1. ADM. CASE No.

3319 June 8, 2000, LESLIE 4

UI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS
BONIFACIO, Respondent.

2. [Resolution. March 18, 1954.] 6

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to
the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.

3. [B.M. NO. 1154 : June 8, 2004] IN THE MATTER 7

OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R.
MELENDREZ, Petitioner,

4. [A.C. NO. 6492 : November 18, 2004], MELANIO 9

L. ZORETA, Complainant, v. ATTY. HEHERSON
ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO, Respondent.

5. A.C. No. 4269, October 11, 2016, DOLORES 10

NATANAUAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO
P. TOLENTINO, Respondent.

6. [A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000] JOSE S. 13

DUCAT, JR., Complainant, v. ATTYS. ARSENIO
C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN, Respondents.

7. [A.C. NO. 6288 : June 16, 2006] MARILI C. 14

RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and
JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, represented by
their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.
CABUNGCAL, Complainants, v. ATTY.
HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

8. A.C. No. 11099, September 27, 2016, LILY 16

FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA, AND
FE V. FLORES, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROMAN
A. VILLANUEVA, JR. Respondent.

9. [Adm. Case No. 4748. August 4, 2000.] 18

VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JOSE O. ALOVERA, Respondent.

10. A.C. No. 10574, September 20, 2016, PATRICK R.

FABIE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONARDO M. 21
REAL, Respondent

Page 1 of 47
11. A.C. No. 7348, September 27, 2016 ROUEL YAP 22
PARAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUSTO P.
PARAS, Respondent

12. A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013, JOCELYN DE 24

LEON, Complainant, v. ATTY. TYRONE
PEDRENA, Respondent.

13. A.C. No. 11095 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11- 25

3140], September 20, 2016, EUFEMIA A.
CAMINO, Complainant, v. ATTY. RYAN REY L.
PASAGUI, Respondent.

14. [G.R. No. 32329. March 23, 1929.] In re LUIS B. 26

TAGORDA

15. [A.C. No. 2131. May 10, 1985.] 27

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, Complainant, v. BAKER
& MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS, JR., LUIS
MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL
E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA,
JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J.
CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and
JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., Respondents.

16. A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, OMAR P. ALI, 28

Complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG,
Respondent

17. [G.R. NOS. 151809-12. April 12, 2005] 29

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth
Division)

18. A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016, ATTY. RUTILLO 31

B. PASOK, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE G.
ZAPATOS, Respondent.

19. A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980, In the Matter of the 33

IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1), petitioner,

20. A.C. No. 8560, September 06, 2016, CARRIE- 35

ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S.
REYES, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON F.
NIEVA, Respondent.

21. A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015, SAMUEL B. 38

Page 2 of 47
 ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A.
ADAZA, Respondent.

22. A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016, MARIA 41

VICTORIA G. BELO-
HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO
"ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, Respondent.

23. A.C. No. 10782, September 14, 2016, ATTY. 44

DELIO M. ASERON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE
A. DIÑO, JR., Respondent.

24. A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016, SPOUSES 46

MANOLO AND MILINIA
NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V.
VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.

25. [A.C. NO. 6396. October 25, 2005], ROSALIE 47

DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.

Page 3 of 47
1.

SECOND DIVISION 
ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of
immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband
of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him
about the relationship between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said
respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail. According however to respondent, she is
a victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor
but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the
two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of
the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she
and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually
accept the situation. Respondent however presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage
contract.

Issue:    

Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law?

 Held: 

NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can
be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics.  If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then
the continued possession of good moral character is also requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession.

Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude”. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondent’s suspicion that something was
amiss in her relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. Respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with
Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered as an immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and to opinion of good and respectable member of the community. Moreover,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral, that is it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.

Page 4 of 47
A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil
status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.  

Page 5 of 47
2.

SECOND DIVISION
[Resolution. March 18, 1954.]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.
 
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title
of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in
the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title
of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations.  Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time.  It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect.  The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not
revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner.  The
same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules
of admission to the practice of law.

Page 6 of 47
3.

EN BANC
[B.M. NO. 1154 : June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN
THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, Petitioner,

FACTS:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:  Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for
Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No.  15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people.  Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’
wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling
used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the
OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle
his misunderstanding with Melendrez.  Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.”  Moreover, Meling denies the charges
and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge
of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take
the Bar Examinations are ludicrous.  He should have known that only the court of competent

Page 7 of 47
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor.  In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending.  Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character.  Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be
taken lightly by an applicant.

ISSUE:
WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall
subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

HELD: 

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.  Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from
the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character.  The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient
to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Page 8 of 47
4.

EN BANC
[A.C. NO. 6492 : November 18, 2004]
MELANIO L. ZORETA, Complainant, v. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G.
SIMPLICIANO, Respondent.

FACTS:
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of COntract and
Damaes against Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to
the latter’s failure to honor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent
Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter’s counsel. In said cases, respondent who
was not a dully commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications issued by teh CLerk of
Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by
presented documents.

ISSUE:
WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the Rules of Court.

RULING:
Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath
to obey the laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,
“Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). The lawyer violates, likewise,
Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.

Page 9 of 47
5.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4269, October 11, 2016
DOLORES NATANAUAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO P. TOLENTINO, Respondent.

FACTS
On January 03, 1978 - Dolores alleged that she is a co-owner of a parcel of land with an area
of about 50,000 square meters located in Tagaytay City.2 On January 3, 1978, they sold
this land to Alejo Tolentino (Alejo) for ₱500,000.00. On August 09, 1979 - Despite several
requests from Dolores, et al., Alejo, however, failed to settle the remaining obligation.

