‘Nuclear Learning in Pakistan since 1998’

Naeem Ahmad Salik

(20881392)

B.A., Pakistan Military Academy, 1974; M.A. (History), University of the Punjab, 1981; B.Sc.
Hons. (War Studies), Balochistan University, 1985; M.Sc. (International Politics and Strategic
Studies), University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1990.

This thesis is presented for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Western Australia

School of Social Sciences

Political Science and International Relations and the Centre for Muslim States and Societies (CMSS)

2015
 Abstract

Nuclear learning is a process through which states that acquire nuclear weapons
capability learn to manage it through the development of nuclear doctrines, command and
control structures, safety and security mechanisms, regulatory regimes and acquire an
understanding of both the technological characteristics of these weapons as well as their
politico-strategic ramifications. This enables them to achieve a stable strategic balance
through a sagacious application of these formidable instruments of power. Pakistan’s
nuclear programme has always been beset with controversies and viewed with concern by
the international community. These concerns have been accentuated by the spill over of
the war in Afghanistan and the widespread incidence of terrorism and extremism within
the country itself. In the pre-1998 period Pakistan had adopted a policy of ambiguity and
denial of a nuclear weapons programme which combined with the secrecy surrounding the
programme had stifled any discussion of issues related to management of an operational
nuclear capability and it only started coming to grips with these issues after the May 1998
nuclear tests.
This study about Pakistan’s learning experience in managing its nuclear capability
suggests that a state that is perpetually afflicted by political instability and weak
institutional structures could effectively handle its nuclear arsenal like a normal nuclear
state provided it expends requisite effort and resources towards this end. The ability of the
state and its institutions to learn through their experiences and from others is also very
important in this regard. While the literature on ‘nuclear learning’ is not very exhaustive,
the concept is sufficiently well developed to provide an adequate framework for study of
Pakistan’s evolution as a nuclear power since 1998.The study helps ascertain the nature
and the magnitude of learning by Pakistan to manage various facets of its nuclear
capability in the past decade and a half. The study has tried to identify the discernible
manifestations of nuclear learning and has tried to determine the reasons for disparity in
learning amongst the civilian and military institutions in view of the troublesome civil-
military balance in Pakistan.
This study brings out Pakistan’s difficult progression to a nuclear weapons capable
state and how this bitter historical experience has predisposed it to adopt a particular
learning path. It also highlights the dynamic nature of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear doctrine
which has been adjusted and adapted to meet the demands of its ever changing security
environment. It establishes that Pakistan’s nuclear command and control is a reflection of
the existing civil-military balance and is line with the traditional division of labour
between the two institutions in the realm of security policy making.
The study finds sufficient evidence to suggest that given its precarious internal and
external security situation Pakistan has invested heavily in augmenting its nuclear safety
and security and this effort has clearly manifested itself and has also received international
recognition. After the embarrassment of the AQ Khan episode as well as the emerging
international trends evident in the form of UNSC Resolution 1540, Pakistan has also paid
attention to strengthening its export control system and to bring it in conformity with
international standards. Discernible learning is also apparent in the field of nuclear
regulation which has also been acknowledged by the IAEA.
 Declaration

I hereby declare that the thesis submitted for examination is my own original work except
where acknowledged in the references.

Student Signature Date…12 April 2015…………….

 Acknowledgements

The completion of this work would not have been possible without the intellectual
and moral support of a number of people. To begin with I would like to acknowledge the
encouragement, insights and guidance of my coordinating supervisor Professor Samina
Yasmeen, who not only gave me freedom to carry out my research and writing but also
regularly provided invaluable inputs and suggestions which contributed greatly in
improving the quality of my work. She along with her husband Professor James Trevelyan
provided a congenial, friendly and family like social atmosphere especially while my
family was back home in Pakistan. My co-supervisor Dr Roderic Pitty was a source of
encouragement and valuable advice and the faculty at the Political Science Department
was always friendly and reassuring. I would also like to express my gratitude for the staff
at the Graduate Research School and School of Social Sciences for providing assistance
and advice, whenever it was needed. The staff and colleagues at the Centre for Muslim
States and Societies deserve to be acknowledged for their cooperation and for maintaining
a congenial work environment.

My thanks are also due to the staff at the Reid Library, who were always
forthcoming with any kind of help, assistance or advice asked of them. Finally, the
peaceful and conducive atmosphere at the UWA and its serene environs were always
helpful in soothing the nerves and relieving the burdens and tensions of work.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my wife for relieving me of the burdens of family

responsibilities and giving me a free hand to concentrate on my work. She looked after the
family affairs back home in Pakistan and taking over the responsibility of all household
chores during the time she spent with me in Australia. My sons also deserve appreciation
for neither causing any distractions nor making any demands on my time. Above all I
would like to thank my mother whose prayers and unmitigated confidence in my abilities
have always been a source of strength for me.

I would also like to thank all those who agreed to be interviewed in connection with
my research project and readily shared their knowledge and ideas with me.
 LIST OF ACRONYMS

AARs After-Action Reviews

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

AWC Air Weapons Complex

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJCSC Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

COAS Chief of Army Staff

CNS Chief of Naval Staff

CAS Chief of Air Staff

C4I Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence

CCS Cabinet Committee on Security

CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety

CoE Centre of Excellence

CPPNM Convention on Physical Security of Nuclear Materials

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DCC Development Control Committee

DND Draft Nuclear Doctrine

DNSRP Directorate of Nuclear Security and Radiation Protection

DOE Department of Energy

ECC Employment Control Committee

ERL Engineering Research Laboratories

EA&R Cell Evaluation Analysis & Research Cell

FMCT Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBMs Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

INFCIRC Information Circular

ISI Inter-services Intelligence

KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant

KRL Khan Research Laboratories

LEU Low Enriched Uranium

LSG London Suppliers Group

MAD Mutual Assured Destruction

MPC&A Material Protection Control & Accounting

MTC Maritime Technologies Complex

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCA National Command Authority

NDC National Development Complex

NESCOM National Commission on Science and Technology

NFU No-First Use

NNPA Non-proliferation Prevention Act

NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon States

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NPT Non-proliferation Treaty

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRECC National Radiation Emergency Coordination Centre

NSAB National Security Advisory Board

NSAP Nuclear Security Action Plan

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

NTI Nuclear Threat Initiative

NuSECC Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre

NWS Nuclear Weapon States

PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

PARR-1 Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-1

PIEAS Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences

PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology

PMO Project Management Organisation

PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

PNRA Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority

PNRB Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Board

PNSRP Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Ordinance

PRP Personnel Reliability Programme

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

R&D Research and Development

SDI Strategic Defence Initiative

SECDIV Strategic Export Controls Division

SFC Strategic Forces Command

SLBMs Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate

SPD Strategic Plans Division

SROs Statutory Regulatory Orders

SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmosphere Commission

TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

WMDs Weapons of Mass Destruction

WWCCS Worldwide Command and Control System

 Table of Contents
Page
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 17
Literature Review
Chapter 244
A Brief History of Development of Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme
Chapter 3 84
Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine

Chapter 4 127

Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control

Chapter 5 159

Nuclear Safety and Security Arrangements

Chapter 6 192

Pakistan’s Nuclear Export Controls Regime

Chapter 7 218

Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Regime

Chapter 8 243

Conclusion

Bibliography 253
 1

Introduction

Background:

This study explores Pakistan’s experience as a nuclear weapons capable state since
the demonstration of its nuclear capability in 1998. Pakistan is one of the three de-facto
nuclear states besides India and Israel, who opted to stay out of the non-proliferation
regime1, each citing its own peculiar security concerns. The group was later joined by
North Korea which had acceded to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty on December 12,
19852 but after various disputes with the IAEA over safeguards and inspections announced
its intention to withdraw from the treaty on March 12, 1993. It later decided to suspend its
decision following talks with the US on 11th June 19933, just a day before its withdrawal
was due to take effect. It again controversially renounced its membership of the treaty on
January 10, 20034 without a prior notice of three months and embarked on a secret nuclear
weapons programme. Iraq, Libya and Iran are in yet another category. These three states
which had signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and had given up their right to
develop nuclear weapons were found to be in violation of their treaty obligations by trying
to clandestinely develop nuclear weapons. While Iraq and Libya have resumed compliance
with the treaty provisions, several unresolved disputes related to Iranian nuclear
programme are yet to be settled between the Islamic Republic and the IAEA.

Among the de-facto nuclear weapon states Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme
has been viewed with suspicion right from its inception in the early 1970s.
Characterisation of Pakistan’s nuclear enterprise as ‘the Islamic Bomb’5 created the
misperception that its end product would be shared with the Islamic states in the Middle

1
The current non-proliferation regime is anchored in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that came
into force in 1970 and is implemented through IAEA’s safeguards and inspections regime. The text of the
treaty can be found at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html,
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml and
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.
2
‘North Korea Nuclear Chronology’ available at www.nti.org
3
Article X of the NPT allows states party to the treaty to withdraw on the basis of threats to their supreme
national security interests giving a three months’ notice of their intention to other member states.
www.nti.org
4
Ibid, www.nti.org
5
See Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, ‘The Islamic Bomb – The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the
Middle East,’ Times Books, New York, 1981. Also see N.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodiri, ‘Pakistan’s
Islamic Bomb,’ Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1979 and ‘The Birth of the Islamic Bomb,’ New York Times,
Special Feature, 15 June 1980.
 2

East, thereby creating a potential threat to Israel. This perception arrayed the non-
proliferationists, the pro-Israeli lobbies within and outside the US Congress and the
Western media against Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Pakistan has neither been
characterised as a rogue nuclear state like North Korea, nor was it amongst states such as
Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea dubbed as the ‘axis of evil’ by President Bush. However,
since Pakistan’s pursuit of a military nuclear capability commenced after the NPT had
already entered into force and international norms against further nuclear proliferation
were gaining ground, its effort was seen as defiance of the prevailing international norms.
Moreover, after the Indian nuclear test in May 1974 international nuclear commerce was
severely curtailed through the introduction of an increasingly restrictive export controls
regime. Pakistan therefore had to acquire requisite nuclear technology surreptitiously
through nuclear black markets and exploitation of loopholes in the export control system
itself. Its effort, therefore, acquired a kind of illegitimacy which continues to bedevil it.

Pakistan’s record of political instability, economic fragility and institutional

weakness has further accentuated the concerns about its ability to safeguard its nuclear
weapons and materials and act like a ‘normal nuclear state.’6 In the past decade, the spill
over of the ‘Global War on Terror’ waged by the US and its NATO allies in neighbouring
Afghanistan and the widespread incidence of terrorism and extremism within the country
have given rise to renewed international concerns about safety and security of Pakistan’s
nuclear assets. In this backdrop questions have been raised about Pakistan’s ability to
effectively manage its nuclear weapons, sensitive materials and installations. The Kargil
conflict across the Line of Control dividing Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir in 1999
and the disclosure of proliferation activities of a clandestine network involving a
prominent Pakistani scientist AQ Khan in 2004, have further dented Pakistan’s credentials
as a responsible nuclear weapons capable state. Pakistan’s chaotic political and internal
security environment and its weak institutions give rise to questions about its ability to
learn to efficiently administer its nuclear programme like any other nuclear weapon state

6
A ‘normal nuclear state’ is a state which is part of the mainstream nuclear non-proliferation regime and is
entitled to nuclear commerce for peaceful uses of nuclear technology such as nuclear power generation and
nuclear medicine etc. In a recent Adelphi Book by IISS, London, Mark Fitzpatrick has recommended that
Pakistan should be treated as a normal nuclear state. See Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear
Dangers,’ Oxford, Routledge, 2014.
 3

and about the existence of any evidence to suggest that it has developed the necessary
wherewithal for this purpose and whether there are any manifestations of this effort.

Aim and Scope of the Study:

The study is aimed at evaluating the state of nuclear learning in Pakistan’s civilian
as well as military institutions since it became an overt nuclear weapons state in May 1998.
Given the cognitive nature of learning and the multiplicity of levels at which nuclear
learning can be analysed it is imperative to identify the most appropriate level of analysis
for the study. Since the study is aimed at estimating nuclear learning amongst the civilian
and military institutions in Pakistan, the most appropriate level of analysis was considered
to be the ‘organisational’ level of learning which also allowed the application of relevant
concepts from the organisational theory as well as keeping the scope of the study within
manageable limits. The study, nevertheless, takes a broader view of nuclear learning in
Pakistan while carrying out an in-depth examination of the manifestations of learning in
both civilian and military institutions to determine the degree of learning in each of these
domains.

Significance of the Study:

Robert Jervis has argued that, “the fact that the nuclear weapons could destroy the
world has changed the way people think and the way nations behave. I also believe that a
better understanding of their role can make the world safer.”7This amply highlights the
importance of exploring how Pakistan’s behaviour as a state has been affected by its
nuclearisation. A study about Pakistan’s learning experience in managing its nuclear
capability is also vital to see whether a state that is perpetually beset with political
instability and has chronically weak institutions could effectively handle its nuclear
arsenal. It, therefore, provides answers to many of the concerns expressed by the
international community about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
While the literature on ‘nuclear learning’ is not very exhaustive, the concept is sufficiently
well developed to provide an adequate framework for study of Pakistan’s evolution as a
nuclear power since its overt nuclearisation in 1998. Though there are quite a few books
and many research articles published about Pakistan’s nuclear programme and policy, no
7
Robert Jervis, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon’,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1989, p. ix.
 4

published study has as yet explored Pakistan’s nuclear progression from the perspective of
the concept of nuclear learning. This study, therefore, adds not only to the literature on
nuclear learning but also adds a new dimension to the literature related to Pakistan’s
evolution as a nuclear weapons capable state.

It may also be noted that Pakistan provides an interesting case study, since it denied
the pursuit of a military nuclear programme until it conducted multiple nuclear tests in
May 1998 in response to the Indian tests earlier that month. India also pursued a similarly
ambivalent policy though it had already demonstrated its nuclear prowess in 1974. This
policy of denial on part of Pakistan helped deflect and mitigate international opprobrium
and sanctions to some extent. However, the downside of this policy was that it did not
allow any room for public debate on critical issues related to nuclear doctrine, command
and control and safety and security. Unfortunately, there was no internal debate on the
subject either within the military or the civilian institutions and there was even a dearth of
academic discourse on the issue. All these key aspects of nuclear policy have therefore,
been effectively addressed only in the post-1998 period. The period covered by this study,
has therefore, seen intense activity in terms of institutional/structural and perceptual
developments for an effective management of Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

The existing literature on Pakistan’s nuclear programme mostly covers the

evolution of Pakistani nuclear weapons programme and to a lesser extent explores the
underlying motivations that compelled Pakistan to go down the nuclear path and have only
partially covered the post 1998 developments.8 However, there is no substantive published
work that comprehensively covers the post-1998 developments especially from the
perspective of ‘nuclear learning.’ This study is aimed at filling this gap in the existing
literature focusing mainly on the post-1998 developments and situating these within the
conceptual framework of ‘nuclear learning’ to ascertain whether and to what degree has
Pakistan learnt to manage its nuclear capability in the past decade and a half. The concept
of Nuclear Learning has been employed by many prominent scholars such as Joseph S.

8
Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, Oxford University Press, Pakistan, 2002;
NaeemSalik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2009; Zafar
Iqbal Cheema, India’s Nuclear Strategy, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2010 and Feroz Hassan Khan,
Eating Grass – The Making of the Pakistani Nuclear Bomb, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2013.
 5

Nye Jr. in their writings mainly to analyse the strategic dynamics of the US-Soviet security
relationship during the Cold War years, no systematic study of nuclear learning using a
particular country as a case study exists.9 A comprehensive study of Pakistan’s nuclear
learning experience would, therefore, be an addition to the existing literature on the
subject. The study will strive to identify the nature and magnitude of the learning, the
discernible manifestations of that learning and to determine whether there is uniformity or
disparity in learning amongst the civilian and military institutions since civil-military
balance in Pakistan has been and continues to be a contentious issue. The study will also
try to identify Pakistan’s own motivations to learn as well as the extraneous factors that
may have pushed the process forward. This will hopefully clarify some of the doubts
related to the management of Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

Research Questions:

The following questions have been addressed during the course of the study:-

 How deeply has Pakistan’s difficult historical experience during the course of
its nuclear development affected its world view and predisposed it to adopt
certain policy approaches?
 How has Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine evolved since 1998?
 What institutional mechanisms in the form of command and control structures
have been created to manage the operationalization of the nuclear capability?
 What security architecture has been developed to deal with the existing and
potential threats to nuclear assets?
 How have Pakistan’s nuclear export control and regulatory regimes evolved
since 1998?
 What kind of nuclear learning has taken place in the military and civilian
institutions and what are its manifestations?

9
See Jack S. Levy, ‘Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield’, International
Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994); also see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Nuclear Learning and U.S. – Soviet
Security Regimes’, International Organizations, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 1987), p. 378 and Jeffery W.
Knopf, ‘The Concept of Nuclear Learning’, Non-proliferation Review No. 19, Vol. 1, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, March 2012.
 6

 Has there been a disparity in the military and civilian learning? If yes. What
are the causes of this disparity?

Research Methodology:

The research is primarily based on empirical analysis of the available literature on

the subject of nuclear learning, and uses this framework to carry out an appraisal of various
facets of nuclear learning in Pakistan. The existing published material on development of
Pakistan’s nuclear management structures as well as its perceptual growth in the form of
books, research articles, and publicly available official documents has been augmented by
interviews conducted in Pakistan during July/ August 2012 with current and former policy
makers as well as academic experts and analysts who have either been involved in decision
making at critical junctures or have seen these developments from a vantage point. This
has helped to confirm or call into question certain conclusions drawn from analysis of
published material. The interviews also helped provide clarity wherever there was
ambiguity in available information. Interviews were especially helpful in drawing
comparisons between the levels of learning amongst the military and civilian institutions as
was evident from the perceptions and explanations by a representative sample of the
Pakistani intelligentsia. Most of the interviews were conducted with the respondents across
the table during the author’s visit to Pakistan in July-August 2012. However, some
respondents provided their inputs through e-mails. Speeches and statements made by key
policy makers on different occasions, books written by important leaders, 10policy
documents published by the government in the form of Official Gazette notifications,
Legislations, Ordinances and Regulations have also been a valuable source of information.

An appropriate criterion had also to be devised to have some measure of the

amount of learning within various institutions given the cognitive nature of the learning
process and various types of learning. The perceptual development and maturity in
thinking is obviously difficult to estimate by any means other than a comparison of public
statements made by responsible officials in the early post-nuclearisation days with those
made a decade and a half later. To serve as a basis for evaluation of learning a typology of
learning has been developed and a nuclear learning matrix has been designed using key

10
Former President Musharraf’s memoirs, ‘In the Line of Fire’ and former Foreign Minister Abdul-Sattar’s,
‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’ are useful references in this regard.
 7

players and important aspects of nuclear policy. The matrix also helped in formulating the
questionnaires for the interviews. See Annexures-A and B respectively.

Constraints on Research:

The research was constrained to some extent by the proximity of the events and
therefore lack of access to declassified official documents, and the dynamic nature and
sensitivity of the subject. In any case, there is no tradition of declassification of official
documents in Pakistan. Sufficient published material is however, available in the form of
books and research articles, official pronouncements and publicly available official
documents such as Gazette Notifications, Ordinances and pieces of Parliamentary
Legislation. The bulk of the research is, therefore, based on published material. Interviews
have been used to verify or disprove the outcome of the empirical analysis carried out in
chapters 2 to 7. An important factor which restricted the number of respondents who could
be interviewed for the purpose of this study, was the technical nature of the subject, which
made it difficult to find many people in the intelligentsia or even within the military, who
have adequate grasp of the subject to be able to provide any meaningful insights.

Research Design/ Broad Outline of the Study:

The study is divided into eight chapters besides introduction and conclusion. The
details are as follows:

 Chapter-1: Literature Review – This chapter provides a theoretical/conceptual

framework for understanding Pakistan’s journey along the nuclear learning curve
since 1998. It provides an overview of the scholarly discussions related to the
broader concept of ‘learning’ in general, and ‘nuclear learning’ in particular,
highlighting the commonalities and differences in perceptions of scholars
representing different schools of thought on the subject. It also looks at various
dimensions and levels of learning that helped determine that the most appropriate
level of learning for the purpose of this study was the institutional/organisational
level. The chapter provides a theoretical foundation for the subsequent chapters that
mainly employ the empirical evidence related to evolving doctrinal thinking, force
configurations and postures, establishment of command and control structures and
 8

safety and security systems, nuclear specific legislation and Pakistan’s crisis
behaviour after the demonstration of its nuclear capability in May 1998.
 Chapter 2: A Brief History of Development of Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme:
This chapter covers the historical evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. It
also looks at the decision making and control arrangements or lack thereof, to
manage and control the nuclear programme during the covert phase of Pakistan’s
nuclear programme between 1972 and 1998. The chapter highlights Pakistan’s
unconventional approach to acquisition of nuclear weapons capability necessitated
by ever tightening international controls on the export of relevant materials and
technologies as well as political, diplomatic and economic pressure exerted
especially by the US in the form of sanctions under the Symington, Glenn and
Pressler Laws as well as the Missile Technology Control Regime. Moreover, there
were intermittent threats of preventive strikes by the US, India and Israel at key
Pakistani nuclear facilities especially during the 1980s. This peculiar historical
experience has created a deep seated perception in Pakistan of being unjustly and
unfairly singled out for penalties while India and Israel remained largely immune
from such treatment. The incessant threat of attacks on its military nuclear facilities
especially at the uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta, has also caused what can be
termed as the ‘Kahuta Syndrome.’ This historical legacy has shaped Pakistan’s
approach towards international nuclear order and continues to cast a long shadow
on its current and future policies thereby impacting upon the trajectory of its
nuclear learning.
 Chapter 3: Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine: Nuclear doctrines are
dynamic in nature and are susceptible to change with the changing security
environment and technological advancements. The United States’ experience is a
testament to that reality and Pakistan’s case is no different. This chapter discusses
the theoretical aspects of nuclear doctrinal thinking. It also surveys the doctrinal
development in the major nuclear powers US, Russia, Britain, France and China. It
looks at the evolving doctrinal thinking in India and its impact on Pakistani
doctrinal thinking due to the close dyadic security relationship between the two
countries. It traces the progression in Pakistani nuclear doctrinal thinking from its
inception and the changes it has undergone during the last decade and half due to
 9

internal technological developments as well as changing nature of the external

threats.
 Chapter 4: Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control: This chapter looks at the
nature, complexity and exacting demands of a nuclear command and control
system. It then reviews the establishment and growth of Pakistan’s nuclear
command and control system, its organisational structure and representation and
roles of civilian and military leadership in the nuclear command hierarchy. It
describes the organisation and role of various components of the command and
control system and also analyses the contents of the specific legislations that
provide legal cover to the existing command and control system.
 Chapter 5: Arrangements for Nuclear Safety and Security: This chapter covers
various, administrative and legislative measures Pakistan has instituted to ensure
requisite safety and security of its nuclear assets. It also highlights the specialised
institutional structures that have been created and the substantial expansion in the
size and capacity of dedicated nuclear security forces especially during the past
decade. Nuclear safety and security in Pakistan has been attracting a lot of attention
in the international media and has drawn all sorts of positive as well as negative
comments from different quarters. It continues to be a focus of all kinds of
insinuations and concerns despite an acknowledgement of the safety and security
measures instituted by Pakistan in the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI’s) Nuclear
Security Index for 2014 which has declared that amongst the nuclear states
Pakistan has shown the most improvement in nuclear security. The Director
General of the IAEA during a recent visit to Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence for
Nuclear Security also appreciated the very high standards of training.
 Chapter 6: Export Controls: This chapter looks at Pakistan’s export control
regime as it existed in 1998 and how it has been augmented and brought in
compliance with international standards in the years following 1998 tests. It will
provide broad contours of the organisational structure that has been developed to
oversee and administer the export control regime. International Export Controls
Regime complements the non-proliferation regime in important ways and its
significance has been reiterated by the UNSC through the passage of resolution
1540 in April 2004. The resolution makes it obligatory for all member states to
 10

bring their nuclear export controls in consonance with international standards and
has established an institutional mechanism to monitor progress in this regard.
Pakistan started the process of upgrading export control laws soon after the 1998
nuclear tests. The proliferation episode involving AQ Khan that caused national
embarrassment injected further urgency in the process in the light of the lessons
learnt from this serious lapse in nuclear stewardship.
 Chapter 7: Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Regime: This chapter gives an
overview of the evolution of nuclear regulatory regime in Pakistan. It then proceeds
to describe the role and functions of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority that
was established in January 2001. It also explains in some detail the National
Nuclear Security Action Plan that has been developed by the PNRA to deal with
any nuclear emergency in the country. Moreover, it highlights the major
undertakings and achievements of PNRA and as to how has it learnt through its
own experience as well as through cooperation with international organisations
such as the IAEA. Given the sensitive nature of nuclear technology and disastrous
consequences of a nuclear accident all nuclear installations and processes need to
be tightly regulated and the evolving nuclear regulatory regime in Pakistan has
been designed to achieve internationally accepted standards in this regard.
 Chapter 8:Conclusion:
This chapter summarises the inferences drawn from the study and recapitulates its
salient points.
 11

Annexure– ‘A’

NUCLEAR LEARNING TYPOLOGY

Type of Learning Illustration

Perceptual Learning This kind of learning relates to development of doctrinal precepts
for the operationalization of nuclear weapons and to integrate the
conventional and nuclear war fighting concepts and doctrines.
Crisis Learning This is another common form of learning and usually leads to
substantive changes in the application of security policies. During
the Cold War the Cuban Missiles Crisis of October 1962 led to
adoption of various confidence building and crisis management
mechanisms such as the Washington-Moscow Hotline and created
an environment for the beginning of arms control negotiations. In
South Asia the Kargil Crisis of 1999 led to a better understanding
of the complexities of a nuclearized security environment and had
a salutary effect on the behaviour of India and Pakistan during the
2001-02 military stand-off and the subsequent crisis in 2008. The
1999 crisis also led to the articulation by India of its Draft Nuclear
Doctrine and by Pakistan of its Nuclear Command and Control
structure.
Experiential Learning11or This is the most common form of learning that can also be found
Learning by Doing in many other spheres of human activity and comes about with the
experience of dealing with nuclear weapons over a period of time
– a kind of on the job learning. The degree of learning will vary
amongst individuals as well as institutions depending on the
availability or lack thereof of conducive environment for learning.
Also not everyone is likely to learn the same lessons from a
similar experience. This type of learning is progressive and
lessons learnt at an earlier stage of learning continue to be
modified and improved upon with further experience, availability
of new information or changes in security environment or
technological developments.
Learning by Emulation or This type of learning entails learning from the experiences of other
Imitative Learning nuclear states, drawing useful lessons and adapting these in
accordance with the peculiarities of own environment. This can be
done with the help of publicly available information. For instance,
nuclear command & control systems in US, UK and France were
studied and useful ideas adapted to suit Pakistani environment
while designing the nuclear command & control. However, this
kind of learning is limited to selected areas only because of
sensitivity of the information and legal limitations imposed by
domestic laws as well international treaty obligations. In most
cases the states with greater experience of handling nuclear
weapons only share ‘good practices’ in areas such as safety and
security, sensitive materials protection control and accounting
(MPC&A) and export control and regulatory practices. US-

11
This term has been borrowed from Russell Leng. See ‘Russell J. Leng, ‘Bargaining and Learning in
Recurring Crises’, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2000.
 12

Pakistan cooperation in security training, MPC&A and export

controls is a case in point.

Learning by Trial & Error This is an innovative type of learning and can be very valuable
provided an individual or an organisation is willing to accept
mistakes and learn the right kind of lessons from these after due
analyses which requires a lot of courage to do. In the nuclear
realm due to the hazardous nature of technology those dealing
with this technology are generally not prepared to take any
chances and therefore in the nuclear realm this is not a popular
kind of learning. Although in many human endeavours this type of
learning could be very productive.
Factual Learning12 In terms of nuclear learning this type of learning refers to
knowledge about the technical characteristics of nuclear weapons
such as their yield and the effects a nuclear detonation produces in
the form of heat, blast and radiation. It is important for both the
publics and the policy makers to be aware of the power of the
nuclear weapons and their peculiar nature as distinct from the
conventional weapons. Such knowledge would ensure that the
public would not exert undesirable pressure on the decision
makers in times of crises and the leaders would know the
consequences of any decisions they take with regard to the use of
nuclear weapons.
Inferential Learning13 This type of learning involves the broader policy implications of
the possession of nuclear weapons and it is important for policy
makers to be aware of these implications for their security policy
to enable them to make adjustments wherever necessary to adjust
either the ends of the policy or the means employed to achieve
those ends or both. However, sometimes otherwise knowledgeable
and experienced people fail to fully comprehend the implications
of their decisions and actions. Henry Kissinger ordered DEFCON-
III during the crisis arising out of 1973 Arab-Israeli War without
fully understanding its practical implications and technical details
and its escalatory potential.14
Unlearning In some cases useful and correctly learnt lessons are unlearnt. A
case in point is Pakistan learning from the Cold War experience
the destabilising potential of the battlefield nuclear weapons and
eschewing their development but then deciding in 2011 to move
down this path.

12
This term has been borrowed from Jeffrey Knopf. See Jeffrey Knopf, “The Concept of Nuclear Learning,”
Nonproliferation Review 19, no. 1 (March 2012): 79-93.
13
Ibid.
14
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “We All Lost the Cold War,” Princeton University Press,
1994, p.251-57.
 13

Annexure – ‘B’

Nuclear Learning Matrix

Decision Doctrine Institution Safety & Legislation Diplomacy
Making Building Security

Military What is Has any What new What What is its role Any
military’s role Operational institutions have arrangements in formulation inputs in
in nuclear Doctrine, been built to have been put of nuclear
decision- targeting exercise in place to related
policy
making? policy, command and ensure safety legislation? making?
linkage with control and for and security
conventional operational use of nuclear
doctrine been of nuclear weapons and
developed? weapons? materials?

Political What is the Does it Any civilian Any steps What nuclear What is
Leadership role in provide broad institution taken to related laws, the role
decision- policy specially ensure safety ordinances and
making? How guidelines? designated to & security of regulations
in policy
effective is deal with nuclear have been guidance
political nuclear issues? related promulgated? ?
control of activities?
decision-
making?

Civilian What is the Has any role Any institutions What is its What is its role
Bureaucracy role in nuclear been played created to role in nuclear in formulation
decision- by the civilian specifically deal safety and &
making? bureaucracy, with nuclear security? implementation
in the issues? of laws,
development ordinances and
of Pakistan’s regulations?
nuclear
doctrine?

Academics/ Are the Do the Have adequate Are there What nuclear Who plays
Security civilians civilians have institutional adequate specific the lead
Analysts fairly any input in Structures been safety and legislative role in
represented in doctrinal built in the security developments formulating
the nuclear development military as well arrangements have taken and
decision or is it purely as civilian to safeguard place since running
making military’s domains? the nuclear 1998? Has the Pakistan’s
process and discretion? assets and progress been nuclear
how effective installations? satisfactory? Is diplomacy?
is their it a
participatory
 14

contribution? process?
 15

Annexure – ‘C’

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

Serial Respondent Designation Respondent

No Code
1. A retired four star general Respondent
‘A’
2. A very senior SPD Official Respondent
‘B’
3. A very senior military officer at the Joint Staff Headquarters Respondent
‘C’
4. A senior officer in Army Strategic Force Command Respondent
‘D’
5. A senior female leader of an opposition political party Respondent
‘E’
6. A senior International Relations Scholar and Civil-Military Respondent
Relations Expert ‘F’
7. A senior social science scholar and security analyst Respondent
‘G’
8. A US based Pakistani security analyst Respondent
‘H’
9. An International Relations Professor and Strategic Analyst Respondent
‘I’
10. A young strategic studies scholar and expert on Pakistan’s nuclear Respondent
history ‘J’
11. A very high ranking official at PNRA Respondent
‘K’
12. A senior official dealing with nuclear policy/diplomacy at the Respondent
Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘L’
13. Head of an Islamabad based security think tank Respondent
‘M’
 16

14. A senior lawyer and International Law expert Respondent

‘N’
15. A young female academic with expertise in nuclear issues/via e Respondent
mail ‘O’
16. A highly placed officer in the Security Division of NCA Respondent
‘P’
17. A senior International Relations Professors, security analyst and Respondent
media-person ‘Q’
18. An American Academic & Strategic analyst of Pakistani origin Respondent
‘R’
19. A very senior scholar of strategic studies with expertise in nuclear Respondent
policy ‘S’
20. A former senior Professor of Physics and anti-nuclear activist/ via e Respondent
mail ‘T’
21. A senior physicist and well known anti-nuclear lobbyist/ via e mail Respondent
‘U’
22. A veteran political leader and parliamentarian from an Islamist Respondent
political party/ via e mail ‘V’
23. A senior official in the Strategic Plans Division Respondent
‘W’
24. A middle ranking official in the strategic Plans Division Respondent
‘X’
 17

Chapter – 1

Literature Review

1.1 Introduction:

This chapter is intended to provide a theoretical basis for understanding Pakistan’s

evolution as a nuclear weapons capable state since 1998. It will provide an overview of the
discourse related to the concept of ‘learning’ in general, and ‘nuclear learning’ in
particular, highlighting the commonalities and differences in perceptions of scholars
representing different schools of thought on the subject. This will provide a foundation for
the subsequent chapters that mainly employ the empirical evidence related to evolving
doctrinal thinking, force configurations and postures, establishment of command and
control structures and safety and security systems, nuclear specific legislations and
Pakistan’s nuclear regulatory regime. Learning can take different forms and can take place
at multiple levels which often overlap and their boundaries are generally blurred. Since the
main purpose of this study is to determine the nature and degree of nuclear learning in the
civilian and military institutions in Pakistan the focus of the study is mainly on the
organisational/institutional learning. It is not easy to determine whether nuclear learning in
Pakistan followed a clearly laid out plan or moved along haphazardly. It is also difficult to
classify which developments can be termed as learning and which fall under the category
of adaptation. However, as a general rule adaptations are impromptu responses to changing
situations and have a short term utility while learning brings about more durable and
longer lasting changes in conduct and behaviour.

1.2 A Brief Overview of the Concept of Learning:

Educational psychologists such as Thorndike, Driscoll, Vail, and Gonzalez etc.

have explained the process of learning in several different ways. Some scholars have taken
a quantitative approach to learning and consider learning as a process of an increase in the
volume of existing knowledge which includes retention of facts and figures and learning
and retaining different skills and techniques which can be employed as and when required.
The second group explain learning as the ability to perceive the meanings and to associate
various elements of knowledge not only with each other but to the broader issues and be
able to grasp the reality and enhance the understanding of the world by finding new
 18

meanings of the available knowledge. Yet others define learning as the ability to modify or
revise existing concepts to suit a particular situation. However, the real challenge does not
lie in the acquisition of knowledge per se but in its application to different circumstances.1

In view of the approaches employed by different scholars to explain the process of

learning, they have been grouped under three main schools namely, the ‘behaviourists’
represented by scholars such as Thorndike, Watson, Skinner and Pandey, the ‘humanists’
including Maslow, Roger and Patterson etc., and the ‘connectivists’ like Gonzalez.2
According to behaviourists, “learning is a permanent change in behaviour as a result of
experience. However, not all changes in behaviour resulting from experience involve
learning.”3 They also emphasise that the process of learning depends upon the relationship
between ‘stimulus’ and ‘response.’4 The humanists on the other hand believe that learning
is a process through which individuals maximise their potential through optimum
utilisation of their talents.5 While keeping in view the growing impact of technology on
human lives, the connectivists argue that in the present times the knowledge is growing so
rapidly that its life span has been greatly reduced and therefore, “the skill and capacity to
know more is more important than what is currently known.”6 They also believe that, “the
scope of formal education is shrinking and learning is becoming continual process that
lasts for a lifetime.”7 In this kind of environment it is hard to make a distinction between
formal learning and ‘on the job learning’ or ‘learning by doing’ and thus “there is an
increased need for knowledge management and linking the individual and organisational
learning.”8

According to Thorndike, learning is deemed to have taken place if the behaviour of

an individual is irrevocably modified and this change in behaviour affects both the internal
actions of the individual that are not visible to outsiders as well external actions that can be
discerned by others. At a broader level learning encompasses the manner in which people
perceive and interpret the world around them. More importantly, Thorndike believes that

1
Dr Malik Ghulam Behlol and DrHukam Dad, ‘Concept of Learning’, International Journal of Psychological
Studies, Vol. 2. No. 2, December 2010. www.ccsenet.org/ijps
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
 19

learning takes place as a result of the interaction between a ‘stimulus’ and the ‘response’ to
it. This clearly means that to begin with the process of learning requires some stimulus.
The amount of learning would obviously depend upon the intensity of the stimulus and
whether the stimulus evokes a positive response.9 He also recognises ‘trial and error’ as an
important mode of learning.

Brockett and Roger argue that, learning is a deliberate effort on part of an

individual to fully exploit his cognitive potential. They consider learning as a process
through which an individual strives to achieve his natural potential to its fullest extent. The
focus of learning here remains the individual. Roger has argued that, “simple memorisation
of raw facts and information cannot be considered as learning. Learning in essentially the
ability to analyse and process the available information.”10

Driscoll does not consider learning as a one off affair but one that manifests itself
in perpetually varying human ability to undertake certain actions. This change in human
capabilities takes place as a result of a person’s own experience as well as his interactions
with his environment.11 According to Vaill, learning is a part of the human existence. In
his view it is a continuous process as a consequence of varying responses of the individuals
and groups of people to different events as they unfold and the manner in which they deal
with familiar or unfamiliar circumstances.12

In the field of business a model called the ‘Uppsala Internationalisation Process

Model’ has been employed primarily to study the process of learning which various
business firms undergo as they venture into the international market. This model however,
provides useful insights into learning by organisations or institutions in general. According
to this model the managements learn in the form of small incremental steps based on their
own experiences which is also termed as ‘learning by doing.’ One of the assumptions in
the model is that the knowledge in specialised areas is individual centric and cannot be
easily passed on from one individual to another or from one situation to another. The

9
E. L. Thorndike, E. O. Bregman, J.W. Tilton and E. Woodyard, ‘Adult Learning’, New York, Macmillan,
1928, quoted in Behlol and Hukam Dad, op. cit.
10
Behlol and Hukam Dad, op. cit.
11
M.Driscoll, ‘Psychology of Learning for Instruction’, Needham Heights, MA., Allyn & Bacon, 2000,
quoted in Behlol and Hukam Dad.
12
P.B. Vaill, ‘Learning as a Way of Being’, Jossey-Blass Inc., San Francisco, California, 1996, quoted in
Behlol and Hukam Dad, op. cit.
 20

Uppsala Model lays emphasis on the importance of ‘experiential learning’ on part of

organisations based on their ongoing operations. On the other hand it also raises the
possibility that sometimes organisations can also acquire knowledge through their
interaction with other organisations without themselves having to undergo the experience
of those organisations. It also introduces the concept of what it calls ‘Imitative Learning’
which essentially means that organisations can learn by monitoring the activities of reputed
and credible organisations and then adopting their ways. Moreover, the model also points
at some short cuts used in the process of organisational learning, wherein the organisations
sometimes buy off other business organisations and benefit from their knowledge and
experience. Similarly, they sometimes hire individuals who possess expertise and
knowledge in a particular field. Nevertheless, the organisations can also learn without
either recourse to short cuts or relying on their own experience, by undertaking a dedicated
effort to acquire the desired information.13

It has also been highlighted in the organisational learning literature that a positive
learning does not necessarily increase the effectiveness of an organisation, however, it
brings to fore alternative ways of conducting their activities. The amount of learning by the
organisation in this context can be gauged by the number of alternatives it has thrown up.
With the passage of time the organisation learns to carry out its activities with ever
increasing efficiency. This phenomenon is also described as a ‘learning curve.’14 By
repeatedly performing the same operations the alternatives are abandoned as the
organisation achieves mastery over its existing methods and techniques. The Uppsala
Model accords greater importance to ‘experiential learning’ as compared to other modes of
learning such as ‘imitative learning’ or learning through incorporation of individuals or
other organisations or even a focused effort to seek new information. The weakness of this
model is its overemphasis on ‘reactive’ rather than ‘proactive learning,’ wherein reactive
learning implies learning more about the procedures in vogue while proactive learning
denotes an effort to seek new solutions.15 This kind of reactive learning can be triggered by
a problem confronted by the organisation during the course of ongoing operations. The

13
M.Forsgren, ‘The Concept of Learning in the Uppsala internationalisation process model: a critical review’,
International Business Review, 11, 2002, p.259.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., p. 260.
 21

search for a solution does not go much beyond the existing ones and the learning process
ends as soon as the problem is resolved.16

The display of ‘incremental behaviour’ indicates a lack of confidence on part of an

organisation and there is an inverse relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the
size of the steps an organisation will take. The institutional theory suggests that in case the
organisation is not sure of itself it will adopt a ‘mimetic behaviour’ to follow the practices
adopted by a majority of organisations because such practices enjoy credibility and success
is assured.17 The relationship between cause and effect is not very clear in the organisation
theory and there is no clear connection between learning and success or failure. The
experiential learning cannot be assumed to be uniform within an organisation because
different individuals and groups with varying interests and abilities will interpret the same
experience in different ways. There is also a tendency to claim credit for success and blame
failure on the actions of others or on extraneous factors.18 It has also been suggested that to
avoid the negative impact of changing of personnel collective memory must be preserved
in the form of standard operating procedures and practices to create what has been termed
by some analysts as ‘pool of habits’ or ‘institutional memory.’19

1.3 What is Nuclear Learning?

The concept of nuclear learning is not commonly understood despite the fact that
many prominent scholars have alluded to it in their writings mainly in the context of US-
Soviet nuclear rivalry during the cold war. Nuclear Learning is basically a subset of the
broader concept of learning that focuses on various aspects of nuclear policy. Since there is
no available definition of nuclear learning the author has attempted to define it as follows:-

Nuclear learning is a process through which states that acquire nuclear weapons
capability learn to manage it through the development of nuclear doctrines,
command and control structures, safety and security mechanisms, regulatory
regimes and acquire an understanding of both the technological characteristics of
these weapons as well as their politico-strategic ramifications which enables them

16
Ibid. p. 261.
17
Ibid., p. 262 &264.
18
Ibid., p.268.
19
Ibid., p.270.
 22

to achieve a stable strategic balance through an astute manipulation of these

formidable instruments of power.

Literature related to ‘nuclear learning’ covers both its components, that is to say,
‘nuclear’ as well as ‘learning’.20 Nuclear Learning is not static but dynamic in nature and
continues to evolve and adjust to the changing security environments as well as
technological developments. This point is evident from an overview of the evolution of
nuclear doctrinal thinking in different nuclear weapon states in chapter three of the study.
Most of the literature related to nuclear learning is based on the US experience in
managing its nuclear capability during the ‘Cold War’ years. The Russians, the British, the
French and the Chinese also learnt from their respective experiences but compared with the
US only limited amount of information about these countries is available in public domain.
Existing strategic literature clearly indicates that ‘nuclear learning’ is an incessant process.
The US, for instance, starting with the strategy of ‘Massive Retaliation’ in 1954, moved to
the ‘Flexible Response’ (early 1960s), then to ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ (late 1960s),
‘Limited Nuclear Options’ (early 1970s), ‘Countervailing strategy’ (late 1970s), and on to
the ‘Prevailing Strategy’ in the 1980s,21 while NATO and European allies also moved from
‘Massive Retaliation’ to ‘Flexible Response’ and ‘Graduated Response’ respectively.
These changes were introduced in order to make adjustments to the ever changing
international security landscape and advancements in science and technology which made
available ever more sophisticated weapons and increasingly accurate delivery systems
supported by advanced surveillance and target acquisition technologies. It is also clear that
whereas individual states readily change their strategies in view of the changing
circumstances the alliances tend to stick to a particular policy for a longer period of time
due to the difficulties in achieving consensus among the alliance partners for any change to
be effected.

Nuclear learning starts with the evolution of doctrinal thinking in order to cater for the
repercussions of these qualitatively different weapons on both the means available for as
well as the ends sought by national security policy. Doctrine in turn provides the bedrock
on which force structures are built and the institutional mechanisms are created to exercise

Jeffrey Knopf, op. cit.

20

Colin McInnes, ‘Nuclear Strategy’, in Colin McInnes & G.D. Sheffield, eds., ‘Warfare in the Twentieth
21

Century’, 1988, Routledge, London.

 23

command and control over these forces. Nuclear doctrine itself has two components one of
which is the declaratory doctrine, which outlines the fundamental principles embodied in
the doctrine. The second component is the operational part of the doctrine, which includes
the intended targets and various plans and contingencies for the employment of nuclear
weapons. The latter part of the doctrine remains classified for obvious reasons. Since the
declaratory doctrine is available in the public domain it catches the attention of the outside
world and evokes responses from the contending states. Because of the special nature of
nuclear weapons the requirements for command and control of these weapons are far more
stringent than conventional weapons. Additionally, complementary structures to ensure
safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials, regulate all nuclear processes and to
exercise control over the export of sensitive materials and technologies also have to be
built.

1.4 The Need for Nuclear Learning:

Nuclear weapons due to their immense destructive potential have had a profound
effect on the way the nations devise and pursue their security policies. A day after the first
atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, having quickly glanced
through the newspaper reports of the event, Bernard Brodie, one of the pioneers of nuclear
strategy, turned towards his wife and remarked that, “everything I have written so far has
become redundant.”22 He was to encapsulate later the fundamental changes that have been
brought about in our thinking about the use of military instruments for the achievement of
policy objectives stating that, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost
no other useful purpose.”23The far reaching impact of the advent of nuclear weapons on
international security landscape has been recognised by other scholars as well. Robert
Jervis, for instance, has captured the essence of the epoch making impact of nuclear
weapons on international security by terming it as ‘Nuclear Revolution.’ 24 He elaborates
his point about the enormity of the change brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons
and the need to absorb this reality due to its dire security implications saying that, “the fact

22
Fred Kaplan, ‘The Wizards of Armageddon’, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1983, p. 10.
23
Bernard Brodie, et al., ‘The Absolute Weapon’, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1946, p. 76.
24
Robert Jervis, ‘The Meaning of The Nuclear Revolution’ – Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon,
Cornell University Press, 1989, Ithaca and London.
 24

that nuclear weapons could destroy the world has changed the way people think and the
way nations behave. I also believe that a better understanding of their role can make the
world safer.”25The above remarks by Brodie and Jervis, echoed by many others, make it
abundantly clear that nations that acquire nuclear weapons also need to undergo a process
of learning to be able to readjust their security policies and national objectives in
accordance with the constraints imposed by nuclear weapons. The successful management
of nuclear weapons would ultimately depend on how comprehensive, effective and timely
is this learning process. To be able to better understand this movement along the nuclear
learning curve by the nuclear weapons states it is imperative to understand the concept of
nuclear learning and its various dimensions and manifestations.

Michael Quinlan has highlighted the fact that in the absence of empirical data about
the nature and consequences of a nuclear war we have to depend on untested concepts and
draw inferences about a wide range of possibilities. He also points out that the concepts
related to nuclear warfare though radically different from traditional concepts of war are
not too difficult to comprehend and do not need special expertise in any particular
academic discipline. A large body of literature is now available on the theory of nuclear
deterrence and concepts related to nuclear war fighting, on which nuclear policies can be
based. However, one has to be careful in choosing the appropriate kind of concepts. As
Quinlan cautions, if the choice of concepts is not sound and policies are based on wrong
premises the consequences could be disastrous.26

1.5 Approaches to Nuclear Learning and Nature of Nuclear Learning:

Whether learning is a normative or a non-normative phenomenon has been a

subject of debate among scholars. Some analysts such as Jeffrey Knopf view learning as a
normative process and argue that learning would have taken place only if there is a
‘positive’ outcome. They set a standard of evaluation that will determine that only those
outcomes would be classified as learning, which are in consonance with this value
judgement and anything in dissonance with this standard would not be considered as

Ibid, p. ix.
25
26
Michael Quinlan, ‘Thinking About Nuclear Weapons – Principles, Problems, Prospects’, Oxford
University Press,2009, Oxford, p. 14-15.
 25

learning.27 Others such as Jack Levy have argued, in favour of a ‘value-neutral’ conception
of learning and believe that any change in outlook or the understanding of a person
irrespective of its direction should be considered as learning.28 Levy’s approach represents
the dominant view amongst the social scientists who, believe that, one’s own value system
should not be employed to judge whether any idea is right or wrong. However, Knopf
insists that learning at policy level is ‘inherently a normative concept’ keeping in view the
fact that ultimately its purpose is to help in the achievement of policy objectives.29 There
are still others who take the middle road and argue that irrespective of whether or not these
fit into a value system, lessons learnt, should be seen in terms of their ‘effectiveness’ or
ability to achieve the desired goals.30

Psychologists contend that the process of learning usually progresses from simple
to more complex learning.31 Jeffery Knopf has explained simple learning as “an adjustment
in the means being employed by a state, with no questioning of the ends being sought.”32
Joseph S. Nye has explained ‘simple learning’ as a modification of the means being
employed to achieve a particular objective without any attempt to modify the end itself,
while ‘Complex Learning’ according to him “involves embracing a new understanding of
cause and effect relations that can lead a state to rethink the fundamental goals of policy.”33
Both these formulations relate to changes in the behaviour of states brought about by their
nuclearisation. But the historical experience suggests that these changes do not normally
result from a deliberate intellectual or an academic exercise but are driven home the hard
way after going through crises and conflicts and through a process of trial and error.34

In addition to dividing learning into simple and complex learning Knopf has also
divided ‘nuclear learning’ into two other segments namely ‘factual learning’ which implies

27
Jeffery W. Knopf, ‘The Concept of Nuclear Learning’, Non-proliferation Review No. 19, Vol. 1, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, March 2012.
28
Jack S. Levy, ‘’Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield’, International
Organisation 48, no. 2 (spring 1994) quoted in Knopf op. cit.
29
Knopf, op. cit.
30
Ibid.
31
Robert Jervis, ‘Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics’, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p. 235.
32
Jeffery W. Knopf, The Concept of Nuclear Learning’, Paper presented at ‘A Decade of Nuclear Learning –
Ten Years after India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests’, Conference held at Honolulu, Hawaii February 12-13 2009.
33
Joseph Nye quoted in Knopf op. cit.
34
Cuban Missiles Crisis is one such example after which both Super powers initiated certain arms control
and confidence building measures such as the Washington-Moscow Hotline and the Partial Test Ban Treaty
(PTBT) of 1963.
 26

learning the basic facts related to nuclear weapons and ‘inferential learning’ which entails
understanding of the broader implications on the basis of these facts.35Robert Jervis has
described an aspect of learning, which he terms as ‘productive learning,’ which “involves
the acquisition of certain broad, non-specific, general notions about the properties of the
object or method experienced.”36This concept of ‘productive learning’ appears to be
similar in connotations to what Knopf has described above as ‘factual learning.’ Both these
types of learning should happen in any new nuclear state with the passage of time.

Joseph S. Nye on the other hand has argued that, “states learn by responding to
structural changes in their environment, or, to put it in game theory terms, they adjust their
behaviour to changes in the payoff matrix.’37 He also believes that perceptions of national
interest do not remain constant and can change with changes in domestic power structure,
which could be through an election, military take-over or generational change in
leadership. In his view international learning takes place when “new knowledge is used to
38
redefine the context of national interest.” This raises an interesting point to explore
which has not been studied in any detail before and that relates to Pakistan’s conduct of its
security and foreign policies in the post 1998 period to determine whether it has made
necessary adjustments to its policies to cater for the changes brought about by the
introduction of nuclear weapons in the regional security equation or has failed to do so.

It is also understandable that some form of learning is bound to take place with the
passage of time or with experience which Russell J. Leng calls “experiential learning.”39
This kind of learning can also be described as ‘Learning by doing’ or ‘on the job learning.’
However, it does not imply that only the right kind of lessons would always be learnt.
Wrong lessons learnt from history and irrelevant analogies drawn from the past events
often lead to disastrous consequences. Within the first decade of nuclearisation the two
South Asian neighbours were involved in three serious crises, which raised questions about
the viability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and the ability of the two countries to

35
Knopf, op. cit.
36
Jervis, op. cit. p. 227-8.
37
Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization, Vol.
41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 372, 378.
38
Ibid, p. 379.
39
Russell J. Leng, ‘Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises’, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan
Press, 2000.
 27

prevent or manage such crises in future by learning from the crisis management by other
nuclear states.

Russell Leng has, however, cautioned against depending on experiential learning in

crisis bargaining because in his view the future behaviour cannot be accurately predicted
on the basis of past record.40 Nye has further elaborated this point by citing the example of
the Bay of Pigs crisis of 1961. He is convinced that Khrushchev learnt wrong lessons from
that crisis leading him to believe that Kennedy’s response would be weak in any future
crisis as well. This misperception led him to precipitate the Berlin and Cuban Missile
Crises.41 Robert Jervis on the other hand has pointed out that during the Cuban missile
crisis Kennedy relearnt the lesson, that expert opinion should not be accepted on its face
value, the hard way, by living through this near disaster.42

Nye argues that frequent changes in government officials weaken institutional

memory and the new leaders are forced to reinvent the wheel. This aspect when applied to
the situation in South Asia would make an interesting case study. The three post
nuclearisation crises in South Asia, in fact, indicate that the new leadership may not
necessarily reinvent the wheel and may deal with the crisis by imitating the conduct of
their predecessors. For instance, in Pakistan General Musharraf the Army Chief of Staff at
the time of the Kargil crisis (1999) was not only still the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) but
had also become the chief executive of the country in 2001-02, while on the Indian side the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was in power under Vajpayee’s leadership both during Kargil
and the 2001-02 crises. In the 2008 Mumbai crisis however, leadership had changed on
both sides. On the face of it the leadership in both countries without any first-hand
experience of past crises did not act in ways different from the ones followed by the
leadership in previous crises and appear to have more or less emulated their predecessors.
The issue of institutional memory is also important from the point of view of developing a
sustainable capacity to manage nuclear assets. It will be interesting to explore whether the
continuity in Pakistani nuclear management structures has helped Pakistan create the
institutional memory, that has been appreciated by the Indian strategic analyst Bharat

40
Russell Leng, quoted in Joseph Nye op. cit.
41
Nye, op. cit. pp. 380.
42
Jervis, op. cit, pp. 239.
 28

Karnad who calls upon his leadership to emulate this example and establish a similar
dedicated nuclear cadre.43

In essence learning could either mean recognition of the need to change the
‘means’ employed for the achievement of an ‘end’ or a realisation of the necessity to alter
the end itself. These two variants of learning have been described in different ways by
different analysts. Views of Jeffrey Knopf and Joseph Nye on the issue of simple and
complex learning have already been described in the preceding paras. Others such as Ernst
Haas make a distinction between ‘real or genuine learning’ and simple ‘adaptation’ in
accordance with the changes in the existing environment.44 Such a distinction, however,
would not be easy to make in most practical situations and would generally be subjective
in nature.

Joseph Nye contends that, ‘learning is to develop knowledge by study or

experience’ and that availability of new information brings about changes in existing
beliefs and perceptions. According to Nye, “learning often involves a shift from overly
simple generalisations to complex integrated understandings grounded in realistic attention
to detail.”45Robert Jervis tends to agree with this notion and basing his argument on
research by psychologists, has stated, that learning usually moves from ‘simple’ to more
‘complex’ learning.46 Both these arguments, however, seem to imply, that the process of
learning follows a linear progression from simple learning to complex learning, without
taking into account the possibility that both simple as well as complex learning could also
start simultaneously and progress along parallel paths, though the progress in each case
may not be equal in magnitude. Another aspect of learning that has not received the desired
amount of attention is what could be termed as ‘reverse learning’ or ‘unlearning’ wherein a
state having learnt a useful lesson from historical precedent or its own experience
disregards it subsequently and adopts policies which are contrary to that.

43
Bharat Karnad, “INS: Indian Nuclear Service”, The Asian Age, August 16, 2012. Available at
www.asianage.com/columnists/ins-indian-nuclear-service-094. Also see ‘Deccan Chronicle,’ at
www.deccanchronicle.com/columnists/bharat-karnad/ins-indian-nuclear-service
44
Ernst B. Haas, ‘Where Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations’,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990.
45
Nye, op. cit. p. 378.
46
Robert Jervis, ‘Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics’, Princeton University Press, 1976,
Princeton, New Jersey, p. 235.
 29

Specific to the ‘nuclear’ aspect two types of learning takes place. Firstly, there is
learning about the scientific and technical characteristics of nuclear weapons which Jeffery
Knopf calls ‘factual learning,’47while Robert Jervis has used the term ‘productive
learning’, which according to him, encompasses acquisition of knowledge about some
general characteristics of the object and the methods involved.48 The terms factual and
productive learning in essence denote the same concept. Secondly, there is learning about
the broader implications of nuclear weapons for the security policy of a state which is also
termed as ‘inferential learning’.49 Knopf argues that factual learning is important for both
the public as well as the ruling elites. Educating the populace through media – both print
and electronic - and other means of public education such as academic institutions and
think tanks serves a very useful purpose especially during crises. If the masses are fully
aware of the terrible consequences of a nuclear war they would not put undesirable
pressure on the policy makers to take precipitate decisions in crises situations. On the other
hand it is imperative that the leadership is not only cognisant of the destructive potential of
the nuclear weapons but also has a good grasp of the wider implications of the possession
of nuclear capability by themselves and their adversaries.50 Such understanding will help
the decision makers adjust their security policies accordingly and take unilateral, bilateral
or multilateral measures to enhance strategic stability and avoid policies and actions that
could lead to a nuclear conflagration.

1.6 Levels of Analysis and Nuclear Learning:

Like any other form of learning, nuclear learning also takes place at multiple levels.
Knopf, for instance, has categorised learning from this perspective into five levels namely,
individual learning, institutional/organisational learning, governmental learning, state
learning, and international learning.51 The institutional learning takes place both in the
military and civilian institutions. Civilian institutions here imply the political elites as well
as the civilian bureaucracy. The learning is usually a combination of both factual as well as

47
Knopf, op. cit.
48
Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 227.
49
Knopf, op. cit.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
 30

inferential learning. It can also be ‘simple’ or ‘complex’52 in nature. The concept of

organisational learning is also widely used in the field of business management especially
for evaluating and analysing the performance of large business corporations.53

However, the above classification would be difficult to sustain in many practical

situations where the boundaries between institutional learning and governmental learning
on the one hand and governmental learning and state learning on the other get blurred and
overlap each other. Choice of one or more levels of analysis will depend on the purpose for
which the analysis is being carried out. If, for instance, the objective is to trace the physical
and intellectual developments in a particular state for management of its nuclear
capabilities institutional/organisational level of learning would be more appropriate.
However, if the purpose of analysis is to determine the state of strategic stability or the
ability to manage crises between two rival states, then international learning54would be
more suitable.

Knopf for instance highlighting the significance of international learning explains

that, “If the underlying motivation for asking about nuclear learning is to figure out
whether or not two sides can avoid nuclear war, it may not be the case that nuclear war can
be avoided if only one side learns unilaterally. It will also be important to examine whether
or not the two sides share the same lessons about how to avoid nuclear war.”55Zachary
Davis suggests that there are instances where the two contending parties ended up learning
entirely opposite lessons from the same event.56

Since learning by its very nature is a cognitive process it may not sound logical to
ascribe this trait to abstract and non-thinking entities such as institutions, governments or
states. However, in reality, institutions, governments and states are nothing but a collection
of individuals who can and do learn to varying degrees. The cognitive nature of learning
also makes it difficult to measure the amount or extent of learning with any degree of
precision. To estimate the degree of learning one has to rely mainly on a comparative

52
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization,
Vol.41, NO. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 371-402.
53
Amy C. Edmondson, ‘Strategies for Learning from Failure’, and Francesca Gino & Gary P. Pisano, ‘Why
Leaders Don’t Learn From Success’, Harvard Business Review, April 2011.
54
Knopf, op. cit., also Nye, op. cit. p.378.
55
Ibid.
56
Zachary S. Davis, ‘The India-Pakistan Military Standoff – Crisis and Escalation in South Asia’, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2011, p. 230.
 31

analysis of the behaviour of individuals, performance of institutions or conduct of states

over a certain period of time. To achieve this purpose one has to improvise and develop
certain benchmarks, criteria or performance parameters to act as reference points or
yardsticks for evaluation of the levels of learning. Realistically speaking, however, the
results of such an exercise will at best be estimates, which would be subjective in nature
and would be more or less accurate depending on the rigour of the tools of analysis devised
to measure the degree of learning and the degree of access to primary sources of
information.

In the post 9/11international security environment, a new but very critical factor
has emerged in the form of non-state actors. This factor, however, has not been dealt with,
in the available studies and literature related to nuclear learning. The problem of non-state
actors, though, does not easily fit into any traditional level of analysis framework, and will
have to be reckoned with, as an independent factor. However, it is important to take into
account this factor due to its ability to trump any learning on the part of organisations,
governments or states and to destabilise the strategic balance between two contending
powers. These non-state actors have already precipitated two serious crises between India
and Pakistan57 and their ability to do so again cannot be underestimated because so far the
two states have been unable to agree to any mechanism to insulate their strategic stability
from the actions of non-state actors despite continuing efforts to deal with this menace.

