REMEDIAL LAW

DIGESTS
ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2002

Table of Contents
Jurisdiction 1-3
Summary Procedure 3-4
Criminal Procedure 4 - 12
Civil Procedure 12 - 29
Evidence 30 - 40
Special Procedure 40 - 42

JURISDICTION
BARANGAY CONCILIATION

Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA

01 Feb 2001

Facts: P filed an action against D for recovery of ownership of a parcel of land. D

questioned P’s failure to submit the issue to barangay conciliation.

Issue: Is there a need to submit to barangay conciliation?

Held: No. The action for recovery was filed in 1991. The Local Government Code
requiring conciliation took effect only in 1992. Besides, P and D are not even residents of
the same province. No lupon has jurisdiction over cases where the parties are not actual
residents of the same city or municipality.

SANDIGANBAYAN

ABBOT V. MAPAYO
335 SCRA 265 (July 2000)

Facts: A was charged before the Sandiganbayan. The case was transferred to RTC by
virtue of R.A. 7975. The RTC denied A’s omnibus motion so he filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. The Solicitor General opined that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the petition and not the CA.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.

Held: Yes. In § 4 (c) of RA 7975, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded
to include petitions for issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

SOLLER V. SANDIGANBAYAN
9 May 2001

Facts: A complaint was filed against A, a municipal mayor, with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging him of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy
report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the
offender. The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an information with
the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?

Held: For an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense
must have been committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) “in relation to
their office,” i.e. it should be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and
should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official
functions. Moreover, these requisites must be alleged in the information. In this case,

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there was no allegation that the offense charged was done in the performance of official
function.

JURISDICTION OVER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

PEOPLE V. REPIROGA
17 May 2001

Facts: A was a member of the Philippine Army. A complaint was filed before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor charging A with murder. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
conducted a preliminary investigation and later recommended the filing of an
information.

Issues: Should the preliminary investigation be conducted by an authorized military

officer before any information could be filed against AFP members? Does the authority
to file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman?

Held: No. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the authority on a
military officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving members of the
AFP. It simply mentions an “investigating officer” who shall examine available witnesses
requested by the accused, without reference to his being a military officer.
Given the foregoing, the contention of A that the authority to file charges against
him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman cannot be upheld. Under
AO 8, the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation over a military
case may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants
since all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. It is only in the
prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoys
exclusive control and supervision.

RTC JURISDICTION

VILLEGAS V. CA
1 Feb. 2001

Facts: In a case for the reconstitution of an original TCT, the posting of the notice of the
petition in the provincial or municipal building of the city or municipality where the subject
property is located was not proven.

Issue: Did the court have jurisdiction over the petition?

Held: No. The proceeding being in rem, the court acquires jurisdiction to hear and
decide the petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s title upon compliance with the
required posting of notices and publication in the Official Gazette. These requirements
and procedure are mandatory and must be strictly complied with, otherwise, the
proceedings are utterly void, which is why the petitioner is required to submit proof of the
publication and posting of the notice.

TALUSAN V. TAYAG
04 Apr. 2001

Facts: The RTC, acting as a land registration court, ruled on the validity of the auction
sale of the subject parcel of land. X believes the RTC has no jurisdiction to resolve this
issue and instituted a separate action to annul the auction sale.

Issue: Does the RTC, acting as a land registration court, have jurisdiction to resolve the
said issue?

Held: Yes. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as those invoking substantial issues. The
court now has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration, but
also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority

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is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.

PEOPLE V. OBINA
20 Apr. 2001

Facts: A was charged in the RTC of Las Pinas for rape. The evidence introduced by the
prosecution, however, points to Nasugbu, Batangas as being the scene of the offense.

Issue: Should the RTC of Las Pinas dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction?

Held: Yes. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike civil cases, is
jurisdictional. The filing of a criminal case with the wrong court can oust the court from
trying the case. For lack of jurisdiction, the case should have been dismissed by the
court a quo.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

BARATA V. ABALOS, et. al.

6 June 2001

Facts: X filed an administrative disciplinary case against A before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman absolved A of the charge. X filed a petition for review
with the SC.

Issue: Which court has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases?

Held: The Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The last paragraph of Section 27 which
provides that in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC was rendered invalid and of
no effect in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto which laid down the rule that said Section
27 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases without violating the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence. Thus, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
brought to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. (The only provision affected by the
Fabian ruling is the designation of the CA as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal; all other matters included in said Section
27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand)

SUMMARY PROCEDURE
CATUNGAL V. HAO
22 March 2001

Facts: D was the lessee of X. Later, P bought the property from X. P filed an action for
ejectment against D. TC ordered D to vacate. Because P disagreed with the TC’s ruling
as to the rent, P sought reconsideration of the order while D filed a notice of appeal.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reconsideration, the TC issued an order elevating the
case to the RTC which in turn modified the decision in favor of C. CA ruled in D’s favor.
According to the CA, the motion filed by P before the TC was a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Summary Procedure. In short, such motion did not produce any legal
effect.

Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to dispose of the issue of Motion for
Reconsideration?

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Held: Yes. A reading of the order issued by the TC will show that the said court
elevated the issue on the amount of rentals raised by P to the RTC because the appeal
of respondent had already been perfected. D could have opposed such irregularity in the
proceeding but D failed to do so. Even if the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading, D is precluded by estoppel from questioning it. The argument of D that the
proceeding was a summary one is incorrect. Considering the amount of rentals and
damages claimed by P, said case was not governed by the Summary Rules as the
unpaid rentals exceed P20, 000. Thus the filing of Motion for Reconsideration is allowed.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SERVICE OF ORDERS & RESOLUTIONS IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

TAM WING TAK V. MAKASIAR

350 SCRA 475 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed an affidavit-complaint with the prosecutor’s office charging D with violation
of BP 22. The prosecutor dismissed the affidavit-complaint and a copy of the resolution
was sent by registered mail to P himself. P received it on April 9. P’s counsel received a
copy on June 27 so counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on July 7. Motion was
denied for being filed out of time because the prosecutor counted the 15-day period from
April 9. P argued that following Rule 13 § 2, if a party appears by counsel, then service
can only be validly made upon counsel and service upon the party himself becomes
invalid and without effect.

Issue: Whether the period should be counted from P’s receipt of the prosecutor’s
resolution

Held: Yes. The Rules were meant to govern court procedures and pleadings. A
preliminary investigation is not a court proceeding. The rule on service provided for in
the Rules of Court cannot be made to apply to the service of resolutions by public
prosecutors especially as the agency concerned (in this case, the Department of Justice)
has its own procedural rules governing said service. DOJ Order 223 § 2 provides that in
preliminary investigations, service of resolutions of public prosecutors could be made
upon either the party or his counsel.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

MANANTAN V. CA
350 SCRA 387 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. A was acquitted.
Complainant appealed the civil aspect of the judgment. CA found A civilly liable. A
contended that this amounted to double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether A was placed in double jeopardy.

Held: No. For double jeopardy to exist, the ff. elements must be established: (a) a 1st
jeopardy must have attached prior to the 2 nd; (2) the 1st jeopardy must have terminated;
and (3) the 2nd jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In this case, what was
elevated to the CA was the civil aspect of the criminal case. A was not charged anew
with a 2nd offense identical to the 1st. There was no 2nd jeopardy to speak of; A’s claim of
having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

TIME OF COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE

PEOPLE V. ELPEDES
350 SCRA 716 (Jan. 2001)

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Facts: A was found guilty of rape. A argued that he cannot be convicted of rape
committed on Feb. 11 ’97 because the victim testified that she was raped on Aug. 11
’97. He pointed out that the victim never testified that she was raped on the date alleged
in the information.

Issue: Whether A should be acquitted since the evidence showed that rape was
committed on a date other than indicated in the information.

Held: No. The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission
of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars (Rule 116 §
10). A did not ask for a bill of particulars. The failure to move or specification or the
quashal of the information on any of the grounds provided for in the Rules deprives the
accused of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and
admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently
charges the accused with a definite crime. Besides, the exact date of the commission of
the crime is not an essential element of the crime.