On May 14, 1991 - Dolores, et al. filed a case against Alejo and his wife Filomena for the
recovery of possession of immovable property,declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, and
damages. Then, on June 1993, Dolores discovered that the TCT No. 107593 under Alejo’s
name was issued not on the basis of the January 3, 1978 contract but on a Deed of Sale dated
August 3, 1979, purportedly executed by their father Jose Natanauan. She further discovered a
Joint Affidavit dated August 6, 1979, purportedly executed by Jose, et al. attesting to the
absence of tenants or lessees in the property10and another Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1979,
executed between Dolores, et al. as vendors and Atty. Tolentino as vendee covering
purportedly the same property. Dolores claims that the documents were forged and falsified as
their father died in Batangas on June 12, 1977 almost 2 years before the documents were
allegedly ‘signed’ by him. The documents were also not duly notarized by a commissioned
Notary Public in Manila. Finally, on June 1, 1994, Dolores filed the present disbarment
complaint against Atty. Tolentino and Perfecto for their alleged acts of falsification. In her
complaint, Dolores attached an Affidavit dated December 2, 1980, where Alejo and
Filomena attested that the subject property never belonged to them in truth or in facts, the true
and absolute owner of the same being Alejo’s brother, Atty. Tolentino.

Atty. Tolentino denied all allegations.

IBP found Atty Tolentino Guilty and suspended him from the practice of law.

ISSUE:
WON Atty Tolentino committed malpractice, YES

HELD:

Supreme Court agrees with the IBP. We find most telling of Atty. Tolentino's involvement is the
Deed of Sale dated March 9, 197970 which, as found by the IBP, Atty. Tolentino himself
presented71 before this Court in the case of Banco De Oro v. Bayuga.72 We quote the relevant
portion of the Banco De Oro decision, to wit:
During the oral argument, the Bank was required to submit copies of the Record on Appeal filed
in CA-G.R. No. 64130-R of the Court of Appeals and a chronology of relevant incidents. Its
Compliance was filed on June 8, 1979. TOLENTINO was also required to submit, not later than
the close of office hours of June 7, 1979, copy of the alleged deed showing the purchase by him
of about eight hectares of real estate in Tagaytay City on account of which he allegedly paid
P350,000.00 out of the P389,000.00 received by him from the loan proceeds. TOLENTINO
complied by submitting on June 7, 1979, at 11:00 A.M., a Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1979 of
a parcel of land of 5 hectares in Tagaytay City for which he is shown to have made a down

Page 10 of 47
payment of P280,000.00. At 3:00 P.M. of the same day, he submitted another Deed of Sale
dated April 2, 1979 over a piece of property of 2 hectares in Tagaytay City for which he
obligated himself to make a down payment of P70,000.00. Both sales, while duly acknowledged
before a Notary Public, do not disclose any evidence of registration.73 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court examined the rollo of the Banco De Oro case and found that, indeed, the Deed of
Sale dated March 9, 1979 presented by Atty. Tolentino therein is the very same Deed of Sale
dated March 9, 1979 which gave rise to the present disbarment case.

The circumstances surrounding the transactions covered by the falsified documents, viewed
against Atty. Tolentino's bare denials, constrain us to apply the rule that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a forged
document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification. The effect of a presumption upon
the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima
facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail. A prima facie case
of falsification having been established, Atty. Tolentino should have presented sufficient
evidence to overcome such burden. Through his own fault, this he failed to do.

Furthermore, we are convinced of Atty. Tolentino's dishonesty when he denied his association
with Notary Public Perfecto. The March 9, 1979 Deed of Sale shows a contract of sale executed
between Dolores, Romulo, Rafaela and Ernestina Natanauan, as vendors, and Atty. Tolentino,
as vendee, and notarized by "Notary Public" Perfecto. This clearly belies Atty. Tolentino's claim
that he does not personally know Perfecto nor dealt with him in any capacity. This, in turn,
further bolsters the conclusion that he had knowledge of or participation in the alleged
falsifications.

In addition, we stress that while Atty. Tolentino vehemently denies any participation in the
alleged falsification of the August 3, 1979 Deed of Sale, he kept silent (both in his Comment and
the subsequent motions he filed before the IBP and the Supreme Court) as to the March 9,
1979 Deed of Sale, a copy of which was attached as Annex I of the disbarment complaint. It
also does not appear that Atty. Tolentino ever disputed his signature appearing in conformity to
the Spouses Tolentino's Affidavit dated December 2, 1980 stating that the property never
belonged to them and that he (Atty. Tolentino) was its true and absolute owner.

Respondent is thus reminded that he is first and foremost an officer of the court. His bounden
duty is to assist it in rendering justice to all. Lest he has forgotten, lawyers must always be
disciples of truth. It is highly reprehensible when they themselves make a travesty of the truth
and mangle the ends of justice. Such behavior runs counter to the standards of honesty and fair
dealing expected from court officers.
We reiterate that a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as
such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious, calling for
both an exercise of disciplinary action and application of the contempt power.80 For his acts of
dishonesty, Atty. Tolentino not only violated the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he also failed to observe his duty as an officer of the court.

Furthermore, Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide that a lawyer
shall, "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes" and "at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar." Atty. Tolentino's deliberate non-participation in the
disciplinary proceedings shows a lack of respect for the legal (disciplinary) process and sullies

Page 11 of 47
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. We agree with the IBP that this constitutes
another reason to suspend Atty. Tolentino from the practice of law:

x x x We cannot ignore the fact that by virtue of one's membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus
submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. x x x Respondent's cavalier
attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to
the judicial institution, x x x It is necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the
Commission in deference to its authority over him as a member of the IBP. His wanton
disregard of its lawful orders subjects him to disciplinary sanction.’

All lawyers must inculcate in themselves that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment.

We thus affirm the IBP Board's recommended action to suspend him from the practice of law for
three (3) years.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Roberto P.