There seems to be no agreement on the issue of levels of analysis and different

scholars have shown preferences for one particular level or the other. Jack Levy has, for
instance, argued in favour of the individual level of analysis,58 while Andrew Bennet and
Amandeep Gill have preferred organisational learning.59 Joseph Nye, while acknowledging
the importance of individual learning considers it an insufficient basis for organisational
learning. He also emphasises the significance of ‘institutional memory’ and ‘procedures’
for organisations since these provide guidelines for both the old hands and the new entrants

57
Terrorists belonging to Lashkar-i-Tayyeba and Jaish-i-Muhammad have been accused of carrying out
attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 and on targets in Mumbai in November 2008 which
created serious military and political crises between India and Pakistan that could only be defused through
diplomatic intervention by the US and other major powers.
58
Levy, Learning and Foreign Policy, op. cit.
59
Andrew Bennett, Çondemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall and Rerise of Soviet – Russian Military
Interventionism, 1973-1996, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1999. Also see Amandeep S. Gill,
‘Nuclear Learning Revisited,’ paper presented at a CISAC social science seminar, Stanford University, June
4, 2009, both quoted in Knopf, The Concept of Nuclear Learning, op. cit.
 32

in the organisation.60 James Rosenau has termed these as ‘pools of habits’.61 Robert Jervis
has also elaborated organisational learning arguing that, “when an event affects the
perceptual predispositions of many members of an organisation, we can speak of
organisational learning.”62 This, however, is a very complex phenomenon, which is not
easy to quantify, because learning amongst individual members of an organisation would
neither be equal, nor in the same direction.

1.7 Learning, Organisation Theory and Bounded Rationality:

Bennet, Gill, Nye and Jervis subscribe to the significance of organisational learning
and Jervis using military organisation as an example has stated that, “Lessons become
working assumptions and form the basis for future planning… they involve not only
strategic and tactical thinking but the conduct of manoeuvres, formal instructions and
standing orders.”63Scott Sagan on the other hand, basing his arguments on the
‘organisational theory’64, has expressed scepticism about the capacity of military
organisations to learn and internalise lessons that would cause them to change their
routines and operating procedures. In his view professional military organisations usually
have rigid routines, professional biases and vested group and sub-group interests, which
could hinder their capacity for nuclear learning required of a rational actor in a nuclear
deterrence environment. Such proclivities on part of the military organisations can lead to
deterrence failure in his view. He also doubts the capacity of military organisations to learn
the right kind of lessons from a given event due to what is termed in organisational theory,
as ‘bounded rationality.’65 Whereas bounded rationality has been explained as under:-

“Like comprehensive rationality, bounded rationality assumes that actors are goal-
oriented, but bounded rationality takes into account the cognitive limitations of
decision makers in attempting to achieve these goals…..The fundamental premise
underlying organisational studies in political science is that behaviour of
organisations mimics the bounded rationality of the actors that inhabit them. This

60
Nye, p. 381.
61
James N. Rosenau, ‘Learning in East-West Relations: The Superpowers as Habit-driven Actors’, Los
Angeles, Institute for Transnational Studies, mimeo, 1986, quoted in Nye, op. cit.
62
Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p. 238.
63
Ibid.
64
Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation, Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons’, International Security, Vol.18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), p. 66-107.
65
Ibid.
 33

correspondence is not simply an analogy among phenomena at different levels; the

relationship is causal…The most important components of the political theory of
organisations were the concepts of limited attention spans, habituation and routine
and organisational identification...” 66

Sagan argues that large organisations – militaries included – focus more on

coordinating actions amongst various units and sub-units for which they devise standing
operating procedures and rules to deal with different situations, at the cost of well-reasoned
decision making.67 It is widely known that militaries are conservative by nature and are
bound by traditions giving rise to the well-worn out cliché that militaries train to fight the
last war. However, what distinguishes conventional and nuclear war strategies is the fact
that right from the outset the theorisation of nuclear strategies has been dominated by
civilian scholars and analysts and nuclear use decisions rest with the political leadership
though the custody of nuclear weapons and delivery systems has remained in the military
domain. Therefore, the organisational and cultural limitations of the military may not
impact nuclear learning in the same way it affects the learning in the conventional sphere.

Sagan’s rather pessimistic assessment is mainly based on his study entitled ‘Limits
of Safety’68 wherein, he has recounted instances, where nuclear accidents actually
happened in the US military, as well as those, which were near misses. He also employs
Charles Perrow’s ‘Normal Accidents Theory’ where Perrow has argued that large
organisations have limited ability to fully understand the complexities of highly technical
systems and that ‘boundedly rational’ organisations are bound to have accidents overtime
due to ‘high interactive complexity’ and ‘tight coupling’ amongst their various
components.69 Since Sagan represents the ‘proliferation pessimists’ and his views that have
been well documented in the form of his classic academic debate with Kenneth Waltz70
should be viewed in that context.

Sagan also believes that ‘new proliferants’ (mainly comprising third world
countries), will undergo a much longer and more difficult transition compared with

66
Bryan D. Jones, ‘Bounded Rationality’, Annual Review of Political Science, 1999.2: 297-321.
67
Sagan, p. 71.
68
Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Limits of Safety – Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons’, Princeton
University Press, 1999, Princeton, New Jersey.
69
Sagan, Perils of Proliferation, p. 94-5.
70
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed’, W.W.
Norton and Company, New York, 2003.
 34

established nuclear powers in achieving a secure retaliatory capability. They would also be
more prone to temptations for preventive war and susceptible to accidental launch of
nuclear weapons because of the dominant role of militaries in many of these countries. In
this context he has given the specific example of Pakistan, where military is known to have
played a dominant role in security policy making, whether related to conventional or
nuclear forces. Waltz however, disagrees with him on this point and believes that new
nuclear powers will do everything to ensure safety and security of their arsenals and will
have strong incentives to avoid accidental nuclear war.71 Waltz’ argument clearly implies
that new nuclear powers will learn by doing as well as through mimicking the experiences
of the more advanced nuclear powers to effectively manage their respective nuclear assets.

Military organisations can however, because of their discipline, intense

socialisation, and strong bonds of esprit de corps fall prey to a phenomenon called ‘Group
Think,’ which is called ‘regimentation’ in the military parlance, that can impair their
judgement and quality of decision making. ‘Group Think’ - a term coined by a social
psychologist Irving Janis in 1972 represents a tendency amongst groups to seek consensus
in an attempt to balance the interests of the individual members with group’s interests. This
convergence of individual and group interests creates a strong bond between the group
members and fortifies the group. Group think is considered to be an important ingredient
of the current social concept of ‘Corporatism.’72Janis’ definition of group-think very aptly
sums up the idea as, “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply
involved in a cohesive group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”73Group think can have
several negative implications such as the tendency to discuss only the few “politically
correct’ alternatives, the solution supported by the majority is seldom revisited to identify
its weaknesses, expert opinion is not sought for fear that it might not conform to the
solution favoured by the group, the collection and analysis of the information is done in a
very selective manner so as to bring up only those pieces of information that conform to

71
Ibid, p. 93.
72
http://www.softpanorama.org/Skeptics/groupthink.shtml
73
Ibid.
 35

the group’s preferred course of action and at times enough thought is not given to
contingency plans.74

1.8 Learning from History and the Effect of Perceptual Dispositions:

Looking at the factors that affect the process of learning the first and foremost is
history, however, its lessons are not always straightforward. The real lessons of history are
deeply ingrained but there is a general tendency to more readily learn the superficial
lessons. More importantly, if one loses sight of the context of historical events and fails to
appreciate the changed circumstances of the present, there is every possibility of drawing
wrong inferences and analogies from history. Robert Jervis has opined that, ‘some events
like wars leave such an impression that equally dramatic developments are required to
displace them.’75 This strong influence of traumatic events makes decision makers
‘insensitive to incoming information,’76 which hampers their ability to identify the
differences between the two situations and leads them to draw and apply inappropriate
analogies to widely differing conditions.77 According to Jervis there is a direct linkage
between the events, lessons learnt from these and the future behaviour of the decision
makers and sometimes this precludes the learning of, what may appear to be very obvious
lessons.

An important factor which affects the ability of any actor to learn the right kind of
lessons from past events is his ‘perceptual disposition’ although it is not easy to objectively
determine how much influence has been exerted by the predispositions on an individual’s
perceptions. However, in case the reading of the past is too obviously inaccurate it is in all
likelihood influenced by the existing predilections of the individual concerned. According
to Jervis, “Decision makers usually fail to strip away from the past event those facets that
depend on the ephemeral context. They often mistake things that are highly specific and
situation bound for more general characteristics because they assume that the most salient
aspects of the results were caused by the most salient aspects of the preceding
situation.”78More importantly, “people pay more attention to what has happened than why

74
Ibid.
75
Jervis, p. 218.
76
Thomson, ‘Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics,’ Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960,
p. 36, quoted in Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions.
77
Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 220.
78
Ibid.
 36

it has happened.”79Joseph Nye while cautioning that the new information can sometimes
be misleading, or can even be wrongly used makes a somewhat similar argument saying
that, “New information affects prior beliefs, but its reception and interpretation are also
affected by those prior beliefs. The extent and accuracy of learning depends upon the
strength of the prior beliefs and quantity and quality of the new information.”80

The studies by psychologists pertaining to the way people receive and convert the
available information into opinions suggest that these opinions are continuously modified
in the light of new information. Psychologists argue that our perceptions are subjective in
nature and are usually at variance with the objective reality. We, therefore, delude
ourselves into seeing what we want to see rather than what exists in reality. Understanding
of this psychological phenomenon is important if we want to understand the decisions
made by the leaders in different situations because it is not the way the situation exists but
the way they perceive it to be, that affects their decision making.81

1.9 Learning from Success:

A very important aspect of learning is the matter of how we look at past events and
classify them as either a success or a failure. An outcome is usually viewed as a success,
when the actor involved is perceived to be better off on balance at the end of it than before.
Once a policy is deemed to be successful there is no incentive for a post-facto analysis of
its pros and cons. No one pauses to think that alternative courses of action might have been
more successful or that it was not the policy per se but a combination of other factors
including sheer good luck that might have contributed to a successful outcome.
Consequently, policies that are seen as having been efficacious would be more readily
repeated in the future sometimes with disastrous outcomes. The other side of the coin is
that, in the absence of a thorough analysis, policies that failed in the past would be
avoided.82 Jervis has very aptly turned around Santayana’s maxim that, “those who forget
the past are condemned to make the same mistakes” into, “those who remember the past
are condemned to make the opposite mistakes.”83 He has also modified the commonly

79
Ibid, p. 228.
80
Jervis, op. cit. p. 379.
81
Robert O. Mathews, et al., ‘International Conflict and Conflict Management,’ Prentice Hall Canada Inc.,
Scarborough, Ontario, 1989, p. 11.
82
Jervis, op. cit. p. 234-5.
83
Ibid, p. 267.
 37

known cliché’ that, ‘nothing succeeds like success’ into “nothing fails like success” to
reinforce his argument.84

In a recent study primarily related to the field of business management, Francesca

Gino and Gary P. Pisano have made a similar argument, in an article with an evocative
title, “Why leaders Don’t Learn From Success” – Failures get a post-mortem, why not
triumphs?85 They argue that success can breed failure by impeding the ability of both
individuals and organisations to learn the appropriate lessons. They point out that
individuals and institutions develop mechanisms for analysing failures with a view to learn
from these, but no one bothers to create the capacity for a similar soul searching in case of
a success. In their view, we have a tendency to assume that our skills and our existing
strategies have resulted in success, without pausing to think that luck, chance and
extraneous factors may have been responsible for this outcome. This proclivity results in
what they call, making “fundamental attribution errors”. Second obstacle to learning in
their opinion is what they term as, “overconfidence bias,” which makes us believe that no
change is required in the scheme of things as they exist now. Third, is what they call, “the
failure to ask why- syndrome,” which prevents a systematic analysis of the reasons behind
good performance.86 They have amplified their arguments by citing the example of Alan
Greenspan who was considered to be the most brilliant Federal Reserve Chairman in the
US History until the economy nearly crashed in 2008. It was evident that Greenspan and
his team had been the victims of the ‘over confidence bias’ and a belief in the infallibility
of their economic models. Such over confidence can afflict organisations, whether civilian
or military, bureaucratic or commercial, resulting in their lack of receptivity to new and
innovative ideas.87 People in leadership positions also develop a tendency to keep away
those who bring in the bad news.

Gino and Pisano have tried to build a simple model of learning, while recognising
the fact, that learning is an extremely ‘complex’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘organisational process.’
They accept the reality that individuals and organisations have concepts, models and rules
of business, that govern their conduct. These precepts are sometimes very refined and

8484
Ibid, p. 278.
85
Francesca Gino and Gary P. Pisano, ‘Why Leaders Don’t Learn From Success – Failures Get a Post-
mortem, Why Not Triumphs? Harvard Business Review, April 2011, p. 68-75.
86
Ibid, p. 69.
87
Ibid, p. 71.
 38

based on logic and long term experience while on other occasions these are superficial and
followed through instinct. They argue that learning is nothing but updating our concepts
and trying to understand why things happen in a particular way and why certain decisions
yield certain types of results. They infer that, “when we succeed, we just focus on applying
what we already know to solving problems. We don’t revise our theories or expand our
knowledge of how our business works,” and go on to advise that, “celebrate success but
examine it…when a win is achieved, the organisation needs to investigate what led to it
with the same rigor and scrutiny it might apply to understanding the causes of failure.”88

Gino and Pisano have also referred to practice by the militaries of systematic
debriefing of each combat mission or training exercise, irrespective of their success or
failure, through what are termed as “after-action reviews” or (AARs) which produce useful
information that can help in improving the future performance. They suggest that Civilian
organisations can emulate the military and adopt similar practices to improve their own
performance. These reviews throw up some fundamental questions such as; what did we
set out to do? What actually happened? Why did it happen? What are we going to do next
time?89 Answers to these questions must be sought by all organisations in order to continue
to succeed.

1.10 Learning from Failure:

On the other side of the spectrum is learning from failure. Amy C. Edmondson
argues that we are taught from very early on that failure is bad and that conviction hinders
learning by organisations from their mistakes.90 There is a general agreement about the
value of learning from mistakes. However, in most cases it is not done in the right spirit
and in the manner it should be done due to the stigma associated with failure. According to
Edmondson, “Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the
blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in
which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised.”91 Due to this fear
failures are not reported and obviously the lessons that could have been learnt, if these
were highlighted, are also not utilised by making necessary course corrections. Again

88
Gino, op. cit., p. 72-3.
89
Ibid, p. 73.
90
Amy C. Edmondson, ‘Strategies for Learning from Failure’, Harvard Business Review, April 2011.
91
Ibid, p. 49.
 39

minor routine failures are bound to occur in large and complex organisations but these
should be addressed in order to avoid systemic failures at some later stage.92

It is even more important to accept and learn from mistakes that are a consequence
of experimentation with new ideas and cutting edge technologies because of the
significance of the information that can be gleaned from those. Such failures have been
called “intelligent failures.”93 It is the responsibility of the leadership to inculcate a culture
of reporting and learning from mistakes and failures within their organisations by
encouraging and rewarding those members of their teams who display the courage to
report failures instead of shooting the messenger that brings the bad news.94 Once the
mistakes are detected or reported, these should, neither be brushed aside, nor should they
be subjected to a superficial investigation. A deeper and wholesome inquiry should be
undertaken, even if our egos are hurt in the process, to be able to discover the root causes
of failure, for the greater good and long term health of the organisation.95

1.11 Brief Overview of Pakistan’s Learning Experience:

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme started in earnest in the mid-1970s after

India had conducted its so called ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in May 1974. As a
consequence the western industrialised world started erecting barriers in the way of
transfer of nuclear technology to would be proliferators. Pakistan, therefore, adopted a
surreptitious approach and espoused an official stance of denial of any military nuclear
programme. This policy of denial of any weapons related activity and insistence on the
peaceful nature of its nuclear research and development programme, helped deflect
international pressure and sanctions. However, the downside of this policy was that issues
related to prospective nuclear doctrine and strategy, command and control and safety and
security could not be discussed in public. This emphasis on secrecy even discouraged in-
house deliberations on these issues in the military as well as civilian institutions. The
nuclear programme was even considered a taboo subject for media and academia. In May
1998 after the multiple nuclear tests, therefore, there was no institutional memory or ‘pool
of habits’ to fall back on and Pakistan was required to learn its nuclear lessons quickly in

92
Ibid.
9393
The term “intelligent failure” has been coined by Duke University Professor of Management, Sim Sitkin.
94
Edmondson, op. cit., p. 51-2.
95
Ibid, p. 54.
 40

order to establish its credentials as a responsible nuclear power. While the specifics of the
nature and extent of nuclear learning in Pakistan will be discussed in detail in the
subsequent chapters of this study, it will suffice here to refer to a few academic works that
have alluded to the subject.

Peter Lavoy has written that, before May 1998, “nuclear weapons had not been
integrated into Pakistani military plans, the armed forces had no nuclear doctrine to speak
of, and command and control over the nuclear arsenal and delivery systems was only
vaguely defined and loosely organised.”96 He also argues that the 9/11 incident, the 2001-
02 military stand-off with India and the revelations of the AQ Khan- proliferation network
while complicating Pakistan’s security environment also hastened the nuclear learning
process in Pakistan.97The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California has recently
published three books two specifically dealing with the first two post nuclear crises in
South Asia which provide an insight into learning from crises while the third deals with
some aspects of nuclear learning in South Asia in the first decade.

The first of these publications focuses on the Kargil Crisis of 1999 and includes
among others at least four chapters related to ‘learning from the crisis.’ Rajesh Basrur and
Hassan Askari Rizvi have outlined the lessons learned by India and Pakistan respectively
from this crisis. Rodney Jones and Joseph McMillan have written about the lessons learned
by the United States from the same crisis. Finally Robert Jervis has tried to extract some
lessons from the Kargil Crisis in the light of classic deterrence and international relations
theory. According to Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan’s response as a state, to the Kargil
crisis, was disjointed and dysfunctional and there was a serious lack of coordination
amongst various organs of the state. In his opinion, Pakistan plunged into the Kargil crisis
because its national security decision makers had not fully absorbed the implications of the
1998 nuclear tests. He goes on to suggest that Pakistan’s conduct during the 2001-2 crisis
was better than 1999, due to the fact, that firstly, President Musharraf had both military

96
Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation’, in Henry D. Sokolski
eds., ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War’, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army, p. 129- 165.
Available at http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
97
Ibid.
 41

and civilian institutions under his control and this unity of command facilitated better
coordination and secondly, the lessons learned during the Kargil crisis came in handy.98

The second book is about the 2001-2002 Crisis,99 and analyses various facets of the
crisis, which resulted in a year-long military standoff between India and Pakistan. The
book contains some very useful lessons and conclusions such as the role of non-state actors
in precipitating a crisis, the potential of military crises to escalate in unexpected ways, the
lack of a common understanding of deterrence dynamics between India and Pakistan, the
explosive potential of the unresolved Kashmir dispute, and the elusive nature of the
concept of learning in international affairs. These lessons could provide valuable insights
to policy makers and guide their actions in avoiding similar crises in future.

The third publication is based on the proceedings of two international conferences

and includes papers by Indian, Pakistani and American scholars on the concept of nuclear
learning, doctrinal developments, command and control and strategic stability. It also
highlights the challenges to nuclear learning in South Asia and contends that while nuclear
learning has taken place in certain areas there is inadequate learning in others such as
escalation dynamics, assessment of each other’s capabilities and security compulsions and
negative repercussions of provocative statements and media hype. It also contends that,
“States learn by doing, and this trial and error approach to nuclear learning appeared
analogous to South Asia’s experience at lower escalation levels. In particular, our research
highlighted the odd utility of Indo-Pak iterative brinksmanship. This approach instigated
lesson learning in both countries as information on red lines and the limits of security
policies were learned through crises.”100

In another context, Robert Jervis has argued that most of the available literature
about crises is based on the US-Soviet interactions or the pre-World War-I crises, which
makes it difficult to relate these to differing strategic environments, different sets of actors
and particular national styles of the nations involved. However, he is convinced that, since

98
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by Pakistan, in Peter R. Lavoy, eds., ‘Asymmetric
Warfare in South Asia – The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict’, Cambridge University Press,
2009, p. 333-352.
99
Zachary S. Davis ed., ‘The India-Pakistan Military Standoff – Crisis and Escalation in South Asia’, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2011.
100
Feroz Hassan Khan and Ryan Jacobs, The Challenges of Nuclear Learning in South Asia, in Feroz Hassan
Khan, Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burke eds., ‘Nuclear Learning in South Asia – The Next Decade,’ Naval Post
Graduate School, Monterey, California, p. 3-15.
 42

the existing theories are not very precise and specific, these can be easily applied to
varying situations. The problem in his view is the lack of available evidence to determine
whether India and Pakistan learnt from the US-Soviet experience and emulated them or
whether the demands of the situation compelled them to behave in a particular manner
without regard to any historical precedence. Though, he contends that India’s behaviour
and indeed much of its rhetoric during the Kargil crisis resembled that of the US during the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.101 He concludes with the observation that, “It would be
difficult but interesting to try to determine how Kargil influenced the crisis in 2002, and to
see if behaviour was more or less dangerous because of it.”102This amply highlights both
the difficulty of evaluating learning as well as the importance of learning for states and
institutions to enable them to act more prudently in future crises.

Michael Wheeler believes that lessons from past events, even from a different
setting, can be usefully applied to present or future situations and argues that the Cuban
missile crisis had a salutary effect on the US and Soviet behaviour and both India and
Pakistan can learn some useful lessons from that and other cold war experiences to
enhance nuclear stability in South Asia.103

Michael Quinlan has emphasised the importance of learning the nuclear jargon
because each of the terms used has a specific concept behind it and therefore, careful use
of language is critical to get the right message across to the other side. 104 He is convinced
that the lessons from the 1999 and 2001-2 crises between India and Pakistan have imposed
caution on them, comparing these crises to the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962.105 He is also of the view that the Pakistani government found the AQ Khan
episode very embarrassing and has since taken requisite measures not only to dismantle
that network but to prevent similar activities in future.106 Quinlan argues that in both India

101
Robert Jervis, “Kargil, Deterrence and International Relations Theory’, in Peter R. Lavoy, eds.,
Ásymmetric Warfare in South Asia, op.cit. p. 377-396.
102
Ibid.
103
Michael O. Wheeler, ‘What was done to achieve Strategic Stability during the Cold War/ Lessons for
South Asia’, in Davis S. Zachary eds., ‘The India-Pakistan Military Standoff – Crisis and Escalation in South
Asia,’ Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, p. 99-126.
104
Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons – Principles Problems, Prospects’, Oxford University
Press, 2009, Oxford, p. 15.
105
Ibid, p. 135.
106
Ibid, p. 137.
 43

and Pakistan ‘strategic communities’ have enhanced their understanding about the
management of their respective capabilities since the nuclear tests in 1998.107

The preceding comments by strategic analysts and experts are mainly related to
learning from crises, development of doctrinal concepts and configuration of nuclear
forces, establishment of command and control systems and strategic stability in South
Asia. However, some critical aspects of learning in the realm of safety and security
mechanisms, export controls and regulatory regimes and nuclear specific legislations have
not been covered. It is also clear that the new nuclear states will not necessarily closely
mimic the example of the established nuclear powers but will try to adapt these to suit their
own peculiar security environments, the roles they envisage for their nuclear forces and
above all the constraints imposed by resources – both technological as well as financial.

It is obvious that nuclear learning has neither been uniform across various
institutions in both civilian and military domains nor amongst the key policy areas that
have been discussed in the study for obvious reasons. The disparity in learning between
civilian and military institutions is a natural corollary of the civil-military imbalance in
Pakistan and the fact that a military dominated government ruled the country during the
formative years of operationalization of the nuclear capability post 1998. Within the major
nuclear policy domains some inequality in learning is discernible mainly for two reasons.
First, it is quite normal that nuclear learning like any other form of learning would not be
equal across the board and there would be some disparity in learning in different policy
areas. Secondly, availability of information in the public domain about developments in
different policy areas is inversely proportional to the sensitivity of those areas.
Consequently, the amount of information available for instance in areas such as the
regulatory and export control regimes would be the greatest, while the evidence of any
progress in safety and security and command and control would be relatively limited and it
would be the least in the realm of nuclear doctrine, especially, in view of the fact that
Pakistan has not formally pronounced its nuclear doctrine. Given the cognitive nature of
learning it would not be appropriate to assign numerical values to describe the degree of
learning in various domains though it may be possible to grade nuclear learning in
different fields as high, medium or low which would represent extensive learning,

107
Ibid, p. 141.
 44

moderate learning or minimal adaptation respectively. However, this classification would

also be subjective in nature and would be dependent on whether the classification is done
on the basis of a value judgment with regards to normative or non-normative nature of
learning or is value neutral.
 45

Chapter-2

A Brief History of Development of Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme

This chapter establishes a linkage between Pakistan’s peculiar historical experience

on its journey to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability and its nuclear learning
since 1998. Pakistan’s progress down the nuclear road was mostly turbulent and riddled
with adversity including economic and military sanctions, a tarnished image and
occasional political isolation. There were also times when the regional and international
security environment epitomised by extraordinary events such as the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan worked to its advantage, providing it a reprieve from politico-diplomatic
pressures and sanctions, thus allowing it some breathing space to consolidate and further
advance its nuclear programme. This traumatic experience and a strong perception of being
a victim of selective application of anti-proliferation laws1 has caused deep scars on
Pakistan’s perceptual dispositions and these predispositions have influenced both the
nature as well as the direction of its subsequent nuclear learning experience.

2.1 Relationship between Pakistan’s Historical Experience and Nuclear Learning:

Pakistan is unique among the nuclear capable states due to the fact that no other
state has had to consistently justify and defend its nuclear programme against all kinds of
insinuations, negative perceptions and concerns about its ability to manage its nuclear
assets. It is also true that no other nuclear state has experienced the kind of turbulent
internal and external security environment and politico-economic instability over a long
period of time as has been the case in Pakistan especially during the last decade. 2 It is,
therefore, imperative to understand the background of the controversies surrounding

1
The 1976 Symington and Glenn Amendments to US Foreign Assistance Act called for imposition of
economic and military sanctions on Non-nuclear states trying to procure Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium
Reprocessing technologies. These were not applicable retroactively, therefore, letting India and Israel off the
hook but were applied against Pakistan in April 1979. Similarly, Pressler Amendment was a Pakistan specific
legislation and was clamped on Pakistan in October 1990. See Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ‘Nuclear
Developments in Pakistan: Future Directions,’ in P.I. Cheema, P.R. Chari et al eds., ‘Nuclear Non-
proliferation in India and Pakistan – South Asian Perspectives,’Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 1996, p.
136-7 and Munir Ahmad Khan, ‘Nuclearization of South Asia and its Regional and Global Implications,’
Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol. 26, No. 4, Autumn 1998.
2
Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig Gen (Ret) Naeem Salik, ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear
Security,’ Arms Control Today, Arms control Association, December 2007. Also see Naeem Salik and
Kenneth N. Luongo, ‘Challenges for Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,’ Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, March 2013.
 46

Pakistan’s nuclear programme in order to get an insight into the mind-set and
predisposition of Pakistani elites which continue to influence the strategic choices they
make and the policy directions they adopt. It is this particular mind set and historic
baggage which largely determines the nature of their nuclear learning at the individual,
institutional or the state level.

An overview of the genesis of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is, therefore,

imperative. It is also important to be cognisant of Pakistan’s historic experience to
understand the causes of a deep seated national perception of being meted out a less than
fair treatment with regard to its nuclear programme by the West in particular and the wider
international community in general.3 This predisposition has significantly influenced
Pakistan’s later policies and attitudes that betray a kind of xenophobia when it comes to the
national nuclear programme and policy. The difficulties Pakistan had to encounter, the
sanctions and politico-diplomatic pressures it had to endure, and the sacrifices the nation
had to make in terms of opportunity costs en-route to attainment of nuclear capability, have
bestowed upon the nuclear weapons the status of the most valued national possession.

In a politically fragmented nation the nuclear programme is probably the only

issue that enjoys widespread public support which extends across the political spectrum
and various strata of the society. This factor alone brings to bear pressures on the policy
makers that constrain their ability to bring any flexibility or change in the nuclear policy.
This has also delineated the course for nuclear learning within certain bounds and
parameters.

2.2 Background:

It has been more than a decade since Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests in
May 1998, overtly demonstrating its nuclear capability and confirming its status as a de-
facto Nuclear Weapons Capable State.4 Long before this fateful event Pakistan was known

3
This is a recurring theme in many Pakistani writings. See for example, Pervez Musharraf, ‘In The Line of
Fire,’ Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, p. 285-88; Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Pakistan as a Nuclear State,’
and Munir Akram, ‘Reversing Strategic Shrinkage,’ in Maleeha Lodhi eds., ‘Pakistan – Beyond the Crisis
State,’ Hurst & Company, London, 2011, p. 270-71 & 298-99 respectively; Abdul Sattar, ‘Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy 1947-2005,’ Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 149; Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, op. cit.,
p. 136-7. Also see Munir Ahmad Khan, op. cit.
4
The term ‘Nuclear Weapons Capable State’ has been advisedly used instead of ‘Nuclear Weapons State’
due to the fact that the former denotes the five recognised nuclear states according to the NPT statutes.
 47

to possess the necessary technological where-withal to fabricate nuclear weapons and had
also been pursuing development of delivery systems based on aircraft and land based
ballistic missiles.5 Though its pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities and the technological
advances it had made were generally known to the international community, Pakistan’s
official position like that of India was to deny the existence of a military nuclear
programme. While India preferred to call its nuclear test of May 1974 as a ‘Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion’ (PNE)6 and insisted on the peaceful intent of its nuclear programme,
Pakistan found it expedient to deny the pursuit of any nuclear weapons related activity
which enabled Presidents Reagan and George Bush to certify to the Congress until October
1990, that Pakistan had not produced any nuclear device, to allow the uninterrupted flow
of military and economic assistance to Pakistan.7 Despite these declarations of peaceful
intent the international community was far from convinced. Sir Michael Quinlan very aptly
remarked on this thinly veiled secret which was ultimately unveiled in May 1998 saying
that: … “India and Pakistan….emerged from their half concealed closets and made
themselves known openly as possessors of nuclear weapons”.8…

Pakistan’s nuclear programme has always been viewed by the outside world with
suspicion and has been at the centre of one controversy after another. Such has been the
intensity of concerns that the words ‘Nuclear’ and ‘Pakistan’ coming together send alarm
bells ringing around the world. Pakistan like India and Israel had opted to stay out of the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that came into force in 1970 and had kept its
options open. The decision not to accede to the NPT was influenced mainly by the Indian
decision not to join the treaty, though Pakistan also had some legitimate concerns about the
equivocation of the security assurances offered by the five recognised Nuclear Weapon

5
Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb,’ Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 2012, p. 234.
6
Amitabh Mattoo, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy in an Anarchic World’, in Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India’s Nuclear
Deterrent, Pokhran II and Beyond’, New Delhi, Har Anand Publications, 1999, p.17.
7
The Pakistan-specific Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act passed by the US Congress in the
mid-1980s required the US President to render a yearly certificate that in his judgement Pakistan was not in
possession of a nuclear device. Presidents Reagan and Bush provided this certification until October 1990
when refusal of President Bush to provide the certification led to the invocation of Pressler Law and
economic and military sanctions against Pakistan.
8
Michael Quinlan, ‘India-Pakistan Deterrence Revisited’, Survival, Vol. 47. No. 3, Autum 2005, IISS,
London, p.
 48

States (NWS) to the non-Nuclear Weapon States.9 India, on its part cited the Chinese
decision to stay out of the treaty as well as the serious imbalance between the rights and
obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear states parties to the treaty, as the justification for
its refusal to join the treaty.10

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 recognises the principle of
free consent for states to decide whether they want to join a treaty or stay out of it 11 and
India, Pakistan and Israel had exercised their sovereign right not to accede to the NPT and
had thus not made any international commitment to give up their right to develop nuclear
weapons unlike Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea. However, Pakistan’s decision to seek a
nuclear weapons capability was at cross purposes with the non-proliferation objectives of
the major global powers and was seen as an infringement upon the existing international
norms against further nuclear proliferation.

2.3 Why Pakistani Nuclear Programme Became Controversial?

A major cause for controversies surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear programme has

been its characterisation as the ‘Islamic Bomb.’ Most Western observers cite late Pakistani
Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto’s statement in which he had lamented the fact that all
civilisations in the world i.e. the Christian, the Jewish, the Hindu and even the Communists
had the nuclear capability except the Muslim civilisation. Pakistanis on their part
frequently complain12 of provocative titles such as Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb – Nuclear
Threat to Israel and the Middle East used by Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney for
their 1981 publication13 and a BBC documentary with the same title telecast in 1980.
However, in reality Pakistanis themselves have also described their nuclear capability in

9
B.M. Kaushik & D.N. Mehrotra, Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb, Sopan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, p.
48-50. Also see Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1969, p.
153.
10
For Indian views on NPT see, K. Subrahmanyam, in Marwah& Schulz eds., Nuclear Proliferation and the
Near Nuclear Countries, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Mass, 1975, p. 127 and M. Rasgotra,
‘Non-proliferation Issues: The South Asian Context,’ Strategic Studies, Vol. XI, No. 1, Summer & Autumn
1987, ISS, Islamabad, p. 82-86. Also see The Asian Age, New Delhi, 21 May 1998.
11
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
12
President Pervez Musharraf for instance seems to be convinced that Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998
invoked much stronger condemnation by the world ‘surely because Pakistan was the first Muslim state to go
nuclear’ adding that he finds the description of Pakistan’s bomb as an Islamic Bomb as ‘pejorative’ and
offensive and racist in essence. See Pervez Musharraf op. cit., p. 285-88.
13
Steve Weissman& Herbert Krosney, ‘The Islamic Bomb, The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle
East’, Times Books, New York, 1981.
 49

similar terms. For instance, the biography of Dr A Q Khan written by a Pakistani journalist
Zahid Malik, was entitled Dr A Q Khan and the Islamic Bomb. Similarly, supporters of
Islamist political parties have been seen carrying mock missile models with the
inscriptions of the Islamic Bomb during public demonstrations in the wake of 1998 tests
and on some other occasions. Nor do they complain when someone describes their country
as the only Muslim nation in the world with a nuclear capability. Even President Zia-ul-
Haq, who was otherwise very cautious and discreet while talking about nuclear issues,
during an interview with a Jeddah based Saudi newspaper in July 1978, stated that, “No
Muslim country has any atomic arms. If Pakistan possesses such a weapon it would
reinforce the power of the Muslim World.”14 It is however, difficult to ascertain whether
Zia deliberately made this statement as part of a strategy either to send some signal to the
West or to gain sympathies of the Muslim world. Though, he later dissociated himself
from the statement.

The US government took note of his remarks but decided at the time not to react
and waited for an opportune moment to use his remarks to justify the French decision to
cancel the reprocessing agreement as well as its own concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear
ambitions.15 Such characterisations, especially the ones linking Pakistani nuclear
programme with Israel’s security, created unnecessary concerns and hostility amongst the
pro-Israeli lobbies in the US. These lobbies then actively engaged in negative propaganda
and used their influence in the US Congress for initiation of punitive measures against
Pakistan. The US government officials were also catching the Islamic bomb fever as is
evident from comments in a secret ‘Interagency Working Group Paper’ pointing at, “the
long term risk that Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear capability may assist other West
Asian and North African states to acquire nuclear weapons.”16 It also ominously stated
with Israel in mind that, “the ‘Islamic Bomb’ aspect of this case could lead to a direct
threat to US national interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.”17

14
‘Nuclear Reprocessing’, Telegram 7624 dated 6 August 1978, from American Embassy, Islamabad to
Department of State.
15
Ibid.
16
Interagency Working Group Paper, ‘South Asian Nuclear and Security Problems: Analysis of Possible
Elements in a US Strategy’. Available at [email protected].
17
Ibid.
 50

The second reason for controversy was Pakistan’s unconventional approach to the
acquisition of nuclear capability. This approach was forced upon Pakistan by the
circumstances. Countries like India were able to procure complete fuel cycle facilities
without any hindrance from the industrially developed countries before the NPT came into
force and well before the institution of any export control regime. However, when Pakistan
embarked on its nuclear weapons programme the environment had changed with the entry
into force of the NPT. To add to its difficulties the Indian nuclear test in May 1974, not
only vitiated the India-Pakistan relations, which were on the mend after the Simla
Agreement,18 but also led the industrialised countries to establish an increasingly
restrictive export controls regime. Pakistan had to navigate its way through and around this
regime, making use of the loopholes which were still unplugged. The race between the
supplier countries’ attempts to close all the avenues and Pakistan’s efforts to exploit
whatever openings were available brought Pakistan on the wrong side of the non-
proliferation regime. Pakistan imported most of the technology part by part through trading
companies and middlemen. These imports were legitimate19 as long as these items were
not placed on export control trigger lists. As pointed out by Feroz Hassan Khan,
“Pakistan’s strategy was to keep its procurement activities within the limits of commercial
law of the country, and if necessary, operate within the legal grey areas.”20 Nevertheless,
such acquisitions were politically unacceptable to the West and turned Pakistan into a
virtual pariah state. Thirdly, there was a general perception that in South Asia the India-
Pakistan relationship was more unstable than the US-Soviet relationship due to geographic
proximity and history of prior wars between the two countries.

The negative perceptions about Pakistan’s nuclear programme and doubts

concerning its ability to maintain an effective stewardship of its nuclear assets continue to
persist to this day. A significant portion of the blame in this regard, must however, be
shared by Pakistan’s officialdom as well as its intelligentsia. In contrast to India, which
asserted its sovereign right to have access to nuclear technology, skilfully using the
Chinese nuclear threat as a justification for its own nuclear endeavours, Pakistan simply

18
Simla Agreement was signed between Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi at Simla in India on 02 July 1972 leading to reciprocal vacation of captured territories
by either side and the repatriation of Pakistani Prisoners of War. It also laid down a road map for
improvement of relations in various fields. http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/simla.html
19
David Albright, ‘Peddling Peril’, New York, Free Press, 2010, p. 35.
20
Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Eating Grass’, op.cit. p. 126-7.
 51

hedged behind India. It neither asserted its sovereign rights nor did it try to construct a
rationale for its nuclear capability in terms of its own security dilemma. Pakistani
contribution to published literature on South Asian nuclear issues has been insignificant
and only a few books have so far been written by Pakistani experts providing a Pakistani
perspective on the subject.21Many of the articles written by Pakistani scholars on the
subject have been published in Pakistani journals with modest circulation and limited
access to international researchers. Unfortunately, such writings are almost exclusively in
English language and have thus not even impacted the domestic discourse nor have they
contributed towards public education because of high illiteracy rates and limited to non-
existent English language skills of the common man.

2.4 The Chronology of the Programme:

History of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is usually divided into three segments.

The first phase beginning in 1954 and ending in 1974 can be characterised as the peaceful
development phase, the second starting in 1974 and ending in 1998 as the development of
nuclear weapons option and third commencing in 1998 and continuing to-date as the
operationalization/consolidation phase. The second phase was also predominantly a covert
or secret phase. However, one can argue with some justification, that, the second phase
actually started in 1972, after Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had authorised the
creation of a nuclear weapons option in January 1972. Since, little information was
available in the public domain about the developments in the intervening period between
the decision to develop a nuclear option in January 1972 and the Indian nuclear test in May
1974, the latter date was usually taken as the starting point of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
option. However, now with the availability of relevant information22 about the
developments in that period we know that it saw the transformation of the nature of
Pakistan’s nuclear programme from a peaceful endeavour to a weapons oriented

21
See for example, Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, Oxford University Press, Pakistan,
2002; NaeemSalik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Karachi, Oxford University Press,
2009; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, India’s Nuclear Strategy, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2010 and Feroz
Hassan Khan, Eating Grass – The Making of the Pakistani Nuclear Bomb, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 2013.
22
This information is available in the forms of speeches and interviews by prominent nuclear scientists such
as Munir Ahmad Khan and Samar Mubarakmand, which provide an insight into the developments which had
taken place during that period largely away from the limelight.
 52

programme based on a clearly laid out road map. The ending of the early phase and the
beginning of the second phase have, therefore, been adjusted accordingly.

2.5 The Early Phase: 1954 – 1972:

Pakistan was a relatively late entrant into the nuclear field. India had started the
spadework in this field in 1944, well before its independence in 1947, by initiating the
training of scientists and technicians at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in
Science and Technology23 largely due to a personal initiative by Dr Homi Bhabha. The
British Indian officialdom had nothing to do with it and it was a purely non-governmental
and private initiative. Consequently, this initial groundwork helped India establish its
Atomic Energy Commission in 1948 not long after its independence under the
Chairmanship of Dr Bhabha. Pakistan, initially, did not evince any interest in nuclear
technology and it was only in 1954, when a touring exhibition under the auspices of
President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Programme came to Pakistan, that some interest
was generated in the applications of nuclear technology. Consequently, a 12 member
Atomic Energy Committee tasked with the preparation of plans for the promotion of
peaceful uses of atomic energy in Pakistan was established in 1955. On the
recommendation of the committee the government set up a high powered ‘Atomic Energy
Council’ in March 1956. The Council had a Governing body comprising two Federal
Ministers, two federal government secretaries and Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission. The second component of the Council was a rather modest ‘Atomic Energy
Commission’ with six scientists under the Chairmanship of Dr Nazir Ahmad. The third
component was an ‘Advisory Committee’ consisting of thirty scientists, doctors,
industrialists, agriculturists and educationists.24

The Council was tasked to undertake planning for utilisation of peaceful potential
of nuclear energy, involving a wide range of activities like exploration, acquisition and
disposal of radioactive materials, setting up of research institutions, installation of research
and power reactors, and negotiation of agreements for cooperation with international
nuclear agencies. It also had to develop applications of radioisotopes for agriculture,

23
SIPRI Yearbook, 1975, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 17. Also see K. Subrahmanyam,
‘India’s Nuclear Policy’ in Onkar Marwah& Ann Schulz, eds., Nuclear Proliferation and Near Nuclear
Countries, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975, p. 141.
24
Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development, New York, Croom Helm, 1987.P.53.
 53

industry and medicine. However, despite this broad mandate the funding for the nuclear
programme was meagre and the amount allocated for the fiscal year 1956-57 amounted to
2.5 million Pakistani Rupees (which amounted to 0.5 million US dollars), which was
doubled for the next financial year. The total allocation during the period of the First Five
Year Plan i.e. 1956-60 was 23.5 million Pak Rupees.25 The execution of the plan was also
impeded by the non-availability of scientific and technical manpower and the absence of
requisite training facilities in the country. Arrangements were therefore made to send a
large number of scientists for training in specialised disciplines in US, UK, France and
Canada. At the same time the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) finalised its
plans in 1957 to acquire a 5 MW research reactor from the United States. It was hoped that
the reactor would become operational by 1960 but due to lack of interest on part of the
national leadership and bureaucratic impediments including active opposition by the
Finance minister and the Planning Commission,26 the reactor became functional only in
1965.27

To the good fortune of the PAEC, a young, enthusiastic and western educated Z. A.
Bhutto was inducted as the Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources in President
Ayub’s cabinet in 1958. The atomic energy programme was also part of his portfolio. He
tried his best to give some stimulus to the programme as he was later to claim from his
death cell that:

“I have been actively associated with the nuclear programme of Pakistan from
October 1958 to July 1977, a span of nineteen years…..when I took charge of
Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission it was no more than a sign board of an
office. It was only a name. Assiduously and with granite determination, I put
my entire vitality behind the task of acquiring nuclear capability for my
country…I negotiated the agreement for the 5 MW research reactor located in
PINSTECH. In the teeth of opposition from Finance Minister Shoaib and
Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Said Hassan, I negotiated with
success to obtain from Canada the 137 MW Karachi nuclear power plant.”28

25
P. B. Sinha & R.R. Subrahmaniam, Nuclear Pakistan- Atomic Threat to South Asia, Vision Books, New
Delhi, 1980, p. 30.
26
Shahid-ur-Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, Print Wise Publications, Islamabad, 1999, p. 20-21.
27
Ashok Kapur, op. cit.
28
Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, p.137.
 54

Mr Bhutto’s key role in Pakistan’s nuclear development is undisputed. He was the

only Cabinet Minister in the Ayub government who was keeping a watchful eye on the
nuclear developments taking place in India. Bhutto took a serious note of the inauguration
of a plutonium reprocessing plant by the Indian Prime Minister Shastri in April 1964. He
urged President Ayub Khan to get a similar plant, which the French were willing to supply
at the time, but his request to the President for sanctioning a sum of 300 million rupees was
turned down because it was deemed to be beyond Pakistan’s economic capacity.29 Even the
military showed no interest in the nuclear programme at the time, since it was part of the
US led military alliances such as SEATO and CENTO and had received substantial
quantities of US military equipment. Pakistani military considered themselves to be well
trained and better equipped than the Indian military and were confident that they could deal
with any Indian threat with their superior conventional weaponry. The military’s
confidence had been boosted after the poor showing by the Indian Army, in the latter’s
border conflict with China in 1962. Bhutto, nevertheless, made a historic and widely
quoted statement in 1965 saying that, “If India makes an atomic bomb then we will also do
so, even if we have to eat grass or go hungry, an atom bomb can only be answered by an
atom bomb.”30According to former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, Bhutto’s rhetoric was,
however, not matched by practical steps. President Ayub, himself, was not enamoured by
the idea, despite the fact, that at the time nuclear technology was easily available,
safeguards were lax and there were no export controls.31

Meanwhile, Dr Ishrat Usmani, a former member of the Indian Civil Service and a
Physicist trained at the Imperial College of Science and Technology at London, had taken
over as the Chairman of the PAEC. Usmani, with his bureaucratic background, was much
better qualified to chalk out and implement plans for developing the nuclear infrastructure
in Pakistan as compared to his predecessor. With valuable help from Dr Abdus Salam,
Chief Scientific Advisor to the President, a renowned Physicist and future Nobel Laureate
and political support from Z.A. Bhutto, Usmani strongly advocated the case for
development of nuclear energy. He justified the need for nuclear power highlighting the
limited hydro-electric power potential and fossil fuel reserves in Pakistan. His lasting

29
Sinha, op. cit., p. 34-5.
30
Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005 – A Concise History, Oxford University Press, 2007,
Karachi, p. 144
31
Ibid, p. 145.
 55

contribution however, was the training of the scientific and technical manpower. He
arranged to send a large number of scientists and engineers for advanced training abroad
and also developed indigenous training facilities by setting up Pakistan Institute of Science
and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad. He established two research centres, one
each in West and East Pakistan for research related to applications of radioisotopes in
agriculture and food preservation, besides establishing eight nuclear medical centres.
Usmani was a strong protagonist of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was opposed
to the development of nuclear weapons capability.32

Though the September 1965 war with India ended in a stalemate, the Pakistani
leadership realised that it might well have lost the last opportunity to militarily wrest
Kashmir from India. On the other hand, India had embarked on a massive rearmament and
military expansion programme in the aftermath of the 1962 war with China and that effort
was now nearing fruition. Pakistan’s delusion that its allies will come to its assistance in
the event of a conflict with India, was effectively dispelled when the US, instead of helping
Pakistan during the war, had put an embargo on the military supplies and even withheld
vital spare parts. A growing feeling of vulnerability started emerging in Pakistan. In this
backdrop, Mr Bhutto visited Vienna in October 1965, where he met Munir Ahmad Khan, a
Pakistani nuclear engineer working at the IAEA as the head of its nuclear power and
reactors division. Munir gave Bhutto an assessment of India’s nuclear programme, based
on his personal knowledge gained during a visit to India’s main nuclear complex at
Trombay in 1964. He pointed out, that India had already built all the necessary facilities,
which are essential for a nuclear weapons programme and pleaded that Pakistan needed a
nuclear deterrent of its own for its survival.33Munir’s assessment reinforced Bhutto’s own
opinion about India’s nuclear ambitions. On Bhutto’s enquiry whether he had ever shared
this information with President Ayub, he learnt that Munir had never met the President.
Consequently, Bhutto set up a meeting between the President and Munir Khan at London
in December 1965, where the latter briefed Ayub Khan. Munir also informed the Pakistani
President that at the time there were no restrictions on the acquisition of nuclear
technology and that India was accumulating whatever it could procure. He further

32
Ashok Kapur, op. cit. p. 53, and Dr Samar Mubarakmand, ‘A Science Odyssey’, Speech delivered on
November 30, 1998 at Khwarzimic Society, Punjab University, Lahore.
33
Munir Ahmad Khan, Speech Delivered on March 20, 1999 on the occasion of Chaghai Medal Award
Ceremony at PINSTECH, Islamabad.
 56

explained that the technology was not very expensive and all the essential facilities could
be purchased for merely $ 150 million. At the end of all this, Ayub said that, Pakistan is
too poor to afford such an expense and naively added that if ever we need the bomb we
will buy it off the shelf from one of our friends. When Munir briefed Bhutto about his
meeting with the President, he was disappointed but remarked that, “don’t worry our time
will come.”34Munir later lamented those lost years and windows of opportunity available
in the pre-NPT era for unrestricted acquisition of nuclear technology that were
subsequently closed.35

By 1968 Pakistani engineers and technicians had returned from Canada after
completion of their training and participated in the construction of the Karachi Nuclear
Power Plant (KANUPP) alongside the Canadian experts. The plant became operational in
1971 and was formally inaugurated by then President Bhutto and linked with the national
power grid in 1972.36

2.6 Development of the Nuclear Weapons Option: 1972-1998:

On 20th of January 1972, barely a month after assuming power, Bhutto convened a
conference of nuclear scientists in Multan to discuss the possibility of initiating a nuclear
weapons programme.37 This was a very sensitive national security issue and in normal
circumstances should have been discussed behind closed doors in a secure building, but
living up to his populist style of leadership, Bhutto held this meeting under canvas in the
lawn of the house of one of his party leaders. After an animated discussion most of the
scientists, especially the younger ones, strongly supported the idea and Bhutto got a pledge
from them that they will produce the bomb within 5 years. Bhutto on his part promised to
provide all the necessary funds and administrative support. He also announced the setting
up of a new Ministry of Science and Technology and Dr Usmani was, on the spur of the
moment, appointed as Secretary of the new Ministry. He was, thus, eased out of his
position as the PAEC Chairman, ostensibly due to his opposition to the weapons option,

34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Samar, op.cit. Also see Jozef Goldblat and Peter Lomas, ‘The Threshold Countries and the future of the
non-proliferation regime,’ in John Simpson, ed., Nuclear Non-proliferation – An Agenda for the 1990s,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p.309.
37
Bashir-ud-din Mahmood, Interview with Waqt TV on 23 July 2009; also see Samar Mubarakmand speech
at Khwarzimic Society and Munir Ahmad Khan speech at PINSTECH; BBC Panorama documentary entitled
‘The Islamic Bomb’ aired in 1980.
 57

and Munir Ahmad Khan, also present on the occasion, was appointed Chairman of the
PAEC, a position he was to hold until 1991.38

In hindsight, the promise of producing the bomb in 5 years was an unrealistic and
tall claim, in view of the fact, that Pakistan lacked the critical nuclear infrastructure needed
for a weapons programme. Pakistan at the time only had a 5 MW research reactor at
PINSTECH near Islamabad and a 137 MW nuclear power plant at Karachi, both of which
were under international safeguards. It lacked even the basic facilities such as those
required for processing of uranium and its conversion into uranium oxide and then into
fuel elements. It neither had a plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant, nor a
uranium enrichment facility, which are essential requirements for the production of fissile
material. There was no gasification plant (the plant where uranium is converted into
uranium hexafluoride gas as feedstock for enrichment) or a solidification plant (where
enriched uranium hexafluoride gas is turned back into solid form). There were no teams of
specialists to design weapons or produce special explosive lenses. Neither were there any
diagnostic experts nor were there any test sites. There were no manufacturing facilities
either, for the production of special metals and sophisticated components used in fissile
material production facilities and nuclear devices. The biggest problem however, was the
shortage of trained manpower, since half of the trained manpower had been lost after East
Pakistan became Bangladesh 1971. The total manpower trained in various disciplines now
available comprised 283 personnel.39 The overambitious goal of production of a nuclear
bomb in five years may explain Prime Minister Bhutto’s later frustration with the PAEC,
because he ostensibly wanted to use the achievement of nuclear capability to facilitate his
re-election bid. Failure of the PAEC to deliver the bomb in five years was later exploited
by A Q Khan who convinced Bhutto that PAEC was too bureaucratic and was neither
sincere nor capable of producing quick results. Whereas, given a free hand, he can achieve
much better results. Consequently, he was made the Director of the Uranium enrichment
project and made autonomous of the PAEC with complete financial and administrative
powers.

38
Ibid; The author got a first-hand account of the Multan meeting from well-known Pakistani journalist
Khalid Hassan who was one of the participants of the meeting in his capacity as Press Secretary to the Prime
Minister during an interview with him at Washington, D.C. in March 2006.
39
Munir, speech at PINSTECH, op. cit.
 58

Munir Ahmad Khan, the PAEC Chairman, on his part, wanted to move
systematically to lay a solid foundation for the programme and started with a survey of the
available facilities and industrial infrastructure in Pakistan. He then prepared a road map to
achieve a complete nuclear fuel cycle capability, which was essential for a sustainable
nuclear programme. PAEC was able to prepare a comprehensive nuclear development plan
within two months of the Multan Conference. The Chairman PAEC himself presented the
plan to the Prime Minister and it was approved within hours.40 According to Munir, the
Prime Minister directed Finance Minister Dr. Mobashar Hassan to abolish all committees
dealing with the nuclear programme and instructed him to instantly release funds as and
when required and asked for by PAEC Chairman. Since Bhutto had assumed personal
control of the nuclear programme, the Chairman PAEC had direct access to the Prime
Minister without any intervening bureaucratic channels.41 The relationship between Bhutto
and Munir was similar to the one that had developed between Prime Minister Nehru and
the founding father of the Indian nuclear programme Homi Bhabha. Bhabha also had direct
access to Nehru, could bypass bureaucratic channels and obtain approvals for his projects
without any hindrance or delay.42 After getting the approval of its proposed development
plan from the Prime Minister the PAEC promptly established a procurement network and
deputed S.A. Butt, a scientist, to the Pakistani embassy at Brussels and later to the Paris
mission to supervise this effort. The procurement operation was very successful and many
critical technologies and materials which were not subject to export controls at the time
were acquired from European suppliers. However, major plants and manufacturing
facilities could only be imported through government to government agreements. Pakistan,
therefore, entered into negotiations with France in 1973 for the purchase of a reprocessing
plant.

After protracted negotiations over the safeguards arrangements a formal tripartite

agreement was signed between France, Pakistan and the IAEA in 1976. The agreement
was duly approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.43 This agreement would however,
become a contentious issue between United States and Pakistan on the one hand and

40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Naeem Salik, Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2009, p. 15.
43
Charles K. Ebinger, Pakistan Energy Planning in a Strategic Vortex’, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, 1981, p. 93. Ebinger considers the tri-lateral safeguards agreement concluded between IAEA,
France and Pakistan as the toughest ever negotiated. (See p.104).
 59

United States and France on the other, until the French government decided to renege on
the agreement in 1978. According to former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, Pakistan had
by then paid over 100 million dollars to France which were partially compensated by
France many years later.44 His account is confirmed by a statement issued by Pakistan’s
Foreign Office Spokesman that, France had agreed to pay $118 million to Pakistan during
the visit to France by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif scheduled for 15-19 January
1992,45 fourteen years after France had unilaterally abrogated the agreement.

On 18th of May 1974, India had stunned the world by conducting a nuclear
explosion, which it preferred to call a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) at the time,
though Raja Ramanna, who led the team of scientists which conducted the underground
test, acknowledged in 1996 that it was indeed a weapon’s test.46 As a result there was a
realisation amongst the advanced industrialised countries that nuclear technology shared
with developing countries for peaceful purposes, could be exploited for the pursuit of a
nuclear weapons programme. The international reaction to the Indian explosion was rather
mild especially on the part of the US and the Soviet Union, both of whom feared that any
harsh response by either of them would push India into the lap of the other super power.
Henry Kissinger thought it was futile to fight a fait accompli.47 Kissinger has been quoted
to have told his Canadian counterpart Mitchell Sharp that, “we didn’t see much purpose in
making abig issue out of an accomplished fact.”48 Referring to the poor safeguards on the
Canadian supplied research reactor ‘CIRUS’ and lack of safeguards on the US supplied
heavy water for this reactor, Kissinger remarked that, “Canada’s safeguards were lousy,
but so were ours.” 49This clearly demonstrates the attitude of the US and its allies that India
was already out of the barn, but Pakistan could still be prevented from doing so.
Consequently, international non-proliferation effort was mainly focused on Pakistan. This
was a major setback for the fledgling Pakistani programme as it had to face the fall out of
the Indian action. According to former PAEC Chairman Munir Khan, it was conveyed to

44
Sattar, op. cit., p. 149.
45
“Pakistan Says France Will Pay $ 118 Million for Supply Breach,” Nucleonics Week, 16 January 1992; in
NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, 16 January 1992, http://www.nti.org. Accessed on 05 February 2014.
46
Amitabh Mattoo, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy in an Anarchic World’, in Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India’s
Nuclear Deterrent – Pokhran-II and Beyond, New Delhi: HarAnand Publications, 1999, p. 17.
47
Abdul Sattar, op. cit. p.146.
48
William Burr, ‘The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group 1974-76: Nuclear
Nonproliferation through Export Regulations’. Paper presented at a conference at ETH Zurich in June 2010.
49
Ibid.
 60

Pakistan that, “India could not be denuclearised because what had been learnt, could not be
unlearnt. It was also told that if India had done something awful, it was now the moral duty
of Pakistan to stay away from following suit.”50 He also complains that when Pakistan
brought up the matter of the Indian nuclear test before IAEA’s Board of Governors on 8
June 1974 only a few countries criticised India and at the end of the debate the Pakistani
delegate was told by a senior IAEA official that, “Even though it was India which had
carried out the nuclear explosion, it would be Pakistan which would be punished for
that.”51

The Indian test also brought about a change in the American leadership’s approach
towards nuclear non-proliferation. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who hither-to-
fore had been dismissive of the NPT, began worrying about further proliferation of nuclear
capabilities. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the state
department officials were able to convince Kissinger that the countries, which were
determined to acquire nuclear weapons capability, still lacked the requisite technologies.52
There was a realisation that it was impossible to prevent a determined country from
ultimately attaining the nuclear capability. However, measures could be taken to make its
task as difficult as possible and thus retard its progress. With this objective in mind,
Washington sought to harness the support of not only its allies but adversaries as well.
Consequently, during 1974-5, the US initiated an intense diplomatic campaign involving
advanced industrialised countries such as Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the Soviet
Union. This effort culminated in the formation of the nuclear export control ‘cartel’
initially called the London Suppliers Club and later renamed as the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG).53 It was no mean achievement to harmonise non-proliferation concerns with
the commercial interests of major exporters of nuclear technology such as Germany and
France. France presented a bigger challenge as compared to Germany, since at that time it
was not a state party to the NPT. Since it was not an NPT member it also could not be a
member of the Zangger Committee and therefore, did not subscribe to export control

50
Munir Ahmad Khan, “Nuclearisation of South Asia and its Regional and Global Implications,” Regional
Studies, Islamabad, Vol. 26, No. 4, Autumn, 1998.
51
Ibid.
52
Burr, op. cit.
53
Ibid.
 61

trigger list of the Committee.54 France was then negotiating the supply of reprocessing
plants to South Korea and Pakistan, while Germany was discussing a major nuclear deal
with Brazil which was also a non-NPT state at the time.