INFORMATION

PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO
03 Apr. 2001

Facts: An information was filed, charging A with the twin killings of 2 brothers. A failed to
question the duplicitous complaint. He was later convicted for the offense charged in the
Information

Issue: On appeal, can A question the defectively crafted information?

Held: No. True, an indictment of multiple offenses in a single complaint or information

transgresses Rule 110, § 13. A, however, has failed to timely question the above defect
and he may thus be deemed to have waived this objection.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN THE INFORMATION

PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ

349 SCRA 124 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of murder. W testified that he saw A shoot the victim. A
argued that W’s name was not mentioned during the preliminary investigation so W
should not have been presented as a witness.

Issue: Whether the prosecution was precluded from presenting W as a witness during
the trial.

Held: No. The non-inclusion of some of the names of the eyewitnesses in the
information does not preclude the prosecutor from presenting them during trial. There is
thus no basis for the allegation that this fact indicated that W’s presentation as an
eyewitness was a mere “afterthought.”

AMENDMENTS TO THE INFORMATION

GABIONZA V. CA
30 March 2001

Facts: G was charged of violating RA 1161 (SSS Law). He pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. About 4 years after he was arraigned, the public prosecutor filed a
motion for leave of court to amend the information in order to change the dates therein.
The TC granted the motion.

Issue: Was the grant proper?

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Held: Yes. After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the information may be
allowed as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the
accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
is when a defense under the complaint or information would no longer be available after
the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.
Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:
a. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription
b. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged
c. it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to
require the accused to undergo any material charge or modification in his
defense
d. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty
e. it does not cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the
new averment.
In this case, the questioned amendment is one of form only. The allegation of time
when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of
the offense.

PLEA OF GUILTY

PEOPLE V. GALAS
20 March 2001

Facts: A was charged with 3 counts of rape of his 15-year old daughter. A pleaded not
guilty when arraigned. Later, A manifested through counsel his desire to change his plea
to guilty. During the searching inquiry, the TC judge asked A whether he is aware that he
may be convicted of reclusion perpetua to death. A said yes, and was therefore
sentenced to death. He now cries improvident plea of guilty.

Issue: Was the plea of guilty improvidently made?

Held: Yes. Nowhere in the proceedings was it explained to the accused that the
penalty imposable is death even if he pleads guilty. It is not enough to inquire as to the
voluntariness of the plea. The court must explain fully to the accused that once
convicted, he could be meted out the death penalty. One cannot dispel the possibility
that the accused may have been led to believe that due to his voluntary plea of guilty, he
may be imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death.

PEOPLE V. ALBORIDA
25 June 2001

Facts: A raped his minor daughter. At trial, A withdrew an earlier plea of not guilty and
substituted the same with a plea of guilty. The prosecution presented evidence and
thereafter A was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death.

Issue: Whether the trial court followed the proper procedure.

Held: No. The trial court failed to abide by the strict safeguards intended to guarantee
a provident plea of guilt. Rule 116 § 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
mandates 3 things upon the trial court in cases where a positive plea is entered by
accused: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the
accused’s comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask the
accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. The questions propounded by the trial court do not constitute a “searching
inquiry” within the contemplation of the rule.

PEOPLE V. LATUPAN
28 June 2001

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Facts: A pleaded guilty to the single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustrated
murder. The trial court found A guilty of the complex offense of Double Murder and
physical injuries.

Issue: Whether the court erred in convicting A.

Held: No. Although SC has set aside convictions based on plea of guilty in capital
offenses because of improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment, the circumstances of this case merit a different result. “Where
the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused erred
in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or
not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on the
evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged."

SEPARATE TRIALS

PEOPLE V. ELLASOS and OBILLO

6 June 2001

Facts: A and B were accused of killing V. The judge ordered the separate trial of the
case against the 2 and transferred the trial of B to Muntinlupa RTC. Still, the judge
convicted both A and B.

Issue: Whether the judge correctly convicted the 2 accused.

Held: No. The trial judge gravely erred in rendering a judgment of conviction against
both accused. Since the trial of B did not take place, the trial court should have rendered
a decision only against A.

WHEN APPEAL OF ONE BENEFITS ALL

PEOPLE V. ESCAÑO
349 SCRA 674 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A, B, and C were convicted. All of them appealed but A later withdrew his appeal.
B and C were acquitted on appeal. A prayed that he should also be acquitted sine the
appeal interposed by his co-accused is applicable and favorable to him.

Issue: Whether A should also be acquitted.

Held: Yes. This is in accordance with § 11 (a) Rule 122 of the New Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The acquittal of the 2 other accused based on reasonable doubt should
benefit A notwithstanding the fact that he withdrew his appeal.

JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE OFFENSES

PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRE
335 SCRA 69 (July 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of rape. A contended that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of
police and not by the complainant.

Issue: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes. The complaint required in Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but a
condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute
the guilty parties. The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not
confer jurisdiction in the court to try the case. Art. 344 is not determinative of the

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jurisdiction of courts over private offenses because the same is governed by the
Judiciary Law and not the Revised Penal Code.

SEARCH WARRANT

GARAYGAY V. PEOPLE
335 SCRA 272 (July 2000)

Facts: Manila RTC issued a search warrant authorizing the search of A’s house located
in Lapu-Lapu City. The raid was conducted and prohibited paraphernalia were
confiscated. An information charging A was filed Before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. A
filed a motion to quash the search warrant with the Lapu-Lapu City RTC.

Issue: Which court should resolve the motion to quash the search warrant?

Held: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on
the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, a motion to quash
the warrant/to retrieve things thereunder seized may be filed for the first time in either
the issuing court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is
alternative, not cumulative. Thus, the motion to quash the warrant was properly filed with
the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City.

PEOPLE V. KO
19 Apr. 2001

Facts: A search warrant was issued to search D’s premises for “undetermined quantity
of Shabu and Drug Paraphernalia” in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. D contends
that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or
use of Shabu and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: Was the warrant issued for more than one specific offense and hence invalid?

Held: No. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and
defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong
to the same class or species. Accordingly, one search warrant may thus be validly
issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

LACSON V. SEC. PEREZ

10 May 2001

Facts: After the anti-Arroyo crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Arroyo
declared a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Pursuant to the proclamation, several key
leaders (Enrile, Maceda) of the opposition were ordered arrested without warrants. The
warrantless arrests were justified on the theory that a person committing rebellion, which
is a continuing crime, may be arrested without a warrant at any time so long as the
rebellion persists.

Issue: Were the arrests made legal?

Held: No. To justify a warrantless arrest, there must be a showing that the person
arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit the offense of rebellion. In other words, there must be an overt act constitutive of
rebellion taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. This requirement was not
complied with in the arrests of Enrile, Maceda et al. A declaration of a state of rebellion
does not relieve the State of its burden of proving probable cause. The declaration does
not constitute a substitute for proof.

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ALLEGATION OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION

PEOPLE V. BANIGUID
340 SCRA 92 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: A was accused of rape. It was stated in the information that he had carnal
knowledge of hi “minor daughter.”

Issue: May death penalty be imposed on the accused?

Held: No. Death penalty is imposed for the crime of rape if the “victim is under 18
years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim.” For this purpose, the special
qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with the offender
must be alleged and proved. The information must state the exact age of the victim at
the time of the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE V. DE VILLA
Feb. 1, 2001

Facts: A was charged with raping V who was at the time 12 years and 10 months old. A
was V’s uncle but such fact was not alleged in the information. He was found guilty and
sentenced to death pursuant to RA 7659.

Issue: Can the death sentence be sustained?

Held: No. Under the amendatory provisions of RA 7659 § 11, the attendance of facts
that would mandate the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death are in the
nature of qualifying circumstances which should be alleged in the information and
proved at the trial. The New Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on Dec. 1,
2000, now specifically require that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be
alleged in the information. In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged only the minority of
V; it failed to allege that A is her relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3 rd civil
degree of relationship. Hence, A cannot be convicted of qualified rape.