Tolentino GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath, and Canons 1, 7, and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for THREE (3) YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a STERN WARNING that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Page 12 of 47
6.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., Complainant, v. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and
CRISPULO DUCUSIN, Respondents.

FACTS
Villalon is the family lawyer of ducats. The original title of ducat sr was handed to villalon. The
handing over has two contradictory versions of reason, first because it is given as part of
process to convey the land because of the good services of villalon as villalon claimed, on the
other hand, allegedly because the latter reasoned that he shall check the measurements of the
land subject of title as alleged by ducat jr. Ducat sr allegedly because of his want to give the
land to villalon executed a deed of sale of the land in favor of villalon. But because it was
discovered that the land is registered in the name of ducat jr,a deed of sale was forged to make
it appear that there was one, ducusin was the notary public there.

ISSUE:
WON Villalon is guilty of misconduct. YES

HELD:
Villalon is guilty of gross misconduct for being involved in fraudulent notarization and forgery of
signature. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor. He was suspended for 1 year.

Page 13 of 47
7.

EN BANC
[A.C. NO. 6288 : June 16, 2006]
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO,
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.
CABUNGCAL, Complainants, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

FACTS:
Complainant Marili Ronquillo together with her minor children Alexander Ronquillo and Jon
Alexander Ronquillo and respondent Atty. Homobono Cezar entered into a deed of assignment
covering certain rights and interest over a townhouse located at Quezon City for the amount of
1.5 million pesos. It was settled that upon payment of the downpayment of the 1.5 million pesos,
respondent must furnish complainants a deed of assignment transferring the said right
and interest over the pertained property. Respondent also obligated himself to furnish the
complainants with a copy of the contract to sell with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, and
upon full payment shall execute with the latter a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said property
in favor of the complainants. However, upon payment of the remaining balance, respondent
failed to perform the subsequent obligations, to wit: delivering the contract to sell which was to
be executed by the respondent with Crown Asia and to execute in favor of the complainants and
deliver the Deed of Absolute Sale to the same. Complainants also received a notice from Crown
Asia that respondent did not actually deliver the full payment of the price of the said townhouse
at the time the Deed of Assignment was executed. Complainants then deliver to respondent
two (2) demand letters demanding for the return of the amount paid to the respondent or the
performance of respondent’s obligation, to pay to Crown Asia the full amount of the town house
and deliver to complainants a copy of the contract to sell and Deed of Absolute Sale. However,
despite of the demand letters, respondent failed to comply with the demands prompting
complainants to file an administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, after thorough investigation conducted, found that herein
respondent is guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE:
WON respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating his oath
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Resoponsibility.

HELD:
The Court Agrees. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit
; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

"Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases.
 
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In the instant case, respondent

Page 14 of 47
may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title over the town house unit and lot in question.
When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for
respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent
was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from
complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the
subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said
property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk
of the purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.

Page 15 of 47
8.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 11099, September 27, 2016
LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA, AND FE V.
FLORES, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA, JR. Respondent.

Facts:
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr., and Fe Flores
presented their adverse claim on the parcel of land situated in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and
registered under the names of Spouses Roman Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario L. Alipao.
The Register of Deeds annotated the adverse claim on January 23, 2007 as Entry No. 67251.
On December 27, 2007, an affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, which appeared to have been signed
by them, was also annotated on TCT No. 7919 as Entry No. 72573.
On March 26, 2008, the Register of Deeds canceled TCT No. 7919, and issued two new TCTs
in the name of the respondent.
Complainants Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores Lura, and Fe Flores lodged their complaint with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with gross dishonesty on the
basis of their assertion therein that they had not signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal,
charged him with dishonesty for concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment in
2006 as a state prosecutor.
They avered that he was disqualified for the position because he had already been 70 years old
at the time of his appointment, having been born on June 26, 1936; that they submitted as
proof: (1) the residence certificate issued in the name of "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.," whom they
claimed was the respondent himself, stating June 26, 1936 as his birthdate; (2) the deed of
extrajudicial partition of the... estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing that the respondent was
14 years old when he signed the document as "Isabelo Villanueva"; (3) the certification issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato[12] showing that he was 26 years old
when he got married on December 24, 1961; and (4) the affidavits respectively... executed by
his siblings, Francisca V. Flores and Tarcela V. Sajulan.
Respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives to the complainants in filing the
disbarment complaint against him.
He asserted that the basis for the partition of the contested property had been the compromise
agreement entered into by him and his siblings, including Francisca, the complainants' mother;
and that he had been born on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth certificate.
(IBP-CBD) submitted his report and recommendation finding the respondent liable for gross
misconduct in relation to the forged the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, and recommended his
two-yea... suspension from the practice of law. Commissioner Fernandez dismissed the charge
of dishonesty in relation to the respondent's age because his birth certificate prevailed over the
documents submitted by the complainants.
IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-278[20] adopting the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez

Page 16 of 47
ISSUES:
WON the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and gross
dishonesty. NO
HELD:
We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors considering that
the charges were not competently substantiated.
Falsification must be proved in the appropriate criminal or civil proceeding, not in the disbarment
proceeding
The birth certificate is the best evidence of the respondent's date of birth
Disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers in the public service involving their
qualifications... should be initially investigated by the agencies or offices having administrative
supervision over them
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against Atty. Roman A.
Villanueva, Jr. for lack of factual and legal merit.

Page 17 of 47
9.

EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 4748. August 4, 2000.]
VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, Respondent.

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Alovera for having penned a decision long after he
retired, which ultimately divested complainant Victoria Radjaie of her property.

From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following facts are established that:

1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What transpired was a mock or
simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the
plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another court, were present. No
Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as there was actual court session in
open court going on at that time.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained with
him even after his retirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs.
Concepcion Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.

3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together with the
"Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January 25,
1995, after the retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the exhibits
were not properly filed and do not bear markings of having been received by the court.

