Leo Echagaray vs.

Secretary of Justice

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)PARTIES:

Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

Crime of Rape: 10 year-old daughter of his common law spouse … Imposition upon him of the
death penalty (Lethal injection) for the said crime.

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of
the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

The finality of judgment does not mean that the court has lost all its powers nor the case. By
the finality of the judgment what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction and that
the most important part of litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of
decisions where supervening events may change the circumstances of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of litigants to prevent unfairness. In affirming that
courts have the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make
them conformable to law and justice, cites Sec. 6 of Rule 135.

Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction also applies. Even the finality of the judgment does not
totally deprive the court of jurisdiction over the case. What the court loses is the power to
amend, modify or alter the judgment. Even after judgment has become final, the court retains
jurisdiction to enforce and execute it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which
is an executive function.
HELD:

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decision after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to
life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to
life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.

ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

A complaint for a sum of money, attorney’s fees and damages was filed by petitioner before the
RTC of Davao City which was raffled to Branch XVI. Private respondent’s cross examination was
heard by Judge Agton since he already assumed office at that time. However, when the
judiciary was reorganized under the Aquino administration, Judge Agton was
transferred to another branch. Meanwhile, Judge Marasigan, was assigned to Branch
XVI, thereby replacing Judge Agton. Judge Marasigan then acted on private respondent’s
motion for extension of time to file memorandum. A decision penned by Judge Agton was
rendered in favor of petitioner. Private respondent moved to reconsider said decision, but the
same was denied in an order by Judge Marasigan. Private respondent appealed to the CA which
nullified Judge Agton’s decision on the ground that at the
time he rendered the judgment, he was neither the judge de jure nor the judge de facto of the
RTC Branch XVI, and correspondingly remanded the case to the lower court.

RTC – Judge Agton penned a decision in favor or petitioner.

CA – Nullified Judge Agton’s and remanded the case to the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision penned by Judge Agton was valid.

RULING:
It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading, brief
or memorandum required by the rules, or by the court. Records disclose that this case was
submitted for decision sometime on March 1987 after the parties’ submission of their
memoranda as required by the court, at which time Judge Marasigan was already presiding in
Branch XVI. Thus, the case was submitted for decision to Judge Marasigan and not to Judge
Agton who by then was already transferred to another branch. Judge Agton’s decision,
therefore, appears to be tainted with impropriety. Nevertheless, the subsequent motion for
reconsideration of Judge Agton’s decision was acted upon by Judge Marasigan himself and his
denial of the said motion indicates that he subscribed with the adopted in toto Judge Agton’s
decision. Any incipient defect was cured. 
Moreover, for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the
incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. Branches of the trial court are not
distinct and separate tribunals from each other. Hence, contrary to private respondent’s
allegation, Judge Agton could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case,
because jurisdiction does not attach to the judge but to the court. The continuity of a court and
the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation, or cessation from the
service of the judge presiding over it. 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through its trustee, the ASSET PRIVATIZATION

TRUST, Petitioner, 
vs.
"G" HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

The Committee on Privatization approved the proposal of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for
the negotiated sale of 90% of the shares of stock of the government-owned Maricalum Mining
Corporation (MMC). Learning of the government’s intention to sell MMC, the respondent "G"
Holdings, Inc. signified its interest to purchase MMC and submitted the best bid. The series of
negotiations between the parties culminated in the execution of a purchase and sale
agreement. Subsequently, a disagreement on the matter of when the installment payments
should commence arose between the parties. Unable to settle the issue, "G" Holdings filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 49, against the Republic to compel it to close the sale in accordance with the purchase
and sale agreement. During the pre-trial, the respective counsels of the parties manifested that
the issue involved in the case was one of law and submitted the case for decision.

RTC: The trial court rendered its decision. It ruled in favor of "G" Holdings.
The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the Republic Contrary to the rules of
procedure, however, the notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals (CA), not with the
trial court which rendered the judgment appealed from. No other judicial remedy was resorted
to when the Republic, through the APT, filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.
It claimed that the decision should be annulled on the ground of abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

CA: Finding that the grounds necessary for the annulment of judgment were inexistent, the
appellate court dismissed the petition.

The appellate court also held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, as well as over the person of the parties. Hence, whatever error the trial court committed
in the exercise of its jurisdiction was merely an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction.
As an error of judgment, it was correctable by appeal. Unfortunately, appeal could no longer be
availed of by the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which resulted in the nullity of the trial court’s decision?

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals.

A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary action. 9 By virtue of its exceptional
character, the action is restricted exclusively to the grounds specified in the rules, 10 namely, (1)
extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction. 11 Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of
judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim.14 Where the court has jurisdiction over the defendant and over the
subject matter of the case, its decision will not be voided on the ground of absence of
jurisdiction. The Republic does not deny that the trial court had jurisdiction over it as well as
over the subject matter of the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction.15 Thus, the concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a
judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion. By claiming grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, the Republic actually concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the
court to take cognizance of the case. It only assails the manner in which the trial court
formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is distinct from the exercise thereof. The Supreme Court amply explained the
distinction between the two in Tolentino v. Leviste,16 thus:
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered
therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
the proper subject of an appeal.

HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ vs. HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ

FACTS:

The Republic acquired the De Leon Estate located in Nueva Ecija for resale to deserving tenants
and landless farmers, conformably with Commonwealth Act No. 539, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1400. The property was under the administration of the Land Tenure Administration
and later the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a
portion of the property in favor of Julian dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon.

The Republic sold Lot No. 778 to Julian dela Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell. In 1960, the
DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his favor. Julian bound and obliged
himself to pay the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the
property and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in
1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10 children, including
Mario and Maximino dela Cruz.

Because of being too old to cultivate the land, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document
in May 1980 in which she declared that, with the consent of her children, she had sold the land
in favor of Alberto Cruz, who henceforth had the right to possess and cultivate the property,
and the obligation to continue the payment of the amortizations due over the land under the
terms of the Agreement to Sell. Mario conformed to the deed.

Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10 years without
any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to purchase the
property with the DAR. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) prepared and signed an
Investigation Report, recommending that the landholding be declared vacant and disposable to
a qualified applicant. Declaring that there was no adverse claimant, the said report also
recommended the approval of Alberto’s application to purchase the property. Appended to the
report was the deed executed by Leonora in favor of Alberto.

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving the recommendation
of the MARO. He directed the cancellation of Julian’s CLT and declared that whatever rights
Julian had over the landholding and payments made in favor of the government under the
Agreement to Sell were forfeited.
The PARO endorsed the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the DAR Secretary, copy
furnished the Regional Director. The DAR Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution reviewed
and evaluated the records and recommended that the PARO’s recommendation be affirmed.

The DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No. 51750 over the property in favor of Alberto
Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). The Register
of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA- 0-3035 over the landholding in
favor of Alberto Cruz. 

Sometime in early 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian, discovered that the
landholding had already been registered in the name of Alberto Cruz. Leonora and her 10
children, with the assistance of the DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance, filed a petition with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the following: the order
of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued in favor of Alberto Cruz. The
petitioners declared they had no knowledge of the sale by Leonora and Mario of their right as
beneficiaries of the property; not being privies to the said sale, they were not bound by the
private deed executed by Leonora; and such sale, as well as the issuance of the CLOA and the
title over the property in favor of Alberto, was null and void, inasmuch as they violated agrarian
reform laws and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980. They insisted that they were
deprived of their rights as heirs of the beneficiary without due process of law.

In his comment on the petition, Alberto Cruz alleged that he acquired the rights over the
landholding from Leonora for P51,000.00 and had taken possession of the subject property. He
had been paying the amortizations for the property to the government and in fact had already
paid the purchase price of the property to the LBP in full.

PARAD granted the petition in a decision declaring that the petitioners were the rightful
allocatees of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA No. 51750 and TCT No. CLOA
-0-3035 and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the
property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title
and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the petitioners.

Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. The
DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners as farmers-beneficiaries could not be transferred
or waived except through hereditary succession or to the government, conformably with
agrarian reform laws and that the private document Leonora executed may be assailed by her
children by Julian, who were not privies thereto.

Alberto then filed a petition for review in the CA. He maintained that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the respondents’ petition because the implementation of agrarian reform laws
and rules and regulations was administrative in nature. He argued that the Dela Cruz should
have sought relief from the DAR instead of filing their petition with the DARAB.
In their Comment on the petition, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz maintained that Section 38 of
R.A. No. 3844 and Section 1134 of R.A. No. 386 have no application in the case, considering that
the issue is not one of tenancy because they had never entered into such a relationship with
Alberto. The Heirs of Julian dela Cruz averred, the MARO and the PARO violated DAR
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, and deprived them of their right as beneficiaries
over the property without due process of law. They maintained that under Rule 2, paragraph (f)
of the DARAB New Rules and Procedures, the DARAB had jurisdiction over actions involving the
issuance, correction or cancellation of the CLOA and Emancipation Patents registered with the
LRA.

The CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the petition of the Heirs of Julian dela
Cruz in the PARAD for lack of jurisdiction. The CA declared that there was no tenancy
relationship between respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the rightful
ownership over the landholding.

The said heirs moved for the reconsideration of the decision. They asserted that respondent
Alberto was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the DARAB because he never raised the
same in the PARAD and the DARAB. However, the appellate court resolved to deny the motion.

In the instant petition for review, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz, as petitioners, maintain that
under Rule VI, Section 1(f) of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has primary and
exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs
registered with the LRA even if there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. The
petitioners point out that the issues before the DARAB do not only involve the ownership of the
landholding, but also whether the PARO violated their substantive and procedural right to due
process, as well as agrarian reform laws.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DARAB HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?

HELD: No. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government

agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether
the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature
and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the
consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal
that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of
the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s
lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.
However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the dispute between the petitioners
and the respondents over the validity of the Order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No.
CLOA-0-3035 and the cancellation thereof is not agrarian in nature. Under Section 17 of
Executive Order No. 229, the DAR is vested with quasi-judicial power and exclusive original
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as other matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform laws, except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture

The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there was no landlord-
tenancy relationship between them and Alberto over the landholding. Nor did they have any
tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her son
Mario executed the deed of sale in May 1980 in favor of Alberto, nor when the petitioners filed
their petition with the DARAB.

The Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and
tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in
the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties
who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the
DARAB.

In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name of Alberto in the
exercise of his administrative powers and in the implementation of the agrarian reform laws.
The approval was based on the Report of the MARO, the Order of the PARO and the
recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over
whom the DAR Secretary has supervision and control.

As held by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has
primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes,
cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A.
3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations.

It bears stressing that in Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it is made clear that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, 38 and other
agrarian reform laws and pertinent rules, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable
by the DAR Secretary. Indeed, under P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian reform laws (including R.A.
No. 6657), the DAR Secretary is vested with the administrative authority to issue and correct or
recall the CLT issued under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Secretary is vested with
authority to approve and execute CLOAs on which are based the TCT to be issued by the
Register of Deeds. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over the orders, resolutions, or other
administrative circulars of the DAR Secretary in the exercise of its administrative powers.

In fine then, the petitioners should have filed their petition against Alberto Cruz with the DAR
Secretary instead of the DARAB. For its part, the DARAB should have dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction; or, at the very least, transferred the petition to the DAR Secretary for
resolution on its merits. In case the DAR Secretary denies their petition, the petitioners may
appeal to the Office of the President, and in case of an adverse ruling, a petition for review with
the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO.
G.R. No. 173946     June 19, 2013

Facts:

On 24 December 1997, petitioner(Boston) filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita
Toledo. Herein respondent (Lolita) filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998,
she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others,
that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.

The death certificate of Manuel states "13 July 1995" as the date of death. As a result,
petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require
respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. In compliance with the verbal order of the court
during the 11 October 1999 hearing of the case, respondent submitted the required names and
addresses of the heirs. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, dated 18 January 2000,
praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants which was granted by
the trial court in an Order dated 9
October 2000.

Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001, the trial court issued its pre-trial order
containing, among others, the dates of hearing of the case. The trial of the case then
proceeded. Herein petitioner, as plaintiff, presented its evidence and its exhibits were
thereafter admitted. On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was
cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein
respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to evidence.
However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The
trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004, denied the motion to dismiss for having been
filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states that: "Within
the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made x x x. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial was likewise denied on the ground that "defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this
Court is now barred by estoppel by laches" since respondent failed to raise the issue despite
several chances to do so. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which the latter granted. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

1.) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the deceased Manuel Toledo?

Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons; trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.

In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A
defendant is informed of a case against him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by
which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person."

2.) Was respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC?

Yes. Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the
trial court’s jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her amended answer was filed.
According to petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at various stages of the
proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing
the doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. petitioner claimed that
respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later
questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the proceedings conducted by the
trial court.

Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction
has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the
parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property,
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.

The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by
laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Here, what respondent was questioning in her
motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case.
 3.) Was the estate of Manuel Toledo an indispensable party in the case?

No.An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter
of a case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest. He or she is a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy, but "an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination
may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that
an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between
the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable." Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly proceed.

On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or
subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily
be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also,
a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him or her and those already parties to the action, or if he or she has no interest in the
subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party simply because his or her presence will avoid multiple litigations.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel
is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of
Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary. In other words, the collection case can
proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only, even without
impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable
party to petitioner’s complaint for sum of money.

CABRERA vs LAPID

Facts:

The instant petition originated from a Complaint-Affidavit filed in November 1995 by petitioner

Amelia M. Cabrera with the Office of the Ombudsman. In her 3-page affidavit, petitioner
accused respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. In her Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that she
entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the
purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. A month later, petitioner learned from
newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was purportedly illegal
and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered
the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. The property was demolished by dynamite blasting.

Governor Lapid also argued that under the law, the Department of Agriculture (DA) is the
government agency authorized to enter into licensing agreements for fishpond operations, and
as per certification by the DA Regional Director, petitioner's fishpond operation was not
covered by a fishpond lease agreement or application. On May 1996, the Ombudsman issued
the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal was based on the
declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in
the municipalities. But the Ombudsman affirmed its May 1996 Resolution. Thus, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue:

WON the filing of petitioner of the petition for review on certiorari to seek reversal of the
Resolution of the Ombudsman was correct

Held:

Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings
of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary
investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

In this case, petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of
substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground
under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear that
petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed
Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated
earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not
sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should be
dismissed outright.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave
abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of

judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error
is reversible only by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors
of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari.

Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it, the courts will not interfere with the
Ombudsman's supervision and control over the preliminary investigation conducted by him. It
is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. The rule is based not only upon respect for
the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.

MANUEL CATINDIG v AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES

Facts:

The property subject of this controversy pertains to a parcel of land (Fishpond) situated in
Malolos, Bulacan, titled in the name of the late Rosendo Meneses, Sr. Respondent Aurora is the
surviving spouse of the registered owner, Rosendo Meneses, Sr. Respondent, as administratrix
of her husband’s estate, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioners Manuel Catindig and Silvino Roxas, Sr., to recover possession over
the Fishpond.

Respondent alleged that Catindig, deprived her of the possession over the Fishpond, through
fraud, undue influence and intimidation. Since then, Catindig unlawfully leased the property to
petitioner Roxas. Despite demands from respondent, petitioners did not vacate the Fishpond.
Hence, respondent filed the suit against the petitioners to recover the property.
Petitioner Catindig maintained that he bought the Fishpond from respondent and her children,
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. He further argued that even assuming that
respondent was indeed divested of her possession of the Fishpond, her cause of action had
already prescribed considering the lapse of about 20 years from 1975, which was allegedly the
year when she was fraudulently deprived of her possession over the property. Petitioner Roxas
asserted that respondent has no cause of action against him, because Catindig is the lawful
owner of the Fishpond, to whom he had paid his rentals in advance.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Petitioner Roxas filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of petitioner Roxas of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is
correct?

Held:

No. Petitioner Roxas assailed the Decision and the Resolution of the CA via Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have been the filing of a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

Roxas claims that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court finds that Roxas is
jointly and severally liable with petitioner Catindig and in not considering him as a lessee in
good faith of the subject property, such error amount to nothing more than error of judgment,
correctible by appeal. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an
exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence,
errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.

Under Rule 45, decisions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to SC by filing a petition for review, which
would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand,
a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground
therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy
of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. One of the requisites of
certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground is grave abuse of
discretion.

In the present case, records show that petitioner Roxas received a copy of the May 20, 2005
Resolution of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration on May 30, 2005. Instead of filing
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15 days from receipt, petitioner, in
addition to his several motions for extension, waited for almost four months before filing the
instant petition on September 22, 2005. The Decision and the Resolution of the CA, as to
petitioner Roxas, had by then already become final and executory, and thus, beyond the
purview of this Court to act upon.

It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the land. When a decision becomes final and executory, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review
the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the
main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justifiable controversies with finality.

SUNTAY vs GOCOLAY
GR#144892 September 23, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners and private respondent were buyers of condominium units from Bayfront.
Petitioners paid in advance the full amount for their units. Bayfront, however, failed to deliver
them despite the due date stated in their contract to sell. Failing to get a reimbursement from
Bayfront, petitioners filed an action against it in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
the decision was ruled in favor of spouses Suntay. Bayfronts titled properties, including the
subject condominium Unit G and two parking slots in its name with Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) Nos. 15802 and 15813, were levied on by the sheriffs of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. At the subsequent public auction of Bayfronts properties, petitioners were the highest
bidders. Certificates of sale were issued to spouses Suntay on March 1995. Private respondent
Eugenia Gocolay, chairperson and president of Keyser Mercantile Co., Inc. (Keyser), claims that
she entered into a contract to sell with Bayfront for the purchase on installment basis of the
same Unit G, among others. She completed her payments in 1991 but Bayfront executed the
deed of absolute sale and delivered CCT No. 15802 on November 1995 (the same CCT No.
15802 on which were annotated the notice of levy and certificate of sale in favor of spouses
Suntay). Gocolay filed before the Expanded National Capital Regional Field Office of the
HLURB a complaint for annulment of auction sale and cancellation of notice of levy from her
title. HLURB ruled in favor of Gocolay, upon appeal to the CA upheld the decision and the same
was dismissed the case for lack of merit. Hence, the current petition.