The United States well aware of the adversarial nature of the India-Pakistan
relationship could anticipate the Pakistani reaction to the Indian nuclear test and tried to
dissuade Pakistan from going nuclear. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistani Prime Minister
had clearly articulated the linkage between India’s nuclear ambitions and Pakistan’s threat
perceptions and had given expression to his feelings through the “eating grass” statement
in 1965.55 He had dilated upon nuclear issues in much greater detail in his book The Myth
of Independence published in 1969.56 Bhutto understood that the strategic threat posed by
the adversary’s nuclear weapons can only be countered by nuclear weapons of your own.
After the Indian test, Bhutto convened a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet
(DCC) on 15th of June 1974 and decided to initiate a nuclear weapons programme,57 this
time around in a more formal setting. Since the Indian test had further vitiated Pakistan’s
security environment, the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability had now become
unavoidable. As Feroz Hassan Khan has aptly remarked, India’s maiden test in the
Pokhran desert had turned a “policy option” for Pakistan into an “imperative.”58 Bhutto
reacted very strongly to the Indian test both in his address to Pakistani parliament as well
as his exchange of letters with the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. While
addressing the National Assembly on 7th June 1974 he stated that, “a more grave and
serious event … has not taken place in the history of Pakistan.”59
The immediate challenge for the US was to somehow prevent Pakistan from
acquiring a nuclear reprocessing plant for which it had already entered into an agreement
with France. In a dual track approach, the US simultaneously started exerting pressure on
Pakistan and France to cancel the agreement. However, the guidelines approved by the

54
Ibid. ‘Zangger Committee’ was formed in 1971, under the chairmanship of Claude Zangger , to draft a
"trigger list" of (a) source or special fissionable materials, and (b) equipment or materials especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials. Under Article III.2 of the
NPT these items are subject to IAEA safeguards if supplied by NPT parties to any non-nuclear weapon state
party to NPT. The Trigger List was first published in September 1974 as IAEA document INFCIRC/209.
55
Abdul Sattar, op. cit., p. 144.
56
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969.
57
Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Nuclear Proliferation Motivations – Lessons from Pakistan,” Non-
Proliferation Review 13, no.3 (November, 2006), p. 503.
58
Ibid, p. 501.
59
India Quarterly xxx, no.4 (October-December 1974) p. 262.
 62

NSG were not retroactively applicable and the US was on a weaker wicket in opposing the
agreements already concluded between France and Pakistan and between Germany and
Brazil. France, however, started demanding stricter safeguards on the reprocessing plant it
was selling to Pakistan. The Pakistani negotiators complained that in every successive
round of talks the French were moving the goal posts. Consequently, the trilateral
agreement finally signed between France, Pakistan and the IAEA contained some of the
toughest safeguards provisions known at the time. The safeguards agreement not only
prohibited the use of reprocessed material for other than peaceful uses but also imposed the
restriction that in case Pakistan replicated the technology in an indigenously built
reprocessing plant, that plant would also automatically come under safeguards. This
condition had never been applied before in a similar agreement. To discourage France from
getting into bilateral agreements with countries like South Korea and Pakistan, the United
States suggested the setting up of regional reprocessing centres with the involvement of the
supplier countries. To this end, the US actively lobbied for establishing a regional
reprocessing centre in Iran for the South West Asian region.60

In December 1975, the CIA issued a secret memorandum on the ‘Prospects for
Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. The memorandum revised the estimates of
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of 1974 that had forecast the time frame of a
decade before Pakistan could produce a nuclear device61 and predicted that Pakistan could
do so as early as 1978. There was no technical ground for this revised estimate and the
only conceivable basis for the CIA estimate might have been a statement purportedly
attributed to Prime Minister Bhutto wherein he had stated shortly after the Indian test that,
“he had completed a plan which would produce a nuclear device in four years.”62The
memorandum also alluded to the fact, that Pakistan was seeking French assistance to build
a small reprocessing plant, but added that French insistence on stringent IAEA safeguards,

60
Burr, op. cit.
61
A ‘Nuclear Device’ is large and unwieldy contraption meant to test the functioning of various components
of a nuclear weapon system and in no way is an equivalent of a usable nuclear weapon that can be mounted
on top of a missile or dropped from a military aircraft. The device can only be carried and delivered by a
transport aircraft.
62
CIA, ‘Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Further
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’ 18 December 1975.
 63

prohibition on transfer of materials and replication of technology would “severely

circumscribe the facility’s value for a nuclear weapons programme.”63

While the international community was expending a lot of diplomatic capital to

prevent Pakistan’s acquisition of the French reprocessing plant, Pakistani nuclear
establishment was exploring the alternative route to the bomb through uranium
enrichment. In November 1974, Munir Khan had tasked Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood,
a nuclear engineer then working at KANUPP, to commence exploratory studies on various
options available to develop Uranium Enrichment technology. These studies led to the
decision to pursue the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment technology. Around the same time Dr
Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan), a Pakistani scientist then working in Holland had written
a letter to Prime Minister Bhutto. Khan informed him that, through his work at the
URENCO’s enrichment plant at Almelo in Holland, he had learnt a lot about enrichment
technology and offered his services for the country. 64 It is difficult to ascertain whether AQ
Khan’s letter instigated an interest in enrichment technology on part of the PAEC or was it
just a coincidence that Dr Khan’s approach to Bhutto and PAEC’s initiation of studies on
uranium enrichment somehow happened almost simultaneously. Mahmood was, later,
dispatched by the PAEC Chairman to Europe to meet AQ Khan. The meeting took place at
Brussels and was followed up with another round of discussions at Amsterdam at Khan’s
house. On his return Mahmood reported that AQ Khan could be very useful for the
programme.65 However, Khan was told to stay in Holland, continue collecting useful
information and sharing it with PAEC. Finally, in December 1975, AQ Khan returned to
Pakistan to join the enrichment project, which had been initiated by the PAEC, at the
Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) at Rawalpindi, with Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood as
the Project Director.66 AQ Khan, however, was not satisfied with the slow and methodical
approach of the PAEC and made a complaint to the Prime Minister. He accused PAEC of
incompetence and lack of commitment and claimed that he could quickly deliver the
desired results if he was appointed the head of the enrichment project. Consequently, on 17
July 1976, AQ Khan was made Project Director with complete financial and administrative

63
Ibid.
64
Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Eating Grass’, op. cit., p. 140-42. According to Feroz’ account PAEC initiated the
enrichment project in October 1974.
65
Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood, interview with WAQT TV on 23 July 2009. Also see Feroz Hassan Khan,
Eating Grass, op. cit., p. 146.
66
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, op. cit., p. 142.
 64

autonomy and a three member oversight board comprising Defence Secretary Ghulam
Ishaq Khan, Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi and Finance Secretary, A.G.N. Kazi as Chair
was constituted to deal with him.67 In the meantime, at Kahuta, an hour’s drive away from
Islamabad, construction work was being undertaken at the site of the enrichment plant by
the Special Works Organisation created under the supervision of the Army Corps of
Engineers.68

In early 1976, Pakistani negotiations with France to purchase a pilot scale

reprocessing plant in addition to its ongoing efforts to acquire the larger commercial scale
reprocessing plant caused more anxiety in the United States. It was feared that this pilot
plant would be capable of producing several kilograms of plutonium per year probably
enough for a nuclear device.69 The PAEC on its part appears to have made an error of
judgement in pursuing the plutonium route to the bomb, at least in the sequencing of its
projects. The justification offered by the PAEC for the procurement of a large reprocessing
plant was that Pakistan was about to embark on an ambitious nuclear power programme
which would be economically unsustainable without the capability to reprocess the spent
fuel from its nuclear reactors.70 In reality, without having initiated the process to acquire
and build any nuclear power plant, proceeding with the reprocessing deal looked like a
classic case of putting the cart before the horse and that is what fuelled suspicions about
real Pakistani intentions amongst foreign experts. It was not until fiscal year 1975-76, that
funds were allocated for the purchase of a 600 MW, later modified to 900 MW, nuclear
power plant to be built at Chashma.71 Had the PAEC started construction of one or two
power plants before embarking on the reprocessing project, its claims would have been
more credible. It appears that the Indian nuclear test and the international response to it had
caught the PAEC on the wrong foot.

It is apparent that the PAEC Chairman had also realised that his plutonium project
had run into snags at a very early stage and if he had to deliver the bomb he had to follow

67
Ibid., p.148-150.
68
Ibid., p. 144-45.
69
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 30 January 1976, to Mr Hartman-Eur, from David H. Schwartz ,
Eur/Rpe, ‘Demarche to Pakistan on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing.’
70
In a nuclear reactor/power plant only a small proportion of the fuel (approximately 5 %) is burnt before it
becomes unusable due to contamination and has to be removed from the reactor. Reprocessing helps in
separating the contaminants and the un-burnt fuel, which can then be recycled and reused.
71
Naeem Salik, Genesis of South Asian nuclear Deterrence, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2009, p. 84.
 65

an alternative path. The problem with the plutonium route is that it requires major nuclear
plants such as a research/ production reactor, a chemical reprocessing plant, a heavy water
plant and a fuel fabrication facility. All of these installations are highly visible and cannot
be built or acquired surreptitiously since these large plants cannot be disaggregated into
smaller components. On the other hand the advantage in gas centrifuge technology is that it
consists of a large number of cylindrical rotating machines called ‘centrifuges’. Each of
these centrifuges has approximately 100 or so small components. If a country is able to
master the technology of fabricating one centrifuge it can replicate it and produce it in
large numbers. Moreover, individual centrifuge parts can be obtained quietly without
raising alarm and can be assembled into centrifuges. These can also be reverse engineered
and produced indigenously depending on the availability of requisite specialised materials
and appropriate manufacturing facilities.

Gas Centrifuge technology72 however, is a highly complex cutting edge technology

and requires many other complex precision engineered pieces of equipment besides the
centrifuge machines to run an enrichment plant. These include a gasification plant to
convert uranium oxide also known as the yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride gas,
which is the feed material for the centrifuge plant and a solidification plant to convert the
enriched gas back into solid form to be machined into weapons cores. Specially designed
gas feed and extraction equipment is required to feed the uranium hexafluoride gas into the
centrifuges and collect the end product at the other end. The centrifuges run at extremely
high speeds, which require high speed inverters, and poses exacting demands on the
materials used for fabricating the centrifuges. Any flaw in the material would cause the
machines to crash. The most critical part in the centrifuge is the rotor and the efficiency of
the machines depends on the sturdiness of the rotor which in turn depends on whether the
rotor is made of aluminium alloy, maraging steel or carbon fibre. These are not trivial
challenges to overcome especially by a developing country like Pakistan. However,
Pakistan realising the snags in its pursuit of the plutonium route to the bomb quickly got
out of this blind alley and switched to the enrichment route. It also promptly learnt the

72
For details of enrichment technology see World Nuclear Association (WNA) brief entitled ‘Uranium
Enrichment’ available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichment-
and-Fabrication/Uranium-Enrichment/. For a more technical explanation see Alexander Glaser,
“Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment and their Relevance for Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation,” Science & Global Security, 16: 1-25, 2008, Taylor & Francis. Available at
https://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2008aglaser_sgsvol16.pdf
 66

intricacies of the gas centrifuge enrichment technology. Pakistan, in fact, successfully

modified the available centrifuge designs and produced machines that were more advanced
and more efficient compared with the original machines.73

Much is made out of the blue prints of the Almelo centrifuge plant ‘stolen away’ by
Dr AQ Khan but more importantly it was his knowledge about the vendors who supplied
various pieces of equipment to URENCO’s plant at Almelo that proved to be more
valuable. As pointed out by Professor Martin Brabers, “In buying equipment, [AQ Khan]
knew all the companies, he knew so many people abroad in many countries…Why, he
knew so many languages, and he is so charming [that] he managed to buy many things that
other Pakistanis would not manage to buy.”74 This information greatly facilitated
Pakistan’s own procurement effort which involved purchase of pieces of equipment from
countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy and Britain. Many of these
parts were dual use technologies, were not subject to export restrictions and could be
legitimately imported. In other cases European companies found it difficult to resist the
temptation of making hefty profits. At the same time Pakistan did not yield any ground on
the reprocessing issue and continued to pursue the French deal which helped keep the
international attention focused on the reprocessing issue masking the preparatory work on
the enrichment plant.

In order to dissuade Pakistan from the reprocessing deal with France, Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger came to Pakistan in August 1976 and met the Pakistani Prime
Minister at Lahore. In terms of carrots Kissinger offered to seek Congressional approval
for the sale of 110 A-7 aircraft to bolster Pakistan’s conventional defences and to alleviate
its security concerns. The sticks were in the form of a warning to Prime Minister Bhutto, to
back off from the reprocessing project, hinting that the Democrats who were likely to win
the coming US elections would take a much harder line on this issue. This ‘warning’ by
Kissinger became a subject of much controversy later. Kissinger maintained that he had
only cautioned Bhutto that a Democratic administration in Washington will take a much
tougher stance on this issue while Bhutto claimed that Kissinger had threatened him, that if
he did not cancel the agreement with France, the Americans will make a horrible example

73
For a detailed expose of the Pakistani efforts in mastering enrichment technology and the difficulties it
confronted see Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, op. cit., p. 150-160.
74
Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, New York, Times Books, 1981, p. 182.
 67

out of him. Bhutto later blamed the United States for destabilising his government and
engineering his downfall for his refusal to back down from his nuclear ambitions.
Meanwhile, American success in persuading South Korea to cancel its reprocessing
agreement with France encouraged the Ford administration to keep up the pressure on
Pakistan.75

In February 1976, Canada upset by India’s misuse of Canadian supplied

technology, demanded more stringent safeguards on its existing nuclear agreements with
Pakistan and wanted retroactive application of these new safeguards. On Pakistan’s refusal
to oblige Canada cut off all nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, withdrew its technicians
working at KANUPP and stopped the supply of fuel, heavy water and spares for the plant,
for which it had an agreement with Pakistan. The Canadian decision to withdraw support
forced Pakistani engineers to learn to run the plant on their own and compelled the PAEC
to initiate a project to indigenously produce fuel elements for the plant. It also reinforced
the Pakistani perception that they are being treated unfairly.76

In January 1977, President Jimmy Carter, a strong proponent of nuclear non-

proliferation became the US President while in Pakistan Bhutto was deposed by General
Zia-ul-Haq in July of the same year. Initially, it was not clear whether Zia would pursue
the nuclear programme with the same zeal as Bhutto or would yield to US pressure. Zia,
however, could not afford to change course on the nuclear policy, since that would have
confirmed Bhutto’s allegation, that he was removed from power due to his steadfast stand
on the nuclear issue. Any weakness on the nuclear policy would have shown Zia as an
American stooge, who dismissed Bhutto’s government at the behest of the Americans.
Given his military background he would also have recognised the significance of the
nuclear programme for Pakistan’s long term security and decided to persist with the
nuclear weapons programme. President Carter visited New Delhi in 1978 and unlike
Eisenhower and Nixon he did not stop over in Pakistan, clearly indicating the widening
gulf between US and Pakistan. In September 1977, Joseph S. Nye Jr., an expert on nuclear
affairs in the State Department, was sent to Islamabad to deliver a stern message. This time
around, there were no carrots as the offer to sell A-7 aircraft had been withdrawn by the

75
Dennis Kux, op. cit., p. 222; also see Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy under Z.A. Bhutto
and Zia-ul-Haq: An Assessment,’ Strategic Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 4, Summer, 1992.
76
Munir Ahmad Khan, Nuclearisation of South Asia, op. cit.
 68

Carter administration. Nye warned his Pakistani interlocutors that if Pakistan persisted
with the reprocessing project the US would cut off all economic assistance to Pakistan
under the provisions of the Glenn amendment.77 Pakistan’s plea that the proposed plant
would be under strict safeguards did not seem to make much impression. However, Zia
told Nye in unequivocal terms that he had no intention of abandoning the project. The
American threat to cut off economic aid did not carry much weight, since the total value of
the annual US assistance had already been reduced to a paltry amount of $ 50 million.78

The US efforts to dissuade Pakistan from the reprocessing deal had apparently
failed, but the US pressure on France bore fruit as the French informed them that they were
prepared to terminate the reprocessing agreement with Pakistan. In order to save their
credibility and to avoid paying reparations they did not want to simply walk out of the
deal. The ploy used by the French government was to offer Pakistan a ‘co-processing’
plant instead of the reprocessing plant, correctly estimating that, the unproven technology
would not be acceptable to Pakistan. The French sent a nuclear expert to Islamabad with
the offer, which as expected was turned down by the Pakistani government. The French
thus had a convenient excuse to renege from an international agreement.79

In April 1978 a CIA memorandum, concluded that, “Pakistan is strongly motivated

to develop at least a potential nuclear capability, in part for prestige purpose but more
strongly because, it genuinely believes its national security could ultimately be threatened
by India…But at present there is no visible sense of urgency about the matter and a
decision to proceed may be postponed for many years.”80 While expressing doubt over the
coming to fruition of the Pakistan -France reprocessing agreement it stated that should
Pakistan obtain this plant and was also willing to violate its safeguards agreements it could

77
Glenn Amendment of 1977 to the Foreign Assistance Act 1961 prohibits U.S. assistance to any non-nuclear
weapon state (as defined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty), that delivers nuclear enrichment equipment,
materials, or technology to any other country, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any
other country, unless before such delivery—“(1) the supplying country and receiving country have reached
agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon delivery, under multilateral auspices
and management when available; and“(2) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel
and facilities in such country under the safeguards system of such Agency.
http://www.irmep.org/ila/nukes/glenn/default.asp
78
Kux, op. cit., p.235.
79
Ibid.
80
Pakistan Nuclear Study, Memorandum dated 26 April 1978, prepared by CIA.
 69

obtain plutonium for a few nuclear devices.81 In an apparent reference to the theoretical
physics group working under Dr Riaz-ud-Din, the memorandum mentioned that PAEC had
set up an organisation to work on weapon designs, indicating that the CIA was closely
watching the developments in Pakistan.82 The cause of American concern was the
possibility of Pakistan emulating the Indian example by detonating a nuclear device and
terming it a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). However, by that time the French President
Giscard d’Estaing had decided to back out of the agreement with Pakistan and the US
government was duly informed of the French decision around May 1978. When the French
formally informed Pakistan of their decision, President Zia reacted by writing a strongly
worded letter to his French counterpart which was not received well by the French.83

The US having succeeded in persuading the French to cancel the agreement with
Pakistan, now wanted to resume assistance cut off under the provisions of the Glenn
amendment, in view of the deteriorating security situation in the region as a result of the
Communist coup in Kabul. To allay the suspicions of the non-proliferation lobby in the
Congress the US administration wanted the Pakistani government to give at least private
assurances that it will not try to build its own reprocessing facility. Foreign Minister Agha
Shahi, however, told the US ambassador in Islamabad that no government in Pakistan
could give such an assurance and still stay in power, due to strong public sentiments on the
issue and added that the US demand impinged on Pakistani sovereignty. 84 Agha Shahi
reiterated the Pakistani position a few days later during his meeting with US Deputy
Secretary of State in New York. He also made it clear that, “the Government of Pakistan
has to tell its public that Pakistan has the unfettered right to do what it wishes and will
retain all its options.” 85

While the controversy over the reprocessing plant was still raging, the issue of
Pakistan’s efforts to purchase high-speed electrical inverters from a British manufacturer
caused a controversy in the British Parliament. These inverters are dual use items that are

81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Telegram 28319 dated 25 August 1978, ‘French Views on Pakistan Reprocessing Plant’, from American
Embassy, Paris to Secretary of State, Washington.
84
Telegram 7480 of 05 August 1978, ‘Pakistan Reprocessing Plant – USG Stipulations,’ from American
Embassy, Islamabad to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
85
Telegram-205550 of 14August 1978, ‘Discussion between Under Secretary Newsom and Pakistan’s
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Agha Shahi on the Reprocessing Issue’, from Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C. to American Embassy, Islamabad.
 70

used in textile plants and are also essential for running the centrifuges at high speeds in an
enrichment plant. This incident brought Pakistan’s thus far secret enterprise, to acquire
uranium enrichment technology, into the open. The US Ambassador confronted General
Zia with the available intelligence but he dismissed it as ‘ridiculous’ and offered to allow
American experts to visit any site in Pakistan for verification of facts. He later on, made
this access conditional on the Indian readiness to allow similar access to the American
experts. The Indians expectedly did not allow such an inspection and Zia ultimately
expressed his inability to allow a unilateral inspection, thus extricating himself from an
offer, he had probably made on the spur of the moment, without having thought through its
implications.86

The American officials based on the available intelligence information about

Pakistan’s procurement activities in Europe were convinced by the spring of 1979, that
Pakistan was pursuing a secret uranium enrichment programme. Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher visited Islamabad to raise the issue with Pakistani officials and warned
Zia that without a solemn assurance from the Pakistani government to the US President
that it was not developing nuclear weapons, the administration would be compelled to cut
off assistance to Pakistan under the Symington amendment.87 Zia on his part, emphasised
the peaceful intent of the Pakistani nuclear programme but did not rule out the possibility
of a ‘PNE’ nor was he ready to accept international safeguards on his country’s nuclear
facilities. Consequently, the Carter administration decided to suspend aid to Pakistan for
the second time in two years and the announcement to this effect was made by the State
Department in April 1979.88

86
Telegram-2413 of 27 February 1979, from American Embassy, Islamabad to Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C. and American Embassy, New Delhi.
87
Symington Amendment of 1976 is an amendment to Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act and is
related to Nuclear Enrichment Transfers that prohibits provision of any economic assistance, military or
security supporting assistance or grant of military education and training, or extending military credits or
making guarantees, to any country which, on or after the date of enactment of the International Security
Assistance Act of 1977, delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other
country, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country, unless before such
delivery unless both the supplier and the recipient have agreed to place all such material and equipment under
multilateral oversight and management and have agreed to place not only this material and equipment but all
other nuclear facilities and equipment in the recipient country under IAEA safeguards (commonly known as
the comprehensive safeguards).
88
Kux, p. 236-39.
 71

The State Department and especially the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) experts were closely monitoring Pakistani nuclear activities and actively
considering options to retard its progress as far as possible. Around mid-1979 the US
Ambassador to IAEA and State Department specialist Robert Gallucci89 gave an
assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear programme to the IAEA Director General Eklund based
on US intelligence information. The briefing was intended to seek greater oversight and
monitoring of Pakistan’s nuclear activities by the IAEA. The IAEA DG was informed that
Pakistan had acquired bulk of critical parts required for setting up a gas centrifuge plant
and that the US had succeeded in closing down the supply of centrifuge parts. Eklund saw
Pakistani nuclear programme as a danger to the future growth of nuclear power
programmes.90

In September 1979, Assistant Director ACDA, Van Doren, during a briefing to a

General Advisory Committee meeting at the State Department, acknowledged the delayed
response to Pakistani effort to acquire enrichment technology saying that, “This is a
railroad train that is going down the track very fast and I am not sure anything will turn it
off.”91The issue of a preventive strike also came up during the meeting and one of the
participants pointed out that the Israelis were talking about ‘Entebbe Two’.92 However,
Van Doren pointed out that the option for such a preventive strike had been compromised
by a New York Times’ report that prematurely made the US plans public. The meeting
also considered such drastic measures as imposing an oil embargo on Pakistan.93
Throughout, the 1980s there were rumours of an Indian, an Israeli or a joint military strike
against Pakistani enrichment plant at Kahuta. Although the strike did not materialise, this

89
Gallucci had during a visit to Islamabad had driven to the Kahuta site with some embassy official and had
taken some photographs of the under construction facility.
90
‘Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Briefing of IAEA Director General Eklund’, Memo of Conversation of
Ambassador Gerard Smith’s Discussion of Pakistan’s Nuclear Issue with IAEA Director General Eklund on
25 and 27 June 1979 on Edges of IAEA Board meeting in Vienna.
91
Department of State, General Advisory Committee on Arms Control & Disarmament, 14 September 1979,
Washington, D.C.
92
‘Entebbe-1’ was a lightening Israeli commando raid that successfully liberated Israeli hostages from a
hijacked aircraft at Entebbe airport in Uganda and therefore the term Entebbe 2 was used. Attack on Osirak
reactor in Iraq took place only in 1981.
93
Ibid.
 72

constant threat and hostility has left an indelible mark on Pakistani psyche which is still
influenced by what a Pakistani official called the ‘Kahuta Syndrome.’94

President Carter, who had twice suspended assistance to Pakistan, was compelled
by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to offer $ 400 million in military and economic
assistance, but the offer, was turned down by President Zia terming it as ‘peanuts.’ 95 Zia
argued that acceptance of such insignificant assistance would further endanger Pakistan’s
security. Foreign Minister Agha Shahi’s talks in Washington also failed to break the
deadlock, since Carter had turned down Pakistan’s request for the supply of F-16 aircraft.
He, however, reaffirmed the commitment to Pakistan’s security against outside aggression
in his State of the Union speech in what came to be known as the ‘Carter Doctrine’.96
When Zia visited New York in October 1980 in connection with the General Assembly
meeting, he was also invited to the White House. However, he politely declined the
assistance offer, despite the fact that Carter had changed his earlier decision with regards to
the F-16s, suggesting that due to US President’s deep involvement in the forthcoming
elections the matter could be discussed at a more opportune moment.97

By 1980 the construction work on the enrichment plant at Kahuta had been
completed and the plant had started operating with some initial hiccups. Around the same
time the construction work on the two tunnels at Chaghai and Kharan in Balochistan,
which had started in 1976, was also completed. Other facilities such as Chemical Plants
Complex (CPC) at Dera Ghazi Khan had also started producing both the fuel for the
KANUPP as well as the Uranium Hexafluoride gas for the Kahuta enrichment facility.
Simultaneously, the theoretical physics and explosives groups were making good progress
towards designing of a nuclear device and manufacturing its components including
specialised explosives.98

94
This term was used by the former DG SPD, Lt General Kidwai during a meeting with a visiting scholar in
2004 in the presence of the author.
95
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, op. cit., p. 209.
96
Kux, p. 248-52.
97
Ibid, p.253-4.
98
Samar Mubarakmand and Munir Khan, speech at PINSTECH, op. cit.
 73

2.7 Reagan Administration – Willing to live with a Pakistani Bomb:

In January 1981, Ronald Reagan became the US President with a more hawkish
approach towards the Soviet Union and a determination to check the growing Soviet
expansionism in Asia and Africa. Reagan’s desire to support the Afghan resistance against
the Soviet occupation forces could not have been fulfilled without intimate cooperation
with Pakistan. The Secretaries of State and Defence and the CIA Director were all
supportive of a much more substantive aid package than the one that had been offered by
the Carter administration. The US Ambassador in Islamabad was also in favour of the
proposed package of $ 3.2 billion in military and economic assistance. President Zia
however, wanted to clarify the terms of engagement and sent Foreign Minister Agha Shahi
and his Chief of Staff General K.M. Arif to Washington for discussions with the US
leadership. Shahi and Arif told Secretary of State Alexander Haig in clear terms that
Pakistan would in no way compromise on its nuclear programme. Haig responded by
saying that the US does not want to make the nuclear issue as the centrepiece of its
relations with Pakistan. However, he cautioned that in case Pakistan conducts a nuclear test
it would be impossible for the administration to seek Congressional approval for the kind
of cooperation it wants to have with Pakistan. The implication was very clear that the
“Reagan administration was willing to live with Pakistan’s nuclear programme short of a
nuclear explosive test by Pakistan.”99

The administration also abandoned the idea of using sanctions to dissuade countries
like Pakistan from pursuit of nuclear programmes. In a statement before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Jane Coon argued that sanctions
have not succeeded in preventing proliferation and we should rather address the legitimate
security concerns of countries like Pakistan which would encourage a more positive and
cooperative relationship.100 Under Secretary of State James Buckley in an August 1981
letter to the New York Times also stressed that the US is strengthening Pakistan’s
conventional defence capabilities to lessen the security concerns that are compelling it to
acquire a nuclear capability.101

99
Kux, 256-57.
100
Ibid, p. 260.
101
Ibid, p. 261.
 74

The US though aware of Pakistani procurement activities for a gas centrifuge

enrichment facility was unsure about the actual progress Pakistan had made. The tendency
on part of many European experts to underrate the technical skills of Pakistani scientists
and engineers also worked to Pakistan’s advantage. European companies such as Emerson
Electrical Company of UK sold equipment to Pakistan knowing its possible applications in
the nuclear programme assuming that the Pakistanis would not be able use these
sophisticated items of equipment.102 There were compelling reasons for scepticism as the
Gas Centrifuge Enrichment technology is highly sophisticated and it had taken an
industrially developed country like Japan ten years to master it. Secondly, until then
centrifuge enrichment technology had only been used by countries like Germany, Japan,
and the URENCO consortium comprising Germany, Holland and Britain, for producing
low enriched uranium, to be used as fuel for their nuclear power reactors and no country in
the world had used it to produce weapons grade material.103 Precisely for this reason the
sceptics, including people such as a former Chairman of the PAEC Dr Usmani, thought
that pursuit of gas centrifuge enrichment technology by Pakistan was a waste of effort and
money.104Munir Ahmad Khan’s continued stress on the significance of plutonium
reprocessing technology for Pakistan could also be based on three underlying reasons.
Firstly, he may have wanted the attention of the US and other Western countries to remain
focused on Pakistan’s reprocessing project while Pakistan was quietly accumulating pieces
of equipment for its enrichment programme. Secondly, he himself may have entertained
some doubts about the success of the enrichment effort and may have wanted to keep the
plutonium option open. Thirdly, since AQ Khan had taken over the enrichment project, the
PAEC felt that it would forever remain dependent on KRL for the fissile material for its
weapons programme and wanted to develop the plutonium route as an alternative which it

102
‘The Islamic Bomb’, BBC, Panorama Documentary aired in 1980.
103
All major nuclear powers including the US had used ‘Gaseous Diffusion’ process of enrichment of
uranium for their nuclear weapons programmes. In this process Uranium in gaseous form is passed through a
successive series of thin membranes to gradually separate the heavier U238 from relatively lighter U 235.
Gaseous Diffusion process consumes ten times more energy than the more modern centrifuge enrichment
process.
104
This was personally narrated to the author by a senior Pakistani diplomat who had this conversation with
Dr Usmani when the former called on him while he was posted as a junior diplomat at the Pakistani embassy
at Brussels.
 75

eventually did by starting work on the construction of the Khushab plutonium production
reactor in the late 1980s.105

2.8: Major Technological Landmarks:

On 11th of March 1983 Pakistan successfully conducted the first cold test106 of the
nuclear device designed by PAEC scientists and engineers. Chairman PAEC called on
President Zia the same evening and informed him that Pakistan was now ready with a
nuclear device. However, Munir Khan commented that PAEC had conducted the cold test
well before the fissile material for a ‘hot test’ was available, adding that, “we were ahead
of others”,107 implying that the enrichment plant at Kahuta had not produced bomb grade
material till then.108 He was also suggesting that PAEC had accomplished its task ahead of
A Q Khan who had been denigrating the PAEC for its slow pace of work. The design team
now had to decide on whether to wait for the availability of fissile material and the
opportunity to conduct a hot test or to continue its work to refine its designs and produce
more compact, rugged and aircraft and missile deliverable designs. They decided to follow
the latter route. The design and manufacturing team was to develop several new designs
during the 1980s and 1990s. The new designs were also confirmed through several cold
tests. These included a small, compact but high yield design, which was termed by the
head of the testing and diagnostics team as ‘state of the art’ design.109

In the uranium enrichment project the first landmark was reached on 04 June 1978,
when a prototype centrifuge was successfully run for the first time, after a number of failed
attempts. The machine was also able to separate the two isotopes of uranium. Dr A Q Khan
who had by then assumed the charge of the project director duly reported the success in a
letter dated 10 June 1978 to President Zia, who personally congratulated the team of
scientists. Pakistan thus became the first country outside the developed world to have
105
Bashir-ud-din Mahmood, Waqt interview.
106
Munir Khan, speech at PINSTECH, op. cit., Samar Mubarakmand, op. cit. [A ‘Cold Test’ is the detonation
of a complete nuclear device but what differentiates it from a full-fledged nuclear test is that the fissile
material core is replaced with natural uranium. As a result all components of the device including its
triggering mechanism, the electronics package and the conventional explosive lenses are tested besides the
functioning of the neutron source. It causes fission and neutrons are released but no nuclear explosion takes
place because the fission reaction is not sustained.]
107
Munir Khan, op. cit.
108
Ibid. [In natural uranium two isotopes of uranium are found in the proportion of U-238- 99.3 % and U-235
– 0.7 %. The process of increasing the proportion of U-235, which is a fissile material, is called enrichment.
Uranium with a proportion of 90% or above of U-235 is called the ‘bomb grade material.’]
109
Samar Mubarakmand, op. cit.
 76

achieved the enrichment capability. This was followed by successful setting up of a 54-
machine cascade110 at the pilot scale enrichment plant at Sihala near Kahuta the same year.
The pilot plant became operational in 1979 while the Kahuta enrichment plant was
completed in 1980. By 1984 Pakistan is believed to have achieved the capability of
uranium enrichment on a significant scale. The news broke through an interview by Dr A
Q Khan to an Urdu language daily Nawa-i-Waqt from where it was picked up by The
Times, London in a report entitled ‘Hint of Pakistani Atom Bomb.’ Dr Khan had claimed
in the interview that, Pakistan had broken the monopoly of the Western countries on
enrichment technology and that if the scientists were tasked by the President to do
something in the national interest, they would not disappoint the nation.111 However,
despite AQ Khan’s claim, it is difficult to ascertain the level of enrichment Pakistan had
achieved at the time. It is, however, important to understand that most of the enrichment
effort is expended in enriching uranium from 0.7% of U-235 to 5% U-235. Beyond that it
is relatively easier to upgrade it to the weapons grade (90% of U-235) which can be
achieved within weeks. Complex technological challenges of running a large enrichment
plant, consisting of thousands of machines, rotating at very high speed, interconnected
through miles of pipes and complex gas feed and collection systems, all controlled with a
process control system, had thus been overcome.

President Zia immediately played down the interview stating that, “Pakistan only
wanted to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”112 Nevertheless, this, caused
a lot of furore in the US Congress and Indian media and led to President Reagan’s letter to
Zia in which he for the first time cautioned him not to cross the ‘red line’ of enriching
uranium beyond 5% level. There was previously no such demand and the tacit
understanding was that Pakistan could continue to pursue its enrichment activity but will
stop short of a nuclear explosion. The episode ultimately led to the passage of the Pressler
amendment in 1985, which made it mandatory for the US President to certify annually that
Pakistan is not in possession of a nuclear device failing which no military or economic
assistance could be provided to Pakistan.113 The Pressler amendment was invoked in

110
A Cascade is a set of centrifuge machines interconnected with pipes and are capable of running as a unit
to enrich uranium.
111
‘The Hint of Pakistani Atom Bomb’, The Times (London), 10 February 1984.
112
‘Zia moves to quell rumours about manufacture of bomb’, The Guardian, 14 February 1984.
113
Kux, op. cit. p. 276-7.
 77

October 1990 slapping wide ranging sanctions on Pakistan. This caused a lot of acrimony,
with the Pakistanis accusing the Americans of abandoning them, after the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Americans blaming Pakistan for going beyond the
mutually understood limits on nuclear activity.

On 01 March 1987, during the course of a military crisis resulting from India’s
exercise ‘Brass Tacks,’ an interview by A Q Khan with Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar
was published by the London Observer, in which the former had purportedly claimed that
Pakistan had achieved nuclear capability despite West’s doubts about his abilities. Despite
AQ Khan’s protestations that he had been misquoted by the interviewer, he was taken to
task by President Zia for his indiscretion, while Mushahid Hussain, editor of Islamabad
based newspaper Muslim, lost his job for facilitating the interview. A month later Zia
himself declared in an interview with Time magazine that, “you can write today that
Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes,” adding by way of clarification, that though
Pakistan had the technical capability it had no intention of making a bomb.114 Pakistan
seemed to have learnt the art of sending signals about its nuclear deterrent capability
without unambiguously acknowledging its nuclear capability.

In 1986, the PAEC initiated the project to build a plutonium production reactor at
Khushab. The work on the reactor started in 1987, with Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood as the
project director and was successfully completed by 1997.115 By then the small reprocessing
facility called the ‘New Labs’ near Islamabad had also become operational thus providing
Pakistan with an alternative source of fissile material in the form of plutonium. Plutonium
weapons are more compact and lighter in weight and can easily be mounted on top of
missiles with limited payload carrying capability. The completion of the plutonium
production reactor also fulfilled PAEC’s long-standing desire of following the plutonium
route to the nuclear weapons and ended the KRL’s monopoly over fissile material
production.

2.9 The Shakti Tests and Decision Time for Pakistan:

In early 1998 during the election campaign in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) had announced in its election manifesto that on coming into power it will
114
Kux, op. cit., p. 284-5.
115
Bashir-ud-din Mahmood, interview with Waqt TV.
 78

operationalize India’s nuclear capability. Many observers dismissed this declaration as part
of the election rhetoric. BJP had also stated that it would review and overhaul the national
security structure in India. It was expected that BJP would not take any major decisions
before the completion of this review. However, to everyone’s surprise one of the very first
decisions taken by Prime Minister Vajpayee was to give a go ahead to India’s nuclear
scientists, to carry out multiple nuclear tests. It, however, did not come as a surprise for
Pakistan and based on the statements by the BJP leadership and credible intelligence
reports, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had written letters to major international powers
including the US, warning them of the imminence of Indian tests. 116 Unfortunately,
Pakistani warnings were not heeded. The CIA on its part failed to pick up India’s
preparations for the test. Admiral Jeremiah, who was assigned by the CIA director to
investigate this major intelligence failure, in response to a question by a journalist about
the Pakistani letter, sarcastically remarked that, they have been warning us since 1974.117

On 11th May 1998, the Indian Prime Minister announced that, India had
successfully conducted three nuclear tests, including a thermonuclear test. However, unlike
1974, this time there was no pretension of peaceful nuclear explosions and he declared
India as a nuclear weapon power. Two days later, on 13 May 1998, India again claimed to
have conducted two more tests. Again like 1974, since India had already crossed the line,
all attention focused on preventing Pakistan from responding in kind.118 In the words of
President Musharraf, “The world and its powers relentlessly pressured us to desist”…119
Sanctions mandated by the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NNPA), also
commonly known as the Glenn Amendment, were automatically triggered and the US
officials in their pronouncements condemned India’s actions. Pakistan waited for the world
to act strongly, but France and Russia made it known that they were not in favour of any
sanctions and the G-8 reaction was also very mild. President Clinton personally called the
Pakistani Prime Minister several times and also sent a delegation led by Deputy Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott to Islamabad, in an effort to dissuade Sharif from going ahead with

116
The Nation, Lahore, 24 May 1998.
117
Naeem Salik, Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrent, op. cit., p. 139.
118
Feroz Hassan Khan, Pakistan as a Nuclear State, op. cit., p. 271
119
Pervez Musharraf, In The Line of Fire, op. cit., p. 287.
 79

the tests.120 However, Nawaz Sharif told them that, no leader in Pakistan could hope to
survive in power after shying away from nuclear tests in view of the prevailing public
sentiment in Pakistan.121

The Indians also played their part in provoking a Pakistani decision to test by
making inflammatory and threatening statements, probably in their keenness to have a
companion in the international dog house.122 Indian effort was premised on two main
assumptions. First, some people in India were of the view that Pakistan’s nuclear
programme was a bluff, created with the connivance of the West, to constrain India’s
nuclear options and thought that it was time to call Pakistan’s bluff. In case Pakistan failed
to respond with nuclear tests of its own, its nuclear bogey would be exposed forever.
Second, they thought that if Pakistan also conducts nuclear tests, the international pressure
on India would be dissipated. The US, on its part, failed to come up with an attractive
package of incentives for Pakistan, beyond vague promises, in return for refraining from
conducting the nuclear explosions. As pointed out by a pre-eminent South Asia expert
Steve Cohen, the US did not offer Pakistan any ‘real incentives’ for refraining from testing
and that price being offered to Pakistan was nowhere near the one which had been offered
to Pyongyang in 1994.Cohen explained that, “Pyongyang got $ 4 billion in American
assistance to cap its nuclear programme; Pakistan was given vague promises that it might
finally be given the 28 F-16 aircraft it bought and paid for almost a decade ago. And we
and the Chinese were unwilling to offer the Pakistanis security guarantees that would have
made them feel comfortable.”123Pakistan was in no doubt, given the statements by senior
Indian leaders including Home Minister L.K. Advani, asking Pakistan to accept India’s
predominance, that the strategic balance in South Asia had been seriously undermined and
needed to be restored.

Prime Minister Sharif was in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan, on May 11, 1998,
for summit meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organisation – a regional grouping of
South West and Central Asian States, when the news of Indian tests broke out. He called
the Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat and told him to initiate preparations for the

120
Strobe Talbott, ‘Engaging India-Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb,’ Brookings Institution Press,
Washington, D.C., 2004, p. 65-67.
121
Ibid.
122
Kux, p. 345-6.
123
Hassan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’, Asian Survey, 41, 6, 2001, p. 943-55.
 80

tests, who in turn asked him to return to Islamabad as soon as possible and convene a
meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, so that an institutionalised decision
could be taken.124 The DCC meeting was held on May 15, 1998, and was attended by
Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz, Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub, Foreign Secretary Shamshad
Ahmed and the three services chiefs. Dr A Q Khan was also there while the PAEC was
represented by Member Technical and head of Directorate of Technical Development, Dr
Samar Mubarakmand, in the absence of PAEC Chairman Dr Ishfaq Ahmad who was on a
visit to the US. The DCC meeting had to decide on two urgent matters, the first, was
regarding whether or not to conduct a nuclear test and the second was with regard to which
of the two organisations i.e. PAEC and KRL to be entrusted with the task. Dr Samar gave a
technical evaluation of Indian tests and there was also a detailed discussion of the financial
and economic impact of the sanctions likely to be imposed in case of a Pakistani nuclear
test. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz cautioned against the tests on grounds of poor state of
the economy and especially the low foreign exchange reserves, while the Foreign Minister
and Foreign Secretary were amongst the strongest voices supporting the tests. However,
the meeting remained inconclusive.125

Dr Ishfaq returned from the US on 16th May and was summoned by the Prime
Minister the next day. When he went to see the Prime Minister along with Dr Samar, he
was asked by the PM about his views on whether or not Pakistan should conduct the tests
and PAEC’s preparedness to undertake the task. He told the PM that the decision to
conduct the test would be a political decision and assured him that PAEC was fully
prepared to fulfil its responsibilities should a decision be taken in favour of the tests. He
received a call from the Prime Minister the next day to go ahead with the tests.126

During the next ten days there was feverish activity. The team of scientists and
engineers led by Dr Samar Mubarakmand travelled in special Pakistan International
Airlines flights to Quetta from where they were moved to the test site at Chaghai in
Balochistan. At the same time Pakistan Air Force C-130s escorted by F-16s were ferrying
the sensitive material and equipment to Quetta from where it was moved by helicopters

124
Author’s personal interview with General Jehangir Karamat at Washington, DC in 2006. Former Foreign
Secretary Shamshad Ahmed in a 2009 conversation with the author stated that the PM had called the Army
Chief on his insistence and advice. Also see Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass,op. cit., p. 270.
125
Shaid-ur-Rehman, op. cit., p. 9-13 and Feroz Hassan Khan, p. 272.
126
Ibid. Also see Dr Samar Mubarakmand, op. cit. Also see Feroz Hassan Khan, p. 278.
 81

and ground transport to the test sites.127 The international pressure to dissuade Pakistan
from conducting the tests was building up while some unconfirmed intelligence reports
pointed to Indian and Israeli preparations to attack Pakistani nuclear sites. As a result the
Pakistan Air Force was placed on a state of high alert and the Army Chief contacted US
Deputy Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Ralston seeking clarifications about the
Israeli plans. Ralston talked to the Israelis and informed General Karamat, that the Israelis
have strongly denied any such plan. The Israelis on their part went a step further to
reassure Pakistan, with their Ambassador at Geneva contacting his Pakistani counterpart to
reiterate the Israeli position.128

There was however, a crisis during the night of 27/28 May, with intelligence
sources reporting heightened air activity across the border. Consequently, Indian High
Commissioner in Islamabad was called to the Foreign office at 01 am on May 28, 1998 and
was warned of the consequences of any hostile action by India.129 Finally, what was
described by Foreign Office in Islamabad as ‘Pakistan’s Finest Hour’ arrived at 3:16 pm
on 28 May, when 5 nuclear devices were successfully detonated, turning the black granite
of Ras Koh mountain white. Two days later another device was detonated at the Kharan
test site 150 kilometres away from Chaghai.130

It is clear that despite the pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme since the early
1970s the top Pakistani leadership, including the Prime Minister, had not tried to learn
even the basics and was unaware of the respective roles and capabilities of PAEC and
KRL. Had they known that the PAEC had prepared the test shafts and had carried out
dozens of cold tests starting in March 1983, the decision would have been straight forward.
Even if the claims of KRL are accepted that it had developed its own nuclear device, it was
ill equipped to carry out the tests. By its own account, the KRL has claimed to have carried
out a solitary cold test, whereas PAEC had conducted dozens of cold tests over a decade,
had designed and prepared the test sites and had the test equipment and trained
manpower.131

127
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, op. cit., p. 279-80.
128
In an email exchange with the author on 01 November 2013, General Karamat confirmed the occurrence
of the exchange with General Ralston and the Israeli assurances.
129
Hassan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing’, Asian Survey, 41, 6, 2001, p. 943-955.
130
Shahid-ur-Rehman, op. cit., and Samar Mubarakmand, op. cit.
131
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, p. 272-3.
 82

It has been debated both within and outside Pakistan as to why Pakistan conducted
six tests in all. Many Pakistani analysts naively assume that Pakistan conducted six tests to
be a step ahead of India’s five tests. But more surprising is the contention of some very
knowledgeable and well known American scholars using the same argument with a further
twist that Pakistan carried out six tests to get even with India’s five tests in 1998 and one
test in 1974.132 Nuclear testing is a complex and technologically challenging process and
nuclear devices are tested for technological reasons not for satisfaction of egos. There were
serious technical considerations which determined the actual number of tests. First, and
foremost, was the number of tunnels available at the test sites. Had five tunnels at Chaghai
and the sixth one at Kharan not been available, there was no way Pakistan could have
conducted six tests. Neither could it have hurriedly prepared the tunnels on the eve of the
tests. The second consideration was the availability of devices based on different designs
and since these were available, PAEC wanted to use the opportunity to test all of these,
knowing that this may well be their last opportunity to do so. It does not make any sense to
test multiple devices of the same design. Finally, it was the availability of adequate
quantity of fissile material, without which, it would not have been possible to conduct the
desired number of tests. No country can afford to waste precious and scarce fissile material
by conducting unnecessary tests just for point scoring.

Thus the long and arduous journey which began almost two decades earlier came to
fruition. A beaming Pakistani Prime Minister addressing the people of Pakistan on
National Television declared, “Today we have settled a score…Our hand was forced by
present Indian leadership’s reckless actions.”133 Pakistan’s claims about the yield of its
tests were disputed by international experts, as was the case with the Indian claims.
However, there was no disputing the fact that Pakistan had unambiguously demonstrated
its nuclear capability. The tests were received with public display of jubilation in major
Pakistani cities and received popular approval.

2.10 Lessons Learnt by Pakistan:

The most important lesson Pakistan learnt through its nuclear enterprise was the
fact that if a nation pursues any project, even the most technologically challenging one,
132
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed’, New
York, W.W. Norton and Company, 2003, p. 88.
133
Kux, op. cit., p. 345-46.
 83

with single minded determination, national resolve and across the board national
consensus, even the apparently insurmountable challenges can be overcome. The
successful mastery of a very complex and cutting edge technology by a relatively poor
country with a limited industrial base was owed to the fact that requisite organisational
structures were built and a pool of highly trained and skilled manpower was created. This
recognition of the importance of purpose built institutions and specially trained manpower
would help Pakistan in establishing the nuclear management infrastructure in the post-1998
phase of its nuclear development. Second, the historical experience of persistent
international pressures and efforts to stifle and undermine Pakistan’s nuclear programme
stretching over almost three decades has seriously impacted on the collective national
memory, creating a deep seated mistrust – a kind of xenophobia - that continues to
influence its outlook. This peculiar mind set and deeply ingrained perception that Pakistan,
unlike India and Israel, was singled out for sanctions and pressures in complete disregard
to its legitimate security concerns, continues to cast a long shadow over Pakistan’s nuclear
policy. Third, Pakistan also learnt that there are no ironclad rules in inter-state relations and
countries do not hesitate to bend their own rules if dictated by their national interests, as
was evident by the change in policy direction by President Carter after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and its continuation during the Reagan presidency and that geopolitical and
commercial interests of the major powers would always trump their non-proliferation
agenda.

It is also an established fact that one of the important factors affecting the learning
process is the historical experience especially if it is a traumatic one 134 as was Pakistan’s
experience of defeat and dismemberment in 1971. The perceptual dispositions thus
developed determine the nature and direction of the learning process and could lead the
decision makers into drawing incorrect inferences and applying analogies from past events
that may have been transient in nature to very different situations in future. Jervis has
established a linkage between past events, lessons learnt from these and the future
behaviour of the leadership which sometimes fails to learn some lessons that may appear to
be very obvious to an outside observer.135Feroz Hassan Khan points out that states without

134
Thomson, ‘Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics,’ Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960,
p. 36.
135
Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 220.
 84

credible security guarantees from allies and faced with security threats from powerful
neighbours are essentially “orphan states”136 and in his view Israel and Pakistan fall in this
category. Such was the severity of their security dilemma that, neither security guarantees
nor conventional forces could assure their survivability and therefore both states opted for
nuclear weapons as ultimate guarantors of their security.137

136
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, op. cit., p. 70. The term “orphan states” has been used by Michael
Mandelbaum in “Lessons for the Next War,” Foreign Affairs, 74, March/April 1995, p. 28-30.
137
Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 204.
 85

Chapter-3

Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine

3.1 Preamble:

This chapter will explore the reasons for Pakistan’s pre-1998 inability to formulate
a nuclear use doctrine or to contemplate various choices that would be available in terms of
the nature and type of nuclear doctrine as and when it would decide to operationalise its
nuclear capability. It will provide a theoretical overview of the nature and types of military
doctrines in general and nuclear doctrine in particular. It will then trace Pakistan’s efforts
to formulate a suitable doctrine in the aftermath of its nuclear tests in May 1998
encompassing the broad contours of the early doctrinal thinking, gradual maturing of the
understanding of the nuances of nuclear doctrines and the current approach to nuclear
deterrence. In view of the fact that Pakistan has not pronounced a formalised nuclear
doctrine one has to delve into and comb through the statements by senior Pakistani
leadership with oblique or direct references to the salient features of its nuclear doctrinal
preferences. As Peter Lavoy points out, “Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear
employment doctrine. But this does not mean there is no doctrine. Pakistan has operational
plans and requirements for nuclear use integrated within its military war-fighting plans.”1
The study of the progression from a non-existent nuclear doctrine to a fairly mature
understanding and articulation of various aspects and implications of the doctrinal choices
will also provide an insight into the nature and quality of nuclear doctrinal learning in
Pakistan.

The covert nature of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme between 1972 and
1998 that was designed to mitigate the international non-proliferation pressures, also meant
that there could be no public debate over the nature and type of nuclear doctrine Pakistan
would need, whenever the nuclear capability would be operationalised. Surprisingly

1
Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation’, in Henry D. Sokolski
ed., ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War’, January 2008, p. 135. Available at,
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
 86

though neither the military nor the civilian institutions initiated even an internal debate to
shape the ideas about a nuclear use doctrine. As a result, the intellectual aspects of the
nuclear development lagged far behind the technological progress. In the wake of nuclear
tests in May 1998, Pakistan was faced with the challenge of bridging this gap. Pakistan
promptly set about accomplishing this task and an initial blue print of the doctrine was
prepared within a few months. The delineation of doctrinal objectives helped in
determining the configuration of the nuclear forces including the tentative requirement of
nuclear warheads and the number and types of delivery systems. This in turn helped lay
down developmental and production goals for the strategic organisations within the
existing resource constraints.2 Pakistan however, chose not to formally pronounce a
nuclear doctrine preferring ambiguity over a clearly articulated nuclear doctrine, despite
pressures to respond to India’s pronouncement of its Draft Nuclear Doctrine on 17th of
August 1999.3 This doctrinal opacity while complicating the adversary’s calculations has
also led to highly speculative interpretations of Pakistan’s perceived nuclear doctrinal
goals.

3.2 Military Doctrine - its Significance, Role and Manifestations:

A military doctrine can provide guidance for employment of military forces on the
battle field, offer direction for training of the forces for combat during peace time or to
dictate the adoption of an appropriate military posture to deter aggression or overawe the
enemy.4 According to Scott Sagan, “Military doctrine consists of plans about how and
5
when military force is to be used.” Depending on the geo-strategic environment of a
country, its resource base, including human resources, availability of strategic materials,
industrial potential, communication infrastructure and relative strength vis-a-vis its
adversary, a country would choose either an offensive or a defensive doctrine. The doctrine
could be aimed at achieving decisive victory in war or could have more limited objectives.
2
Author’s personal experience being part of the team of officers constituted on 30 th of May 1998, in the
Army Headquarters immediately after the last nuclear test on 30 May 1998.
3
Complete Text of India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine based on the report of National Security Advisory Board
can is available at Appendix 4 to P. R. Chari, Sonika Gupta and Arpit Rajain eds., ‘Nuclear Stability in
Southern Asia,’ New Delhi, 2003, Manohar, p. 184-88.
4
Greg Austin, ‘The Sources of Military Doctrine – Lessons from the Cold War about Scholars and the
Intelligence Community’, Australian Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No: 18, University College,
University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, p.1.
5
Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’, in Peter R. Lavoy,
Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz eds., Planning the Unthinkable, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and
London, 2000, p. 17.
 87

It will determine, especially in case of a nuclear conflict, whether the preferred targets
would be military (counter-force) or cities and major industrial hubs (counter-value) or
opposing leadership and command and control (decapitation) or some combination of
these. It would also indicate whether the ultimate objective is war deterrence or war
fighting.

Some analysts such as former U.S. Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, have
emphasised the transient nature of military doctrines. In his view, “doctrines control the
minds of men only in periods of non-emergency. They do not necessarily control the minds
of men during periods of emergency. In the moment of truth, when the possibility of major
devastation occurs, one is likely to discover sudden changes in doctrine.”6

Scott Sagan has explained the military doctrine using the ‘Organisation,’ ‘Realism’
and the ‘Strategic Culture’ theories as his frames of reference. He concludes after
examining the organisation theory that, military planners because of their professional
training and experience develop a tendency to focus mainly on military factors directly
impacting on military operations to the neglect of political considerations and as an
organisation the military also harbours ‘parochial interests’. As a consequence of this
outlook, the militaries in Sagan’s view have a bias towards adoption of offensive doctrines
which in addition to making their planning simpler, also legitimises their demands for an
increased share in the budget, since much larger forces are needed to conduct offensive as
compared to defensive operations. In his view, firstly, militaries are inclined to favour
‘preventive wars.’ Secondly, military officers doubt the ability of civilian leaders to control
the escalation and thus do not want them to interfere in operational planning. Third, a
penchant for seizing the initiative will lead the military officers to push for ‘pre-emptive
strikes’ or at least the adoption of ‘launch on warning’ strategies. Fourth, military officers
would prefer counter-force targeting as compared to ‘counter-value targets, to reduce the
ability of enemy forces to attack and kill their own forces. Fifth, because of preferences for
pre-emption and launch on warning the militaries are not very keen to develop secure
second strike capabilities.7

6
James Schlesinger quoted in Brigadier V.K. Nair, ‘Nuclear India’, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1992,
p. 135.
7
Sagan, op. cit., p. 18-22.
 88

Sagan’s apparently very cogent arguments are based on broad generalisations and
stereo-typing of military organisations and are mainly grounded in his study of the US
military history. The US military’s world-view has always been influenced by abundance
of resources, technological superiority and the political primacy of the United States in the
international system. Most of the militaries around the world do not enjoy these advantages
and there are many other variables in different sets of rivalries among nation states that
determine the choices that each military makes in adopting the doctrine most suited to its
peculiar requirements.

Sagan suggests that military’s preferences and biases will affect the state policy in
three different ways. First, in the states, which lack even the nominal civilian control over
the military, the military will be the final arbiter in the choice of a doctrine. Second, even
in countries with effective civilian control over the military, the ability of the civilian
leadership is severely curtailed due to the fact that they are not well prepared to grasp the
complexities of the military doctrine. Third, even if the civilians are well informed the
military officers are likely to put direct or indirect pressures on the decision makers to lead
them to the doctrine preferred by the military.8 The second assertion is a clear admission of
the fact that lack of civilian oversight of military plans cannot always be blamed on the
militaries’ reluctance to accept civilian guidance. In many cases, it is the inability of the
civilian leadership to understand the complexities of modern warfare, that inhibits them
from exercising effective control over military planning and therefore they are more
inclined to abdicate their prerogatives to the military.

According to realists, doctrine is considered to be a rational response to threat

perception and that the anarchic nature of the international system compels states to take
all possible measures to protect their respective national security interests including
internal as well as external balancing.9 Barry Posen in his Sources of Military Doctrine has
discussed various choices, states can make, in terms of their doctrines depending on their
circumstances. For instance, states that desire to change the status quo will need offensive
weapons and would adopt offensive doctrines to realise their objectives. In the second
category are states, which would adopt offensive doctrines, in order to defend their
vulnerable allies. The third category comprises states that are faced with multiple enemies,
8
Sagan, op. cit., p. 22.
9
Ibid, p. 23.
 89

and would prefer to adopt offensive doctrines to be able to deal with their enemies
sequentially.10 However, Posen’s formulations were essentially based on the European
military experiences during the two World Wars and these precepts are rooted in the pre-
nuclear era with limited relevance for the nuclear age.

Amongst the realist thinkers, Glen Snyder has introduced the concept of ‘the
stability-instability paradox,’ which posits that, “greater the stability of the strategic
balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at its lower level of
violence.”11 Robert Jervis has summed up the same dilemma as follows: “To the extent that
the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at
lower levels of violence.”12 Paul Nitze on the other hand has introduced the term “counter
deterrent doctrine,” implying that states armed with both conventional and non-
conventional weapons, confronted with similarly armed adversaries, may use the
unconventional weapons as a shield behind which they could undertake conventional
aggression without fear of escalation by the adversary.13 However, neo-realist scholars
such as Kenneth Waltz disagree with these ideas and believe that all states would exercise
restraint in the use of their un-conventional weapons and keeping in mind the serious risks
of retaliation would only use these weapons for deterrence purposes.14 In the same context
Sagan has argued that evidence from Cold War history suggests that ‘revisionist powers’
would use their nuclear weapons as a buffer to enable them to launch conventional
aggression.

Proponents of the organisation theory and the realists differ on the impact of
civilian control of military or lack thereof, on the nature of doctrine. The organisational
theorists believe that doctrinal decisions will be influenced by military’s preferences, in
states where military plays a dominant role. The realists, however, are of the view that
military officers even when in control of the government are compelled to make rational
decisions on the basis of their national interests. The organisational theorists, however,
concede that the highly technical nature of military planning becomes a limiting factor in

10
Barry Posen, ‘Sources of Military Doctrine’, p. 59-79, quoted in Scott Sagan, op. cit., p. 24.
11
Glenn Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury ed., The Balance of Power,
San Francisco, Chandler, 1965, p. 184-201.
12
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 31.
13
Paul Nitze, ‘Deterring our Deterrent’, Foreign Policy, No. 25 (Winter 1976-77): p. 196, quoted in Sagan,
op. cit. p. 26.
14
Kenneth Waltz, ‘More May be Better’, in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 1-45.
 90

civilian oversight which is further restricted during crises and wartime due to paucity of
time to modify the plans.15

‘Strategic Culture’ theorists argue that, choice of doctrines and strategies is

influenced by the domestic political environment and cultural background of a country.
The military doctrines are, from this standpoint, ingrained in the ‘historical experience,’
the ‘myths’ related to national historical experience and societal ‘norms.’ Under the
influence of these factors different states faced with comparable strategic environments are
likely to select different doctrines.16 Neo-culturists on their part, take into account, the
nexus between domestic politics and strategic culture and the resultant restrictions the
militaries have to contend with in the process of formulation of their doctrines. They also
pay more attention to ‘moral norms’ and ‘cultural taboos’ that are likely to influence a
leader’s preferences especially in the nuclear domain. The neo-realists also contend that
civilian leaders try to influence military policy in ways that will increase their own
political stock, not necessarily for furtherance of national interests.17

Elizabeth Kier disagrees with the assertion of the exponents of organisation theory
that, militaries are biased towards offensive doctrines and believes instead that different
military organisations choose doctrines appropriate for them, on the basis of their historical
experiences and the shaping of their mind set through different training regimes.18 She
argues that the political leadership may not try to directly influence the military’s doctrinal
choices, but they can achieve the same by indirect means that is to say through budgetary
decisions and their preferences for certain weapon systems or types of forces. 19 They could
do this by sanctioning the budget for acquisition of a particular type of weapon systems
and may deny funds for some others. The most recent example is the US Congress
allocating budget for development or retention of certain weapon systems the Pentagon
doesn’t want. These weapons include, the Global Hawk block 30 Drone programme, the
C-27 J Spartan cargo aircraft, upgrades to the M1 Abrams tank, Air National Guard

15
Sagan, op. cit. p. 29.
16
Sagan, op. cit. p. 30.
17
Ibid, p. 31.
18
Ibid, p. 32.
19
Ibid, p. 32-33.
 91

funding, and a proposed East Coast missile defence system. Congress has also forced the
Pentagon to retain the ageing fleet of A-10 strike aircraft.20

In a recent study on nuclear postures Vipin Narang has employed a different

criterion to categorise nuclear postures as under:-

1) Catalytic Posture:21 This kind of posture is adopted by weak and vulnerable

states, based on ambiguous nuclear capabilities and is designed to attract the
military or diplomatic intervention by powerful international players on their
side through their nuclear posturing. He cites Israel’s approach during the 1973
war in the Middle East and Pakistan’s conduct during several crises during the
1980s and in 1990 to illustrate his point.
2) Assured Retaliation Posture:22 This posture is aimed at directly deterring
nuclear threats and coercion and requires an assured second strike capability.
He includes Chinese and Indian nuclear postures in this category.
3) Asymmetric Escalation Posture:23 This posture calls for ‘rapid’ first use of
nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack and requires a high degree of
operational preparedness. NATO and French postures against the Soviet Union
during the Cold War and the current French and Pakistani postures are cited as
examples of this posture.
The foregoing discussion amply highlights the complex interplay of factors such as
organisational biases, hard-core realist compulsions and domestic political and cultural
pressures that influence the ultimate choice of a particular doctrine by a country. After
their respective nuclear tests in May 1998, both India and Pakistan declared their intentions
to adopt ‘credible minimum deterrence’ doctrines. Minimum deterrence itself is a vaguely
defined concept and addition of the term ‘credible’ with it makes it even harder to
understand. It may, therefore, be appropriate to amplify the meanings of the formulations
minimum deterrence and credible minimum deterrence before proceeding to analyse the
specifics of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and its evolution over the years since 1998.

