Canet vs.

Decena presiding judge to temporarily cease and desist from enforcing the
G.R. No. 155344 January 20, 2004 writ of preliminary injunction issued on Feb. 1, 2000.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. ISSUE:
Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor,
Petition – Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition can be compelled to issue the necessary business permit to petitioner
with the Court of Appeals. absent a municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so.

FACTS: HELD:
On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, NO. Since there was no ordinance allowing the operation of
Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 049 Series of 1998, cockpit, it cannot be implemented. It is a basic precept of statutory
authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish, operate and construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
maintain a cockpit in Sitio, Cabaya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the maxim
Sur. expression unius est exlusio alterius and expressium facit cessare
tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Canet, relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, filed
an application for mayor’s permit. Mayor Julieta Decena denied the The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
application since under the Local Government Code of 1991, the respondent Judge are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE while the writ
authority to give licences for such business is vested in the of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by the Court of Appeals
Sanguniang Bayan. Moreover, Mayor Decena could not issue the on July 10, 2002 is made permanent.
permit as well because there was no ordinance passed by the
Sanguniang Bayan to authorize it.

On July 26, 1999, Canet filed a complaint against Decena for

mandamus and damages with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction in RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI. Decena’s
move to dismiss the complaint was denied. The writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued on Feb. 1, 2000.

Decena, on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On April 3, 2000, the CA
issued a temporary restraining order instructing Canet and the
ARATEA v COMELEC disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012 Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor was mandated to
succeed as Mayor.
FACTS:
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, ISSUE:
Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of the Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny OEC, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the
due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should
Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms. succeed as Mayor in this case.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy. RULING:
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec.
COMELEC En Banc remained pending during said elections. 78 of the OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the "second placer," should
Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy
were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively. was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all.
Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually
Mayor. Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified garnered the highest number of votes for the position.
Lonzanida from running for Mayor based on two grounds: (1),
Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive
terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by
final judgment of ten counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Qualifications and Disqualifications
Code (RPC). The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and
Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to 40 of the Local Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides,
be proclaimed as Mayor because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate among others:
when the COMELEC Division ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified
of official candidates. from running for any elective local position:
Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
winning candidate. He reasoned that since Lonzanida’s moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent xxx
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualification means that "the
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has run for elective public office, and commits a false material
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he
is eligible to so run.
xxx Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any
elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction
False Material Representation against him became final. The judgment of conviction was
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009,
denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
contents of the certificate of candidacy. 2009 .
Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy. This included among others a statement that the person Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under
filing it is eligible for said office. Section 78 of the OEC because this accessory penalty is
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run
of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires
public office, or from being elected to any public office. This him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material
judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who
candidacy. suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special
operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required
Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification produces under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit
of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly
principal penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running
for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under petition for disqualification, not a petition for the cancellation of
Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting opinions write Lonzanida’s CoC.
in the law what is not found in the law. A resulting disqualification based on a violation of the three-term
limit rule cannot begin to operate until after the elections, where the
Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special three-term official emerged as victorious. The prohibition against
Disqualification Lonzanida only took place after his election for his fourth
Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to consecutive term. With Lonzanida ineligible to assume office, the
cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from Vice-Mayor takes over by succession.
perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of
a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is DISSENTING OPINION
judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the REYES, J.:
convict from running for public office. The violation of the three-term limit cannot be a ground for
cancellation of COC. To emphasize, this remedy can only be pursued
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy in cases of material misrepresentation in the CoC, which are limited
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to to the details that must be stated therein. Antipolo’s contention that
a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Lonzanida should be deemed to have made a misrepresentation in his
Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the COC when he stated that he was eligible to run when in fact he was
constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, he is known to not is inconsistent with the basic rule in statutory construction that
have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of provisions of a law should be construed as a whole and not as a
Falsification. In other words, on election day, respondent series of disconnected articles and phrases.
Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in Considering that the number of terms for which a local candidate had
law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for served is not required to be stated in the CoC, it cannot be a ground
the position, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. for a petition to cancel a CoC.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the The petition filed by Dra. Rodolfo against Lonzanida should be
duly elected Mayor. considered a petition for disqualification and not a petition to cancel
a CoC.
DISSENTING OPINION In the event that a vacancy is created in the office of the mayor, it is
BRION, J.: the duly-elected vice-mayor, petitioner Aratea in this case, who shall
The violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for the succeed as mayor.
cancellation of a CoC. It is an appropriate ground for
disqualification; thus, Dr. Rodolfo should be deemed to have filed a
Farinas v. Barba
FARINAS VS BARBA
GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. ISSUE:
BARBA,  Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996 what procedure?