Issue: Whether or not the HLURB, a quasi-judicial agency, have jurisdiction over an action
seeking the annulment of an auction sale, cancellation of notice of levy?

Held:

No, it does not have jurisdiction.

Petitioners were condominium buyers, not project/condominium owners, developers, dealers,

brokers or salesmen against whom a case cognizable by the HLURB could be brought. Obviously
the cause of action (unsound business practice) could not have referred to them since they
were mere buyers of a condominium unit, but only to Bayfront as developer of the project. It
was therefore error for Gocolay to include petitioners in HLURB case and for the HLURB to take
cognizance of the complaint. The HLURB had no jurisdiction over the issue of ownership,
possession or interest in the disputed condominium unit. BP 129 vests jurisdiction over these
matters on the RTC. The decision in HLRB Case No. REM-032196-9152 was in effect a
determination of the ownership of the condominium unit because it directed the annulment of
the execution sale in HLRB Case No. REM-102193-5625 on which petitioners title was based.
This was clearly incorrect.  

The respective preambles of PD 957 and PD 1344 state the intention of the government to curb
the unscrupulous practices of project/condominium owners, developers, dealers, brokers or
salesmen in the real estate industry. These laws seek to protect hapless buyers victimized by
unprincipled realty developers. It was thus completely baseless for Gocolay to implead a real
estate buyer like herself before a body like the HLURB which had no authority to determine the
ownership of the subject condominium unit. The decision in HLRB Case No. REM-032196-9152
in effect tried to nullify the judgment in HLRB Case No. REM-102193-5625. This is reprehensible
and smacks of either dishonesty or gross ignorance on the part of the lawyers involved. Any
controversy in the execution of a judgment should be referred to the tribunal which issued the
writ of execution since it has the inherent power to control its own processes to enforce its
judgments and orders. Courts of coequal and coordinate jurisdiction may not interfere with or
pass upon each others orders or processes, except in extreme situations authorized by law. The
HLURB arbiters who took cognizance of HLURB Case No. REM-032196-9152 clearly overstepped
their authority when they allowed the inclusion of petitioners as co-defendants of Bayfront in a
suit that actually sought to determine the liability of real estate developers under PD 957 and
PD 1344.

For her part, Gocolay, who was not a party to HLRB Case No. REM-102192-5625, should have
resorted to judicial action to protect her interest in the contested properties. Instead, she
proceeded against the Suntays before a quasi-judicial body with no jurisdiction over their
person or the cause of action.

Vette Industrial Sales vs. Cheng

Facts:

Cheng filed an action for specific performance and damages against Vette Industrial Sales Co.
for breaching their obligation contained in the Memorandum of Agreement. Under the MOA,
the company acknowledged owing Cheng a sum of money as compensation for the shares he
transferred, insurance proceeds and signing bonus. In their answer with compulsory
counterclaim, Vette Industrial claimed that the shares have already been paid; that the MOA is
unenforceable and void. After failing to settle during mediation, the case was referred back to
the RTC.

On the day of the Pre-trial, Cheng and his counsel Atty. Ferrer failed to appear resulting to the
dismissal of the case. Cheng filed a motion for reconsideration. Vette Industrial claims that the
motion was procedurally defective because it was not served three days before the date of the
hearing and no proof of service was given to the court, in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of Rule
15. The trial court granted the motion. Vette Industrial elevated the case to the CA. The ruling
of the trial court was vacated and Cheng’s complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Both
parties assailed the ruling before SC.

Issue:

Whether there was grave abuse of discretion of the trial judge when he granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by Cheng

Held:

The SC hold that there was none. The judge has the discretion whether or not to declare a
party non-suited. It is likewise, settled that the determination of whether or not an order of
dismissal issued under such conditions should be maintained or reconsidered rests upon the
discretion of the trial judge.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its
legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and
patent, and it must be shown that discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically.

Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts
without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the
respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as
determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction.

Under Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules, the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial may be
excused when there is a valid cause shown or when a representative shall appear in his behalf,
and is fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Although Sui was absent during the pre-trial, Atty. Ferrer alleged that he was fully authorized to
represent Sui. Moreover, it is not entirely accurate to state that Atty. Ferrer was absent during
pre-trial because he was only late, the reasons for which he explained in his Manifestation and
Motion for Reconsideration.

It is held that the rules of procedures are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice and must be relaxed if its strict and rigid application would frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice. Thus, the RTC lifted and set aside its order of dismissal in the
interest of substantial justice, which is the legal basis for the trial court to grant the motion for
reconsideration of Sui.

#10
Papunan v. DARAB (GR No. 132163; January 28, 2003)
Facts:
>July 21, 1981 – Angelina Rodriguez waived her rights over the landholdings (which contain
three parcels of land) in favor of private respondent (Marcos Rodriguez) evidenced by the
Sinumpaang Salaysay made by the former.
>July 1988 – private respondent obtained a loan from the petitioner (Graciano Papunan) for
Php 50,000.00 and the former’s landholdings were mortgaged.
-The loan agreement provided that the petitioner was allowed to possess and cultivate the land
for two years and/or until repayment of the debt.
>January 10, 1990 – The Emancipation Patents which cover the said landholdings were issued
to Angelina Rodriguez even if she already waived her rights so on October 9, 1990 she waiver
her rights in favor of the petitioner for Php 55,000.00.
-The petitioner started constructing a house and warehouse on the lands.
>The private respondent filed a case for injunction before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board.

