear roles and missions.
In pursuing its ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ posture, Pakistan’s defence
planners have given particular attention to nuclear options for responding
to an Indian military doctrine that envisages carrying out rapid but limited
conventional attacks on Pakistani territory using forward-deployed forces.15
Pakistan has deployed two land-based, single-stage ballistic missiles
capable of delivering compact, low-yield nuclear warheads as well as con-
ventional warheads: the 200-km range, road-mobile Abdali (Hatf-2); and
the 60-km range, road-mobile Nasr (Hatf-9). The Nasr system was initially
tested in 2011 using a single-tube launcher but has subsequently appeared
with a mobile multi-tube launcher that can fire a four-missile salvo.16 An
improved 70-km range version was test launched on 5 July 2017.17

Sea-based cruise missiles

As part of its efforts to achieve a secure second-strike capability, Pakistan

is seeking to match India’s nuclear triad by developing a sea-based nuclear
force. On 9 January 2017 Pakistan announced that the first test launch
of a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), the Babur-3, had been
success­fully carried out from ‘an underwater, mobile platform’ deployed
in the Indian Ocean.18 The missile was said to be a sea-based variant of the

develop­ment programmes. Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘National Defence Complex’, updated 27 Sep.
2011.
12 Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release PR-34/2017-ISPR, 24 Jan. 2017.
13 Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations (note 12).
14 Tasleem, S., ‘No Indian BMD for no Pakistani MIRVS’, Stimson Center, Off Ramps Initiative,

Paper, 2 Oct. 2017.

15 Ahmed, M., ‘Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons and their impact on stability’, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, Regional Insight, 30 June 2016; and Sankaran, J., ‘Pakistan’s
battlefield nuclear policy: a risky solution to an exaggerated threat’, International Security, vol. 39,
no. 3 (winter 2014/15), pp. 118–51.
16 Ansari, U., ‘Pakistan holds parade after 7-year break’, Defense News, 24 Mar. 2015; and

Haroon, A., ‘Pakistan test fires Hatf-IX’, Dispatch News Desk, 26 Sep. 2014.
17 Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release PR-344/2017-ISPR, 5 July 2017.
18 Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release PR-10/2017-ISPR, 9 Jan. 2017.
 world nuclear forces 277

Babur-2  ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and to have a range of

450 km (see below). It is most likely to be deployed on the Pakistan Navy’s
diesel-electric Agosta class submarines, which are currently in service.19
In 2012 Pakistan established a Naval Strategic Force Command as the
‘custodian of the nation’s second-strike capability’. 20 It is unclear whether
the Pakistan Navy has developed a command and control infrastructure
to manage a submarine-based nuclear force or custodial arrangements for
nuclear warheads deployed on patrol. 21

Ground- and air-launched cruise missiles

In addition to the sea-based Babur-3 SLCM, Pakistan continues to develop

two types of nuclear-capable cruise missile as an integral part of its pursuit
of a full-spectrum deterrence posture. The 700-km range Babur-2 is an
improved version of the Babur (Hatf-7) GLCM that incorporates stealth
design features. It was first test launched in 2016. 22 The Ra’ad (Hatf-8) ALCM,
which Pakistan claims can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads
to a range of over 350 km, has been flight tested seven times since 2007. 23
Although the initial tests were conducted using a PAF Mirage III combat
aircraft, some reports indicate that the missile may have been integrated
with the JF-17 aircraft. 24 In 2017 Pakistan revealed an improved version, the
Ra’ad-2 ALCM, which reportedly has an extended range. 25

19 See e.g. Khan, F. H., ‘Going tactical: Pakistan’s nuclear posture and implications for stability’,

Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Proliferation Papers, no. 53, Sep. 2015, p. 41.
20 Iskander, R., Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean (Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace: Washington, DC, Mar. 2015), p. 17.

21 Panda, A. and Narang, V., ‘Pakistan tests new sub-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile:

what now?’, The Diplomat, 10 Jan. 2017.

22 Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release PR-482/2016-ISPR, 14 Dec. 2016.
23 Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release PR-16/2016-ISPR, 19 Jan. 2016.
24 Fisher (note 7).
25 Khan, B., ‘Pakistan officially unveils extended range Ra’ad 2 air-launched cruise missile’, Quwa

Defence News and Analysis Group, 23 Mar. 2017.

278 military spending and armaments, 2 017

VIII. Israeli nuclear forces

shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen

Israel continues to maintain its long-standing policy of nuclear opacity: it

neither officially confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons.1
Like India and Pakistan, Israel has never been a party to the 1968 Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty,
NPT). 2
Declassified US and Israeli government documents indicate that Israel
began building a stockpile of nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, using
plutonium produced by the Israel Research Reactor 2 (IRR-2) at the Negev
Nuclear Research Center near Dimona. 3 There is little publicly available
information about the operating history and power capacity of the unsafe-
guarded IRR-2. The ageing heavy water reactor remained operational in
2017 despite the existence of a number of identified structural problems. 4 It
may now be operated primarily to produce tritium. 5
It is estimated that Israel has approximately 80 nuclear weapons (see
table  6.9). Of these, approximately 30 are gravity bombs for delivery by
combat aircraft. Several bunkers thought to contain nuclear bombs are
located at the Tel Nof airbase south of Tel Aviv. The remaining 50 weapons
are for delivery by land-based ballistic missiles. Israel’s arsenal includes
solid-­f uelled, two-stage Jericho II medium-range ballistic missiles, which
are believed to be based, along with their mobile transporter­-erector-
launchers, in caves at an airbase near Zekharia in the Negev desert. 6 A
three-stage Jericho  III intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a range
exceeding 4000 kilometres, was declared operational in 2011.7 In 2013 Israel
tested a Jericho III with a new motor that some sources believe may give the
missile an intercontinental range—that is, a range exceeding 5500 km. 8 Its
development status is unknown.
There are numerous unconfirmed reports that Israel has equipped
its fleet of German-built Dolphin class diesel-electric submarines with

1 On the role of this policy in Israel’s national security decision making see Cohen, A., ‘Israel’, eds

H. Born, B. Gill and H. Hänggi, SIPRI, Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and Democratic Account-
ability of Nuclear Weapons (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010).
2 For a summary and other details of the NPT see annex A, section I, in this volume.
3 For a history of Israel’s nuclear weapon programme see Cohen, A., The Worst-kept Secret: Israel’s

Bargain with the Bomb (Columbia University Press: New York, 2010).
4 Times of Israel, ‘Government has no plans to close aging Dimona nuclear facility’, 19 Sep. 2017.
5 International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear

Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Dec. 2015), p. 26.
6 O’Halloran, J. (ed.), ‘Jericho missiles’, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015–16 (IHS Jane’s:

Coulsdon, 2015), p. 53.

7 O’Halloran, ed. (note 6).
8 Ben David, A., ‘Israel tests Jericho III missile’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 July 2013.
 world nuclear forces 279

Table 6.9. Israeli nuclear forces, January 2018

Range Payload No. of
Type (km)a (kg) Status warheads
Aircraftb . .
F-16A/B/C/D/I 1 600 5 400 205 aircraft in the inventory; some are 30
Falcon believed to be equipped for nuclear
weapon delivery
Land-based ballistic missilesc . .
Jericho II 1 500– 750– c. 25 missiles; first deployed in 1990 25
1 800 1 000
Jericho III >4 000 1 000– First became operational in 2011–15 and 25
1 300 is gradually replacing Jericho II
Cruise missiles . .
. . . . . . Dolphin class diesel-electric submarines . .
are rumoured to have been equipped
with nuclear-armed SLCMs; denied by
Israeli officials
Total 80 d
. . = not available or not applicable; SLCM = sea-launched cruise missile.
a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary. Missile

payloads may have to be reduced in order to achieve maximum range.

b Some of Israel’s 25 F-15I aircraft may also have a long-range nuclear delivery role.
c The Jericho III is based on the Shavit space launch vehicle, which if converted to a ballistic

missile, could deliver a 775-kg payload to a distance of 4000 km.

d SIPRI’s estimate, which is approximate, is that Israel has 80 stored warheads. There is

signifi­cant uncertainty about the size of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its warhead capabilities.
Sources: Cohen, A., The Worst-kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (Columbia University
Press: New York, 2010); Cohen, A. and Burr, W., ‘Israel crosses the threshold’, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, vol. 62, no. 3 (May/June 2006); Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb (Columbia
University Press: New York, 1998); Albright, D., Berkhout, F. and Walker, W., SIPRI, Plutonium
and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford Univer-
sity Press: Oxford, 1997); IHS Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, various issues; International
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (Routledge: London, 2018); Fetter, S.,
‘Israeli ballistic missile capabilities’, Physics and Society, vol. 19, no. 3 (July 1990); ‘Nuclear
notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and authors’ estimates.

nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, giving it a sea-based second-

strike capability. German and Israeli officials have consistently denied
these reports. Israel has purchased six Dolphin class submarines, five of
which have been delivered to Israel. The sixth submarine is scheduled to
be delivered by the end of 2019.9 In October 2017 the German Government
announced that it had agreed to subsidize the sale of three new submarines
to Israel to replace the first three Dolphin class boats, which were delivered
in the late 1990s.10 The new submarines will enter service from 2027.

