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Breakthrough for Bangsamoro: Can They Overcome the Odds?

Article · April 2019

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 www.rsis.edu.sg No. 070 – 11 April 2019

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Breakthrough for Bangsamoro:

Can They Overcome the Odds?
By Joseph Franco

SYNOPSIS

Muslim Mindanao is getting a fresh start as an autonomous region in the Philippines.

Repeated delays to the Bangsamoro Transition Authority’s (BTA) inauguration have,
however, raised questions about its ability to bring tangible benefits to its constituents.
Failure to manage frustrations can derail the Bangsamoro’s self-governance.

COMMENTARY

ON 21 JANUARY 2019, a plebiscite was held to ratify the Bangsamoro Organic Law
(BOL). The referendum garnered 1.5 million ‘Yes’ votes with only 199,000 ‘No’ votes.
This meant that a new Bangsamoro region will be created; the previous Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will be expanded to include more than 60 villages
contiguous to the ARMM, as well as Cotabato City.

The BOL was the culmination of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB), which was signed by the government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Under the CAB, a
new subregional political entity will be created that would allow for the meaningful
exercise of political autonomy in Mindanao. The BOL was initially slated to be ratified
in 2015 but was derailed by the 2015 Mamasapano Massacre which saw the killing of
44 police commandos in a misencounter with MILF forces.

Breakthrough, with Halting Starts

The plebiscite was to be subsequently followed by the appointment of an 80-strong

Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), a parliamentary-style legislature which would
fuse law-making and the implementation of new infrastructure projects. The new
BARMM’s major difference from the ARMM is the greater share the BARMM gets from
natural resources extracted from the Bangsamoro region.

The BARMM will also see a normalisation process for former MILF combatants. The
Independent Decommissioning Board (IDB) is tasked to oversee the demobilisation of
30 percent of MILF combatants by the end of 2019.

Euphoria, not surprisingly, greeted the oath-taking of more than 70 newly appointed
BTA members in Manila on 22 February. The event was heralded by both the top
leadership of the Philippine government and the MILF as the beginning of meaningful
governance. At the time, it was expected that the inaugural session of the BTA would
take place a month later on 21 March. Instead, the momentum seems to have been
weakened as the inauguration was re-scheduled thrice, only pushing through on 29
March.

The delays were attributed to scheduling issues. Bangsamoro Chief Minister Murad
Ebrahim stated that President Duterte could only be present on 29 March, but was
eager to witness the inauguration of the BTA, having been instrumental in paving the
way for the breakthrough in Mindanao.

Prior to the recent BTA inaugural session, some of its members have sternly called
out the irony of the situation. What was meant as an assertive exercise of self-
determination became subject to the whims of the Manila-based national leadership.

Keeping Lights on in BARMM

While the BTA has much promise, it does not have the luxury of slowly easing its way
into governance. The BOL, which acts as the founding charter of the BARMM, needs
to be supported by a framework of enabling laws and codes. Without such policy
instruments, the entire bureaucracy meant to execute the will of the BARMM would
grind to a stop.

Civil servants employed in the now defunct regional government face the very real
threat of massive lay-offs if the mandate of their respective offices either lapses or
become redundant. Promotions and salary adjustments would also likely be affected,
as the BARMM needs to promulgate its own rules for its civil service.

Without clarity in funding mechanisms, disaster relief plans would likely be disrupted.
This can exacerbate the effects of an exceptionally dry summer in Mindanao, as it
faces the El Niño phenomenon.

Building the BARMM

The national media as well as Malacañang Palace have been focusing mostly on the
potential benefits of the BARMM. Large-scale prestige projects such as the opening
of a new seaport and airport in Cotabato City have been promoted heavily. The thrust
towards massive infrastructure projects is signalled by no less than Chief Minister
Murad taking a concurrent role as Minister of Public Works and Highways.

Funding for BARMM infrastructure would come from block grants from the national
government, which can be as much as three times the amount allocated for the former
ARMM.

The question is whether the BARMM’s fiscal policy can be truly independent, given
that the new political entity still needs to develop its bureaucracy. The BOL anticipates
that the BARMM will sustain itself through the exploitation of natural resources.

Compared to other regions in the Philippines, the BARMM would get 75 percent of
proceeds from resource exploitation (including offshore oil and gas) instead of 40
percent. There are concerns if the BARMM can transcend the endemic corruption that
beset the former ARMM.

Securing the new BARMM

Under the BOL, the new BARMM would have its own regional security force, in charge
of internal security.

The other important security-related question is the normalisation process for

combatants of the MILF’s armed wing — the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
(BIAF). The process will be overseen by the Independent Decommissioning Body
(IDB), which includes members from third-party countries like Turkey, Norway and
Brunei Darussalam.

On 29 March, the BIAF submitted a list of 12,000 combatants who are slated to turn-
in their weapons. This development is the first major step in the normalisation process,
following the ceremonial turnover of 20 crew-served weapons and 55 other high-
powered firearms.

Validation of the 12,000-strong MILF list of combatants will be an arduous process,

with some members of the security services expressing scepticism over the ability of
the BIAF command to compel their fighters to turn in their weapons. Further
complicating the matter is the need to secure the budget for the arms buyback
schemes that would incentivise the disarmament process.

Enough time for BARMM Transition?

The delayed inauguration of the BTA has truncated the already short transition
process of the BARMM. The appointed members of the BTA would only have three
years to lay the foundations for the BARMM, until regular elections are held. The MILF
members of the BTA would need to wield their majority stake decisively and effectively.

Without tangible improvements to peace and development, the Bangsamoro

constituency may be disillusioned and trigger another cycle of secessionist-inspired
violence. If the current mood in Cotabato City is to be the gauge, the question is no
longer whether there will be frustration and impatience at the grassroots. The
challenge now for the BTA is to manage frustrations in the short-term while building
sustainable institutions by 2022.

Mindanao is no stranger to how violent extremist groups can thrive and exploit
 governance vacuums. As Chief Minister Murad remarked, “the success of our
[Bangsamoro] government is the best antithesis to violent radicalism”.

Joseph Franco is a Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National
Security (CENS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: +65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg

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