20
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/congress-pushes-for-weapons-pentagon-didnt-want/nRC7w/
21
Vipin Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability.’ International
Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), p. 41-2.
22
Vipin Narang, op. cit., p. 43-4.
23
Ibid., p. 44-5.
 92

3.3 The Concept of Minimum Deterrence:

One of the simplest definitions of minimum deterrence states that, “Minimum

Deterrence is an attempt to prevent enemy attack through reliance on a small nuclear
retaliatory force capable of destroying a limited number of key targets.”24This definition,
however, does not provide any criteria for measuring either the size of the ‘small nuclear
retaliatory’ force or the ‘limited number of key targets.’ The qualifier ‘credible’ used by
both India and Pakistan adds another complication. The use of the term credible with
minimum deterrence indicates dissatisfaction and unease with minimal level of forces on
part of the two South Asian antagonists. They embraced the minimum deterrence concept
to alleviate international concerns about the possibility of an unbridled nuclear arms race in
South Asia and to present themselves as responsible nuclear capable states. However, by
adding the prefix ‘credible’ they expanded the scope of their respective nuclear arsenals to
be something more than minimal.

A prominent US expert of South Asian nuclear scene, Rodney W. Jones agrees

that, “the term credible is much more demanding criterion than ‘minimum deterrence’
might imply by itself.”25Commenting on the minimum deterrence postures of India and
Pakistan Rodney Jones has raised some very pertinent questions as under:-

Although the term ‘minimum’ rapidly became a fixture of the public discourse in
South Asia neither India nor Pakistan officially clarified, what the term minimum
means, leaving this open to speculation. Does minimum imply the sufficiency of
small numbers of nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons held in reserve? Low
readiness or alert rates of a nuclear force? Renunciation of nuclear war-fighting?
Mainly counter-value targeting? Or does the term ‘minimum’ merely make a virtue
of today’s facts of life in the subcontinent – limited resources, scarce weapons
material, unproved delivery systems, and still undeveloped capabilities?26

The context of some of the questions raised by Rodney Jones in 2001 has since
changed, due to substantial technological developments in South Asia. For instance, both
India and Pakistan have considerably enhanced their fissile material stockpiles over the last

24
John Baylis, Ken Booth et al eds., ‘Contemporary Strategy’ Vol-1, London, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 312.
25
Rodney W. Jones, ‘Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview’, Defence Threat
Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Final Report, October 1, 2001, p. 3.
26
Ibid, p. 2-3.
 93

decade. Similarly, they have been regularly conducting missiles flight tests and the proven
systems have been integrated into the military forces. Cruise missiles have also been
developed and tested by the two countries and missiles with increasingly longer ranges
have been fielded. All these developments indicate a maturing of their respective
operational nuclear capabilities. However, neither country has clarified in quantitative
terms the intended size of their prospective nuclear arsenals.

For instance, replying to a question about the size of India’s nuclear arsenal, the
former Indian Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh instead of clarifying the
situation added some additional layers of ambiguity stating that:-

“Minimum deterrence is not quantification. It is not a fixity. It is the enunciation

of a fixity. The principle is codified in cold war phraseology. It is to be determined
in accordance with the reality of an assessment of the security situation. And as the
security situation alters with time determination of minimum deterrence also
alters.”27

India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine at its subsection 2.3 also alludes to a similar
approach to credible minimum deterrence stating that, “This is a dynamic concept related
to strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The
actual size, components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in
the light of these factors.”28 According to a respected Indian analyst Rajesh Basrur, “the
concept of minimum deterrence has not been adequately spelled out and hence might be
undermined by pressures emanating from perceived threats or by groups with vested
interests.” 29

According to a report published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in 2011,

Pakistan was estimated to have 90-110 nuclear weapons and with likely average annual
production of 10 weapons per year it could by 2014 have 120-140 weapons.30 A similar
report on India’s nuclear arsenal published in 2012 estimates India’s arsenal at 80-100

27
Jaswant Singh, interview with India Today, January 11, 1999. Available at http://www.indianembassy.org
28
P.R. Chari, Sonika Gupta and Arpit Rajain, eds., ‘Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia’, New Delhi,
Manohar, 2003, p. 185-6.
29
Rajesh M. Basrur, ‘Nuclear India at the Cross Roads’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association,
Washington, DC, September 2003.
30
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 2011, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2011 67:91. Available at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/4/91
 94

weapons which could be projected to have grown to 100-120 weapons by 2014.31 Even
giving an allowance of 10% plus or minus in the estimated figures these cannot be
described as ‘small nuclear retaliatory forces’ as per the definition of minimum deterrence
and both countries continue to produce more fissile material to fabricate even more nuclear
weapons. Vipin Narang states that, “Pakistan describes its current nuclear doctrine as
‘credible minimum deterrence,’ but its salient features are anything but minimal and
emphasize all of the characteristics of a first use asymmetric escalation posture.”32

The concept of minimum deterrence derives from the unique characteristics of

nuclear weapons. Such is the destructive power of each individual nuclear weapon that
even a small number can cause unacceptable damage.33 This special quality of the nuclear
weapons gave rise to the idea of the ‘great equalising power of the atom,’ which was used
by the French strategists such as Andre Beaufre and Pierre Gallois to justify France’s
independent nuclear deterrence in the early 1960s. The argument is primarily based on the
fact that due to the tremendous destructive power of the nuclear weapons, there is no need
to match the adversary bomb for bomb and unlike conventional weapons numerical ratios
are immaterial.34 If the preceding argument is embraced in its true spirit it could help
dampen the arms racing tendencies driven by the action-reaction syndrome and therefore,
the overall size of the arsenal can be kept at a lower level.

From another stand point minimum deterrence posture is normally adopted when
the purpose of the nuclear forces is simply to deter nuclear attack or prevent a nuclear
blackmail, but if the objective is war fighting the requirement of nuclear weapons both in
terms of numbers and the variety of warheads and delivery systems is considerably higher.
The efficacy of minimum deterrence is historically proven by China’s case, wherein it was
able to deter the two super powers in the 1960s and 1970s with an arsenal which bore no
comparison with the huge nuclear stockpiles of US and the USSR. Even now China has
around 20 or so ICBMs capable of reaching the American homeland but its deterrence
remains credible. The situation will, however, change once the US deploys a fully
operational National Missile Defence System, which will force China to qualitatively as

31
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Indian Nuclear Forces 2012, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2012 68:96. Available at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/4/96
32
Vipin Narang, op. cit., p. 58.
33
Agha Shahi, et al op. cit.
34
Ibid.
 95

well as quantitatively upgrade its strategic nuclear deterrent. China was the first nuclear
power to adopt a No First Use Policy and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states. Given the size of the British and French nuclear forces compared with the Soviet/
Russian arsenal their nuclear posture could also be characterised as minimum deterrence.
However, one has to keep in mind the fact that their national deterrence forces were woven
into the overall deterrence architecture of the Western alliance and augmented by the US
strategic deterrence forces as well as its battlefield nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. It
would be worthwhile here to offer a brief overview of the doctrinal developments in the
five established nuclear powers USA, Russia, Britain, France and China to provide a
context for the doctrinal thinking in Pakistan. Amongst the aforementioned nuclear powers
the American nuclear doctrines have been the best documented and most widely discussed.
Due to the close dyadic security relationship between India and Pakistan and the
simultaneous commencement of their respective journeys along the road to nuclear
learning it would also be appropriate to describe the salient features of the Indian nuclear
doctrine because of its direct impact on Pakistani doctrinal choices.

3.4.1 US Nuclear Strategy:

The United States is the only country to have used the nuclear weapons in war
against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th of August 1945
respectively. However, the first ever employment of nuclear weapons took place in the
absence of any nuclear doctrine. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) considered it an
extension of its bombing campaign against major Japanese cities and industrial targets. It
was not until the 12th of January 1954 that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
pronounced the first ever nuclear doctrine in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations
in New York. This doctrine termed as the ‘massive retaliation doctrine’ relied upon the
threat of a massive nuclear retaliation to deter any Soviet military aggression against the
US or its allies. The role of the conventional forces was reduced to act only as a trip wire to
warn of an attack and then the nuclear weapons would be unleashed. This was, however, as
critics pointed out an incredible, inflexible and dangerous doctrine especially in case of a
limited military incursion by the Soviets. The targeting and employment policy however,
 96

was left at the discretion of SAC.35 At the time the massive retaliation doctrine was
adopted by the US the Soviet Union did not have long range bombers to carry out a
retaliatory strike against the US mainland while the US had the advantage of overseas
bases in Europe and Asia from where its strategic bombers could reach the Soviet
heartland. However, when the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite on 4 October 1957
which provided them the technological capability to convert this into long range ballistic
missiles the nature of threat radically changed and led to the creation of NASA and an
accelerated US space programme.36

In the early 1960s President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara,

carried out a detailed review of the nuclear strategy. Consequently, he announced first at a
meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in 1962 and later at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor the ‘Flexible Response Doctrine.’ The new doctrine emphasised flexibility in
response options, damage limitation, city avoidance and intra-war bargaining by allowing
for pauses between successive nuclear strikes. This doctrine was aimed at responding to
the threat with a corresponding level of force and gradually escalating from conventional
to tactical nuclear response, then on to the theatre nuclear weapons and finally, the
strategic nuclear exchange. Though, the doctrine was adopted by NATO as its official
nuclear doctrine in 1967 McNamara had started losing confidence in it. Its major weakness
was that the doctrine could only work in case the Soviet Union also agreed tacitly or
explicitly to the desirability of restraint. Amongst its other flaws were the impracticality of
damage limitation measures such as civil defence and the inability of NATO allies to
provide for larger conventional force levels envisaged by this doctrine. Compared with the
massive retaliation doctrine which was based on a simple punishment model of deterrence,
flexible response was based on war fighting or deterrence by denial model.37 It also
required a wider variety of nuclear weapons in much larger numbers. McNamara,
therefore, began to shift towards ‘Assured Destruction’ by 1965. It was envisaged that
assured destruction could be achieved by the ability to destroy 1/3rd to 1/5 th of Soviet
population and 3/4th to 1/2 of its industry. The advantage in specifying finite targets meant
that an upper ceiling could be fixed on the number of weapons required. However, by that

35
Colin McInnes & G.D. Sheffield eds., ‘Warfare in the Twentieth Century,’ London, Unwin Hyman, 1988,
p. 147.
36
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/
37
McInnes, op. cit., p. 148.
 97

time the Soviets had also reached a level of essential equivalence with the US and could
cause a similar amount of damage to the United States and as such the concept was re-
christened as ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ or MAD.38

In his message to Congress in 1970, President Nixon expressed his unease with the
MAD doctrine because this left the President only with a choice between ‘suicide’ or
‘surrender’. The review he ordered produced what came to be known as the ‘strategy of
limited nuclear options’ also known as the Schlesinger doctrine. This doctrine was a
nuclear war fighting doctrine but potential targets were grouped into small packages and
between successive packages there would be deliberate pauses to allow for a negotiated
ceasefire. The emphasis was on selectivity in targeting, avoiding hitting the cities and
keeping these as hostages (withholds) and focusing on counter force targets and Soviet
recovery economy while exercising restraint in the use of nuclear weapons. 39 The adoption
of this strategy was made possible by the availability of a large variety of warheads and
highly accurate delivery systems.

President Carter’s Secretary of Defence Brown announced Carter administration’s

new ‘Countervailing Strategy’ in July 1980. This was also a nuclear war fighting strategy
with the declared purpose of denying victory to the Soviets at every level of violence by
causing unacceptable damage. The strategy reiterated counter force targeting and
American ability to fight a prolonged nuclear war. The targets comprised Soviet nuclear
forces, other military targets, military and political leadership and war supporting and war
recovery industries.40

President Reagan who had been critical of Carter’s nuclear strategy during the
election campaign ordered a fresh review and consequently came up with what is called the
‘Prevailing Strategy.’ Whereas Carter’s countervailing strategy was designed to deny
victory to the Soviets, the new strategy was aimed at ensuring an American victory in
every eventuality. On 23rd of March 1983 Reagan announced his Strategic Defence
Initiative (SDI) commonly known as the ‘Star Wars,’ aimed at preventing any Soviet
missiles from entering the US airspace. This very expensive programme involved many
esoteric technologies and after an expenditure of scores of billions of dollars over three
38
Ibid., p. 149.
39
Ibid, p. 149-50.
40
Ibid, p. 150-51.
 98

decades is yet to become fully operational. Since then the US has issued several ‘nuclear
posture reviews’ with some adjustment in targeting priorities. American nuclear strategy
has been marked by a persistent dilemma of failure to find an entirely satisfactory nuclear
doctrine.41

The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review indicated departure from the existing US nuclear
policy in some key areas. There were at least three important features of the review that
attracted most criticism: first, possible use of nuclear weapons against chemical or
biological weapons use against US forces or its allies; second, inclusion of non-nuclear
states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria as possible nuclear targets; and
third, blurring of distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons by declaring the
intent to develop low yield earth penetrating nuclear warheads to be used against deep
underground bunkers.42 The April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review issued by the Obama
administration laid down five key objectives of US nuclear policy as under:-

1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;

2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;

3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;

4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and

5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.43

The 2010 NPR came after President Obama’s Prague speech wherein he had
expressed his desire to see a ‘nuclear-free world’ and on the eve of NPT Review
Conference in May 2010. The 2010 review has used a more nuanced language however, in
content there were only minor differences. For instance, whereas the 2002 NPR named
some non-nuclear countries as possible nuclear targets, the 2010 NPR stated the same as
follows: “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-

41
Ibid., p. 151.
42
http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf, http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-
archive/crs/8039.pdf, www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591,
43
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf
 99

proliferation obligations” after blaming North Korea and Iran for persistent violations of
their NPT obligations.44
It is evident from the foregoing that the US nuclear policy and doctrines have been
constantly undergoing changes due to changing nature of threat as well as technological
developments in weapons designs and delivery systems which provided them with a much
greater variety of options.
3.4.2 Soviet Nuclear Strategy:
Soviet nuclear strategy was influenced by several factors such as their historical
experience, ideological considerations and bureaucratic wrangling. They would try to
prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war but if it starts would fight and win it. The strategic
thinking was stifled by Stalin’s emphasis on his ‘permanently operating factors’ which
included size, quantity and the destruction of enemy forces in a land war. These factors
were relics of the traumatic Soviet experience of the Second World War and were more
relevant to a conventional war scenario. When Khrushchev took over in the mid-1950s he
showed his preference for a minimum deterrence strategy rather than Stalin’s preference
for quantitative superiority and called for a reduction in the conventional forces as well.
This new approach was necessitated partially by economic difficulties and partly by
Khrushchev’s greater confidence in the stability of strategic balance. His pro-nuclear
posture and his attempt to reduce the size of conventional forces earned him many critics at
home who characterised his strategy as “nuclear mania.”45 He assigned higher priority to
strategic forces and air defences which would play a decisive role in a nuclear conflict.
This attempt to degrade the importance of conventional forces coincided with his
‘adventurist’ foreign policy. Khrushchev’s policy between 1957 and 1962 has thus been
variously described as ‘missile diplomacy,’ ‘psycho-strategic warfare,’ and ‘rocket
rattling.’46

The most significant development in Soviet Union was, however, not in the
doctrinal domain but in the technological realm in the form of launching of ‘Sputnik’ space

44
‘Nuclear Posture Review Report April 2010’, Department of Defense, United States of America, available
at http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf
45
Ken Booth, Soviet Defence Policy, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams eds.,
Contemporary Strategy – II, London, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 64.
46
Ibid., p. 65.
 100

craft in 1957,47 which for the first time provided them the capability to directly threaten the
US mainland with a pre-emptive or retaliatory strike thus enhancing the credibility of their
strategic deterrence. Khrushchev, however, deliberately exaggerated the Soviet missile
capability which caused the fear of a missile gap in the US wherein it was felt that the US
was trailing behind the Soviet Union in the missile competition. This assessment led to a
redoubling of the American effort to build up their missile capability. This reckless policy
precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 which badly exposed Khrushchev’s rhetoric
and bluster and it was found that in reality it was not the US but the Soviet Union that was
falling behind in the nuclear race.48 From that point onwards Khrushchev relied more on
arms control diplomacy which resulted in the formulation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty
(PTBT) in 1963. Khrushchev was finally deposed in 1964. Despite all his failings he
brought the Soviet Union out of isolation of the Stalin years and Soviet missile and air
defence capabilities improved under his leadership.49

In the late 1960s and 1970s under Brezhnev and Kosygin the Soviet Union
achieved parity with the United States in terms of strategic offensive forces and land based
ICBMs. However, since Soviet ICBMs could carry heavier payloads and more powerful
warheads they had an overall superior destructive potential. In addition to these
achievements in the strategic forces the Soviets also enhanced the strategic airlift
capabilities of their conventional forces and had strengthened the overall capabilities of
their air force. These Soviet achievements led to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT) in 1972 which codified the strategic parity between the two super powers.50

In essence the Soviet strategy was meant to avert war failing which they were
prepared to fight and win it by resorting to pre-emptive strikes to limit the damage likely to
be caused by enemy’s retaliatory strikes. The Soviets preferred war fighting and showed no
inclination to embrace concepts such bargaining and limitation.51 After the demise of the
Soviet Union and the pre-eminence of US military power, the Russian Federation has
increased its reliance on nuclear weapons as their conventional military capabilities have
substantially declined overtime.

47
McInnes, op. cit., p. 152.
48
Ken Booth, op. cit., p. 65.
49
Ibid., p. 66.
50
Ibid., p. 67.
51
McInnes, op. cit., p. 154.
 101

3.4.3 British Nuclear Strategy:

British strategic discourse characterised nuclear weapons as the ‘great leveller’ that
could counter balance overwhelming Soviet advantage in conventional forces. After
Churchill’s return to power in 1951, Chiefs of Staffs prepared a ‘Global Strategy paper’
under the direction of Chief of Air Staff Sir John Slessor. The paper emphasised the
‘massive retaliatory power of nuclear weapons while assigning a very minor role to the
conventional forces,’ in a way predating Dulles’ Strategy of Massive Retaliation
enunciated in 1954. This concept came under severe criticism by analysts such as P.M.S.
Blackett, Liddell Hart and Anthony Buzzard. Buzzard on his part articulated a strategy of
‘Graduated Response’ making a distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
However, throughout the 1950s massive retaliation remained the official policy as was
evident in the 1957 Defence White Paper which emphasised greater reliance on nuclear
weapons and massive nuclear retaliation.52

The British debate also endeavoured to rationalise the need for an independent
British nuclear deterrent. Doubts were openly aired about the credibility of American
nuclear guarantees especially in the backdrop of the Suez crisis of 1956 in which the US
had refused to endorse the joint Franco-British-Israeli operation. However, the limitations
of the ‘independent’ deterrent became apparent when Britain purchased components for
‘Blue Streak Missile’, and after the abandonment of that project, acquired Skybolt missiles
and Polaris submarines from the US. Consequently, the 1962 Defence White Paper
adopted a more objective outlook, though the 1964 paper showed shades of Gaullist
approach and Britain’s position as a second centre of decision making was emphasised.53

According to Lawrence Freedman, “the attraction of this approach lies as much in

its diplomatic convenience as in the rigour of its strategic logic. It allows Britain to
maintain an independent force, while insisting that this is for the greater good of the
alliance.”54 Ironically, the British ‘independent’ deterrence has long been dependent on the
US supplied delivery systems from the Polaris SLBMs to the current Trident SLBMs and
whatever new system the British government would choose to replace Trident missiles
would also be acquired from the US.
52
Ibid, p. 155-56.
53
Ibid., p. 156.
54
McInnes, op. cit., p. 157.
 102

3.4.4 French Nuclear Strategy:

The French nuclear policy like the British was also predicated on considerations of
prestige and concerns about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantees based on
the question whether the Americans would be willing to sacrifice New York and
Washington for London and Paris. President De Gaulle’s strategic approach was aimed at
attaining French strategic autonomy and to restore its ‘grandeur.’ In his bid to justify the
need for an independent French nuclear deterrent, General De Gaulle enunciated in 1964,
the concept of “proportional deterrence” which has since then remained the centrepiece of
French strategic doctrine. He argued that, in the nuclear realm there was no need to match
the adversary bomb for bomb. Therefore, France can have an effective deterrent even with
a nuclear force constituting a small proportion of American and Soviet arsenals. The basic
requirement was to convince the aggressor of France’s ability to survive a first strike and
still cause unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. Early French doctrine was similar to
the doctrine of massive retaliation wherein on identification of a major aggression by the
enemy the complete French nuclear arsenal would be unleashed against adversary’s cities.
As with the US doctrine the French doctrine also underwent changes and provided the
decision makers with more options to choose from rather than the only option of a spasm
strike. These changes in approach were facilitated by the increasing size and variety of
nuclear weapons and were premised on the understanding that with the availability of
tactical nuclear weapons the conventional forces aided by the threat of use or actual use of
tactical nuclear weapons would make the enemy pause. However, if the enemy pursued its
offensive actions France would respond with the full might of its strategic nuclear forces –
a kind of a delayed massive retaliation.55

In March 1969, in a speech at the French Military Academy, the new French Chief
of Staff General Fourquet rejected the massive retaliation as well as the American doctrine
of Flexible Response that required meeting the aggression with adequate force at various
levels of conflict. Instead, he came up with the ‘graduated deterrence’ strategy that was
designed to raise the threshold of nuclear use to an optimal level somewhere between the
massive retaliation and flexible response. Fourquet was trying to find a balance between

John Baylis, ‘French Defence Policy,’ in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, eds.,
55

Contemporary Strategy-II, London, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 185.

 103

the all or nothing conception of massive retaliation and the watered down deterrence of
flexible response.56

The actual or threatened use of tactical nuclear weapons was seen as enhancing the
options for the decision makers. Once a major offensive was identified the tactical nuclear
weapons would be used as a “shot across the bow” to convey the seriousness of the French
resolve to escalate to a nuclear exchange if required. The process of change in French
strategic thinking was carried forward by General Mery in his speeches delivered in 1976.
He rejected the notion of ‘total sanctuary’ or ‘Fortress France’ for his new concept of
‘enlarged sanctuary’ which meant a forward battle, which would also entail greater
coordination with NATO forces in Germany. Mery disapproved the massive retaliation and
was amenable to a graduated deterrence strategy which closely resembled the Flexible
Response strategy adopted by NATO in 1967.57 According to John Baylis the
‘demonstrative use’ of tactical nuclear weapons remains an important feature of French
policy. However, he also points out that President Giscard d’Estaing in the mid-1970s and
General Fourquet before him had also hinted at the possibility for their use as battlefield
weapons. There were critics like General Gallois who questioned the utility of tactical
nuclear weapons as well as proponents such as Colonel Geneste who argued in favour of a
well prepared tactical nuclear defence supported with shelters, concealment and deception
measures to fight and defeat a Soviet offensive.58 In Colin McInnes’s view, however,
General Guy Mery’s strategy implied that tactical nuclear weapons were to be used as
battlefield weapons rather than warning shots.59

French President Jacques Chirac announced a new French nuclear doctrine in

January 2006 which has profound implications and major departures from traditional
French doctrinal thinking. Some of the elements of the new doctrine had already been
alluded to by Chirac in a speech in June 2001. The new doctrine emphasises France’s new
objective of deterring regional powers and its ability to employ more flexible and usable
nuclear options. Basically the doctrine aims at deterring state sponsors of terrorism by
threatening to cripple their ‘capacity to act’ by using techniques such as detonating nuclear

56
Baylis, op. cit., p. 186.
57
Ibid., p. 187.
58
Ibid.
59
McInnes, op. cit., p. 159.
 104

weapons at very high altitudes to create a strong Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to destroy
the targeted state’s communications and command and control structures and using nuclear
armed missiles with fewer warheads than they can carry. A significant aspect of the
doctrine is inclusion of ‘strategic supplies’ as one of France’s vital interests, whose
disruption could evoke a nuclear response from France. As elaborated by then Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe in 1995 any use of chemical or biological weapons against France
would also be responded to with nuclear weapons. French policy in this regard is similar to
the British and American policy. Bruno Tertrais, a prominent French analyst, had pointed
out in 2003 that ‘vital interests’ principle could also be employed to deter attacks against
France with conventional missiles through a nuclear response by France. These recent
changes have greatly expanded the scope of French nuclear deterrent from its traditional
objective of deterring great powers.60

3.4.5 Chinese Nuclear Strategy:

The Chinese chose to pursue their national nuclear programme as a result of failure
of their erstwhile ally USSR to unambiguously support them during the Quemoy Crisis in
1958, while the US supporting Taiwan had openly threatened the use of nuclear weapons
against the mainland Chinese targets in case of a Communist Chinese invasion of the
islands.61The Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated after the crisis and the Chinese
leadership was convinced that they cannot rely on the Soviet support in any future crisis.
They were also convinced that they would be subjected to nuclear blackmail in any future
crisis as well. Therefore, they decided to acquire a nuclear capability of their own and
conducted their first nuclear test in October 1964. However, the Chinese approach to
nuclear weapons is unique and doesn’t resemble either the Western or the Soviet thinking.
Even after acquiring the nuclear capability Chinese defence strategy continued to depend
mainly on the strength of their conventional forces and the people’s war concept.

60
David S. Yost, ‘France’s New Nuclear Doctrine’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International
Affairs), Vol. 82, No. 4 (Jul 2006), p. 701-721. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3874154.Accessed on
12/01/2014.
61
See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/quemoy_matsu.htm. Also see
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the%20china%20post/joe%20hung/2008/08/23/171420/Why-
Quemoy.htm
 105

Chinese were the first nuclear power to declare a minimum deterrence doctrine, a
‘no first use policy,’ and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Since they
did not view nuclear weapons as war fighting weapons, this doctrine suited their
requirements very well. Consequently, they have maintained a rather small nuclear arsenal
which is estimated to be around 250 weapons.62 China was able to deter both the US and
the Soviet Union with this small arsenal which constituted a very small fraction of their
vast nuclear inventory, thereby proving the efficacy of the concept of minimum nuclear
deterrence. Countries like Pakistan can learn useful lessons from the Chinese example. The
Chinese have, however, not elaborated their nuclear policy beyond the aforementioned
basic tenets. Similarly no details about the Chinese nuclear command and control structure
are known except that the control of nuclear weapons stays with the Central Military
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

3.4.6 Salient Features of Indian Nuclear Doctrine:

India’s then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra announced what was termed
as a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) on 17 August 1999.63 The six page document was
prepared by the 32 member National Security Advisory board (NSAB) comprising former
civil and military officials and academics nominated by the Indian government, under the
leadership of veteran Indian strategic expert K. Subrahmanyam. It was announced that the
document would have to be approved by the Indian government for it to become official
policy. The salient features of the DND are as under:-

 India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence.

 India will have a ‘no first use’ (NFU) policy but will respond with punitive
retaliation should deterrence fail.

 India will maintain sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces,
capable of shifting from peacetime deployment to fully employable force in the
shortest time.

62
McInnes, op. cit., p. 160-61.
63
Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August 1999, Appendix
4 to P.R. Chari, Sonika Gupta and Arpit Rajain eds., Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia’, Manohar, New
Delhi, 2003, p. 184-88.
 106

 A robust command and control system with effective intelligence and early
warning capabilities would be established, for which space-based and other assets
shall be created. Authority for the release of nuclear weapons will vest in the
person of the Prime Minister of India, or his designated successor(s).

 Comprehensive planning and training for operations will be carried out in line with
the strategy.

 India will demonstrate the political will to employ nuclear forces.

 Highly effective conventional military capabilities will be maintained to raise the

threshold of outbreak of both conventional as well as nuclear war.

 India will have effective, diverse, flexible and responsive nuclear forces based on a
triad of land based missiles, aircraft and sea based assets.

 Survivability will be ensured through redundancy, mobility, dispersion and

deception.

 India shall not accept any restraints on its R&D capability and will continue to
conduct sub-critical nuclear tests even if it decides to sign the CTBT at a future
date.

 India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS),
other than those which are aligned to any nuclear power.

The DND however, neither defined the country/countries against whom, India’s
deterrence was directed, nor did it outline the command and control structure. The
document retained its draft status until on 04 January 2003 India’s Cabinet Committee on
Security (CCS) issued a one page document which besides providing the broad contours of
India’s nuclear command and control also reiterated some of the salient points of the DND
with some nuanced changes. However, it has never been clarified whether DND has been
superseded by the new document or whether those points of the draft doctrine that have not
appeared in the new document have been discarded. For instance, the new document does
not mention anything about operational preparedness, creation of space based assets for
early warning, planning and training for nuclear operations or creation of a triad of land,
 107

air and sea based forces. Neither does it talk of unrestrained R&D and conducting sub-
critical tests. The important points of the new document are as follows:-

 Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.

 A posture of no first use.

 Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict

unacceptable damage.
 Retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political
leadership through NCA (Nuclear Command Authority).
 No use of weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.

 In the event of a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere, by

biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating
with nuclear weapons.

 A continuance of controls on export of nuclear and missile related

materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Materials Cut-Off
Treaty negotiations and observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.64

A closer look at the new document reveals that India has declared its intention to
retaliate with nuclear weapons against any use of chemical or biological weapons against
India or Indian forces anywhere. This formulation has not only expanded the threshold of
its nuclear use but extended its geographical scope beyond Indian-territory thereby,
virtually negating the no first use and retaliatory nuclear use commitments. While the
DND talked of a ‘punitive retaliation’ against a nuclear first strike against India, the new
document has replaced it with a more aggressive ‘massive retaliation.’

3.5 Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine:

The historical experience of other nuclear powers suggests that it is not possible to
devise an enduring doctrine that is impervious to changes in the security environment or

64
Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release 4th January 2003.
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html. See also C. Raja Mohan,
‘Nuclear Command Authority Comes into Being,’ The Hindu, 05 January 2003.
 108

technological breakthroughs. As a prime example the US nuclear doctrine continually

changed from ‘Massive Retaliation’ (1954) to ‘Flexible Response’ (1963), to ‘Mutual
Assured Destruction’ (mid 1960s onward), to ‘Limited Nuclear Options’ (early 1970s), to
‘Countervailing Strategy’ (late 1970s) to ‘Prevailing Strategy’ (early 1980s) and finally to
‘Strategic Defence Initiative’ in 1983. It would, therefore, be unfair to expect that the
Pakistani nuclear doctrine will remain static. It is obvious from the historical experience
and from lessons learnt during the first decade and a half of nuclearized South Asia that
Pakistani nuclear doctrine would also continue to evolve and adjust to the ever-changing
strategic landscape and advancements in weapons and their delivery systems. As it gains
more experience and acquires more advanced and sophisticated technologies its doctrinal
thinking will also undergo a metamorphosis. Despite the fact that Pakistan has the
advantage of hindsight it is still too early for it to have found definitive answers to its
nuclear dilemmas. The current situation should, therefore, be considered a transient phase
in the evolving doctrinal thinking. It is also important to recognise that India and Pakistan
are in a very close dyadic nuclear relationship and given their historic rivalry dominated by
the ‘action-reaction’ syndrome, it is obvious that one country cannot remain oblivious to
the developments in the other.

Peter R. Lavoy in his analysis of the premises of Pakistan’s nuclear posture has
stated that the fundamental principle of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy was outlined by
Z.A. Bhutto as far back as December 1974 citing his statement that: “Ultimately, if our
backs are to the wall and we have absolutely no option, in that event, this decision about
65
going nuclear will have to be taken.” It may however, be unfair to characterise this
statement which implies a last resort policy, as a nuclear weapons’ use policy mainly due
to its timing. The statement was made at a time when Pakistan had just initiated its nuclear
weapons effort and it was too early to predict whether Pakistan will ultimately succeed in
its endeavour or not, given the almost insurmountable technological and political odds it
was faced with. What Bhutto implied by ‘going nuclear’ at the time was not about the
employment of nuclear weapons in war. He was, in fact, signalling to the United States
that he would be compelled to seek the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability unless

Z.A. Bhutto reported in The Pakistan Times, 27 December 1974, quoted in Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s
65

Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation’, in Henry D. Sokolski ed., ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Future:
Worries Beyond War’, January 2008, p. 135. Available at, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
 109

Pakistan’s precarious security situation was addressed by removing sanctions and

restrictions on the supply of conventional weapons. The American response, however,
came a bit too late when in July 1976 on a mission to persuade Bhutto to retract his
agreement to procure a nuclear reprocessing plant from France, Henry Kissinger offered to
sell 110 A-7 fighter aircraft as a quid-pro-quo. The offer was, however, turned down by
Bhutto on the counsel of his senior advisors.66

3.5.1 Early Thoughts:

In one of the earliest public articulations of what was considered to be a prospective

nuclear doctrine for Pakistan, three former high-ranking officials including former Foreign
Minister Agha Shahi, former Foreign Secretary and later Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar
and former Air Chief, Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan published a joint newspaper article in
October 1999. It cannot be definitively concluded whether the timing of the article was
coincidental or it was in response to the announcement of India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine a
few weeks earlier. However, given the fact that Pakistan had not declared any nuclear
doctrine at the time, these former officials who by virtue of their senior positions had good
insight and understanding of strategic issues67 in all probability might have thought it
prudent to provide a template for a Pakistani nuclear doctrine. Michael Krepon has also
observed that the article was published after India’s NSAB had released its DND
document68 implying that the article by these three senior former officials was in response
to the enunciation of India’s draft Nuclear Doctrine. It may also be pointed out that these
veteran officials who were neither privy to nor part of the actual policy formulation post-
1998,69 rightly recognized that Pakistan cannot afford to squander its limited economic
resources on building up an unnecessarily large arsenal exceeding Pakistan’s legitimate

66
Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2004, Oxford University Press, Karachi,
67
Agha Shahi had been part of the 3 member oversight & coordination committee established by Prime
Minister Bhutto and retained by General Zia to oversee the Uranium enrichment project besides being the
Pakistani representative in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee and at the UN during NPT
negotiations, Zulfiqar Khan was a former Chief of Air Staff and Abdul Sattar had been ambassador in Vienna
and later Foreign Secretary.
68
Michael Krepon, Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability, Henry L. Stimson Center, 2012, p.
8. See http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/krepon_Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf
69
The draft nuclear doctrine and proposed command and control structure had been formulated by a small
team of officers including this author at GHQ by end 1998. The documents were presented to the Prime
Minister in April 1999 after approval by the Army Chief in February. However, the government had not
accorded its formal approval until it was deposed on 12 October 1999. Incidentally the GHQ had also
recommended a ‘credible minimum deterrence’ doctrine.
 110

security needs. Therefore, they suggested that it should avoid entering into a futile arms
competition with India, which it could never hope to win, arguing that:-

“Although the precise contingencies in which Pakistan might use nuclear weapons
have not been articulated or perhaps even defined by the government, the
assumption has been that if the enemy launches a general war…threatening to
occupy large territory or communication junctions, the ‘weapon of last resort’
would have to be invoked.”70

They made a compelling case for ‘minimum deterrence’ by ruling out the
possibility of nuclear war fighting considering it futile due to large disparity in the
geographical sizes and resource bases of India and Pakistan, adding that:-

“Deterrence was the sole aim and a small arsenal was considered adequate. At no
time did Pakistan contemplate use of nuclear weapons for war fighting or seek to
develop capability for a pre-emptive attack. Apart from the obvious constraint of
resources, it was not so unrealistic as to entertain such thoughts. India is too large
and too well armed to be vulnerable to a disabling strike. Besides, any such attempt
would provoke retaliation with disastrous consequences. Pakistan’s purpose
warranted no more than a minimalist approach…”71

This line of argument clearly indicated a realistic approach to deterrence, keeping

in view the existing power disparities vis-à-vis India. Interestingly, these analysts
recommended a ‘minimalist approach’ in line with the common conception of ‘minimum
deterrence’ and they did not use the term ‘credible minimum deterrence’ in their article.
However, they refrained from suggesting any numbers to quantify the size of Pakistan’s
nuclear forces. They argued instead that minimum deterrence is not an abstract number,
which remains constant, but rather a dynamic concept capable of changing with the
changing circumstances thus opening up the possibility of an ever expanding arsenal. They
thought the efficacy of Pakistan’s deterrent could only be maintained by keeping the size
of the force flexible, explaining that:

“Minimum deterrence has been and should continue to be the guiding principle of
Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit. Of course minimum cannot be defined in static

70
Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Khan and Abdul Sattar, “Securing Nuclear Peace,” The News International, October 5,
1999. Also reproduced in P.R. Chari, et al., eds., Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia, pp. 189-194.
71
Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Khan and Abdul Sattar, op. cit.
 111

numbers. In the absence of mutual restraints, the size of Pakistan’s arsenal and its
deployment pattern have to be adjusted, to ward off dangers of pre-emption and
interception. Only then can deterrence remain efficacious.”72

Speaking at a seminar at Islamabad in November 1999, one of the authors of the

article, Abdul Sattar, who had by then become the Foreign Minister in the Government of
General Pervez Musharraf, explained that Pakistan was compelled to go nuclear to deter
aggression, prevent war, and to safeguard its peace and security. Its decision was in no way
motivated by any pretensions to great power status or desire for regional domination. He
emphasized Pakistan’s determination not to get embroiled in a nuclear arms race with
India, repeating the earlier statement that:
“Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear
strategy. The minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian build up
would necessitate review and re-assessment…But we shall not engage in any
nuclear competition or arms race”.73

This point was again reiterated during an international seminar on Command and
Control of Nuclear Weapons held at Islamabad in February 2000, when former Foreign
Minister Agha Shahi invoked the traditional action-reaction syndrome that has dominated
Indo-Pakistani relations for over six decades. Arguing that, since India wanted to keep the
size of its minimum deterrent flexible and subject to change with changing circumstances,
Pakistan would perforce have to respond with equivalent flexibility in its own conception
of a minimum deterrent.74

Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar provided further insight into Pakistan’s nuclear
doctrine while speaking at the National Defence College in May 2000 stating that:-
“For the past decade or so, nuclear capability has been the bedrock of our defence
and security policy...its sole purpose is to deter and prevent war. Unlike some other
countries, Pakistan neither aspires to great power status or permanent membership
of the Security Council nor nourishes any design for regional dominance…We
support a global, non-discriminatory international regime of nuclear and missile
restraints, voted for the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty], will participate
in negotiations for FMCT [Fissile Material Cut off Treaty], and are prepared to

72
Ibid.
73
Strategic Issues, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, March 2000, p. 2–3.
74
Ibid.
 112

strengthen our existing stringent controls against export of strategic weapons

technology. Our policy of Minimum Credible Deterrence will obviate any strategic
arms race…the idea of no-first-use of nuclear weapons needs to be expanded into a
no-first-use of force, lest the former should be interpreted to sanction first use of
conventional weapons”.75
The logic of dynamic and flexible deterrence constantly adjusting to any expansion
in the adversary’s arsenal is seemingly contradictory to the commonly understood
conception of minimum deterrence and can potentially lead down a slippery slope towards
an unintended arms race. It also opens up the possibilities of an open ended increase in the
number of nuclear weapons.

Other hints on Pakistan’s nuclear policy can be found in the statements made at the
highest levels of leadership. Former President Musharraf, for instance, used the term
“minimum defensive deterrence,”76 in some of his statements, which apparently was meant
to convey the same meaning as credible minimum deterrence, but with an emphasis on the
defensive nature of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. Highly placed Pakistani officials have
suggested that the most credible and authentic source of Pakistan’s nuclear policy and
posture can be found in the Press Statements issues after the meetings of the National
Command Authority (NCA).77 Michael Krepon has also hinted at this by stating that,
“Succinct authoritative reaffirmations of doctrine are usually embedded in press releases
by the military’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate after missile flight
tests or after meetings of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA).” 78 Moreover,
Pakistani officials have repeatedly stated that Pakistan’s nuclear policy is built around the
twin principles of restraint and responsibility79 and is driven by its security concerns, in a
bid to highlight the contrast with India’s pretensions to global power status. Pakistan has

75
Abdul Sattar, address at the National Defence College, Islamabad, May 24, 2000.
76
‘No Compromise on minimum deterrence’, The News, Islamabad, April 6, 2005.
77
Author’s interviews with very senior officials at the NCA on August 7, 2012. See
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-nca_press_release_archive
78
Michael Krepon, op. cit., p. 8.
79
Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, ‘Pakistan’s Evolution as A Nuclear Weapons State’, address at
CCC, 27 October 2006. http://www.nps.edu. Also see the Press Release issued after the 16th NCA meeting on
January 13, 2010, No PR11/2010-ISPR available at https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
nca_press_release_archive
 113

also made it clear that its nuclear deterrence is aimed at India, 80 which makes its
calculations much simpler as compared to India which has to take into account China as
well.

In January 2002, in the midst of the brewing crisis with India, following a militant
attack on the Indian parliament, Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Director
General of the Strategic Plans Division, gave a rare interview to two visiting Italian
scientists. When repeatedly pressed by the visitors during the interview to elaborate
Pakistan’s potential nuclear ‘red lines’ he explained the thresholds, a combination of some
or all of which could potentially create a situation wherein Pakistan’s very existence is
imperilled, could trigger a Pakistani nuclear response. The four thresholds are as under:-
 India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold).
 India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military threshold).
 India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic strangling – which
could be in the form of a naval blockade or disrupting water supplies from the
Indus rivers system).
 India pushes Pakistan into political destabilisation or creates a large-scale internal
subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilisation).81
In addition to the description of Pakistan’s possible nuclear thresholds, General
Kidwai also highlighted that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are kept separate from their
delivery systems but these can be assembled quickly. He also said that nuclear artillery is
not part of the Pakistani nuclear plans ‘at the moment’ adding that there are a range of
nuclear use options and that control of the nuclear weapons would not be delegated.82
When the interview was posted on the website of the Italian think tank it immediately
triggered a debate. The main criticism was focused on the thresholds, which were
considered by critics such as Ejaz Haider, to be too broad and too vaguely defined and they
especially found the fourth threshold incomprehensible. However, Pakistan’s history tells
us that such internal subversion had preceded India’s military intervention in the erstwhile
East Pakistan in 1971. In a scathing critique of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy, which he

80
P. Cotta-Ramusino and M. Martellini, A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network Centro Volta,
Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan, January 2002, Landau Network Centro
Volta, Como, Italy, January 21, 2002, http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/, also see Krepon, op. cit., p. 7.
81
P. Cotta-Ramusino and M. Martellini, Landau Network Centro Volta, Como, Italy, January 21, 2002,
http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/
82
Ibid.
 114

considered to be ‘flawed’ Ejaz Haider termed the fourth scenario as “outlandish and
vague”. He thought that:
“Pakistan wants to create deterrence stability in a situation of perpetual conflict and
threatens, if deterrence were to break down, to escalate to nuclear level. By
creating a linkage between nuclear capability and sub-conventional warfare, it has
sought to bring the nuclear threshold down and make space for low intensity
conflict without the fear of having to fight a large scale conventional conflict.” 83
He did not subscribe to the view that the ongoing military stand-off between India
and Pakistan meant a deterrence failure but considered the Pakistani nuclear strategy
flawed because in his view it had failed to prevent India from following a policy of
military brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy to extract concessions from Pakistan over
its Kashmir policy.84 On the other hand, Rodney Jones in a rejoinder to Haider’s article
argued that:
“This outline of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence posture is an entirely credible
statement of nuclear deterrence strategy, proportioned to Pakistan’s military
capabilities and overall security situation. Kidwai’s statement contains no hint of
vital ‘forward’ objectives, offers no nuclear umbrella to regional neighbours and
places no tactical nuclear rungs low down in the India-Pakistan nuclear escalation
ladder. It begs the question of course how Pakistan’s operational nuclear assets may
influence interaction with India during a confrontation or whether low-intensity
operations by either side are made easier by the nuclear shadow. But it contains no
promise that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence can prevent Indian military brinkmanship
or related political gains.” 85
A few months later President Pervez Musharraf in an interview with the German
magazine Der Spiegel reiterated the core assertion of General Kidwai’s interview with the
Italians about contemplating the use of nuclear weapons only when Pakistan’s very
existence was at stake stating that:-
“Nuclear weapons are the last resort. I am optimistic and confident that we can
defend ourselves with conventional means, even though the Indians are buying up
the most modern weapons in a megalomaniac frenzy…Nuclear weapons could be

83
Ejaz Haider, ‘Stable Deterrence and flawed Pakistani nuclear Strategy’, The Friday Times, February 08-14,
2002. www.thefridaytimes.com.
84
Ibid.
85
Rodney W. Jones, ‘Is stable nuclear deterrence feasible’? The Friday Times, February 22-28, 2002.
www.thefridaytimes.com.
 115

used…If Pakistan is threatened with extinction, then the pressure of our

countrymen would also be so big that this option, too would have to be
considered.”86

3.5.2 Gradual Maturing of Ideas:

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine seeks to not only counter Indian nuclear threat but also
to deter a conventional military aggression by India, thereby using nuclear weapons as an
equaliser to nullify the conventional asymmetries stacked in latter’s favour. This fact was
acknowledged by, former Indian Minister for External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, while
addressing a seminar in New Delhi. He said that, “The question that troubles us is that the
1998 nuclear tests by India conferred a kind of parity to Pakistan that it always
sought...explaining that this parity had come about as the deterrent quotient had been
altered after the nuclear tests.”87 Some analysts however, ascribe another and more sinister
objective to Pakistani nuclear doctrine, which is, to pursue a relentless sub-conventional
conflict against India. In order to force it to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, hoping
that India will be unable to raise the stakes due to fear of nuclear escalation.
In another public articulation of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrinal goals, after the often-
cited interview with the Italian scientists, Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, dealt
with the issue in an address at the Centre for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval
Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. He stated that, Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is
defensive, based on credible minimum deterrence and driven by its security concerns,
adding that, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear policy is based on restraint and responsibility with the
following main objectives:-
 Deterrence of all forms of external aggression.
 Ability to deter a counter-strike against strategic assets.
 Stabilisation of strategic deterrence in South Asia.
 [Employment of a combination of]Conventional and Strategic deterrence methods.88

86
Roger Boyes, “Musharraf Warns India He May Use Nuclear Weapons,’ Times Online, 8 April 2002,
available at http://www.nci.org/02/04f/08-06.htm , quoted in Peter R. Lavoy op. cit.
87
Jaswant Singh, ‘1998 Tests gave parity to Pakistan’, Press Trust of India/Sunday, November 28, 2010.
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_1998-nuclear-tests-gave-parity-to-pakistan-jaswant-singh_1473590-
all
88
Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, ‘Pakistan’s Evolution as A Nuclear Weapons State’, address at
CCC, 27 October 2006. http://www.nps.edu.
 116

This statement displays greater clarity in terms of the use of appropriate strategic
jargon, unambiguously articulates the perceived objectives of the nuclear doctrine and is
indicative of a gradual learning process with the passage of time that could be termed as
learning through experience and habituation or what Russell J. Leng has termed as
‘experiential learning’.89 However, as pointed out earlier, doctrines are prone to changes
owing to changes in the overall security environment, technological developments and in
response to changes in adversary’s disposition. Likelihood of this happening in South Asia
is even greater, due to the turbulent regional security landscape as a result of spill over of
the on-going war on terror in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan, as well as the
pervasive influence of the action-reaction syndrome over the India-Pakistan security
relationship.

Michael Krepon has identified four underlying principles of Pakistani nuclear doctrine
as under:-

 First, they assert that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is India-specific.

 Second, Pakistan has embraced a doctrine of credible, minimum deterrence.
 Third, the requirements for credible, minimal deterrence are not fixed; instead, they
are determined by a dynamic threat environment.
 Fourth, given India’s conventional military advantages, Pakistan reserves the
option to use nuclear weapons first in extremis.90
However, he does not seem to be fully convinced of the first principle arguing that,
“Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is not entirely ‘India specific.’ Pakistani officials have occasionally
expressed concerns about Israeli and US designs against their nuclear capabilities – designs
that presumably also require deterrence in some fashion.”91

3.6 India’s Espousal of The New Conventional War Doctrine:

89
Russell J. Leng, ‘Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises’, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan
Press, 2000.
90
Michael Krepon, Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability,
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/Krepon__Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf December 10, 2012, p.
7.
91
Ibid. p. 8.
 117

In 2001-02 India had carried out the largest mobilisation of its military forces since
the 1971 war, in response to the terrorist attack on its parliament, 92 triggering a counter
mobilisation by Pakistan.93 This led to a ten month long military stand-off between the two
countries, with over a million soldiers facing each other across the India-Pakistan borders.
However, India could not undertake any military operation, because, due to lack of
territorial depth Pakistan was able to move its forces to the borders in a comparatively
shorter time, denying India the advantage of surprise. To preclude a similar situation in
future, Indian military came up in 2004, with what has come to be known as the Cold Start
Doctrine.94 The doctrine is aimed at cutting down the mobilisation time, by pre-positioning
offensive forces to forward locations, reorganising these into smaller more agile battle
groups and providing the defensive corps with inherent offensive capability to enable them
to launch limited offensive operations. The doctrine is designed to enable the launching of
quick but shallow thrusts on multiple axes with a view to denying any prior warning time
to Pakistan. The shallow thrusts are meant to avoid crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red
lines.95But it is not clear as to how those red lines would be identified. More recently,
Indian officials have in public statements denied the existence of a ‘Cold Start Doctrine’
explaining that no such doctrine has been officially sanctioned by the Indian government.
They have instead been talking about an operational doctrine which has been termed as
‘proactive operations.’96The doctrine irrespective of its name carries the same implications
and has been tested in large-scale field exercises and war games every year since its
inception. This has been viewed in Pakistan, as an attempt by the Indians to find a space

92
‘The Day India Was Attacked,’ India Today, December 24, 2001. Available at
http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/ParliamentAttack.pdf , Harish Khare, ‘Suicide squad storms Parliament;
5 militants killed; Army deployed,’ The Hindu, December 14, 2001 and ‘Troop mobilization almost
complete,’ The Hindu, December 31, 2001.
93
Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation’, op. cit., p. 132. Available
at, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
94
For a very comprehensive and detailed description of the Cold Start Doctrine, see Walter C. Ladwig, ‘A
Cold Start for Hot Wars’, International Security, Vol. 32, No.3, Winter 2007/08, p. 158-92.
95
Ibid.
96
Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear compulsions,’ The News International, November 06, 2012.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-141314-Pakistan%25E2%2580%2599s-nuclear-compulsions
Also see Dhruv C Katoch, ‘Future Conflict: Doctrine is the Enabler,’ Claws Journal, New Delhi, Spring
2013, p. viii-x
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/Future%2520Conflict%2520Doctrine%2520is%2520the%252...,
Rajat Pandit, ‘Army reworks war doctrine for Pakistan, China,’ The Times of India, December 30,
2009.http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Army-reworks-war-doctrine-for-Pakistan-China/artic. And
David Slungaard, Revisiting Cold Start – Weighing Strategic Shifts in South Asia,
http://csis.org/blog/revisiting-cold-start-weighing-strategic-shifts-south-asia
 118

below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, for a limited conventional war.97 Pakistan feels that a
full blown nuclear response to shallow thrusts into its territory by the Indian ground forces,
would be seen as a disproportionate response and would therefore, be less credible.98
However, one could argue that, the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence remained
intact, even after India’s adoption of the Cold Start doctrine and this was amply proven in
the aftermath of Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008. Though, the Cold Start
doctrine was being rehearsed since 2004, India could not actuate it and instead resorted to
threatening surgical airstrikes against alleged terrorist training camps in Pakistan. In the
end, even that option could not be exercised, due to the ever-present danger of nuclear
escalation. However, the Pakistani strategic planners thought otherwise and responded
according to their own perception of the threat.

3.7 Pakistan’s Response to Its Changing Threat Environment:

On 19th April 2011, Pakistan conducted the maiden test of a newly developed short-
range ballistic missile called ‘NASR’ (HATF-IX) with a range of 60 kilometres. The
missile can be fired from a multi-tube launcher mounted on a mobile carrier. A press
statement issued by the Inter Services Public Relations Directorate on the occasion,
described the missile as a quick reaction weapon, capable of carrying nuclear warheads of
appropriate yields. The Director General of Strategic Plans Division who was present at
the test site to witness the test stated that, “this test has consolidated Pakistan’s nuclear
deterrence at all levels of threat spectrum.”99 This statement, apparently indicated, that the
new weapon system was intended for employment on the battlefield. The test generated an
animated media debate amongst the proponents and opponents of the development. The
analysts, supportive of the NASR argued that it was a logical response on Pakistan’s part

Mansoor Ahmed, “Why Pakistan Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Weekly Pulse, May 6, 2011.
97

http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=563&storylist=9. Also see

Usman Ansari, “Pakistan Missile Test Underscores Need for Deterrence,” Defense News, June 1,

2012. http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012306010001 and Dr. Adil Sultan, ‘NCA’s

Full Spectrum Response,’ The Express Tribune, November 7, 2013.
98
Adil Sultan, ‘Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,’
Strategic Studies, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, vol. XXXI & XXXII, Winter 2011 & Spring
2012, nos. 4 & 1, p. 163.
99
Inter Services Public Relations, Pakistan, Press Release No. 94/2011-ISPR.
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721#pr_link1721
 119

to India’s provocative and threatening ‘Cold Start War Doctrine.’ Senior Pakistani officials
have been quoted as saying that ‘NASR’ was meant to pour cold water over ‘Cold
Start.’100The critics on the other hand viewed it as a destabilising development that would
enhance the probability of a nuclear war in South Asia.101 Irrespective of the view one
subscribes to, there is no doubt in the fact that Pakistan has inexorably embarked upon the
development of a battlefield usable nuclear weapons capability. At the declaratory level
however, Pakistani government spokesmen continue to reiterate Pakistan’s policy as
‘credible minimum deterrence’ which is a form of ‘simple punishment’ model of
deterrence, whereas use of battlefield nuclear weapons is part of ‘deterrence by denial’ or
war fighting model of deterrence. Each one of these models has very different demands in
terms of size of arsenals, command and control and battlefield management. However, this
apparent dichotomy in the declaratory doctrine and actual force posture is yet to be
clarified by Pakistani strategic planners.

The transformation of the Pakistani doctrine, has not escaped the attention of the
Indians. In an article in The Hindu, former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran who is
currently the Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), has
commented that:-

“During the past decade, there have been notable shifts in Pakistan’s nuclear
doctrine, away from minimum deterrence to second strike capability and towards
expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal to include both strategic and tactical
weapons. Islamabad has described these developments as consolidating Pakistan’s
deterrence capability at all levels of threat spectrum.”102

He goes on to cite, the shift from uranium based weapons to plutonium based
weapons, development and testing of short range missiles such as Abdali (180 kilometres)
and NASR (60 kilometres), improved accuracy of delivery systems and more reliance on
solid fuelled missiles. However, he is reluctant to concede that the ‘tactical’ nuclear
weapons are a response to India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine and argues that, Pakistan is using it

100
Feroz Khan, Eating Grass, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012, op. cit. p. 396.
101
For a balanced view see, Rodney W. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Answer to Cold Start? The Friday Times, Lahore,
May 13-19, 2011. Mansoor Ahmed, ‘Why Pakistan Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons’, Weekly Pulse, 6 May
2011 represents a supportive view. Ejaz Haider, ‘Stupidity Goes Nuclear I & II’, The Express Tribune,
Lahore, 26 & 27 April 2011, typifies the critical views.
102
Shyam Saran, ‘Dealing with Pakistan’s brinkmanship’, The Hindu, December 7, 2012.
 120

as a cover to expand its nuclear arsenal to deal with the proven US capability and its
suspected intentions to disable or seize Pakistani nuclear weapons. He also threatens in no
uncertain terms, a massive retaliation to even a tactical use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan
declaring that:-

“Whatever sophistry Pakistan may indulge in to justify its augmented arsenal and
threatened recourse to tactical nuclear weapons, for India the label on the weapon,
tactical or strategic, is irrelevant since the use of either would constitute a nuclear
attack against India. In terms of India’s stated nuclear doctrine, this would invite a
massive retaliatory strike. For Pakistan to think that a counter-force nuclear strike
against military targets would enable it to escape a counter-value strike against its
cities and population centres, is a dangerous illusion.”103

Coming from a senior former official and especially due to his influential position as
Chairman of NSAB and in the recent past, as India’s chief negotiator during the
deliberations with the US on India-US nuclear deal, this statement cannot be lightly
brushed aside. Such strident rhetoric would, however, serve no purpose other than further
vitiating the already tenuous strategic environment in the region. Some Indian analysts
have taken into account the catastrophic consequences of a disproportionate response,
which would certainly invite a devastating Pakistani strike. They view a massive response
to, for instance, a Pakistani nuclear use against Indian forces on its own soil, as disparate
and have suggested a more proportionate ‘tit for tat’ retaliation as an alternative.104

Krepon has also noted recent subtle changes in Pakistan’s articulation of its nuclear
policy, wherein Pakistani officials have added to the usual credible minimum deterrence
enunciations, formulations such as, “full spectrum deterrence” and “deterrence at all
levels of threat spectrum,” which in their opinion requires “flexible deterrence options.”105

An important question related to Pakistan’s apparent change of course in its approach

towards its nuclear doctrine that needs to be addressed is: what compelled Pakistan to alter
its earlier views about the need or desirability of battlefield nuclear weapons and to shift its
doctrinal emphasis from deterrence by simple punishment to a more exacting deterrence by
103
Shyam Saran, op. cit.
104
Ali Ahmed, ‘Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
October 3, 2011. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TitforTatANuclearRetaliationAlternative
105
Michael Krepon, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability’, December 2012, p.
6.http://www.stimson.org
 121

denial strategy? The first and fore-most, is obviously, India’s advocacy of a ‘proactive’ or
‘Cold Start’ doctrine which has created the perpetual threat of a surprise attack by India.
This alone, might possibly have evinced a different approach from Pakistan, as long as it
could retain a manageable conventional forces balance with India. The threat has been
compounded, both psychologically and physically, by a prolonged commitment of almost
1/3rd of Pakistan’s military forces in counter-terror/counter-insurgency operations in the
tribal areas along its border with Afghanistan. With no end in sight to that commitment, the
thinning of forces from the eastern border with India has created a vulnerability that can be
very tempting for India, to exploit in a future crisis. It may be worth pointing out here that
during the military crisis with India in 2001-02, Pakistan was compelled to pull out bulk of
its forces from the western borders at a very critical time, while the famous ‘Tora Bora’ 106
operation was underway along the Pak-Afghan border.

In opting for the battlefield nuclear weapons, Pakistan seems to have taken a cue
from a very respectable British thinker and practitioner of nuclear strategy, Sir Michael
Quinlan. Quinlan has argued on the basis of NATO’s reasoning, that wars cannot be fought
in ‘sealed compartments,’ and has suggested that the possibility has to be kept open, that
the defender can exercise the option of escalating the conflict to a level not envisaged by
the attacker.107 A Pakistani security analyst Brigadier ® Shaukat Qadir, criticising the
escalatory dynamic inherent in the Cold Start doctrine, also made a somewhat similar
point, stating that, “Wars, unfortunately, cannot be fought in ‘halves’ or ‘quarters’. That is
the basis of opposition to these concepts of punitive strikes and limited wars, terms
carefully avoided in the concept [Cold Start] but in fact attempting to actualise them.”108

Pakistan’s development and field testing of Hatf-II (Abdali) and Hatf-IX (NASR)
seem to fit well with Quinlan’s advice that: “….the range of options available must
therefore be an unmistakable continuum without huge gaps. That in turn meant that there
had to be nuclear forces, backed by will and doctrine for their possible use, intermediate

106
Tora Bora was a complex of caves and tunnels in Eastern Afghanistan where Osama Bin Laden and his Al-
Qaeda fighters had taken refuge and were subjected to heavy aerial bombing by US forces. However, Osama
along with his close associates managed to escape into Pakistani tribal areas because of thinning out of forces
on the Pakistani side.
107
Michael Quinlan, ‘Thinking about Nuclear Weapons – Principles, Problems, Prospects’, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 36.
108
Brigadier ® Shaukat Qadir, ‘Cold Start: The Nuclear Side’, Daily Times, May 16, 2004.
 122

between conventional forces and the ultimate strategic nuclear capability.” 109 NATO’s
political and geographical compulsions in the central European theatre of operations,
which constrained its ability to give up any space even for sound operational reasons,
forced upon it a forward defence posture not unlike Pakistan’s situation. Quinlan argues
that, “the only available options, surrender apart, plainly had to envisage the use of nuclear
110
weapons in some way.” He is also opposed to, what is commonly termed as, a
‘demonstrative use,’111 because, it will be seen by the adversary as a lack of will and
determination, which is an important component of a credible of deterrence. 112 Pakistan
can justifiably draw comparison between NATO’s compulsions and its own dilemmas and
therefore feels compelled to exhibit a high probability of nuclear use in the event of a
military conflict with India. Some Pakistani analysts,113whose thinking is still rooted in the
ideas of the 1960s, suggest a ‘demonstrative strike’ in an unpopulated desert area to show
resolve, but it will be counter-productive precisely for the reason explained by Michael
Quinlan.