4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the
court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and because he was no longer a
judge his submission was refused.

CONCLUSIONS

The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though dated January 20, 1995 bears signature
and PTR No. issued on January 31, 1995. This simply means that the pleadings (were) ante
dated. It is impossible for Atty. Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated January 31, 1995 or any date
prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could have been made only on January 31, 1995 or
later. Because this is so, the Order of Judge Alovera dated January 25, 1995 is also ante dated
and could have been made only on a date beyond the filing of the Offer of Exhibits. So also with
the decision of former Judge Alovera dated January 30, 1995.
x x x

The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made after the retirement of Judge
Alovera. He was no longer a judge.

The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera constitute deceit, malpractice, serious
and grave misconduct as lawyer justifying their suspension from the practice of law and
ultimately their disbarment. 43

Page 18 of 47
Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant recommended the disbarment of
respondent, declaring that it found more than sufficient evidence to sustain complainant’s
charge against respondent that, indeed, the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No. V-
6186, which divested complainant of her property in Panay, Capiz, was penned by respondent
after his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent should be disbarred for simulating a trial. YES

HELD:
This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to be well-taken.
Respondent has thus sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in
the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession.

In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time
once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to
the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law 44 to be forgotten
afterwards nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must
uphold and keep inviolable at all times. 45 This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the particular provisions of which are applicable to the case at
bar, provide, to wit:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
x       x       x

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
x       x       x

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When
respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so
stand by his pledge. 46 In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.

Page 19 of 47
The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon and Concepcion Alcazar were all quite
telling on how respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having the questioned
decision dated January 30, 1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution divesting the
complainant of her property. Respondent gravely abused his relationship with his former staff,
pompously flaunting his erstwhile standing as a judge. Respondent disregarded his primary duty
as an officer of the court, who is sworn to assist the courts and not to impede or pervert the
administration of justice to all and sundry. 47 In so doing, he made a mockery of the judiciary
and eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character from members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a
guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice — a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of
his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority 48 for there is
perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high toned morality is more
imperative than that of law.

Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial defense to refute the
charges against him, he failed neither to do so nor to offer a valid explanation. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show
proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him.

Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court finds as appropriate
the recommended penalty of the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report. Such gross
misconduct of the respondent brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and calls for the
severance of respondent’s privilege to practice law for life.

WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk
of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of
this Decision

Page 20 of 47
10.

A.C. No. 10574, September 20, 2016, PATRICK R. FABIE, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
LEONARDO M. REAL, Respondent

FACTS:
In 2010, Fabie, the owner of a donated lot by his sister for the purpose of application as an
immigrant to the US or Canada filed a disbarment case against Atty. Real on the grounds of
failure to perform transfer of title back to his sister and turn over documents together with
40,000 cash for the expenses and attorney’s fees which was acknowledged by him. Atty. Real
claims that he was just caught in the bitter family fued and the transfer of titles was a
misunderstanding among the siblings, and that the receipts acknowledging the money was a
mistake on his secretary’s part.

IBP, on the other hand, found him guilty of (1) breach of duties to his client, (2) converted the
40,000 to his own use, (3) committed dishonesty.

ISSUE
WON respondent violated Canon of Responsibility. YES.

HELD:

Respondent failed to provide competent evidence aside from the self-serving statements.
Canon 18 states that, “A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Clearly, here, respondent failed to competently and diligently discharge his duties when he was
unable to transfer ownership of the property. Having failed, he obstinately failed to return the
money paid to him which he gave receipts. His inability to properly discharge his duty, makes
him answerable not only to him, but also to this Court, to the legal profession and the general
public.

WHEREFORE, court finds him guilty and suspends him for 6 months. He is ordered to return
the sum of 40,000 with interest.

Page 21 of 47
11.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7348, September 27, 2016
ROUEL YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUSTO P. PARAS, Respondent.

FACTS:
This is an administrative Complaint[1] directly filed before this Court, Rouel Yap Paras (Rouel)
charges his father Atty. Justo J. Paras (Atty. Paras) with violation of his lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[2... allegedly voluntarily offered properties he did not own
nor possess to the Department of Agrarian Reform for coverage under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.[3]... has been previously disciplined twice upon complaint of his wife.
[4]

In September 2006, Rouel found out that a listing of possible beneficiaries for the Department of
Agrarian Reform's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was being made by a certain
Edna Mijares and Tomas Visitacion.[5] On the same month, h... received at their residence in
Negros Oriental[6] a copy of a Notice of Coverage... from the Department of Land Reform.
was addressed to Atty. Paras and was signed by Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Grace B.
Fua.

Rouel’s counsel wrote Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer requesting a copy of all documents
pertaining to the September 8, 2006 Notice of Coverage addressed to Atty. Paras

Rouel's counsel also informed the Department of Agrarian Reform that: (1) the real properties
were subject of a pending case; (2) Atty. Paras was suspended by this Court for unlawfully
"having the said properties titled in his name[;]" the properties were titled in the name of Atty.
Paras only for free patent title coverage; (4) Atty. Paras did not possess the properties; and (5)
Rouel was the real owner and in possession of the properties.

