FAMILY LAW II
CASE COMMENTARY
Rishabh Munjal
PRN: 18010223039
Division: D; Batch 2018-23
Programme: B.A. LL.B
Symbiosis Law School
Symbiosis International (Deemed) University
March, 2020
Under the Guidance of
Ms. Deepali Sahoo
(Assistant Professor)
In The Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Appeal (civil) 4838 of 1999, decided on 6 May, 2005
Vellikannu vs R. Singaperumal & Anr AIR 2005 SC 2587
(Before Ashok Bhan, A.K. Mathur JJ.)
INTRODUCTION
In ancient and pristine Hindu Law, the commission of a sin such as murder had the
effect of rendering the perpetrator a ‘patita’ or a denounced or degraded
individual. This degradation had multifarious consequences, including a loss of the
right of inheritance. The application of this principle in modern law is best given by
the Latin maxim, “Nemo Ex Suo Delicto MelioremSuam Conditionem Facere
Potest”, which literally translated that no one must be allowed to derive any
advantage, or improve his condition, through his own wrong. Therefore, the
driving force behind this principle becomes the rule of justice and equity. It has
been held that it is a principle of general policy 1. However, an attempt has been
made towards the codification of this principle in Section 25 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. It is taken as established law that a murderer cannot
succeed to the estate of his or her victim. Clearly, a disqualification is justified in
such cases.
The honourable High Court of Madras has held in Sarvanabhaba v. Sellamma 2 that
a distinction between inheritance and testamentary succession to the deceased’s
estate by his murderer doesn’t exist, and the murderer is not entitled to the
property bequeathed to him under the will. Thus the principle of the section
applies to testamentary succession as well.
1
Biro v. Banta Singh AIR 1980 P&H 164
2
(1972) 2 MLJ 49.
In the given case, however, the tussle was between a strict interpretation of S. 25,
which would only bring succession under its ambit, and that of a broader definition
that was in consonance with principles of justice and equity one that even
accepted the doctrine of survivorship, i.e., coparcenery property. It has been
observed, specifically with respect to statutes concerning inheritance that any
deliberation must not be in contradiction to established jurisprudential principles 3.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
FACTS
The appellant and respondent are both residents of Melur taluk within the Madurai
district of Tamil Nadu. The respondent had married the appellant in 1970 and they
were living in the respondent-husband’s home as man and wife when 2 years
later, on 10.10.1972, the respondent murdered his father, Ramasami Konar. He
was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for life imprisonment.
The conviction was subsequently confirmed after an appeal but the sentence was
reduced. Due to this reason, the plaintiff was released from prison in July 1975.
The appellant then lived with the respondent for some time, but was then driven
out of the house. Thereafter, a divorce had taken place between the two parties
and the appellant was remarried to another person. The bone of contention in the
case arose when the appellant, before her second marriage, filed a suit before the
Court of the District-Munsif claiming that she was entitled to the properties of
Ramasami Konar. She had further argued that by virtue of Sections 25 read with
Section 27of the Hindu Succession Act, the respondent had been disqualified as a
legal heir and therefore, only she had a right to claim the properties.
She based this claim on the nebulous fact that the scheduled properties were
coparcenery in nature and they devolved through survivorship. The phrasing of
Section 25 mentions inheritance only through succession. Thus, a question of law
does indeed arise in the situation. The appellant-wife had argued that by virtue of
3
Kenchava v. Girimallappa AIR 1921 Bom 270
section 27 read with section25, the respondent-husband must be deemed to have
died before the question of inheritance arose, and she, being the only legal heir
alive, would have the right to inherit the entire estate of the deceased. The
appellant had prayed for the relief of declaration based on the same.
PROGRESSION OF CASE
The original suit was filed in the District Munsif’s Court by the plaintiff-wife. She
had petitioned the honourable court to direct the first defendant (husband) and
the second defendant (a tenant cultivating on the estate) to surrender the
possession of the estate to her ‘without let or hindrance’. She had also demanded
the profits accruing from the land the money had been garnered from the
cultivation of the same in the intervening period. Lastly, she had asked for a
decree for partition, claiming half a share over the lands.
The trial court, in its decision, held that the properties were in fact joint-family
properties, but a decree for half share was granted in favour of the plaintiff-wife.
The case was then taken in appeal to the lower Appellate Court which confirmed
the same but held that the decree passed by the Munsif’s Court would be treated
as a preliminary decree - one which declares the rights and liabilities of the parties
leaving the actual result to be worked out in further proceedings. It also said that
the appellant must be treated as non-existent, meaning that the plaintiff-wife
would become a Class 1 heir under Schedule 1 of the Succession Act. Therefore,
the Court had declared, the right of succession over the property was devolved on
the plaintiff and the husband’s appeal was dismissed.
In the High Court of Madras’ decision of 1997, it went undisputed that the
properties were in fact jointly-owned and all the concerned persons were governed
by Mistakshara Hindu Law. The honourable court held that the wife was clearly not
entitled to inherit, as she could only have claimed this right as a widow if there
was succession to the estate of the victim. Since there was no succession involved
in the matter, the deeming provision that the husband had died before his father
wouldn’t apply. Thus she couldn’t claim as the widow of his pre-deceased son. The
Supreme Court, in its decision, upheld the High Court’s decision and further held
that the neither the murderer-son, nor any of his stock (his wife, or son) can be
allowed to inherit the property based on the principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
1. Whether the honourable High Court of Madras was right in its decision to
disinherit the appellant?
2. Whether such disinheritance would cover enlargement of interest by
survivorship?
JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
RATIO OF THE JUDGEMENT
By virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the respondent
cannot lay any claim to the property of his father. Using principles of justice,
equity and good conscience, when the son can’t inherit, then his whole stock,
including his wife, can’t inherit. Thus the wife has no right to any share in the
property as her husband, through whom she could have claimed, has been
disinherited.