Issue: What confers jurisdiction?

Case History:

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) – August 26, 1991; ruled in favor of
private respondent and declared him the lawful-tenant beneficiary of the subject lands.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) – January 27, 1995; it affirmed
the decision of the PARAD.

Court of Appeals – August 14, 1997; it ruled against the petitioner. It ruled that the private
respondent was the farmer-beneficiary after it was given to him by Angelina Rodriguez, so
when the latter executed a waiver of her rights in favor of the petitioner she no longer has
rights over the land, therefore the petitioner did not acquire the rights over the land. It also
held that the petitioner was only a mortgagee over the land.

Ruling:
>It is the law which confers jurisdiction and not the rules.
>It was ruled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law
and rules of procedure yield to substantive law.
In the present case – it is wrong for the private respondent to argue that the public respondent
(DARAB) derives its jurisdiction from the DARAB Rules of Procedure because it derives its
jurisdiction from RA 6657 or Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. PILAR ESTIPULAR, respondent. (July 20,2000)

Facts:

Pilar Estipular filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title before the Regional Trial Court of La
Union. In her Petition for Reconstitution of Title, Estipular declared that she was the only legal
heir of the late Fermin Estipular and the Certificate of Title No. 154 was issued under her
father’s name. However, Said certificate was either destroyed or burned as a result of the
burning of the Register of Deeds of La Union during the last World War.

The Regional Trial Court ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for two successive issues
of the Official Gazette and be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal Building at least 30
days prior to the date of hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC and held
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law pertaining the
publication and posting of notice of hearing. The petitioner through its counsel, the OSG, filed a
Petition for Review on the contention that there was a failure to observe the requirements laid
down in R.A. 26 in which the posting of notice required by law is both at the main entrance of
the provincial building and of the municipal building in which the land is situated. There was no
issue as to the publication matter, as it complied with by the respondent. Then petitioner
submits the lone issue for resolution that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction because of the failure
to comply with the legal requirement of posting the notice at the main entrance of both the
municipal and provincial building.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the R.A 26 to
confer jurisdiction on the trial court.

Ruling:

The Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and the requirements are mandatory
and compliance with them is jurisdictional.

It must be emphasized that under the law, the publication of a notice of hearing in the Official
Gazette is not enough. The posting of said notice at the main entrances of both the municipal
and the provincial building is another equally vital requisite. The purposes of the stringent and
mandatory character of the legal requirements of publication, posting and mailing are to
safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested
parties of the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to intervene in the
proceeding.

The publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette does not justify the respondent’s
failure to comply with the legal requirement of posting the Notice at the main entrance
of both the municipal and the provincial buildings. The principle of substantial compliance
cannot be applied to the present case, as the trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the
Petition hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.

True, the root of this failure may be traced from the order of the trial court, which failed to
include a directive that the Notice of Hearing be posted at the main entrance of the provincial
building. However, this oversight cannot excuse noncompliance with the requirements of RA
No. 26. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case because of its own lapse, which respondent failed to cure.
CADIMAS v. CARRION

GR NO. 180394, 29 SEPTEMBER 2008

FACTS:

The instant petition stemmed from the complaint for accion reivindicatoria and damages filed
by petitioner Marjorie B. Cadimas, through her attorney-in-fact, Venancio Z. Rosales,
against respondents Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo.

In the complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent Carrion were parties to a Contract
To Sell dated 4 August 2003, wherein petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a town house
located at Lot 4-F-1-12 No. 23 Aster Street, West Fairview Park Subdivision, Quezon City for the
sum of P330,000.00 to be paid in installments. According to petitioner, Carrion had violated
paragraph 8 of said contract when she transferred ownership of the property to respondent
Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which authorized the latter to manage and
administer the property for and in behalf of respondent Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked
respondent Carrion in writing to explain the alleged violation but the latter ignored petitioners
letter, prompting petitioner to demand in writing that Carrion and Hugo vacate the property
and to cancel the contract.

On 28 October 2004, petitioner filed a Motion To Declare Defendant Marites Carrion In Default,

alleging that despite the service of summons and a copy of the complaint, respondent Carrion
failed to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period.

Respondent Hugo filed a Motion To Dismiss on her behalf and on behalf of respondent Carrion
on18 November 2004, citing the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to hear the case on the part of
the RTC andestoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner. Respondent Hugo argued that the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over the complaint because
ultimately, the sole issue to be resolved was whether petitioner, as the owner and developer of
the subdivision on which the subject property stood, was guilty of committing unsound real
estate business practices.

RTC- The RTC ruled that summons was served properly, thus, the court had acquired
jurisdiction over respondent Carrion. The RTC noted that respondent Hugos failure to disclose
at the outset that she was equipped with a special power of attorney was an act constitutive of
misleading the court. Thus, the RTC declared respondent Carrion in default, directed petitioner
to present evidenceex-parte against respondent Carrion, and respondent Hugo to file an
answer.
CA- The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision granting respondents petition for
certiorari. The appellate court set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered the
dismissal of petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In its Resolution dated 9 November
2007, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

Essentially, petitioner argues that based on the allegations in the complaint and
the reliefs sought, the RTC has jurisdiction over the matter. In any case, the compulsory
counterclaim pleaded in the answer of respondents was an express recognition on their part of
the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for accion reivindicatoria, petitioner adds.

The petition is meritorious.

The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of
the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by
the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of an action.

We agree with the ruling of the RTC that it has jurisdiction over the case based on the
allegations of the complaint. Nothing in the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests that
petitioner is the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There is nothing in the
allegations in the complaint or in the terms and conditions of the contract to sell that would
suggest that the nature of the controversy calls for the application of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D.
No. 1344 insofar as the extent of the powers and duties of the HLURB is concerned.