In by far the most cogent explanation of Pakistan’s new nuclear doctrinal thinking, a
Pakistani nuclear analyst with a good insight into the thinking of the Pakistani nuclear
establishment, has talked of Pakistan’s quest for assured deterrence in view of India’s
doctrinal preference for Cold Start and Pro-active operations. He acknowledges that,
introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons will lower the nuclear threshold, and raise the
probability of a nuclear war. However, he argues that allowing space for a limited
conventional war, is also bound to lead to a nuclear exchange114 and goes on to explain
that:-

109
Quinlan, op. cit. p. 36.
110
Ibid, p. 37.
111
The idea of using tactical nuclear weapons as ‘warning shots’ was initially adopted by France in its 1972
Defence White Paper during Pompidou’s presidency. However, it was dropped after a review of the French
defence policy once Giscard d’Estaing became President in 1974 and it was decided that ‘tactical’ nuclear
weapons would be used in actual battle rather than for demonstrative purposes or the so called ‘warning
shots.’ See Colin McInnes and G.D. Sheffield eds., ‘Warfare in the Twentieth Century – Theory and
Practice’, London, Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 159.
112
Quinlan, p. 38.
113
See for instance, Sardar F.S. Lodhi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine’, Defence Journal, Karachi.
http://www.defencejournal.com/apr99/pak-nuclear-doctrine.htm
114
Adil Sultan, ‘Pakistan’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine’,
Strategic Studies, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, vol. XXXI & XXXII, Winter 2011 & Spring
2012, nos. 4 & 1, p. 154.
 123

“Pakistan’s earlier posture of responding massively with nuclear weapons to cause

unacceptable damage appeared to be a disproportionate response, especially
against limited incursions by the Indian troops. On the other hand, if Pakistan did
not respond, it could discredit its nuclear deterrence. From a Pakistani perspective
these perceived gaps at the operational and tactical levels therefore, needed to be
plugged – to deny India the space to launch limited military operations in the form
of CSD. NASR provides Pakistan’s National Command Authority additional
options during the times of crisis other than retaliating with full force.”115

His explanation of current Pakistani policy appears to be self-contradictory. His

formulation of ‘massive response’ to cause ‘unacceptable damage’ is in contravention to
Pakistan’s pronounced policy of a ‘credible minimum deterrence’ which has been in vogue
since 1998. He seems to have mixed up causing ‘unacceptable damage’ with ‘massive
retaliation.’ Whereas massive retaliation could cause widespread destruction – similar to
assured destruction, unacceptable damage can comparatively be at a much lower scale and
can be achieved with a minimal deterrence capability. He goes on to insist that Pakistan is
acquiring ‘operational’ and ‘tactical’ level deterrence capability in addition to strategic
deterrence to achieve what he terms as a “strategy of assured deterrence.”116 One could,
however, argue that as war cannot be fought in halves and quarters or compartmentalised
into different boxes similarly deterrence should not be divided into tactical, operational and
strategic compartments. Deterrence is all encompassing and overarching and casts its long
shadow over the whole spectrum of conflict as has been proven in 2001-02 and in the
aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. There was no reason for Pakistan to
lose confidence in the efficacy of its deterrence. This Pakistani reaction has apparently
been precipitated as mentioned earlier by the combined effect of the Cold Start Doctrine
and the prolonged counter terrorism operations and facilitated by technological success in
miniaturisation of nuclear warheads.

To justify Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture, Stephen Cohen’s comments, that

Pakistan’s current nuclear doctrine resembles that of the United States in the 1950s with
elements such as possible first use and ‘tactical use’ of nuclear weapons against attacking

115
Ibid, p.159.
116
Ibid, p. 160.
 124

conventional forces, have been cited.117 However, this does not accurately depict the
reality. First, the above mentioned comments were made by Stephen Cohen in 2004, when
Pakistan was neither in possession of battlefield nuclear weapons whether of tactical or
operational genre nor was it talking about battlefield use of nuclear weapons. In fact, in the
often-cited interview with Italian analysts General Kidwai had ruled out any need for
tactical nuclear weapons. Second, there is a significant difference between ‘tactical nuclear
weapons’ and the ’tactical use’ of nuclear weapons. Whereas tactical nuclear weapons
denote small low yield weapons, tactical use of nuclear weapons is neither dependent on
the size nor on the yield of the weapons, as long as these have a direct impact on the
battlefield. NATO’s analogy may therefore, be misleading in some respects, especially the
configurations of weapon systems, as some of the ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons in NATO’s
inventory, especially the air delivered gravity bombs, have yields of 200 kilotons or more.
It is therefore, a technically flawed argument that NASR is designed to carry low yield or
sub-kiloton nuclear weapons for “destroying strong Indian armoured thrusts inside
Pakistani territory.” 118

The ability of low yield nuclear weapons to destroy Indian tanks is limited to the
extent of being inconsequential and to cause a substantial damage to a well dispersed
attacking armoured formation a large number of 15-20 kiloton yield weapons would be
required.119 Any attacking armoured force mindful of a possible nuclear strike by the
adversary would disperse its tanks more than the normal spacing except at choke points
such as bridges or when they are preparing to break out of a bridgehead. One thing is clear,
however, that low yield weapons envisaged to be mounted atop NASR are not likely to
make much physical impact unless used in large numbers. Their psychological impact may
be out of proportion to their capability but cannot be anticipated.

117
Stephen Philip Cohen, ‘The Idea of Pakistan’, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 2004, p. 103
quoted in Adil Sultan, op. cit. p. 160.
118
Mansur Ahmed, ‘Why Pakistan needs tactical nuclear weapons’, Weekly Pulse, Islamabad, May 6, 2011,
quoted in Adil Sultan, op. cit. p. 161.
119
Two physicists have calculated that a 15 kiloton weapon can destroy 55 tanks, 100 metres apart; if 300
metres apart it would take 8 weapons. They contend that to kill 500 tanks, 100 weapons of 15 kilotont would
be needed. Such concentration of tanks is not envisaged in cold start. See A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, ‘The
Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian
Conventional Attack’, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 61, November 11, 2010. Since
the study predates the testing of NASR, it has not taken into account the impact of use of low yield weapons.
 125

The emerging Pakistani doctrine of “assured deterrence” and “flexible deterrence

options” does not seem to be very different from US and NATO’s Strategy of ‘Flexible
Response,’ which was also termed as ‘Graduated Response’ by the European allies. The
US abandoned the strategy in favour of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ after only two years
of its inception. However, NATO has clung to it because they saw in it a means of linking
the European battlefield with the American strategic nuclear deterrence. They thought that
without the battlefield and theatre nuclear weapons it would entail a big jump from the
conventional battlefield in Europe to the US strategic deterrence, and the Americans may
shy away from using their strategic deterrence without this linkage. The flexible response
strategy was flawed because it could only have worked in case the Soviets also agreed to
play by the same rules. However, as pointed out by the critics there was nothing stopping
the Soviets from going straight to a strategic nuclear response to a battlefield or theatre use
of nuclear weapons. Will India be prepared to play the game by the rules stipulated by
Pakistan? If ‘flexible deterrence options’ denote a strategy similar to the US strategy of
‘limited nuclear options’ adopted during the Nixon presidency in the 1970s it will again be
at cross purposes to the ‘credible minimum deterrence’ since limited nuclear options was a
nuclear war fighting strategy entailing a large and diversified nuclear arsenal.

In case India responds proportionately to a Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons

claiming the high moral ground by displaying restraint while continuing to press on with
its conventional operations, an escalation to a wider nuclear exchange will be inevitable.
Pakistani planners seem to have placed the onus on the Indians to prevent further nuclear
escalation. They have also argued that, in case India takes counter measures against
Pakistani policy of using battlefield nuclear weapons to deter India’s cold start or proactive
operations, it will destabilise the strategic equilibrium in South Asia. 120 This appears to be
an unfair expectation on part of Pakistani planners and they would do better not to bank on
this. Pakistan could have and even now should explore other options to respond to India’s
provocative conventional war doctrine. One option to mitigate the threat would be to
negotiate joint mechanisms with India, to stifle as far as possible, the ability of the non-
state actors to carry out cross border actions, in return for India’s agreement to give up its
aggressive cold start or proactive operations doctrines. The second option would be to

120
Adil Sultan, op. cit. p. 164.
 126

explore ‘limited nuclear options’121 type of nuclear strategy, which could be adopted in
conjunction with the first option or by itself.

3.8 Has there been any Doctrinal Learning in Pakistan?

While it will remain a moot point whether evolutionary changes in Pakistan’s nuclear
doctrinal thinking could be categorised as normative or non-normative, there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that a considerable amount of ‘simple’ learning has taken place. As for
the manifestations of this learning, the nuclear factor is now an integral part of the teaching
and war-gaming in the curriculum of National Security and War Course at the National
Defence University.122 At the same time, the conventional and nuclear war strategies have
been closely integrated123 through several war games, by the Pakistani military. Requisite
command and control arrangements have also been developed for employment of nuclear
weapons in war, which would be discussed in detail in the next chapter. As Quinlan has
pointed out, NATO’s nuclear strategy evolved over an extended period of time exceeding
three decades124 and by that standard India and Pakistan still have some distance to traverse
along the nuclear learning curve. He acknowledges though that: “there have clearly been,
learning and development processes underway, but published information does not say
125
how far they have gone save in a few limited respects.” He further adds that, “in both
countries strategic affairs communities, both in and out of government, have since the 1998
tests notably deepened their grasp of the issues raised by the possession of nuclear
weapons.”126

Learning in the doctrinal domain may appear to some observers to be moderate or

even minimal for obvious reasons. Firstly, Pakistan as a matter of policy has decided not to
publicly pronounce its nuclear doctrine and has deliberately maintained ambiguity about its
nuclear doctrinal objectives. As a result the detailed contours of the Pakistani nuclear

121
‘Limited Nuclear Options’ also known as the Schlesinger Doctrine was adopted by the Nixon
administration in order to enhance the options available to the President other than suicide or surrender. It
involved engaging small packages of targets in successive strikes with pauses in between to allow for a
negotiated resolution of the crisis.
122
Author’s personal experience of lecturing senior military officers participating in National Security War
Course on nuclear strategy and as a faculty member in the Faculty of Contemporary Studies at the National
Defence University.
123
Peter Lavoy,
124
Quinlan, op. cit. p. 33.
125
Quinlan, p. 136.
126
Ibid, p. 141.
 127

doctrine have remained hidden from public view and have been a subject of speculation.
Secondly, as is the case with all other nuclear powers the operational parts of the nuclear
doctrine including nuclear thresholds and targeting policy are kept as secrets. In view of
the limited access to information the evolution in nuclear doctrinal thinking is not traceable
and it would therefore, appear that little learning has taken place in this realm. Some
analysts would also view the introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons as a case of
unlearning given the earlier policy of eschewing the development of such weapons having
learnt about their futility from the experience of the Cold War.
 128

Chapter - 4

Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control

4.1 Introduction:

This chapter will explore how Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system has
evolved since 1998. It will also highlight the arduous requirements of nuclear command
and control, the nature and types of command and control systems in theory and as
practised by other nuclear weapon states especially the United States127 before moving on
to trace the administrative, institutional and legislative steps taken by Pakistan to develop a
viable nuclear command and control system in the face of substantial technological and
financial challenges. An effort will be made to determine whether the development of
Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system is indicative of a coherent learning
process based on trial and error or experience or internalization of experiences of other
nuclear powers and in what forms has this learning manifested itself. However, due to the
nature of the subject the focus will remain on the physical manifestations of the
progressive learning process and it is not possible to delve into the intangibles such as the
procedures and the hierarchy of command and control due to the non-availability of
information on such aspects in the public domain.

4.2 Background:

An effective and reliable command and control system is essential for optimum
utilisation of armed forces for the successful achievement of national objectives. The
requirements of a nuclear command and control are far more rigorous and demanding than
the conventional command and control arrangements, because the destructive power
embodied by these weapons is such that, there is no room for error or failure. The ability of
highest decision makers to exercise command and control over nuclear forces is largely
dependent on the means of communications that link the national command centres with
the forces in the field. These communication links are however, the softest and most
vulnerable parts of a nuclear force structure. They are also very costly to build. Paul

The US example has been used due to the availability of sufficient published material on US Nuclear
127

Command & Control.

 129

Bracken while explaining the command and control of US Nuclear Forces states that,
“Command and Control as we define it here amounts to a system that brings the individual
128
pieces of a defence system together into a coherent overall structure.” Elsewhere, the
US nuclear, command, control and communications system has been described as:-

“Collection of activities, processes, and procedures performed by appropriate

military commanders and support personnel that – through the chain of command
– allow for senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment to be made,
based on relevant information and subsequently allow for those decisions to be
communicated to forces for execution.” 129

The nuclear battlefield poses unique dangers to the communication systems, which
can be seriously damaged or destroyed by conventional attacks, as well as by various
effects of a nuclear explosion, such as the blast, radiation and the electro-magnetic pulse
(EMP). There is, therefore, a distinct need for not only redundant but hardened and
survivable means of communication. According to Desmond Ball, “many C3 systems are
inherently susceptible to a wide range of physical and electronic threats, and certain critical
nodal points are inevitable. These vulnerabilities impose very severe physical limits to the
extent to which a nuclear war could be controlled.” 130

There is also a need to create a very fine balance, between the need to ensure that
no nuclear weapon can be fired deliberately by any unauthorised person or mistakenly by
an authorised person (the negative control), and the assurance that these weapons would be
readily launched when ordered by the competent authority (positive control). This presents
the decision makers with a dilemma, which has been termed as the ‘Always-Never
Dilemma.’131 The resolution of this complex problem lends itself to no easy or permanent
solutions, and the policy makers have to continuously juggle with it by tilting the balance
in one direction or the other, depending on the circumstances.

128
Paul Bracken, ‘The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces’, 1983, Yale University Press, New Haven
and London, p. 179.
129
The Nuclear Matters Handbook, Expanded Edition, Federation of American Scientists, 2011, p. 51.
Available at www.fas.org/man/eprint/NMHB2011.pdf.
130
Desmond Ball, ‘Can Nuclear War Be Controlled’? Adelphi Paper – 169, International Institute of
Strategic Studies, London, 1981, p. 2.
131
Peter D. Feaver, ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations’, International Security, Vol. 17,
No. 3. (Winter, 1992-1993), p.163.
 130

Peter Feaver, who is credited with coining this phrase, has explained the
always/never dilemma thus:

“At the heart of nuclear command and control lies the always/never dilemma.
Leaders want a high assurance that the weapons will always work when directed
and a similar assurance the weapons will never be used in the absence of
authorised direction. Weapons must be reliable: unlikely to detonate accidentally;
and secure: resistant to efforts by unauthorised people to detonate them.” 132

Always/never is not the only dilemma faced by nuclear command and control
mechanisms, since, there is a constant interplay between sophisticated technology and a
large organisation. Neither the organisation nor the technology can be tested under realistic
conditions likely to prevail on a nuclear battlefield. The high-technology systems tend to
fail often at critical moments and large organisations have their own inherent problems,
where weaknesses can often be overlooked or brushed aside.133

During the Cold War, the scale and magnitude of the command and control
mechanisms built by the two super powers was enormous by any standards, due to the
global proportions of their security competition. The United States had established, what
was known as the ‘World Wide Command and Control System’ (WWCCS).134 The
extended deterrence commitments made to the European allies added further complexities.
The system had to make provisions for sharing of US nuclear assets with the non-nuclear
allies and to accommodate their inputs into nuclear decision making for nuclear operations
in the European theatre. The introduction of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), as
the prime means of nuclear delivery, created the perpetual fear of a surprise ‘bolt from the
blue’ type attack. This compelled both super-powers to maintain their respective nuclear
forces on a ‘hair-trigger’ alert. The fear of a decapitating strike, directly targeting the
leadership and command elements, meant that arrangements had to be made to ensure the
survivability of at least some elements of the command and control system, to enable the
launching of an effective retaliatory strike. This led the US to create airborne command
posts based on Boeing-707 jets, nicknamed the looking glass aircraft. These aircraft would
remain airborne around the clock, with necessary staff headed by a two star general,

132
Feaver, op. cit., p. 163.
133
Ibid.
134
Desmond Ball, op. cit., p. 3.
 131

equipped with all the necessary codes and means of communications to order a punitive
strike, in case the leadership in the National Command Centre on ground was eliminated
by a pre-emptive strike.135 Civilian telephone networks such as AT&T and Bell
Telephone136 were fully integrated with the military communications networks to create
redundancy. The multiple communication nodes and alternative links were designed to
ensure, that if one or two links were disrupted the communications would automatically be
routed through an alternate path.137 The whole system was supported by, real time
surveillance and target acquisition assets. The scale of the problem is by comparison
miniscule in case of India and Pakistan, with much smaller nuclear forces and relatively
limited theatre of operations. Moreover, neither India nor Pakistan has as yet operationally
deployed its nuclear forces. This type of recessed nuclear posture reduces the pressure over
the command and control system, due to the built in time buffers.

4.3 Typology of Command and Control Systems:

The command and control systems can be broadly categorised as ‘assertive’ or

‘delegative.’138 A command and control system that is biased in favour of ‘negative
control’ is called the assertive type of control while a command and control system that
leans in favour of ‘positive control’ is termed as delegative type of control.139 The choice
of either type of system is dependent on a number of factors, such as the kind of nuclear
doctrine adopted by a particular country and the ability of the opponents to undertake a
successful decapitating strike. A decapitating strike is aimed at destroying or seriously
degrading the adversary’s ability to launch an effective and coordinated retaliatory strike,
by targeting its command and control system, leadership elements and the nuclear forces.
However, if war termination at some stage, is the ultimate objective, it would be prudent
not to target the leadership, which would be needed for intra-war bargaining and
negotiations. In the absence of a suitable counterpart to talk to, the war would only end
after the complete destruction of both the antagonists. Additionally, once the top leadership
is taken out, the control of nuclear forces would shift to multiple lower level decision
making centres, operating without any centralised guidance. Keeping these negative

135
Bracken, op. cit., p. 204.
136
Ibid, p. 187-190.
137
Ibid, p.
138
Feaver, op. cit., p. 168-9.
139
Ibid.
 132

outcomes in view, most adversaries would avoid targeting leadership and command and
control mechanisms. That is why the debate about the desirability of a decapitating strike
during the cold war remained inconclusive.

However, the threat of a pre-emptive strike against nuclear forces, distinct from
their command elements, cannot be ruled out, and more ominous the threat of a pre-
emptive counter-force strike, the greater would be the leaning towards a delegative
command and control system. If a country adopts a ‘first use’ nuclear posture, the
requirements of the command and control system are greatly simplified, and the
decapitation threat is also taken out of the equation. There would, therefore, be no
compulsion for hardening the early warning systems and command centres. It would,
nevertheless, be advantageous to make the nuclear forces survivable to relieve unnecessary
pressure over the decision makers.

On the other hand, if there is a higher level of threat of accidental or unauthorised

use or a possibility of theft of weapons by terrorists, the preferred command and control
system would be assertive and centralised.140 The assertive control is achieved, through the
employment of Permissive Action Links (PALs)141 - which are basically electro-
mechanical locks, weapon activation codes and the use of two-man rule. Two-man rule is
the most basic and low-tech method of exercising assertive control and can be applied in
various forms. For instance, it could take the form of a second authorised person
confirming the weapon release/ launch orders at every tier of command, or two different
people feeding segments of the electronic code needed to activate the weapon systems, or
two weapon operators required to near simultaneously turn their respective keys located so
far apart, that even the tallest person cannot reach both keys even at full stretch, in order to
activate or launch a long range missile.

There are, though, some situations where there are technical barriers to application
of centralised control. The prime example is the submarine based nuclear weapons, which,
while providing an assured and survivable second-strike capability, pose the most

140
Pakistan follows an assertive type of command and control. This information was shared with the author
during interviews with respondents ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ - all senior officers in the nuclear chain of command –
on 28 July, 06 August and 07 August 2012 respectively.
141
The US installed PALs on its weapons in 1960s and these were especially important to prevent
unauthorized use of battle field and accidental use of strategic weapons.
 133

intractable challenges to the command and control systems. The difficulty of

communicating with a submerged submarine means that, a centralised control over these
weapons cannot be reliably exercised. The submarine based weapons do not have PALs,
and due to the restricted space available in a submarine, it is also not possible to create a
geographic separation between the warheads and their delivery systems. That is why
sending out of nuclear-armed submarines to their operational stations is, considered to be a
serious escalation in crisis situations,142 because the command and control is automatically
ceded to the submarine crew from the centralised authority. There is only a perilous means
of control in the form of a periodic signal indicating to the submarine crews that the
headquarters was intact and functioning. Any break down of communication or the failure
of the headquarters to transmit a timely signal would be understood as delegation of
authority to the naval vessel. That is why this type of a system is termed as a ‘fail-deadly’
system and is not resorted to during peacetime.143 The other situation, where there are
practical difficulties in exercising a centralised command and control, is in the case of
battlefield nuclear weapons. The earlier versions of these weapons in the 1950s did not
have any electronic safety arrangements, and the field units in custody of these weapons,
had the ability to launch these weapons on their own volition. The later versions of
US/NATO battlefield nuclear weapons, from the 1960s onwards, were equipped with
PALs, but the possibility of a manual override of these safety mechanisms could not be
completely ruled out.144

Scholars such as Rajesh Basrur have challenged the notion of command and control
as it is commonly understood and have argued that ‘control’ is more important than
‘command’. In his view:-

…“Command and Control is a contestable concept that owes its meaning to Cold
War thinking and experience. Its components are contradictory, and must be
differently prioritised such that control takes precedence over command. This
allows much greater scope for long-term stability than is at present the case…

142
Bracken, op. cit., p. 229.
143
Bracken, op. cit., p. 229.
144
Ibid., p.
 134

Command has to do with the usability of nuclear weapons and control with the
prevention of their use.” 145

Basrur emphasises the importance of control suggesting that an effective command

is not critical to achieving deterrence since the possibility of even a small risk of nuclear
war would be enough to deter even a powerful adversary. On the other hand he argues that
loss of control entails greater risk to oneself and any loss of control could also trigger an
unintended nuclear war with catastrophic consequences. It could also result in acts of
nuclear terrorism adding that, “If the two must be juxtaposed, ‘control and command’
146
would be a more appropriate term.” This idea has its own merits but in actual
operational environments every state will assign a higher priority to ‘command’ as an
expression of resolve to use the nuclear weapons if there is a need to do so. As Michael
Quinlan has suggested the possibility of use of nuclear weapons is necessary for deterrence
to be credible.147

In the early stages of development of operational nuclear forces, the easiest and the
simplest method of enhancing the safety and security, and to maintain ‘negative control’ is,
to store the weapons and their delivery systems separately. This arrangement rules out the
possibility of an accidental or unauthorised nuclear detonation. Both the US and the former
Soviet Union adopted such systems in the late 1940s.148 Pakistan is currently known to
store its warheads and delivery systems separately. 149 However, when it decides to deploy
its weapons in silos and on submarines this separation will not be possible due to technical
reasons.

4.4 The Nature of Command and Control System:

The nature of the command and control system is largely influenced by the state of
the civil-military relations in a country. In the United States, with an established tradition
of civilian supremacy over the military, and a highly professional but autonomous military,

145
Rajesh M. Basrur, ‘Nuclear Command and Control and Strategic Politics in South Asia’, Contemporary
South Asia, 14: 2, 2005, p. 155-161.
146
Ibid.
147
Michael Quinlan, ‘Thinking About Nuclear Weapons –Principles, Problems and Prospects, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 26.
148
Desmond Ball, op. cit., p. 4.
149
Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues’,
Congressional Research Service www.crs.gov RL34248, February 13, 2013, p. 15.
 135

the civilians initially retained strict control over the nuclear weapons. The American
military was only allowed direct control of nuclear weapons in the early 1950s. 150 The
Soviets on their part maintained tight civilian control over the nuclear weapons by keeping
the warheads in the custody of the KGB, due to Kremlin’s lack of trust of the military.
However, as both the countries developed capabilities to launch pre-emptive decapitating
strikes against each other and got into a hair-trigger alert mode, the control over the nuclear
weapons was gradually transferred to the military in the US. Similarly, in the Soviet
Union, the Soviet military also gained greater control over nuclear weapons after the fall of
Khruschev from political power in 1964.151 In the United States nuclear weapons had been
completely transferred to military control by the late 1950s and direct command channels
had been established between commanders of nuclear forces and the president with the role
of the president limited to giving an order to ‘Go’ or ‘No Go’. 152 This system could work
with the ‘strategy of massive retaliation’ but with the adoption of a ‘flexible response’
strategy in the early 1960s the command and control structure was revamped to allow for
the limited nuclear use options and greater involvement of political leaders in the whole
process from alerting to firing of nuclear weapons as well as bargaining to bring the
conflict to an end.153 In both US and the Soviet Union the system of control over nuclear
weapons evolved from civilian to military control primarily due to operational needs.154

4.5 Nuclear Command and Control Challenges for Nascent Nuclear Powers:

The international community generally perceives that the complexities and

challenges involved in the setting up of a viable nuclear command and control system are
beyond the limited technological prowess and meagre economic resources of countries like
Pakistan and India. The deep seated hostility between the two countries and unresolved
disputes such as that over the fate of the State of Jammu and Kashmir make the situation
look even more worrisome. However, as suggested by Shaun Gregory many of these
anxieties are caused by viewing the South Asian situation through the prism of the cold
war, whereas the scale of the problem in case of Pakistan is much smaller than that faced

150
Bracken, op. cit., p. 23.
151
Bracken, op. cit., p. 183.
152
Bracken, p. 184.
153
Ibid, p. 188-9.
154
Ibid., p. 23-4.
 136

by the superpowers and the other three nuclear weapon states. Shaun Gregory elaborates
his point by adding that:-

...“The point at issue here is whether a stable nuclear relationship can be

constructed in South Asia. Much of the answer to this question rests on whether
robust command and control (C2) arrangements can be put in place to meet the
requirements of stable deterrence. These are primarily: assured high level
(preferably political) control of nuclear forces; the prevention of accidental,
irrational or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons; the assurance arrangements for
escalation control and war termination. The evidence from the region suggests that
these requirements can be met and that many are presently in the process of being
met on both sides.” 155

Peter Feaver has argued using the ‘vicarious learning curve’156 hypothesis, that new
nuclear states can learn from the practices of the earlier nuclear states, adding, that both
Britain and France built on the lessons learnt from the United States and started at an
advanced stage of command and control. He believes that, “proliferators in the 1990s
would have some fifty years of nuclear experience on which to draw.”157 Shaun Gregory
has taken this argument further affirming that:-

“India and Pakistan have benefited greatly from reflection on the experience of
the N-5 powers as they emerged as stable nuclear states in circumstances which in
almost all respects were technically inferior to those of late twentieth century India
and Pakistan. This reflection encompasses a rich understanding of nuclear
deterrence, nuclear doctrines, strategy, posture, command and control
arrangements and the role of arms control and confidence-building measures.”158

Pakistan has adopted a credible minimum deterrence posture in line with its
technological and resource limitations. Such a posture makes the task of fashioning a
nuclear command and control much easier and simpler. The recessed operational posture,

155
Shaun Gregory, ‘A Formidable Challenge: Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia’, Disarmament
Diplomacy, Issue No. 54, February 2001.
156
‘Vicarious learning’ involves ‘learning through experience’ preceded by ‘learning by observation.’ It
essentially means learning from the experiences of established nuclear powers.
157
Feaver, op. cit., p. 173.
158
Shaun Gregory, op. cit.
 137

wherein warheads and delivery systems are kept separate from each other159, reduces the
requirements for real time surveillance and tactical warning and also eliminates the
possibility of accidental or unauthorised use. However, things can and will change if
Pakistan decides to operationally deploy its recently developed battle field nuclear
weapons,160 or proceeds with the deployment of submarine based nuclear weapons. Both
the submarine based nuclear weapons and the battlefield nuclear weapons pose serious
command and control challenges.

4.6 Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics:

In the 1970s and 80s, Pakistani military provided indirect support to the nuclear
programme, by way of constructing facilities like the enrichment plant at Kahuta,
providing security and preparing the tunnels at ‘Chagai’ for conducting nuclear tests. This
was similar to the role played by the US military in the ‘Manhattan Project’ and in the
early post-WW-II years. The year1993 marks a watershed, when President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan, who had been part of the management and oversight arrangements of the nuclear
programme since the mid-1970s, was forced to resign over differences with the Prime
Minister. Since the Prime Minister had also resigned, it created a serious dilemma of
succession of control of the nuclear programme. The outgoing president therefore, handed
over the sensitive records and responsibility of coordination of the nuclear programme to
the Army Chief.161

Since then, the military has been more directly involved, in the development and
oversight of the country’s nuclear programme. Successive Directors General of the Combat
Development Directorate with a select group of officers performed the duty of acting as
liaison between the Army Chief and the heads of the strategic organisations and kept the
Army Chief briefed on technical and developmental issues. The rest of the Staff in GHQ
and commanders in the field were not privy to nuclear related issues.162

159
Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,’ in Pakistan’s Nuclear
Future: Worries Beyond War, Henry Sokolski, ed. Carlisle, PA; Strategic Studies Institute, January 2008, p.
141. Available at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. Also see Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,
‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,’ RL 34248, of June 26, 2012, www.crs.gov
160
Pakistan…..
161
Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management,’ Non-proliferation Policy
Education Centre, February 27, 2012. See http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1156&rid=6#_edn37
162
Ibid.
 138

There is, however, a widespread perception, both within and outside the country,
that the political leadership has had a tendency to readily delegate the lead role in
managing the nuclear programme to the military, even during the times when civilian
governments have been in power in Pakistan. Some politicians are very critical of this
tendency163 while others such as respondent ‘V’ who has been a long term member of the
Senate and has also been a member of the Senate’s Standing Committee on Defence and
Defence Production from 1988-1991 and again from 2003-2012 disagree. In his view the
impression of military dominance of nuclear decision making is usually overplayed and
can be attributed to prolonged periods of military rule in Pakistan insisting that the role of
politicians/civilians has been critical and that there has been complete harmony between
the civilians and the military on the nuclear issues. He argues that normally, the political
leadership provides broad policy guidelines, but operational matters are left to the military,
which is the common practice in most other nuclear weapon states. 164 However, many
respondents (mainly academics and security analysts) interviewed for this research project
considered that the civilian role in nuclear policy making is nominal and
inconsequential.165

There is, also a general perception, that Pakistan follows a ‘delegative’ type of
nuclear command and control system,166 which is only partially true. Though the control of
weapons has been delegated by the civilian leadership to the military, it has not been
delegated to the conventional military, but to the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which
acts on behalf of the National Command Authority (NCA). Beyond that level, the
command and control system is ‘assertive,’ to the extent that, even the services strategic
force commands, which have the custody of the delivery systems, do not have access to the
nuclear warheads, which are centrally controlled by the SPD/NCA. The scenarios conjured

163
Author’s interview with respondent ‘E’ at Islamabad on 28 July 2012.
164
Author’s interview with respondent ‘V’ on 21 January 2013.
165
Author’s interviews with respondents ‘H’, ‘Q’, ‘T’ and ‘U’ on 14 July, 06 August, 05 September and 11
September 2012 respectively.
166
Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small
Nuclear Forces in the second Nuclear Age,’ Security Challenges Volume 2 Number 2 July 2006, p.129-131.
Available at http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol2no2Chakma.pdfs. Also see Shashank
Joshi, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Nightmares: Déjà vu?’ The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2013, p. 165-
66.
 139

up occasionally by some American think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute167
and news media about a ‘rogue’ corps commander running away with a few nuclear
weapons are not in the realm of possibility since the corps commanders and the division
commanders do not have access to nuclear weapons. In the existing command and control
system the delivery systems are held by the services strategic force commands and though
these are under the administrative control of their respective services their operational
control rests with the NCA while the warheads are under the direct control of the NCA.
The conventional army corps and divisions neither have access to any nuclear weapons or
delivery systems nor are they part of the nuclear chain of command.168 A very highly
placed official of the NCA emphasised that:-

“Pakistan has the unambiguous position that the NCA exercises assertive control
over the nuclear capability in all circumstances and situations in a manner that
weapons can be employed in pursuit of deterrence in timely manner, yet avoiding
accidental or unauthorised use. The transition from crises to operational
contingencies would be managed through elaborate and redundant system of
command and control. The decision making for deployment, employment, and if it
ever comes to that, the use of nuclear weapons rests firmly in the NCA.” 169

The fact that command and communications channels for strategic forces are
independent of the command and communications channels for the conventional forces is
not widely known. Therefore, after the introduction of short range battlefield nuclear
weapon systems,170questions have arisen, whether the authority over these weapons would
be delegated to commanders in the field. Concerns have also been expressed over the
possibility of strained communications networks and the ability of the NCA to maintain an
assertive control over the deployed battlefield nuclear weapons. 171 Such questions came up
mainly because of lack of information about the existence of separate and independent

167
In 2006 and 2007 the American Enterprise Institute and some other think tanks based in Washington, DC
held some War Games behind closed doors. The theme of American Enterprise Institute exercise was built
around ‘a rogue Pakistani Corps Commander, running away with a few nuclear warheads’.
168
Based on author’s personal knowledge of the command and control system and interviews with former and
current senior officials at the Joint Staff Headquarters and the Strategic Plans Division in July/August 2012.
169
Author’s interview with respondent ‘B’ at Rawalpindi, on 07 August 2012.
170
Inter Services Public Relations, Pakistan, Press Release No. 94/2011-ISPR.
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721#pr_link1721, and
Rodney W. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Answer to Cold Start? The Friday Times, Lahore, May 13-19, 2011. Also see
Ejaz Haider, ‘Stupidity Goes Nuclear I & II’, The Express Tribune, Lahore, 26 & 27 April 2011.
171
Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia during Peace, Crisis, and War,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol.
14, No. 2 (June 2005), p. 169.
 140

command and control mechanisms for conventional and strategic forces. Senior officials in
the nuclear hierarchy are confident of the viability of systems that are in place, to ensure an
assertive centralised control over these weapons, and insist that there would be no pre-
delegation.172 One thing however, is certain that, it will be a challenging task to ensure
with a high degree of confidence that, the weapons would be able to perform their time
urgent operational role, while maintaining assertive centralised control.

4.7 Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control:

As pointed out in chapter 2 and 3 of the study, Pakistan, owing to the peculiar
nature of its nuclear weapons enterprise did not pay much attention, to doctrinal and
command and control issues before May 1998. There was lack of clarity on the intricacies,
sophistication and rigorous demands of a nuclear command and control system. There was,
since late 1980s, an informal decision making arrangement, whereby the President, the
Army Chief and senior scientists would decide on the developmental goals for the
programme. The Prime Minister was also occasionally involved in decision making. A
particular occasion where the Prime Minister was also involved in the decision making
process, was the decision in early 1989, to freeze the production of bomb grade enriched
uranium. This arrangement has often been called the ‘Nuclear Command and Control
Authority’ by former Army Chief Mirza Aslam Beg, 173 but in reality it was no more than a
developmental policy making forum. It had no structures or means for exercising
operational command and control.

Towards the end of 1996 then Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat had
established an Evaluation Analysis and Research cell (EA&R Cell) in the Army
Headquarters. EA&R cell was tasked to do analytical studies on professional issues for the
Army Chief. In February 1998, the Director General of the cell (who later rose to become
the Vice Chief of Army Staff), called the author in his office for a routine discussion
during which the issue of nuclear command and control also came up. The General listened
with disbelief that there was no functional nuclear command and control system and that

172
Author’s interviews with senior military officials at the Joint Staff Headquarters and SPD in July/August
2012.
173
Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management,’ op. cit. Also see Bhumitra
Chakma, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,’ Oxford, Routledge 2009, p. 43.
 141

what a former Army Chief had been referring to as ‘nuclear command authority’174 does
not even remotely resemble an operational command and control system. He then asked
the author to write a concept paper on a proposed strategic command and control system. A
thorough study and analysis of the command and control systems of the US, UK and
France revealed that, though one could learn some useful lessons and basic principles,
none of these systems could not be simply replicated by Pakistan. Accordingly, a proposed
structure suited to Pakistani situation and compatible with Pakistan’s limited resource base
was designed.175

The concept paper entitled ‘Strategic Command Organisation’ was then sent to the
Army Chief and subsequently to the Chief of General Staff. In hindsight, it turned out to be
a fortuitous break for Pakistan. While the paper was still being studied at various levels in
the Army Headquarters, the Indians conducted a series of nuclear tests on 11th and 13th of
May 1998 which were followed by Pakistani tests on 28th and 30th of May 1998. On 30th of
May the author was invited by the Military Operations Directorate to be part of a very
small group of officers to prepare a draft nuclear doctrine and command and control
structure. The concept paper written earlier formed the basis of further work on the
proposed command and control organisation.176

A few weeks later, then Major General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai who had taken over
as Director General of EA&R Cell on 30th of May 1998, was nominated by the Army Chief
to head the secretariat of the proposed National Command Authority. He was asked to
further refine the suggested organisation and elaborate its charter of duties, manpower,
equipment and budgetary requirements. The outline plan was presented to General
Musharraf, who in the meantime had taken over as the new Army Chief, in February 1999.
The Chief of General Staff, the Director General Military Operations and Director General
Military Intelligence were also present. The Army Chief approved the plan in principle and
asked General Kidwai with a small group of officers to start working as the core group of
National Command Authority’s Secretariat, pending formal government approval. 177 The

174
Feroz Hassan Kahan, Eating Grass: Making of the Pakistani Bomb,’ Stanford University Press, Stanford,
2012, p. 254.
175
Based on author’s personal experience being part of the EA&R Cell.
176
Ibid.
177
The author was part of this core group.
 142

group started working in the General Headquarters in March 1999 178 before moving to the
present location near the Joint Staff Headquarters at Chaklala Cantonment near Rawalpindi
in July. The blue prints of the intended command and control organisation and the
proposed nuclear doctrine were then presented to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and some
of his cabinet colleagues at the General Headquarters in April 1999. The Prime Minister
and his team did not have any serious objections to the proposal but wanted some more
time to study it further. Another six months would pass without the receipt of any formal
government approval and then in mid-October the military took over the reins of the
government.179

The military government led by General Pervez Musharraf accorded a high priority
to formalisation of nuclear command and control. In February 2000, a joint meeting of
National Security Council and the Cabinet formally approved the proposed structure that
had already been functioning for almost a year. Though, the government did not consider it
prudent at the time to announce the nuclear doctrine the details of the command and
control organisation were made public. The detailed text of the announcement released by
the official news agency, the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) is as under:-

“In accordance with Pakistan's well known nuclear policy of responsibility and
restraint as reaffirmed by the Chief Executive on several occasions, and with the
objective of creating an institutionalized command and control mechanism,
consistent with Pakistan's obligations as a nuclear power, the National Security
Council on Feb. 2 approved the establishment of National Command Authority
(NCA). The meeting was chaired by the Chief Executive General Pervez
Musharraf. NCA will be responsible for policy formulation, and will exercise
employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic
organizations. It will comprise two committees, including, Employment Control
Committee and Development Control Committee as well as Strategic Plans
Division which will act as Secretariat. The apex "Employment Control
Committee" will be chaired by the Head of the Government and include Minister
of Foreign Affairs (Deputy Chairman), Minister of Defence, Minister for Interior,
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Services Chiefs, Director
General Strategic Plans Division (Secretary) and Technical Advisors/others as

178
Ibid.
179
Ibid.
 143

required by the Chairman. The Development Control Committee will also be

chaired by the Head of the Government and include CJCSC (Deputy Chairman),
Service Chiefs, Director General Strategic Plans Division and representative of the
Strategic organisations and scientific community. The Committee will control
development of strategic assets. Strategic Plans Division, headed by a senior army
officer has been established in the Joint Services Headquarters under CJCSC. It
will act as the secretariat for NCA and will perform the functions of planning and
coordination in particular for establishing a reliable command, control,
communication, computers and intelligence (C4I) network for the NCA.”180

The Employment Control Committee (ECC), a politico-military committee in its

composition, is the main decision/policy making forum, while the Development Control
Committee, which can be termed as the military-scientific committee on the basis of its
configuration, is responsible for implementing the decisions of the ECC. The second tier is
the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which acts as the permanent secretariat for the NCA.
At the third tier are the three services strategic force commands though the press release
did not make any mention of this tier. It can also be noted that the Finance Minister was
not originally part of the ECC and was included at a later stage. The structure of the NCA
and roles and functions of its various components will be discussed later.

The organisation was designed to meet the challenges articulated by the long
serving Director General of SPD, Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai
during an address at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California in 2006:

“Following Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests, the Pakistani nuclear programme
faced three major challenges: (1) the need to manage the nuclear programme in an
institutional way, (2) the need to review the range of national security policies and
(3) the need for an effective and prudent force development strategy.” 181

Since the establishment of NCA, the SPD had started coordinating and overseeing
the activities of the strategic organisations such as Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
(PAEC), Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and National Development Complex (NDC)
and some other organisations such as the Project Management Organisation (PMO), Air

Press Statement released by Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) on 03 February 2000.

180

Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, ‘Pakistan’s Evolution as A Nuclear Weapons State’, address at
181

CCC, 27 October 2006. http://www.nps.edu

 144

Weapons Complex (AWC) and Maritime Technologies Complex (MTC). Many of these
organisations were working on overlapping projects and were not cooperating with each
other resulting in avoidable expenditures. It was therefore, decided to bring NDC, PMO,
AWC and MTC under one umbrella organisation which was named as the National
Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM)182, and Dr Samar Mubarakmand was
appointed as its Chairman. On 27 November 2000 the NCA, in a meeting chaired by then
Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf, decided to formally place all strategic
organisations under the NCA.183

Initially the structure of NCA’s permanent secretariat – the SPD, was rather
modest and simple. Over the last decade, it has evolved and become more elaborate and
more sophisticated as the organisation confronted more complex challenges posed by a
hostile security environment both externally as well as internally, a growing arsenal and a
gradual move towards operationalization.184 Since there was no institutional memory or
prior experience of dealing with nuclear matters, most of the officers working in the SPD
had to undergo a process of on the job learning. The officers were, therefore, allowed
extended tenures and an overlap between key functionaries and their successors was
ensured to retain the institutional memory and experience. This policy has paid dividends
by helping the organisation mature in a relatively short period of time and to firm up
procedures and routines.185

The original structure of the NCA had as its Chairman the ‘Head of the
Government,’186 which in a parliamentary system like that of Pakistan is the Prime
Minister. In February 2000, however, when the organisation was formally approved
General Musharraf was ruling the country under the title of the ‘Chief Executive’ and by
virtue of that position he became the Chairman of the NCA. After the national elections in
October 2002, when a new Prime Minister was elected and Musharraf took over as
President, the structure was modified at the top to accommodate both of them. The post of
the Chairman was thereafter assigned to the President, while the Prime Minister was

182
http://www.nti.org/facilities/586/
183
Shakil Sheikh, ‘Strategic Organisations put under NCA control’, The News, Islamabad, November 28,
2000.
184
Author’s interview with respondent ‘A’ at Islamabad on 28 July 2012.
185
Based on author’s personal experience having served in the SPD from March 1999 to October 2005.
186
Press Statement released by Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) on 03 February 2000.
 145

designated as the Vice Chairman. Even after the 2008 elections and coming into power of a
political government the same arrangement continued. However, in 2009, President
Zardari voluntarily abdicated his position as the Chairman of NCA leaving the
Chairmanship to the Prime Minister.187

4.8 The NCA Ordinance 2007:188

The NCA was initially established as a result of a decision taken by the Federal
Cabinet and the National Security Council, which was essentially an administrative action.
There appears to have been no effort to get the decision approved by the parliament when
it came into being in the wake of the October 2002 elections. Towards the end of 2007
there was a belated realisation that NCA needs to be provided a legal cover. This may have
been prompted by concerns that the new political government may try to change the
existing structure of NCA which could unhinge the whole system. There could also be the
possibility of legal challenges to the actions of the NCA during the Musharraf regime.
Consequently a Presidential Ordinance called the ‘National Command Authority
Ordinance, 2007’ was promulgated on 13th of December 2007.189 The Ordinance laid down
the powers and jurisdiction of the National Command Authority and the Chairman,
specified the members of the NCA, named the strategic organisations which come under
its purview, the types of offences under the ordinance and the jurisdiction and powers to
investigate and punish the offenders. It also provided ex-post-facto legal cover to the NCA
since its inception. The manner in which the promulgation of the NCA ordinance was
reported by the Pakistani press created an impression that a new command and control
structure was put in place. The headlines of two English language daily newspapers would
elaborate the point. ‘The News’ headlined the story as, “25 year jail for national security
offenders’, National Command Authority Ordinance Promulgated, Ordinance overrides

187
‘Zardari Hands Over nuclear powers’, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/south_asia/8384555.stm, accessed on 07 February 2013.
188
Ordinance No. LXX of 2007; Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part-I, dated 13th December 2007,
Islamabad. Available at http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1302673639_661.pdf
189
‘President promulgates National Command Authority Ordinance’, Associated Press of Pakistan,
December 13, 2007. http://www.app.com.pk/en/index.php?option=com, accessed on 07 February 2013.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/PrintEdition.aspx?ID=11712&Cat=13
 146

existing laws,” while the Daily Times report read, “Musharraf promulgates ordinance to
establish NCA.”190

In actual fact, the Ordinance did not establish the NCA but regularised its
establishment that had taken place in February 2000, and provided the authority with
necessary legal cover, a fact that section 3 (1) of the ordinance clearly stated: “The
National Command Authority already established by the competent authority shall deem to
be the Authority established under this Ordinance.”191 The salient features of the
ordinance were as under:-

 It specified the jurisdiction of NCA vis-à-vis existing laws in the event of a

crime committed against it.

 It listed twenty one crimes in Schedule-1 of the ordinance which were liable
to be tried under the provisions of the ordinance.

 It stipulated the punishment for such crimes which could be up to twenty five
years of imprisonment.

 The procedures and authority for investigation and prosecution were also
elaborated.

4.9 National Command Authority Act 2010:

After the coming into power of a political government in 2008, the Supreme Court
of Pakistan directed the government to indemnify the ordinances issued by the previous
government by placing them before the parliament for approval. The NCA Ordinance was
also placed before the parliamentary committee on defence. The draft law was deliberated
by the committee and some opposition members proposed some amendments requiring
annual reporting by NCA about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.192
However, these amendments were rejected and the draft law was passed as an act of
parliament in early 2010 and after receiving the assent of the President it was notified as a

190
’25 year jail for national security offenders’, National Command Authority Ordinance Promulgated,
Ordinance overrides existing laws, The News International, Islamabad, December14, 2007 and ‘Musharraf
promulgates ordinance to establish NCA,’ Daily Times, Lahore, December 14, 2007.
http://.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\12\14\story_
191
Ordinance No. LXX of 2007, op. cit.
192
These amendments were proposed by two parliamentarians Ayaz Amir and Dr. Attiya Inayatullah.
 147

law through Gazette of Pakistan on 11th of March 2010.193 It was entitled ‘National
Command Authority Act, 2010.’ The act was deemed to have taken effect retroactively on
13 December 2007, the same date on which the NCA ordinance was promulgated.

The contents and substance of the Act generally remain the same as the NCA
Ordinance with some subtle and one substantive change. By the time the act was passed by
the parliament President Zardari had decided to give up his position as Chairman of the
NCA and therefore, the Prime Minister who was hither-to-fore, the Vice Chairman was
now designated as the Chairman of NCA. The position of Vice Chairman has been done
away with in the new arrangement.

4.10 A Comparison of NCA Ordinance 2007 and NCA Act of 2010:

National Command Authority Ordinance National Command Authority Act, 2010.

2007.
Section 2 (b) “Chairman means the “Chairman means the Prime Minister of the
President of the Islamic Republic of Islamic Republic of Pakistan”
Pakistan
Section 3 (4) The Vice Chairman of the No Vice Chairman
Authority shall be the Prime Minister of (4) The other members of the Authority shall
Pakistan. be the, (a) Minister for Foreign Affairs; (b)
(5) The other ex-officio members of the Minister for Defence; (c) Minister for
Authority shall be the:- (a) Minister for Finance; (d) Minister for Interior; (e)
Foreign Affairs; (b) Minister for Defence; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee;
(c) Minister for Finance; (d) Minister for (f) Chief of Army Staff; (g) Chief of Naval
Interior; (e) Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Staff; (h) Chief of Air Staff.
Committee; (f) Chief of Army Staff; (g) (5) The Director General Strategic Plans
Chief of Naval Staff; (h) Chief of Air Staff; Division shall act as the Secretary of the
and (i) Director General Strategic Plans Authority.
Division.
(6) The Director General Strategic Plans
Division shall act as the Secretary of the
Authority.
Section 4: Powers of the Chairman:- All Powers of the Chairman:- All the powers
the powers and functions of the Authority and functions shall rest with the National
shall vest in the Chairman who may, Command Authority on whose behalf, the

193
The Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary, Islamabad, March 11, 2010.
 148

subject to such limitations as he may Chairman will exercise these powers and
specify, delegate all or any of these powers functions who may in consultation with
and functions to Director General National Command Authority and subject to
Strategic Plans Division or such other such limitations as he may specify, delegate
person as he may deem appropriate. any of these powers and functions to
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
and Director General Strategic Plans
Division, who may further sub-delegate the
same to any employee.
Section 5: Secretariat of the Authority: Section 5: Secretariat of the Authority:
The Strategic Plans Division shall function The Strategic Plans Division shall function
as the secretariat of the Authority and shall as the Secretariat of the Authority and shall
be headed by a Director General to be be headed by a Director General to be
appointed by the Chairman. appointed by the Chairman on the
recommendation of the Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Director
General shall be a serving Lieutenant
General who may continue after
retirement for completion of assigned
projects.
No provision for a Standing Committee for Section 12 (4): In the event of, suspicion
investigating proliferation related matters. regarding matters related to proliferation
National Command Authority will appoint a
Standing Committee constituted from
amongst its members and other individuals
as deemed necessary, which will inquire and
investigate matters on this account.
Schedule 1 Under section 12 (2) of the Schedule [See section 12 (2)]
NCA Ordinance: Does not include ‘Offences under Defence of
Serial 8: Offences under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1971.
Pakistan Ordinance, 1971. [Total offences listed=20]
[Total offences listed=21]
 149

4.11 Organisation, Role and Functions of NCA and its Constituents:

[Source: Strategic Plans Division]

4.11(1) Role and Functions of the Employment Control Committee (ECC):194

The employment control committee (ECC) is the apex policy making body and
performs the following functions:-

194
Author’s interviews with respondents ‘W’ and ‘X’ at Rawalpindi on 6-7 August 2012.
 150

(1) Regularly reviews the information related to developments in the adversary’s

strategic weapons programme.
(2) Provides policy direction during peacetime and has the authority to order and
control the movement, deployment and employment of strategic forces during war.
(3) Furnishes guidance for development of appropriate doctrines and employment
policy based on own technical capabilities and assessment of threat.
(4) Is responsible for establishing hierarchy of command and policy for delegation of
authority for employment of nuclear weapons.
(5) Stipulates guiding principles and procedures for an effective command and control
system to prevent any accidental, unauthorised or mistaken use of nuclear weapons.

4.11(2) Role and Functions of Development Control Committee (DCC):195

DCC is the subordinate committee of the ECC and most of its members are
also members of the ECC. DCC is basically responsible for converting the decisions of the
ECC into specific developmental goals and oversees the implementation of these by the
strategic organisations. It performs the following functions:-

(1) Exercises technical, financial and essential administrative control over the strategic
organisations. The respective Chairmen however, enjoy full autonomy in the
internal administration and management of their organisations.
(2) Supervises the orderly development of strategic weapons programmes in
accordance with the developmental strategy approved by the ECC.
(3) It has the power to establish new facilities/organisations or to combine existing
ones in line with laid down objectives.

195
Ibid.
 151

ORGANISATION – STRATEGIC PLANS DIVISION

DIRECTOR GENERAL
3 STAR GENERAL

STRATEGIC WEAPONS ACDA DIRECTORATE CONVENTIONAL & OPEN STRATEGIC

OPERATIONS & SECURITY
DEVELOPMENT (Arms Control PROGRAMMES COMMUNICATIONS
PLANS BRANCH DIVISION
DIRECTORATE &Disarmament Issues) DIRECTORATE ORGANISATION

OPERATIONS PLANS INTELLIGENCE C4I2SR CIVIL WORKS

DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE ORGANISATION

CONSULTANCY
DIRECTORATE

COUNTER TECHNICAL PRP TRAINING SPECIAL TASKS EVALUATION & ANALYSIS

INTELLIGENCE TEAMS
SECURITY DIRECTORATES & PROTECTIONS DIRECTORATE
DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE ACADEMY

PAEC KRL SUPARCO NESCOM

[Source: Strategic Plans Division]

4.11(3) Role and Functions of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD):196

SPD was headed since its inception in March 1999 until early 2014, by General
Kidwai, initially as a two star, then a three star general and later as a retired three star
general. That prolonged tenure helped in solidifying the operating procedures and norms,
advancing the operational planning and preparedness and completing key developmental
projects. The first transition in the top leadership of the SPD took place in early 2014 and
the process was completed at the beginning of March 2014 when a serving three star
general formally assumed charge as the new DG SPD.197 The NCA Ordinance of 2007 did
not elaborate the rank of the DG SPD or the procedure for his appointment except that,
“SPD shall be headed by a Director General to be appointed by the Chairman [NCA].”198
However, the NCA Act of 2010 elaborated the procedure further by stating that DG SPD

196
Author’s interviews with respondents ‘W’ and ‘X’ at Rawalpindi on 06-07 August 2012.
197
‘Lt Gen Hayat takes charge as SPD DG,’ Daily Times, March 01, 2014. See
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/01-Mar-2014/lt-gen-hayat-takes-charge-as-spd-dg. For background information
see‘New chief to oversee SPD,’ The Express Tribune, December 19, 2013,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/647579/new-chief-to-oversee-spd/ , ‘Change of Guard in SPD,’ The
Hindu, January 12, 2014; http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/change-of-guard-in-
spd/article5569697.ece , ‘Major reshuffle in army hierarchy,’ The Dawn, December 24, 2013.
198
Ordinance No. LXX of 2007 op. cit.
 152

will be appointed by the Chairman NCA (Prime Minister) on the recommendation of

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It also explained that SPD will be headed by a
serving three star general but with the proviso that he could continue in retirement to
complete the ongoing projects.199 SPD represents the permanent secretariat of the NCA
and is assigned the responsibility to manage all aspects of the national nuclear capability
on its behalf. It works directly under the Prime Minister through the Chairman Joint Chiefs
of Staff. SPD has officers from all three services on its staff. It performs the following
main functions200:-

(1) Prepares the agenda for NCA meetings and provides secretariat and administrative
support for convening and holding of regular NCA meetings.
(2) Formulates recommendations with regard to country’s nuclear policy, nuclear
strategy and nuclear doctrine and presents these for approval by the NCA.
(3) Devises short and long term development strategies and force goals for the three
services’ strategic forces, within the ambit of the policy parameters approved by the
NCA, keeping in view constraints imposed by available resources and international
regimes, and oversees their implementation.
(4) Formulates strategic and operational plans for the movement, deployment and
employment of strategic forces in the light of policies approved by the NCA.
(5) Articulates the chain of command/authority and pre-delegation on behalf of the
NCA.
(6) Implements short and long term measures for the safety and security of strategic
assets through the Security Division.
(7) Exercises control over strategic organisations and oversees their budgetary,
technical, developmental and administrative affairs on behalf of the Prime Minister
and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(8) Furnishes military inputs to the Foreign Office and Pakistani mission at Conference
on Disarmament at Geneva on arms control and disarmament related issues.
(9) Coordinates the establishment of Strategic Command, Control, and
Communications, mechanisms for the NCA for exercising command and control

199
See Section -5 of NCA Act 2010, notified vide The Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary, Islamabad, March
11, 2010.
200
Based on author’s interviews with respondents ‘W’ and ‘X’ at Rawalpindi on 06-07 August 2012.
 153

over strategic assets, and maintains real time communication links with the three
services and strategic forces.
(10) It also coordinates Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) related routine
inspections in conjunction with the national authority in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and organises training and dissemination of information to all stake holders.
(11) SPD officials also participate in multilateral arms control and disarmament forums
as part of the Pakistani delegations as well as in bilateral dialogue on strategic issues
with friendly countries. They also form part of the official delegations during expert
level talks on nuclear CBMs with India.
(12) Senior SPD officers deliver lectures on nuclear policy related issues at both
military and civilian higher institutions of learning.
(13) SPD arranges briefings on nuclear policy for members of parliamentary committees
on defence and national security as and when required in addition to holding
briefings for participants of National Security Workshops.
(14) SPD officers regularly share their experiences and knowledge as practitioners of
nuclear policy with students of related disciplines at University Departments.

4.11(4) Security Division:

Security Division headed by a two star army general with over 25,000 specially
trained and equipped personnel is an important organisation within the NCA structure. It is
responsible for physical security, personnel security as well as counter-intelligence and
directly reports to DG SPD. Its detailed roles and functions will, however, be discussed in
the chapter-5 (Nuclear Safety and Security).

4.11 (5) Role and Functions of the Strategic Force Commands:201

Strategic Force Commands have been created in each of the three military services.
The most recent being the Naval Strategic Forces Command, which was established in
2012.202The services strategic force commands are responsible for custody and
maintenance of nuclear delivery systems as well as training of weapon crews. The services
retain training, technical and administrative control over their respective strategic forces.

Interviews with respondents ‘W’ and ‘X’ at Rawalpindi on 06-07 August 2012.
201
202
“Naval Chief Inaugurates Naval Strategic Force Headquarters,” Inter Services Public Relations, May 19,
2012.
 154

The operational planning and control remains with the NCA under overall military
direction of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. SPD is responsible for coordinating all
related details with the services headquarters. The Army Strategic Forces Command
(ASFC) is headed by a three star general officer while the Air Force Strategic Forces
Command (AFSC) and Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC) are headed by two star
generals respectively.