9 Opall-Rome, B., ‘Israeli Navy backs Netanyahu’s submarine scheme’, Defense News, 19 Apr. 2017.
10 Reuters, ‘Deutschland beteiligt sich finanziell an U-Booten für Israel’ [Germany participates
financially in submarines for Israel], Der Spiegel, 23 Oct. 2017.
2 8 0 military spending and armaments, 2 017

IX. North Korea’s military nuclear capabilities

shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea)

maintains an active but highly opaque nuclear weapon programme. It is
estimated that North Korea may have produced 10–20 nuclear weapons
(see table  6.10). This is based on calculations of the amount of plutonium
that North Korea may have separated from the spent fuel produced by its
5 megawatt-­electric (MW(e)) graphite-moderated research reactor at the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center (YNSRC) and assumptions
about North Korean weapon design and fabrication skills. North Korea is
believed to be increasing its limited holdings of weapon-usable plutonium
(see section X), although assessments differ about the scale and pace of the
increase.1 In 2017 com­mercial satellite imagery and thermal imagery indi-
cated that the Radiochemical Laboratory at the YNSRC might be continuing
to operate intermittently to separate plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel
rods. 2
In 2016 North Korea publicly acknowledged that it was producing highly
enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. 3 There has been consider­
able speculation that North Korea is seeking to build warheads using HEU
as the fissile material in order to overcome the constraints imposed by its
limited holding of separated plutonium. However, it is not known whether it
has done so. Furthermore, little is known about North Korea’s stock of HEU
or its uranium enrichment capacity. 4
On 3 September 2017 North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test explo-
sion at the Punggye-ri underground test site in the north-east of the coun-
try. 5 Following the explosion, the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Institute
announced that the event was a successful test of a hydrogen bomb that
could be delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). 6 Many
commentators assessed, based on indirect evidence, that North Korea’s

1 See e.g. Yonhap News Agency, ‘North Korea has 50 kg of weapons-grade plutonium: Seoul’s

Defense White Paper’, 11 Jan. 2017; and Albright, D. and Kelleher-Vergantini, S., ‘Plutonium, tritium
and highly enriched uranium production at the Yongbyon nuclear site’, Institute for Science and
International Security, Imagery Brief, 14 June 2016.
2 Bermudez, J. et al., ‘North Korea’s Yongbyon facility: probable production of additional pluto-

nium for nuclear weapons’, 38 North, US–Korea Institute, 14 July 2017.

3 Kyodo News Agency, ‘North Korea confirms restart of plutonium processing’, Japan Times,

17 Aug. 2016.
4 Albright and Kelleher-Vergantini (note 1); and Hecker, S. et al., North Korean Nuclear Facilities

After the Agreed Framework, Working Paper (Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,
Stanford University: Stanford, CA, 2016).
5 For a technical assessment of the test and an overview of global nuclear weapon tests since 1945

see section XI of this chapter.

6 Korean Central News Agency, ‘DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute on successful test of H-bomb

for ICBM’, 3 Sep. 2017.

 world nuclear forces 2 81

claim that the nuclear explosive device tested was a thermonuclear weapon
was plausible.7 However, some experts noted that in the absence of the
detection of leaked radioactive debris characteristic of a thermonuclear
explosion, it was not possible to rule out that North Korea had tested another
type of weapon design, such as a boosted composite device or even a large
fission-only device. 8
North Korea had previously conducted nuclear tests at the site in Octo-
ber 2006, May 2009, February 2013, and January and September 2016.9 The
estimated yields (explosive energy) of the tests have progressively increased.

Ballistic missiles

North Korea is expanding and modernizing its ballistic missile force,

which consists of 10  types of indigenously produced short-, medium- and
intermediate­-range systems that are either deployed or under development.
It is developing a road-mobile ICBM as well as a submarine-launched bal­
listic missile (SLBM). In 2017 North Korea conducted 20 known missile
tests, compared with 24 tests in 2016. Of the seven different types of missile
tested in 2017, four had not been previously tested.10
In a speech on 1 January 2018, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un,
said that the country would begin to mass-produce nuclear warheads and
ballistic missiles.11 There is no publicly available evidence to confirm North
Korea’s claim that it has built a nuclear warhead that is sufficiently com-
pact to be delivered by a ballistic missile. In 2017 the Defense Intelligence
Agency of the United States reportedly concluded that North Korea had
successfully designed and produced an operational nuclear weapon that
could be delivered by a ballistic missile.12 In the 2016 edition of its biennial
Defense White Paper, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense noted
that North Korea had ‘reached a significant level’ of technical progress
towards building a miniaturized warhead, but it did not state whether it
believed that North Korea had succeeded in doing so.13 Other elements of the

7 See e.g. Lewis, J., ‘Welcome to the thermonuclear club, North Korea!’, Foreign Policy, 4 Sep. 2017.
8 Dominguez, G., ‘North Korea conducts its sixth and largest nuclear test’, Jane’s Defence Weekly,

13 Sep. 2017, p. 6.
9 On the earlier tests see Fedchenko, V. and Ferm Hellgren, R., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2006’,

SIPRI Yearbook 2007; Fedchenko, V., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2009’, SIPRI Yearbook 2010; Fed-
chenko, V., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2013’, SIPRI Yearbook 2014; and Fedchenko, V., ‘Nuclear
explosions, 1945–2016’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017.
10 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea Missile Test Database, 30 Nov.

2017. North Korea conducted an additional test in 2017 but the missile type is not known.
11 Korean Central News Agency, ‘Kim Jong-un makes new year address’, 1 Jan. 2018.
12 Warrick, J., Nakashima, E. and Fifield, A., ‘North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear

weapons, US analysts say’, Washington Post, 8 Aug. 2017.

13 Park, B., ‘2016 Defense White Paper estimates North Korea has 50kg of plutonium’, Hankyoreh,

12 Jan. 2017.
2 8 2 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.10. North Korean forces with potential nuclear capability, January
2018
Range Payload No. of
Typea (km) (kg) Status warheads
Land-based ballistic missiles . .
Hwasong-7 >1 200 1 000 Single-stage, liquid-fuel missile. Fewer
(Nodong) than 100 launchers; first deployed in 1990
Hwasong-9 1 000 500 Scud missile variant, lengthened to carry
(Scud-ER) additional fuel
Bukkeukseong-2 1 000 . . 2-stage, solid-fuel missile launched from
(KN-15) canister launcher. Land-based version
of Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM; test launched
twice in 2017
Hwasong-10 >3 000 (1 000) Single-stage, liquid-fuel missile under
(BM-25, Musudan) development; several failed test launches
in 2016
Hwasong-12 3 300– 1 000 Single-stage, liquid-fuel missile under
(KN-17) 4 500 development; although half of 2017 test
launches failed, North Korea declared it
operational after Sep. 2017 test launch
Hwasong-13 >5 500 . . 3-stage, liquid-fuel missile with
(KN-08)b potential intercontinental range under
development; no known test launches
Hwasong-14 6 700– 500– 2-stage, liquid-fuel missile under
(KN-20) 10 400 1 000 development; test launched twice in 2017
Hwasong-15 8 500– 1 000– 2-stage, liquid-fuel missile under
(KN-22) 13 000 1 500 development; test launched once in 2017
Taepodong-2c 12 000 . . Under development; 3-stage space launch
vehicle variant placed satellites in orbit in
2012 and 2016
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
Bukkeukseong-1 . . . . 2-stage, solid-fuel SLBM under
(KN-11) development, replacing earlier liquid-fuel
version
Total (10–20)d
. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = uncertain figure; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic
missile.
a The operational capability of North Korean warheads is uncertain. While there is specu-

lation that some medium-range ballistic missiles might have operational nuclear capability,
there is no authoritative open-source evidence that North Korea has developed and tested a
functioning re-entry vehicle that is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead on a long-range
ballistic missile and deployed warheads with operational forces. This table lists the ballistic
missiles that could potentially have a nuclear delivery role, although that does not imply that
each type is a mass-produced operational weapon system.
b A longer-range variant, the KN-14, is under development but has yet to be test launched.
c A 2-stage Taepodong-1 missile was unsuccessfully flight tested in 1998.
d SIPRI’s estimate is that North Korea may have fissile material for between 20 and 30 war-

heads. After 6 tests, 1 of which was more than 200 kilotons, North Korea might have a small
number of deliverable nuclear warheads.
 world nuclear forces 2 8 3

Sources: US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and
Cruise Missile Threat, various years; IHS Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, various issues;
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (Routledge: London,
2018); ‘Nuclear notebook’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various issues; and authors’ esti-
mates.

US intelligence community and military have expressed doubt about the

operational capability of, in particular, the warheads on long-range missiles.
The South Korean Vice Defense Minister, Suh Choo-suk, stated in August
2017 that ‘Both the United States and South Korea do not believe North
Korea has yet completely gained re-entry technology in material engineering
terms’.14 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US General Paul Selva,
added in January 2018 that ‘What [North Korea] has not demonstrated yet
are the fusing and targeting technologies and survivable re-entry vehicle’.15

Medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles

Assuming that North Korea is able to produce a sufficiently compact war-
head, some observers assess that the size, range and operational status of
the Hwasong-7, also known as the Nodong, medium-range missile make
it the system most likely to be given a nuclear delivery role.16 Based on a
Soviet-era Scud missile design, the Nodong is a single-stage, liquid-fuelled
ballistic missile with an estimated range exceeding 1200 kilometres. The
North Korean Army’s Strategic Rocket Force Command carried out five test
launches of Nodong missiles in 2016.17 No tests were conducted in 2017.
North Korea has developed the single-stage, liquid-fuelled Hwa-
song-9, also known as the Scud-ER (extended-range) system. Based on
the Hwasong-6 (Scud C variant) missile with a lengthened fuselage to
carry add­itional fuel, the Scud-ER has an estimated range of 1000 km.18
On 6  March 2017 four Scud-ER missiles were test fired simultaneously
from the Sohae Satellite Launch complex in north-western North Korea.19
According to some reports, a fifth Scud-ER may have failed to launch. 20 The
missiles flew nearly 1000 km and landed in the Sea of Japan, approximately

14 ‘N. Korea still needs time to perfect re-entry technology: S. Korea vice def min’, Reuters, 13 Aug.

