X.
509 Version 3 Certificate
Validity Period: The
certificate's start and
expiration dates.
define the interval
during which the
certificate is valid,
although the certificate
can be revoked before
the designated
expiration date.
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X.509 Version 3 Certificate
Subject: The name of the
subject (owner) of the
certificate such as:
X.500 directory name
Internet e-mail address
URL
Subject Public-Key
Information: The public key
and the public key
cryptography algorithm.
The algorithms for which the
public key set can be used,
such as digital signing, secret
key encryption, and
authentication.
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X.509 Version 3 Certificate
Issuer Unique Identifier:
Optional information (bit
string) for uniquely
identifying the issuer,
when necessary.
Subject Unique
Identifier: Optional
information (bit string)
for uniquely identifying
the subject, when
necessary.
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X.509 Version 3 Certificate
Extensions: Additional
information that can be
specified for optional use by
public key infrastructures.
Common extensions include a
list of specific uses for
certificates (for example,
S/MIME secure mail or IPSec
authentication), CA trust
relationship and hierarchy
information, a list of publication
points for revocation lists, and
a list of additional attributes
for the issuer and subject.
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X.509 Version 3 Certificate
Certification Authority's
Digital Signature: The CA's
digital signature of all the
previous fields, which is
created as the last step in
generating the certificate.
(Called Encrypted)
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X.509 Version 3 Certificate
3 extension categories
Key and policy information
Subject and issuer attributes
Certification path constraints
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X.509 Extensions: Key and Policy
Subject and issuer keys information
Indicators of certificate policy
Extension fields
Authority key identifier (to differentiate keys of the same
CA)
Subject key identifier (to differentiate keys of the same
subject)
Key usage (bit string for 9 possibilities, such as key and/or
data encryption, signature verification on
certificates/CRLs, …)
Private-key usage period (for signatures)
Certificate policies (used for issuing and for certificate
usage)
Policy mappings (from CA to CA, for matching policies of
different CAs)
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X.509 Extensions:
Certificate Subject Attributes
Alternate names for either the certificate
subject or the certificate issuer
Extension fields
Subject alternative name (additional
identities to be bound to the subject)
Issuer alternative name (to associate, e.g.,
internet style identities to issuer)
Subject directory attributes (such as DoB
or clearance, to be used by X.500 directory )
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X.509 Extensions:
Certification Path Constraints
Provide constraints for certificates issued
by CAs for other CAs.
Extension fields
Basic constraints (can subject be CA and
length of allowed certification path from this CA)
Name constraints (name space for allowed
subjects in subsequent certificates)
Policy constraints (for path validation, either
prohibiting or requiring policy)
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Vulnerability and Exploits
In 2005, shown "how to use hash collisions to construct two X.509
certificates with identical signatures and differerent public keys",
using a collision attack on the MD5 hash function.
In 2008, presented a practical attack to create a rogue
Certificate Authority, accepted by all common browsers, by
exploiting the issuing X.509 certificates based on MD5.
X.509 certificates based on SHA-1 appeared to be secure until
April 2009 when researchers produced a method to increases the
likelihood of a collision
There are implementation errors with X.509 that allow e.g.
falsified subject names using null-terminated strings or code
injections attacks in certificates
Implementations suffer from design flaws, bugs, different
interpretations of standards and lack of interoperability.
Many implementations turn off revocation check and policies are not enforced
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