4.12 Indian Nuclear Command and Control:

It may be pertinent here to provide a brief overview of the Indian Nuclear

Command and Control which has also evolved parallel to that of Pakistan. India
announced its Draft Nuclear Doctrine on 17th August 1999. The draft doctrine only
mentioned maintenance of ‘robust command and control’ as one of the requirements for
India’s nuclear deterrence at section 2.6203 but did not elaborate the structure of the
prospective command and control. Then on 4th January 2003, more than four and a half
years after declaring itself a nuclear weapons power and almost three years after Pakistan’s
announcement of the establishment of its nuclear command and control, a press release by
India’s Cabinet Committee on Security made public the broad outline of India’s nuclear
command and control.204 The statement mentioned a two tiered structure called Nuclear
Command Authority (NCA), comprising a Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister
and an Executive Council to be chaired by the Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor.
The Cabinet Committee also approved the appointment of a tri-service strategic force
command205 unlike Pakistan which has three separate strategic force commands for the
three services. The Executive Council would provide inputs to the Political Council for
decision making and also oversee the implementation of decisions taken by the Political
Council,206 a role somewhat similar to SPD in Pakistan but with less elaborate
organisational structure. As explained by Raja Mohan, the statement did not reveal the
‘actual composition’ of either the Political Council or the Executive Council. The
statement also talked of approval of a chain of command to cater for the eventuality of
incapacitation of the Prime Minister during an emergency. However, it did not explain how

203
P.R. Chari, Sonika Gupta and Arpit Rajain, eds., ‘Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia,’ New Delhi,
Manohar, 2003, p. 186.
204
C. Raja Mohan, ‘Nuclear Command Authority Comes into Being,’ The Hindu, January 5, 2003.
205
Ibid.
206
Ibid.
 155

this succession down the chain of command will take effect nor did it identify the Prime
Minister’s successors.207

A well-known Indian strategic analyst Bharat Karnad, who was also a member of
the NSAB that authored India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine has expressed his dissatisfaction
over the state of affairs in India’s nuclear command and control system while highlighting
the need for a ‘Dedicated Nuclear Cadre’. According to Karnad:-

“I have argued in my books and other writings, Pakistan SPD’s professionalism

and competence in nuclear strategic matters is principally the result of painstaking
and rigorous efforts over a long period of time to seed and nurture a force manned
by a specialist cadre, and this is no bad thing for our SFC (Strategic Force
Command) and the nuclear cell in the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) to emulate.
It will be an improvement on what presently exists.” He goes on to add that, “The
Central point about the success of the SPD and every other nuclear force is that the
nuclear secretariat is run by a corps of officers with real expertise – top to bottom,
who are recruited after intensive tests and psychological profiling, including their
ability to handle extreme stress.”208

4.13 Analysis:

At the end of May 1998 in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests Pakistan
was faced with the challenge of setting up an effective command and control mechanism to
establish its credentials as a responsible nuclear power both internationally as well as
domestically. Such an overarching structure was deemed essential to enhance safety and
security of sensitive installations, materials and personnel working in sensitive areas of the
nuclear and missile programmes. An efficacious command and control was also necessary
for credibility of its nuclear deterrence and to operationalize the nuclear capability.
Important tasks such as development of a nuclear doctrine, operational planning,
estimation of the size of the nuclear arsenal, number and type of delivery systems and
development of necessary means of communication between the NCA and the strategic

207
Ibid.
208
Bharat Karnad, ‘Dedicated Nuclear Cadre,’ posted on the blog ‘Security Wise on 16 August 2012,
file:///F:/Dedicated%20Nuclear%20Cadre%20_%20Security%20Wise.htm. Originally published on 16
August 2012 as “INS: Indian Nuclear Service” in the Asian Age at www.asianage.com/columnists/ins-
indian-nuclear-service-094 and in the 'Deccan Chronicle' at www.deccanchronicle.com/comunists/bharat-
karnad/ins-indian-nuclear-service
 156

forces had to be undertaken. The urgency of all these undertakings meant that it could not
develop various segments sequentially but had to commence work in all these areas
simultaneously. However, Pakistan’s severe resource constraints would mean that various
tasks would have to be prioritised. Since, communication networks are very costly and
time consuming to establish and their real need arises when weapons and requisite delivery
systems become operationally ready, it was decided to undertake this job in a phased
programme spread over a decade in order to distribute the financial costs into convenient
portions.209

A decade and a half later, there is a worldwide recognition that Pakistan has put in
place a viable, comprehensive and effective command and control system.210 According to
Bruno Tertrais, “There is every reason to believe that Pakistan takes good care of its
nuclear weapons. It sees them as the ultimate guarantee of its survival. And it knows that it
cannot afford to make a mistake…”211 Peter Lavoy has also expressed similar confidence
explaining that, “Since the AQ Khan affair, the Strategic Plans Division has gone to great
lengths to improve the country’s command and control infrastructure…”212 Along the way
many additions have been made to the structures and organisations initially conceived and
set up. This significant movement up the learning curve can be attributed to ‘experiential
learning’ as well as ‘inferential learning’ and in some cases there may have been instances
of what could be termed as ‘unlearning.’ It is, however, extremely difficult to distinguish
between learning and adaptation due to non-availability of empirical data in the public
domain. In terms of ‘experiential learning’ a critical mass of professional expertise and
institutional memory has been built. In the domain of ‘inferential learning’ evidence from

209
Based on interviews with respondents ‘A’ and ‘R’ author’s personal knowledge of the process..
210
See for instance, Bharat Karnad, ‘INS: Indian Nuclear Service’ op. cit., Lawrence J. Korb, “The Security of
Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 19, 2009,
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-security-of-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal. See “President
Obama’s 100th-Day Press Briefing,” The New York Times, April 29, 2009; General David H. Petraeus,
interview with Chris Wallace, Fox News Sunday, Fox, May 10, 2009,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/10/fox_news_sunday_david_petraeus_96429.html;
“Pak Nukes Safely Guarded, Says Narayanan,” Press Trust of India, December 16, 2007,
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Pak+nukes+safely+guarded,+says+Narayanan/1/2524.html. and Paul K.
Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,’ Congressional
Research Service, 7-5700, www.crs.gov RL 34248.
211
Bruno Tertrais, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: Status, Evolution and Risks,’ EU Non-Proliferation
Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 19, July 2012 at http://www.nonproliferation.eu
212
Peter R. Lavoy, Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation, in Henry D. Sokolski ed.,
‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Future Worries Beyond War, January 2008,
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
 157

statements issued after the NCA meetings, missile tests and at diplomatic forums suggests
that there is a better and more sophisticated understanding of the nuances of nuclear policy,
strategy, and diplomacy. The officials also exhibit greater degree of self-assurance and
self-confidence. However, critics point out that there have been some instances of
‘unlearning’ as well. They consider Pakistan’s earlier decision to eschew the so called
‘tactical’ or battlefield nuclear weapons as a wise decision based on lessons correctly learnt
from the experience of US/NATO and the erstwhile Soviet Union and believe that Pakistan
has actually unlearnt those useful lessons by its recent move to develop and field
battlefield nuclear weapons. Yet another instance of unlearning is cited as the recent
tendency to discourage dialogue and interaction with outsiders which would only
encourage ‘group think’ by insulating the organisation from alternative viewpoints. This
they consider as a retrogressive step after the relatively open and transparent approach
during the earlier years.213

The existing structure of the NCA looks evenly balanced on paper in terms of
civilian and military representation, though sceptics consider that the civilian presence in
the NCA is only symbolic and they simply endorse the policy decisions taken by the
military brass.214 Others think that the job of the civilians is to provide broad policy
guidelines and it is military’s job to carry out operational planning and handle other
technical issues and that is the usual practice in most countries with nuclear weapons.215
Another point of view is very critical of former President Zardari’s decision to dissociate
himself from the NCA and handing over the responsibility of chairing the NCA to the
Prime Minister. This critique is based on the argument that President is constitutionally the
supreme commander of the armed forces and represents the federation, whereas the Prime
Minister represents a political party and since nuclear weapons are national assets he
should not have abdicated his position.216

Moreover, given the volatility of Pakistani politics and the perpetual friction
between the government and the higher judiciary other complications of more practical

213
Based on author’s interviews with respondents ‘H’ at Islamabad on 14 July 2012 and with respondent ‘R’
at Bangkok on 9 September 2012.
214
This was a common perception amongst academics and security analysts during interview conducted by
the author in Pakistan during July/August 2012.
215
Author’s interview with respondent ‘V’ via e mail on January 21, 2013.
216
Author’s interview with respondent ‘E’ at Islamabad on 28 July 2012.
 158

nature can arise. In the recent past an incumbent Prime Minister was removed from his
post by the Supreme Court on contempt of court charges and orders were issued for the
arrest of his successor for his alleged involvement in a corruption case. These episodes
amply highlight the fragility of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan where one chairman
of NCA was summarily dismissed and another narrowly escaped dismissal. In the current
hierarchy of NCA the position of the Vice Chairman has been abolished but given the
tenuous position of the prime ministers, it may be prudent to amend the law to reinstate the
appointment of a Vice Chairman of NCA who could take over as acting chairman in case
the incumbent chairman is unable to continue in his job for whatever reasons. Restoring
the appointment of the Vice Chairman of NCA could, however, open a debate as to who
should be designated as Vice Chairman. Should he be from amongst the civilians or
military members of the NCA? One option could be to designate the foreign minister, who
is, already deputy chairman of the highest decision making body, the ECC in the NCA.
Alternatively, it could be the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff who is currently deputy
chairman of the DCC. The third option could be to have two Vice Chairmen wherein both
the Foreign Minister as well as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff could be nominated.
This issue will have to be tackled sooner or later and cannot be ignored for long because it
can have adverse impact on the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.

The foundations for Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and institutional structures for
nuclear command and control were laid in the early days of General Musharraf’s military
led government. These structures evolved and matured during the next eight years of his
rule. In a way it was a blessing in disguise because decision making channels were short
and direct and devoid of any bureaucratic hurdles. DG SPD had easy access to the
president through the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The strategic programme
was accorded high priority throughout this period and all its demands were met
expeditiously. In fact, the inclusion of the Finance Minister in the NCA was also aimed at
facilitating and expediting the allocation of financial resources for developmental
programmes.

The political government that came into power in 2008 also accorded priority to the
needs of the strategic programmes despite economic difficulties mainly for the reason that
they did not want to be accused by the political opposition and the public of undermining
 159

the nuclear capability. One thing though did not seem to have been given careful
consideration and that is the assignment of ministerial portfolios. The ministries seemed to
have been allocated on the basis of political considerations and expediencies of coalition
politics without giving much thought to the fact that some of these ministers are also going
to be part of the NCA. Appointing people lacking credentials to fulfil the responsibilities
that accrue from being a member of the NCA or those with tainted reputations is bound to
adversely affect not only the credibility but functioning of the institution as well. This is an
area where there is still a lot of room for learning.

When the Nawaz Sharif government took office in June 2013 it was expected that it
would improve upon the performance of its predecessor in this regard. However, the new
government’s handling of this issue has raised several new questions. For instance, the
Prime Minister also retained the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Defence which meant
that the representation of civilian members in the NCA was reduced by two. Later on under
compulsion of a court case the Prime Minister relinquished the charge of Defence Minister
and appointed a new incumbent as Minister of Defence but he continues to hold the charge
of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since the Minister of Foreign Affairs is also designated as
the Deputy Chairman of the main policy making body of NCA i.e. the Employment
Control Committee it leaves a gap in the hierarchy of nuclear command and control
especially when there is no Vice Chairman in the NCA’s organisation. Prime Minister’s
Advisor on Foreign Affairs and the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign
Affairs, who have attended the NCA meetings on special invitation, cannot despite their
high credentials fill in the positions specified by the NCA Law. Apparently, there seems to
be no concern on this anomaly in any quarters and even the usually noisy Pakistani media
has also remained silent on it.

In contrast to nuclear doctrine Pakistan has been far more open about sharing
information about its nuclear command and control structures as is evident from the
February 2000 press release. Later on, the NCA Ordinance and the NCA Law also
elaborated the organisation, role and functions of the nuclear command and control
organisation. It is obvious therefore, that learning in this domain would be relatively more
pronounced. However, due to sensitive nature of information about chain of command and
procedures for pre-delegation of authority have not been made public. However, learning
 160

about their role in the nuclear command and control structure on part of the political
leadership has not been up to the desired levels. Learning in this domain can, therefore, be
graded as somewhere between moderate and extensive.
 161

Chapter-5

Nuclear Safety and Security Arrangements

5.1 Background:

The sceptics in the international community as well as within Pakistan have

perpetually raised questions and concerns about the safety and security of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and materials. There are others who are more assured of the viability of
existing nuclear safety and security mechanisms instituted by Pakistan.1 This chapter will
review the administrative, institutional and legislative measures implemented by Pakistan
to address the challenges to its nuclear safety and security. It will also explore the internal
as well as external factors that have driven the learning process in this particular domain
and how this learning has manifested itself in the form of organisational and institutional
responses and brought about changes in the security culture within the nuclear
establishment.

5.2 The Theoretical Foundation:

The immense destructive power of nuclear weapons and the potential for
widespread damage resulting from an accidental or unauthorised nuclear detonation make
nuclear technology one of the most hazardous technologies developed by modern science.
Spread of chemical, biological and radiological materials due to an accident can also cause
significant loss of life though not comparable to an intended or unintended nuclear
explosion. The subject of nuclear safety and security, both in the civilian as well as
military applications therefore, attracts utmost attention. In general terms safety relates to
the vulnerability of either the nuclear weapons or nuclear reactors to accidents, security

1
For favourable views see, Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From
Reality,’ arms control Today, July/August 2009; Ken Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik, ‘Building
Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,’ Arms Control Today, December 2007. Christopher Clary,
‘Thinking about Pakistan’s nuclear Security in Peacetime, War and Crisis,’ IDSA Occasional Paper No. 12,
Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, September, 2010. For skeptical views see, Rolf
Mowatt Larssen, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism,’ Arms Control
Today, July/August 2009, Seymour Hersh, ‘Defending the Arsenal,’ The New Yorker, November 16, 2009,
Shaun Gregory, ‘The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s nuclear Weapons,’ CTC Sentinel, July 2009, Vol. 2, Issue
7, United States Military Academy, West Point.
 162

stands for physical security of nuclear weapons storage sites, nuclear installations and
materials against external threats and is organised in the form of perimeter fences, intrusion
barriers and various kinds of sensors and detectors. As per the IAEA’s Glossary of
Concepts and terms ‘safety’ in the nuclear domain has been explained as under:-

“Safety is the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents

and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the
public and the environment from undue radiation hazards… Safety concerns both
risks under normal circumstances and risks as a consequence of incidents, as well
as other possible direct consequences of a loss of control over a nuclear reactor
core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation.”2

While nuclear security has been defined by the IAEA in following terms:-

“Nuclear Security is the prevention and detection of, and response to theft,
sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving
nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.”3

IAEA also recognises the existence of complementarity and synergy between safety and
security and observes that it is difficult to clearly distinguish safety from security. As the above
definitions would indicate actions taken to enhance safety also help increase the security. For
instance, the reactor containment vessels are made of steel and then placed inside a concrete dome
to prevent any leakage of radiation to ensure the protection of humans and the environment. The
same strong structure also prevents malicious acts against the reactor thereby enhancing security.
Similarly, emergency response plans help in mitigating the effects of a normal accident during
operations and at the same time providing the ability to reverse the effects of any unauthorised
access or action carried out with malicious intent.4 It is, therefore, evident that in the literature
dealing with nuclear safety and security where the term safety is used alone it invariably denotes
both safety and security related issues. A case in point is Scott Sagan’s book entitled ‘The Limits
of Safety – Organisations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons.’5 He has used the framework
of organisation theory to analyse the experiences of US Strategic Air Command (SAC)

2
IAEA Safety Glossary and terms – Nuclear Safety and Security, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/concepts-
terms.asp
3
IAEA Safety Glossary and terms – Nuclear Safety and Security, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/concepts-
terms.asp
4
Complementarity of Safety and Security, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/concepts-terms.asp
5
Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Limits of Safety – Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons’, New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1993.
 163

and other elements of nuclear command and control through the month long heightened
nuclear alert during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. According to the study,
though there was no accident involving nuclear weapons, there were several close calls
and ‘near misses,’ which could have potentially resulted in catastrophic accidents. Sagan
suggests that, “In the large and very complex organisations that control hazardous
technologies in our society, one should expect that the unexpected will occur, that
unimaginable interactions will develop, that accidents will happen.”6 He, however,
concedes that, “The safety record seems quite extraordinary, however, with the most
hazardous technology of all: nuclear weapons. There has never been an accidental or
unauthorised detonation of a nuclear weapon, much less escalation to an accidental nuclear
war.”7

The study has pitched against each other the arguments proffered by two competing
schools of thought within the organisation theory literature, to help explain various aspects
of the issue and to draw relevant conclusions. These two schools of thought have been
termed by Sagan as the ‘high reliability theory’ representing an ‘optimistic’ view point and
the ‘normal accidents theory’ that represents the relatively more ‘pessimistic’ interpretation
of the issue. In his view, the protagonists of high reliability school believe that extremely
hazardous technologies can be handled with high levels of confidence using suitable
organisational structures and management procedures, while the advocates of normal
accidents theory are convinced that accidents are bound to occur sooner or later in the
operations involving extremely complex high technology systems. A recapitulation of the
gist of arguments of these two contending schools will provide the basis that will facilitate
the identification of key issues, which in turn will help put into perspective Pakistan
specific nuclear safety and security issues. This will enable us to review and analyse the
organisational structures and operational procedures and practices developed by Pakistan
since 1998 to determine whether any learning has taken in Pakistan in this particular area.

5.2.1 The High Reliability Theory:

The arguments of the high reliability school have been outlined in three important
studies. The first, a joint study, by Joseph Marone and Edward Woodhouse, is entitled

6
Ibid., p. 3.
7
Ibid., p. 4.
 164

‘Averting Catastrophe: Strategies for Regulating Risky Technologies’ that covers a whole
gamut of issues ranging from toxic chemicals to nuclear power and DNA research in the
United States. The authors contend that, “given the challenges posed by modern
technologies, the record is surprisingly good: despite dire warnings, no catastrophes have
occurred in the United States.”8 They argue that this is, “a systematic product of human
actions – the result of a deliberate process by which risks are monitored, evaluated and
reduced,”9 adding that the strategies employed clearly indicate all the ingredients of a
comprehensive system to prevent the occurrence of catastrophes.10

The second major study was conducted by scholars from Berkeley University such
as Geoffrey Gosling, Todd R. La Porte and Karlene H. Roberts etc. who argue that, “we
have begun to discover the degree and character of effort necessary to overcome the
inherent limitations to securing consistent, failure free operations in complex social
organisations.”11

The third significant study representing the high reliability school is Aaron
Wildavsky’s Searching for Safety’ which is aimed at developing a theoretical framework
that could rationalise the high level of safety achieved in modern societies.12 The study
concentrates on what the author has termed as two ‘universal strategies’ for enhancement
of safety. The first of these is “anticipation” which as the name suggests means foreseeing
and precluding the accidents even before they happen, while the second is called
“resilience” which covers the efforts to mitigate the dangers after an accident has
happened.13

The common strand that runs through the arguments of high reliability theorists is
their confidence in the viability of appropriately designed and run organisations which
compensate for the limitations and weaknesses of individual human beings and are far
more rational and efficient than individual actors. High reliability organisations act
rationally and have clearly defined goals aimed at achieving accident free operations.

8
Joseph G. Marone and Edward J. Woodhouse, ‘Averting Catastrophe: Strategies for Regulating Risky
Technologies’, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986, quoted in Sagan, op. cit., p. 14.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., p. 14-15.
11
Todd R. La Porte, letter to Scott Sagan, September 29, 1991, quoted in Sagan, op. cit., p. 15.
12
Aaron Wildavsky, ‘Searching for Safety’, New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1988, quoted in
Sagan, op. cit., p. 16.
13
Ibid.
 165

According to Scott Sagan, the high reliability theory fits in well with the concept of a
“closed rational system” propounded by W. Richard Scott. Such organisations are
characterised as “closed systems” because of the fact that they go to great lengths to
insulate the system as far as possible from the influence of extraneous factors.14 Carrying
forward the same argument scholars such as La Porte and Consolini have argued that, high
reliability organisations have clearly defined objectives adding that:

“Those in the organisations carry on intensive efforts to know the physical and
dynamic properties of their production technologies, and they go to considerable
pains to buffer the effects of environmental surprises. In most regards, the
organisations come close to meeting the conditions of closed rational systems, i.e.,
a well buffered, well understood technical core requiring consistency and stability
for effective, failure-free operations.”15

In essence the arguments of high reliability theorists revolve around four causal
factors: “the prioritisation of safety and reliability as a goal by political elites and the
organisation’s leadership; high levels of redundancy in personnel and technical safety
measures; the development of a ‘high reliability culture’ in decentralised and continually
practical operations; and sophisticated forms of trial and error organisational learning.”16

If the leadership both at the political and the organisational level is not fully
committed to safety and is not willing to set aside sufficient resources for the purpose there
will be a greater probability of accidents. Similarly, according to the high reliability theory
protagonists the need for redundancy cannot be overemphasised. The redundancy relates to
both personnel as well as safety equipment. They are convinced that redundancy plays a
critical role in the functioning of all complex organisations and is especially vital for safe
running of nuclear reactors which require duplicate independent power sources, redundant
instrumentation and surplus cooling channels.17 They also stress the importance of
delegation of decision making especially related to safety functions to ensure quick
responses by individuals to deal with emergency situations. This would however, require
induction, training and socialisation of individuals to inculcate a robust culture of safety

14
W. Richard Scott, ‘Organisations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems’, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice
Hall, 1987, quoted in Sagan, op. cit., p. 17.
15
La Porte and Consolini, “Working in Practice but Not in Theory”, quote in Sagan, op. cit., p. 17.
16
Sagan, op. cit., p. 17.
17
Ibid., p. 19-20.
 166

and reliability. Development of this culture leads to commonality of assumptions and

premises that underpin the decision making.18 Militaries have an advantage over their
civilian counterparts in this regard due to intense socialisation and cultural integration of
their members.

The high reliability school also lays emphasis on the importance of ‘organisational
learning’ which is critical for the safe operation of organisations dealing with hazardous
technologies. They emphasise the importance for a high reliability organisation to adapt
and amend its operating procedures, based on a continuous process of ‘trial and error,’ that
helps identify the procedures which enhance safety and those which do not. This gradual
learning process and course correction helps eliminate potentially dangerous practices
through a process of elimination. Wildavsky has highlighted the importance of trial and
error thus:

“Trial and error is a device for correcting small dangers in order to avoid or lessen
the damage from big ones…Because it is a discovery process that discloses latent
errors so we can learn how to deal with them, trial and error also lowers risk by
reducing the scope of unforeseen dangers. Trial and error samples the world of as
yet unknown risks; by learning to cope with risks that become evident as the result
of small-scale trial and error, we develop skills for dealing with whatever may
come our way from the world of unknown risks.” 19

Simulation of probable scenarios can also help learn lessons as an alternative

strategy to trial and error. This simulation can take the form of table top exercises, crisis
simulation exercises and military war games. High reliability theorists are convinced that
an appropriately structured and efficiently managed command and control system with
built in practices of learning, adaptation and adjustments based on the experiences gained
either through trial and error or simulation can assure the desired levels of reliability and
safety.20

18
Ibid., p. 22-3.
19
Wildavsky, quoted in Sagan, op. cit., p. 26.
20
Sagan, op. cit., p. 26, 28.
 167

5.2.2 Normal Accidents Theory:

In contrast to the optimistic view of the high reliability theorists the proponents of
normal accidents theory take a far more pessimistic view of the issue of safe operation of
dangerous technologies. While acknowledging the strenuous efforts on part of any
complex organisation to ensure safety and reliability, they believe that serious accidents
are a ‘normal’ outcome of the systems dealing with hazardous technologies. They concede
the fact that serious accidents in organisations handling dangerous technologies are a rare
occurrence but are convinced that such accidents are bound to happen sooner or later.21

Normal accidents theorists argue that often there are conflicting interests within the
organisations themselves while they are also vulnerable to external influences. Some
theorists from this school have built on an approach termed as the “garbage can model”
contending that decision making in complex organisations takes place in anarchic
environment rather than in a rational manner as propounded by high reliability theorists.
Calling complex organisations “organised anarchies,” they base their reasoning on three
characteristics exhibited by complex organisations. First, the organisations usually have
“inconsistent” and “ill-defined” priorities and that various individuals in an organisation
may have incompatible objectives and that these individual preferences are also subject to
change. Second, while it is a fact that such organisations operate highly complex
technologies, which may work efficiently, the personnel involved in running these systems
are not always well versed with the intricacies of the technological processes. Similarly,
the causal relationship between various actions and their consequences is also not fully
understood. Third, neither the decision makers in complex organisations remain constant
nor do they exhibit a uniform level of interest or competence.22

The garbage can model combines all the possible failings and weaknesses in the
functioning of complex organisations and takes an extremely pessimistic and negative
view of the situation. In reality, however, all these negative factors will not co-exist at the
same time, and as the authors of the model have themselves conceded, such dire

21
Ibid., p. 28.
22
Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organisational
Choice,”in March, ‘Decisions and Organisations’. Also see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “Garbage
Can Models of Decision Making in Organisations,” in James G. March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds.,
‘Ambiguity and Command: Organisational Perspectives on Military Decision Making,’ Marshfield, Mass.,
Pitman, 1986, quoted in Sagan, op. cit., p. 29.
 168

circumstances are not likely to prevail at all times in every organisation.23 The Fukushima
disaster involving a Japanese nuclear power complex on March 11, 2011 was an
exceptional event where a combination of a powerful earthquake, the resulting Tsunami
and flaws in the construction and management of the nuclear plants resulted in failure of
the cooling system. That in turn led to a meltdown of the reactor core and leakage of
radiation. There have been no cases of deaths or radiation sickness but over a hundred
thousand people had to be evacuated.24

One of the leading proponents of normal accidents theory Charles Perrow has
employed a modified version of the garbage can theory in his 1984 book entitled Normal
Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies,25 to analyse the safety hazards in systems
such as the commercial airlines, nuclear power plants, international shipping, petro-
chemical industry and nuclear weapons. He represents a rather pessimistic view that is in
clear contrast with the far more positive outlook of the high reliability theorists asserting
that, “serious accidents are inevitable, no matter how hard we try to avoid them.”26
According to Sagan, the normal accidents theory is comparatively more structured and is
also more political as compared to the high reliability theory. In his view Perrow has not
only identified structural peculiarities of highly complex organisations operating hazardous
technologies, but has also paid attention to the competing interests within the organisation
itself, as well as the conflict of interests between the organisation and the political
influentials outside the organisation. He has highlighted two salient features of
organisations managing hazardous technologies as “interactive complexity” and “tight
coupling.” According to Perrow, “complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences,
unplanned and unexpected sequences and are either not visible or not immediately
comprehensible.”27 He cites the example of a nuclear power plant as a system which
symbolises high interactive complexity, and since critical assemblies are kept within a
confined space inside the nuclear plants, there is always a possibility of undesirable

23
Ibid.
24
Fukushima Accident, World Nuclear Association; http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/safety-and-
security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident/
25
Charles Perrow, ‘Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies,’ New York, Basic Books, 1984;
quoted in Sagan, op. cit., p. 31.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
 169

interactions. Due to tight coupling failure of one component can lead to the failure of other
closely interconnected parts thus leading to a serious accident.28

Perrow points out, that for successful functioning of a tightly coupled system, it is
imperative to have centralised decision making, strict adherence to laid down procedures,
unqualified submission to orders by the individuals and quick responses to any unforeseen
event. He believes that the remedy offered by the high reliability theorists in the form of
strong organisational culture is not easy to realise especially in the free democratic
societies. He elaborates his point by arguing that:

“It calls for a wartime military model in a peacetime civilian operation. A military
model reflects strict discipline, unquestioning obedience, intense socialisation and
isolation from normal civilian life styles…..Efforts to extend this model to
industry in the 19th and early 20th centuries failed; it was too incompatible with
American social values and culture.”29

However, due to this narrow focus on US culture and values he seems to have
overlooked the possibility that in many other societies, people would show greater
readiness, to accept such restrictions, for the sake of ensuring safe operations of hazardous
technologies especially in countries like China, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan etc. The
normal accidents theorists would find it hard to explain the successful operation of the US
nuclear command and control system and the absence of an accidental nuclear war. The
remarkable safety record of nuclear weapons management in fact fits in well with the
precepts of the high reliability theorists. This flawless record has forced even Perrow to
accept the viability of the safety systems designed to prevent an accidental nuclear war.
There seems to be a consensus between him and the high reliability theorists on the need
for insulation from society, intense socialisation, and strict discipline of organisation
members, as is the case with the military model, for reliable and safe handling of nuclear
weapons30 though scholars like Scott Sagan continue to see the military control of nuclear
weapons as problematic.

28
Ibid., p. 32.
29
Ibid., p.41.
30
Sagan, op. cit., p.50.
 170

5.3 Nuclear Safety and Security in Pakistan:

In Pakistan’s case some academics representing the anti-nuclear lobby are critical
of the military’s control over its nuclear arsenal31 while others, among them some senior
academics and security analysts view the civilian presence in the NCA as cosmetic and
think that military plays the dominant role, but do not consider it as a negative factor per
se.32 However, the younger academics, military officers, civilian bureaucrats and some
political representatives think that there is a healthy balance between civilian and military
representation in the NCA, though military plays the lead role in planning and
management of nuclear assets.33 Given the fact that most of the analysts belonging to both
the high reliability and normal accidents schools agree that the military model is best
suited for safe and reliable handling of nuclear weapons, the Pakistani military’s
domineering role in nuclear command and control should not be seen as a weakness of the
system. However, scholars like Scott Sagan remain sceptical and believe that militaries are
not only inclined towards pre-emptive strategies but also show little capacity to learn from
past mistakes and therefore, military control of nuclear weapons remains problematic in
their view. For instance, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
speaking to a Washington audience said that, “the Pakistani military’s control of the
nuclear weapons is a good thing because that is an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact,
withstood many of the political changes over the years.”34 A former Pakistani Professor of
Physics however, thinks that despite expenditure of huge amounts of money the security
organisation is capable of dealing with only a few security threats and doubts its ability to
deal with all possible contingencies, especially if an adversary was to launch a multi-
pronged attack.35 However, he did not elaborate this contingency which can only be
launched by a resourceful and well trained military and is beyond the currently known
capabilities of the extremist groups in Pakistan. If he is alluding to an attack by a hostile
country it will be considered an act of war and the response will not remain limited to the
nuclear security forces but will involve the whole security apparatus of the country.

31
Interviews via email with two retired Physicists and known anti-nuclear lobbyists on 05 & 11 September
2012 respectively.
32
Interview by the author with respondents ‘G’, ‘Q’, and ‘S’ at Islamabad on 02 August, 06 August and 08
August 2012 respectively.
33
Interviews by the author with respondents ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’, ‘I’, ‘J’,’L’, ‘M’, ‘O’, in July/August 2012.
34
Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues’,
Congressional Research Service www.crs.gov RL34248, February 13, 2013, p. 16.
35
Interview with respondent ‘T’ via email on 11 September 2012.
 171

Pakistan is also known to keep its weapons and delivery systems in de-mated form
which essentially means that warheads and delivery vehicles are stored separately though
some analysts have speculated that even the warheads are also kept in disassembled form.36
However, senior officials in Pakistani nuclear establishment do not agree with this
characterisation and made it clear in their comments to the author that they have only
talked of geographical separation between warheads and delivery systems.37 The current
arrangement adds to the safety by eliminating the possibility of an accidental, unauthorised
or mistaken nuclear detonation.

In terms of the safety of civilian nuclear installations such as nuclear power plants
and research reactors Pakistan has an enviable record of accident free operations spread
over decades.38 Most of the concerns expressed by the media with regard to weapons
falling in the hands of extremist elements or threat of attack by TTP on Pakistani nuclear
sites are related to physical security rather than safety. However, as discussed at the
beginning of this chapter there is an overlap between the two terms and they are frequently
used interchangeably. It would be appropriate to list here and elaborate the concerns and
criticisms related to Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security, analyse these in the light of
alternative views and then explain in some detail the arrangements for safety and security
put in place by Pakistan since the May 1998 nuclear tests.

5.4 Nature of Concerns about Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security:

The 9/11 incidents and the ensuing war in neighbouring Afghanistan as well as
terrorist attacks by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) across the country, including targeted
attacks on sensitive military installations, have given rise to heightened concerns about
safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear materials. Almost
every attack on or near a military base is portrayed by international media as an attack on a
nuclear installation and questions are raised both in the national as well as international
media about the ability of the Pakistani security forces to guard nuclear assets and
conversely over the ability of the terrorists to attack sensitive installations at will.39 The

36Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, op. cit.

37Interviews with a retired four star officer and a very senior officer in SPD on 28 July and 07August 2012 respectively.
38Zahid Malik, ‘Gilani charms Obama Brings US nuclear energy close to Pakistan,’

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=26646
39See Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Air Force Base with Nuclear Ties Is Attacked,” The New York Times, August 15, 2012.

See Shaiq Hussain, “Militants Storm Pakistan Air Base,” The Washington Post, August 16, 2012; Kelsey Davenport,
 172

second recurring theme is the fear of ‘Islamist’ take-over of government in Islamabad,

either through the electoral process or some unconstitutional means. Linked to this, is the
rather exaggerated concern about the growing influence of radical Islamist elements within
the military and other security forces, citing sporadic incidents of alleged ‘insider’ help to
terrorists.40 Third concern is an outgrowth of the AQ Khan’s proliferation episode,
implying that if it could happen in the past a repeat of similar activities of leakage of
sensitive technologies cannot be ruled out in the future. In this regard, the story of the two
retired Pakistani scientists, who were running a charity in Afghanistan and reportedly met
Osama Bin Laden in Kandahar, is also frequently mentioned.41 The AQ Khan incident
was partly due to a flawed export controls regime and partly due to weaknesses in the
security system. Since there was no independent security oversight and the officers
deputed for security at KRL were answerable to AQ Khan himself who was also their pay
master it was too much to expect of these security personnel to report against their own
boss even if they noticed any irregularities. Moreover, the orientation of security was
towards dealing with the external threats and insider threat was not given due attention.
Due to the covert nature of the programme before 1998 ‘secrecy’ took precedence over
‘security.’42 Finally, some analysts have expressed fears, that if Pakistan decides to
disperse and deploy its nuclear weapons in the midst of a crisis with India, these would
become vulnerable to theft or attacks by terrorists.43

5.4.1 Adverse Views:

Professor Shaun Gregory, who in recent years, has been one of the most fervent
critics of nuclear safety and security in Pakistan while conceding that, “Pakistan has

“Militants Attack Pakistani Base,” Arms Control Today, September 2012. Also see Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Army Under
Scrutiny After U.S. Raid,” The New York Times, May 5, 2011; Zahid Hussain, Matthew Rosenberg, and Jeremy Page,
“After Raid, Confused Response,” The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011.
40
Insider involvement in an assassination attempt against President Musharraf on 24 December 2003 and the
attack on Mehran Base in May 2011 are usually cited as cases in point.
41
The two retired scientists Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed were arrested by
the Pakistani security agencies on the American request and were interrogated both by Pakistani officials as
well as FBI/CIA investigators. However, no evidence was found of their involvement in any WMD related
activities. See Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood, Interview with WAQT TV in Urdu language on July 23,
2009. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UvwmnYsTmIA
42
Author’s firsthand knowledge of the AQ Khan investigations in 2004 and interview with respondents ‘A’
and ‘P’ 0n 28 July and 07 August 2012 respectively.
43
Robin Fernandez, ‘South Asia Nuclear Safety in fallible hands: US Expert,’ The Express Tribune, May 23,
2011.
 173

established a robust set of measures to assure the security of its nuclear weapons,” 44 claims
that, “empirical evidence points to a clear set of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in
Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security arrangements.”45His critique has been built around
following themes:-

a) In view of the Indian threat Pakistan has to keep its nuclear weapons away from the
eastern border with India and the conclusion he draws is that many of the Pakistani
nuclear sites are therefore, located in the north west of the country, in close
proximity to the areas dominated by the Taliban and Al-Qaida elements. In his
view TTP and Al-Qaida have the capability to launch attacks in these areas and
even in and around the capital Islamabad. 46
b) The physical security of nuclear weapons across the weapons cycle may not be
robust enough to withstand determined terrorist assault. As an example he
mentions a series of attacks that have taken place on ‘suspected’ nuclear weapons
facilities including a “nuclear missile storage facility” at Sargodha, “nuclear
airbase at Kamra,” and a Taliban suicide attack at an entry points to one of the
armament factories at the Wah cantonment, which he considers to be one of
Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites.47
c) Among the estimated 70,000 people with access to the nuclear weapons cycle,
some may be willing to collude in various ways with terrorists.
d) The threat extends beyond terrorists gaining access to complete and workable
nuclear weapons to their gaining access to fissile material, nuclear weapons
components, or penetrating nuclear weapons facilities that would have serious
political and security implications.
e) A strong element exists within the army and the ISI with strong anti-West and
especially anti-US sentiments as well as Islamist tendencies.48
f) There is a possibility of collusion between the ‘Islamist sympathisers’ within the
security forces and the nuclear establishment and the Al-Qaida or Taliban.

44
Shaun Gregory, ‘The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons’, CTC Sentinel, July 2009, Vol
2.Issue 7, United States Military Academy, West Point, p.1.
45
Ibid., p.2.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., p. 3.
48
Ibid.
 174

g) Finally, the Pakistan Army as an institution may decide to transfer nuclear weapons
to a terrorist group as suggested by Philip Bobbit in Terror and Consent that states
can become “pressurised” or “incentivised” to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist
groups in response to threat from external powers.49

Shaun Gregory has also claimed that:

“On October 10, 2009, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

militants staged an audacious attack on the Pakistan Army’s GHQ in
Rawalpindi…housing within its sprawling campus not only the chief of army
staff, but also many of Pakistan’s most senior military commanders, including
the director general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) 50 and the ‘director
general’51 of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) – Pakistan’s two most
senior operational nuclear commanders.”52

Other analysts, such as a former CIA official Bruce Riedel and journalists David
Sanger, Jobby Warrick and Seymour Hersh, have also expressed more or less similar
concerns from time to time.53Hersh, in fact, went a step further by suggesting on at least
two occasions that US Special Forces have rehearsed plans to take possession of Pakistani
nuclear assets in case of danger of these falling into wrong hands. 54 Some Pakistani
analysts among them a senior International Relations professor and two former Physics
professors have also expressed scepticism about Pakistani nuclear safety and security
arrangements in the course of interviews with the author.55 In the aftermath of US

49
Ibid, p. 3-4.
50
DG SPD’s office is not located in the GHQ premises and SPD has its own office complex near the Joint
Staff Headquarters.
51
The correct designation is Commander Army Strategic Force Command. He is also not located in GHQ and
operates from his own headquarters in the suburbs of Rawalpindi.
52
Shaun Gregory, ‘Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,’ CTC Sentinel, US
Military Academy, West Point, June 2011, Vol. 4, Issue 6.

53
See Bruce Riedel, ‘Pakistan and the Bomb,’ The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2009. Joby Warrick, “U.S.
Has Concerns over Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, November 11, 2007;
David Sanger and William Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York
Times, November 17, 2007 and Seymour M. Hersh, ‘Defending the arsenal,’ The New Yorker, November 16,
2009. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/16/defending-the-arsenal?printable=true

54
See Seymour M. Hersh, ‘Defending the arsenal,’ The New Yorker, November 16, 2009. Available at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/16/defending-the-arsenal?printable=true
55
Interview with respondent ‘Q’ at Islamabad on August 06, 2012 and e mail interviews with respondents ‘T’
and ‘U’ on 05 and 09 September 2012 respectively.
 175

operation in May 2011 at Abbottabad in Pakistan, which resulted in the killing of Osama
bin Laden, a fresh debate was generated at home and abroad about the threats to Pakistan’s
nuclear security. This debate revolved around Pakistan’s ability to successfully ward off
these threats and whether countries like India and the US could attack and destroy
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.56

5.4.2 Favourable Views:

Despite the lingering negative perceptions, many positive comments on Pakistani

nuclear security have also been made by responsible officials and leaders from around the
world to inspire sufficient confidence in the system. These include many senior US civilian
as well military officials who have on different occasions expressed their confidence in the
viability and effectiveness of Pakistan’s nuclear security system. Deputy Secretary of State
John D. Negroponte in testimony to Congress on November 7, 2007, said he believed that
there is “plenty of succession planning that’s going on in the Pakistani military” and that
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”57 M.K. Narayanan,
then Indian National Security Advisor, termed Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as “safe” and
with “adequate checks and balances” in place.58 Similarly, former British Foreign
Secretary, David Miliband stated in ‘Charlie Rose Show’ in December 2008, that,
“Islamabad’s nuclear weapons are under pretty close lock and key.”59 DIA Director
Maples stated on March 10, 2009, that Islamabad “has taken important steps to safeguard
60
its nuclear weapons,” although he pointed out that “vulnerabilities exist.” General
Petraeus, said in an interview on May10, 2009, that, “with respect to the nuclear weapons
and sites that are controlled by Pakistan … we have confidence in their security procedures
and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.”61 Defence Secretary

56
Ansar Abbasi, ‘FO casts doubt on Pakistan’s security,’ The News International, May 04, 2011. See ‘Pak
nukes safe but matter of concern, Nato’, The News International, May 25, 2011 and Pentagon confident of
Pak ability to protect nuclear assets, The News International, May 26, 2011. Also see Jane Perlez, “Pakistan
Army Under Scrutiny After U.S. Raid,” The New York Times, May 5, 2011; Zahid Hussain, Matthew
Rosenberg, and Jeremy Page, “After Raid, Confused Response,” The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011.
57
House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Democracy, Authoritarianism and Terrorism in
Contemporary Pakistan, November 7, 2007.
58
‘Pak Nukes Safely Guarded, says Narayanan,’ The Press Trust of India, December 16, 2007, quoted in
Kerr and Nikitin, op. cit., p. 17.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Interview with General David Petraeaus, FOX News Sunday, May 10, 2009.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,519696,00.html. Quoted in Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons; Proliferation and Security Issues, February 13, 2013, p. 17.
 176

Robert Gates stated in a January 21, 2010 interview that the United States is “very
comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”62

Several other international leaders have also expressed their confidence in

Pakistan’s nuclear security regime. For instance, Erard Corbin de Mangoux, Director of the
French General Directorate of External Security, said in a spring 2010 interview that,
“Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders have a sense of responsibility to maintain control
over the country’s nuclear weapons; these leaders know that the international status to
which they aspire depends directly on their ability to exercise complete control over such
an instrument of power.”63 President Obama, in a meeting with Prime Minister Yusuf Raza
Gilani on the eve of the Nuclear Security Summit at Washington D.C. in April 2010,
“expressed full satisfaction over the safeguards applied by Pakistan for the security of its
nuclear material and assured that US has no sinister designs on Pakistan’s nuclear
programme.”64 A few weeks later, Under Secretary of Defence Michele Flournoy said at
an April 29, 2010 congressional hearing that, “we believe that Pakistan has a very solid
command and control system for their nuclear weapons,” adding that, “they have made
great deal of investment in the security of their nuclear arsenal.”65James Clapper, Director
of National Intelligence, told the House Intelligence Committee on February 10, 2011 that,
“our assessment is that the nuclear weapons in Pakistan are secure.”66 Responding to the
questions being raised about Pakistan’s nuclear security after the Bin Laden killing, Prime
Minster Gilani in a May 25, 2011, statement said, that the country’s “strategic assets are
well protected and our capability to defend our sovereignty, territorial integrity and
liberties of our people, is very much in place.”67

Feroz Hassan Khan cautioning against unnecessary hype on nuclear ‘insecurity’ in

Pakistan, argues that an exaggerated perception of threat in the West could lead the US to
devise inappropriate policies to deal with it. Moreover, the persistent media focus on the
issue, feeds into Pakistani misgivings about the US intentions. He has characterised the

62
Kerr and Nikitin, p. 17.
63
Ibid., p.17-18.
64
Zahid Malik, ‘Gilani charms Obama Brings US nuclear energy close to Pakistan,’ Pakistan Observer;
http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=26646
65
Ibid.
66
Kerr and Nikitin, op. cit., p. 17.
67
Press Information Department, “Prime Minister Gilani’s Opening Statement at the Defence Committee of
the Cabinet,” Pakistan Official News, May 25, 2011.
 177

Western concerns about security of Pakistani nuclear assets as ranging from ‘legitimate’ to
‘bizarre.’ As an example of the bizarre scenarios he cites the fear that either the Pakistani
military and intelligence agencies could become collaborators of Taliban in their attempts
to gain control of Pakistani nuclear assets or the Pakistani state could be taken over by
Taliban due to the inability of the Pakistani military to defeat them. Pakistan’s Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, however, termed such scenarios as plain mischievous
which needed to be contemptuously dismissed.68

5.4.3 Addressing the Concerns:

Christopher Clary, in his monograph entitled, ‘Thinking about Pakistan’s Nuclear

Security in Peacetime, War and Crisis,’ while cautioning against complacency, has
expressed the view, that threats to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have been “exaggerated.”69
Clary has recounted the often-expressed concerns about nuclear security in Pakistan and
has then proceeded to systematically analyse each of these. In his view, Shaun Gregory’s
unequivocal conclusion that, “empirical evidence points to a clear set of weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s safety and security arrangements,” is too strong, because there
is no evidence yet to suggest that those posing a threat to the nuclear facilities are capable
of getting through and overcoming the defensive arrangements in place.70

Clary argues that, “In both the Sargodha and Kamra cases, an attack on a bus
outside the facility – a soft target – is not the same thing as an attack on the base itself,
which is protected by layers of security.” 71The Wah attack was a suicide attack at the main
entrance of one of the armaments factories, causing large number of casualties. The Wah
Complex widely known to be Pakistan’s main production facility for conventional
munitions consists of over a dozen factories and employs over 20,000 people. It is,
however, hard to identify which of these factories – if at all - is involved in nuclear related
work and thus became the target of a suicide attack.72

68
Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan – Separating Myth from Reality’, Arms Control Today,
Arms Control Association, July-August 2009.
69
Christopher Clary, ‘Thinking About Pakistan’s Nuclear Security in Peacetime, War and Crisis’, IDSA
Occasional Paper No. 12, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, September 2010, p. 5.
70
Ibid., p. 21.
71
Ibid., p. 20.
72
Clary, p. 19-20.
 178

Unrelated incidents are sometimes invoked to make a case for uncertain state of
nuclear security in Pakistan. In this regard, much was made out of the assassination
attempts on former President Musharraf. It was argued that if the personal security of the
Pakistani President could be threatened the same would be true for the nuclear weapons.
Clary has opined that, “Both heads of state and nuclear weapons receive the most intensive
security that a country can provide. The analogy is, however, a weak one on the grounds
that different services perform the two different security missions. Moreover, the
Presidents must interact with the public, but nuclear weapons can be kept locked behind
gates…” 73

In late 2008 and early 2009, when Taliban had occupied parts of Swat valley in
North Western Pakistan, some analysts argued that since the Taliban are merely 60 miles
away from Islamabad Pakistan’s nuclear assets are under threat74in full knowledge of the
fact that the nuclear weapons are not likely to be stored in the Pakistani capital. Similarly,
in the aftermath of an October 2009 attack, on Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi,
questions were raised about Pakistan’s nuclear security. Undoubtedly, the attack on the
General Headquarters was a serious security lapse and indicated growing audacity of
militant attacks, but it had no causal relationship with nuclear security. By virtue of its
nature, as a static installation located in the midst of a populated area, and its high
visibility, the army headquarters was a relatively easier target. On the other hand, nuclear
storage sites are located in isolated areas, in secret locations, neither easily identifiable nor
easy to attack because of multiple layers of sensors and physical defences.75

5.5 Measures Instituted by Pakistan for Nuclear Safety and Security:

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Pakistan proceeded apace after the May 98
nuclear tests to set up an effective command and control system. All the strategic
organisations which had hither-to-fore been functioning autonomously were placed under

73
Clary, op. cit., p. 24.
74
See Bruce Riedel, "Pakistan and the Bomb," The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2009; Bryan Bender,
"Pakistan, US in Talks on Nuclear Security," Boston Globe, May 5, 2009,
www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/05/05/pakistan_us_in_talks_on_nuclear_security/
and Mark Thompson, ‘Does Pakistan’s Taliban Surge Raise a Nuclear Threat,’ The Time Magazine, April
24, 2009.
75
Author’s interviews with respondents ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘P’ on 28 July, 07 August and 07 August 2012,
respectively.
 179

the NCA.76 A system of external audit was introduced to keep an eye on the handling and
accounting of sensitive materials. Later on, more sophisticated Material Protection Control
and Accounting (MPC&A) system was implemented.77Even before the implementation of
the personnel reliability programme (PRP), the ISI, Military Intelligence and Civilian
Intelligence Bureau carried out background checks and cleared technical as well as security
personnel for assignments at sensitive nuclear sites. During the bilateral exchanges on
nuclear security with the US in 2002 and 2003 the US side gave detailed briefings on their
PRP programme to the Pakistani experts. The American PRP regulations were suitably
adapted and a comprehensive PRP was instituted in 2004.78 Moreover, many technical as
well as physical security measures have been implemented. For instance, Pakistani nuclear
weapons require an electronic code to be fed into them before they could be armed and
these codes are centrally held by the NCA.79 Other procedural controls such as the ‘two-
man rule’ are also employed and strict secrecy is maintained about the location of nuclear
weapons’ storage sites. As Chris Clary has explained that, “to preclude any possibility of
inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has developed physical
safety mechanisms and firewalls both in the weapon systems themselves and in the chain
of command. No single individual can operate a weapon system, nor can one individual
issue the command for nuclear weapons use.”80

To ensure the safety of civilian nuclear installations in Pakistan an autonomous

Nuclear Regulatory Authority was established in January 2001. 81 Though this authority
does not have access to the military nuclear facilities, it has provided a check list of
internationally acceptable safety standards to be complied with and heads of these

76
Shakil Sheikh, ‘Strategic Organisations put under NCA Control,’ The News, Islamabad, 28 November,
2000.
77
Sharing of information on MPC&A was part of bilateral exchanges with the US and consequently the
existing system in Pakistan was improved, beginning in 2004, in the light of information and training
received from the US.
78
Author’s personal experience being part of the bilateral exchanges and interview with respondent ‘P’ at
Rawalpindi on 07 August 2012.
79
Dr Samar Mubarakmand, explained in response to a question about the possibility of some terrorist group
stealing and detonating a Pakistani nuclear weapon during an interview with Geo Television in April 2004,
that even if the hypothetical scenario of theft of a weapon is accepted it would be impossible for the terrorists
to detonate it due to the fact that that electronic codes are built into the weapons and unless the codes are fed
into it the weapon cannot be armed or exploded. This was also confirmed during the interviews conducted by
the author with respondents ‘A’ and ‘B’ on 28 July and 07 August 2012 respectively.
80
Chris Clary, op. cit. p. 16.
81
The Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, (Registered No. M-302/L-7646), Published in Islamabad on
January 22, 2001.
 180

installations as well as the SPD periodically check the safety at these facilities according to
these standards.82 The organisation, role and functions of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory
Authority (PNRA) will be discussed in detail in chapter 7. The institution responsible for
the safety and the physical security of the military segment of the nuclear programme is the
Security Division of NCA.

Initially, when the command and control system was set up in early 1999, a
brigadier was designated as ‘Advisor Security NCA’ with a few dozen serving and retired
military personnel under his command.83 Additionally, there were some regular infantry
battalions loaned from the Army to provide physical protection at sensitive sites and
installations.84 It was soon realised however, that this particular component of the
organisation would need to be expanded and the deteriorating security environment after
9/11 introduced greater urgency. The discovery of the AQ Khan network followed, which
gave further impetus to the process. Overtime the small segment of the NCA dealing with
security transformed into ‘Security Division’ of NCA headed by a two star general with
exponential increase in its manpower.85 It would be pertinent here to describe in some
detail the organisation, role and functions of the security division of Pakistan’s NCA
because of its central role in ensuring security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

82
Author’s interview with respondents ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘K’ on 28 July, 07 August and 02 August 2012
respectively.
83
Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,’
Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 37, Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004, p. 50.
84
Interview with a very senior officer in the Security Division on 07 August 2012.
85
Ibid.
 181

5.6 Security Division of NCA – Organisation, Role and

functions:
SECURITY DIVISION
NCA

DIRECTOR GENERAL
(TWO STAR GENERAL)

COUNTER
SECURITY TECHNICAL PRP
INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTORATES DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE
TEAMS

DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR
SECURITY SECURITY SECURITY
SECURITY KRL
PAEC NESCOM SUPARCO

As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the security division of NCA is headed

by a serving two star general officer who currently has 25,000 security force personnel
under his command and this figure is projected to be raised to 28,000 in the next 2-3
years.86 Each of the major strategic organisations such as the PAEC, KRL, NESCOM and
SUPARCO has a serving brigadier designated as Director Security with requisite
manpower. These directors are responsible for security in their respective organisations
and report directly to DG Security. In the period before the establishment of the NCA, the
officers responsible for security within these organisations used to report to the heads of
their respective organisations which was a serious drawback.87 In addition to these security
directorates the security division has counter intelligence teams, which constitute the
outermost perimeter of security and are meant to guard against external threats, espionage
and internal subversion threats etc. These teams are spread all over the country and are the
eyes and ears of the DG Security. There is also a technical directorate that employs all

86
Author’s interview with a senior officer of Security Division at Rawalpindi on 07 August 2012.
87
Ibid., and author’s personal knowledge of the system.
 182

available technical means to augment security at nuclear installations and to detect possible
threats.

An important part of the security division is the Personnel Reliability Programme

(PRP) Directorate.88 This directorate is responsible for the implementation of the PRP
programme for the selected individuals within the nuclear establishment who are dealing
with the most sensitive parts of the programme. The number of individuals covered by the
PRP in strategic organisations, strategic forces and SPD itself is around 150,000. These
personnel undergo strict psychological, medical, social and intellectual scrutiny at the time
of recruitment and remain under a continuous oversight regime as long as they work in
sensitive areas of the programme.89 The directorate is responsible for organising initial and
periodic psychological, medical and character evaluations as well as surprise checks and
keeps a constant eye on the activities of the personnel covered by the PRP. Any
infringement of PRP regulations by any employee renders that individual liable to
disciplinary action which results in his decertification and removal from the sensitive job.
The exact number of personnel removed from sensitive duties for violation of PRP
obligations has not been made public by the security division. However, senior officers in
the organisation insist that several cases of violation of rules have been detected at very
early stages and actions have been taken accordingly.90

Traditionally, personnel employed for security duties at various nuclear

installations were mainly recruited from amongst the retired military soldiers and officers.
However, recognising the sensitivity of the job, and the exacting physical and professional
standards required to fulfil the challenging duties, in the backdrop of the prevailing
terrorist activity in the country as well as the external threats, a new approach has been
adopted. Since January 2004 the security division has been recruiting its own personnel.
To begin with these men were selected from among the ex-servicemen. However, with
effect from 2010 it started its direct induction from the civilian volunteers, with much
higher physical and IQ standards than the standards laid down for regular army soldiers.
These recruits, trained in various regimental training centres of the army, now form the

88
The PRP Directorate was established in 2004 after the briefings and workshops attended by relevant SPD
officials in the US in 2003 and 2004.Author’s interview with respondent ‘P’ at Rawalpindi on 06 August
2012.
89
Based on information received from a senior official through e mail on 19 September 2014.
90
Author’s interview with a senior officer of the Security Division on 07 August 2012 at Rawalpindi.
 183

bulk of the force and would gradually replace all the old retired personnel in a phased
programme, in the near future.91 In this regard, the NCA decided to establish a specialised
training academy for imparting training to the security force personnel. The academy is
built on the model of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Academy at
Albuquerque, New Mexico in the United States.92 This state of the art training facility was
inaugurated by General Khalid Shamim Wynne, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
(CJCSC) on April 13, 2012. Speaking on the occasion the CJCSC stated that, “highest
standards of safety and security in the nuclear field have always been and shall remain the
hallmark of Pakistan’s strategic programme.” While expressing his satisfaction on the
establishment of the SPD Training Academy he called it, “a very significant milestone in
Pakistan’s continued efforts towards strengthening nuclear safety and security. Adding
that, “the training facility has only recently been offered for training to the international
community under IAEA auspices, by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Nuclear
Security Summit at Seoul.”93The academy spread over a vast area provides training on the
pattern of special-forces training to the officers and men of the security force. It will also
house a mock nuclear facility, which is being built by Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory
Authority (PNRA) with assistance from the IAEA. The academy has been turned into a
Centre of Excellence that will provide realistic and high quality training environment for
trainees from Pakistan as well as foreign countries.94

Besides creating a specially trained and equipped force, the security division has
also established an Emergency Response Centre, at its headquarters in Rawalpindi, with an
elite rapid reaction force capable of reaching, the scene of any untoward incident at a
nuclear facility anywhere in the country, in a short span of time. It carries out regular war
games and field exercises to identify weaknesses and to sharpen the skills of its forces.95
Furthermore, the security division has also installed radiation detection portal monitors at
critical entry and exit points in the country.96 More importantly, in addition to institutional

91
Based on information received from a senior official through e mail on 19 September 2014.
92
A team of officers including the author had visited the NNSA Academy at Albuqurque in December 2003
and were briefed on training programmes and procedures as well as the PRP programme. The SPD Academy
was built with US financial assistance replicating the model of the NNSA Academy.
93
Inter Services Public Relations Press Release, No PR84/2012-ISPR, Rawalpindi, dated April 13, 2012.
94
Author’s visit to the SPD Academy and briefing by a senior official on 08 August 2012. The IAEA has
announced to run its regional course on ‘Radiation Security’ for the year 2014 at the SPD Academy.
95
Author’s interview with a very senior officer in the Security Division at Rawalpindi on 07 August 2012.
96
Ibid.
 184

and administrative measures, a need was felt to inculcate a ‘security culture’ within the
various organs of the NCA and in the strategic organisations. This was a challenging task
given the general lack of security consciousness compared with more advanced countries.
However, over the last decade or so this security culture is becoming more and more
evident at least in the NCA Secretariat, Security Division and various strategic
organisations.97

Critics both within and outside Pakistan have raised concerns over the presence of
Islamists or Islamist sympathisers within the nuclear establishment and have expressed
doubts about the effectiveness of the PRP. To support their arguments they cite the fact
that the PRP has supposedly not caught any offenders so far. In response the Pakistani
officials argue that there is a general tendency to equate religiosity with extremism and a
readiness to label any bearded person as an extremist. They concede that there are quite a
few bearded persons amongst the scientists, engineers and even the security forces but this
is indicative of religiosity and conservatism, rather than widespread religious fanaticism.
They also alluded to a policy not to publicise cases of people found to be contravening the
PRP regulations, though they are removed from sensitive positions in case of any
infringement of rules. In an interview with the author a very senior official responsible for
security asserted that the monitoring system works in 3-4 stages and many cases are
detected and actions are taken pre-emptively before any actual mischief could have
occurred.98

The small but vocal anti-nuclear lobby in Pakistan is also sceptical of the security
measures instituted by the government arguing that, “religious conservatism gripping the
applicant pool [for jobs in the nuclear establishment] makes it too difficult to discern
potentially dangerous zealots.”99 In practice, however, all potential recruits have to
undergo extensive background checks and their credentials are independently verified by at
least four different intelligence agencies before they could be cleared for induction. These
agencies include the security division of NCA, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military
Intelligence and the Intelligence Bureau and the process is very time consuming usually

97
During visits to some of these institutions by the author in July-August 2012 a discernible improvement in
security culture and practices was seen in the form of walk through gates, electronic code controlled doors,
electronic ID badges, and thorough checking/identification of visitors.
98
Author’s interview with a senior officer of the Security Division in August 2012 at Rawalpindi.
99
Ibid.
 185

taking from 6-12 months.100 The newly inducted individuals are subjected to psychological
and medical tests and a fresh security screening is carried out every two years. There is
also a system of random surprise checks, as well as a ‘peer reporting’ system.101

In a Pakistani academic’s opinion, “Pakistan’s ‘urban Taliban’, rather than

illiterate tribal fighters, pose a nuclear risk. There are indeed more than a few scientists and
engineers in the nuclear establishment with extreme religious views.”102 The officials,
however, contend that the system has adequate mechanisms to take care of such
individuals. In a rare sharing of information on the functioning of the PRP system a senior
security official informed a Wall Street Journal correspondent, that an employee was
expelled from the nuclear programme for distributing pamphlets of a religious party
amongst his colleagues and trying to persuade his co-workers to attend a religious rally at a
local mosque. The general explained that, “We don’t mind people being religious, but we
don’t want people with extreme thoughts.”103 This clearly indicates that not only the
system has very little tolerance for radical ideologies and practices it is also capable of
detecting and acting in case of any violations of the code of conduct.