ARRAIGNMENT

PEOPLE V. ASOY
June 29, 2001

Facts: RTC convicted A for rape and imposed upon him the death penalty. The
Certificate of Arraignment of A dated March 4, 1997 states:
"That in open court and in the presence of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor X, the
accused A, assisted by his PUBLIC ATTORNEY P, of Cariaga, Leyte, was called and
having been informed of the nature of the charge against him by reading the
INFORMATION and in answer of the question of the Court, he pleaded, GUILTY of the
crime charged."

Issue: Whether the court properly complied with Rule 116 §§ 1 and 3.

Held: No. The mandatory and stringent procedural requirements concerning the
arraignment and plea of an accused are set by §§ 1 and 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended. As shown in the Certificate of Arraignment, the
appellant was "informed of the nature of the charge against him" by merely "reading the
Information". The Information is written in the English language of which A, a
probinsiyano, is obviously unfamiliar with. The trial court, during the arraignment of the
appellant, failed to comply with the requirements of § 1 (a) of Rule 116 when it did not
furnish the accused with a copy of the Information and read the same in the language or
dialect known to him. And, after A entered a plea of guilty to the capital offense charged,
the trial court also violated § 3 of Rule 116 by not conducting a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.

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BAIL

YAP V. CA and the PEOPLE

June 6, 2001

Facts: A was found guilty of estafa and was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years. A
appealed and applied for bail pending appeal. CA allowed bail for “humanitarian
reasons.” However, because of the perceived high risk of flight (A admitted that he left
the country several times during the pendency of the case) the CA deemed it necessary
to peg the amount of bail at P5.5 M. A argued that the bail required was excessive.

Issue: Whether the bail imposed was excessive.

Held: Yes. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the
Constitution. The obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could
render meaningless the right to bail. The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of
bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from
installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail
bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court
and to make an accounting of his movements. Although an increase in the amount of
bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the SC found that the setting of the
amount at P5.5M is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of A’s
right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which A is
charged (in this case, P5.5M) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is
an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this cannot be allowed
because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which
should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

YAP V. CA and the PEOPLE

June 6, 2001

Facts: The SC found that the bail amounting to P5.5 M recommended by the appellate
court was excessive. A, the accused, argued that bail should be set at P40T based on
the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000,
maintains recommended bail at P40T for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142T or
over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal).

Issue: Whether the Bail Bond Guide is controlling at all times.

Held: No. True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the
Department of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not
binding upon the courts, “merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the
Executive Branch, through the DOJ, in the enforcement of criminal laws.” Thus, courts
are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond
Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal justice. This
notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in A’s case an amount higher
than P40T (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate
increase is dictated by the circumstances.

PEOPLE V. SINGH, et. al.

June 29, 2001

Facts: A was charged with a non-bailable offense. A filed an application for admission to
bail.

Issue: Who has the burden of proof in hearings for bail application?

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Held: In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong pursuant to § 8 Rule 114. In bail proceedings, the prosecution
must be given ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. While the
proceeding is conducted as a regular trial, it must be limited to the determination of the
bailability of the accused. It should be brief and speedy, lest the purpose for which it is
available is rendered nugatory.

AUTOMATIC REVIEW

PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO
15 Mar. 2001

Facts: A was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness by his 11-year old daughter.
The TC found the accused guilty of both crimes.

Issue: Whether the automatic review of the death sentence includes the automatic
appeal of his conviction for the less serious crime of acts of lasciviousness.

Held: No. In the case of People v. Panganiban, we ruled that an automatic review of
the death penalty imposed by the TC was deemed to include an appeal of the less
serious crime not so punished by death, “but arising out of the same occurrence or
committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious
offense.” In the instant case, however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousness
arose out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion.
The two cases involve distinct offenses committed at an interval of 2 months in point of
time. In both cases, A was animated by separate criminal intent. Moreover, the
evidence presented by the prosecution in the rape case was not the same evidence they
offered to prove the acts of lasciviousness case.

PEOPLE V. BARCUMA
07 May 2001

Facts: A was charged with murder. A escaped from jail and since then has been at
large. The court rendered a decision finding A guilty and sentencing him to death.

Issue: May the automatic review of the RTC’s decision proceed despite the absence of
the accused?

Held: Yes. There is no good reason to withhold judgment pending the re-arrest of
accused-appellant after reviewing the decision of the trail court. Rule 122 § 10 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in fact provides for automatic review and judgment.

OMBUDSMAN’S PROSECUTORY FUNCTION

UY V. SANDIGANBAYAN
20 March 2001

Facts: A motion for further clarification was filed by Ombudsman Desierto to the SC’s
ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases
falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

Issue: Can the Ombudsman prosecute only cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan?

Held: No. We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees,
not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. § 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
does not make any distinction. “Any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. Such grant of

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primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not necessarily
imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees
cognizable by the other courts.

ROXAS V. VASQUEZ
19 June 2001

Facts: A and B were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Ombudsman approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the complaints
against A and B. Upon reinvestigation however, without notice to or participation of A
and B, the two were indicted. They argue that there has been a procedural infirmity
because the Rules of Procedure require that a motion for reconsideration or a
reinvestigation must be filed within 15 days from notice of an approved resolution. This
was not done here.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman erred.

Held: No. In criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entire
case open for review, regardless of whether a motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation was sought. The Ombudsman should not be limited in its review. It is
clear from R. A. 6770 that the Ombudsman may motu propio conduct a reinvestigation.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

CAUSE OF ACTION

CHU V. BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT

01 Mar. 2001

Facts: P and D entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage involving
several parcels of land. The agreement was for D to mortgage the property after the
purchase to pay the remaining balance. She failed to comply and instead sold the 2 lots
to X. P instituted a complaint for annulment of title. The defense filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of cause of action as P failed to allege that the purchaser was
aware of the defect in the title (i.e., that X was not an innocent purchaser for value).
Issue: Should the complaint be dismissed?

Held: Yes. In a case for annulment of title, the complaint must allege that the
purchaser was aware of the defect in the title so that the cause of action against him will
be sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the court
cannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser who is presumed to be in good
faith in acquiring the property. Therefore, the tile of respondent, being that of an innocent
purchaser for value, remains valid.

PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

BARITUA V. MERCADER
350 SCRA 86 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed a complaint against D in 1984. D contended that since P did not pay the
correct amounts of docket and other lawful fees, then the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case, following the ruling in the case of Manchester Development
Corporation v. CA.

Issue: Whether the Manchester ruling applies.

Held: No. The statute in force at the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of a court. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it cannot be ousted
therefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have

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prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The Manchester ruling, which
became final in 1987, has no retroactive application and cannot be invoked in the
subject complaint filed in 1984.

COUNTERCLAIMS

Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA

01 Feb. 2001

Facts: P filed a forcible entry case against D. D filed an answer/counterclaim, arguing

that P’s certificate of title is invalid since the land is a “swamp land” and D had a
Fisheries Leases Agreement over that land.

Issue: Can the validity of the certificate of title be assailed in a counterclaim?

Held: No. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief,
the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. D raised the issue of
invalidity as a defense in an answer/counterclaim to P’s action for recovery of ownership.
This partakes of the nature of a collateral attack and is an indirect challenge to the final
judgment and decree of registration which resulted in the issuance of the titles. The
Property Registration Decree requires no less than a direct action for reconveyance duly
filed within the period provided by law; a collateral attack is not allowed. Plus, there is
also a presumption that the lots could be registered and that titles were regularly issued
and valid since they were issued as a result of a decision rendered by a competent land
registration court.

COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS

FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION V. FORBES PARK

338 SCRA 346 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: P filed an injunction suit to stop D from suspending all permit’s of entry for P’s
personnel in the construction site. D filed a motion to dismiss. The case was eventually
dismissed with finality. D subsequently filed a complaint for damages against P for
alleged violation of certain deed restrictions.

Issue: Whether D’s separate suit should be given due course.

