Week 5 – Land Titles and Deeds

JOCSON vs. SORIANO

FACTS:

Silvestre Estacion purchased from the Government, lots. He continued to make payments under his
contract, until death. After his death, Valentina Jocson, the surviving widow, taking advantage of the
provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120, had said lots transferred to her. Notwithstanding this, the
administrator of the estate of Silvestre took possession of the same, included them in the inventory
of the estate and continued to administer the same as a part of the estate of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Does Valentina have the right to the title of the subject lands?

RULING:

Yes, Act 1120 provides that the title remains with the government until full payment of the purchase
price. Section 16 provides that in case of death of purchaser, prior to completion, his widow shall be
entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied
with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. . . ."The character of the right of Silvestre
was analogous to a homesteader. Act No. 926, provides for homesteads. Section 3 provides that "in
the event of the death of an applicant for a homestead prior to the issuance of a patent (title), his
widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her" upon a proper showing,
and until a final title or patent is issued for the land to the applicant the Government remains the
owner.

Acts Nos. 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and special
privileges under the laws of US and the various states of the Union. Their object is to provide a
home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of
financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which are
essential to the maintenance of three institutions. Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the
citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to pauperism.

The doctrine announced with reference to the right of the widow in the homestead upon the death of
her husband, does no injustice to the creditors of the deceased, since they have it always in their
power to protect themselves either by refusing credit or by demanding such security as will protect
them from loss.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
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The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to
the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petition was denied.

Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

What are the classifications of public lands?

RULING:

1. Classifications of land according to ownership.

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either:

(a) is intended for public use; or

(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of
private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from
the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land,
and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration
of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
Week 5 – Land Titles and Deeds

proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

2. Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.

Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Governor General William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 on June 13,1913 which
reserved some square meters of land in Barrio Naga, Albay for provincial park purposes. On December 9,
1916, The CFI of Albay ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by E.O. No. 40 to Diego
Palomo. Two months before his death, Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heir, Ignacion
Palomo and Carmen Palomo which was allegedly covered by an Original Certificate of Title. President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced in E.O No. 40 into “Tiwi
Hot Spring National Parks and Wildlife. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion
of public domain and therefore is neither susceptible to disposition nor registrable. The Palomos,
however continued in possession of the property and paid real estate taxes and introduced
improvements by planting banana, pandan and coconuts. On May 7, 1974 petitioners filed a civil case
against private respondents who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered
their land and cut down bamboos. The Republic of the Philippines also filed a Civil Case for the
annulment and cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving the 15 parcels of land. RTC ad CA ruled
against the Palomos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lands claimed by the Palomos are alienable lands of the public domain which may be
acquired by adverse possession?

RULING:

No. The lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. There was no proof that
the petitioners’ predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. The “decisions” of the
CFI were not signed by the judge but merely certified true copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing
Week 5 – Land Titles and Deeds

the signature of the clerk of court. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest
land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof no matter how
lengthy, cannot be converted into private property unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable. CA’s decision was affirmed.

ATUN v. NUÑEZ
GR No. L-8018, October 26, 1955

FACTS:

Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her nieces and nephews,
a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra Nuñez (sister of defendant-
appellee Eusebio Nuñez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental.
In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuñez, who thereafter refused to recognize
plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce. The defendant turn sold the land to his co-
defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuñez, but
to plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of
the decedent.

ISSUE:

Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?

RULING:

Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now
deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died
without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas,
plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of
a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status as such,
provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

FACTS:

President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the development,
improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred
to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered
into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint
venture in the absence of any public bidding.
Week 5 – Land Titles and Deeds

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA
was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the Freedom
Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory
committee on the legality of the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or
sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations
happening between the parties.

ISSUE:

W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

RULING:

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned
by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot
be alienated.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part
of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas
of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.

The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters
and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged
areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The
mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
Week 5 – Land Titles and Deeds

SPOUSES VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The property subject of this case (property) is a 480-square meter lot that formed part of Lot No. 532
which has a total area of 25,178 square meters, was acquired by Lamberto Bajao's (respondent) parent,
Leoncio Bajao, through Free Patent issued on May 28, 1968. Spouses De Guzman acquired the property
in two transactions. On May 24, 1969, Spouses Bajao sold 200 square meters of Lot No. 532 to them for
P1,000. On June 18, 1970, Spouses Bajao sold another 280 square meters of Lot No. 532 to petitioners
for P1,400. Both transactions were evidenced by separate Deeds of Absolute Sale. Spouses Bajao
allegedly promised to segregate the property from the remaining area of Lot No. 532 and to deliver a
separate title to petitioners covering it. However, because the promise was not forthcoming, petitioner
Lydia S. de Guzman executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on April 21, 1980 covering the property.