The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot buyer. The contract to sell
does not contain clauses which would indicate that petitioner has obligations in the capacity of
a subdivision lot developer, owner or broker or salesman or a person engaged in real estate
business. From the face of the complaint and the contract to sell, petitioner is an ordinary seller
of an interest in the subject property who is seeking redress for the alleged violation of the
terms of the contract to sell. Petitioners complaint alleged that a contract to sell over a
townhouse was entered into by and between petitioner and respondent Carrion and that the
latter breached the contract when Carrion transferred the same to
respondent Hugo without petitioners consent. Thus, petitioner sought the cancellation of the
contract and the recovery of possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the
complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Padlan vs. Dinglasan

Facts:

Elenita was the owner of parcel of land with an aggregate area of 82,972 square meters. While
on board a jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia, had a conversation with Maura. Believing that
Maura was a real state agent, she borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave
it to Maura. The latter then subdivided the property into several lots, from Lot No. 625-A to Lot
No. 625-0, under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan. Through falsified
deed of sale of the spouses, he was able to sell the lots to different buyer. Lot No. 625-K was
sold to Lorna, who later caused the issuance of TCT No. 134932 under her name then she sold it
to Padlan for Php 4,000 so new TCT was issued in the name of the latter. After Dinglasan
learned what had happened, it demanded to Padlan to surrender the possession of the subject
Lot but the she refused. So the spouses forced to file a case before the RTC.

Issue:

W/N the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

CASE HISTORY:

RTC

Respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed that they be allowed to present
evidence ex parte.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare Dinglasan in Default with Motion to
Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of Defendant claimed that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over her, because the summons was not validly served upon her
person, but only by means of substituted service through her mother.

RTC denied the motion finding that Padlan is a buyer in good faith hence the dismissal of the
complaint.

CA

Reversed the decision of RTC and ordered the cancellation of TCT issued in the name of Lorna
and Padlan. CA found that petitioner purchased the property in bad faith from Lorna. Petitioner
purchased the property in bad faith from Lorna.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the
complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case and the person of the petitioner. CA denied. The CA concluded that the rationale for
the exception made in the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy was present in the case. It
reasoned that when the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner neither moved for a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any
remedy provided by the Rules. Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case
again when the CA rendered a decision adverse to her claim.

Ruling:

No. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is
only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

RTC JURISDICTION: In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

MTC: Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Delos Reyes vs. sps. Odones

FACTS:

Private Respondents spouses Francisco and Arwenia Odones filed a conplaint for annulment of
Deed, Title and Damages against Petitioners. They alleged that they are the owner of the 940
sqm land located at Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of Extrajudici Succession.
When they decided to register the lands they found out that the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) was cancelled and replaced by Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
petitioners, Delos Reyes on April 18, 1972.

The petitioners obtained TCT by virtue of Deed of Absolute Sale, and subdivided into 3titles.

Respondents sought the cancellation of the said 3 new titles on the grounds that the signature
of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in Deed of Absolute Sale were forged for the reason
that they died June 30,1926 and June 5,1971, respectively.

Petitioner filed a MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS (clarifying the ambiguity in respondent's
claim) but was DENIED. They therefore answered and pleaded in affirmative defense on the
following grounds:
1. failure of the Respondent to state a cause of action, inasmuch as the basis of respondents
alleged title is void. And respondents are not the real party in interest to question the title of
petitioner for they do not transact to each other;

2. Non-adjoinder of the other heirs of Donata as indispensable parties;

3. Respondents' claim is barred by laches.

Respondents denied the allegations of petitioners and insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession
is valid.

Petitioner served upon the respondent a Request for Admission, in which respondent failed to
respond. As a result, the petitioner promtly file a Motion to set a Preliminary hearing, arguing
that the respondent's failure to respond/ object to the Request for Admission is amounted to
an implied admission (citing Sec 2, Rule 26, ROC).

RTC- denied the Motion. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but likewise denied by the
court.

Petitioner elevated the issue through Certiorari. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on part of
RTC.

CA- dismissed the petition. Petitioners again moved for reconsideration but thesame was
denied by the court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondents’ failure to respond to the Request for Admission amounted to an

implied admission & a preliminary hearing should therefore be conducted.
2. Whether the affirmative defense of non-joiner of indispensable parties is a ground for
dismissal of the action.

RULING:

SC- denied the Petition.

- citing Sec 1 (request for admission) & 2 (implied admission), Rule 26, Rules of Court.

• As to the Request for Admission

- the respondents has already responded. There is redundancy when petitioner compels the
respondents to deny what has been already denied in the first instance.
- ineffectual, futile and irrelevant.

• When the affirmative defence failed to state a cause of actio, a preliminary hearing is
unneccessary, erroneous and impovident.

• In action foe annulment of title- complaint must contain ff allegations:

(1) The contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed
certificate of title to the defendant.
(2) Dependant perpetuated a fraud or commited mistake in obtaining a document of title over
the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff

• Application of the Rules and determination of sanction upon the failure to comply rests on
judicial discretion.

• The court may look at the validity of the extrajudicial succession of estate and sale and the
status of petitioner as predecessor in interest through;
=the merits of their repective claims and defenses.
=based on preponderence of the evidence in full-blown trial.

• non-joiner of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action.

• declaration of heirship can be made only in special proceeding not in civil action.

Gustilo vs Gustilo III

FACTS:

Petitioner Mary Joy Anne Gustilo and respondent Jose Vicente Gustilo III are heirs of their
natural father, the late Atty. Armando Gustilo (they have different mothers), who owned
several properties and was, prior to his death, the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial Corporation
(A.G. Agro) in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. Petitioner Bonifacio Peña is Mary Joy’s attorney-in-
fact whom she authorized to exercise general control and supervision of her real properties. On
August 31, 1993, following their father’s death, Mary Joy and Jose Vicente entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), adjudicating between themselves their father’s properties.
One of these was Hacienda Imelda which the MOA assigned to Mary Joy. As it happened,
however, the hacienda’s title remained in the name of A.G. Agro. Mary Joy immediately took
possession of the land through Mila Barco, her mother and natural guardian, and planted
sugarcane on it. Over three years later or in 1997 Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased
Hacienda Imelda and its farm implements to respondent Tita Sy Young for five agricultural crop
years from 1997-1998 to 2001-2002. Being financially hard up, Mary Joy and her mother were
pained to watch Young take over the land. When the lease contract was about to expire,
however, Mary Joy had her lawyer advise Young to surrender the land to her. But the latter
refused to yield possession and continued to cultivate the same for sugarcane.