2017.
15 Ali, I., ‘US general says North Korea not demonstrated all components of ICBM’, Reuters,

30 Jan. 2018.
16 See e.g. Fitzpatrick, M., ‘North Korea nuclear test on hold?’, Shangri-La Voices, International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 27 May 2014.

17 Three of the missile flight tests were apparently successful, but 2 of the missiles exploded (1 in

July 2016 and 1 in Aug. 2016) shortly after launch. Kwon, K., Berlinger, J. and Hanna, J., ‘North Korea
fires 2 ballistic missiles, South Korea and US say’, CNN, 3 Aug. 2016.
18 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile

Threat (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2017), pp. 18, 25.
19 Bermudez, J. and Liu, J., ‘North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Scud-ER launch site

visible; activity at vertical engine test stand’, 38 North, US–Korea Institute, 17 Mar. 2017.
20 Schmerler, D., ‘Did North Korea test a fifth missile last week?’, NK News, 16 Mar. 2017.
2 84 military spending and armaments, 2 017

350 km from the Japanese island of Honshu. 21 The test raised concerns in
Japan that North Korea was developing an ability to launch salvos of missiles
capable of overwhelming Japan’s ballistic missile defence systems, including
those that have yet to be deployed. 22
The Hwasong-10 missile, also designated the Musudan or BM-25, is a
single-stage, liquid-fuelled missile with an estimated range exceeding
3000 km. The Musudan was first unveiled at a military parade in 2010. Flight
testing began in 2016, with multiple failures. 23 No flight tests of the Musu-
dan are known to have been conducted in 2017 and the status of the missile
development programme is unclear.
The Hwasong-12 (also referred to by the US Department of Defense,
DOD, designation KN-17) is a single-stage, intermediate-range missile
that is believed to have a new liquid-propellant booster engine as well as
design features that may serve as a technology test bed for a future ICBM. 24
Some analysts have speculated that the missile carries a small post-boost
vehicle (PBV) that, in addition to increasing its maximum range, can be
used to improve warhead accuracy. 25 The missile has an estimated range of
3300–4500 km, which would be sufficient to strike US military bases in the
western Pacific Ocean, including on the island of Guam. A Hwasong-12 missile
was successfully test launched for the first time on 14 May 2017. 26 Three
tests conducted the previous month reportedly all failed. 27 On 28 August
the North Korean Army’s Strategic Rocket Force Command test launched a
Hwasong-12 missile that travelled 2700 km, flying over Hokkaido in north-
ern Japan before breaking up into three pieces during re-entry and falling
into the Pacific Ocean. 28 The missile’s flight path over Japan was strongly
condemned by the Japanese Government. 29 A Hwasong-12 missile that was

21 Hancocks, P. and Westcott, B., ‘North Korea fires four missiles into the Sea of Japan’, CNN,
7 Mar. 2017.
22 Rich, M., ‘North Korea launch could be test of new attack strategy, Japan analysts say’, New

York Times, 6 Mar. 2017.

23 Savelsberg, R. and Kiessling, J., ‘North Korea’s Musudan missile: a performance assessment’,

38 North, US–Korea Institute, 20 Dec. 2016. In 2016 North Korea conducted 8 flight tests of the
Musudan system. Only 1 of the tests was judged to have been successful. In the other tests, the
missiles exploded on launch or shortly thereafter.
24 Yi, Y., ‘Hwasong-12 a stepping stone in North Korea’s ICBM development’, Hankyoreh, 16 May

2017; and Savelsberg, R., ‘A quick technical analysis of the Hwasong-12 missile’, 38 North, US–Korea
Institute, 19 May 2017.
25 Elleman, M., ‘North Korea’s Hwasong-12 launch: a disturbing development’, 38 North, US–

Korea Institute, 30 Aug. 2017.

26 Felstead, P. and Gibson, N., ‘North Korea fires new missile to 2000 km altitude’, Jane’s Defence

Weekly, 24 May 2017, p. 8.

27 Panda, A., ‘Exclusive: North Korea tested its new intermediate-range ballistic missile 3 times

in April 2017’, The Diplomat, 3 June 2017.

28 Elleman (note 25); and Felstead, P. and Gibson, N., ‘North Korean IRBM flies over Japan’, Jane’s

Defence Weekly, 6 Sep. 2017, p. 5.

29 Fifield, A., ‘North Korean missile flies over Japan escalating tensions and prompting an angry

response from Tokyo’, Washington Post, 28 Aug. 2017; and McCurry, J., ‘Trump and Abe vow to
 world nuclear forces 2 8 5

test launched on 15 September also flew over Japan and travelled 3700 km—
the longest distance by a North Korean missile to date—before landing in
the Pacific Ocean. 30 Unlike previous tests, the missile was fired from a
transporter-erector-launcher vehicle rather than from a concrete platform,
which indicates a higher level of operational readiness. 31
North Korea is developing the Bukkeukseong-2 missile (‘Polaris-2’, US DOD
designation, KN-15), which is a land-based variant of the Bukkeukseong-1
SLBM. The two-stage, solid-fuelled missile has an estimated maximum
range exceeding 1000 km. 32 The missile was first flight tested on 12 February
2017, followed by a second test on 21 May 2017. 33 Some analysts noted that
North Korea’s development of the Bukkeukseong-2 was probably part of an
effort to improve the survivability of its nuclear-capable ballistic missile
systems. Solid-fuelled missiles can be fired more quickly than liquid-­f uelled
systems and require fewer support vehicles that might give away their pos­
ition to overhead surveillance. 34

Intercontinental-range ballistic missiles

North Korea is widely believed to have prioritized building and deploying a
long-range ballistic missile that can deliver a nuclear warhead to targets in
the continental USA. In recent years it has pursued the serial development
of several missile systems with progressively longer ranges and increasingly
sophisticated delivery capabilities.
The Hwasong-13 (US DOD designation, KN-08) was first presented by
North Korea as a road-mobile, three-stage missile with intercontinental
range at a military parade in April 2012, although some non-governmental
analysts have argued that the missiles displayed were only mock-ups. 35 Esti-
mates of the range and payload capabilities of the missile are highly specula-
tive. No test launch had been conducted as of the end of 2017.
North Korea has developed the Hwasong-14 (US DOD designation,
KN-20), a prototype ICBM that first appeared in 2015 at a military parade
in Pyongyang. 36 The two-stage missile appears to use the same high-energy

increase pressure after North Korea fires missile over Japan’, The Guardian, 29 Aug. 2017.
30 ‘North Korea fires second missile over Japan’, BBC News, 15 Sep. 2017.
31 Graham, C., Boyle, D. and Connor, N., ‘North Korea fires second missile over Japan as US tells

China and Russia to take “direct action”’, Daily Telegraph, 15 Sep. 2017; and Panda, A. ‘North Korea
shows increased operational confidence in the Hwasong-12 IRBM’, The Diplomat, 17 Sep. 2017.
32 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (note 18), p. 25.
33 Felstead, P. and Gibson, N., ‘North Korea tests Trump with ballistic missile launch’, Jane’s

Defence Weekly, 22 Feb. 2017, p. 16; and BBC News, ‘North Korea confirms “successful” new ballistic
missile test’, 21 May 2017.
34 Panda, A., ‘It wasn’t an ICBM, but North Korea’s first missile test of 2017 is a big deal’, The

Diplomat, 14 Feb. 2017.

35 Schiller, M. and Kelley, R., ‘Evolving threat: North Korea’s quest for an ICBM’, Jane’s Defence

Weekly, 18 Jan. 2017, p. 24.

36 Schiller and Kelley (note 35).
2 8 6 military spending and armaments, 2 017

liquid-propellant booster engine as the single-stage Hwasong-12. 37 The

missile was test launched from mobile platforms twice in 2017, on 4 July and
28 July. In both tests the missiles were fired on elevated trajectories to avoid
flying over Japan and reached maximum altitudes of 2800 km and 3700 km,
respectively. The second test might not have been completely successful, as a
lightweight re-entry vehicle carried by the missile apparently disintegrated
before reaching the ground. 38 The Hwasong-14 is estimated to have a range
of up to 10 400 km, depending on the payload and flight trajectory. 39
North Korea is developing a new two-stage ICBM, the Hwasong-15 (US
DOD designation, KN-22) that has a significantly larger second stage and
more powerful booster engines than the Hwasong-14. The first flight test
was conducted on 28 November 2017, when a Hwasong-15 was launched on
an elevated trajectory and flew higher and for a longer duration than any
previous North Korean missile. One estimate put the theoretical maxi-
mum range of the Hwasong-15 on a normal trajectory at up to 13 000 km—
suf­fi cient to reach Washington, DC, and other targets on the east coast of
the USA. 40 The missile was assessed to be carrying a light payload, however,
and the range would be significantly reduced if it were carrying a heavier
payload such as a nuclear warhead. 41 According to a North Korean Govern-
ment statement issued after the test, the Hwasong-15 is ‘an intercontinental
ballistic rocket tipped with super-large heavy warhead which is capable of
striking the whole mainland of the US’ that ‘meets the goal of the completion
of the rocket weaponry system’. 42
Overall, in 2017 North Korea made progress towards building an oper­
ational ICBM across a range of technical challenges at a pace that surprised
many experts. 43 Some analysts pointed out that North Korea had yet to vali-
date the performance and reliability of an ICBM system, in particular that of
the missile’s re-entry vehicle. 44 However, estimates of the time required for
it to do so shortened during the year. According to a July 2017 media report,
the US Defense Intelligence Agency had concluded that North Korea would
be able to produce a ‘reliable, nuclear-capable ICBM’ some time in 2018. The

37 According to 1 non-governmental analyst, North Korea probably acquired the engine through

illicit channels operating in Russia or Ukraine. Elleman, M., ‘The secret to North Korea’s ICBM suc-
cess’, IISS Voices blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 14 Aug. 2017.
38 Schilling, J., ‘What’s next for North Korea’s ICBM?’, 38 North, US–Korea Institute, 1 Aug. 2017.
39 Wright, D., ‘North Korean ICBM appears able to reach major US cities’, All Things Nuclear

blog, Union of Concerned Scientists, 28 July 2017.