Held: No. D should have set it up as a compulsory counterclaim in the first case. The
prior case and the instant case arose from the same occurrence and the issues of fact
and law in both cases are identical. Since D filed a motion to dismiss in the previous
case, his compulsory counterclaim that should have been filed at that time is now
barred. The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim
are incompatible remedies. If the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of
the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss
the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim.

ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE

350 SCRA 113 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed a case against insurance agent D. D filed an answer and by way of
counterclaim, asserted her right to be paid commission and prayed for damages. P
moved to dismiss D’s counterclaim for being merely permissive in nature and D failed to
pay the required docket fees.

Issue: Whether D’s counterclaim is merely permissive in nature.

Held: Yes. The criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a
counterclaim is permissive or compulsory is as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely
the same?

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2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well
as defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counter claim?
Another test is the “compelling test of compulsoriness,” which requires a “logical
relationship between the claim and the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate
trials of the parties’ respective claims would entail a substantial duplication of effort and
time by the parties and the court.”
Tested against these standards, D’s counterclaim is merely permissive. Only her
claims for damages allegedly suffered as a result of P’s filing of the complaint are
compulsory. In order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, D is bound to pay the prescribed docket fee.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN CASES OF COMPLAINTS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OR TRO

GONZALES V. STATE PROPERTIES

350 SCRA 311 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P filed a case against D for recovery of property against D and his brothers and
sisters. P’s complaint was accompanied by an application for preliminary injunction
and/or TRO. The case was raffled but D requested that another raffle be held because
the other defendants did not receive notice of the raffle. Summons was served by
publication on all defendants (except D) because their residences could not be
ascertained despite diligent inquiry. Again, D opposed the holding of a raffle on the
ground that the other defendants were not duly notified.

Issue: Whether the notice requirement prior to raffle was properly complied with.

Held: Yes. § 4 (c) Rule 58 states that the prerequisites for conducting a raffle when
there is a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction/TRO are (1) notice to and (2)
presence of the adverse party or person to be enjoined. This rule also provides that the
notice shall be preceded or accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse
party/person to be enjoined. The 2nd paragraph of the rule states that the required prior
or contemporaneous service of summons in the ff. instances: (a) when summons cannot
be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts (b) when the
adverse party is a resident of the Phils. temporarily absent therefrom, or (c) when such
party is a nonresident. In such event, the notice of raffle and the presence of the adverse
party must also be dispensed with. In this case, the situation in par. (a) applies so the
raffle may therefore proceed even without notice to and the presence of the parties.

SERVICE OF PROCESSES

TCL SALES V. TENG

349 SCRA 35 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: D received a copy of the decision of the SEC en banc on June 14. D filed a
motion for reconsideration on June 23 (13 th day). D received the order denying this
motion on Aug. 6. D filed a petition for review with the CA on Sept. 25. CA held that D
should have filed the petition not later that Aug. 21 or 15 days after Aug. 6.

Issue: Whether the period should be counted from D’s receipt of the order.

Held: No. Where a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be made
on counsel and not on the party. This rule applies to proceedings before the SEC as the
Rules of Court apply suppletorily thereto.

FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

MC ENGINEERING, INC. & HANIL DEVELOPMENT V. NLRC

28 June 2001

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Facts: A copy of the pleading was not personally served to P and there was no
explanation given as to why personal service was not made.

Issue: What is the effect if service of pleadings is not done personally and no
explanation is given therefor?

Held: Service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be
done personally. If they are made through other modes, the party concerned must
provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. To
underscore the mandatory nature of this rule requiring personal service whenever
practicable, § 11 of Rule 13 gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper
as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place.

SPECIFIC DENIAL

UNITED AIRLINES V. CA
20 Apr. 2001

Facts: P filed a case against D. In the Complaint, P alleged that, at 9:45 a.m., P
checked in at D’s designated counter. In his Answer, D denies that P checked in at 9:45
a.m., for “lack of knowledge or information at this point in time as to the truth thereof.”

Issue: Is such denial contained in the Answer allowed by the Rules?

Held: No. The rule authorizing an answer that the defendant has no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such
answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of
knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge
that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. Whether or not P checked in at
D’s designated counter at 9:45 a.m. must necessarily be within P’s knowledge.

PRE-TRIAL

DE GUIA V. DE GUIA
04 Apr. 2001

Facts: A notice of pre-trial was served only on the counsel, without expressly directing
the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial
conference.

Issue: What is the effect of the absence of such notice?

Held: The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void and the judgment
rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or collaterally.

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

DE JESUS V. OBNAMIA
340 SCRA 1 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: P won an ejectment suit against D. The decision became final and executory and
the judge issued the writ of execution. It appeared that the CA modified the order of
execution. Because D refused to vacate, P filed a motion for an alias writ of execution.
The motion was set for hearing on April 6 but D’s counsel only received a copy of the
motion on that date so D was not represented during the hearing of the motion. The alias
writ of execution was granted.

Issue: Whether the 3-day notice rule for motions must be followed.

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Held: Yes. Generally, no notice or even prior hearing of such motion for execution is
required before a writ of execution is issued when a decision has become final.
However, there are circumstances in this case which make a hearing and the requisite
3-day notice of the same to the adverse party necessary. The execution of the decision
is a contentious matter as there was an issue concerning the modification of the writ.

BUSTOS V. CA
350 SCRA 155 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: P won in an unlawful detainer case against D. The trial court issued writs of
execution and demolition, but these were stayed when D filed a petition for certiorari and
injunction. D subsequently became the owner of the land. In another case for accion
reivindicatoria, the CA affirmed D’s ownership over the land.

Issue: Whether D could be ejected from what is now his own land.

Held: No. Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory.
However the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory
judgment admits of exceptions: as in special and exceptional cases where it becomes
imperative in the higher degree of justice to direct suspension of its execution; whenever
it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the judgment became final that would render the
execution of the judgment unjust.
In this case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that D is now the legal
owner of the land. Allowing the execution of judgment would result to grave injustice and
the issue of possession was already rendered moot when the court adjudicated
ownership to D.

SANTOS V. SILVA
349 SCRA 426 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: Writs of execution and demolition were issued in favor of P. The structures were
demolished pursuant to the writ. D complained that the clerk of court illegally expanded
the coverage of the demolition order.

Issue: Whether the clerk of court could validly amend the writ on his own initiative.

Held: No. By expanding the coverage of the writ, the clerk of court illegally arrogated
unto himself the exercise of judicial discretion. Before he or she can amend the writ, the
court’s order granting the issuance should first be amended. Indeed, the preparation of a
writ of execution is the duty of the clerk of court. But the performance of such duty is
under the supervision and control of the judge and the clerk of court cannot amend the
writ on his own initiative.

RES JUDICATA

Vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et. al. V. CA

01 Feb. 2001

Facts: P bought 2 parcels of land from X but no decree of registration had yet been
issued. P filed a forcible entry case against D. 3 months later, a decree of registration
was issued in favor of P. D claimed that the land was “swamp land” and that he had a
Fisheries Lease Agreement. The trial court dismissed the complaint. P filed another
action to assert ownership over the property.

Issue: Is the present action barred by res judicata?

Held: No. The earlier action filed by P was for forcible entry which involved only the
issue of physical possession and not ownership. Meanwhile, the instant case is an
accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element
of ownership. A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action

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between the same parties respecting title or ownership because there is no identity of
causes of action.

MOTIONS

FAJARDO V. CA
20 Mar. 2001

Facts: B sued F for collection of attorney’s fees. After the presentation of evidence, the
TC rendered a decision in favor of B. F, alleging that she received a copy of the decision
on Jan. 19, filed a notice of appeal on Feb. 3. On the same day, the TC denied the
notice of appeal for being premature as there was a pending motion for correction of
judgment. After granting the motion for correction, the TC granted the motion for
issuance of a writ of execution.

Issue: Whether the court erred in issuing a writ of execution.