5.7 Bilateral Security Cooperation with the United States:

In October 2002, on the eve of US attack on Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin

Powell visited Islamabad and conveyed American concerns about the security of
Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons. The Pakistani leaders on their part expressed their confidence
in the viability and effectiveness of the security arrangements in place. Secretary Powell
explained that he was neither interested in knowing how many weapons Pakistan had, nor
in knowing their locations or the type of security arrangements in place while offering to
share United States’ vastly greater experience in securing nuclear weapons. 104 The
Pakistani side laid down clear red lines for this cooperation which included complete non-
intrusiveness, and Pakistan’s right to pick and choose the areas of cooperation.105 In any
case due to limitations imposed by the US legal obligations accruing out of its membership

100
Interview with respondent ‘P’ at the Security Division at Rawalpindi on 07 August 2012.
101
Ibid. Also see Bruno Tertrais, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear programme: a net assessment’, Recherches and
Documents No. 4/2012, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Paris, www.f r s t r a t e g ie.o r g
102
Clary, op. cit. p. 22.
103
Peter Wonacott, op. cit.
104
Author’s interview with respondent ‘A’ at Islamabad on 28 July 2012.
105
Author’s personal experience as part of the Pakistani team at the bilateral negotiations and as a member of
the experts’ group.
 186

of the Non-proliferation Treaty and Pakistan’s legitimate concerns about the possibilities
of rigging or bugging the technology the scope of the bilateral cooperation has remained
limited to a few mutually agreed areas. These include sharing of best practices related to
protection of fixed installations, convoys transporting sensitive nuclear materials,
MPC&A, export and border controls and personnel reliability programmes.106 In 2003, a
group of Pakistani experts visited the US to witness demonstrations and attend workshops
on training of security forces and personnel reliability programme. The US also provided
training to selected security personnel from Pakistan at the NNSA Academy with a view to
creating a core of instructors who could then impart training to other personnel in Pakistan.
The establishment of the SPD Academy is also an outcome of this bilateral cooperation.107

There have been some speculative stories in the press about the nature of this
cooperation and questions have also been raised about the utility of this cooperation.
Sceptics in Pakistan have expressed concerns that in the garb of this security cooperation
the United States might have made ingress into sensitive areas of Pakistani nuclear
programme, while those in the US seem to be concerned about whether the assistance has
been appropriately used and whether it has produced any positive results. But such
speculations have no relationship with reality to say the least.108 One thing is certain,
however, that this mutual interaction has raised the confidence level of senior US
government officials in the efficacy of Pakistan’s nuclear security. The official Washington
has always been more confident of Pakistan’s nuclear security than the media and think
tank analysts. The obvious reason is that the officials have greater access to information
and knowledge about the steps taken by Pakistan to enhance security on its own volition as
well as with the help of technical assistance and information sharing by the United States.
For instance, Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
remarked in May 2009 that, “the United States, have invested fairly significantly over the
last three years, to work with them [Pakistan], to improve that security. And we are
satisfied, very satisfied with that progress.”109 In a similar vein Richard Armitage, former
Deputy Secretary of State said, “We have spent considerable time with the Pakistani
military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear

106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Clary, op. cit. p. 16.
 187

weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty
sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of these.”110

It is also worth mentioning that the cooperation between the US and Pakistan was
in the security domain, which relates to the installations and transportation of sensitive
materials rather than safety, that is directly linked with the weapons due to the reasons
already explained. In this regard there have been suggestions that US should provide
Permissive Action Links (PALs), which are essentially electro-mechanical locks, to be
installed on Pakistani weapons for safety purposes, but this is impracticable due to
restrictions imposed by US laws as well as Pakistani concerns about secrecy and
confidentiality.111 It may be pointed out that PALs are purpose built mechanisms based on
the designs of particular weapon systems. Since Pakistan was not willing to compromise
the technical parameters of its weapons even if the US would have offered to provide such
technology there was no scope of cooperation in this area. Moreover, senior Pakistani
officials have claimed that Pakistan has already developed its own version of the PALs.112

The bilateral cooperation on nuclear security between the US and Pakistan

however, continues to be a subject for speculation and insinuation by some journalists. In
an article published in the New Yorker on November 16, 2009, Seymour Hersh, a well-
known investigative journalist made some startling claims. He averred that, “current and
former officials said in interviews in Washington and Pakistan that [the Obama]
Administration has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani
military. These would allow specially trained American units to provide additional security
for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis,” adding that, “the Pakistani military would be
given money to equip and train Pakistani soldiers and to improve their housing and
facilities.”113Michael Krepon, a well-known expert on South Asian nuclear affairs, has
characterised Hersh’s assertions as ‘headline grabbing’ and has questioned his claims
remarking that:-

110
Ibid.
111
Mark Thompson, ‘Does Pakistan’s Taliban Surge Raise a Nuclear Threat,’ The Time Magazine, April 24,
2009.
112
Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Director General of Strategic Plans Division made
this assertion during a talk at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California in October 2006.
113
Seymour Hersh quoted in Seymour Hersh and Pakistan’s Nukes by Michael Krepon in
ArmsContrlWonk.com.
 188

“There are many reasons to seriously doubt Hersh’s headline, and the sources he
relied upon to reach this conclusion, explaining that, First, Pakistan’s military
establishment doesn’t need to provide access to its most sensitive nuclear sites in
order to receive money for equipment and training from the United States. Second,
there is wide trust deficit at present between Pakistan and the United States.
Pakistan’s military does not trust the United States to get up close and personal
with its crown jewels, which is why offers to provide help along these lines have
been rebuffed in the past. If special units of the US military were to visit nuclear-
related facilities in Pakistan, it is highly unlikely that they would be served tea and
treated as guests. Third, the very few individuals in Pakistan who know truth from
fiction regarding nuclear safety and security don’t speak to journalists about
particulars.”114

Krepon’s views were echoed by General Tariq Majid, then Chairman Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee, in remarks to Pakistani media saying that, “There is absolutely no
question of sharing or allowing any foreign individual, entity or state any access to
sensitive information about our nuclear assets. Our engagement with other countries…..to
learn more about international best practices for security of such assets is based on two
clearly spelt out red lines – non-intrusiveness and our right to pick and choose.”115

5.8 Pakistan and the Global Nuclear Security Efforts:

Pakistan has been actively participating in the nuclear security summit process
initiated by President Obama with a meeting of a selected group of countries and
concerned international organisations at Washington, DC in April 2010. The second
summit was held at Seoul in 2012, the third has been held at Hague in March 2014 and
another is scheduled to be held at Washington, DC in 2016. The main purpose of these
summits is to sensitise the highest level leadership of key countries about the significance
of nuclear security and to jointly advocate the need for measures to be taken by every
country to enhance nuclear security. Leaders attending these summits have endorsed
important measures to maintain effective nuclear security over all nuclear materials in their
respective countries. These included President Obama’s goal of securing all nuclear
materials within four years – a goal which has been partially met so far, as well as the need
114
Michael Krepon, Sy Hersh and Pakistan’s Nukes, ArmsControlWonk.com, posted on November 19, 2009
under krepon-shoebox, Pakistan by Michael_krepon.
115
Ibid.
 189

for converting nuclear reactors running on highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched
uranium. The summits have also underlined the importance of the implementation of
International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its additional protocol of 2005.
Additionally, they have supported the effective implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540,
which requires all countries to promulgate laws to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems. The nuclear security summits have
also supported the initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT), disposal of surplus nuclear materials and reduction of the use of HEU in civilian
nuclear activities.116

Pakistan has fulfilled its international obligations by submitting comprehensive

reports to the 1540 committee.117 It has been actively participating in the GICNT activities,
which include nuclear forensics and efforts to improve detection of nuclear and radioactive
materials. Pakistan, though endorsing the recommendations of the security summits, did
not make any national commitments at the Washington summit. However, at the Seoul
summit, it made a commitment to establish a nuclear security training centre and signed
the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres.118 The centre,
referred to earlier as the SPD Training Academy, is designed to become a regional and
international facility for nuclear security training, to be organised under the IAEA’s
auspices. Pakistan had also promised to deploy portal monitors for detection of
radiological materials to prevent illicit trafficking of such materials. These portal monitors
have already been deployed at critical entry and exit points by the Security Division. These
are in addition to those being deployed by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority.119

Pakistan informed the Seoul summit, that it has taken a number of measures to
strengthen its export controls, protect radiological sources and block nuclear smuggling. In
this regard it has revised and improved its control lists associated with its export control

116
Nuclear Security Summits, US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecuritysummit/
117
Pakistan’s Reports to the 1540 Committee can be viewed under the ‘National Reports’ available at
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/national-reports.shtml
118
Michelle Canne, “2010 Nuclear Security Summit National Commitment Implementation,” U.S.-Korea
Institute at SAIS, March 2012, http://uskoreainstitute.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/03/USKI_NSS2012_Cann.pdf.
119
Ibid., Naeem Salik and Kenneth N. Luongo, ‘Challenges for Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,’ Arms Control
Today, March 2013.
 190

legislation and has fabricated mobile laboratories to assist the first responders and other
law enforcement agencies in the event of a radiological incident. Pakistan is also
undertaking the improvement of physical security of eleven nuclear medical centres as part
of its National Nuclear Security Action Plan initiated in 2006. 120 It may be pointed out
that:-

“Pakistan has taken a number of actions related to nuclear security and safety
beyond those it pledged at the summits. It has intensified collaboration with the
IAEA by joining ‘collaborating centres’, which are designed to standardise
technology, disseminate information, and facilitate research and learning on a
range of issues related to IAEA activities, including nuclear safety and security. It
is also participating in the development of the IAEA Nuclear Safety Action
Plan.”121

Pakistan has also taken steps to improve nuclear safety. In an address to the IAEA’s
annual General Conference in Vienna in September 2012, Dr Ansar Pervez, Chairman of
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission stated that, “Pakistan had been actively engaged in
absorbing lessons from the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima nuclear reactor complex
in Japan. The PAEC has identified a comprehensive set of safety retrofits that are in
various stages of implementation.”122

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI’s) Nuclear Materials Security Index released in
January 2014 has declared that, “amongst nuclear-armed states Pakistan is most improved
through a series of steps to update nuclear security regulations and to implement best
practices, though it ranks 22nd overall.”123 Pakistan has improved its position by three
points since the last index published in 2012 and has overtaken India. On 12th of March
2014, the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visited Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence
for Nuclear Security. The visiting dignitary acknowledged Pakistan’s record of safe and
secure operations of its nuclear plants and assured IAEA’s full cooperation in this
regard.124 The IAEA has decided to run its Regional Nuclear Security Course for 2014 at

120
Naeem Salik and Kenneth N. Luongo, op. cit., p. 17-19.
121
Ibid., p. 18.
122
Ibid., p. 17.
123
NTI Nuclear Security Index, Second Edition, available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/2014-nti-
nuclear-materials-security-index-report/
124
‘DG IAEA Visits Nuclear Centre of Excellence’, The News International, Islamabad, March 13, 2014.
 191

Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence which is seen as recognition of Pakistan’s efforts in the

realm of nuclear security and the internationally acceptable standards of its training
institutions.

5.9 Conclusion:

In conclusion it is important to address two basic questions related to nuclear safety

and security in Pakistan. The first is whether there is a nexus between ‘Political Instability’
and ‘Nuclear Security’ in Pakistan and the second, relates to whether there is any clear
evidence of learning on part of Pakistan in relation to nuclear safety and security. If the
answer to the first question is in the negative and the answer to the second question is in
the affirmative most of the concerns often expressed about nuclear security in Pakistan
would have been addressed.

Pakistan has frequently experienced political instability, partly due to weak

political institutions, several breakdowns of politicalorder and replacement of democratic
governments by military dispensations and is partly due to its location in a very turbulent
neighbourhood. The fragility of Pakistani system of governance has been widely
commented upon in the past decade due to rampant acts of terrorism in many parts of the
country mostly as a spill over of the counter terrorism operations astride its western border
against Al-Qaida and Taliban elements. However, Pakistan has a seasoned civilian
bureaucracy, a pro-active and functioning judiciary, an independent media, an active civil
society and a large professional military though Pakistan’s overall record of governance
has been poor. Concerns about an imminent takeover of power in Islamabad by religious
extremists or Taliban, are, however, unrealistic. First, a forcible takeover of government by
the extremists can only happen in case there is a total breakdown of the state structures and
complete melt down of its military, which is highly unlikely. Second, extremists’
assumption of power through ballot is also far-fetched given the historical record of
Pakistani elections, wherein, even the relatively moderate mainstream religious political
parties have never won more than 5-7 per cent of the votes in any national elections.
Statements such as that by then IAEA Director General Mohammed Al-Baradei,
 192

expressing fears of a radical regime taking over power in Pakistan and consequently
gaining control of nuclear weapons are, therefore, divorced from reality.125

Since the inception of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, the country has
experienced many serious crises. In July 1977, the government of Z.A. Bhutto was toppled
by General Zia-ul-Haq. Zia himself died in an air crash in August 1988 and despite the
serious nature of the crisis, a smooth transition of power took place, without any tinkering
with the authority overseeing the nuclear programme. There were four transitions of
political government during the decade of the 1990s, before General Musharraf’s military
take-over in October 1999, with no discernible impact on the system of controls over the
nuclear programme. Since then, there has been a transition to civilian rule in 2008 and the
transfer of power to the next elected government in 2013, without any disruption of nuclear
command and control and safety and security systems.

An overview of the evolution of the institutions directly responsible for keeping

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal safe and secure and the implementation of legislative and
administrative measures besides development of rules and procedures governing both the
conduct of personnel assigned for security duties as well as handling of sensitive materials
and technologies, makes it clear that discernible progress has been made. The security
division’s exponential growth from a few dozen people, without any specialised training,
to 30,000 specially recruited, trained and equipped personnel, is a significant achievement.
The mechanisms that have been developed to oversee the personnel working in sensitive
areas of the programme and handling sensitive materials and to keep a constant eye on the
threats that may be brewing within the system or emanating from external sources indicate
a clearly charted road map. There are no half measures and the system is subjected to a
constant review, tested through war games and continuously improved. The growth and
refinement of the security system over the last decade clearly indicates a positive and fairly
steep learning curve that has been consolidated through institutionalisation of the lessons
learnt.

Pakistan has invested the greatest effort in terms of human as well as financial
resources to augment its nuclear safety and security rightly assessing the threat posed to its
125
“AlBaradei to AlHayat,” Dar Al Hayat, English Edition online, January 10, 2008,
http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/01-2008/Article-20080110-639032eb-c0a8-10ed-01ae-
81ab2ea588db/story.html.
 193

nuclear assets by non-state actors operating within the country as well as the historic
perception of outside threat to its nuclear infrastructure. Though there are still gaps in the
dissemination of information about the developments in this domain the available
information is enough to suggest that learning in this particular area has been extensive.
 194

Chapter – 6

Pakistan’s Nuclear Export Controls Regime

This chapter will examine Pakistan’s efforts since 1998 to constitute a

comprehensive nuclear export controls regime. An effort will be made to highlight the
significance of the international nuclear export controls regime and its various
components and then contextualise Pakistan’s efforts to reform and strengthen its
nuclear export controls system to bring it at par with the international standards.
Pakistani efforts to improve upon its pre-1998 export controls system through
legislative, administrative and institutional measures will then be traced. This insight
will enable us to evaluate the learning in this domain by relevant state institutions over
a period spanning more than a decade. The visible manifestations of this learning are in
the form of establishment of new institutions and enactment of nuclear export control
laws through inter-ministerial and parliamentary processes as well as appropriate
administrative actions. This will also help us identify the domestic and /or international
pressures and compulsions and enabling factors that helped to move the learning
process forward in this particular area.

6.1 A Brief Introduction to Nuclear Export Controls:

Export Controls in the nuclear context are criteria instituted and employed to
keep a check on the transfer of sensitive materials, equipment and technology from one
country to another or diversion of imported materials from peaceful areas of the nuclear
programme to the weapons oriented activities within a country. These measures include
national legislation and regulations, international obligations accruing from multilateral
treaties or specific United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and informal
arrangements amongst industrially developed countries, with actual or potential
capability to export sensitive materials and technologies.

An effective export control system is designed to ‘cause delay’ and ‘increase

the costs’ of acquisition of nuclear weapons capability even if it cannot ultimately
prevent a determined state from achieving its objectives. It also ‘deters’ potential
proliferators by the prospects of negative consequences in the form of sanctions.
However, the deterrent will only be effective if there are efficient detection measures
and the penalties of violations outweigh the gains for both the supplier and the recipient
of technology. The export controls increase the chances of detecting illegitimate trade
 195

in sensitive materials and technologies and thus create an opportunity to closely

monitor such activities in the future by the state or states involved. Mechanisms
devised to implement export controls yield useful information about the covert nuclear
programmes being pursued by countries of concern. If the export control systems are
unable to detect any illegal activity there is a high degree of assurance that states
suspected of involvement in surreptitious nuclear programmes are not involved in
secret nuclear activities. The export control lists which are also known as ‘trigger lists’
facilitate export decision by states and help them in furnishing requisite information to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Finally, the export controls enable
the states to monitor the activities of their citizens as well as commercial entities
thereby helping them fulfil their obligations accruing from article III of the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the terms of the export control groupings of which they
may be members. 1

There is a close nexus between nuclear non-proliferation regime and nuclear

export controls. According to Dr Hans Blix, Director General Emeritus of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “export control is an important component in the
efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation. This was underlined in the consensus
statement of 31 January 1992 by the United Nations Security Council in which the
Council inter alia, underlined the importance of effective export controls.”2While the
regime based on multilateral treaties provides the legal foundations for the non-
proliferation efforts the export control mechanisms play an important complementary
role due to the fact that access to nuclear technology and materials is limited to a small
number of countries. By exercising control over the trade in specialised technologies,
equipment and substances efforts by non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear
weapons can be curbed or at least substantially delayed.

Most of the existing export control agreements have more or less similar
membership comprising mainly Western industrialised countries including the five
recognised nuclear weapons states (as would be clear from the table below). This factor
alone causes concerns amongst less developed countries, which view these groupings
as ‘cartels’ created by more advanced countries to perpetuate the division between the
haves and have-nots and thus raise questions on their legitimacy.

1
ISIS, ‘Key Elements of an Effective Export Control System’, Institute of Science and International
Security, 2003, http://exportcontrols.info/print/key_elements.htm
2
Dr Hans Blix, ‘Keynote Speech’ at International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, held at Vienna International Centre, Vienna, 7-8 October 1997.
 196

MEMBERS OF ZANGGER COMMITTEE & NSG

ZANGGER COMMITTEE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)

1)Argentina 1)Argentina

2)Australia 2)Australia

3)Austria 3)Austria

4)Belarus 4)Belarus

5)Belgium 5)Belgium

- 6)Brazil

6)Bulgaria 7)Bulgaria

7)Canada 8)Canada

8)China 9)China

9)Croatia 10)Croatia

- 11)Cyprus

10)Czech Republic 12)Czech Republic

11)Denmark 13)Denmark

- 14)Estonia

12)Finland 15)Finland

13)France 16)France

14)Germany 17)Germany

15)Greece 18)Greece

16)Hungary 19)Hungary

- 20)Iceland

17)Ireland 21)Ireland

18)Italy 22)Italy
 197

19)Japan 23)Japan

20)Kazakhstan 24)Kazakhstan

21)Republic of Korea 25)Republic of Korea

- 26)Latvia

- 27)Lithuania

22)Luxemburg 28)Luxemburg

- 29)Malta

- 30)Mexico

23)Netherlands 31)Netherlands

24)New Zealand 32)New Zealand

25)Norway 33)Norway

26)Poland 34)Poland

27)Portugal 35)Portugal

28)Romania 36)Romania

29)Russian Federation 37)Russian Federation

- 38)Serbia

30)Slovakia 39)Slovakia

31)Slovenia 40)Slovenia

32)South Africa 41)South Africa

33)Spain 42)Spain

34)Sweden 43)Sweden

35)Switzerland 44)Switzerland

36)Turkey 45)Turkey

37)Ukraine 46)Ukraine

38)United Kingdom 47)United Kingdom

39)United States 48)United States

 198

It was realised in the very early days of the nuclear era that the unbridled spread
of nuclear technology with its immense destructive potential would pose a very grave
threat to international security as is evident from the ‘Baruch Plan’ presented by the
United States at the United Nations wherein it was proposed to set up an International
Atomic Development Authority which should exercise:-

1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy, activities

potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.
3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character
intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and
thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of
atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the world's
leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus
supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in
possession of leadership in knowledge.3

In the words of Dr Hans Blix, “from the beginning of the nuclear era export
controls and export restrictions have been seen as indispensable.”4 As early as 1943, the
United States, the UK and Canada had reached a secret agreement at Quebec not to
share any information, technology or sensitive materials with any other country without
mutual consent. The ‘Baruch Plan,’5 presented by the United States in the nascent
United Nations Organisation in June 1946, through President Truman’s representative,
Bernard Baruch, was the first attempt to bring nuclear technology under international
controls. The Soviets, who had not acquired nuclear capability at the time, suspected it
as an American ploy to perpetuate their monopoly over nuclear power and deny it to
others.

Later, on 8 December 1953, President Eisenhower unveiled his famous ‘Atoms

for Peace’ programme6 aimed at sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology
with countries that did not have access to nuclear technology. To implement
3
‘The Baruch Plan,’ Available at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml
4
Dr Hans Blix, op. cit.
5
The Baruch Plan (Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946).
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml
6
President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” Speech, December 8, 1953.Before the General Assembly of
the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy.http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Atomsforpeace.shtml
 199

Eisenhower’s plan necessary changes were incorporated in the US Atomic Energy Act
to allow exports of nuclear technology and materials on the condition that the countries
receiving such assistance would make a commitment not to utilise this technology for
production of nuclear weapons. Under the auspices of the Atoms for Peace Programme
selected countries were provided training, technical information and assistance in
setting up research reactors.7 Peter Lavoy has argued that, the programme inadvertently
helped the rapid spread of nuclear technology around the world, some of which was
later misused. In his view, “optimism in the ability of US technology to deliver
prosperity and peace to the world did not abate until India’s 1974 nuclear explosive test
demonstrated the dangerous potential of ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology.”8

This collaboration in peaceful uses of nuclear technology, however, was

deemed to be regulated through international oversight arrangements, to ensure that
technology shared for peaceful purposes was not misused by the recipients for any
military purposes. This led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in 1954. The role of the IAEA was, to prevent the diversion of the imported
nuclear technology to any purpose other than its peaceful uses, through a system of
inspections and safeguards. The safeguards system however, was not very effective and
many bilateral transactions between countries, in the era before the entry into force of
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in 1970, were carried out merely on the basis
of good faith rather than any binding obligations. Some of these agreements were later
abused by the beneficiary countries. The Canadian supplied research reactor to India
known as ‘CIRUS’ is a case in point. The US supplied the heavy water for the reactor.
The reactor was supplied with the good faith understanding that it would be used only
for peaceful research. However, India used the plutonium extracted from this reactor to
conduct its first nuclear test in 1974. Canada felt betrayed but there was no legally
binding agreement that would have prevented this abuse.9

7
Peter Lavoy, ‘The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, December 2003.
8
Ibid.

9
Raja Ramanna, the former director of India's nuclear program, speaking to the press trust of India on
October 10th, 1997, said: "The Pokhran test" - that is the 1974 explosion - "was a bomb, I can tell you
now. An explosion is an explosion. A gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground.
I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful." See ‘The US-India Nuclear Cooperation
Deal: A Critical Assessment,’ Arms Control Association Press Briefing Wednesday, February 15, 2006.
Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20060215_India_Transcript
 200

6.2 NPT, IAEA Safeguards and the Origins of the Zangger Committee:

When the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, it did not
have any inherent institutional structure to monitor its implementation. IAEA was,
therefore, asked to carry out this function through its safeguards system. It may be
pertinent here to reproduce the formulation of Article III of the NPT:-

1. Each non-nuclear –weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to

accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated
and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s
safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the
fulfilment of its obligations assumed under the treaty with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedure for
the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with
respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being
produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is
outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article
shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under
its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, or use or
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear
weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by
this Article.

However, Article III.2 did not define the source or special fissionable materials
nor did it elaborate the especially designed or prepared equipment or materials. The
Treaty seemed to have left the task of licensing of exports of sensitive nuclear materials
at the discretion of the individual states, while IAEA safeguards were meant to verify
any such transactions. Consequently, in 1971, a committee was formed under the
chairmanship of Claude Zangger of Switzerland to prepare a list of: (a) source or special
fissionable materials, and (b) equipment or materials especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials.10The objective of the

10
Zangger Committee, http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/zangger-committee-zac/
 201

committee was to regulate the trade in nuclear technology in accordance with Article-III
of the NPT. The Committee compiled a list of goods and elaborated the licensing
procedures for nuclear exports. This list is called the ‘Trigger List’ because of the fact
that any export of items listed in it would automatically trigger the application of IAEA
safeguards. The purpose was to ensure that, nuclear related goods exported for peaceful
purposes as envisaged in the NPT, would not be used for military purposes. The
Zangger Committee’s Trigger List was published in September 1974, as an IAEA
Information Circular 209 (INFCIRC/209).11

The initial Zangger Committee list included items directly related to nuclear
technology, such as reactors, reactor components and special nuclear materials. Later
on, the lists were successively revised and updated to include dual use items as well.
Dual use items are those materials and equipment that have uses in nuclear technology
but at the same time these have legitimate non-nuclear applications as well. A prime
example is ‘high speed inverters’ which are used both in gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment plants as well the textile industry. Similarly, high grade aluminum and
Maraging steel are used both in nuclear and non-nuclear industries. Computers with
very high processing speeds also commonly known as ‘super computers’ and high
speed x-ray machines also fall under this category. Membership of the Zangger
Committee is on voluntary basis and entails no formal commitments to enforce the
guidelines. Members of the committee meet biannually for information sharing and
updating/revision of its list of controlled items.12
In 1991 after the first Gulf War the full extent of Iraq’s illicit nuclear activities,
wherein Iraq was involved in secretly developing uranium enrichment capability, was
revealed through UN mandated inspections carried out by the IAEA. 13 This combined
with North Korea’s activities at its Yongbyon reactor involving separation of plutonium
from spent fuel rods for weaponisation purposes,14 exposed the limitations of the
existing safeguards system of the IAEA. The biggest flaw in the safeguards
arrangements in effect at the time was that, the IAEA inspectors could only verify the
facilities declared by the member states, and there was no provision to check undeclared
and clandestine facilities. Therefore, in 1993, the IAEA initiated an effort to close this

11
Dr Fritz W. Smith, Chair Zangger Committee, ‘The Role of the IAEA in Nuclear Export Controls’,
speech made at International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation, held
at Vienna International Centre, Vienna, 7-8 October 1997.
12
Sharon Squassoni, op. cit.
13
Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections, Arms Control Today, October 2002. www.armscontrol.org
14
See ‘Timeline on North Korea’s Nuclear Programme,’ The New York Times, August 6, 2013.
 202

loophole and make the safeguards mechanisms more effective. This initiative was
known as the ‘93+2’ plan as it was envisaged to be implemented by 1995. The new
programme had two components i.e., a technical component and a legal component. In
terms of technical innovations new measures such as ‘environmental sampling’, ‘short-
notice inspections’ of declared facilities and ‘remote monitoring and analysis’ were
adopted. The environmental sampling was first adopted as a means to augment the
application of IAEA Safeguards in 1996. It is based on the assumption that every
nuclear process releases small quantities of materials in the environment. This material
settles down on nearby equipment, buildings, vegetation and soil, or can mix into water
or air. Swipes taken from these structures are used as samples for analysis, while air
samples collected from the area around a nuclear facility help in the Wide Area
Environmental Sampling (WAES).15

In the legal domain agency’s mandate was to be extended through the adoption
of an additional protocol by NPT member states to augment their existing safeguards
agreements with the agency. The IAEA adopted a ‘Model Additional Protocol’ in May
1997 for voluntary acceptance by non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT.16 As
for the nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT, they could individually negotiate
country specific protocols with the IAEA. However, India, which is neither a nuclear
weapon state as per the NPT stipulation, nor is an NPT state party, was allowed to
negotiate a ‘country specific’ protocol with the IAEA – a privilege that is only available
to the five nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT. The protocol was approved by
the IAEA Board of Governors by consensus on 01 August 2008.17 Such exceptionalism
is detrimental to the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and undermines
confidence of other states in the regime itself.

6.3 The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG):

Alarmed by India’s explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974, using nuclear

technology, explicitly provided for peaceful uses, the US initiated efforts to develop a
mechanism to curb the unbridled commerce in nuclear technology. The discussions
which began in 1975 amongst seven nuclear supplier countries including Canada,

15
See E. Kuhn, D. Fischer, M. Ryjinski, ‘Environmental Sampling for IAEA Safeguards: A Five Year
Review’, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-sm-367/10/01, available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF file
16
‘The 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol at a Glance’, Arms Control Today, December 2012, Arms
Control Association, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.
17
Wade Boese, ‘U.S – Indian Nuclear Deal Reaches NSG Brink’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, September 2008.
 203

France, West Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States, led to an agreement on guidelines to control nuclear exports. These guidelines,
however, remained confidential. In 1978, the group of nuclear exporters known at the
time as the London Suppliers’ Club (LSC) inducted new members and announced a
common nuclear exports policy. While the Zangger Committee’s ‘Trigger List’
included items of direct use in nuclear weapons development, the NSG guidelines were
far more stringent and included dual-use items, with legitimate non-nuclear civil and
military applications as well. The group’s guidelines called upon the suppliers to
exercise restraint in the export of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
technologies. They also asked for adequate physical security arrangements for imported
technology and put restrictions on retransfer of technology by the recipient countries.
As an informal arrangement the NSG has no permanent institutional structure, no legal
authority nor any mechanism to enforce its decisions.18

The original guidelines, however, did not include the acceptance of ‘full scope
safeguards’19 by the recipient countries as a condition of supply, despite strong US
lobbying, since France, which was not an NPT state party then, was not amenable to a
demand for full scope safeguards. However, when the NSG members formally met in
March 1991, for the first time since 1978, they agreed to the expansion of the dual-use
commodities list. They also agreed on a requirement for acceptance of full-scope
safeguards as a pre-condition for all nuclear exports in January 1992. This meeting and
agreement on expansion of dual use items list and requirement for full scope safeguards
was facilitated by the weaknesses highlighted in the existing system by the revelations
of Iraq’s secret acquisition of sensitive technologies and materials and the decision by
France – which had been strongly resisting the application of full scope safeguards - to
join the NPT.20

The NSG currently has 48 members while the EU participates in its

deliberations as an observer. NSG’S list of proscribed items is divided into Part-1,
dealing with nuclear transfers, and Part-2, dealing with nuclear related dual-use

18
Sharon Squassoni, op. cit., p. 21-2 and Ian Anthony, Christer Ahlstrom and Vitaly Fedchenko,
‘Reforming Nuclear Export Controls – The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Oxford University
Press, 2007, p. 3.
19
‘Full scope safeguards agreement’ is an agreement between the IAEA and a country ‘importing’
nuclear technology, which obliges the recipient country to open all its existing nuclear facilities and
materials to IAEA inspections and to make a commitment that any facilities built in future would also
come under safeguards.
20
France eventually acceded to the NPT in August 1992 though the decision had been made sometimes in
1991. See ‘Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Chronology,’ http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm
 204

materials, equipment, technology and software. The lists are constantly reviewed and
updated and are published by the IAEA in the form of its information circular
(INFCIRC) known as INFCIRC/254.21

NSG guidelines for nuclear transfers include the following basic principles:-22

 “Prohibition on nuclear explosives”: Suppliers should seek firm assurances from

recipients that items being transferred to them would not be used for production of
any nuclear explosive device.
 “Physical Protection”: The facilities where the imported equipment or materials are
to be used should have physical protection arrangements meeting international
standards.
 “Safeguards”: Suppliers should only transfer trigger list items to a non-nuclear
weapon state if the state concerned has agreed with the IAEA to bring all its existing
and future peaceful nuclear activities involving special fissionable materials under
IAEA safeguards. This type of safeguards agreement is commonly known as the
‘Full Scope or Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.’
 “Special Controls on sensitive exports”: Suppliers should exercise special care and
caution in exporting enrichment and reprocessing technologies and should
encourage the recipients to accept multinational participation in running such plants.
In a speech at the National Defence University in February 2004, President Bush
went a step further by asking NSG member states to out-rightly ‘refuse’ to sell
reprocessing and enrichment related equipment and technology to any country that
does not already have a fully operational reprocessing or enrichment facilities.23
 “Special Controls on export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technologies”:
In case of transfer of an enrichment facility or related equipment the recipient state
should make a commitment not to use that facility or any other facility replicated on
that design for enrichment of uranium beyond 20% without agreement of the
supplier state. As per the IAEA glossary of terms low enriched uranium is enriched
to less than 20% while highly enriched uranium suitable for bombs is over 90%
enriched but theoretically uranium enriched to over 20% can be considered as
highly enriched uranium.24

21
Ibid.
22
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part.1 November 2007.
23
Wade Boese, ‘Bush Outlines Proposals to Stem Proliferation’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, March 2004.
24
http://www.iaea.org/ns/tutorials/regcontrol/intro/glossaryu_v.htm
 205

 “Controls on supplied or derived material usable for nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices”: In order to promote the cause of nuclear non-
proliferation the suppliers are required to include specific clauses in the agreements
to make it obligatory for the recipient to consult the supplier before undertaking any
reprocessing, storage, modification, use or retransfer of any material that could be
used for production of nuclear explosive devices.
 “Controls on retransfer”: Suppliers are obliged to obtain assurances from the
recipient that it will demand same assurances, as it has given to the supplier, from
the recipient of a retransfer of material or equipment. It should also agree to consult
the supplier before entering into any retransfer agreement.
 “Non-proliferation Principle”: In addition to fulfilling the provisions of the NSG the
suppliers need to satisfy themselves that the exported items would not be used for
any clandestine nuclear weapons programme or used for acts of nuclear terrorism.

NSG also has a ‘no under-cut’ clause to make sure, that if an NSG member
country denies export of any item to a particular recipient country, no other member of
NSG would supply that item to that particular country at the cost of commercial interest
of the country denying export licence in the first place. For this purpose the country
turning down the request of a recipient country also informs other members of the group
of its decision through regular information exchange mechanisms. Ironically, the US
which played the leading role in the formation of the NSG in response to India’s 1974
nuclear test, in a major policy reversal pressurised the other NSG members to grant a
waiver to India in September 2008. The waiver allows India to import nuclear materials
and equipment from NSG member states without having to accept full scope safeguards
over its nuclear programme.25The waiver has, subsequently, enabled India to enter into
nuclear trade agreements with countries such as France, the Russian Federation, Japan,
Canada and Australia for import of nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel. Negotiations
are also underway with the US, to pave the way for US companies to enter into similar
agreements with India. The two countries are currently trying to remove some of the
misgivings and concerns created by India’s controversial ‘Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage Bill’ passed by the Indian parliament in 2010.26

25
Wade Boese, ‘NSG, Congress Approve Nuclear Trade with India’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, October 2008. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org
26
Eric Auner, ‘India Passes Nuclear Liability Bill’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association,
October 2010. Available at, http://www.armscontrol.org . Also see ‘Defective law on nuclear liability;
India walks alone on nuclear jurisprudence’, The Economic Times, New Delhi, December 20, 2012.
 206

6.4 The United Nations Security Council Resolution – 1540:

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution -1540. The
work on the resolution was initiated on the urging of President George W. Bush in
2003. In a speech at the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2003, “President Bush
warned that “[t]he deadly combination of outlaw regimes and terror networks and
weapons of mass murder is a peril that cannot be ignored or wished away.” He called on
states to “adopt tighter export controls, stronger legislation, and better border security to
prevent the illicit transfer of materials and offered U.S. support to any country that
needed help devising such programs.” 27 UNSCR-1540 is a part of a series of
resolutions passed by the UN Security Council in the aftermath of 9/11 to counter
international terrorism. The resolution is based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
which confers powers to the Security Council to take actions necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security including the use of force. 28 The
resolution was specifically aimed at plugging a serious gap that existed in the
international treaties regime as well as national legislations. That gap was related to the
activities of non-state actors, which did not fall in the purview of treaties such as NPT,
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). According to NTI:

“The revelations of the A.Q. Khan nuclear trafficking network in 2004

highlighted the need to counter illicit trafficking activities. To counter these
types of proliferation networks and provide support for counter-proliferation
efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the United Kingdom,
the United States, and other countries put forward what was to become
UNSCR 1540, and urged the UN Security Council to take action to halt the
illicit trade in WMD-related materials.”29

The resolution calls upon states to adopt “appropriate, effective measures to

account for and secure WMD related items in production, use, storage or transport and
to maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures of said items.”30 The
resolution basically sought for the first time to address, the lack of export control

27
Christine Kucia, ‘Bush Calls on UN to Curb Proliferation,’ Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, October 2003. Available at
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/PresidentBushsSpeech
28
See http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. Also see ‘UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 at a Glance,’ https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/1540 updated October 2012.
29
UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection, http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/1540-reporting-overview/
30
Scott Jones, ‘Resolution 1540: Universalising Export Control Standards?’ Arms Control Today, Arms
Control Association, May 2006.
 207

arrangements conforming to the internationally accepted standards in most member

states and therefore, can be seen as the most comprehensive international effort in the
realm of export controls. International export controls can be likened to a ‘link chain’
wherein the strength of the chain is determined by the weakest link in the chain and
there were many weak links even some missing links in that chain. The existing export
control arrangements including the NSG, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar
Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have limited
membership and majority of the states that are not part of these regimes can defeat the
purpose of these arrangements, since they are not obliged to meet their standards.

Resolution 1540, has laid down the key components of an effective export
control system, by calling upon states to enact ‘effective” laws to control transfers of
WMD related materials in consonance with their respective national legislative
procedures. The resolution also calls upon states to prepare national control lists and
develop enforcement mechanisms to effectively oversee the transfer of sensitive
materials and equipment. It also requires states to “develop and maintain appropriate
effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and
combat including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit
trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal
authorities and legislation and consistent with international law.”31 For many states that
are outside the current export control groupings, export controls are an uncharted
territory and they have generally viewed the multilateral export control regimes as
“supplier cartels” designed to deny access to high technology to developing countries.
The resolution provided for the creation of a committee consisting of the security-
council representatives and selected outside experts. The committee known as the 1540
Committee was initially given a mandate for two years, but its mandate has since been
extended several times.32 The committee has also suggested that the Security Council
may consider developing a ‘model export control legislation’ to assist the states in
fulfilling their obligations in this regard.33 The resolution could form the basis of
universally accepted export control standards and could also facilitate sharing of
expertise and best practices in ‘licencing and enforcement ‘amongst states.34

31
Ibid.
32
Scott Jones, op. cit.
33
Ibid.
34
Ian Anthony, Christer Ahlstrom and Vitaly Fedchenko, op. cit., p. 123.
 208

Pakistan participated in the deliberations for the formulation of UNSCR-1540,

as a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time. Pakistan’s Permanent
representative to the UN, Munir Akram raised several questions on the justification as
well as scope of the resolution stating that:

“The first question was whether the Council had the right to assume the role of
prescribing legislative action by member states…The Council where five states
retained nuclear weapons and had the right of veto, was not the appropriate
body to be entrusted with oversight responsibilities over non-proliferation and
disarmament. Secondly, there were discrepancies between the draft’s stated
objective and its provisions…Thirdly, there was no justification for adopting
the text under Chapter VII… Legitimate fears arose as to the use of authority
under chapter VII to justify coercive actions, including the use of force…the
scope of the resolution could be enlarged beyond non-state actors…Fifth, the
creation of the council committee mentioned in operative paragraph 9 was
unnecessary.”35

Pakistan provided an initial report to the 1540 committee on October 27, 2004
and then an expanded report of one hundred and twenty five pages based on the matrix
provided by the committee. It has since forwarded two more reports in the form of
additional information.36 It has also offered to provide assistance to other countries that
may need help in developing their export control legislation and implementation
mechanisms under the UNSC auspices.37

6.5 A Brief Historical Overview of Pakistan’s Export Control Regime:

Pakistan has traditionally employed a combination of laws, ordinances and

statutory regulatory orders (SROs) to implement its export control policies. In the
nuclear realm, these measures were designed to curb the export of sensitive nuclear
materials and also identified the designated authorities which could provide licences for
such exports. There was, however, a lack of clarity and the penalties for any violations

35
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8070.doc.htm

36
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/national-reports.shtml

37
See http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-1540-reporting/andAuthor’s interviews with
respondents ‘L’ at Islamabad on August 7, 2012 and with respondent ‘W’ at Rawalpindi on August 6,
2012.
 209

were not clearly specified. It was expected that this bits and pieces system will
somehow work, since all the entities having access to nuclear materials or technology
are state owned, and unlike the western industrialised nations, the private sector is not
involved in nuclear commerce. A brief summary of some of the relevant legal and
administrative measures is as under:-38

1) Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950; (Act No. XXXIX of 1950):

This is a broad based law not specifically meant for nuclear materials but has a
much wider application. It gives authority to the Federal Government to prohibit,
restrict or control the import/export of goods and regulate related practices and
procedures.

2) Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance,

1984 and PNSRP Regulations, 1990:

These nuclear specific regulations provide for control of import and export of
nuclear and radioactive materials. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was identified
as the licensing authority for any import or export activity related to such materials.

3) Statutory Notification No. SRO-782 (1), 1998:

This notification specifically prohibits the export of fissionable materials. This

SRO was issued after the nuclear tests in May 1998 and constituted the earliest post-
nuclearisation effort to augment the export controls over nuclear substances.

4) Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) Ordinance 2001:

This law established an autonomous regulatory body responsible for maintaining

nuclear and radiation safety and to regulate the activities of nuclear operators which in
Pakistan’s case is the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). It also gives the
PNRA the authority to issue no objection certificates (NOCs) for import and export of
any radio-active materials or sources. The details of role and functions of the PNRA are
covered in Chapter-7 of this study.

38
Pakistan: Dual-use export control system; http://archives.sipri.org/contents/expcon/pakistandu.html
 210

5) Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment

related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Means, 2004:39

Recognising the weaknesses and incoherence in the existing export control laws
especially those related to nuclear substances and technology Pakistan started a
reappraisal of the laws with a view to formulating comprehensive and all-encompassing
nuclear export controls legislation in line with the internationally accepted standards. As
an interim measure internal export control guidelines for the strategic organisations
were prepared by the SPD in September 200040 to regulate the export of conventional
weapons and equipment such as Laser Range Finders, night sights for small arms, anti-
tank and anti-aircraft guided missiles produced by PAEC, KRL and air Weapons
Complex. In 2000 an inter-ministerial committee comprising representatives of the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Commerce, PAEC, and SPD was constituted
to prepare a draft export control law. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the lead
agency and the overall coordinator. The original draft was revised a few times and an
agreed draft was ready by the end of 2002. However, instead of further processing, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs held it back for reasons best known to them.41

After the initiation of the bilateral US-Pakistan cooperation on nuclear security

related issues in 2002, export controls and border controls were identified as areas of
potential cooperation.42 Consequently, a number of exchanges took place in bilateral as
well as multilateral settings and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SPD,
PAEC, PNRA, Federal Board of Revenue and Customs attended several workshops
dealing with various aspects of an effective export control system. The experience and
information gained through these exchanges helped in refining the draft legislation and
especially in the preparation of control lists.43Discussions were also held with countries
such as Japan for exchange of ideas and experiences. In early 2004, after the unearthing
of the AQ Khan-network, weaknesses of the existing export control system in checking
illicit exports of sensitive technologies became apparent and an urgent need was felt to
put in place effective export control mechanisms. The draft law prepared in 2002 was,
therefore, revisited and finalised along with the related control lists. It was then

39
Chemical Weapons and related means of delivery were not included in the legislation since those are
covered by the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Implementation Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance
No. LIV of 2000).
40
Kenneth N. Luongo and Brigadier General (Ret) Naeem Salik, ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan’s
Nuclear Security,’ Arms Control Today, December 2007.
41
Author’s personal experience as part of the inter-ministerial group.
42
As already explained in Chapter 5 under Bilateral Cooperation with the US.
43
Author’s personal knowledge of the process, having participated in some of these events.
 211

processed through the Ministry of Law for legal and technical opinion. Initially, it was
proposed to be issued in the form of a Presidential Ordinance, however, since the
parliament was in session it was decided to introduce it as a bill in the parliament.44 It
was finally approved by both houses of the parliament in September 2004 and was
promulgated after the assent by the President on 23rd of September 2004.45

As mentioned in the preceding paras work was already underway since 2000, to
formulate comprehensive export controls legislation. However, there can be no doubt in
the fact that the revelations of the AQ Khan network and the passage of the UNSC
Resolution-1540 injected the necessary sense of urgency in the process. In a letter
addressed to the Director General of IAEA on 4th November 2004, Pakistan’s
permanent representative at Vienna forwarded a copy of the legislation with a request to
circulate it among the members as an INFCIRC. The same was duly circulated as
IAEA’s INFCIRC/636 dated 23 November 2004.46

 Salient Features of the Export Control Legislation:

(a) Wide Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the act covers the whole of Pakistan
and is applicable to:
(1) “Every citizen of Pakistan or a person in the service of Pakistan within
and beyond Pakistan or any Pakistani visiting or working abroad;
(2) Any foreign national while in the territories of Pakistan; and
(3) Any ground transport, ship or aircraft registered in Pakistan wherever it
may be.”
(b) Covers intangible transfers as well, as is evident from the definition of
technology which says, “any documents including blueprints, plans,
diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs or specifications,
manuals or instructions, necessary for the development and production of
nuclear or biological weapons and their delivery systems, including on-the-
job training, expert advice and services”…
(c) Authorises the Federal Government to make necessary rules and regulations
for effective implementation of the law and specifically calls upon the
government to:

44
Author’s personal experience being part of the process in his capacity as Director Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs at SPD at the time.
45
The Gazette of Pakistan, [812 (2004)/Ex. Gaz.], Islamabad, Monday, September 27, 2004.
46
IAEA INFCIRC/636 dated 23 November 2004. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
 212

(1) Set up a government authority to administer export controls contained in

this act.
(2) Designate the concerned agency or agencies authorised to enforce the
act.
(3) Establish an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of the act.
(d) Control Lists of goods and technologies subject to the licencing
requirements under the act, to be notified separately, shall be maintained by
the Federal Government.
(e) Federal Government shall be responsible to prepare and notify the licences
required along with the procedures for approval or rejection of the same.
(f) Record keeping has been made mandatory for all exporters.
(g) Relevant Courts of Law authorised to try offences under the act have been
designated.
(h) Any offence under the act entails severe punishments which include a prison
sentence extending up to 14 years or a fine of five million rupees or both. On
conviction an offender’s property and assets could also be confiscated.47

The control list was subsequently published by the government of Pakistan in

the form of Statutory Regulatory Order No. 1078 (1) 2005. The list includes all the
items that are part of the NSG, Australia Group and Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) lists and is therefore, in conformity with the universally accepted international
standards. EU’s classification system has been used to identify various items on the list.
Pakistan’s permanent mission at Vienna through a letter addressed to the DG IAEA
dated 19 January 2006 notified the lists to the IAEA. These were subsequently
circulated as IAEA’s INFCIRC/669 of 20 February 2006.48 The lists were later
reviewed, updated and published as a Statutory Regulatory Order S.R.O. 669 (1)/2011
and IAEA was informed of the same vide a communication from the permanent mission
of Pakistan dated 17 October 2011. The amended lists were circulated by the IAEA as
INFCIRC/832 dated 30 November 2011.49 The national control lists were revised
through an inter-agency review process to incorporate the amendments and changes

47
The Gazette of Pakistan, [812 (2004)/Ex. Gaz.], Islamabad, Monday, September 27, 2004. Also see,
Gabrielle Kohlmeier, ‘Pakistan Introduces Export Control Bill’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, September 2004 and Gabrielle Kohlmeier and Miles A. Pomper, ‘Pakistan Advances Export
Control’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, October 2004. http://www.armscontrol.org
48
IAEA INFCIRC/669 dated 20 February 2006. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
49
IAEA INFCIRC/832 dated 30 November 2011. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
 213

made by NSG, MTCR and Australia Group in their respective lists since the issuance of
Pakistani lists in 200550 to keep abreast with the international standards and practices.

To fulfil the requirement of Article 3 of the Export Control Act, the Government
of Pakistan set up a Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which is the lead ministry in this regard. The SECDIV, which includes
experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Board of Revenue, PAEC, PNRA
and SPD, is responsible for preparing and enforcing necessary rules and regulations for
the implementation of export controls besides acting as the licensing authority.51
Amongst the measures taken by the SECDIV was the promulgation of “Export Control
(Licensing and Enforcement) Rules” in 2009, which laid down detailed procedures
specifying that export of any items mentioned in the Export Control Act and Control
Lists has to follow the registration and licensing mechanisms laid down by the
SECDIV.52 Moreover, to facilitate the enforcement of the export controls, detection
equipment has been deployed at important entry and exit points in the country, in
addition to training the personnel of concerned departments, to raise the awareness and
enhance coordination between various agencies.53

Earlier, on 7 August 2007, Pakistan had communicated to the IAEA, the

establishment of a high powered ‘Oversight Board’ envisaged in the export control act
of 2004, to monitor implementation of the act as well as the formation and functioning
of Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) which was also stipulated under the
terms of the export control act.54 The Oversight Board is chaired by the Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and includes ten other senior government bureaucrats as its
members, including the DG of the SECDIV, and secretaries of the ministries of Defence
and Interior and senior officials of the Board of Revenue, Cabinet Division, National
55
Command Authority and the PNRA. The main functions of the Oversight Board are
as under:-

 Monitor implementation of relevant laws on export controls that fall under the
ambit of the SECDIV.

50
Ibid.
51
Ibid. Also see http://www.mofa.gov.pk/secdiv/content.php?pageID=secdiv
52
Ibid.
53
IAEA INFCIRC/832 op. cit.
54
IAEA INFCIRC/712 dated 06 September 2007. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
55
S.R.O. 693(I)/2007 published vide Gazette of Pakistan, [633(2007)/Ex. Gaz.], Islamabad, July 13,
2007.
 214

 Monitor the functioning of the SECDIV and provide guidance for the
achievement of its objectives.
 Review and approve policy and administrative measures for improvement in the
functioning of the SECDIV.56

6.6.1 Organisation of the SECDIV:

DIRECTOR GENERAL
SECDIV

DIRECTOR
DOMESTIC/ DIRECTOR DIRECTOR
INTERNATIONAL LICENSING & REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT
POLICY

DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY

DEPUTY
DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR
DIRECTOR
LICENSING REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION

LICENSING REGULATION INVESTIGATION

OFFICERS OFFICERS OFFICERS

6.6.2 Functions of the SECDIV:

The SECDIV has been tasked to perform the following functions:-

 Control export, re-export, transhipment and transit of goods, technologies,

materials and equipment, which may contribute to the designing, development,
production, stockpiling, maintenance or use of nuclear and biological weapons
and their delivery systems, in accordance with the provisions of Export Control
Act – 2004.
 Development, implementation and interpretation of ‘Pakistan’s export control
policy’. Whereas the export control policy here means only that part of the

56
Zafar Ali (Director Policy, SECDIV), ‘Pakistan’s Export Control Measure’ - presentation made at
Partnership for Global Security (PGS) Conference on Pakistan’s Nuclear Security at Washington, DC on
21 February 2008.
 215

policy which specifically deals with the export of nuclear and biological
materials and technology. It does not deal with the formulation of overall
national export policy which falls under the purview of the Federal Ministry of
Commerce. The Ministry of Commerce bears the overall responsibility for
laying down the national export policy related to export of all other
commodities.
 To ensure that the export of sensitive technologies, materials and equipment as
specified in the Control Lists does not in any way contribute to proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
 To reach out to industry, media and other relevant entities for technical advice
and dissemination and sharing of information.
 To evaluate on a regular basis whether the existing strategic export policy is
adequately serving the country’s national interests and future needs.

6.7 National Control Lists and Licensing Process:

Export Controls are designed to serve specified purposes and are not meant to
stifle the exports. Therefore, the procedures should be unambiguously stated to facilitate
the exporters while fulfilling the government’s policy objectives. National Control Lists
play an important role in this regard by clearly identifying the items of equipment and
materials along with their detailed specifications. Strategic Export Control Lists were
initially issued in 2005 and were later reviewed and amended in 2011. 57 These lists are
subjected to a constant review process and are likely to be modified from time to time in
conformity with any changes introduced by NSG, MTCR and Australia Group.

The prospective exporters are required to submit a licence request to the SECDIV.
At the SECDIV the goods intended to be exported would be checked against the control
lists and given a technical rating in accordance with their sensitivity and likely uses.
The review process of the requests for an export licence would invariably be exhaustive
in view of the sensitive nature of the exports. The review process is designed to
establish the following:-

 Whether the applicant has the right credentials and is eligible to export the items
in question.

57
IAEA INFCIRC/832, op. cit.
 216

 Whether the particular export is in conformity with non-proliferation objectives

and whether it is in full compliance with the existing unilateral and
multilateral export control regimes. It will also determine whether the
item/items under review or the recipient country itself are affected by any UN
embargoes or sanctions.
 Whether all parties involved in the transaction are bona-fide.
 Are there adequate assurances against re-export/transfer and enough guarantees
on non-diversion, of the items to be exported from their declared end-use?
 Whether the quality and quantity of the proposed export to the recipient is in line
with the stated end-use.
 Any other legal impediments to the proposed export.
 Any national security or foreign policy implications of the proposed export.58

An exporter will have to register with the SECDIV before filing an application for
export. The application once received will be verified and classified, and a registration
number will be assigned to the application by the SECDIV. It will then, be forwarded
for technical and policy review. The application will go through an interagency review
before a final decision would be made whether to approve or deny the request.

6.8 Oversight Institutions:

National institutions responsible for overseeing the implementation and

enforcement of the provisions of the Export Control Act – 2004 and other relevant rules
and regulations such as the CWC Implementation Ordinance – 2000 and PNRA
Ordinance – 2001 etc. are as under:-

 National Command Authority:

*Strategic Plans Division.
*Security Division.
 Strategic Export Control Oversight Board.
 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority.
 National Authority for CWC Implementation.
 Designated National Point of Contact for BWC related actions (at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs).
 Ministry of Defence Production.

58
Zafar Ali, op. cit.
 217

6.9 Enforcement Agencies:

To ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of export control laws

following agencies which have the primary responsibility for controlling the land, air
and sea entry and exit points have been designated:-

 Pakistan Customs is the lead agency as far as enforcement of export control

measures is concerned.
 Maritime Security Agency is responsible for the security of the maritime
frontiers.
 Coast Guards are responsible for looking after the territorial waters.
 Frontier Corps has the responsibility for the Western border with Afghanistan
and South Western border with Iran.
 Pakistan Rangers look after the eastern borders between Pakistani provinces of
Punjab and Sindh and India.
 Northern Area Scouts take care of the northern reaches of the country.
 Anti-narcotics Force is primarily responsible for preventing smuggling of
narcotics into and from the country but has intelligence, surveillance and
enforcement resources which can be helpful in other law enforcement missions
as well.
 Air Port Security Force.
 Police.

6.10 Analysis:

Pakistan’s export control regime can be traced back to the 1950s but the export
laws were general in nature and it was only in 1984 when Pakistan Nuclear Safety and
Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance was issued and was followed by the PNSRP
Regulations in 1990, that nuclear specific export laws came into being. However, these
laws were not comprehensive enough, did not contain any accompanying control lists
and penalties for violations were ambiguous. The lack of urgency in development and
promulgation of effective and comprehensive nuclear specific laws can be explained by
the fact that Pakistan did not consider itself to be an exporter of nuclear materials and
technology. Moreover, the covert nature of Pakistan’s nuclear programme from early
1970s to 1998 meant that secrecy took precedence over security and accountability.
After 1998 when the nuclear capability became overt, a need was felt to take all
 218

necessary measures to bring all facets of the nuclear programme under institutional
controls to reassure the international community as well as the domestic public and
establish Pakistan’s credentials as a responsible nuclear state.

In the realm of export controls, as a first step, a statutory regulatory order was
issued, not long after the nuclear tests in May 1998, to specifically prohibit export of
fissionable materials. This was followed by a series of WMD specific laws in the form
of SROs and ordinances etc. Subsequently, in the year 2000, an inter-ministerial
working group was put together to develop a comprehensive nuclear-export control law.
However, the progress remained rather slow until the revelation of AQ Khan’s illegal
export network in early 2004 caused national embarrassment and infused a new sense of
urgency in the effort. The UNSC Resolution – 1540 passed in April 2004 gave further
impetus to the process. The resulting ‘Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies,
Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery
Systems-2004’ is an all-encompassing piece of legislation.

Having had a detailed overview of the historical progression of Pakistan’s

export control regime one may ask whether there has been any learning in this field.
One could then proceed to determine the levels of analysis at which the learning is
discernible and which areas show lack of learning. A legal expert who has advised the
concerned government departments on nuclear related legislations opined that Pakistan
has demonstrated a rather steep upward learning curve in the last decade or so, which is
evident in the shape of enactment of a series of main as well as delegative legislations
including the Export Control Law of 2004 which fully meets the international
standards59 and the NCA Act of 2010 which was originally promulgated as an
ordinance in 2007. The delegative legislation is in the form of regulations, guidelines
and notifications. This substantive body of legislative work indicates a serious
consciousness about nuclear non-proliferation. The driving force behind the formulation
of these new laws has been the SPD which realised the implications of the existence of
these laws or absence thereof. These legislative measures have not only fulfilled the
state’s legal obligations but also have administrative connotations by way of
establishing new institutions through specific statutes.60

59
The Control Lists accompanying the legislation include all the items listed in the NSG, MTCR and
Australia Group guidelines which set the international standards.
60
Author’s personal Interview with a senior Supreme Court lawyer and eminent international law expert
at Islamabad in August 2012.
 219

This learning has been partly out of realisation that Pakistan lacked an effective
export control system especially in the nuclear realm and partly out of compulsions
such as the revelation of illegal activities of some Pakistani citizens and the building up
of international pressure in the form of UNSC resolutions. The process was also
facilitated by international cooperation both bilateral as well as multilateral which
provided opportunities for concerned Pakistani officials to learn from the best practices
and experiences of their counterparts. However, this learning can mostly be discerned at
the institutional and government levels as well as international learning to some extent.

However, within the country there has been a lack of involvement of either the
political parties or the civil society and even the relevant industries did not participate in
the process. This lack of interest becomes even more visible in case of academia and the
legal fraternity with almost complete absence of any comment or criticism. The possible
reasons for this apparent lack of interest are that on the one hand the academics usually
consider legal affairs as something exclusive and normally refrain from commenting on
such issues and on the other hand, the lawyers’ community considers nuclear laws as
something too technical for them to delve into. As a result most people simply shy away
from these.61. Comment, analysis and criticism by the intelligentsia would help remove
any weaknesses and to improve the quality of these laws. Pakistan, though, has a
distinct advantage over most other countries and has a comparatively easier task to
enforce its nuclear export control laws since almost all the entities dealing with nuclear
substances and related technology and materials are state controlled and the private
sector currently does not play any role in this field.

Learning about nuclear export controls is essential for the institutions dealing
with the subject and the relevant government ministries. To that extent significant
learning has taken place as is evident by the body of legislations, rules and regulations
and establishment of specialised institutions. Pakistan also made an effort to learn from
the greater experience and expertise of advanced countries such as the US and Japan in
formulation and implementation of export control legislations and Pakistani experts
consulted their counterparts in those countries before finalising the legislation. The
control lists accompanying Pakistani legislation include all the items listed by
international export control groupings such as the NSG, MTCR and the Australia Group
and are therefore, in full compliance with the international standards. Learning in the
field of nuclear export controls which has resulted from Pakistan’s own bitter
61
Ibid.
 220

experience with its flawed export control system which allowed the AQ Khan network
to operate unchecked as well as developments in this area internationally in the form of
UNSC Resolution-1540 has been extensive.
 221

Chapter – 7

Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Regime

This chapter is aimed at exploring the evolution of the nuclear regulatory

regime in Pakistan with a view to determine the nature and quantum of learning in this
field especially since 1998. In order to evaluate the learning process the focus will be
mainly on the tangible signs of learning in the shape of institution building, legislative
developments and administrative measures undertaken to establish an autonomous
regulatory regime. Nevertheless, an effort will also be made to identify the intangible
forms of learning in the form of promotion and inculcation of a safety and security
culture within the nuclear establishment. Since the origins of nuclear regulatory regime
are rooted in the history of Pakistan’s early nuclear development, though the process
was greatly accelerated in the decade following 1998, an historical overview of the
advancement of the nuclear regulatory mechanisms would also be in order.

7.1 Preamble:

Operation of nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations needs to be

conducted within a clearly laid out and strictly implemented regulatory regime due to
the complex and hazardous nature of nuclear technology. All countries with extensive
civilian or military nuclear programmes need to develop comprehensive arrangements
for regulating and monitoring the operation of various nuclear facilities. These facilities
include nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear medical centres and even
private medical clinics, hospitals laboratories using diagnostic and therapeutic
equipment containing radioactive sources such as the x-ray machines. In the past
decade, the issue of nuclear safety and security has come to the forefront of the
international security discourse, in view of the known desire of international terror
groups to acquire nuclear and/or radiological materials to perpetrate a catastrophic
event using these dangerous materials. There are, however, many technical and
practical challenges in the acquisition and use of an already fabricated nuclear device or
even an improvised one. The other alternative could be an attack against a nuclear plant
or spent fuel storage site to cause the release of harmful radiation. Though the safety
record of nuclear plants around the world has been exceptionally good barring a few
major accidents such as the three miles island in 1979, Chernobyl April 1986 and the
 222

Fukushima disaster in Japan in March 2011, probability of an accident involving a

nuclear installation cannot be completely ruled out. It is, therefore, imperative that the
nuclear regulatory regime ensures that all nuclear facilities are operated in accordance
with the laid down safety regulations. It is also important that plans and preparations to
mitigate the effects of an accident involving release of nuclear radiation are made
beforehand, disseminated to the relevant authorities and regularly rehearsed and
updated.

Though the primary responsibility for nuclear safety lies with the state in whose
jurisdiction any nuclear installation is located, the harmful effects of leakage of nuclear
radiation can go across the state boundaries and can cause dangers to the human beings
and environment in neighbouring countries as well. This fact, came into sharp focus
after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine in 1986 released
radioactive fumes that travelled not only to countries in the immediate neighbourhood
but as far away as Sweden. More recently radiation leakages from the Fukushima
nuclear power plant complex disaster in Japan have spread to a large area. It is logical,
therefore, to expect the international community to take increasing interest in nuclear
safety related issues. This interest could manifest itself in various forms such as
enhanced international cooperation through forums provided by treaty arrangements or
on voluntary basis and laying down minimum acceptable safety standards for universal
observance. The Chernobyl disaster acted as a catalyst for multi-lateral negotiations on
nuclear safety that were held between 1992 and 1994, culminating in the formulation of
an international ‘Convention on Nuclear Safety’ in 1994. It may be worthwhile here to
provide an overview of the salient aspects of the safety convention especially its main
objectives and the key obligations accruing from it for states parties to the convention.

7.2 Convention on Nuclear Safety:

The Convention on Nuclear Safety was approved at a diplomatic meeting held

under the auspices of the IAEA at its headquarters in Vienna in June 1994 and was
subsequently opened for signatures on 20th of September the same year. The
contracting parties reaffirmed the need for promotion of high standards of nuclear
safety, pointing out that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the
states on whose territory a particular nuclear installation is located. They also expressed
a desire “to promote an effective nuclear safety culture.”62 It also talked of

62
IAEA, INFCIRC/449 OF 5 July 1994 – Convention on Nuclear Safety.
 223

internationally formulated safety guidelines available as standards to be followed to

achieve the desired levels of safety. Chapter 1 of the Convention has laid down the
following objectives of the Convention:-

 “To achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide

through the enhancement of national measures and international cooperation
including, where appropriate, safety-related technical cooperation.
 To establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations
against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society
and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such
installations.
 To prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate
such consequences should they occur.”63

The convention defined a nuclear installation as a “land-based civil nuclear

power plant” including its associated facilities such as storage, handling and treatment
of radioactive materials co-located with the main plant. It also defined the functions of
‘regulatory bodies’ for each contracting party as “bodies given the legal authority by
that Contracting Party to grant licences and to regulate the siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear installations.”64 It also
clarified the scope of the convention as safety of nuclear installations which is related
to the operation of the facilities as distinct from the physical security. 65 It may also be
noted that Article 2 of the convention clearly defined a nuclear installation as a land
based civil nuclear power plant which means that it neither has any jurisdiction over
military related nuclear installations, nor does it cover sea-based or space based nuclear
installations.

Article 6 of the Convention requires all states parties to the convention to

undertake an urgent review of the safety of their existing nuclear installations and
introduce safety upgrades wherever feasible. In case safety upgrades are not possible
efforts should be made to shut down such facilities as soon as practicable.66 Article 7
elaborates the requirements for the legislative and regulatory framework as under:-

 “The establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations.