40 Wright, D., ‘Re-entry of North Korea’s Hwasong-15 missile’, All Things Nuclear blog, Union of

Concerned Scientists, 7 Dec. 2017.

41 Elleman, M., ‘North Korea’s third ICBM launch’, 38 North, US–Korea Institute, 29 Nov. 2017;

and Wright (note 40).

42 Korean Central News Agency, ‘DPRK Gov’t statement on successful test-fire of new-type

ICBM’, 29 Nov. 2017.

43 Broad, W. and Sanger, D., ‘How US Intelligence agencies underestimated North Korea’, New

York Times, 6 Jan. 2018.

44 Wright (note 40); and Elleman (note 41).
 world nuclear forces 2 87

US intelligence community had previously assessed that North Korea would

not have a credible ICBM capability until 2020 at the earliest. 45 In his state-
ment in August 2017, Choo-suk noted that North Korea would need ‘at least
one or two more years’ to master the re-entry vehicle technology required
for a long-range missile delivery system. 46

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

North Korea is developing an SLBM called the Bukkeukseong-1 (‘Polaris-1’,
US DOD designation, KN-11). The missile is now a two-stage, solid-fuelled
design after initial test failures using a liquid-fuelled missile. 47 In August
2016, following a series of failed attempts, North Korea conducted the first
successful underwater test launch of the Bukkeukseong-1 missile from
an experimental submarine. 48 In 2017 North Korea conducted a series of
success­ful underwater ejection tests—that is, tests designed to evaluate
stabil­ization systems and the process of ejecting the missile from a sub-
merged launch tube—but it did not conduct any flight tests of the missile. 49
Most observers assess that North Korea still has numerous technical
challenges to overcome before it will be able to design, build and deploy
an oper­ational SLBM force. However, commercial satellite imagery of the
shipyard in Sinpo from November 2017 revealed that North Korea appeared
to be building a new, larger submarine capable of launching an SLBM. 50 As
the year ended, concerns about North Korea’s technical progress towards
achieving an SLBM capability spurred the USA, Japan and South Korea to
conduct military drills for tracking submarine missile launches by North
Korea. 51

45 Nakashima, E., Fifield, A. and Warrick J., ‘North Korea could cross ICBM threshold next year,

US officials warn in new assessment’, Washington Post, 25 July 2017.

46 ‘N. Korea still needs time to perfect re-entry technology: S. Korea vice def min’ (note 14).
47 Schilling, J., ‘A new submarine-launched ballistic missile for North Korea’, 38 North, US–Korea

Institute, 25 Apr. 2016.

48 Park, J. M. and Kim, J., ‘North Korea fires submarine-launched ballistic missile towards

Japan’, Reuters, 24 Aug. 2016.

49 Ryall, J., ‘North Korea carries out “unprecedented” test of submarine missile system’, Daily

Telegraph, 1 Aug. 2017.

50 Bermudez, J., ‘North Korea’s submarine ballistic missile program moves ahead: indications of

shipbuilding and missile ejection testing’, 38 North, US–Korea Institute, 16 Nov. 2017.
51 Mullany, G., ‘North Korean submarine missile threat prompts US-led military drills’, New York

Times, 11 Dec. 2017.

2 8 8 military spending and armaments, 2 017

X. Global stocks and production of fissile materials, 2017

moritz kütt, zia mian and pavel podvig
international panel on fissile materials

Materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction are essential
for all types of nuclear explosives, from first-generation fission weapons
to advanced thermonuclear weapons. The most common of these fissile
materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. This section
gives details of military and civilian stocks as of the beginning of 2017 of
HEU (see table 6.11) and separated plutonium (see table 6.12), including in
weapons, and details of the current capacity to produce these materials (see
tables 6.13 and 6.14, respectively). The information in the tables is based on
estimates prepared for the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM).
The most recent annual declarations on civilian plutonium and HEU stocks
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were released in late
2017 and give data for the end of 2016.
The production of both HEU and plutonium starts with natural uranium.
Natural uranium consists almost entirely of the non-chain-reacting isotope
uranium-238 (U-238) and is only about 0.7 per cent uranium-235 (U-235). The
concentration of U-235, however, can be increased through enrichment—
typically using gas centrifuges. Uranium that has been enriched to less than
20 per cent U-235 (typically, 3–5 per cent)—known as low-enriched uran­
ium—is suitable for use in power reactors. Uranium that has been enriched to
contain at least 20 per cent U-235—known as HEU—is generally taken to be
the lowest concentration practicable for use in weapons. However, in order
to minimize the mass of the nuclear explosive, weapon-grade uranium is
usually enriched to over 90 per cent U-235. Plutonium is produced in nuclear
reactors when U-238 is exposed to neutrons. The plutonium is subsequently
chemically separated from spent fuel in a reprocessing operation. Plutonium
comes in a variety of isotopic mixtures, most of which are weapon-usable.
Weapon designers prefer to work with a mixture that predominantly consists
of plutonium-239 (Pu-239) because of its relatively low rate of spontaneous
emission of neutrons and gamma rays and the low level of heat generation
from radioactive alpha decay. Weapon-grade plutonium typically contains
more than 90 per cent of the isotope Pu-239. The plutonium in typical spent
fuel from power reactors (reactor-grade plutonium) contains 50–60 per cent
Pu-239 but is weapon-usable, even in a first-generation weapon design. All
states with a civil nuclear industry have some capability to produce fissile
materials that could be used for weapons.
 world nuclear forces 2 8 9

Table 6.11. Global stocks of highly enriched uranium, 2017

National stockpile Production
State (tonnes)a status Comments
China b 14 ± 3 Stopped 1987–89
Francec 30 ± 6 Stopped 1996 Includes 4.8 tonnes declared
civilian
India d 4 ± 1.4 Continuing Includes HEU in naval reactor
cores
Israele 0.3 –
Pakistan 3.4 ± 0.4 Continuing
Russiaf 679 ± 120 Stopped 1987–88
UK g 21.1 Stopped 1962 Includes 1.37 tonnes declared
civilian
USA h 574.5 (95 not available for Stopped 1992 Includes HEU in a naval reserve
military purposes)
Other statesi ~15
Totalj ~1340 (95 not available for military purposes)
HEU = highly enriched uranium.
a Most of this material is 90–93% enriched uranium-235 (U-235), which is typically con-

sidered weapon-grade. Important exceptions are noted. Blending down (i.e. reducing the
concentration of U-235) of excess Russian and US weapon-grade HEU and civilian HEU dec-
larations up to the end of 2016 has been taken into account. The estimates are in effect for the
end of 2016.
b This revised estimate is based on a new assessment for the International Panel on Fissile

Materials (IPFM) of fissile material production and stocks in China.

c France declared 4.8 tonnes of civilian HEU to the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) as of the end of 2016; it is assumed here to be 93% enriched HEU, even though
1.54 tonnes of the material is in irradiated form. The uncertainty in the estimate applies only
to the military stockpile of about 26 tonnes and does not apply to the declared civilian stock.
A recent analysis offers grounds for a significantly lower estimate of the stockpile of weapon-­
grade HEU (as large as 10 ± 2 tonnes or as low as 6 ± 2 tonnes), based on evidence that the
Pierrelatte enrichment plant may have had both a much shorter effective period of operation
and a smaller weapon-grade HEU production capacity than previously assumed.
d It is believed that India is producing HEU (enriched to 30–45%) for use as naval reactor

fuel. The estimate is for HEU enriched to 30%.

e Israel may have acquired about 300 kg of weapon-grade HEU from the USA in or before

1965.
f This estimate may understate the amount of HEU in Russia since it assumes that it ceased

production of all HEU in 1988. However, Russia may have continued producing HEU for civil-
ian and non-weapon military uses after that date. The material in discharged naval cores is not
included in the current stock since the enrichment of uranium in these cores is believed to be
less than 20% U-235.
g The UK declared a stockpile of 21.9 tonnes of HEU as of 31 Mar. 2002, the average enrich-

ment of which was not given. Some of this has been consumed since then in naval fuel. The UK
declared a stock of 1.37 tonnes of civilian HEU to the IAEA as of the end of 2016.
h The amount of US HEU is given in actual tonnes, not 93% enriched equivalent. In 2016 the

USA declared that as of 30 Sep. 2013 its HEU inventory was 585.6 tonnes, of which 499.4 tonnes
was declared to be for ‘national security or non-national security programs including nuclear
weapons, naval propulsion, nuclear energy, and science’. The remaining 86.2 tonnes was
composed of 41.6 tonnes ‘available for potential down-blend to low enriched uranium or, if
not possible, disposal as low-level waste’, and 44.6 tonnes in spent reactor fuel. As of the end
2 9 0 military spending and armaments, 2 017

of Dec. 2016, another 11.1 tonnes had been down blended or shipped for blending down. The
95 tonnes declared excess includes the remaining 75.1 tonnes and 20 tonnes of HEU reserved
for HEU fuel for research reactors.
i The 2016 IAEA Annual Report lists 181 significant quantities of HEU under comprehen-

sive safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states as of the end of 2016. In order to reflect the
uncertainty in the enrichment levels of this material, mostly in research reactor fuel, a total of
15 tonnes of HEU is assumed. About 10 tonnes of this is in Kazakhstan and has been irradiated;
it was initially slightly higher than 20%-enriched fuel. It is possible that this material is no
longer HEU.
j Totals are rounded to the nearest 5 tonnes.