Held: Yes. The motion for correction was defective, as it did not have a proper notice
of hearing. Such defect reduced the motion to a mere scrap of paper which may not be
taken cognizance of by the court. This is required under §§ 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The
rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing,
the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ABRAHAM V. NLRC
6 Mar 2001

Facts: P filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against D. Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of P. NLRC at first upheld the decision but reversed later upon motion
for reconsideration by D. P immediately went to CA via Rule 65 certiorari. CA dismissed
the petition on the ground that she failed to file a motion for reconsideration (MFR).

Issue: Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?

Held: No. Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct
its imputed errors. However, this is subject to exceptions, among which are: where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
and, where the MFR would be useless. In the present case, NLRC was clearly given the
opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself when D filed its MFR. In fact, it granted
the MFR filed by the D. Thus, the NLRC had more than one opportunity to resolve the
issues of the case and in fact reversed itself upon reconsideration. It is highly improbable
that the NLRC would reverse itself again.

APPEAL

FAJARDO V. CA
20 Mar 2001

Facts: F lost in the case filed against him. F received the copy of the decision on Dec.
15. F’s counsel received a copy only on Jan. 19. F filed a notice of appeal on Feb. 3.

Issue: Whether the appeal was timely filed.

Held: Yes. While the copy was received by F on Dec. 15, the copy of the decision was
received by F’s counsel only on Jan. 19. The 15-day period for filing the appeal should
be counted from the date when petitioner’s counsel received a copy of said judgment.

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When a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be made on counsel,

not on the party. (§ 2, Rule 13)

METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA
17 Apr. 2001

Facts: D was declared in default. The RTC rendered a Decision ordering him to pay P a
sum of money. The Decision became final and executory. After executing on the various
properties owned by D, the RTC directed the sheriff to sell at a public auction the Club
Filipino share owned by D. A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of P as purchaser of
that share. P then filed a Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate. The
RTC issued an Order denying the Motion. P then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied.

Issue: Can D appeal from the denial of the Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of
the Certificate of Sale and to declare the sale void?

Held: Yes. As provided in § 2, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, one who has
been declared in default may appeal, without need of an order lifting the default. The
denial of the Motion being final in character, and not merely interlocutory, he is allowed
by the Rules to appeal therefrom. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory
or final is: “Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.

APPEAL—UNASSIGNED ERRORS

LUDO AND LUYM V. CA

01 Feb 2001

Facts: P sued D because D’s ship allegedly rammed and destroyed P’s fender pile
clusters used for docking at the wharf. The trial court ruled in favor of P and ordered D to
pay damages. The CA reversed. P argued that D did not assign as an error the
eyewitness’ incompetence to testify on the negligence of the ship’s officers and crew so
that matter should not have been disturbed by the CA.

Issue: Did the CA go beyond the issues raised?

Held: No. The SC noted that while the witness’ incompetence was not one of the
assigned errors in D’s brief, the latter raised it in connection with the issue of their
negligence. The CA, therefore, did not err in addressing the matter because an appellate
court can consider an unassigned error on which depends the determination of the
question in the properly assigned error. The issue of negligence of the ship’s officers and
crew depends significantly on the determination of whether the witness is competent to
testify on the maneuvering of a docking vessel.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

DBP V. CA et. al.

06 June 2001

Facts: P, a government financial institution, lost in a case against D. P filed a notice of

appeal and requested for an extension to file appellant’s brief. The appellate court
granted a number of extensions. P failed to filed its appellant’s brief within the last
extended period accorded to it by the appellate court

Issue: What is the difference between the failure to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period and the failure to file a brief within the period granted by the
appellate court?

Held: Failure to file a notice of appeal results in the failure of the appellate court to
acquire jurisdiction over the appealed decision, resulting in its becoming final and

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executory upon failure of the appellant to move for reconsideration. Failure to file a brief
within the period granted simply results in the abandonment of the appeal which could
lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration, in which case the
appealed decision would also become final and executory, but prior thereto, the
appellate court shall have obtained jurisdiction of the appealed decision. There is more
leeway to exempt a case from the strictures of procedural rules when the appellate court
has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case.

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PLEADINGS

DBP V. CA et. al.

06 June 2001

Facts: P appealed to the CA. P filed a motion for extension to file the appellant’s brief.

Issue: When may extensions to file pleadings be granted?

Held: An extension will only be granted if there is good and sufficient cause, and if the
motion asking for the same is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be
extended. The granting of an extension, including the duration thereof, lies within the
sound discretion of the court, to be exercised in accordance with the attendant
circumstances of each case. However, the movant is not justified in assuming that the
extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time sought.
Thus, it is the duty of the movant for extension to exercise due diligence and inform
himself as soon as possible of the appellate court’s action on his motion.

CERTIORARI

ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ V. PHIL. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE

349 SCRA 240 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: PEZA received the unfavorable order of the trial court on Aug. 11. It filed a
motion for reconsideration on the 15th day. PEZA received the order denying the motion
on Nov. 23. On Nov. 27, PEZA filed a petition for certiorari. D argued that the petition for
certiorari filed by PEZA was actually a substitute for lost appeal that should not be
entertained. According to D, the rule that a petition for certiorari can be availed of despite
the fact that the proper remedy is an appeal only applies in cases where the petition is
filed within the reglementary period for appeal (as in the cases of Aguilar v. Tan and
Bautista v. Sarmiento).

Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari should be allowed to prosper.

Held: Yes. There was grave abuse of discretion in this case and appeal was not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy so the petition for certiorari was proper. The SC
found D’s interpretation to be too restrictive. The said cases do not set as a condition
sine qua non the filing of a petition for certiorari within the 15-day period to appeal in
order for the said petition to be entertained by the court. To espouse D’s contention
would render inutile the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

PCGG V. DESIERTO
349 SCRA 767 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The PCGG received a copy of the assailed resolution on 8 April. It filed a motion
for reconsideration on 12 April. On 6 August, it received a copy of the order denying its
motion. PCGG filed a petition for certiorari on 5 October.

Issue: Whether the petition was timely filed.

Held: Yes. Indeed, pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition should have been filed on 2 October so the petition should have been dismissed
for late filing. However, during the pendency of the case, SC promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-

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03-SC (effective 1 Sept. 2000) which provided: “In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.” In view of the retroactive application
of procedural laws, the petition should be considered timely filed.

UNITY FISHING V. CA
02 Feb. 2001

Facts: The NLRC-Resolution denying P’s motion for reconsideration was received by P
on Oct. 6. P filed a petition for certiorari on Dec. 6.

Issue: Was the petition for certiorari filed within the reglementary period?

Held: Yes. Under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, amending § 4, Rule 65, the 60-day period to
file a petition for certiorari is reckoned from the receipt of the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. Applying the amendment, the last day for filing the petition for
certiorari should have been Dec. 5. Dec. 5 being a Sunday, the time shall not run until
the next working day pursuant to Rule 22.

INDIANA V. CHED
04 Apr. 2001

Facts: The Indiana Aerospace University filed a complaint for damages against the
Commission on Higher Education (“CHED”) before the RTC. The RTC denied CHED’s
motion to dismiss. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, CHED filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA.

Issue: Does CHED’s Petition for Certiorari require a prior resort to a motion for
reconsideration?

Held: No. The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to
correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions such as: (1) the issues raised are purely legal
in nature; (2) public interest is involved; (3) extreme urgency is obvious; or (4) special
circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. It is patently clear that the
regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is
invested with public interest. Thus CHED’s Petition for Certiorari did not require prior
resort to a motion for reconsideration.

DEPOSITIONS

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
30 May 2001

Facts: Before the defendants have filed their answers, the prosecution moved to take
the deposition of X. The prosecution alleges that X, who has been out of the country,
would give vital testimony but would not return to the country because he fears for his
safety.

Issue: Is there a valid reason for the court to allow the taking of X’s deposition?

Held: None. The general rule is that a plaintiff may not be permitted to take
depositions before answer is served. However, deposition is allowed to be taken before
service of answer where conditions point to the necessity of presenting a strong case for
allowance of the motion. In this case, no proof, much less any allegation, has been
presented to show there exists a real threat to X’s life once he returns to the Philippines
and that adequate security cannot be provided for such a vital witness.

