Cases and Questions concerning Norms

CASE 1
Riggs v. Palmer
Court of Appeals of New York, Decided October 8, 1889

[Factual background: In 1880 Francis Palmer executed a will in which he provided that his 14-year old grandson,
Elmer Palmer. was to inherit most of his property. But then Francis remarried and decided to change his will giving
his property to his new wife. In 1882 Elmer murdered his grandfather to prevent this. Since he was a minor, Elmer
was not executed, rather he was placed into a youth reform institution. He then claimed right to his grandfather’s
property under the will which, due to the murder, had not been changed. Two of Francis Palmer’s daughters (one of
whom was named Riggs), who would inherit his property if Elmer did not, brought a lawsuit to have the court
declare that, since he had murdered his grandfather, Elmer was ineligible to inherit under his will. Their lawsuit
was dismissed, and they lost their appeal. They then appealed to the highest court of New York, the Court of
Appeals.]

Opinion of Earl, J

. . . [The defendant, Elmer Palmer, murdered his grandfather in order to gain his property.] He
now claims the property, and the sole question for our determination is, can he have it? The defendants
say that the testator is dead; that his will was made in due form and has been admitted to probate [the
court proceeding for putting a will into effect], and that, therefore, it must have effect according to the
letter of the law.
It is quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills, and the devolution of
property, if literally construed, and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be
controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer.
The purpose of those statutes was to enable testators to dispose of their estates to the objects of
their bounty at death, and to carry into effect their final wishes legally expressed; and in considering and
giving effect to them this purpose must be kept in view. It was the intention of the law-makers that the
[beneficiaries] in a will should have the property given to them. But it never could have been their
intention that a [beneficiary] who murdered the testator to make the will operative should have any
benefit under it. If such a case had been present to their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to
make some provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided for it. It is a
familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as
much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers. The writers of laws do not always
express their intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges are to collect it from
probable or rational conjectures only, and this is called rational interpretation . . .
Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer the intention which the
makers had in view. . . In [several learned treatises] many cases are mentioned where it was held that
matters embraced in the general words of statutes, nevertheless, were not within the statutes, because it
could not have been the intention of the law-makers that they should be included. They were taken out of
the statutes by an equitable construction, and it is said in Bacon: "By an equitable construction, a case not
within the letter of the statute is sometimes holden to be within the meaning, because it is within the
mischief for which a remedy is provided. The reason for such construction is that the law-makers could
not set down every case in express terms. In order to form a right judgment whether a case be within the
equity of a statute, it is a good way to suppose the law-maker present, and that you have asked him this
question, did you intend to comprehend this case? Then you must give yourself such answer as you
imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man, would have given. If this be that he did mean to
comprehend it, you may safely hold the case to be within the equity of the statute; for while you do no
more than he would have done, you do not act contrary to the statute, but in conformity thereto." In some
cases the letter of a legislative act is restrained by an equitable construction; in others it is enlarged; in
others the construction is contrary to the letter. . . If the law-makers could, as to this case, be consulted,
would they say that they intended by their general language that the property of a testator or of an
ancestor should pass to one who had taken his life for the express purpose of getting his property? In 1
Blackstone's Commentaries (91) the learned author, speaking of the construction of statutes, says: "If
there arise out of them any absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are,
with regard to those collateral consequences, void. * * * When some collateral matter arises out of the
general words, and happen to be unreasonable, then the judges are in decency to conclude that the
consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and, therefore, they are at liberty to expound the statute
by equity and only quo ad hoc disregard it;" and he gives as an illustration, if an act of parliament gives a
man power to try all causes that arise within his manor of Dale, yet, if a cause should arise in which he
himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that because it is unreasonable that any man should
determine his own quarrel.
There was a statute in Bologna that whoever drew blood in the streets should be severely
punished, and yet it was held not to apply to the case of a barber who opened a vein in the street. It is
commanded in the Decalogue that no work shall be done upon the Sabbath, and yet, giving the command
a rational interpretation founded upon its design, the Infallible Judge held that it did not prohibit works of
necessity, charity or benevolence on that day.
What could be more unreasonable than to suppose that it was the legislative intention in the
general laws passed for the orderly, peaceable and just devolution of property, that they should have
operation in favor of one who murdered his ancestor that he might speedily come into the possession of
his estate? Such an intention is inconceivable. We need not, therefore, be much troubled by the general
language contained in the laws.
Besides, all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their operation and effect by
general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or
to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property
by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law
administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes. They were applied
in the decision of the case of the New York Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Armstrong (117 U.S. 591).
There it was held that the person who procured a policy upon the life of another, payable at his death, and
then murdered the assured to make the policy payable, could not recover thereon. Mr. Justice Field,
writing the opinion, said: "Independently of any proof of the motives of Hunter in obtaining the policy,
and even assuming that they were just and proper, he forfeited all rights under it when, to secure its
immediate payment, he murdered the assured. It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country
if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken.
As well might he recover insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired."
 These maxims, without any statute giving them force or operation, frequently control the effect
and nullify the language of wills. A will procured by fraud and deception, like any other instrument, may
be decreed void and set aside, and so a particular portion of a will may be excluded from probate or held
inoperative if induced by the fraud or undue influence of the person in whose favor it is. ( Allen v.
M'Pherson, 1 H. L. Cas. 191; Harrison's Appeal, 48 Conn. 202.) So a will may contain provisions which
are immoral, irreligious or against public policy, and they will be held void.
....
Under the civil law evolved from the general principles of natural law and justice by many
generations of jurisconsults, philosophers and statesmen, one cannot take property by inheritance or will
from an ancestor or benefactor whom he has murdered. . . But, so far as I can find, in no country where
the common law prevails has it been deemed important to enact a law to provide for such a case. . . This
is not a casus omissus. It was evidently supposed that the maxims of the common law were sufficient to
regulate such a case and that a specific enactment for that purpose was not needed.
For the same reasons the defendant Palmer cannot take any of this property as heir. Just before
the murder he was not an heir, and it was not certain that he ever would be. He might have died before his
grandfather, or might have been disinherited by him. He made himself an heir by the murder, and he seeks
to take property as the fruit of his crime. What has before been said as to him as legatee applies to him
with equal force as an heir. He cannot vest himself with title by crime.
....
The facts found entitled the plaintiffs to the relief they seek. . . .
. . . judgment should be entered as follows: That Elmer E. Palmer . . . be enjoined from using any
of the personality or real estate left by the testator for Elmer's benefit; that the devise and bequest in the
will to Elmer be declared ineffective to pass the title to him; that by reason of the crime of murder
committed upon the grandfather he is deprived of any interest in the estate left by him . . . .