Sources: International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2015:
Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Dec.
2015). China: Zhang, H., China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile (IPFM: Princeton, NJ,
Dec. 2017). France: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Communication Received
from France Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/
Add.5/21, 29 Sep. 2017; and Philippe, S. and Glaser, A., ‘Nuclear archaeology for gaseous dif­
fusion enrichment plants’, Science & Global Security, vol. 22, no. 1 (2014), pp.  27–49. Israel:
Myers, H., ‘The real source of Israel’s first fissile material’, Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 8
(Oct. 2007), p. 56; and Gilinsky, V. and Mattson, R. J., ‘Revisiting the NUMEC affair’, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, vol. 66, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 2010). UK: British Ministry of Defence, ‘Histor­
ical accounting for UK defence highly enriched uranium’, Mar. 2006; and Office for Nuclear
Regulation, ‘Annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium as at 31 December
2016’, 2017. USA: US Department of Energy (DOE), Highly Enriched Uran­ium, Striking a Bal-
ance: A Historical Report on the United States Highly Enriched Uranium Pro­duction, Acquisition,
and Utilization Activities from 1945 through September 30, 1996 (DOE: Washington, DC, 2001);
Personal communication, US DOE, Office of Fissile Material Dis­position, National Nuclear
Security Administration; White House, Office of the Press Sec­retary, ‘Fact sheet: trans­
parency in the US highly enriched uranium inventory’, 31 Mar. 2016; and Irons, C. W., ‘Status
of surplus HEU disposition in the United States’, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management,
57th Annual Meeting, Atlanta, 26 July 2016. Non-nuclear weapon states: IAEA, IAEA Annual
Report 2016 (IAEA: Vienna, 2017), Annex, Table A4, p. 123.
 world nuclear forces 2 91

Table 6.12. Global stocks of separated plutonium, 2017

Military
Military stocks production Civilian stocks
State (tonnes) status (tonnes)a
China 2.9 ± 0.6 Stopped in 1991 0.04
France 6 ± 1.0 Stopped in 1992 65.4 (excludes 16.3 foreign
owned)
Germanyb – – 0.6
India c 0.58 ± 0.15 Continuing 6.4 ± 3.5 (includes 0.4 under
safeguards)
Israeld 0.9 ± 0.13 Continuing –
Japan – – 47.0 (includes 37.1 in France and
UK)
Korea, Northe 0.04 Continuing –
Pakistanf 0.28 ± 0.09 Continuing –
Russia g 128 ± 8 (40 not available Stopped in 2010 57.2
for weapons)
UK h 3.2 Stopped in 1995 110.3 (excludes 23.2 foreign
owned)
USA i 87.8 (49.4 not available Stopped in 1988 –
for weapons)
Other statesj – – 2.3
Totalsk ~230 (89 not available for weapons) ~290
a Some countries with civilian plutonium stocks do not submit an International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) INFCIRC/549 declaration. Of these countries, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain and Sweden store their plutonium abroad. The data is for the end of 2016.
b This may be an overestimate since Germany apparently reports plutonium as being in

unirradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel even if the fuel is being irradiated in a reactor.
c India’s estimate for military plutonium is reduced because of new publicly available

information about the performance of its Dhruva reactor. As part of the 2005 Indian–US Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, India has included in the military sector much of the pluto-
nium separated from its spent power-reactor fuel. While it is labelled civilian here since it
is intended for breeder reactor fuel, this plutonium was not placed under safeguards in the
‘India-specific’ safeguards agreement signed by the Indian Government and the IAEA on
2 Feb. 2009. India does not submit an IAEA INFCIRC/549 declaration.
d Israel is believed to still be operating the Dimona plutonium production reactor but may be

using it primarily for tritium production. The estimate is for the end of 2016.
e North Korea reportedly declared a plutonium stock of 37 kg in June 2008. It resumed

pluto­nium production in 2009, but has probably expended some material in the nuclear tests
conducted in 2009–17.
f As of the end of 2016, Pakistan was operating 4 plutonium production reactors at its

Khushab site. This estimate assumes that in 2016 Pakistan separated plutonium from the
cooled spent fuel from 2 new reactors, 1 of which began operating some time in 2013 and the
other in late 2014 or early 2015.
g The 40 tonnes of plutonium not available for weapons comprises 25 tonnes of weapon-­

origin plutonium stored at the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility and about 15 tonnes
of weapon-grade plutonium produced between 1 Jan. 1995 and 15 Apr. 2010, when the last
plutonium production reactor was shut down. The post-1994 plutonium, which is currently
stored at Zheleznogorsk, cannot be used for weapon purposes under the terms of the US–­
Russian agreement on plutonium production reactors signed in 1997. Russia made a com-
mitment to eliminate 34 tonnes of the plutonium not available for weapons (including all
25 tonnes of pluto­nium stored at Mayak) as part of the US–Russian Plutonium Management
2 92 military spending and armaments, 2 017

and Dis­position Agreement, concluded in 2000. Russia does not include the plutonium that
is not available for weapons in its INFCIRC/549 statement. Nor does it make the plutonium it
reports as civilian available to IAEA safeguards.
h The UK declared 110.3 tonnes of civilian plutonium (not including 23.2 tonnes of foreign-­

owned plutonium in the UK) as of the end of 2016. This includes 4.4 tonnes of military pluto-
nium declared excess and placed under Euratom safeguards.
i In 2012 the USA declared a government-owned plutonium inventory of 95.4 tonnes as

of 30 Sep. 2009. In its 2016 IAEA INFCIRC/549 statement, the USA declared 49 tonnes of
unirradiated plutonium (both separated and in MOX) as part of the stock that was identified
as excess for military purposes. Since most of this material is stored in classified form, it is con­
sidered military stock. The USA considers a total of 61.5 tonnes of plutonium as declared excess
to national security needs. This includes 49 tonnes of unirradiated plutonium, 4.5 tonnes of
plutonium disposed of as waste, 0.2 tonnes lost to radioactive decay since 1994 and 7.8 tonnes
of irradiated government-owned plutonium. The plutonium reported in INFCIRC/549
also includes 0.4 tonnes of plutonium brought to the USA in 2016 from Japan, Germany and
Switzer­land (331 kg, 30 kg, and 18 kg, respectively). Like the 49 tonnes of unirradiated excess
plutonium, this material will not be used for weapons. However, it has not been placed under
IAEA safeguards, so it is accounted for together with military material.
j This is estimated by reconciling the amounts of plutonium declared as ‘held in locations in

other countries’ and ‘belonging to foreign bodies’ in the INFCIRC/549 reports.

k Totals are rounded to the nearest 5 tonnes.

Sources: International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2015:
Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Dec.
2015). Civilian stocks (except for India): declarations by countries to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) under INFCIRC/549. China: Zhang, H., China’s Fissile Material Produc-
tion and Stockpile (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Dec. 2017). North Korea: Kessler, G., ‘Message to US
preceded nuclear declaration by North Korea’, Washington Post, 2 July 2008; and Hecker, S. S.,
‘What we really know about North Korea’s nuclear weapons’, Foreign Affairs, 4 Dec. 2017.
Russia: Agreement Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as
No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (Russian–US Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement), signed 29 Aug. and 1 Sep. 2000, amended Apr. 2010,
entered into force July 2011. USA: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), The
United States Plutonium Balance, 1944–2009 (NNSA: Washington, DC, June 2012).
 world nuclear forces 2 93