ATTACHMENT

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CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
349 SCRA 745 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The government filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against several
individuals, including D, for restitution of ill-gotten wealth. The government asked for the
issuance of a writ of attachment and this was granted. D assailed the propriety of the
issuance of the writ.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the writ was proper.

Held: Yes. In order to quash a writ of attachment, a party may file a counterbond (Rule
57 § 12) or to quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently
issued (Rule 57 § 13). The grounds cited by D have nothing to do with the issuance of
the writ. His grounds were facts that took place after the writ had already been
implemented. Supervening events, which may or may not justify the discharge of the
writ, are not within the purview of Rule 57 § 13.

LITIS PENDENTIA

SHANGRI-LA INTERNATIONAL HOTEL V. CA

21 June 2001

Facts: A case for the cancellation of a mark with the Bureau of Legal Affairs, Intellectual
Property Office was filed by P. D filed a subsequent action for infringement against P
with the regular courts in connection with the same registered mark.

Issue: Whether the administrative case for cancellation barred the filing of an
infringement case with the court.

Held: No. The earlier case for cancellation of a mark cannot effectively bar the
subsequent filing of an infringement case by the registrant of such mark. The certificate
of registration still subsists and is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration,
as such a corresponding infringement suit may be filed against the party who infringes
on the rights of the registrant.

BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK V. CA

29 June 2001

Facts: There was an existing case involving P and D. D sought the dismissal of the
present case on the ground of litis pendentia.

Issue: What are the requisites of litis pendentia?

Held: Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to a situation
wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It must conform
to the following requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent
the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to the two (2)
preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other case.

RULE 45

PENGSON V. OCAMPO, et. al.

29 June 2001

Facts: P filed an ejectment case against D before the MTC. D averred that she is a co-
owner of such land being a compulsory heir of its original owners. MTC ruled in favor of
D, holding that she is a legitimate daughter of the original owners. RTC affirmed. CA

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reversed. Hence, this certiorari proceeding under Rule 45.

Issue: Whether a petition for review under Rule 45 is proper.

Held: No. The jurisdiction of SC in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 is
limited to reviewing errors or questions of law. It is the burden of the party seeking
review of a decision of the CA or other lower tribunals to distinctly set forth in his petition
for review, not only the existence of questions of law fairly and logically arising
therefrom, but also questions substantial enough to merit consideration, or show that
there are special and important reasons warranting the review that he seeks. If these are
not shown prima facie in the petition, the Court will be justified in summarily spurning the
petition as lacking in merit.

APPEAL/PETITION FOR REVIEW/CERTIORARI—DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE ATTACHED

CUSI-HERNANDEZ V. DIAZ
336 SCRA 113 (July 2000)

Facts: P filed a case of accion publiciana against D. They had a contract to sell but P
rescinded this because D failed to fulfill his obligation. D refused to vacate the premises.
The MTC ruled in favor of P but RTC reversed. The CA denied due course to P’s appeal
because of her failure to attach a certified true copy of the contract to sell.

Issue: Whether there was a need to attach the contract to sell.

Held: No. Attached to the petition for review were original duplicate copies of the RTC
and MTC decisions. The SC found that the MTC decision reproduced verbatim the
contract to sell, which is central to the dispute. There was substantial compliance with §
2 Rule 42. In Caydona v. CA, it was held that “we do not construe § 2 (d) of Rule 42 as
imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should
be certified as true copies.”

ATILLO V. BOMBAY
07 Feb. 2001

Facts: D entered into a Lease Agreement with P, alleged owner of Alto Commercial
Building. D failed to pay her rentals so P filed an action for ejectment which the MTC
dismissed. RTC reversed; CA dismissed on D’s failure to attach pleadings and other
material portions of the record of the case in violation of Rule 42 § 2(d).

Issue: Is § 2(d) of Rule 42 mandatory, or merely directory?

Held: Mandatory, and therefore non-compliance with the § 2(d) is a ground for the
dismissal of a petition based on § 3 of the same rule. The phrase “of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record” in § 2(d) is followed by the phrase “as would
support the allegations of the petition.” This contemplates the exercise of discretion on
the part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to
the petition. However, while it is true that it is petitioner who initially exercises the
discretion in selecting the relevant supporting documents that will be appended to the
petition, it is the CA that will ultimately determine if the supporting documents are
sufficient to even make out a prima facie case.

PARAS V. BALDADO
08 Mar. 2001

Facts: In an estate proceeding, petitioners moved to inhibit the respondent judge on the
ground of bias. The judge refused to do so. Certiorari with CA. CA dismissed on the
ground of failure to attach a certified true copy of impugned order as required by § 1 of
Rule 65 as what was attached was a mere plain xerox copy of the order.

Issue: Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?

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Held: No. The filing of original actions for certiorari in the CA is governed by § 3, Rule
46 which mandates a certified true copy of the impugned order as a jurisdictional
requirement. In this case, the CA was correct in disregarding the copies of the RTC
orders even if these were certified by a notary public. However, the records reveal that
duplicate original copies were in fact attached to one of the seven copies of the petition
filed with the CA, moreover, copies of the same orders, this time accomplished by the
clerk of court, were submitted by petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus,
the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the requirement and the CA
should have given the petition due course.

VERIFICATION

UY V. LANDBANK
336 SCRA 419 (July 2000)

Facts: P filed an unlawful detainer case against D. It reached the SC. D filed a petition
for review with the SC. On 15 Feb. the SC denied the petition for (1) lack of certification
against forum shopping and (2) lack of verification. Before D’s counsel received the
Resolution denying the petition, he filed a Motion for Admission of Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping on 4 March.

Issue: Whether the (1) lack of verification and (2) certification against forum shopping
may be cured by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.

Held: (1) Yes. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the
non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of imagination or speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith.
(2) Generally, no. Rule 45 § 5 provides that failure of petitioner to submit the
required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification
against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. But the SC
may find special circumstances or compelling reasons for the reinstatement of the
petition as what occurred in this case.

CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

LOQUIAS V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

338 SCRA 62 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: A sworn complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman charging A, B, C,
and D with the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman
found probable cause and recommended the filing of the information. The accused filed
a petition for certiorari. The Ombudsman argued that the petition did not comply with
Rule 7 § 5 because the verification against forum shopping was signed only by B and
not by all petitioners.

Issue: Whether there was substantial compliance with § 5 Rule 7.

Held: No. The petition is defective. There was no showing that B was authorized by his
co-petitioners to represent them and to sign the certification. It cannot be presumed that
B knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar
actions or claims filed or pending. The attestation contained in the certification on non-
forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.
Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.

DAR V. ALONZO-LEGASTO
339 SCRA 306 (Aug. 2000)

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Facts: Spouses X and Y in an unlawful detainer case filed by P. They were sued as “Mr.
and Mrs.” They filed a petition for review with the C. This petition was dismissed for
failure to comply with the rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping since it was
signed by X only.

Issue: Whether there was substantial compliance with the Rule on Certification against
Forum Shopping.

Held: Yes. With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may
prepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. While the rule requires
that it be strictly complied with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it
cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded but it
does not prevent substantial compliance on the aspect of its provisions under justifiable
circumstances. In this case, it should be noted that X and Y were sued jointly as
spouses over a property in which they have a common interest. The signing of one of
them in the certification substantially complies with the rule.

SOLLER V. COMELEC
339 SCRA 685 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: P filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of the proclamation of D as
mayor. He also filed with the RTC an election protest against D. D moved to dismiss the
protest on the ground of forum shopping. P argued that he did not need to disclose in his
election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of proclamation because he
deemed the COMELEC petition abandoned upon the filing of the protest.

Issue: Whether P should comply with the certification of non-forum shopping.

Held: Yes. Before the COMELEC dismissed P’s petition for annulment of
proclamation, this was legally still pending resolution and he should have disclosed the
existence of such action in his election protest. The fact that P’s protest was not based
on the same cause of action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not
complying with the rule. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory. The rule applies to any complaint, petition, application, or other initiatory
pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping.