63
Ibid.
64
Ibid., Article 2.
65
Ibid., Article 3.
66
Ibid., Article 6.
 224

 A system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition

of the operation of a nuclear installation without a licence.
 A system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to
ascertain compliance with applicable regulations and terms of licences.
 The enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licences,
including suspension, modification or revocation.” 67

Article 8 specifically lays down the requirement for all states parties to the
convention to establish a regulatory body or to designate an existing body as a
regulatory body but more importantly asking for a separation between the working of
the regulatory body and that of the operators of nuclear facilities.68 This created an
obligation for the states parties to the convention to establish autonomous regulatory
institutions. The safety convention also requires states parties to ensure that the
exposure of workers and general population to radiation remains below the prescribed
national limits and to prepare and regularly test ‘emergency plans’ for nuclear
installations. It also calls upon the contracting parties to disseminate necessary
information to its own population in the proximity of the nuclear installations as well as
to the concerned authorities of other states located in the vicinity of the nuclear
installation for prior planning to respond to a nuclear incident.69

Pakistan signed the Nuclear Safety Convention – 1994, when it was opened for
signatures on 20 September 1994 and ratified it on 30 September 1997. 70 In February
1992 Pakistan had signed an agreement with China for the purchase of a 300 MW
nuclear power plant. The Chinese had gone ahead with this agreement despite US
pressure not to do so unless Pakistan accepts full scope safeguards on its whole nuclear
programme. A Chinese request for the reactor cooling vessel for the reactor destined
for Pakistan from a German firm was also denied on the same grounds. This was a
major breakthrough for Pakistan since its efforts to acquire nuclear power plants had
been constantly rebuffed since the mid-1970s by the Western industrialised countries. It
was, therefore, important for Pakistan to establish its credentials as a responsible state
that was willing to implement international safety standards for its nuclear

67
Ibid., Article 7.
68
Ibid., Article 8.
69
Ibid., Articles 15 & 16.
70
M. Nasim and S.D. Orfi, ‘Evolution and Development of Nuclear Safety Regime in Pakistan’, The
Nucleus, 42 (1-2) 2005, p. 67-72. The Nucleus is a quarterly scientific journal of Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission.
 225

programme.71 The convention entered into force on 24 October 1996. In comparison

India signed the convention on 20 September 1994 but did not ratify it until 31 March
2005, Israel has signed but not ratified it while the United States signed the convention
on 20 September 1994 and ratified it on 11 April 1999. As recently as 09 January 2014
there were 77 contracting parties while 10 countries have signed but not yet ratified the
convention. The convention also requires the contracting parties to submit their annual
national reports on nuclear safety to the IAEA for peer review.72

7.3 Origins of Nuclear Safety Regime in Pakistan:

Nuclear safety regime has gradually evolved in Pakistan over many decades. To
begin with it was accorded a low priority due to the fact that until the mid-1970s
Pakistan had a very modest nuclear programme with a 5MW research reactor at Nilore
near Islamabad, the 137 MW Karachi Nuclear Power Plant and nuclear agriculture
research centres at Faisalabad and Peshawar. By the 1980s the programme had started
gaining some momentum due to expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in
medicine and agriculture. Many nuclear fuel cycle facilities, related to both the peaceful
as well as military nuclear programme, such as fuel fabrication and heavy water plants
as well as Uranium enrichment and pilot scale reprocessing laboratories were becoming
operational in late 1970s and early 1980s which underlined the need for greater security
consciousness. After the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 the importance of high
standards of safety at nuclear plants had gained universal recognition. Pakistan’s
accession to the nuclear safety convention brought greater urgency to the matter since
the convention imposes certain obligations on the contracting parties, such as the
obligation to establish an autonomous nuclear regulatory and oversight authority. The
subsequent developments that have taken place in the realm of nuclear safety and
regulation provide enough evidence to suggest that Pakistan has made discernible
progress in this direction.

When Pakistan ventured into the nuclear field in the mid-1950s under the
auspices of the Atoms for Peace Programme it created a modest Atomic Energy
Council with a governing body and an Atomic Energy Commission in February 1956.
However, this was merely, an administrative arrangement with no legislative back up.

71
Naeem Salik, Genesis of South Asian nuclear Deterrence, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 133.
72
Convention on Nuclear Safety;
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/nuclearsafety_status.pdf
 226

When a decision was taken by the government in 1959 to set up a research reactor, a
team of two American and three Pakistani scientists73 was formed to carry out selection
and appraisal of possible sites. On the basis of the recommendations of this team a
decision was taken to place an order for a US made 5 MW (e), research reactor to be
built at Nilore in the outskirts of Islamabad. At the time no national nuclear safety
legislation existed and the Ministry of Fuel and Natural Resources under whose
jurisdiction the PAEC fell, issued notifications about nuclear safety and radiation
protection on as required basis. Therefore, the IAEA was approached by the PAEC to
carry out a safety review of the reactor named Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor -1 or
PARR-1. The PAEC specially formed an ad hoc nuclear safety committee (NSC) to
grant approval for start-up of the reactor.74

In 1961, PAEC initiated a study to determine the possibility of building a

nuclear power plant. The economic aspects of the project were evaluated by an
international company, which submitted a report entitled the ‘Gibbs and Hill Report’75.
The report identified three possible sites for construction of a nuclear power plant, two
in West Pakistan and one in East Pakistan. Considerations for selection of a site include
communications infrastructure, availability of water and power and climatic conditions.
It also has to be located at a safe distance from the population and in a stable seismic
zone. Karachi was selected as the site since the IAEA in a separate study on the
prospects of nuclear power in Pakistan had also concluded that nuclear power could
provide a solution for growing power needs of Karachi. 76 Subsequently, an agreement
was signed with the Canadian government for the provision of a 137 MW (e) Canadian
Deuterium Uranium Reactor commonly known as the CANDU type reactor or a heavy
water reactor.77 A memorandum of understanding (MOU) stipulating the safety
procedures was also signed which called for a safety review to be conducted by an
Independent Pakistani Nuclear Safety Committee. The MOU also laid down the
procedures to be followed for safety evaluation and identified the project stages each of
which would require safety appraisals. These stages and the types of evaluation
required included: a) Site evaluation report at the time of site selection, b) Safety

73
The names of these American are not found in any study on the subject, while the Pakistani scientists
have been mentioned by M. Nasim and S.D. Orfi and included DrNazir Ahmad, Dr I.H. Usmani and Dr
Abdus-Salam.
74
M. Nasim and S.D. Orfi, op. cit., p. 68.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
This type of reactor runs on natural uranium fuel and heavy water is used both as a coolant and as a
moderator.
 227

analysis of Plant Design at the time of commencement of construction, c) Final Safety

Analysis Report at the time of beginning of fuel loading in the plant.78 However, in the
absence of an independent regulatory institution, the PAEC, which was also going to be
the operator of the plant, earmarked its own scientists and engineers who were not
directly involved in the project to carry out the safety review. This was at best a stop
gap and ad-hoc arrangement.

It was only in 1965 that Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Ordinance 79 was
promulgated providing a legal basis to the activities of the PAEC. The PAEC
Ordinance while authorising the PAEC to initiate projects related to promotion of
peaceful uses of atomic energy and to make necessary regulations with the approval of
the Government of Pakistan, did not envisage any specified organisation within the
PAEC to deal with safety and regulatory issues. The purpose of the ordinance as stated
in the preamble of the ordinance is:-

“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the establishment of an Atomic Energy

Commission for the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in
Pakistan, the discharge of international obligations connected therewith, the
execution of development projects involving nuclear power stations and
matters incidental thereto.”80

The ordinance was essentially meant to provide legal cover to the PAEC and
lays down the composition and functioning of the commission including the
appointment, terms of service of members and other administrative matters. It does not
specify either the responsibility or authority of the commission with regard to safety
and regulatory matters except a reference to international obligations related to peaceful
uses of atomic energy. The IAEA as per Article III.A.6 of its statutes is obliged to
establish safety standards. These standards are not legally binding on IAEA member
states who can adopt these standards voluntarily as part of their national regulations if
they so desire.81 Later on in early 1966, the PAEC established what was known as
Pakistan Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC). This seven member committee had a
Nuclear Safety and Licensing Division (NSLD) as its secretariat. Subsequently, the
PNSC approved the site evaluation and the Preliminary Safety Report for the Karachi
Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) and issued a construction permit to the supplier, the

78
Nasim and Orfi, op. cit.
79
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Ordinance 1965; (Ordinance No. XVII of 1965).
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid., http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/standards/spess.pdf
 228

General Electric Company of Canada.82 Later, as the construction progressed the PNSC
provided the ‘Final Safety Analysis Report’ to the company in October 1969 and then
gave step by step approval of the commissioning process, from the pre-start-up to
initial start-up and then to full power operation, through a specially designated three
member Commissioning Committee.83 This, improvised arrangement, however, could
not be a substitute for a full-fledged and autonomous regulatory authority which was
not established until January 2001 when Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority was
established through an Ordinance.84

7.4 Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Ordinance - 198485:

In January 1984, the Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

Ordinance was promulgated with the express purpose of providing for the regulations
of nuclear safety and radiation protection with its jurisdiction extending to whole of
Pakistan. The ordinance clearly defined important terms such as ‘ionizing radiation’,
‘licence’, ‘nuclear installation’, ‘nuclear material’, ‘radiation incident’, ‘radiation
apparatus’ which included beside other equipment x-ray machines used for medical,
surgical and dental diagnostics and treatment. The ordinance empowered the PAEC to
make and enforce ‘regulations’, ‘orders’ or ‘codes of practice’ for nuclear and radiation
safety and protection as it may deem necessary. It also authorised the PAEC to issue
licenses for the production, storage, disposal, trade in and use of nuclear substances and
radioactive materials while granting it the power to inspect all licensed installations to
ensure compliance with the existing regulations. It specified the requirement to obtain a
license before any person could;

a) “Acquire, manufacture, construct, install or operate any nuclear

installation or radiation apparatus,

b) Explore for, mine, mill, extract, use, sell, lease, buy, transfer, transport,
import, export, convert, enrich, process, reprocess, fabricate or dispose of
any nuclear substance or nuclear material or other prescribed substances,

c) Discharge radioactive waste,

d) Cause a nuclear powered vehicle to enter Pakistan, or

82
Nasim and Orfi, op. cit., p. 69.
83
Ibid.
84
The Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, (Registered No. M-302/L-7646), Published in Islamabad on
January 22, 2001.
85
The Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Ordinance 1984, Ordinance No. IV of 1984.
 229

e) Manufacture, sell, distribute or otherwise dispose of food that has been

treated or contaminated by ionizing radiation.”86

PNSRP Ordinance 1984 also authorised the PAEC to prescribe terms and
condition for any licensee to maintain financial protection for nuclear damage to cover
public liability claims and to require the establishment of an effective reporting system
in case of radiation accidents and preparation of plans to mitigate the effects of nuclear
incidents.87 More importantly, the ordinance prescribed offences and penalties in case
of contravention of the provisions of the ordinance. Any person found to be in non-
compliance with the terms of license would be liable to be punished with imprisonment
of up to seven years or a fine of one hundred thousand rupees or both. The courts could
take cognizance of an offence under the provisions of the ordinance only on a written
complaint by a person on behalf of the PAEC.88

7.5 Directorate of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (DNSRP) – 1985:

To fulfil the obligations and exercise the powers conferred upon it by the
PNSRP Ordinance 1984, the PAEC established a Directorate of Nuclear Safety and
Radiation Protection (DNSRP) in 1985. Nuclear Safety and Licensing Division that had
been part of the Pakistan Nuclear Safety Committee was merged into the newly
established directorate. Later on, PAEC formulated the Pakistan Nuclear Safety and
Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Regulations in 1990, which were duly notified through a
gazette notification of the Government of Pakistan dated September 12, 1990. These
regulations provided substance to the nuclear regulatory effort. However, due to lack of
public education and information on the subject the implementation of the regulations
initially met some resistance from the medical community which saw it as an
encroachment on their domain. The general public was also unaware of the hazardous
effects of overexposure to radiation such as the x-rays commonly used for diagnostic
purposes. This necessitated the initiation of a public education and awareness
programme about the hazards that can be caused by nuclear radiation and the
importance of protective measures against these.89

86
Ibid.
87
PNSRP Ordinance -1984, op. cit. Nuclear Incident means any incident that may happen at a nuclear
installation or during the operation of equipment using nuclear or radioactive materials that may cause
the leakage of harmful ionizing radiation which could threaten humans as well as the environment.
88
Ibid.
89
Nasim and Orfi, op. cit. p. 69.
 230

Amongst the major regulatory functions performed by the DNSRP were

registration and licensing of Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor – 2 (PARR-2). PARR-2
is a 27 KW research reactor which was built with Chinese assistance and is mainly used
for the production of radio-isotopes and neutron sources. This reactor is located at
Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) at Nilore, where
PARR-1was already located. PARR-1 which was originally a 5MW research reactor
was upgraded to 10 MW and also converted from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel
to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The upgraded PARR-1 was licensed for full
operation by the DNSRP in October 2000.90 In 1992 when an agreement was signed
between the Pakistani and Chinese governments for the construction of a Chinese
manufactured 320 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma on the eastern bank of river
Indus in Northern Punjab province, the DNSRP signed a protocol with its Chinese
counterpart for cooperation in the realm of nuclear safety. It also entered into an
agreement with Beijing Nuclear Safety Centre to seek assistance in the safety review of
technical reports that it will receive at various stages of construction and
commencement of operation of the plant.91 These arrangements with the Chinese
institutions are indicative of lack of indigenous expertise in the field of nuclear safety at
the time as well as reluctance of other advanced countries to cooperate with Pakistan
even in peaceful nuclear activities due to its nuclear weapons programme. Since this
was the first ever Chinese built nuclear power reactor exported to any other country the
Chinese must also have been keen to ensure that the reactor operates safely to establish
their credentials as a nuclear supplier.

In its effort to project DNSRP as an independent organization and to enhance its

status PAEC upgraded its director to the rank of Director General, detached it from
Member Technical PAEC and made him directly answerable to Chairman PAEC. But
these changes remained cosmetic in view of the fact that there were no commensurate
changes in the structure and capacity of DNSRP. Since the DNSRP remained within
the PAEC and under the control of Chairman PAEC it was difficult to establish its
credentials as an independent body amongst its international counterparts such as the
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which is an autonomous regulatory body
outside the purview of the Department of Energy (DOE).92

90
Nasim and Orfi, op. cit., p. 70.
91
Nasim and Orfi, op. cit., p. 70.
92
Ibid.
 231

7.6 Establishment of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Board (PNRB):

In early 1994, the PAEC had decided in principle to grant full autonomy to the
DNSRP to enable it to perform its assigned functions more effectively. As an interim
measure it was decided to set up Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Board (PNRB) and it
was envisaged that a fully autonomous regulatory body will be established within the
next five years.93 Apparently, the PAEC was moving towards the creation of an
autonomous regulatory body on its own volition to prepare the groundwork for the
forthcoming Nuclear Safety Convention. It is important to note here that diplomatic
negotiations to formulate an international nuclear safety convention had already been
underway since 1992 and the convention was approved in June 1994. As already
pointed out, Pakistan had signed the convention in September 1994 when it was opened
for signatures and ratified it in September 1997. Amongst other provisions the
convention required the contracting parties to establish autonomous regulatory
authorities. On the other hand, Pakistan was also expanding its nuclear power
infrastructure. A Chinese supplied nuclear power reactor was already under
construction and building of more reactors was being envisaged at the nuclear complex
at the Chashma site. PNRB at best was a halfway house and could not meet the criteria
for a fully independent regulator since it was still within the organisational structure of
the PAEC which was the only operator of nuclear plants in Pakistan. Moreover, the
PAEC Chairman remained the ex-officio chairman of the PNRB and its funding was
also controlled by the PAEC.94 A stage was however, set for the next phase in the
development of an independent nuclear regulatory framework.

7.7 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) Ordinance – 2001:

In order to completely separate the regulatory and operational roles in the

management of nuclear energy PNRB explored various options. In July 1997, the
Chairman PNRB tasked a three member committee of experts to prepare a draft law to
set up a new nuclear regulatory authority. The draft legislation prepared by the experts
committee was formally approved by the PNRB in February 1998. The draft was then
sent to the Prime Minister’s Secretariat for further processing. It was reviewed several

93
Ibid. Prime Minister’s Secretariat Notification issued at Islamabad on the 30 th of October, 1994 on the
subject of ‘Creation of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Board was published vide ‘The Gazette of Pakistan,
Extraordinary, Registered No. M-302, Karachi, November 24, 1994.
94
Nasim and Orfi, op. cit., p. 70.
 232

times in consultation with the technical as well as legal experts in the Law Ministry
before its finalisation.95 Finally, on 22nd of January, 2001, the Ministry of Law, Justice,
Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs issued a Presidential Ordinance, “to provide
for the establishment of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority for regulation of
nuclear safety and radiation protection in Pakistan and the extent of civil liability for
96
nuclear damage resulting from any nuclear incident.” The Ordinance stipulated the
establishment of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) as the designated
national authority to regulate the setting up and operation of civilian nuclear
installations, cater for protection against risks arising from any incident causing leakage
of radiation, determine the amount of civil liability in case of any damage caused to life
and property as a consequence of a nuclear incident and all other related matters.97 It
defined nuclear installations to include nuclear power reactors, nuclear fuel production
facilities, nuclear processing and reprocessing facilities, and nuclear storage sites.
These are all mainly civilian nuclear facilities and do not include military nuclear
installations including the plutonium production, uranium enrichment and weapons
fabrication and testing facilities. The ordinance, which came into force immediately,
extended to whole of Pakistan.

The PNRA Ordinance also laid down the composition of the authority and
essential qualifications and experience required for its chairman and members
including terms of service and tenure of their appointment. The headquarters of the
authority would be in Islamabad while it could establish regional offices as well. The
authority was granted the powers to establish one or more directorates to fulfil its
mandated obligations.

7.8 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA):

Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority is a fully autonomous body created

under the provisions of the PNRA Ordinance of 22nd January 2001. It has been closely
collaborating with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the US, the IAEA
and its Chinese counterparts. The PNRA envisions itself:-

“to become a world class regulatory body with highly trained, competent and
dedicated personnel working in unison with a zeal to foster a positive safety

95
Ibid, p. 71.
96
The Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, (Registered No. M-302/L-7646), Published in Islamabad on
January 22, 2001.
97
Ibid.
 233

culture in their licensees and regulate nuclear facilities to protect the public,
workers and environment from the harmful effects of radiation in a manner
that wins the confidence of all the stake holders viz. the public, the government
and the licensees.”98

The stated mission of PNRA is “to ensure safe operation of nuclear facilities and
to protect radiation workers, general public and the environment from the harmful
effects of radiation by formulating and implementing effective regulations and building
a relationship of trust with the licensees and maintain transparency in its actions and
decisions.”99

7.8.1 Organisational Structure and Roles of PNRA:

The PNRA has a Chairman, two full time members and seven part time
members all of whom are appointed by the Federal Government. The Chairman is
required to have a postgraduate degree, preferably a PhD, in physical or nuclear
sciences or engineering and technology from an internationally recognised university, a
work experience of at least 25 years in the relevant fields and should be a citizen of
Pakistan. The two full time members are also required to hold similar qualifications but
with a work experience of at least 20 years in the fields of radiation protection, nuclear
or reactor safety.100 Of the part time members two are required to hold qualifications
similar to the Chairman and full time members except that they should have a work
experience of 15 years. One member is supposed to be a medical doctor with
postgraduate degree in nuclear medicine, radiotherapy or radiation sciences with 15
years’ work experience. One member each is from the Ministry of Health and Pakistan
Environmental Protection Agency. One member is from PAEC with a standing similar
to the full time member of the commission. The Director General Strategic Plans
Division (DG SPD) is the ex-officio member. The authority has a Secretary who is a
non-voting member. The term of office of the Chairman is four years which can be
extended by another term of four years. Similarly, the full time as well as part time
members are also appointed for a term of four years at the expiry of which they can be
reappointed for another four years.

The PNRA Chairman is the chief executive of the authority and reports directly
to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The authority has an Executive Wing and a

98
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority National Report 2007.
99
Ibid.
100
PNRA Ordinance 2001, op. cit.
 234

Corporate Wing, each headed by a full time member who in turn report to the
Chairman. The executive wing has three technical directorates headed by Director
General (Technical) and three regional directorates headed by Director General
(Inspection and Enforcement). Three other projects i.e. Nuclear Security Action Plan,
Project for Dosimetry and Project for Environmental Monitoring also fall under the
purview of the executive wing. Both directors general report to Member Executive who
in turn reports to the Chairman PNRA. The corporate wing has seven directorates each
headed by its own director. All seven directorates come under a Director General
(Corporate), who in turn reports to Member Corporate.101

The purview of the responsibilities of PNRA extends from exploration/mining

of radioactive substances to their import, export, transportation, transfer, use and
storage as well as the disposal of radioactive sources that have completed their useful
life. This wide ranging mandate is often described by the PNRA officials as the
responsibility to oversee radioactive sources from ‘cradle to grave.’ The PNRA is the
designated licensing authority for any import or export of radioactive substances and
their subsequent use for medical, agriculture, industrial, educational or research
purposes. It ensures that the licensees have made adequate physical protection
arrangements and catered for sufficient insurance coverage to meet the liability in case
of a nuclear incident. It also has the authority to inspect all nuclear installations,
radiation generation equipment such as X-ray machines and radiation sources and
nuclear substances in storage to ensure that the provisions of the concerned regulations
are being fully complied with.102

The ordinance allows the PNRA to enter into cooperative arrangements and
agreements with other nuclear regulatory authorities and concerned international
organisations subject to government approval. Strict penalties have been prescribed
under the ordinance to deal with any person found to be in contravention to the
provisions of the sections 19 - 23 of the ordinance. Offences under the ordinance are
liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term of up to seven years, or a fine of up
to one million rupees or with both. Any person found to have filed a false return or
provided false information or prevented any official of PNRA from undertaking his
assigned duties shall be punishable with an imprisonment of up to one year, or with a
fine of 0.25 million rupees or both. Similarly, any operator found to be in violation of

101
PNRA Ordinance 2001, op. cit.
102
Ibid.
 235

the provisions of the rules and regulations framed under this ordinance would be liable
to a punishment of imprisonment of up to three years or a fine of 0.5 million rupees or
both. If a person fails to comply with or violates any provision of the ordinance or rules
and regulations made subsequent to the ordinance where no penalty is clearly defined
for that offence, he shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to six months or a fine
of 0.1 million rupees or both. The courts can only take cognizance of any offence under
the ordinance on the written complaint of an officer authorised for this purpose by the
PNRA.103

The applications by the intending importers and licensees are initially received
and reviewed by the regional nuclear safety directorates of PNRA. The review process
determines the credentials of the applicants. The licences and no objection certificates
are issued only after evaluation of the professional credentials of the applicant. The
responsibility for controlling the entry and exit of nuclear and radioactive substances
into and out of the country in the light of import and export procedures laid down by
the Ministry of Commerce and the regulations formulated by the PNRA lies with
Pakistan Customs.104

In the aftermath of 9/11, when the probability of an act of nuclear terrorism

appeared to be high, the PNRA moved quickly to devise and pronounce a series of new
measures in order to improve nuclear disaster management system to provide
protection for “the plant and society from hazards that could be man-made or natural.”
These included enhanced quality control and monitoring for both infrastructure and
equipment, creation of multiple physical barriers to prevent the release of radioactive
materials, radiation protection procedures, and procurement of equipment for disaster
mitigation. The PNRA also critically appraised the adequacy of resources in nuclear
facilities, including the availability of technically qualified manpower to deal with
emergency situations.105

7.8.1.1 Role and Functions of Nuclear Safety Directorate (NSD):

The Nuclear Safety Directorate (NSD) is located at the PNRA

Headquarters at Islamabad and is one of the more important directorates of the
executive wing. The NSD has been assigned to:-

103
PNRA Ordinance 2001, op. cit.
104
Kenneth Luongo and Naeem Salik, ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security’, Arms
Control Today, Arms Control Association, December 2007.
105
Ibid.
 236

 Formulate regulations, operating procedures and guidelines to be followed

by the operators of the Nuclear Power Plants.
 Issue licenses to nuclear power plants for operations or for carrying out any
modifications. Carry out regular safety reviews and re-license power plants
for life extension.
 Issue licenses and carry out inspections of industrial units involved in
manufacturing of equipment for nuclear facilities.
 Conduct periodic reviews and assess safety standards.
 Create a regulatory system for nuclear safety and ensure its uninterrupted
implementation.
 Carry out coordination with PNRA’s Regional Directorates in matters
related to nuclear safety.
 Maintain the latest and updated information with regard to nuclear safety
and ensure its sharing and dissemination with other departments within
PNRA.106

The NSD has been energetically performing its assigned tasks and has already
accomplished some important tasks including the planning and coordination of the
safety review of ‘Preliminary Safety Analysis Report’ prepared for the construction of
the second power plant (C-2) at the Chashma nuclear complex. NSD also relicensed the
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) to run on full power in 2007. The plant was
initially allowed to run on a reduced power level for two years after its life extension
and refurbishment. It also coordinated on behalf of the PNRA, the visits of IAEA’s
experts to review the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report related to C-2. Moreover, it
has laid down standards for issuance of licenses for industrial units involved in the
manufacturing of mechanical components used in nuclear plants. A case in point is
Heavy Mechanical Complex-3 (HMC-3) at Taxila, which manufactures reactor
containment vessels and other safety related equipment for nuclear power plants. It has
also been coordinating inspection activities by the PNRA, whenever Chashma nuclear
power plant unit-1 (C1) is shut down for refuelling purposes, besides making plans and
preparations for integrated safety review of all safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities in

106
www.pnra.org
 237

Pakistan. It has also awarded licenses to Reactor Operators and Shift Engineers of C-1
and K-1(Karachi-1) plants.107

7.8.3.2 Functions of Radiation Safety Directorate (RSD):

The Radiation Safety Directorate is primarily responsible for regulating and

overseeing the radiation safety and protection related issues. The directorate is tasked
with ensuring that radiation produced as a result of normal operations of nuclear
facilities and equipment remains below the minimum acceptable national standards.
The underlying purpose is to ensure that level of radiation emissions that can cause
harm to human health and the environment remains “As Low as Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA).” The RSD is headed by a Director and has a highly professional
staff with a majority of them holding post-graduate degrees in relevant fields of
physical sciences and medicine. In terms of its functioning the RSD works
independently just like the other technical directorates within the PNRA. It formulates
its technical recommendations only after a thorough assessment and evaluation of the
prevailing radiation safety environment in various licensed facilities. These
recommendations are then submitted for perusal and approval of the PNRA for
subsequent implementation as regulations.108

In terms of its radiation protection related work the RSD covers many diverse
areas including preparation of regulations and guidelines to facilitate the
implementation of these regulations by radiation users. It also evaluates plans prepared
by nuclear power plant operators for protection against radiation, medical applications
of radiation, use of radiation for purposes of research at the universities and use of
radiation sources by the industry, and to ensure adequate protection is provided against
work related exposure to radiation. The RSD also manages the National Radiation
Emergency Coordination Centre (NRECC) and can acquire the services of the experts
from other technical directorates of PNRA to constitute the ‘technical support group’ to
deal with any emergency situation. These experts will provide technical advice and
guidance on how to deal with the incident and contain the spread of radiation. The
technical support group and NRECC staff regularly participate in training exercises to
practise and further enhance their skills.109

107
Briefing of the author by senior PNRA officials at PNRA Headquarters in August 2012.
108
www.pnra.org
109
Ibid.
 238

The RSD also participates in joint international projects under the auspices of
IAEA, United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR), and International System of Occupational Exposure (ISOE). These
activities are aimed at gaining experience and learning from interactions with
international experts to improve the radiation protection arrangements at the national
level. It also benefits from IAEA programmes for the improvement in radiation safety
standards and radiation protection practices.

7.8.3.3 National Radiation Emergency Coordination Centre (NRECC):

One of the responsibilities of PNRA is to make sure that all the licensees have
made appropriate arrangements to deal with any serious nuclear or radiation
emergency. In this regard PNRA has developed necessary regulations for the
management of nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies entitled ‘PAK-914’.
These regulations are designed to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiation
accident. The National Radiation Emergency Coordination Centre (NRECC) has been
provided with necessary communication resources to enable it to communicate with
relevant national and international authorities in the event of an emergency. NRECC
remains operational round the clock to receive information about any emergency
without any delay. NRECC is managed by the Radiation Safety Directorate (RSD) and
acts as a secretariat to Chairman (PNRA) who has been designated as the National
Competent Authority for radiation related emergencies whether domestic or
international.110

NRECC constitutes the national focal point to meet national as well as

international obligations accruing from Pakistan’s accession to ‘International
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident’ (CENNA) and ‘Convention
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency’
(CACNARE). PNRA itself maintains its readiness to assist the licensees as well as the
authorities and regularly tests its emergency preparedness through periodic drills and
table top exercises. NRECC’s primary purpose is to facilitate communication with the
licensees, the administration and the concerned international organisations, to reduce
the damage to property and harm to the public and the environment to the minimum, in
the event of a radiological disaster. It is also required to provide immediate help and
advice in such eventualities. The primary responsibility for managing a nuclear or

110
www.pnra.org
 239

radiation accident lies with the licensees, for which purpose they are required to prepare
and rehearse emergency plans. PNRA provides assistance and advice and ensures
adequate emergency preparedness through regular drills and exercises involving all
stake holders.111

The actions required to be undertaken by the NRECC during an emergency are

as under:-

 It would receive information about the nature and scale of the emergency
including the likelihood of any national and/or trans-national consequences.
 It would verify and authenticate the accuracy of the information received and
determine the seriousness of the emergency.
 Immediately after receiving the information about an incident it would inform
all those in the NRECC chain of command about the information received.
 It would share without delay the information received with the licensee,
government authorities and concerned international agencies without
compromising the confidentiality of sensitive information.
 It would facilitate and co-ordinate the provision of assistance at the national as
well as international level in case it is required to do so.
 It would render technical advice to the National Competent Authority
(Chairman PNRA) on the advice and recommendations he will proffer to the
government about appropriate protective measures such as sheltering and
evacuation etc.
 It would also facilitate cooperation between the licensee, the local authorities
and international agencies.
 It would, in cooperation with concerned authorities, provide timely and reliable
information and briefings to the media.112

Since an appropriate response to an emergency mainly depends on the correct

categorisation of the emergency, the NRECC categorises the emergencies into two
broad types as under:-

 Emergency specific to nuclear installations e.g. site area emergency or general

emergency.

111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
 240

 Emergency not specific to nuclear installations e.g. a missing dangerous

radiation source or an accident during transportation of a radiation source,
etc.113

NRECC maintains a ‘Mobile Radiological Monitoring Laboratory’ (MRML)

and other radiological monitoring equipment. Supplies of essential emergency items are
also available at NRECC. The MRML is located at PNRA Headquarters in Islamabad
and can be activated on a few hours’ notice to support PNRA’s Regional Directorates,
or the licensees and/or the local administration.114

7.8.3.4 Transport and Waste Safety Directorate (WSD):

Transport and Waste Safety Directorate (WSD) of PNRA, as the name suggests,
deals with issues related to management of radioactive waste, safe transportation of
radioactive materials, physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear installations,
safety and security of radioactive sources in use at various facilities and
decommissioning of nuclear facilities. To fulfil these responsibilities it has created a
regulatory system which includes regulations, safety guidelines, and checklists for
safety inspections. It also ensures compliance with the regulations with the help of
regional directorates of PNRA.IAEA’s ‘Radiation Safety Infrastructure Appraisal’
(RaSIA) Mission of 2005, acknowledged the existence of a well- developed legal
regime with an autonomous regulatory authority which issues licenses for import and
use, carries out inspections and enforces the regulatory system for radioactive sources.
The system in vogue is in conformity with the internationally accepted standards.
Additionally, PNRA also guides the licensees to ensure that their operations are carried
out in such a way that they produce the minimum possible volume of radioactive
waste.115

Physical protection measures implemented by the operators at various nuclear

installations are regularly checked through on-site inspections. The licensees are
required to abide by the physical protection standards prescribed by IAEA document
INFCIRC/225/REV-4. WSD also maintains the nationwide database of Sealed
Radioactive Sources (SRSs). These sources are classified into five different categories
depending on their characteristics. It further classifies the sources into four categories

113
www.pnra.org and interviews of senior PNRA officials at Islamabad in August 2012.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
 241

on the basis of security requirements and keeps a track of the sources from their initial
import to their final disposal.116 The WSD collaborates with other concerned state
institutions not only to maintain control over radioactive sources and materials but also
to prevent any malicious act against facilities using these sources. With regard to the
import and export of radioactive sources WSD works in close harmony with the
Customs Department as well as the Ministry of Commerce. WSD works proactively to
disseminate information to the operators of radiation facilities to develop awareness
and to promote a safety culture. It also benefits from IAEA’s activities in this regard.117

7.8.3.5 Other Organs of PNRA:

Other directorates of PNRA which in their own right perform equally

significant work and facilitate the working of the above mentioned directorates include
Information Services Directorate (ISD), Policies and Procedures Directorate (PPD),
Human Resources Development Directorate (HRD), International Cooperation
Directorate (ICD) and Regulatory Affairs Directorate (RAD). PNRA has its own
Technical Support Organisation which is called Centre for Nuclear Safety (CNS). CNS
has a Directorate of Safety Analysis and a Directorate of Safety Review. PNRA has
also established a School for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SNRS) which runs
Postgraduate Diploma courses, specified short courses, refresher courses and
specialised training courses for its own employees as well as those of other stake
holders. It is in the process of setting up a School for Nuclear Security as well. It has
laid down ‘Safety Performance Indicators’ which are used as reference points for
evaluating the performance of the licensees. It also carries out ‘Self-Assessment of
Regulatory Effectiveness’. The results of this self-assessment are reflected in the
Annual Performance Review Reports. The PNRA also invites IAEA experts for peer
reviews and subjected itself to IAEA’s International Regulatory Review Team in
December 2003 for evaluation of its performance in the light of international
standards.118

7.8.4 Major Achievements of PNRA:

Over the last decade or so since the establishment of an autonomous regulatory

authority (PNRA) in January, 2001, it has made considerable progress in multiple areas

116
Ibid.
117
www.pnra.org and interviews of senior PNRA officials at Islamabad in August 2012.
118
Ibid.
 242

and has established its credentials as an effective regulatory body. One of the earliest
tasks performed by the PNRA was the relicensing of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant
(KANUPP) which had completed its designed life of 30 years in 2002. The PAEC was
of the view that since the plant is running safely it should be allowed to run while the
PAEC upgrades its safety systems and prepares it for relicensing. However, the PNRA
did not yield to this request and in the interest of safety ordered the plant to be shut
down until its safety upgrades were completed to its satisfaction and in line with
internationally recognised standards. As a result the plant remained shut for over two
and half years before it was issued a new operating licence and life extension.
Similarly, The PNRA has ordered the shutting down of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant
for weeks at a time until the safety issues raised by it were addressed by the operator. 119
While the exact nature of the safety issue which necessitated the plant to be closed
down remains confidential the episode illustrates the effectiveness of the regulatory
regime which does not compromise on safety standards. Though the purview of the
PNRA’s activities is confined to civilian nuclear facilities only, it has prepared security
and safety checklists for the military nuclear facilities as well. These check lists are
used as a guide by the SPD and the respective heads of those institutions to periodically
assess the state of safety and security within these facilities. The PNRA subscribes to
IAEA’s Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and applies it
for regulating the radioactive sources within the country.

A very significant achievement of the PNRA has been the development of a

National Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP). It is fully cognisant of the importance
of physical protection of nuclear installations and materials and the synergy between
nuclear safety and nuclear security. It may be pertinent here to recount some of the
salient aspects of the NSAP which has received the acclamation of the IAEA as a
model programme to be emulated by other states.

7.8.4.1 Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP):120

The programme was initiated in July 2006 at the behest of the Government of
Pakistan and was targeted to achieve its major objectives over the next five years. This
phasing of the plan allowed the distribution of expenditure over a period of five years
thereby reducing the budgetary pressures. The NSAP has not only enhanced the
confidence of the nuclear energy sector and industry in Pakistan but the international
119
Author’s personal recollection having dealt with the issue in his official capacity.
120
www.pnra.org and Luongo and Salik, Arms Control Today, December 2007, op. cit.
 243

community as reflected in the NTI Index for 2014 which recognised Pakistan’s nuclear
safety and security as the most improved amongst the nuclear states.121 The IAEA DG
Yukiyo Amano during a visit to Pakistan from March 10-12, 2014 also visited
Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence (CoE) for Nuclear Security and commended the high
level of professional excellence.122 The IAEA has also planned to run its regional
Radiation Safety Course for 2014 at Pakistan’s CoE.123 A team of IAEA experts stated
at the conclusion of a 12 day Integrated Regulatory Review Service that, “PNRA is an
independent and competent regulatory body, empowered with the full scope of
regulatory powers required by the IAEA standards and is provided sufficient resources
and the legislation and associated regulations provide a binding legal framework for
nuclear and radiation safety in Pakistan.”124 These statements by DG IAEA and senior
international experts are an acknowledgement of Pakistan’s seriousness in meeting its
international treaty obligations through the creation of an effective regulatory regime.
The NSAP has integrated all stake holders and concerned governmental institutions and
departments and has enhanced the preparedness and capabilities to deal with any
radiological emergency. The main priority areas of NSAP are:-

 Bringing all radiological sources under regulatory control. Carryout an

assessment of vulnerable facilities and assist in the efforts to address these.
Conduct inspections of all sources whether they are being used, are in storage or
being transported. Carryout biannual security assessments and follow these up
to ensure that its recommendations are being implemented. Re-evaluate the
existing protection arrangements around various facilities and render advice,
guidance and training for further augmenting these.
 Setting up a Nuclear Safety and Security Training Centre to run training courses
on nuclear security, physical protection of radioactive materials, emergency
preparedness, operating of detection equipment, recovery operations, and border
monitoring. The training is being imparted to PNRA personnel as well as the
first responders in case of an emergency, including officials from customs,

121
NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index- Building Assurance, Accountability and Action,
www.ntiindex.org
122
Visit of DG IAEA TO Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security, ISPR Press Release No.
PR53/2014-ISPR of 12 March 2014. Also see ‘DG IAEA visits nuclear Centre of Excellence,’ The News,
Islamabad, March 13, 2014.
123
Information shared with the author by senior SPD officials in March 2014.
124
‘IAEA Mission Concludes Peer Review of Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Framework,’ IAEA Press
Release 2014/09. Available at
file:///G:/IAEA%20Mission%20Concludes%20Peer%20Review%20of%20Pakistan's%20Nuclear%20Re
gulatory%20Framework.htm
 244

border control agencies, local administration, and law enforcement agencies.

Several hundred personnel have already undergone this training.
 As part of the NSAP a National Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination
Centre (NuSECC) has been established at Islamabad to coordinate with relevant
government agencies, and PNRA’s regional directorates. Three additional
regional directorates have been created in addition to those already existing at
Karachi, Chashma, and Islamabad. A mobile lab has already been acquired and
efforts are at hand to procure five more to be provided to regional directorates
and inspectorates.
 NSAP also aims at locating and securing any orphan radioactive sources that
may be present in the country. Orphan sources are defined as “sources not under
regulatory control, either because they have never been under regulatory control
or because they have been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred
without proper authorization.” The PNRA’s campaign to locate all sources
through physical and nonphysical searches and public outreach is already
underway.
 Another objective laid down for the NSAP was deployment of radiation
detection portals at major entry and exit points in the country to prevent any
illicit movement of radioactive sources into or out of the country and to help the
border control agencies to respond to a radiological emergency in a timely
manner for which they are being provided with requisite training.

7.8.5 Analysis:

The preceding overview of the evolution of a nuclear regulatory regime in

Pakistan over the course of five decades indicates a slow and gradual learning process
which led to the realisation that a fully autonomous regulatory authority separate from
the operators of nuclear plants was an essential requirement for safe and secure running
of these plants. The importance of public as well as environmental safety was also
recognised. This learning process gained some momentum as the nuclear power
programme started to expand in the 1990s. It was also helped along by the international
treaty agreements such as the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
(CPPNM) and the Nuclear Safety Convention which specifically required the
establishment of an autonomous regulatory authority by states parties to the
convention. A further urgency was instilled by the major changes in global security
 245

perceptions following the 9/11 incidents. That may explain the discernible acceleration
of the process since the promulgation of the PNRA Ordinance in January 2001 and the
establishment of The PNRA. In fact, the body of regulatory work carried out by PNRA
since 2001 is far greater than what had been achieved by its predecessors in almost four
decades. It may also be pointed out that the PNRA’s establishment and growth
coincided with the establishment of the National Command Authority (NCA) with SPD
as its permanent secretariat which led to the reorganisation and reform of existing
nuclear management structures and the building of new institutional mechanisms. This
holistic institutional development and learning has certainly helped the rapid growth of
the PNRA and the nuclear regulatory regime in Pakistan.

The establishment and maturing of the PNRA is clearly indicative of learning

about the importance of nuclear safety and the need for establishment of an effective
regulatory regime in the backdrop of construction of several major nuclear energy
projects. The PNRA’s efforts has raised awareness and has helped the development of a
safety and security culture amongst the strategic organisations and institutions involved
in the management of the nuclear programme an aspect which though not completely
absent had not been accorded due importance. The learning has mainly happened at the
institutional level both in the relevant civilian as well as military institutions. This
learning has been partly out of necessity in view of the ongoing and projected
expansion of nuclear energy in Pakistan and partly by the international obligations
accruing from treaties such as the Nuclear Safety Convention as well as the
deteriorating internal and external security environment.

In view of the fact that PNRA has proven its credentials as an effective and
independent regulatory authority by instituting internationally recognised safety
standards and implementing these strictly, developing very close cooperative
relationship with the IAEA and developing a substantial body of regulations besides
preparing national plans for dealing with radiation emergencies the learning in the
nuclear regulatory domain can easily be categorised as ‘extensive.’
 246

Chapter-8

Conclusion

This thesis contends that states that acquire nuclear weapons capabilities learn over
time to manage these capabilities irrespective of the fact that this learning falls in the
category of normative or non-normative learning. Given the cognitive nature of learning it
is hard to measure the magnitude of this learning but one can have a fairly accurate
assessment of the nature and quality of learning from the discernible manifestations of
learning. Such manifestations of learning are found in the form of establishment of purpose
built institutions for command and control, safety and security, export controls and
regulation of nuclear operations. Further evidence of this learning can be found in the
evolution of doctrinal precepts, public articulation of nuclear policy by the leadership,
crisis behaviour of states and nuclear related legislation. Nuclear learning however, does
not follow a linear progression according to a long term plan deliberately laid out at the
very beginning. Since nuclear policies are sensitive to changes in the security landscape
they remain dynamic in nature and adjust and adapt to changes in the threat environment.
The learning process therefore, is a mix of learning by doing or experiential learning, trial
and error learning, and adaptation to meet various exigencies as is evident from the
experience of the established nuclear weapons powers through the Cold War years and
beyond.

In this regard Pakistan provides an interesting case study due to the unconventional
nature of its nuclear development and the general disquiet of the international community
with acquisition of nuclear capability by a state which is perceived to be politically and
socially volatile. Pakistan started its nuclear programme in the early 1970s coinciding with
the newly established rules of the nuclear game through the entry into force of the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and the beginning of an ever expanding technology
control regime. Pakistan was, therefore, seen to be going against the prevailing
international norms. Consequently Pakistan faced an array of sanctions, political and
diplomatic pressures and negative media images. Many Pakistanis have deeply ingrained
feelings that their country has been subjected to an unfair treatment unlike other countries
with comparable nuclear programmes outside the purview of the existing non-proliferation
regime. This difficult historical experience has predisposed Pakistan to adopt certain
 247

policies and thus impacted its nuclear learning process. However, through the difficult
development phase Pakistan learnt two important lessons. First, it learnt that national
security or economic interests of the global powers can always trump their non-
proliferation concerns as was evident from the reprieve Pakistan won during the Afghan
war against the Soviets through the 1980s. Second, a lesson driven home was that if a
nation is determined to achieve an objective and willing to pay the price, it will ultimately
surmount all difficulties and hardships and succeed in reaching its goals. Pakistan’s
learning process was hastened by developments such as 9/11 and the revelation of the
proliferation network run by AQ Khan and the marked deterioration in its external as well
as internal security environment. Pakistan also learnt its lessons from the Kargil Crisis of
1999 which occurred at a time when the lessons had not been adequately grasped from the
nuclearisation of the security environment. This crisis learning was reflected in discernible
maturity in Pakistan’s conduct as a state in dealing with the 2001-02 Military Crisis as well
as the 2008 Mumbai Crisis.

During the development stage of its programme, to deflect international pressure

Pakistan also learnt the art of denying the existence of a nuclear weapons programme,
while periodically sending out ambiguous signals of its growing technological capabilities
to deter any military adventurism by India. However, this policy while alleviating the
external pressures stifled any public discourse on issues related to a prospective nuclear
doctrine that would be required as and when the nuclear capability is operationalised. As a
result after the nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan had to quickly devise a nuclear doctrine
that would also provide guidelines for the configuration of nuclear forces and help
establish developmental targets. Though Pakistan has chosen not to pronounce its nuclear
doctrine its broad contours have been alluded to by responsible state functionaries from
time to time. Such statements which now appear in the form of press releases at the
conclusion of the meetings of the National Command Authority or after the missile flight
tests show increasingly mature and nuanced articulation of doctrinal goals. In essence
Pakistani nuclear doctrine is aimed at maintaining a credible minimum deterrence and to
deter aggression at all levels of conflict including conventional war. Of late, Pakistan has
also tested short range battlefield nuclear weapons in response to India’s ‘Cold Start’ or
‘Proactive’ war doctrine. This shows some dynamism in the nuclear doctrinal thinking
thereby allowing it to adapt to changing security environment. This particular development
 248

is seen by many observers, including some within the country, as a destabilising

development and could therefore be termed as non-normative learning or ‘unlearning,’
because Pakistan had initially eschewed the development of battlefield nuclear weapons
having learnt of their futility from the US and Russian experience. From a non-existent
doctrine in 1998 to integration of nuclear weapons into military doctrine by synergising the
conventional and nuclear war doctrines, incorporating the nuclear factor in curricula of
military’s higher learning institutions, and testing these concepts through war games shows
that considerable amount of learning has taken place.

In the pre-1998 period there were no formal command and control mechanisms and
only an informal arrangement involving the President, the Prime Minister, the Army Chief
and senior scientists was available for decision making. After the overt demonstration of
its nuclear capability however, Pakistan felt the urgency to establish an effective and viable
nuclear command and control system in order to establish its credentials as a responsible
nuclear state. This led to the establishment of a three tiered nuclear command and control
structure. At the apex of this structure is the National Command Authority (NCA) which is
chaired by the Prime Minister and has four key cabinet ministers besides the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three services chiefs. NCA’s decision making and
implementation is carried out with the help of a permanent secretariat known as the
Strategic Plans Division (SPD) which is headed by a three star general and includes
officers from all three services. The third tier of nuclear command and control consists of
three services strategic force commands which are custodians of the delivery systems while
the warheads and operational control remain with the NCA. This elaborate institutional
structure which has grown from a modest beginning in February 2000 is the visible
manifestation of learning in this regard while intangible learning in the form of
development of standard operating procedures and routines is difficult to measure. The
system of extended tenures of duty and overlap between successive directors seems to have
worked well to develop an institutional memory and a pool of expertise. However, a
downside of this arrangement is the danger of succumbing to ‘group think,’ that can curb
fresh ideas and diversity of opinion, which needs to be guarded against.

During the course of interviews conducted in Pakistan with a representative group

of civilian and military respondents in July/August 2012, the issue of civil-military
 249

equation in the nuclear stewardship remained a divisive one. There was no agreement
amongst respondents as to the respective roles of the military and civilian leadership in the
nuclear policy/decision making. The military respondents felt that the civilians have a fair
representation in the NCA and they play an effective role in policy making while the
civilians, barring a few exceptions, feel that the decision making is dominated by the
military and the civilians do not play a meaningful role. However, a variety of reasons
were proffered for the ineffectiveness of the civilian role in nuclear decision making. One
group of respondents believed that it is a reflection of the existing civil-military imbalance
in Pakistan wherein as a result of successive periods of military rule, the military has
become dominant in all aspects of national security policy and the same applies to the
nuclear policy as well. Others felt that the inability of the civilian leadership to play their
due role in nuclear decision making process is mainly due to their own ineptitude, lack of
effort on their part to improve their knowledge and understanding of the issues, tendency
to use nuclear capability for achieving political ends, low priority given to nuclear policy
making in their political agenda and therefore, a readiness to abdicate their responsibility to
the military. A few however, felt that civilian understanding of the issues though not up to
the mark at the moment is improving and their role and representation is no different from
the situation in other advanced nuclear powers. According to this view point civilians are
only required to provide broad policy guidelines while the military is responsible to take
care of technical and operational issues as is the system in vogue in most countries around
the world.

The civilian leadership is however, entangled in a complex web of socio-political

and economic problems. It has neither time nor inclination to focus on nuclear policy
making and is resigned to concede the leading role to the military. The manifestation of
this lack of interest is the fact that the last political government did not appear to be
mindful of the fact in assigning cabinet portfolios that certain ministers were going to sit
on the nuclear high table. The current government seems to be oblivious of the importance
of proper civilian representation in the NCA by not appointing the foreign and defence
ministers to begin with and still not having a full time foreign minister a year and a half
into their tenure. Nor have the politicians pondered over the implications for nuclear
stewardship during the term of the interim government which runs the country for three
months or so prior to national elections.
 250

Pakistan’s perpetual political instability and weak governance has always given rise
to speculation about its ability for safe keeping of its nuclear assets. In the past decade or
so the spill over of war in neighbouring Afghanistan and the growing incidence of
terrorism and extremism within the country have given rise to renewed concerns about
nuclear safety and security in Pakistan. This combined with serious gaps in the security
system which had allowed AQ Khan to run his nuclear proliferation business unimpeded
had further accentuated the worries about the inadequacy of the nuclear security. The
initial structure of NCA had included a brigadier designated as ‘Advisor Security NCA’
with a few dozen serving and retired personnel at his disposal. However, the
transformation of the security environment after 9/11, the discovery of AQ Khan network
and the growing threat of domestic terrorism combined together to infuse a sense of
urgency in this matter. As a result a new security division was created with a two star
general at the helm and the recruitment of its manpower, training and equipment was
completely overhauled. Bilateral cooperation with the US in the form of sharing of
information, provision of training and financial assistance helped the process to proceed
rapidly. The specially recruited manpower now being trained at a purpose built training
academy has grown to over 25,000 personnel and is likely to reach a figure of 28,000 in
the next two to three years. An elite rapid response force capable of reaching any trouble
spot anywhere in the country within half an hour has also been created. Moreover, to guard
against indiscretions by scientists, engineers and security personnel assigned to sensitive
areas of the programme, such personnel are now covered by a Personnel Reliability
Programme (PRP). The PRP is meant to prevent the recurrence of AQ Khan’s incident as
well as counter any potential insider threat. The learning curve in nuclear safety and
security appears to be distinctly steep and has recently been recognised by the NTI nuclear
Security Index 2014, which termed Pakistan’s nuclear security as most improved among
nuclear states. The Director General of IAEA during a visit to Pakistan in March 2014
visited its Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security and appreciated the high standards of
professionalism at the related training facilities.

International obligations accruing out of Pakistan’s accession to the International

Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1997 and the Convention on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in 2000 as well as the enhanced threat of radiological and
nuclear terrorism in the wake of 9/11 also led Pakistan to tighten the safety and security of
 251

its civilian nuclear infrastructure. The learning in this domain started with the
establishment of an independent regulatory authority in the form of the Pakistan Nuclear
Regulatory Authority (PNRA) in January 2001. The learning curve in this regard has been
fairly steep with the development of a body of legislation and regulations along with the
establishment of training and oversight institutions some of which have now evolved into a
Centre of Excellence (CoE) for nuclear security training. These developments have
received international recognition as mentioned above.

Prior to 1998 Pakistan had not paid much attention to the development of an
effective nuclear export controls system because it did not consider itself a nuclear
exporter. The need for a comprehensive export control mechanism was felt after 1998
when the need to bring the nuclear programme under effective oversight and control was
felt. Consequently, an inter-ministerial committee was formed to develop comprehensive
legislation. However, this process remained stuck in the bureaucratic red tape until the AQ
Khan episode brought to light the weaknesses of the existing system. It became obvious
that the system existing at the time had utterly failed to check the illegal technology
transfers and it also lacked the capacity to punish the people involved in illicit activities
should a decision be taken to proceed against them. Around the same time the UNSC
passed resolution 1540 which made it mandatory for all UN member states to bring their
export control legislations and implementation mechanisms at par with the international
standards irrespective of the fact whether any country had the capacity to export nuclear
technology or not. These developments hastened the process and a comprehensive export
control law was passed in September 2004. Pakistan has submitted detailed reports to the
1540 committee beginning October 2004 and has also offered to provide assistance in
developing export control laws to countries which do not have any experience or expertise
in the field. Pakistan, itself, during the course of development of its own legal instruments
had sought advice from countries like the US and Japan in order to learn from their greater
experience in the field. The existing export control laws with associated control lists,
implementation rules and regulations and oversight and enforcement mechanisms in the
form of a high powered oversight board and a Strategic Export Controls Division housed
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meet the accepted international standards. Learning in
this particular field is also reckonable with requisite institutional and legal basis firmly in
place.
 252

A clear upward learning curve is discernible in the legislative field. There is an

impressive list of new nuclear specific legislations. Prominent among these laws are the
NCA law, which provides legal cover to the activities of the NCA and governs the conduct
of thousands of employees in various strategic organisations and SPD itself, the PNRA
Ordinance, which established PNRA as an autonomous body to oversee nuclear and
radiation safety, and the Export Control Law, which regulates the export of sensitive
materials and technologies. However, this legislative process has been mainly driven by
the SPD and the laws were drafted through an inter-ministerial process. The end product
was then either enacted as an Ordinance or passed as an Act of Parliament. In case of the
NCA Law it was first promulgated as an Ordinance in December 2007 and later passed by
the parliament as an act in 2010. Neither the legal fraternity nor the civil society has
evinced much interest in this process. They have not looked at these pieces of legislation
critically with a view to point out weaknesses or to suggest improvements. The academia
has also not demonstrated any desire to understand or to evaluate these laws.

There has been a visible effort to create a critical mass of academic analysts with
requisite understanding of nuclear policy related issues and most university departments
are running basic courses related to the subject in international relations and defence
studies departments. The National Defence University has even started a dedicated
department which runs post-graduate courses in the discipline of nuclear studies. In recent
years a number of books written by Pakistani scholars on nuclear issues have also been
published and some serious articles have appeared in research publications. The media’s
performance has been inconsistent. On the one hand it has shown greater understanding
and displayed a greater degree of maturity while dealing with nuclear matters, while on the
other hand it has failed in its responsibility to educate the general public about the serious
ramifications of nuclearisation of the South Asian region. A common man simply loves the
bomb, considering these as bigger and more powerful bombs no different from the
conventional bombs and is unaware of the devastating and long term consequences of any
use of nuclear weapons. This public affinity with the nuclear weapons is then exploited by
the politicians to gain political mileage. Ironically, this also constrains their ability to
control the trajectory of the nuclear programme because if they curtail any aspect of
nuclear development or disapprove of testing or fielding of a new weapon system they will
be perceived to be compromising on national security or yielding to external pressure.
 253

Lack of public understanding of the consequences of a nuclear war could also generate
unwarranted pressures for the decision makers during a crisis which would be a very
dangerous situation.

Pakistan has not evolved as a ‘normal nuclear state,’ as one expert 1 remarked, as
compared to India or any other nuclear power. This has happened because of the combined
impact of external and internal challenges. The origin of both of these factors can be found
in the so called ‘Global War on Terror’ in which Pakistan has been an important player. As
a result Pakistan has been and continues to be under international scrutiny over the safety
and security of its nuclear assets. The deteriorating internal security situation has not only
created pressures internally, but has also fed into adverse perceptions abroad about
Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons and installations. These stresses and
strains have had both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side these have
helped accelerate the learning process which in turn has hastened the building of command
and control, safety and security and export controls mechanisms. While on the negative
side the perpetual international scrutiny and criticism has resulted in the tendency on part
of the nuclear establishment to shut itself to any alternative views due to the paranoia
resulting from continuous vilification and the anxiety about the possibility of a hostile
action against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. This has also caused a hardening of Pakistani
positions in nuclear diplomacy at the multilateral negotiating forums.

Seen from the level of analysis perspective, there appears to be sufficient evidence of
learning at the individual level especially amongst the academia. However, the greatest
amount of learning seems to have taken place at the organisational level, though that is
unevenly distributed between military and civilian institutions. The reason for greater
learning in the military organisation can be attributed to its more efficient institutional
structure and professional ethos as well as the fact that for the bulk of the time since 1998
Pakistan remained under military rule. There are also indications of some governmental
and state learning which is evident from the body of legislations that have been enacted
and a decrease in nuclear rhetoric. Amongst the general public the level of even the
‘factual learning’ is not up to the desired level due to low literacy rates as well as lack of
any concerted effort on part of the government or the media to educate the people.

1
Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers,’ Oxford, Routledge, 2014.
 254

Amongst the politicians the standard of both factual as well as ‘inferential learning’ leaves
much to be desired, due to a general lack of interest, lack of effort to enhance their
competence and low priority of the issue on the political agenda.

An important conclusion one can draw from the preceding discussion is that the
process of ‘nuclear learning’ as hypothesised by the academic experts does not follow the
same pattern in real life situations. It is apparent in case of Pakistan, and there is no
evidence to suggest that it is any different in other nuclear states, that there is no
overarching framework or blue print to be followed systematically over a period of time. In
reality, the process does not follow a linear pattern but unfolds in the form of a series of
haphazard steps taken by different stake holders in response to the ever changing security
environment and the unanticipated challenges posed by internal as well as external
developments. It is hard to characterise the responses as a proof of learning or adaptation to
a dynamic environment. The whole phenomenon would in fact be a combination of
learning and adaptation without any clear cut distinction or a precise framework.

The interviews revealed a clear divide between the military respondents, civilian
officials and younger scholars and analysts on the one hand and the senior academics and
analysts on the other. While the former appeared to be more upbeat and confident of the
positive trajectory of learning, the latter while acknowledging the progress made so far
were less enthusiastic with a hint of scepticism in their views. The politicians interviewed
clearly recognised the higher degree of learning within the military and were critical of the
politicians’ inability and lack of effort to learn. Most of the academic experts also seemed
to concur with this view. While the civilian bureaucrats saw their role in policy making as
significant, some respondents saw the civilian input into decision making as
inconsequential. While some interviewees lamented the lack of purposeful institution
building in the civilian domain, others thought that such institutions existed in the form of
government funded think tanks, but conceded that these were not being utilised optimally.
In terms of learning in the legislative domain, a knowledgeable legal expert saw
appreciable achievements in the field and a significant amount of learning. 2 There was also
a general consensus that learning by the general public including the media leaves much to
be desired. The media only takes up these issues whenever international media runs some

2
Interview with respondent ‘N’ at Islamabad in August 2012.
 255

story about Pakistan’s nuclear programme but the discussions usually lack professionalism
and technical understanding, are not well informed and are rhetorical in nature. Such media
discourse only helps sensationalise the issues rather than promoting a sober and informed
understanding.

The preceding paragraphs have highlighted the fact, that considerable amount of
learning of various types such as factual, inferential, experiential, perceptual, crisis and
imitative has taken place in Pakistan at different levels of analysis. However, viewed from
the stand point of ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ learning it appears that much of the learning that
has taken place in Pakistan since 1998 can be categorised under the ‘simple learning’
rather than ‘complex learning.’ While Pakistan seems to have readjusted the means to
achieve its national objectives especially after Kargil, there is no clear evidence to suggest
that a comprehensive policy overhaul has taken place to re-evaluate the means – ends
relationship nor is there any indication that any reappraisal of national aims and objectives
has taken place to modify the national objectives. Pakistan, however, is not alone in this
regard as the experience of other nuclear powers also suggests that whereas it is quite
common to see readjustment in the means, it is rare to see any effort to substantively
modify the national goals and objectives. In South Asia, India’s approach in dealing with
its territorial disputes either with China or with Pakistan has not undergone any reckonable
transformation after the nuclearisation of its security environment. Similarly, in the United
States President Obama’s nuclear policy may appear to be more nuanced in articulation but
in substance it is no different from the Bush era nuclear policy. Given Pakistan’s volatile
internal and external security environment and persistent political instability it would be
unrealistic to expect any significant advance along the complex learning curve in the near
future.

The following table summarises the degree of learning across various nuclear
policy domains. However, this is at best a subjective representation of learning given the
difficulty in precisely measuring or quantifying learning which is cognitive by nature.
 256

Table Summarising Degree of Nuclear Learning in Pakistan

Domains

Degree of Learning

Low Medium High

(Minimal Adaptation) (Moderate Learning) (Extensive Learning)

Nuclear Doctrine Medium.

Command & Control Medium.

Safety & Security High

Export Control Regime High

Nuclear Regulatory High

Regime
 257

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