Table 6.13. Significant uranium enrichment facilities and capacity worldwide,

2017
Capacity
Facility name Enrichment (thousands
State or location Type Status processa SWU/yr)b
Argentina c Pilcaniyeu Civilian Resuming operation GD 20
Brazil Resende Enrichment Civilian Expanding capacity GC 120
China d Lanzhou Civilian Operational GC 2 600
Hanzhong (Shaanxi) Civilian Operational GC 2 000
Emeishan Civilian Operational GC 1 050
Heping Dual-use Operational GD 230
France Georges Besse II Civilian Operational GC 7 500
Germany Urenco Gronau Civilian Operational GC 4 000
India Rattehalli Military Operational GC 15–30
Irane Natanz Civilian Limited operation GC 3.5–5
Qom (Fordow) Civilian Idle GC ..
Japan Rokkashof Civilian Resuming operation GC 75
Korea, North Yongbyon g . . Uncertain GC 8
Netherlands Urenco Almelo Civilian Operational GC 5 400
Pakistan Gadwal Military Operational GC ..
Kahuta Military Operational GC 15–45
Russia h Angarsk Civilian Operational GC 4 000
Novouralsk Civilian Operational GC 13 300
Seversk Civilian Operational GC 3 800
Zelenogorsk Civilian Operational GC 7 900
UK Capenhurst Civilian Operational GC 4 700
USA i Urenco Eunice Civilian Operational GC 4 700
a The gas centrifuge (GC) is the main isotope-separation technology used to increase the

percentage of uranium-235 (U-235) in uranium, but a few facilities continue to use gaseous
diffusion (GD).
b SWU/yr = Separative work units per year: an SWU is a measure of the effort required in an

enrichment facility to separate uranium of a given content of U-235 into 2 components, 1 with
a higher and 1 with a lower percentage of U-235. Where a range of capacities is shown, the
capacity is uncertain or the facility is expanding its capacity.
c In Dec. 2015 Argentina announced resumption of production at its Pilcaniyeu GD uranium

enrichment plant, which was shut down in the 1990s.

d A new assessment of China’s enrichment capacity in 2015 identified new enrichment sites

and suggested a much larger total capacity than had previously been estimated. These esti-
mates were again updated in a new report in 2017.
e In July 2015 Iran agreed a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that ended uranium enrich-

ment at Fordow but kept centrifuges operating, and limited the enrichment capacity at Natanz
to 5060 IR 1 centrifuges (equivalent to 3500–5000 SWU/yr) for 10 years.
f The Rokkasho centrifuge plant is being refitted with new centrifuge technology and is

operating at very low capacity, about 75 000 SWU/yr as of Dec. 2016.

g North Korea revealed its Yongbyon enrichment facility in 2010. Its operating status is

unknown.
h Zelenogorsk is operating a cascade for highly enriched uranium production for fast reactor

and research reactor fuel.

i Plans for new centrifuge enrichment plants at Piketon (United States Enrichment Cor­

poration, USEC) and Eagle Rock (AREVA) have been shelved for technical and financial
reasons, respectively.
2 94 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.14. Significant reprocessing facilities worldwide, as of 2017

All facilities process light water reactor (LWR) fuel, except where indicated.
Facility name Design capacity
State or location Type Status (tHM/yr)a
China b Jiuquan pilot plant Civilian Operational 50
France La Hague UP2 Civilian Operational 1 000
La Hague UP3 Civilian Operational 1 000
India c Kalpakkam (HWR fuel) Dual-use Operational 100
Tarapur (HWR fuel) Dual-use Operational 100
Tarapur-II (HWR fuel) Dual-use Operational 100
Trombay (HWR fuel) Military Operational 50
Israel Dimona (HWR fuel) Military Operational 40–100
Japan JNC Tokai Civilian To be shut downd 200
Rokkasho Civilian Start planned for 2021 800
Korea, North Yongbyon Military Operational 100–150
Pakistan Chashma (HWR fuel) Military Starting up 50–100
Nilore (HWR fuel) Military Operational 20–40
Russia e Mayak RT-1, Ozersk Civilian Operational 400
UK BNFL B205 (Magnox fuel) Civilian To be shut down 2018 1 500
BNFL Thorp, Sellafield Civilian To be shut down 2020 1 200
USA H-canyon, Savannah Civilian Operational 15
River Site
HWR = heavy water reactor.
a Design capacity refers to the highest amount of spent fuel the plant is designed to process

and is measured in tonnes of heavy metal per year (tHM/yr), tHM being a measure of the
amount of heavy metal—uranium in these cases—that is in the spent fuel. Actual throughput is
often a small fraction of the design capacity. LWR spent fuel contains about 1% plutonium, and
heavy water- and graphite-moderated reactor fuel about 0.4%.
b China is planning to build a pilot reprocessing facility at Jiuquan with a capacity of

200 tHM/yr.
c As part of the 2005 Indian–US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, India has decided

that none of its reprocessing plants will be opened for International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards inspections.
d In 2014 the Japan Atomic Energy Agency announced the planned closure of the head-end

of its Tokai reprocessing plant, effectively ending further plutonium separation activity. In
2016 it was still working with very small amounts of plutonium.
e A 250 tHM/yr Pilot Experimental Centre is under construction in Zheleznogorsk. It is

supposed to begin operation in 2018.

Sources for table 6.13: Indo-Asian News Service, ‘Argentina president inaugurates enriched
uranium plant’, Business Standard, 1 Dec. 2015; Zhang, H., ‘China’s uranium enrichment com-
plex’, Science & Global Security, vol. 23, no. 3 (2015), pp. 171–90; and Zhang, H., China’s Fissile
Material Production and Stockpile (International Panel on Fissile Materials: Princeton, NJ, Dec.
2017). Enrichment capacity data is based on International Atomic Energy Agency, Integrated
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information Systems (INFCIS); Urenco website; and Inter­national Panel
on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile
Material Stockpiles and Production (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Dec. 2015).
Sources for table 6.14: Data on design capacity is based on International Atomic Energy Agency,
Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information Systems (INFCIS); and International Panel on Fis-
sile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material
Stockpiles and Production (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Dec. 2015).
 world nuclear forces 2 9 5

XI. Nuclear explosions, 1945–2017

vitaly fedchenko

On 3 September 2017 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK,

or North Korea) conducted its sixth nuclear test explosion, following tests
conducted in January and September 2016, February 2013, May 2009 and
October 2006.1 This 2017 test brought the total number of nuclear explosions
recorded since 1945 to 2058.

The September 2017 nuclear test

On 3 September 2017 at 03:30 Coordinated Universal Time (12:00 local time)

North Korea conducted an underground test explosion at the Punggye-ri
Nuclear Test Facility under Mount Mantap in the north-east of the country. 2
Shortly after, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that
the event was a successful test of a hydrogen bomb for an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) and published a statement by the Nuclear Weapons
Institute (NWI) of North Korea detailing the features of the test device. 3
The publication after a test of discussion by the NWI of the test device’s
features is a new development: it occurred for the first time after the fifth
test in September 2016. The NWI noted that the test carried out in Septem-
ber 2017 was of a bomb of ‘unprecedentedly big power’ and proclaimed the
test a success. The NWI also stated that North Korea had conducted ‘experi­
mental measurements’ to verify the performance of a new ‘H-bomb’ design,
in terms of (a) its ‘total explosion power’ (yield); (b) its ‘fission to fusion
power’ ratio; (c) the ‘precision of the compression technology and the fission
chain reaction start control technology of the first system of the H-bomb’,
meaning the performance of the high explosive implosion assembly and the
neutron initiator in the primary; and (d) the ‘nuclear material utility rate
in the first system and the second system’, or the proportion of the fissile
material in the primary that underwent fission, as opposed to being scattered
by the explosion, and the amount of material that underwent either fusion
or fission in the secondary. 4 Some descriptions of the test device’s features,

1 On the earlier tests see Fedchenko, V. and Ferm Hellgren, R., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2006’,

SIPRI Yearbook 2007; Fedchenko, V., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2009’, SIPRI Yearbook 2010; Fed-
chenko, V., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2013’, SIPRI Yearbook 2014; and Fedchenko, V., ‘Nuclear
explosions, 1945–2016’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017.
2 Lee, M. Y. H., ‘North Korea’s latest nuclear test was so powerful it reshaped the mountain above

it’, Washington Post, 14 Sep. 2017.

3 Korean Central News Agency, ‘DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute on successful test of H-bomb

for ICBM’, 3 Sep. 2017.

4 The ratio of fission to fusion energy (i.e. the share of energy from fission and fusion reactions

in the total yield) determines the amount of long-term contamination by radioactive isotopes.
Less fission means less long-lived radioactive isotopes in the fallout, so the weapon can be treated
2 96 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.15. Data on North Korea’s nuclear explosion, 3 September 2017

Error Body-wave
Sourcea Origin time (UTC) Latitude Longitude margin b magnitudec
IDCd 03:30:06.09 ± 3.7 41.3256° N 129.0760° E ±6.7 kme 6.07 ± 0.1
CEME 03:29:59.0 41.3° N 129.1° E . . 6.3
NEIC 03:30:01.760 41.332° N 129.030° E ±1.4 kmf 6.3
IES CAS 03:30:00 41.3° N 129.1° E . . 6.3
KMA 03:29:58 41.302° N 129.080° E . . 5.7
FOI 03:30 41.3° N 129.1° E . . 6.1
. . = data not available; CEME = Russian Academy of Sciences, Geophysical Survey, Central
Experimental Methodical Expedition, Obninsk, Kaluga oblast, Russia; FOI = Swedish Defence
Research Agency, Stockholm, Sweden; IDC = Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO), International Data Centre, Vienna, Austria; IES CAS = Institutions of
Earth Science, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China; km = kilometres; KMA = Korean
Meteorological Administration, Seoul, South Korea; NEIC = US Geological Survey, National
Earthquake Information Center, Denver, CO, United States; UTC = Coordinated Universal
Time.
a Because of differences between estimates regarding the precise location and magnitude of

the explosion, data from 6 sources—1 internationally recognized body and 5 national bodies—
is provided for comparison.
b The error margins are as defined by the data sources.
c Body-wave magnitude indicates the size of the event. In order to give a reasonably correct

estimate of the yield of an underground explosion, detailed information is needed (e.g. on the
geological conditions in the area where the explosion took place). Body-wave magnitude is an
unambiguous way of indicating the size of an explosion.
d The IDC was ‘in a test and provisional operation mode only’ so 41 of the 50 primary and

96 of the 120 auxiliary seismic monitoring stations in the CTBTO’s International Monitoring
System were contributing data at the time of the event.
e This figure is the length of the semi-major axis of the confidence ellipse. The confidence

ellipse area was 109 square km, or almost 10 times smaller than the maximum area allowed to
be inspected under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection regime
(1000 square km).
f This figure is the horizontal location error, defined as the ‘length of the largest projection

of the three principal errors on a horizontal plane’.