DOCENA V. LAPESURA
28 March 2001

Facts: P filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
spouses H and W. TC ruled in favor of P. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
only one of the petitioners signed the certification of non-forum shopping.

Issue: Was the dismissal correct?

Held: No. It has been the Court’s previous ruling that all the petitioners should sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping or plaintiffs in a case and that the signing by only one
of them is insufficient. In the case at bar, however, we hold that there is substantial
compliance. There are only 2 petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife.
The certification was signed stating that “he and his wife…” The property subject of the
original action for recovery is conjugal. Under the Family Code, management or
administration belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject only to the intervention of the
Court. Thus, such omission is not a fatal defect.

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

UY V. SANTIAGO
336 SCRA 680 (July 2000)

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Facts: MTC ruled in favor of P in an ejectment case. D appealed to the RTC. The RTC
affirmed the MTC ruling in toto. P filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution pending
appeal to which D filed his opposition. Meanwhile, D filed a petition for review with the
CA assailing the RTC decision in the ejectment case. RTC judge denied execution
pending appeal because D perfected his appeal, filed a supersedeas bond and gave
periodic deposits of the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

Issue: Whether the decision of the RTC in the appealed ejectment case is immediately
executory pending appeal.

Held: Yes. It is only execution of the MTC judgment pending appeal with the RTC,
which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites, provided in Rule 79 § 19. On
the other hand, once the RTC has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such
decision shall under Rule 70 § 21, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an
appeal via a petition for review with the CA and/or SC.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

BASCO V. CA
337 SCRA 472 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of illegal possession of firearm. On the last day of filing an
appeal, A’s counsel submitted a motion fro reconsideration without the required notice of
hearing. 8 days later, counsel submitted a notification and manifestation in an attempt to
rectify the error. RTC denied both the motion for reconsideration and the notification and
manifestation. A filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 38, which was
also denied for lack of merit. A then appealed the order of denial to the CA.

Issue: Whether an order denying a petition for relief is appealable.

Held: No. Under the old Rules of Court, a judgment or order denying relief under Rule
38 is final and appealable. However, under the 1997 Amended Rules of Procedure, an
order denying a petition for relief is no longer subject to appeal. The aggrieved party’s
recourse is to file the appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

DAP MINING ASSOCIATION V. CA, et. al.

6 June 2001

Facts: P failed to file an appeal of the decision of the Director of Mines within the 5-day
reglementary period prescribed by Sec. 50 of P.D. 463. P filed a petition for relief from
judgment but it was not accompanied by affidavits of merit.

Issue: Whether the petition for relief should be allowed to prosper.

Held: No. A petition for relief is a special remedy designed to give a party a last
chance to defend his right or protect his interest. It is a relief that can only be availed of
in exceptional cases. Being an act of grace, so designed as it were to give the aggrieved
party a second opportunity, the extraordinary period fixed therefor must be considered
non-extendible and not subject to condition or contingency. In this case, the petition for
relief failed to be accompanied by affidavits of merit, showing the fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner's good
and substantial cause of action or defense. These affidavits of merit would serve as the
indispensable basis for a court to be called upon to entertain a petition for relief.

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT

TRINIDAD V. CA
6 June 2001

Facts: P sought to annul the final judgment rendered against his interest.

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Issue: Whether the petition to annul judgment was timely filed.

Held: No. The petition to annul the judgment of the trial court was filed more than 6
months after the judgment had become final and executory. The action to annul the
compromise judgment should even be deemed barred under Rule 38 § 3 providing that
the judgment could only be set aside if the action were brought within 60 days after
petitioners’ knowledge of the judgment but in no case later than six months after its
entry.

INJUNCTION

CANSON V. HIDALGO
337 SCRA 293 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: CAPCOM Regional Director ordered the re-assignment of P, a police officer.

Instead of complying with the directive, P filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the RTC to enjoin the enforcement of the directive. RTC granted
preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether the court may enjoin the assignment/re-assignment of a police officer.

Held: No. The court has no supervisory power over the officers and men of the
national police, unless the acts of the latter are plainly done in grave abuse of discretion
or beyond the competence of the functions or jurisdiction of their office. In this case,
there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CAPCOM Regional
Director. Courts cannot by injunction review, overrule or otherwise interfere with the valid
acts of police officials.

IDOLOR V. CA
07 Feb. 2001

Facts: X, whose mortgaged property was foreclosed and sold in a public auction, failed
to exercise her right of redemption within the proper period. X then filed a complaint for
annulment of sheriff’s sale against the buyers with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Issue: Should the writ of preliminary injunction be issued?

Held: No. X failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be
protected as her right of redemption had already expired two days before the filing of the
complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has
insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought.

URBANES V. CA
28 March 2001

Facts: X agency participated in a public bidding to secure a contract providing security

services to the SSS. However, the contract was awarded to Y. Claiming that
irregularities and anomalies attended the public bidding, X filed an action for injunction to
prevent the awarding of the contract to Y. X asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction as well. TC issued the writ. CA set it aside and also dismissed the
main action.

Issue: Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion?

Held: Yes. The CA overstepped its boundaries when it dismissed the main action.
The issue to be resolved was only in respect to the writ of preliminary injunction. The
main action of injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct
from the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

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SPOUSES CRYSTAL V. CEBU INT’L SCHOOL

04 Apr. 2001

Facts: X was not able to pay the required school fees on time. Thus, X was not enrolled
in Y school. X filed a complaint against Y school, praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.

Issue: Should the writ be issued?

Held: No. X failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right that has been
violated. The right to enroll in a private school is not absolute; it is subject to “fair,
reasonable and equitable requirements.” X has no right or standing to pray for the
issuance of an injunctive writ, because he failed to pay the required school fees on time.
Moreover, X has not shown any urgent and permanent necessity for it, considering that
X is already enrolled in another school.

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT

VIRGILIO V. PATRICIA
340 SCRA 525 (Sept. 2000)

Facts: P won in an unlawful detainer case against D. On appeal, RTC reversed and
ruled in favor of D. P filed a motion for clarificatory judgment. Without waiting for the
resolution of the motion, P filed a petition for review with the CA. D argued that the
petition for review was premature. For D, because of the pendency of P’s motion, there
was no final judgment or decision that could be the subject of a petition for review.

Issue: Was the petition for review premature because of the pendency of the motion for
clarificatory judgment?

Held: No. A motion for clarificatory judgment, not being in the character of a motion for
reconsideration, does not toll the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. Its
filing will not bar the judgment from attaining finality, nor will its resolution amen the
decision to be reviewed.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

SPS. MIRASOL V. CA
01 Feb. 2001

Facts: Spouses H and W entered into a crop loaning financing scheme with PNB. PNB
was empowered as the spouses attorney-in-fact and could sell their sugar in order to
apply the proceeds to the payment of obligation. The spouses wanted an accounting of
the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar but PNB ignored their requests. Come time
to settle their obligations, it was found that H and W owed PNB around 15.9 million
pesos. The spouses claimed that had PNB made the accounting, it would have found
out that the proceeds were enough to cover the obligation. They then filed a suit for
accounting, specific performance and damages against the latter.

Issue: Should the Sol Gen be notified in respect to actions for declaratory relief?

Held: Yes. Rule 63 § 3 of the Rules of Court require notice to the Solicitor General.
The mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions for declaratory relief but in
fact extends to “any action” contrary to the spouses’ contention that said rule applies
only to actions for declaratory relief and not to the present action which is only for
accounting, specific performance and damages.

SPOUSES LIM V. CRUZ

04 Apr. 2001

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Facts: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by P against D. P caused the annotation
of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT covering the said subject land. A motion
to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by D, on the ground that a notice of lis pendens
cannot be granted on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale.

Issue: Can a notice of lis pendens be granted, even on the basis of an unregistered
deed of sale?

Held: Yes. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the
rules which requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him.
In fact, there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the notice
must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Hence, even
on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated
on the title.