On September 26, 1980, or after the death of Leoncio Bajao on February 1, 1972, respondent and
Anastacia Bajao executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs (Extrajudicial Settlement), which
subdivided Lot No. 532 into three parts. The property was included in Lot No. 532-C, which was
adjudicated in favor of respondent. The Extrajudicial Settlement was registered on December 10, 1980.
On December 16, 1980, respondent caused the cancellation of petitioners' annotated adverse claim
over the property and later obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7133 on February 13 and
October 2, 1981. Petitioners thereafter requested respondent to deliver TCT No. T-7133 so they could
present it to the Register of Deeds, respondent, however, refused to heed their request. Thus, on
January 21, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Damages.

Spouses De Guzman alleged that they were innocent purchasers for value. They also alleged that
respondent was in bad faith since he knew about the sale of the property between them and his
parents, and the existing survey and segregation over the area, yet he fraudulently included the same in
his share upon the issuance of TCT No. T-7133.

Bajao argued that the action is time barred and there is no more trust to speak of. He pointed out that
more than 10 years have lapsed from the date of the registration of the Extrajudicial Settlement on
December 10, 1980 and the registration of TCT No. T-7133 on February and October 1981, to the date of
filing of the Complaint. Respondent also countered that there was no mistake or fraud in including the
property in TCT No. T-7133 since his rights arose from the Extrajudicial Settlement.
The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs and hereby orders the defendant to reconvey to the plaintiffs the
four hundred eighty square meter lot in question. The trial court found the two Deeds of Absolute Sale
free from infirmities.

The trial court also found respondent in bad faith. Respondent admitted that he was aware of the
adverse claim annotated at the back of the title when he went to the Register of Deeds to register the
Extrajudicial Settlement. The CA granted the appeal of the Bajao. The CA noted that an implied trust
between the parties under Article 145653 of the Civil Code was created at the time Anastacia Bajao and
respondent executed the Extrajudicial Settlement on September 26, 1980, with respondent becoming
the trustee who holds the property in trust for the benefit of petitioners. The CA held that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years from the registration of title in the Office
of the Register of Deeds.55 Thus, petitioners' action for reconveyance filed in January 2000 has already
Week 5 – Land Titles and Deeds

prescribed since more than 10 years have lapsed from October 1981, the date of registration of
respondent's title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Complaint for reconveyance is barred by prescription

RULING:

Yes. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through mistake or fraud
becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the
property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust generally prescribes in 10 years, the
reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property. Thus, petitioners had 10 years from 1981 or until 1991 to file their complaint
for reconveyance of property. The Complaint, however, was filed only on January 21, 2000, or more
than 10 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-7133. Hence, the action is already barred by prescription.
The exception to the ten-year rule on prescription is when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
reconveyed. In such case, the action becomes one for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible.
Here, petitioners allege that they were in juridical possession of the property from the time they put up
a fence on it until the filing of the Complaint. Respondent disputes this claim, countering that petitioners
are not in actual and material possession of the property. Whether petitioners have actual possession of
the lot is a question of fact. xxxx We affirm the CA's finding that petitioners were not able to establish
their actual possession of the lot except by bare allegations not substantiated by evidence. During trial,
petitioners testified that they do not live on the property. They alleged putting up a fence alter they
purchased the lot but there was no evidence to support their allegations as to when this fence was
constructed.

Also, the sale between the parties were null and void under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, any
acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of Sections
118 to 123 of the Public Land Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution. The violation
shall also produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or permit originally
issued, recognized or confirmed actually or presumptively. The violation shall also cause the reversion of
the property and its improvements to the State. The contract executed in violation of these sections
being void, it is not susceptible of ratification, and the action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
such a contract is imprescriptible.

In this case, portions of Lot No. 532 were conveyed to petitioners by virtue of two Deeds of Absolute
Sale executed on May 24, 1969 and June 18, 1970, or after the grant and issuance of Free Patent May
28, 1968. Both Deeds of Absolute Sale were executed within the prohibited period of five years.
Consequently, following Section 124, these Deeds are null and void and produce no effect. They did not
convey any right from Spouses Bajao to petitioners on the property. The parties could not have claimed
ignorance of the free patent grant. Section 118 does not exempt patentees and their purported
transferees who had no knowledge of the issuance of the patent from the prohibition against alienation;
for the law does not say that the five years are to be counted "from knowledge or notice of issuance" of
the patent or grant.