Sources: CTBTO, IDC, ‘Technical briefing’, 3 Sep. 2017; and CTBTO, IDC, ‘Technical findings’,
7 Sep. 2017; CEME, [Information message about underground nuclear explosion made in North
Korea on 3 September 2017], 4 Sep. 2017 (in Russian); NEIC, ‘M 6.3 nuclear explosion: 21 km
ENE of Sungjibaegam, North Korea’, US Geological Survey, [n.d.]; IES CAS, ‘Research letters:
September 3, 2017, preliminary results of seismological discrimination, depth and equivalence
estimates for North Korea’s nuclear tests’, 4 Sep. 2017; KMA, Earthquake Volcano Monitoring
Division, ‘Artificial earthquake occurred in North Hamkyung Province’, Press release, 3 Sep.
2017; and FOI, ‘Nuclear weapons test in North Korea’, Press release, 11 Sep. 2017.

such as ‘the directional combination structure and multi-layer radiation

explosion-proof structural design of the first system and the second system’
and the ‘light thermal radiation-resisting materials and neutron-resisting

as ‘cleaner’ by military planners. This could be important for those considering the tactical use of
nuclear weapons.
 world nuclear forces 2 97

materials’, are harder to interpret specifically on the basis of open-source

descriptions of thermonuclear weapon designs. However, these statements
seem to be consistent with the ‘Teller–Ulam’ thermonuclear design, which is
ostensibly used by all states with thermonuclear weapons. 5
As was the case with the fifth test, the NWI statement noted that ‘there
were neither emission through ground surface nor leakage of radioactive
materials nor did it have any adverse impact on the surrounding ecological
environment’.

Verification of the September 2017 North Korean test by the

international community

The international community—international organizations, individual

states and many research institutions—sought to verify North Korea’s claims
concerning the test using a combination of available technologies, including
seismology, radionuclide monitoring and satellite imagery analysis. 6
The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multi­
lateral treaty that, once it enters into force, will prohibit the carrying out of
any nuclear explosion.7 The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) has been established
to prepare for the entry into force of the CTBT. These preparations include
the creation of an International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear
explosions. While the CTBT had been ratified by 166 states as of 1 Febru-
ary 2018, it cannot enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by
44 states that possess certain nuclear facilities. North Korea, which is one of
these 44 states, has not signed the treaty and therefore does not participate
in the IMS.
Seismic data recorded at monitoring stations around the world was used
to estimate the time, location and size of the 3 September 2017 explosion (see
table 6.15). The seismic wave patterns recorded, the depth of the event (less
than 1 kilometre) and the fact that it occurred so close to the five previous
nuclear tests (a characteristic distance being a few hundred metres) all indi-
cate that it was an explosion rather than an earthquake. 8 The characteristic
feature of this test was that its yield (see below) was large enough to produce
aftershocks that themselves were large enough to be detected by seismic

5 Korean Central News Agency (note 3).

6 US National Academy of Sciences, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (National Academy Press: Washington, DC, 2002), pp. 39–41; and Dahlman, O. et al.,
Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban? (Springer: Dordrecht, 2011), pp. 29–76.
7 For a summary and other details of the CTBT see annex A, section I, in this volume.
8 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, International Data Centre, ‘Technical

findings’, 7 Sep. 2017.

2 9 8 military spending and armaments, 2 017

monitoring stations.9 In addition, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite

imagery was used to show that the peak of Mount Mantap had ‘incurred a
visible amount of subsidence’, and an area of about 35 hectares ‘of the south-
west flank of the mountain was displaced by several meters’.10 The seismic
events that followed the test explosion have reportedly led the governments
of the United States and China to conclude that a collapse of an explosion
cavity or tunnels had taken place.11
Even though there can be little doubt in cases of an explosion of this
size, strictly speaking, seismic data alone is insufficient to confirm that an
underground explosion is a nuclear explosion. Following North Korea’s
2006 and 2013 tests, the nuclear nature of the explosion was confirmed
when air sampling detected traces of radioxenon—radioactive isotopes of
xenon that are released from a nuclear explosion.12 No trace of radioxenon
or other radioactive debris was reported found after the 2009 event, or after
either of the events in 2016. Radioxenon detection after the 2017 test pro-
duced ambiguous results. The Government of the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) announced that its Nuclear Safety and Security Commission found
xenon-133 in ‘ground, air and maritime’ samples collected locally after the
test.13 The CTBTO also detected and investigated elevated concentrations
of radioxenon, but found these ‘not conclusive with regard to a possible
associ­ation to the seismic event on 3 September’. It therefore determined
that ‘no CTBT-relevant radionuclides were detected by the IMS that could
be unambiguously linked to a nuclear test in DPRK in September 2017’.14

Discussion of the September 2017 test results

North Korea does not announce the planned or measured yields from its test
explosions. Estimates made by international researchers vary significantly.
The published body-wave magnitude measurements—an unambiguous way
of registering the size of a seismic event—ranged from 5.7 to 6.3.15 As a result
of this discrepancy and differences in the empirical methods used to convert

9 Kitov, I. O. and Rozhkov, M. V., ‘Discrimination of the DPRK underground explosions and their

aftershocks using the P/S spectral amplitude ratio’, Cornell University Library, Preprint, 5 Dec. 2017.
10 Lee (note 2).
11 Dill, C., ‘North Korea nuclear test: “tunnel collapse” may provide clues’, BBC News, 3 Sep. 2017.
12 Fedchenko and Ferm Hellgren (note 1), p. 553; and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Organization (CTBTO), ‘CTBTO detects radioactivity consistent with 12 February announced

North Korean nuclear test’, Press release, 23 Apr. 2013.
13 Yonhap News Agency, ‘Traces of xenon detected in S. Korea following N. Korea’s nuke test’,

8 Sep. 2017.
14 American Geophysical Union (AGU), Proceedings of the AGU Fall Meeting 2017, New

Orleans, 11–15 Dec. 2017. For a detailed discussion of CTBT-relevant radionuclides and the CTBTO
pro­cedures for their detection and analysis see De Geer, L. E., ‘Radionuclide signatures for post-­
explosion environments’, ed. V. Fedchenko, SIPRI, The New Nuclear Forensics: Analysis of Nuclear
Materials for Security Purposes (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2015), pp. 128–55.
15 For further detail on body-wave magnitude see the United States Geological Survey website.
 world nuclear forces 2 9 9

these values into explosive yields, yield estimates ranged from 50 kilotons
to 1 megaton.16 Most researchers agree, however, that the September 2017
test was about an order of magnitude larger than the previous one in Sep-
tember 2016. For example, the US Government’s assessment of the explosive
yield is 140 kt, the Norwegian Government’s figure is 120 kt and the Swedish
Government and Chinese university researchers, working independently,
estimate a yield in the range of 100–200 kt.17
Most commentators found North Korea’s claim that the nuclear explosive
device tested on 3 September 2017 was a thermonuclear weapon to be plaus­
ible.18 It should be noted, however, that these findings, which may indeed be
correct, are based on indirect evidence. The only direct evidence associated
with the event that is described in open sources is seismic wave data. Seismic
waves can provide evidence of the size of the explosion but do not give infor-
mation on the nuclear, boosted or thermonuclear nature of the explosive
device, or on whether the test device used uranium or plutonium. The radio­
active debris—and specifically the radioactive micro-­particles—associated
with the explosion must be analysed to discern that kind of detail.19
The explosive yield of the tested device is consistent with all three of the
above-mentioned types of weapon (nuclear, boosted or thermonuclear) and
therefore cannot be used to discriminate between them. For example, the
B61 nuclear bomb—a true thermonuclear two-stage gravity bomb currently
deployed in the US arsenal—reportedly has variants with yields of between
a few kilotons and 300 kt. 20 By contrast, the largest publicly known pure-­
fission nuclear explosive device ever tested by the USA, the Ivy King test
explosion on 16 November 1952, had a yield of about 500 kt. 21 Moreover, some
commentators point out that it is technically easier to achieve a 100-kt yield
in an underground test with no constraints on size and weight than to design
a miniature warhead with a yield of 10–20 kt. 22

16 See table 6.15; and Incorporated Research Institutions of Seismology, ‘Special event: 2017

North Korean nuclear test’, 23 Jan. 2018.

17 Panda, A., ‘US intelligence: North Korea’s sixth test was a 140 kiloton “advanced nuclear”

device’, The Diplomat, 6 Sep. 2017; NORSAR, ‘Large nuclear test in North Korea on 3 September
2017’, 3 Sep. 2017; University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), ‘North Korea’s 3 Septem-
ber 2017 nuclear test location and yield: seismic results from USTC’, [n.d.]; and Swedish Defence
Research Agency (FOI), ‘Nuclear weapons test in North Korea’, Press release, 11 Sep. 2017.
18 See e.g. Lewis, J., ‘Welcome to the thermonuclear club, North Korea!’, Foreign Policy, 4 Sep.