Questions: This case contains rules and principles. Attempt to determine which of the norms
found in this case can be classified as rules and which as principles. Explain why.

What does this case illustrate about the nature and function of principles in relation to rules?

CASE 2

Gerald Mayo v. Satan, United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania,54 F.R.D. 282, December 3, 1971

Memorandum Order

Weber, District Judge

 Plaintiff . . . prays for leave to file a complaint for violation of his civil rights in forma
pauperis. He alleges that Satan has on numerous occasions caused plaintiff misery and
unwarranted threats, against the will of plaintiff, that Satan has placed deliberate obstacles in his
path and has caused plaintiff's downfall.
Plaintiff alleges that by reason of these acts Satan has deprived him of his constitutional
rights.
We feel that the application to file and proceed in forma pauperis must be denied. Even if
plaintiff's complaint reveals a prima facie recital of the infringement of the civil rights of a
citizen of the United States, the Court has serious doubts that the complaint reveals a cause of
action upon which relief can be granted by the court. We question whether plaintiff may obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this judicial district. The complaint contains no
allegation of residence in this district. While the official reports disclose no case where this
defendant has appeared as defendant there is an unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire
where this defendant filed an action of mortgage foreclosure as plaintiff. The defendant in that
action was represented by the preeminent advocate of that day, and raised the defense that the
plaintiff was a foreign prince with no standing to sue in an American Court. This defense was
overcome by overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Whether or not this would raise an estoppel
in the present case we are unable to determine at this time.
If such action were to be allowed we would also face the question of whether it may be
maintained as a class action. It appears to meet the requirements of Fed.R. of Civ.P. 23 that the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, there are questions of law and
fact common to the class, and the claims of the representative party is typical of the claims of the
class. We cannot now determine if the representative party will fairly protect the interests of the
class.
We note that the plaintiff has failed to include with his complaint the required form of
instructions for the United States Marshal for directions as to service of process
For the foregoing reasons we must exercise our discretion to refuse the prayer of plaintiff
to proceed in forma pauperis.
It is ordered that the complaint be given a miscellaneous docket number and leave to
proceed in forma pauperis be denied.