The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the request and furnished Rouel with all
documents. Among... these documents were: (1) Atty. Paras' October 20, 2004 letter[18] to
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas; (2) an authorization letter[19] by Atty.
Paras for Edna R. Mijares; and (3) an October 9, 2006 Certification[20] by Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer

Rouel Yap Paras filed this Complaint before this Court and alleged:1. That respondent, ATTY.
JUSTO J. PARAS,. had violated the LAWYER'S OATH and the Code of Professional
Responsibility

That respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS,. had violated the LAWYER'S OATH and the Code
of Professional Responsibility,... That the respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he deliberate[ly] represented himself as "LANDOWNER", and voluntarily
offered real properties to the DAR for CARP coverage, when he knew fully well that he is NOT
THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;

Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred as respondent had already been suspended
by this Court in two (2) previous administrative cases.[23]... respondent filed his Comment.[24]
He alleged that the present Complaint is "identical in subject-matter, principal parties involved,
issues and persecutory intent"[25] with A.C. No. 7349[26] filed against him by Rosa Yap-Paras,

Page 22 of 47
complainant's mother.[27] However, respondent admitted that:... the properties subject-matter of
the instant [administrative] complaint ... [are] subject of a pending trial court proceedings [sic]
before RTC

On the allegation of voluntary offer of properties, respondent claimed:

Respondent prayed for the dismissal of this case.[30]
On August 22, 2007, a mandatory conference was
Counsel of complainant appeared for complainant, while respondent appeared for himself.[33] 
The conference ended with both parties submitting their issues to Investigating Commissioner
Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner... of the Commission on Bar Discipline.[34]
In his Report and Recommendation[46] dated January 5, 2008, Commissioner Hababag found
respondent guilty of violating his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thus:[47]
The penalty of a one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was recommended
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner
Hababag's Report and Recommendation. However, the Board of Governors... modified the
penalty and reduced respondent's suspension from one (1) year to six (6) months.[51...
complainant moved for reconsideration[52] of the January 17, 2008 Resolution, praying that the
penalty of suspension be reconsidered and a penalty of... disbarment be imposed instead. On
January 3, 2013, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied

ISSUE:
WON respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he voluntarily offered property that he neither owned nor possessed for coverage under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

HELD:
We confirm the guilt of respondent. However, we modify the penalty imposed.In deciding this
case, this Court takes judicial notice of two (2) administrative cases filed by Rosa Yap Panis
against respondent

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in

violation of It's lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,... with a
WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Justo J. ParasGUILTY of violating the lawyer's
oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Page 23 of 47
12.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013
JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant, v. ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA, Respondent.

FACTS:
Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, a public Attorney of Paranaque City Jocelyn De Leon is a single mother
of two minor children. Atty Pedrena is the counsel of Jocelyn De Leon on the case of support for
the two minor children.
Record show, as established by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, on January 30, 2006 after
asking about the status of the case Atty. Pedrena told Jocelyn De Leon then to ride with him
and he would just drop Jocelyn by the jeepney station, she refused to ride with him but Atty.
Pedreña persistently told her to get in the car, and so she acceded to his request so as not to
offend him. Inside the car, Atty. Pedrena rubbed Jocelyn’s leg with his hand; tried to insert his
finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand forcibly placed it on his crotch area and
pressed his finegr agaionst her private part.

Jocelyn thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s door and told him categorically that she
was getting off the car. Instead he accelerated a bit more but sensing her insistence to get off,
he stopped thecar, and allowed her to get off.

Jocelyn de Leon then filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña.
IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended for his disbarment, the IBP Board of Governors
however modified the penalty to three month suspension from practice of law.

Upon Motion for Reconsideration by Atty. Pedreña which the Board denied, they increased the
penalty to six months. Thereafter transmitted records and resolution to the Court for approval.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Pedreña is guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
YES

HELD:
The Supreme Court adopted the Findings and conclusions of the Investigating Commissioner.
Yet, the Court considered the recommended penalty of suspension for six months not
commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed. Given the circumstances in
which Atty. Pedreñacommitted them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but
repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.

In view of the considerations, the penalty should be suspension of 2 years.

Page 24 of 47
13.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 11095 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3140], September 20, 2016
EUFEMIA A. CAMINO, Complainant, v. ATTY. RYAN REY L. PASAGUI, Respondent.

FACTS:
Disbarment complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagani before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-commission on bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), that the respondent
violated their agreement for the latter to facilitate and secure a loan to finance the payment of
necessary expenses to transfer the title of a certain property under her name, she claimed that
respondent obtained a loan using their property as a collateral, but atty. Pasagni arrogated the
proceeds.

ISSUE
WON a malpractice or gross misconduct can be used as grounds for disbarment of a lawyer.
YES

HELD:
The Court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the IBP Board of Governors and imposed the
penalty to disbarment. The Court also ordered to return the load proceeds he received from
Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative Inc.
Wherefore, Resolution No. XX1-2014-938 dated December 14, 2014 of the IBP Board of
Governors which found respondent Atty. Ryan Rey I Pasagan GUILTY of violation for Rule 1.0 if
the Code of Professional responsibility affirmed with Modification as to the penalty. Respondent
is instead meted the penalty of Disbarment, Respondent is further ordered to Return the load
proceeds amounting to 1,000.000.00 and to pay legal interest at the rate of twelve percent per
annum computed from the release of the loan on February 15, 2011 up to June 30, 2013 and
six percent per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid as well as the 120,000.00 received for
the purpose or transferring of the title in the name of the complainant to pay legal interest at the
rate of twelve percent per annum computed from receipt of the amount on February 3, 2011 up
to June 30, 2013 and six percent per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. He is likewise
ordered to return all other documents pertinent to the load obtained from PHCCI and those
received from complaint.

Page 25 of 47
14.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32329. March 23, 1929.]
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA

FACTS:
The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that in
the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in
translation, read as follows:
“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of
Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit.  As a
lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you.  Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela.  He offers free consultation,
and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio
in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:
“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public.  Such is not the case and
I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my
residence here in Echague,  I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your
barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my
desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public.  If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the
registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge
only three pesos for every registration.”

ISSUE:
WON the respondent violated the Code of Responsibility. YES

HELD:
Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828,
providing “ The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, “ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code
of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar
Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer.  The law is a profession and not a
business.  The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.
Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.
For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded.