2017.
19 De Geer (note 14), pp. 128–55.
20 Hansen, C., Swords of Armageddon, vol. 5 (Chukelea Publications: Sunnyvale, CA, 2007), p. 473.
21 Hansen (note 20), pp. 96–97.
22 Kelley, R., ‘North Korea’s sixth nuclear test: what do we know so far?’, SIPRI Expert Comment,

5 Sep. 2017.
3 0 0 military spending and armaments, 2 017

Table 6.16. Estimated number of nuclear explosions, 1945–2017

Russia/ North
USA b USSR UK b France China India Pakistan Korea
Yeara a u a u a u a u a u a u a u a u Total
1945 3 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 3
1946 2c – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 2
1948 3 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 3
1949 – – 1 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1
1951 15 1 2 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 18
1952 10 – – – 1 – – – – – – – – – – – 11
1953 11 – 5 – 2 – – – – – – – – – – – 18
1954 6 – 10 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 16
1955 17c 1 6c – – – – – – – – – – – – – 24
1956 18 – 9 – 6 – – – – – – – – – – – 33
1957 27 5 16 c – 7 – – – – – – – – – – – 55
1958 62 d 15 34 – 5 – – – – – – – – – – – 116
1960 – – – – – – 3 – – – – – – – – – 3
1961 – 10 58 c 1 – – 1 1 – – – – – – – – 71
1962 39 c 57 78 1 – 2 – 1 – – – – – – – – 178
1963 4 43 – – – – – 3 – – – – – – – – 50
1964 – 45 – 9 – 2 – 3 1 – – – – – – – 60
1965 – 38 – 14 – 1 – 4 1 – – – – – – – 58
1966 – 48 – 18 – – 6 1 3 – – – – – – – 76
1967 – 42 – 17 – – 3 – 2 – – – – – – – 64
1968 – 56 – 17 – – 5 – 1 – – – – – – – 79
1969 – 46 – 19 – – – – 1 1 – – – – – – 67
1970 – 39 – 16 – – 8 – 1 – – – – – – – 64
1971 – 24 – 23 – – 5 – 1 – – – – – – – 53
1972 – 27 – 24 – – 4 – 2 – – – – – – – 57
1973 – 24 – 17 – – 6 – 1 – – – – – – – 48
1974 – 22 – 21 – 1 9 – 1 – – 1 – – – – 55
1975 – 22 – 19 – – – 2 – 1 – – – – – – 44
1976 – 20 – 21 – 1 – 5 3 1 – – – – – – 51
1977 – 20 – 24 – – – 9 1 – – – – – – – 54
1978 – 19 – 31 – 2 – 11 2 1 – – – – – – 66
1979 – 15 – 31 – 1 – 10 1 – – – – – – – 58
1980 – 14 – 24 – 3 – 12 1 – – – – – – – 54
1981 – 16 – 21 – 1 – 12 – – – – – – – – 50
1982 – 18 – 19 – 1 – 10 – 1 – – – – – – 49
1983 – 18 – 25 – 1 – 9 – 2 – – – – – – 55
1984 – 18 – 27 – 2 – 8 – 2 – – – – – – 57
1985 – 17 – 10 – 1 – 8 – – – – – – – – 36
1986 – 14 – – – 1 – 8 – – – – – – – – 23
1987 – 14 – 23 – 1 – 8 – 1 – – – – – – 47
1988 – 15 – 16 – – – 8 – 1 – – – – – – 40
1989 – 11 – 7 – 1 – 9 – – – – – – – – 28
1990 – 8 – 1 – 1 – 6 – 2 – – – – – – 18
1991 – 7 – – – 1 – 6 – – – – – – – – 14
1992 – 6 – – – – – – – 2 – – – – – – 8
 world nuclear forces 3 01

Russia/ North
USA b USSR UK b France China India Pakistan Korea
Yeara a u a u a u a u a u a u a u a u Total
1993 – – – – – – – – – 1 – – – – – – 1
1994 – – – – – – – – – 2 – – – – – – 2
1995 – – – – – – – 5 – 2 – – – – – – 7
1996 – – – – – – – 1 – 2 – – – – – – 3
1998 – – – – – – – – – – – 2e – 2e – – 4
2006 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 1
2009 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 1
2013 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 1
2016 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 2 2
2017 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 1
Subtotal 217 815 219 496 21 24 50 160 23 22 – 3 – 2 – 6
Total 1 032 715 45 210 45 3 2 6 2 058
– = no known test; a = atmospheric (or in a few cases underwater); u = undergroundf ; USSR =
Soviet Union.
a The table includes only those years in which a known explosion took place.
b All British tests from 1962 were conducted jointly with the USA at the US Nevada Test Site

but are listed only under ‘UK’ in this table. Thus, the number of US tests is higher than shown.
Safety tests carried out by the UK are not included in the table.
c One of these tests was carried out underwater.
d Two of these tests were carried out underwater.
e India’s detonations on 11 and 13 May 1998 are listed as 1 test for each date. The 5 deton­

ations by Pakistan on 28 May 1998 are also listed as 1 test.

f ‘Underground nuclear test’ is defined by the 1990 Protocol to the 1974 Soviet–US Thresh-

old Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT) as ‘either a single underground nuclear explosion conducted at
a test site, or two or more underground nuclear explosions conducted at a test site within an
area delineated by a circle having a diameter of two kilometres and conducted within a total
period of time of 0.1 second’ (section I, para. 2). ‘Underground nuclear explosion’ is defined by
the 1976 Soviet–US Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) as ‘any individual or group
underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes’ (Article II(a)). ‘Group explosion’ is
defined as ‘two or more individual explosions for which the time interval between successive
individual explosions does not exceed five seconds and for which the emplacement points
of all explosives can be inter-connected by straight line segments, each of which joins two
emplacement points and each of which does not exceed 40 kilometres’ (Article II(c)).
Sources: Bergkvist, N.-O. and Ferm, R., Nuclear Explosions 1945–1998 (Swedish Defence
Research Establishment/SIPRI: Stockholm, July 2000); Swedish Defence Research Agency
(FOI), various estimates, including information from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization (CTBTO) International Data Centre and from the Swedish National
Data Centre provided to the author in Feb. 2007 and Oct. 2009; Reports from the Australian
Seismological Centre, Australian Geological Survey Organisation, Canberra; US Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992 (DOE:
Washington, DC, 1994); Norris, R. S., Burrows, A. S. and Fieldhouse, R. W., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5, British, French and Chinese Nuclear
Weapons (Westview: Boulder, CO, 1994); Direction des centres d’experimentations nucléaires
(DIRCEN) and Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA), Assessment of French Nuclear Test-
ing (DIRCEN and CEA: Paris, 1998); Russian ministries of Atomic Energy and Defence, USSR
Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, 1949 through 1990 (Russian Federal
Nuclear Centre (VNIIEF): Sarov, 1996); and Natural Resources Defense Council, ‘Archive of
nuclear data’, various years.
3 0 2 military spending and armaments, 2 017

The estimated number of nuclear explosions, 1945–2017

Since 1945 there have been 2058 known nuclear explosions carried out by
eight states—the USA, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China,
India, Pakistan and North Korea (see table 6.16). This total includes nuclear
tests conducted in nuclear weapon test programmes, explosions carried out
for peaceful purposes and the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in August 1945. The total also includes tests for safety purposes
carried out by France, the Soviet Union and the USA, irrespective of the
yield and of whether they caused a nuclear explosion. 23 It does not include
sub­critical experiments that did not sustain a nuclear chain reaction. Simul-
taneous detonations, also known as salvo explosions, were carried out by
the USA (from 1963) and the Soviet Union (from 1965), mainly for economic
reasons. 24 A total of 20 per cent of the Soviet tests and 6 per cent of the
US tests were salvo experiments.
No verified nuclear tests have been carried out by Israel. There are asser-
tions that the unexpected ‘double flash’ registered by the US Vela 6911 satel-
lite in September 1979 was an indication of a nuclear weapon test conducted
by Israel with support from South Africa. However, this assertion has never
been officially confirmed by either government. 25
A number of moratoriums on testing, both voluntary and legal, have been
observed. The Soviet Union, the UK and the USA observed a moratorium
from November 1958 to September 1961. The 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty
(PTBT), which prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer
space and underwater, entered into force on 10 October 1963. 26 The Soviet
Union observed a unilateral moratorium on testing between August 1985 and
February 1987. The Soviet Union and then Russia observed a moratorium on
testing from January 1991 and the USA from October 1992, until they signed
the CTBT on 24 September 1996. France observed a similar moratorium
from April 1992 to September 1995. The CTBT, which has not yet entered
into force, would prohibit the carrying out of any nuclear explosion. 27

23 In a safety experiment, or a safety trial, more or less fully developed nuclear devices are sub-

jected to simulated accident conditions. The nuclear weapon core is destroyed by conventional
explosives with either no or a very small release of fission energy. The UK has also carried out
numerous safety tests but they are not included in table 6.16.
24 The Soviet Union conducted simultaneous tests of up to 8 devices on 23 Aug. 1975 and 24 Oct.

1990 (the last Soviet test).

25 Weiss, L., ‘Flash from the past: why an apparent Israeli nuclear test in 1979 matters today’, Bul-

letin of the Atomic Scientists, 8 Sep. 2015.

26 India, Pakistan, Russia, the UK and the USA are among the parties. For a full list see annex A,

section I, in this volume.

27 China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are among the parties. For a full list see annex A,

section I, in this volume.