FACTS: HELD:
 Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang  The person who has the power to appoint under such
Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation of
resigned after going without leave to the United States. the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan
 To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was  The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither
made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was
recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding
containing the recommendation, was submitted to the paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by
compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino
(R.A. No. 7160). was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On
provision of the Local Government Code, disapproved the the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was
resolution “for the reason that the authority and power to recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the
appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.
Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner
Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed
petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On
the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed
respondent Edward Palafox to the same position.
 June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
 July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding
the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor
Barba.
CHUA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COA V. PROVINCE OF CEBU
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) GR 141386, Nov 29, 2001

FACTS: FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the
voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code,
reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 2. appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS
Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate
employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized students in the public schools.
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the period January to June 1998,
a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the
date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were
qualified to avail of the benefits charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF
of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with were the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently,
Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu,
same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship
yielded the same result. grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.
Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the
ISSUE: province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a petition for
W/N Petitioner’s status as a co- declaratory relief with the trial court.
terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 On December 13, 1999, the court a quo rendered a decision
(Early Retirement Law). declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures of the
SEF. Declaring further, the respondent's audit findings on pages 36
HELD: and 37 in the Annual Audit Report on the Province of Cebu for the
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would year ending December 31, 1999 as null and void.
violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Hence, the instant petition by the Commission on Audit on the
Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the expenses for college scholarship grants, since chargeable to the
benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit
employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said concerned expressly was not mentioned under R.A. NO.5447.
law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in
deciding this case.
With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, establishment and maintenance of extension classes are declared
petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447 was repealed, leaving Section chargeable against the Special Education Fund of the province.
100 (c) of the Code to govern the disposition of the SEF, to wit: However, the expenses incurred by the provincial government for the
SEC. 100. Meeting and Quorum; Budget college scholarship grants should not be charged against the Special
(c) The annual school board budget shall give priority to the Education Fund, but against the General Funds of the province of
following: Cebu. Since salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship
(1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the
other facilities of public elementary and secondary schools; SEF under the Local Government Code, they should be deemed
(2) Establishment and maintenance of extension classes where excluded there from.
necessary; and It should be noted that Section 100 of the Local Government Code
(3) Sports activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay substantially reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike
levels. payment of salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of
establishment and maintenance of extension classes and operation
ISSUE : and maintenance of public schools, the granting of government
Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public scholarship to poor but deserving students was omitted.
school teachers appointed by the local chief executives in connection
with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well
as the expenses for college scholarship grants, chargeable to the
Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit
concerned?

RULING:
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20,
in Civil Case No. CEB-24422, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION applying the Doctrine of Casus Ommisus (Casus
omissus pro omisso habendus es). A person, object, or thing omitted
from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of
scholarship where the legislature has omitted it.
The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed
by the provincial school board of Cebu in connection with the
GUINGONA v. CARAGUE HELD:
GR No. 94571, 1991-04-22
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
FACTS: Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary
priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to
(with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, state policies or objectives.
or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect
PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the
Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out Principles:
of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Purpose.” Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary
priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the adequate... remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are
of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives
priority to education.” of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies
or... objectives.
ISSUE: The amount of P29,740,611,000.00[8] set aside for... the Department
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations
unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R.
constitutional mandate according highest priority to... education. No. 146738, March 2 2001
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an [Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt,... The controversy]
automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective
execution of debt management policies... it enables the Government FACTS:
to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings
redeeming high-interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon
arrangements... that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt- Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the
to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in
Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and
existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
"bills" that must again go through the legislative mill. succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a
result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional
and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition
with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
duties of his office. provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art
VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art
ISSUE(S): VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy. immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President. right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit. 2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the
prejudicial publicity. Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial
RULING: evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is
deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been release containing his final statement:
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It 1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of 2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace
a particular measure." and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
Power II: reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
EDSA I EDSA II 3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
exercise of people power of serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
freedom of speech and freedom of
exercise of the people power of assembly to petition the government
opportunity);
revolution which overthrew the for redress of grievances which only 4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
whole government. affected the office of the President. may come in the same service of the country;
extra constitutional and the intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government resignation of the sitting President
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a
that resulted from it cannot be the that it caused and the succession of constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
subject of judicial review the Vice President as President are Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions. act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The
its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show
of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation,
Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer justice and less with prosecution.
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They

involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of
the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful
acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as
any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free
press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use
the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995 or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely
Freedom of the Press for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
FACTS: income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision freedom under the Constitution.
dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PEOPLE VS. VENERACION
Philippine Press Institute (PPI) that by removing the exemption of G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others,
the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, FACTS:
“even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed The case arose from the conviction of two individuals by the
freedom is unconstitutional.” respondent judge with the crime of Rape with Homicide of seven-
year old girl. The accused on the incident also caused fatal injuries to
ISSUE: the minor child by slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick
Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious and press peace of wood and stabling her neck, which were all the direct cause
freedom? of her immediate death. Respondent-judge however, instead of
imposing the corresponding death penalty, imposed rather the
RULING: reclusion perpetua to each accused.
No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration
unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the praying that the decision be modified that the penalty be death
press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the instead of reclusion perpetua. Respondent-judge still denied the
exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such motion citing religious convictions.
those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to
religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in connection ISSUE:
with the latter’s sale of religious books and pamphlets, is Whether or not the respondent-judge acted with grave abuse
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “it is one thing to of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another failed to attach the corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with
thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon.” Homicide.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax
on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is
HELD: Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay
Yes, respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the attaching Doctrine of Condonation Abandoned
the proper corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of FACTS:
guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by law A complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the
on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
Respondent-judge is duty bound to emphasize that a court of law is employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019, otherwise
sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection
penalty in specific and well defined instances. The discomfort faced with the five phases of the procurement and construction of the
by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, Makati City Hall Parking Building.
but is a matter upon which judges have no choice. This is consistent Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits,
in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9, that no judge or the Ombudsman issued the order placing Binay, Jr., et al. under
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, preventive suspension for not more than six months without pay,
obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws. during the pendency of the OMB Cases.
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case suspension of a public officer are present, and that their continued
back to the respondent-judge for the imposition of death penalty of stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB
the accused. Cases filed against them.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation.
Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of
the five phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a)
Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first
term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if
any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office.
Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that
CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for TRO. election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal
The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an
grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO. inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective
official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this
ISSUE: jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’s our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or
case. at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in
a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
RULING: Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be
The petition is partly meritorious. said that the electorate’s will has been abdicated.
This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted
from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch
from – and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in
the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the
CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s
abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, There is no truth in Pascual’s
postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their
right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned.
MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position
Facts: which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of
Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
upon naturalization as citizen of United States of America. Sometime and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted and he subsequently demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. On and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
November 2009, Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
won the said election. But prior from his declaration as winner, a appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign
pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua, one of the citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no
citizen of the Philippines, with a certification issued by the Bureau of other. It is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only
Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-American and a at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
been using his American passport even after renunciation of qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
American citizenship. A division of the COMELEC ruled against Therefore, the Court held Arnando disqualified for any local elective
Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc position as provided by express disqualification under Section 40(d)
stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does not cure this
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 ineligibility of the candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set
through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile, by the Constitution are nugatory.
Maquiling petition that should be declared winner as he gained the Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as
second highest number of votes. reiterated in the case of Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when the
ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced.
Issue: Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who
Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing garnered the highest votes should be declared as winner.
foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public
office.

Held:
Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
FUNA V. COA CHAIR Jurisprudence tells us that the word “reappointment” means a second
GR No. 192791, April 24, 2012 appointment to one and the same office; Necessarily, a movement to
a different position within the commission (from Commissioner to
SUBJECT MATTER: Powers and Functions of the President; Power Chairman) would constitute an appointment, or a second
of Appointment appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment.

CASE SUMMARY: Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the
In this case, after Carague (former COA chairman) finished his 7- term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without
year term, the respondent was appointed as COA Chairman while authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than
serving his fourth year as commissioner. However, he was to serve what the law provides—if the vacancy calls for a full seven-year
for 3 years only, the unexpired portion of Villar’s 7-year term of appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a
office. Villar insists that his appointment accorded him a fresh 7-year promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years.
term and should serve full 7 years as chairman instead of 3 years. The explicit command of the Constitution is that the “Chairman and
The SC ruled that while his appointment is not a reappointment, it is the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President xxx for a
still unconstitutional, as the president does not have the power to term of seven years [and] appointment to any vacancy shall be only
extend a promotional appointment for more or less than 7 years. It is for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
also not possible for Villar to serve the full 7-year term as he has
already served 4 years as commissioner. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for
less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of
DOCTRINES: Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution: chairman
The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments FACTS:
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first  This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Dennis A. B. Funa challenging the constitutionality of the
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be Commission on Audit.
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no  On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or appointed Guillermo N. Carague as Chairman of the
acting capacity. Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years,
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague’s term of office
started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.
  Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the third member of capacity.
the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2,
2004 until February 2, 2011. The appointment of Villar, from Commissioner to Chairman, was not
 Following Carague’s retirement on February 2, 2008 and a reappointment. Jurisprudence tells us that the word
during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, “reappointment” means a second appointment to one and the same
Villar was appointed as COA Chairman on April 18, 2008. office. Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the
 He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute
in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original an appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but not
term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, reappointment.
2011.
 Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman However, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman when
accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the
lapse. His term of office as chairman is up to February 2, expiration of his 7-year term. Therefore there in no unexpired
2015 or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he portion of the Carague’s term. Thus the next appointed COA
was appointed to that position. chairman should serve a 7-year term. However, in this case, Villar
has already served four years as commissioner, serving as COA
ISSUE/S: chairman for full 7-year term as COA chairman would unduly
WON whether the assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA extend his term beyond the 7 years fixed by the constitution.
Chairman is unconstitutional. (YES) Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the
term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without
HOLDING: authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than
Yes, the appointment of Villar as COA Chairman is unconstitutional what the law provides—if the vacancy calls for a full seven-year
because according to Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, “The appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a
Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7)
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a years. The explicit command of the Constitution is that the
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, “Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for President for a term of seven years and appointment to any vacancy
five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of
Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman terms of office and appointments had already expired.

Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then

Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of
the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague,
whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D) of the Constitution.