Page 26 of 47
15.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2131. May 10, 1985.]
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, Complainant, v. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS,
JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR.,
ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:
[R]espondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the
names of the ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay
Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated
December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie “and if not, what is your purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office.” Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities
around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practicing
under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice law in the Philippines.

HELD:
NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

RATIO:
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court).
[R]espondents’ use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a representation that being
associated with the firm they could “render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment”. This was unethical
because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to practice law here.

Page 27 of 47
16.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4018 March 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, Respondent

FACTS:
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative caseearlier filed
by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initiallyinvestigated by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent withillegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 inthe names of Lawan
Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae BauduliDatu, Mooamadali
Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminalcomplaint filed against
Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the
records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Bubong violate Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. YES

HELD:
In the case at bar, respondent’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of thePresident
and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.By taking
advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing
hisknowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives,respondent
had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of acivil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
explicit on this matter. It reads:Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promoteor advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties.Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in
the public office heused to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived useof his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the
withdrawal of hisprivilege to practice law.As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased
complainant’s daughter, requesting forthe withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably
act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be “interrupted
or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the cha
rges or failure of the complainant toprosecute the same.” As we have previously explained in
the case of 
Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos
… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interestof
the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by therecord, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule ispremised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension ordisbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and therespondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest andafford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for thepublic welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from theofficial ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer tothe court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person whocalled the attention of the court to the attorney’s
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party

Page 28 of 47
17.
EN BANC
[G.R. NOS. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO
TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN,
CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO,
ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN
T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS,
INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT
CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

FACTS:
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the
mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of
GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision
of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres
Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his
family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor
General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and
counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept

Page 29 of 47
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
the said service.”

HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later
as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of
whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the
metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter”
or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central
Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and
cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank
to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act
of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be
remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be
considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the
intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court
gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of
justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such
a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest
of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having
once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement
accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which
he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to
lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a
lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or
employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

Page 30 of 47
18.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS, Respondent.

FACTS
This administrative case concerns the respondent, a retired judge who took on the case that he
had intervened in during his incumbency on the Bench. The complainant was the counsel of
record of the plaintiff in the case. The charge specified that the respondent was guilty of
"representing adverse interest, illegal practice of law, conduct and becoming as a former
member of the bench and conduct unbecoming in violation of the canons of legal ethics with
prayer for disbarment"

ISSUE
Won the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of Canon 6 of the Code ofProfessional
Responsibility YES

HELD:
We adopt and affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Rule 6.03 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

This rule, according to Presidential Commission on Good Government v.

Sandiganbayan,8 traces its lineage to Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.

To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the

respondent must be shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in relation to a
matter that, by virtue of his judicial office, he had previously exercised power to influence the
outcome of the proceedings. That showing was sufficiently made herein. The respondent, in his
capacity as the judge of the MTCC of Tangub City, presided over the case before eventually
inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted intervention within
the meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the degree or length of the intervention in
the particular case or matter. It is also plain and unquestionable that Canon 36, supra, from
which the canon was derived, prohibited him as a former member of the Bench from handling
any case upon which he had previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context, he not only
exercised the power to influence the outcome of the proceedings but also had a direct hand in
bringing about the result of the case by virtue of his having the power to rule on it.

Page 31 of 47
The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The respondent could not accept work
or employment from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter in which he had
intervened as a judge except on behalf of the body or authority that he served during his public
employment.10 The restriction as applied to him lasted beyond his tenure in relation to the
matters in which he had intervened as judge.11 Accordingly, the fact that he was already retired
from the Bench, or that he was already in the private practice of law when he was engaged for
the case was inconsequential.

Although the respondent removed himself from the cases once his neutrality and impartiality
were challenged, he ultimately did not stay away from the cases following his retirement from
the Bench, and acted thereon as a lawyer for and in behalf of the defendants.

The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the Court towards his plight of "poverty."
Although we can understand his current situation and symphatize with him, his actuations
cannot be overlooked because they contravened the express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In any case, his representing the defendants in the civil
cases was not the only way by which he could improve his dire financial situation. It would not
be difficult for him, being a lawyer and a former member of the Bench, to accept clients whom
he could ethically represent in a professional capacity. If the alternatives open to him were not
adequate to his liking, he had other recourses, like serving as a notary public under a valid
commission. His taking on of the defendants' civil cases despite his previous direct intervention
thereon while still a member of the Bench was impermissible. He should have maintained his
ethical integrity by avoiding the engagement by the defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS guilty of

violating Rule 6.03 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) MONTH effective immediately upon receipt of
this decision, with warning that a similar offense by him will be dealt with more severely.

Page 32 of 47
19.

EN BANC
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FACTS:
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution
notwithstanding due notice. The Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution;
he submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. The
core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By- Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.”

ISSUES
WON the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
WON the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
WON the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
WON the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.

HELD:

1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s

constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers. But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a
sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right

Page 33 of 47
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment,
is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is
not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power
of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue
of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll
of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.

Page 34 of 47
20.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 8560, September 06, 2016
CARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S. REYES, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON F.
NIEVA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes (complainant) filed against respondent Atty. Ramon F.
Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for sexually harassing her. Complainant
alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as an
Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since October 2004. Sometime in January 2009, she
was re¬assigned at the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the supervision of
respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. During complainant's stint
under respondent, she would notice that during office hours, respondent would often watch
"pampagana" videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films.
Complainant also averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand
and would sometimes give it a kiss. During these instances, complainant would remove her
hands and tell him to desist. 

Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called her on
her cellular phone, asked if she received his text message, and told her he would tell her
something upon his arrival at the office. At about 9:30 in the morning of even date, respondent
asked complainant to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate. Suddenly, respondent
placed his hand on complainant's waist area near her breast and started caressing the latter's
torso. Complainant immediately moved away from respondent and told him "sumosobrana ho
kayo sir." Instead of asking for an apology, respondent told complainant he was willing to give
her P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket and even gave her a note stating "just bet
(between) you and me, x xxkahitnasi mommy," referring to complainant's mother who was also
working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the morning of the same day, while complainant
and respondent were left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door, grabbed
complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then attempted to kiss complainant.
This prompted complainant to thwart respondent's advances with her left arm, raised her voice
in order to invite help, and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yungasawanyomagagalit, sir
may asawaako." After respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the office to ask
assistance from her former supervisor who advised her to file an administrative case against
respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI).

 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal
of the instant administrative complaint against respondent. He found that complainant failed to
substantiate her allegations against respondent, as opposed to respondent's defenses which
are ably supported by evidence.

ISSUE:
WON respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)

Page 35 of 47
HELD:
The excerpts of the Transcript show that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2,
2009, complainant and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary as
complainant's officemates were all out on errands. In this regard, it was error on the part of the
IBP to hastily conclude from the testimonies of complainant's officemates who were interviewed
by the CODI that nothing out of the ordinary happened. Surely, they were not in a position to
confirm or refute complainant's allegations as they were not physically in the office so as to
make a credible testimony as to the events that transpired therein during that time.

Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the testimonies of the witnesses in the CODI
proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting that all those interviewed in the CODI
proceedings were job order and regular employees of the CAAP. Naturally, they would be
cautious in giving any unfavorable statements against a high-ranking official of the CAAP such
as respondent who was the Acting Board Secretary at that time - lest they earn the ire of such
official and put their career in jeopardy.

Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript shows that respondent did not perform
the acts complained of. On the contrary, said Transcript proves that there was indeed a period
of time where complainant and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary which gave respondent a window of opportunity to carry out his acts constituting
sexual harassment against complainant.

In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence "means evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it." Generally, under Rule
133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold applies to civil cases:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. 

Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon cited by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that the burden of proof by
preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings is upon the complainant. These rulings
appear to conflict with other jurisprudence on the matter which contrarily hold that substantial
evidence is the quantum of proof to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers. The
latter standard was applied in administrative cases such as Foster v. Agtang, wherein the Court
had, in fact, illumined that:

[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence
required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto." In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed.

Page 36 of 47
Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.49(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Similarly, in Peña v. Paterno, it was held:

Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance of evidence, how proved)] and 2

[(Proofbeyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases,
or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 

Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was
promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence.

Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further
confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against
lawyers.

Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of

evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations
attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or
a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motuproprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor."

With the proper application of the substantial evidence threshold having been clarified, the Court
finds that the present charges against respondent have been adequately proven by this
standard. Complainant has established her claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is, that respondent had harassed
her and committed despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine,
respondent should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.

Page 37 of 47
21.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.

FACTS:
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of
this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under
process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for
Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that
he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance
In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation[3] dated 14 August 2013,[4] the MCLE
Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice
Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that... respondent applied for exemption for the
First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004
to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board... denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the
same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption
nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In his Compliance and Comment[5] dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not
receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why
his application for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged... that he did not receive a
formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice
sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and
Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the
Romualdo family.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing
law for about 50 years.
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground
of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof.
Feliciano informed... respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012.
The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from
compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the
applicant must... submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in
a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements
necessary for the exemption.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the
dismissal of the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records.[7] The OBC also
reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar
who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to
explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the... requirements. Section 12(e) also
provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a non-compliance
fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing
Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13
August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board
recommended that cases be filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed
without the

Page 38 of 47
MCLE compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that
the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty
of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same... or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended
that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing
Board.

ISSUE:
WON respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.

HELD:
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law."[8] The First
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period
was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April
2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings... filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE
requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four
compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption
only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application
for... exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply
for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application
did not meet the... requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No.
850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption to
respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October 2012
signed by Prof.
Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin
Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the
MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter[9] dated 29 November 2013, signed by
Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter
No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed
after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his... application for
exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 2012[10] to the MCLE Office
asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to
send it to the MCLE Office.[11] He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November
2013 letter denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption.
The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August
2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days
from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this
Court,... respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the
country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February

Page 39 of 47
2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines
(UP)
Diliman on those dates.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would
only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance...
for the First Compliance Period.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial
of his application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and... after it
received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period
when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings,
he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for...
exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it
still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion
for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to... satisfy the requirements
of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE
Office.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We
agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension
because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full...
compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the
MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the
IBP and to suspend... him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied
with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods,
whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that
require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to
communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as
the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November
2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.

Page 40 of 47
22.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016
MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.
GUEVARRA, Respondent.

FACTS
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc.
On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio, who filed
criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks
in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social
networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant.

The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that
were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical
practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause.

Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened
complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof.

Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort
money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a comment on his
Facebook post.

Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire
public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort
the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand letter dated August 26, 2009,
complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent.

ISSUES:
1.   Whether or not complainant violated the right of privacy of respondent, claiming that they
were "private remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends.
2.   Whether it is violative of the freedom of expression
3.   Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of
the verified complaint.

HELD

First Issue
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as
information uploaded by the user.

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization

Page 41 of 47
of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,
in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant,
which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer
evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to
protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive
evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto,
were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving,
thus deserving scant consideration.

Restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends.
The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the
former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook
friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of
violation of right to privacy is negated.

Second issue

No. Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. The constitutional right of freedom of expression may
not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation
or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were
ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and
BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to
destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and
reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio,
labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these
despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant.
He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is
contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·

Third Issue:

Yes. The subject Facebook posts are in complete and utter violation of the following provisions
in the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Page 42 of 47
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it
in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of
an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and
rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an
aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is
exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal
condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls,
for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.

