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Establishing Integrity Operating

Windows (IOW’s) 

IPEIA Conference
February 2, 2006
Banff, Alberta
John Reynolds
Steamboat Springs, CO, USA
Recently retired from
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Outline for this Presentation

• The 10 Shell (US) Process Safety Initiatives (PSI)
• The Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative 
• Corrosion Control Documents (CCD)
• Integrity Operating Windows (IOW)
• Standard and Critical IOW’s 
• Integration of IOW’s into the 10 PSI’s 
• Training of Operators on IOW’s 
• The Pressure Equipment Integrity Pyramid 

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Ten Process Safety Initiatives

(PSI)  – Initiated in May, 2000
• Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) - IOW creation
process 
• Ensure Safe Production (ESP) - IOW monitoring process 
• Operator Training and Procedures - IOW knowledge
transfer  
• Management Of Change (MOC) - IOW change process
• Investigations – 3 Levels up to RCA
• Protective Instrument Systems (IPF – “SIL”) 
• Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
• Causal Learning
•  Audits and Assessments
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• Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)

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Process Safety Initiative

Metrics
• Each of the 10
main metrics toPSI’s
track were required toprogress
implementation have four(10
X 4 = 40 metrics total)
• For the PEI process safety initiative we tracked:
- Numbers of Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s) completed 
- Numbers of process units with RBI completed
- Numbers of process units with all IOW’s implemented 
- Numbers of operators trained on their CCD & IOW’s 
• But there was only one bottom line metric for the
aggregate of the ten process safety initiatives –> 
numbers of process safety incidents per
year
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Results of the Process Safety Initiatives

YTD Totals
1999 2000 2001
Number s of 2002 2003 2004

25
23
Pr ocess Saf ety 20
20 19

I ncidents
in last 6 years –  
15
15

A r eal success 10 9

story 5
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Primary Aspects of the Pressure Equipment

Integrity (PEI) Initiative

„ Identify all necessary Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s)

„ Create OEMI Teams (Operations - Engineering - Maintenance - Inspection) in each
operating area to create and manage CCD’s and IOW’s 

„ Create Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s), which document all process IOW’s 
„ Train operators on the CCD and IOW’s 
„ Implement IOW’s and Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)
®
„ Implement PEI Focused Asset Integrity Reviews (FAIR ) to monitor progress of the
PEI Initiative 

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ESP
PEI PSI
Pyramid RBI

CCD’s & IOW’s 

OEMI Teams

101 Essential Elements

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Corrosion Control Documents ‟ Contents 

„ Relatively comprehensive documents for managing equipment degradation

„ Description of the process unit and process conditions

„ Shutdown and start up conditions that may affect corrosion and degradation mechanisms, as well as normal
operation
„ Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Materials and Corrosion Diagram (modified PFD showing construction
materials)

„ Corrosion Control Loops (areas of similar corrosion within the PFD) e.g. overhead system, slurry system,
reflux system, etc.
„  All potential types of degradation (and fouling) in each process unit and history of problem areas
„ Quantitative and predictive models for degradation mechanisms
„  Vital corrosion control procedures, injections, inhibitors, etc.

„ Recommended inspection & corrosion monitoring, process changes, construction materials changes, etc .
„ Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s) 

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Corrosion Control Documents ‟ Construction 

„ Unit specific CCD’s completed by an OEMI team which includes:

- Site corrosion engineer/specialist
- Unit process engineer
- Unit inspector

- One or more experienced unit operations representatives

- Facilitator (knowledgeable / experienced corrosion engineer)

„ Final document represents an agreement between the OEMI Team

involved and clearly benefits by the synergistic interaction of all team

members

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Establishing Integrity Operating Windows  

„ Historical operating, maintenance & inspection records

„ Design data; lab data; operating data

„ Metallurgical and corrosion data and modules
„ Process chemistry and engineering knowledge
„ Reactive chemistry knowledge
„ Recommended practices (industry and company)
„ Process and corrosion modeling tools
„ Subject matter expertise and experience (heavy dose)

Result:  Reasonable, practical IOW’s ‟ not too conservative ‟ not non-

conservative 
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Integrity Operating Windows

Operating
Operating
Window 
Window 

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Integrity Operating Windows ‟ Examples 

„ Typically fall into 2 categories:

„ Physical
-  Various limits on pressures and temperatures, including design, operating, partial pressures, dew
points, dry points, heating and cooling rates, delta P, etc.
- Flow rates, injection rates, inhibitor dosage, amperage levels on Alky contactor motors, slurry
content, hydrogen flux, vibration limits, corrosivity probes, etc.

„ Chemical
- pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur content, salt content in crude, NH 4HS content, NH3
content, TAN, acid strength, amine strength, inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination levels,
oxygen content, etc.