ISSUE:

WoN Mary Joy’s action presents an intra-corporate dispute that belongs to the jurisdiction of a
specially designated commercial court.

HELD:

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
in the complaint. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to
the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong
hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession, can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he is entitled to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right. Here, Jose Vicente and
Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the subject property is
in the name of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one of intra-
corporate. The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to
possess, independently of title.3 But where the parties raise the issue of ownership, as in
this case, the courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not final and
binding as regards the issue of ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession when it is inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The
adjudication on the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. 4 Also, any intra-corporate
issues that may be involved in determining the real owner of the property may be
threshed out in a separate proceeding in the proper commercial court.

Sps. Villacastin vs Pelaez

Facts:

Respondent Paul Pelaez and his wife mortgaged their agricultural lands to the Development
Bank of the Philippines. For failure of the Pelaez spouses to pay their mortgage obligation, the
properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold at public auction.

The purported tenants of the property filed an action to annul the mortgage, foreclosure and
sale of the properties, claiming that they are the owners. 
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court against
respondent.

Respondent countered that he is the owner of the subject property. Respondent further
claimed that he had redeemed the property and accordingly reacquired possession.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator :

Rendered a decision in favor of the tenants.

DARAB:
This decision was affirmed by the DARAB.

MCTC:
MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and is hereby ordered to return to
plaintiffs possession of the parcel of land above-described and vacate the premises.

RTC:
The Regional Trial Court affirmed the MCTC decision.

CA:
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that regular courts should respect the primary
jurisdiction vested upon the DARAB in cases involving agricultural lands such as the property
subject of this case. Accordingly, it set aside the decision rendered by the RTC and the MCTC,
and dismissed the complaint for forcible entry filed by petitioners in this case.

Issue:
W/N RTC and MTC have jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:
Yes.
Petitioners' action is clearly for the recovery of physical or material possession of the subject
property only, a question which both the MCTC and the RTC ruled petitioners are entitled to. It
does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter, nor an agrarian dispute falling
within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to
determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of
disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in the DAR. Thus,
jurisdiction was rightfully exercised by the MCTC and the RTC.

The Decision of the Regional Trial affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is
REINSTATED.

MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDO v CULLEN GR 181416 : Nov. 11, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI) a condominium Unit of
the Medical Plaza Makati. Petitioner demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid
association dues and assessments of P145,567.42. Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he
had been religiously paying his dues shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and
director of petitioner.

Petitioner claimed that respondent’s obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI. Respondent was
prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioner’s
Board of Directors. Respondent demanded from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a
delinquent payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation.
Hence, the Complaint for Damages filed by respondent against petitioner and MLHI.

Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. MLHI claims that it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is vested
with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

RTC granted both motions to dismiss and, consequently, dismissing respondent’s complaint. The trial
court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by respondent clearly falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. As to petitioner, the court held that the complaint states no
cause of action, considering that respondent’s obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It, likewise,
ruled that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. The CA held that the controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages which falls
within the jurisdiction of regular courts. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Based on the allegations made by respondent in his complaint, does the controversy involve intra-
corporate issues as would fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court?
HELD:

Yes, the SC granted the petition and CA decision is reversed.

RATIO:

In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy, the Court uses two tests,
namely, the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. Applying the two tests, the court
ruled that the case involves intra-corporate controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate
relations between the parties, and the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under
the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation.

This action partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy, the jurisdiction over which pertains
to the SEC. Pursuant to Sec. 5.2 of RA 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under Sec 5 of PD 902-A has been transferred to RTCs
designated by this Court as Special Commercial Courts.

The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the complaint. While the CA
may be correct that the RTC has jurisdiction, the case should have been filed not with the regular court
but with the branch of the RTC designated as a special commercial court. Considering that the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 58 was not designated as a special commercial court, it was not vested with
jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.

DOCTRINE:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause
of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE INC. VS. COURT OF APPEAL

GR NO. 124262, OCTOBER 12, 1999

FACTS:

The private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Morong
Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro died intestate and they are
the only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father also owned a parcel
of land with an area of two hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or less. They further
claimed that in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, the said lot was sold by their
brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when Mariano represented himself
as a sole heir to the property.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
The Trial Court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner again filed its own motion for
reconsideration but was also denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeal a
special civil action for certiorari on the ground that a.) the trial court has no jurisdiction to try
and take cognizance of the case as the causes of action have been decided with finality by the
Supreme Court, b.)the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority in taking
cognizance of the case. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and finds that there is no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court and/or Court of Appeal had jurisdiction over the case,
and if so, whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision
of the RTC.

HELD:

According to the Supreme Court, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the public respondent. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took cognizance of
the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Also, according to the Supreme Court, acquiring
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court
meant to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the Land registration case mentioned by
the petitioner.

Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined
by the allegation of the complaint, hence the court’s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.

In addition, according to the Supreme Court, it is now too late for petitioner to question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. It was the petitioner who elevated the instant controversy
to the CA via petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
CA by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. Lastly, according to the SC, if a party invokes the
jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge that court’s jurisdiction in the same case.
To do otherwise would amount to speculating on fortune of litigation, which is against the
policy of the court.