Questions: Assuming we can take this ruling seriously, can we make sense out of it? Why
doesn't the judge just dismiss the case straightaway as the product of delusion?

CASE 3

Gabillet v. Noye, French Court of Cassation (Supreme Civil Court), 1984

The Court:

Given that according to the judgment under attack (Agen, 12 May 1980) young Eric
Gabillet was sitting on an improvised see-saw on 30 June 1975, with a stick in his hand, when
the see-saw broke and he fell, putting out the eye of his friend Philippe Noye as he did so; that
Lucien Noye, acting as statutory administrator of his son's property, sued Eric Gabillet's parents
in respect of this accident as having him in their garde;
Given that his parents complain that the decision held young Eric liable under article
1384(1) Code civil1 whereas, as they contend, the presumption of liability can only be applied
where there is some faculty of discernment, and that the Court of Appeal thus violated and
misapplied article 1384(1);
But given that after holding that young Eric Gubler had the use, direction and control of
the stick the Court of Appeal had no need, notwithstanding the very tender years of the child, to
determine whether or not he had any sense or judgement, and their decision is legally justified;

For these reasons REJECTS the application for review.

CASE 4

Fullenwarth v. Felten, French Court of Cassation (Supreme Civil Court), 1984

The Court:
Given that according to the judgment under attack (Metz, 25 September 1979) Pascal
Fullenwarth, then aged seven, shot in the direction of his friend David Felten an arrow from a
bow he himself had made and put out his eye, and that M. Felten, David's father, claimed
damages from M. Raymond Fullenwarth as being civilly responsible for his son Pascal under
article 1384(4)2 Code civil;
Given that M. Raymond Fullenwarth criticises the judgment for having held him wholly
liable for the consequences whereas, according to the him, the Court of Appeal should have
asked whether Pascal had sufficient discernment for his act to be imputed to him as a fault and its
failure to do so rendered its decision without legal basis and violated articles 1382 4 and 1384(4)
Code civil;
But given that in order for the parents of a minor child living with them to be presumed
liable under article 1384(4) Code civil, it is sufficient that the child have committed an act which
is the direct cause of the damage complained of and that for this reason of pure law, rather than
the reason criticised, the judgment is correct in law;

For these reasons DISMISSES the application for review.

Questions: What do CASES 3 & 4 indicate about the status of children in the law?Does it
appear in these cases that young children are viewed as true subjects of the law or rather as
potential harmful agents that parents must keep under control and be responsible for?

1
Art. 1384 (1) of the French Civil Code: “A person is liable not only for the damages he causes by his own act, but
also for that which is caused by the acts of persons for whom he is responsible, or by things which are in his
custody.”
2
The father and mother, in so far as they exercise “parental authority” are jointly and severally liable for the damage
caused by their minor children who live with them.
QUESTION 1

Consider the following passage from the case, In re Sigsworth, Bedford v. Bedford:

“There can be no question . . . that the claim of the plaintiff . . . to the estate of the
mother under her will is bound to fail by reason of the well settled principle that public
policy precludes a sane murderer from taking a benefit under his victim's will.”

How might you classify the norm stated above? Is there more than one possible way to classify
it? Can you restate it as a different type of norm? Explain in detail.

QUESTION 2

This case of In re Pollock, Pollock v. Pollock, [1941] 1 Ch. 219, is similar to In re Sigsworth,
Bedford v. Bedford, in that it involves the question whether a person who murders someone can
inherit from his victim. Also as in Sigsworth, after killing his victim, the killer committed
suicide, making it hard to establish the his state of mind, thus whether his act constituted murder.

Consider the following excerpt from the Pollock case:

“[I]f a claim is made by a person on behalf of a deceased who killed another, it is for
that person to show by evidence that the act was in fact not felonious but was done under
a condition of mind which rendered it not criminal at all. Here no such evidence is
forthcoming and in the absence of any such evidence the Court can, I think, only act on
the assumption that the act of the husband which caused the death of the wife was
felonious and, therefore, one which prevented any person claiming through the husband
from benefiting from the wife’s estate.”

In this passage the Court declares a norm that governs the matter. Which type of norm is this?
How will it operate in this case? Explain your answer in detail, especially in reference to
Sunstein’s article, The Problem with Rules.