Penalty: suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year 

Page 43 of 47
23.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10782, September 14, 2016
ATTY. DELIO M. ASERON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE A. DIÑO, JR., Respondent.

FACTS:
In a verified complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Atty. Delio M. Aseron (complainant) sought the disbarment of Atty.
Jose A. Diño, Jr. (respondent) for his alleged violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

On January 25, 2009, the complainant figured in a vehicular accident along Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City with a bus operated by Nova Auto Transport, Inc. (NATI) which, at that
time, was driven by Jerry Garcia (Garcia).

Consequently, the complainant filed the following cases: (i) a criminal case against Garcia for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Serious Physical Injuries docketed
as Criminal Case No. 025403 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36; (ii)
a civil case for Damages against Garcia and NATI docketed as Ci Case No. Q-09-64558 before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105. In both instances, the respondent is the
counsel of record for Garcia and NATI.3

On March 3, 2009, Atty. Alberto H. Habitan, counsel for complainant, demanded from NATI
damages in the amount of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as a result of the
accident.4chanrobleslaw

The complainant, however, claimed that the respondent's reply letter5 dated March 20, 2009,
was couched in abusive, disrespectful language, malicious and unfounded accusations and
besmirched his reputation.6 The reply letter in part stated:

With reference to said Criminal Case No. 09-025403, we received information that [the
complainant] allegedly used his "influence" in persuading the former handling Prosecutor of
Inquest Case No. 09-388, not to allow the release of the Passenger Bus with Plate No. TWL-
653, unless our client agrees to immediately pay the mercenary claim of Php 2 Million as
demanded by [the complainant. Fortunately, our client heeded our Law Office's persistent
advice not to fall prey to such hustler tactic.7
Due to the insinuations made by the respondent in his reply letter, the complainant was
constrained to file a libel case against the former before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City.8chanrobleslaw

Also, the complainant asseverated that the respondent made a mockery of the judicial system
by employing unwarranted dilatory tactics in Criminal Case No. 025403 and Civil Case No. Q-
09-64558 by filing numerous motions that were eventually denied by the courts for lack of
merit.9chanrobleslaw

Moreover, the complainant alleged that the respondent committed malpractice by misleading
the court when he admitted ownership of the passenger bus with body number 054 and plate
number TWC 653 as that of NATI in one pleading and denying it in another.10

Page 44 of 47
ISSUE
WON Respondent liable for violation of the CPR.

HELD
After a careful perusal of the records of the case, the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP-
CBD and the Board of Governors that the respondent violated the CPR when he used
intemperate language in his letter to the complainant.

Canon 8 of the CPR directs all members of the bar to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness, and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the CPR provides:

Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
In the present case, the respondent's actions failed to measure up to this Canon. Records show
that he imputed to the complainant the use of his influence as a former public prosecutor to
harass his clients during the inquest proceedings without sufficient proof or evidence to support
the same.

As an officer of the court, the respondent could have aired his charge against the complainant in
a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language. He should refrain from being
tempted by the adversarial nature of our legal system to use strong language in pursuit of his
duty to advance the interest of his client.

Indeed, there is a strong showing that the Respondent had failed to conduct himself toward his
fellow lawyer with that courtesy that all have the right to expect. When he mentioned that
Complainant had used his influence in persuading the fiscal, he used a language which was
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. He showed ill-feelings toward Complainant and
allowed such feeling to influence him in his conduct and demeanor towards the latter.

The Court has consistently reminded lawyers that though they are entitled to present their case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.24chanrobleslaw

As to the penalty, in Uy v. Atty. Depasucat,25cralawred the Court reprimanded the lawyers for
misconduct in using offensive and abusive language in their Manifestation.26chanrobleslaw

Here, considering that the respondent was merely over-zealous in protecting the rights of his
client, the Court finds that the recommended penalty by the IBP Board of Governors to
reprimand him for the use of intemperate language against his fellow lawyer is proper under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RESOLVES treat respondent Atty. Jose A.

Diño, Jr.'s second Motion for Reconsideration as a Petition for Review under Rule 45,
and DENY the same for lack of merit.

Page 45 of 47
24.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016
SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V.
VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.

FACTS:
In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter...
copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening but also
libelous utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants
to its recipients.
Thus, they maintained that respondent should be held administratively liable therefor.
In a Resolution[5] dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the
verified complaint. However, for failure... the complainants were then ordered[6] to furnish the
Court the complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply...
refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, which set the case for a
mandatory conference/hearing.[8]
Unfortunately, despite notices,[9] complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory
hearings.
IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),... recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter
recommended that respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the amount of
PI,000.00, with a... warning that repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.[12]
IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the May 29, 2015
Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent from the practice of
law... for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.

ISSUE:
WON respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified
complaint.

HELD:
Partially concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule
8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of
this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Page 46 of 47
25.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6396. October 25, 2005]
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.

FACTS
Atty. Castro, a private practitioner, went to the office of Atty. Dallong-Galicinao, the clerk of court
of Bambang (Nueva Vizcaya) RTC, to inquire whether the complete records of a civil case had
already been remanded to the court of origin. Atty. Castro was not the counsel of record of
either party in the said civil case. When denied such request, Atty. Castro hurled invectives at
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao which caused the same to file a complaint-affidavit against the former for
unprofessional conduct. Due to Atty. Castro’s public apology, Atty. Dallong-Galicinao expressed
her desire not to appear on the next hearing.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Castro should be held administratively liable.YES

HELD:
Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to
represent them, Atty. Castro has no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. Although the
penalty should be tempered since Atty. Castro apologized and Atty. Dallong-Galicinao accepted
it. This is not to say that Atty. Castro should be absolved of his actuations. Atty. Castro is
ordered fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that any similar infractions shall be
dealt with more severely.

Page 47 of 47