ANALYSIS
With regard to the first issue, the court had to decide between two contentions.
One of them was that the appellant-wife being the sole female survivor of the
joint-family property, she was entitled to the estate as per Section 6 of the Hindu
Succession Act read with Section 8 of the same.
Relevant extract of section 6 says:
Section 6: Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. When a male Hindu dies
after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in
a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in
accordance with this Act.
The honourable Supreme Court found that the above Section coincided with the
second contention: that the property concerned would devolve through
survivorship upon the surviving coparceners. Even under the pristine Hindu Law, if
the property concerned is coparcenery in nature, then no question of ‘succession
to the estate’ will arise between coparcerners, unless the proviso to Section 6 is
made applicable:
Proviso: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative
specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who
claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara
coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the
case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship.
However, it was observed that the deceased had left behind no such relative as
specified in the proviso, and it would therefore not be applicable.
The Court had then reasoned that survivorship in any instance of coparcenery
would imply a unity of ownership, including a fluctuating interest and common
possession4. In such a case, the share of any coparcener cannot be predicated
without a partition having taken place. In the current scenario, when the
disqualified (notionally deceased) son’s share itself is not fixed, then his wife had
no legal basis in laying claim to half of the property.
The question that the Courts later answered was whether the sole male survivor
(and consequently his kin), having incurred a disqualification, can lay claim to the
4
Satyajeet Desai (rev.), D.F. Mulla, PRINCIPLES OF HINDU LAW, Vol. I, 18th ed. 2001, pp. 284-285
property according to Mitakshara Hindu Law. This, the honourable Supreme Court
had answered based on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, and
as a measure of public policy. A number of cases were considered to arrive at the
decision that he wouldn’t be entitled to any property based on the above
measures. Ultimately, the Court propounded that the murderer should be treated
as non-existent, and not as one who forms the stock for a fresh line of descent.
The Court had then referred to the object and reasons of the Joint Select
Committee on the Hindu Succession Bill on the issue. It was categorically stated
therein that even if traditional/pristine Hindu Law doesn’t disqualify a murderer
from succession, he will still be deemed to be disinherited based on the above
considerations. The exclusion would be both from beneficial and legal estates.
For the murderer, rights to both the legal and beneficial estate are excluded. The
rejection of this right to legal and beneficial estate as held in Vedanayaga
Mudaliarv. Vedammal5 was subscribed to here as well. The judges have taken
recourse of precedents, where it was held that no guilty person should be allowed
to take advantage of his own wrong6.
The Court then went as far as stating that in interpreting Sections 25 and 27, it
emerges that the murderer, and his stock, can be allowed to have no relationship
with the deceased’s estate. This was because once survivorship is admitted, then
the only way that a widow can claim property is in representation of her husband’s
estate. And when he himself lies disinherited, she has no claim. Thus it was given,
on the basis of precedents that a murderer must be disinherited even when he
claims through survivorship, and he would be excluded from any increased share
accruing to him as a result of the heinous act he committed 7.
The Court had also considered the question if motive of the perpetrator would be
relevant in deciding upon disqualification. On the one hand, it was seen that
5
(1905) ILR 27 Mad 591
6
Girimalappa Channappa v. Kenchava ILR 45 Bom. 768
7
Ranganath Mishra and Vijender Kumar (rev.), John D. Mayne TREATISE ON HINDU LAW & USAGE,16th ed. 2009, p. 815
deprivation of property was justified if the murder was to further or accelerate the
succession8. And this would apply to both, self-acquired and coparcenery
properties. On the other hand, it was also to be observed that this would only be
applicable to the second part of section 25. The first part implies that the person
to be so disqualified must be the immediate heir of the deceased, and that the
motive there must not necessarily have been to acquire the property of the
deceased. Therefore, the motive would be immaterial under the first part of the
concerned section. In this particular case, the question of motive would hardly be
of consequence as the respondent is admittedly not claiming based on succession,
and he is not advantaged in any manner whatsoever by the death of his father as
under Hindu Mitakshara Law.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS:
The question of a murderer’s right of succession (to the deceased’s estate or
otherwise) has been considered in a number of cases in the past. In the 1889
landmark case of Biggs v. Palmer, the issue was first put under modern judicial
scrutiny. There, the deceased had promised certain properties and gifts to his
grandson as under a will. The defendant-grandson had then proceeded to murder
him in order to prevent him from amending the will. The Court held that even
though there was no express provision in furtherance of disinheritance, the
defendant was liable to be excluded from succession on the grounds of morality,
and public policy, keeping in view the heinousness of the crime.
The court has adopted the abovementioned principle and has given a liberal
interpretation to provisions of the statute. In light of this case a principle was set,
that a murderer should be treated as never having existed in his family of birth,
and not being one who harbours the stock for a fresh line of descent. Thus the
ramification of such a rule would be to exclude the legal and beneficial interest or
estate disentitling the murderer, or any of his stock, from succession.
8
Ramesh Chandra Nagpal , MODERN HINDU LAW, 1st ed. 1983, p.742.
Following the reasoning of the court in this case, in my opinion persons guilty of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder or conspiracy of murder must also be
disentitled to inherit. This would be in furtherance of the principles of justice,
equity and good conscience. An example would be the disinheritance of a person
who has raped a woman who dies later. Since the lines between the application of
the law and that of the said principles are often blurry in such scenarios, the
judgments on the issue would tend to vary subjectively, from case to case.
For example, in a situation where a husband has murdered his legally wedded
wife, he should not be entitled to claim inheritance to her property, and even his
parents have no right to such a claim, following the well-established principle, that
in case of a disqualification due to murder, the property shall devolve as if the
murderer had died before the intestate.