Del Monte Philippines vs. Sangunay

G.R. 180013, Jan 31, 2011

Facts:

Del Monte Philippines Inc. Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative(DEARBC) filed
a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance with Damage with the DARAB
Region 10 Office against several respondents, among whom were Jesus Sangunay (Sangunay)
and Sonny Labunos (Labunos) for a landholding located in Sankanan, Manolo Fortrich, Bukidnon
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. AO-3[Certificate of Land Ownership Award(CLOA)].
Said landholding was awarded to DEARBC under the Cooperative Agrarian Reform
Program(CARP). DEARBC leased a substantial portion of the land to Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI) under

DEARBC claimed that both Sangunay and Labunos illegally entered portions of its property
called “Field 34”. Sangunay utilized approximately one and a half hectare where he planted
corn, built a house and resided from 1986 to the present. Labunos, on the other hand, tilled an
area approximately eight (8) hectares where he planted fruit trees, gmelina, mahogany and
other crops as a source of his livelihood. Both respondents refused to return the parcels of land
notwithstanding a demand to vacate them.

Issue:

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case?

Case History:

DARAB Region 10 Office Ruling

The Adjudicator ruled in favor of DEARBC on the ground that the respondents failed to present
proof of ownership over the subject portions of the landholding.  According to the Adjudicator,
their bare allegation of possession, even prior to the award of the land to DEARBC, did not
suffice as proof of ownership.

DARAB Central Office Ruling

The DARAB dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.  It ruled that the issue of ownership of
the subject land classifies the controversy as a regular case falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts and not as an agrarian dispute.

In the case at bar, petitioner-appellants wanted to recover x x the subject landholding on the
premise of ownership xxx. Defendants-appellants assail such allegations saying that the
landholdings are accrual deposits and maintaining their open, peaceful and adverse possession
over the same. Indubitably, there assertions and issues classify the present controversy as a
regular case.  As such, clearly, this Board has no jurisdiction to rule upon the instant case.
Obviously, the dispute between the parties does not relate to any tenurial arrangement.  Thus,
this Board has no jurisdiction over the same.

CA Ruling through a petition for review under Rule 43:

The CA dismissed the petition for procedural infirmities in its verification, certification and
attachments.

Held:

No. DARAB does not have jurisdiction over the case. It is the regular courts who has
jurisdiction

Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and as held in a string of cases, "the DAR is vested with the
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program." The DARAB was created, thru Executive Order No. 109-A, to assume the powers and
functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.  Hence, all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform are within the DAR's primary, exclusive and
original jurisdiction. At the first instance, only the DARAB, as the DAR's quasi-judicial body, can
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the CARP.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether

leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

Verily, all that DEARBC prayed for was the ejectment of the respondents from the respective
portions of the subject lands they allegedly entered and occupied illegally. DEARBC avers that,
as the owner of the subject landholding, it was in prior physical possession of the property but
was deprived of it by respondents' intrusion.

Clearly, no "agrarian dispute" exists between the parties. The absence of tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, cannot be overlooked.
In this case, no juridical tie of landownership and tenancy was alleged between DEARBC and
Sangunay or Labunos, which would so categorize the controversy as an agrarian dispute. In fact,
the respondents were contending for the ownership of the same parcels of land

This set of facts clearly comprises an action for recovery of possession. The claim of being
farmer-beneficiaries with right of retention will not divest the regular courts of jurisdiction,
since the pleas of the defendant in a case are immaterial.

Although the complaint filed by DEARBC was similarly denominated as one for recovery of
possession, it utterly lacks allegations to persuade the Court into ruling that the issue
encompasses an agrarian dispute.

DEARBC's argument that this case partakes of either a boundary dispute, correction of a CLOA,
and ouster of an interloper or intruder, as found under Section 1, Rule 11 of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure is unavailing. Nowhere in the complaint was the correction or cancellation
of the CLOA prayed for, much less mentioned. DEARBC merely asserted its sole ownership of
the awarded land and no boundary dispute was even hinted at.

Sps. Javellana vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila 139067 Nov 23, 2004
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

FACTS:
Respondent filed before the RTC of Manila, a complaint for accion publiciana and sum of money
against petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners submit that the subject property is a subdivision lot as
expressly stipulated in their Contract to Sell, hence it is cognizable by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
A reading of the complaint does not show that the subject lot was a subdivision lot which would
fall under the jurisdiction of the HLURB.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject matter of the case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

RULING:

No. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the
defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
The use of the phrase "regular subdivision project" (in the complaint) does not automatically
make the instant case fall under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. What appears from the
complaint was the fact that the subject lot was sold to petitioners in an ordinary sale of a lot on
installment basis; that petitioners allegedly defaulted in the payment of their monthly
installments for which reason respondent seeks to recover possession thereof. Thus, the trial
court has jurisdiction over the case.

Dionisio vs Sioson

Facts

Plaintiff filed a complaint for recovery. Defendants admitted their indebtedness in their answer
but claimed that plaintiff had charged usurious interest. Plaintiff, denied the allegation of usury
although such pleading was not made under oath. Defendants filed a Manifestation and Motion
claiming that plaintiff's failure to deny under oath the allegation of usurious interest as raised in
their affirmative defense would warrant the dismissal of the case if it had been raised in a
Motion to dismiss.
Defendants failed to appear although they were duly served with notice and the trial court
declared them in default upon plaintiff's motion and directed the clerk to receive plaintiff's
evidence.

Trial court rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue

1. Where a motion for preliminary hearing has been filed and requested set for hearing
"immediately" (without the reglementary 3-day period) which happened to be on the
same day set for pre-trial at which neither defendants nor their counsel were present
despite notice, was it proper for the court to declare the defendants in default, and
allow plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte?

2. Considering that plaintiff's reply denying defendants' charge of usury was not under
oath; should the court a quo not have dismissed the case outright?

Ruling

1. No error was committed by the trial court in declaring defendants in default for their failure
to appear at the pre-trial despite due notice. The trial court's action is expressly authorized
under Rule 20, section 2 which provides that "A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial
conference may be non-suited or considered as in default."

2. Defendants' second assignment of error that the trial court should have dismissed the case
outright, on the ground that plaintiff's reply denying their charge of usury was not under oath,
is untenable.

The rule that "Allegations of usury are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under
oath” is a procedural rule, and the lack of oath in a pleading is a defect which is subject to
waiver just as a defective or imperfect verification may be waived.