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IOW Example ‟ Hot Hydrogen Service

„ Mechanical design window set by the
Temperature
design code e.g. ASME
Mechanical Design Limits
„ IOW set by material limit for high
temperature hydrogen attack in API RP
EOR Process Temp IOW
941
„ SOR process temperature definitely within
the IOW SOR Process Temp

„ EOR process temperature possibly beyond

the IOW ‟ need to know the hydrogen
partial pressure and duration of EOR
conditions
Pressure

Based on H2 pp Based on
Total Pressure
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 Integrity Operating Windows ‟ 
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Typical Numbers per Operating Unit

(before after an intensive review)  

„ Typically start with 5 -10 IOW’s that may already be in place, along with
other operating quality variable limits
„ Typically end up with 30 ‟ 50 IOW’s with about
5 -10% being critical limits (requires drastic and/or immediate action),
and the rest being standard limits (requires attention within a specified

timeframe to get back into control)

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Definitions: IOW Critical Limit

A limit at which the operator has one last opportunity to return the
process to a safe condition and, if exceeded, could result in one of
the following in a fairly short timeframe:

„  A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or Hazardous fluids

„ Loss of Containment

„ Non-orderly Shutdown

„ Significant Environmental Impact

„ Other Unacceptable Risk

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 Critical IOW Limit ‟ Examples
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„ Boiler Feed Water Level

- Lost of boiler feed water level could quickly cause boiler tube rupture

„ Hydroprocess Reactor Temperature

- Metal temperatures below the MDMT could give rise to brittle fracture

„ Heater Tube Skin Temperature

- Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused, for example, by a no flow or hot spot
condition.

„ Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation

- Too low acid strength could cause runaway reaction

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Definition: Standard Level

A limit that, if exceeded over a defined period of time, could cause one
of the following to eventually occur:

„  A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or hazardous fluids

„ Loss of containment

„ Non-orderly shutdown

„  A negative impact to the long term unit performance and its ability to meet turnaround run
length

„ Excessive financial impact

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Standard Level Examples

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„ REAC NH4HS Concentration

- Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping
„ Heater Tube Skin Temperature
- Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube failure.

„ Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature

- Sustained operation below dew point could cause damage to fractionator internals or potential loss of
containment.

„ pH of Crude Tower Overhead

- Sustained operation below standard pH level could lead to corrosion of tubing and piping and potential
loss of containment.

„ Desalter Outlet Salt Content

- Sustained operation above standard level could lead to corrosion and potential loss of containment

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Integrity Operating Windows ‟ Successes 
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„ In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a previous project had installed the
wrong construction materials ‟ immediate inspection revealed significant HTHA damage

„  An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process engineer and said that “we
actually operate much hotter than you think because we use the by-pass” ‟ immediate
inspection revealed significant localized damage
„  A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH4HS in the REAC system of an
HCU ‟ immediate inspection revealed a previously-missed localized spot of significant
corrosion
„  An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at another refinery, which then began to take
routine lab samples ‟ soon thereafter discovered the concentration was too high and took
steps to increase wash water and adjust feedstock

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Operator Training on CCD’s and IOW’s 

„ Level 1
-  Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety Initiative
- SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training

„ Level 2
- Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents
-  What they contain; where they’re stored; how to use them 

„ Level 3
- Details contained within each operator’s unit-specific CCD
- Specific IOW’s and the reasoning behind them 
-  What can happen if the IOW is exceeded

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ESP
PEI PSI
Pyramid RBI

CCD’s & IOW’s 

OEMI TEAMS

101 Essential Elements

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Implementing Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) 

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„  Another major part of our pressure equipment integrity process safety initiative

„  We use both a Shell developed more qualitative RBI (S-RBI), as well as the
more quantitative API RBI, both successfully for different needs at different
sites
„ But RBI will not be covered today ‟ a topic for another day, if you like
„ Suffice it to say that any inspection program, be it risk-based, condition-based,
or time-based may not be fully reliable without effective identification and
implementation of integrity operating windows (IOW’s)  

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 Integration of CCD’s, IOW’s RBI 
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Feedback Confidence in plant integrity

Creating the CCD: 

 Type of degradation
RBI planning: 
Method of inspection

 Location of degradation Where to inspect
 Susceptibility to degradation
Frequency of inspection
 Degradation rates

IOW limits:

 Determination & management of the operating limits to avoid degradation

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Integration of Multiple Work Processes Leading To Sustained Asset Inte gr ity Ope ra ting Windows She ll - slide pdf.c om

Integrity

Long Term Asset Integrity

F ocused Asset I ntegr ity Reviews

Design and
Corrosion Risk-Based
Materials Selection
Control IOW’s  Inspection

Asset integrity management is a balancing process designed to achieve lowest total cost of
ownership
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 Along with Asset Integrity Comes Proven Better Process Safety
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Performance

YTD Totals
1999 2000 2001
2002 2003 2004

Number s of Pr ocess 25
23

Safety I ncidents 19
20
20

in last 6 years in 15
15
Shell (US) Ref ining
Operations  –  F acts, 10 9

not just hopes for 5

3

the futur e
0
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Shell Experience with Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s) 

Time for Discussion

 [email protected] 
Recently retired from
Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.

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