SPOUSES LIM V. CRUZ

04 Apr. 2001

Facts: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by P against D. P caused the annotation
of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT covering the said subject land. A motion
to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by D. The judge issued an order canceling the
notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of a party’s TCT upon D’s posting of an
indemnity bond.

Issue: Can the court allow D to file a bond in substitution of the notice of lis pendens?

Held: No. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of
the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if D is
allowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of the notice.

OMNIBUS MOTION

MEDISERV V. CHINA BANKING

17 Apr. 2001

Facts: D was declared in default. D filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to lift Order of Default;
and (b) dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice. The Omnibus Motion was not under oath,
and the Affidavit of Merit failed to aver any fact which constitutes movant’s good and
substantial defense nor allege circumstances constituting D’s mistake or excusable
negligence.

Issue: Should the Omnibus Motion be granted?

Held: No. The Omnibus Motion was not under oath as required in Rule 9, Sec. 3 (b),
and the Affidavit of Merit is defective for failing to aver any fact which constitutes
movant’s good and substantial defense nor allege circumstances constituting D’s
mistake or excusable negligence.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EVADEL V. SPOUSES SORIANO

20 Apr. 2001

Facts: P filed against D an action to recover ownership over real property. P seeks to
recover a certain portion of land with a total area of 2,450 square meters from D which
portion was allegedly in excess of the total area of the property actually sold by them to
the latter. In his Answer, D admitted the existence and due execution of the Contract to
sell which contained the specific description of the property it bought from P.

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Issue: Is there a genuine issue as to any material fact?

Held: No. There is no genuine issue of fact as to ownership of the subject property
because the admissions made by D in its Answer are tantamount to an admission that P
owned the property in question. Thus, the court may summarily resolve the issue of
ownership of the subject property.

PERSONS BOUND BY JUDGMENT IN AN EJECTMENT SUIT

EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. KU

26 March 2001

Facts: P mortgaged property to D. However, due to default in the payment of the loan, D
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure and was issued a new certificate of title in his name.
D then filed an action for ejectment against P’s father. The order directing the father to
vacate became final. P appealed claiming that she was deprived of due process, as she
was not made a party to the ejectment suit.

Issue: Should P have been impleaded in the ejectment suit?

Held: No. Generally, no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a

stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
Nevertheless, a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in
the suit but also those not made parties if they are trespassers, squatters or agents of
the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; guests or
other occupants with defendant’s permission; transferees pendente lite; sub-lessees; co-
lessees; members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant. P, being the
daughter, is bound.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

GARCIA V. CA et. al.

6 June 2001

Facts: An administrative case was filed against A before the PCA. A filed a case with
the CA arguing that there was violation of administrative due process. The CA refused to
take cognizance of the case for A’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies.

Held: Yes. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse

through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would
have first been exhausted. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of action, and it is
too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts. This traditional attitude of the
courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the
party litigants and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a remedy is available
within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be
made to (the) courts. Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act
and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be
held to be inappropriate and impermissible.
A argued that his case should have been viewed as an exception from the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A cannot deny that he has been able
to effectively, if not deliberately, delayed the resolution of the administrative case against
him due to his repeated requests for extension of time to file answer and his
inexcusable refusal to attend the scheduled hearings thereon despite due notice.
A's invocation that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be EXCEPTED
by the fact that irreparable damage would ensue upon his overdue suspension and
illegal ouster from office cannot be countenanced.

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EVIDENCE
IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS

PEOPLE V. PERALTA
350 SCRA 198 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of murder. A attempted to impeach the credibility of 3

prosecution witnesses, especially witness W. A pointed out that W testified that as the
victim’s fraternity brother, he would do “anything and everything” for the victim.

Issue: Whether A was able to properly impeach the witnesses on account of bias.

Held: No. A witness may be said to biased when his relation to the cause or to the
parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color or pervert the
truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel must lay the
proper foundation of the bias by asking the witness facts constituting the bias. In this
case, there was no proper impeachment by bias of the 3 prosecution witnesses. W’s
testimony that he would do anything for his fellow brothers was too broad and general so
as to constitute a motive to lie before the court.

PEOPLE V. MACANDOG et. al.

6 June 2001

Facts: A was accused of the murder of V. E, a witness of the prosecution, testified that
A was among those present at the crime scene. A argued that E’s testimony should not
have been given credence because she was biased, as she was the sister of the
deceased.

Issue: Whether E is a biased witness.

Held: No. The fact that E is the sister of deceased does not per se make her a biased
witness. Mere relationship of the victim to a witness does not automatically impair her
credibility and render her testimony less worthy of credence where no improper motive
can be ascribed. Such relationship lends more credence to the testimony considering
her natural interest to see the guilty punished. It would be unnatural for a relative who is
interested in vindicating the crime to accuse anyone other than the real culprit.

CHILD WITNESS

PEOPLE V. RAMA
350 SCRA 266 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of kidnapping a baby. W, the 5-year old cousin of the victim,
identified A as the one who took the victim. A contended that W’s testimony, coming
from the mouth of a 5-year old, does not deserve credit because she could not answer
many questions and appeared to have been coached by her grandmother.

Issue: Whether W is disqualified as a witness.

Held: No. The requirements of a child’s competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity
of observation, (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication. Professor
Wigmore said that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity. In this
case, while the 5-year old witness was not able to answer some questions, she was
straightforward in identifying A as the culprit. This is in accord with the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness (became effective Dec. 15, 2000), which provides in § 6
(a) that the age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency
examination.

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PROOF OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION

PEOPLE V. FELWA
20 Apr. 2001

Facts: A was charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. In the course of the
trial, the prosecution attempted to bring out A’s former conviction of another crime.

Issue: Can the proof of A’s past conviction be used to prove his guilt of the crime
charged?

Held: No. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only
prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove
that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case.

OPINION RULE

PEOPLE V. DURANAN
349 SCRA 180 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was found guilty of rape. The victim’s mother testified as to the mental
condition of her daughter. The victim was considered retarded and A was sentenced
accordingly. A contended that since the victim’s mental age was not proven, he cannot
be convicted of rape of a mental retardate.

Issue: Whether the testimony of the victim’s mother was sufficient to establish the
mental condition of the victim.

Held: Yes. The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a
psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was
born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on
these matters. This is in accordance with the exception to the opinion rule provided in
Rule 130 § 50.

HEARSAY

PEOPLE V. GARCIA
335 SCRA 208 (July 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of murder. The police officer who prepared the information
testified that he was informed by X and Y of the identity of the assailant. However, X and
Y did not actually see the assailants but merely heard the news from others.

Issue: Whether the police officer’s testimony as to the identity of the assailants is
admissible.

Held: No. The information given by X and Y to the police officer was hearsay. The
police officer’s testimony is even multiple hearsay, since it is based upon “third hand”
information related to the witness by someone who heard it from others.

GO V. CA
5 Feb. 2001

Facts: The prosecution sought to establish the fact that a certain checkbook was
delivered personally to Mr. A by presenting the testimony of X, who testified that Y told
her that he left the checkbook on top of Mr. A’s table.

Issue: Is X’s testimony admissible?

Held: No. X’s testimony is hearsay. It does not appear that X has first-hand knowledge
that the checkbook was indeed delivered to Mr. A.

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ESTRADA V. ANIANO DESIERTO

03 Apr. 2001

Facts: The Supreme Court, in a prior decision, used the Angara Diary (“AD”) to
establish Estrada’s intent to resign.

Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence?

Held: No.
1. The AD is not an out of court statement. The AD is part of the pleadings in the
cases at bar. Estrada (E) cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the
AD. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said diary was
frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. E had all the opportunity to
contest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
2. Even assuming arguendo that the AD was an out of court statement, still its use
is not covered by the hearsay rule. The rules of exclusion do not cover
admissions of a party and the AD belongs to this class. Although the AD is not
the diary of E, E is bound by it, in accordance with the doctrine of adoptive
admission. Sec. Angara acted for and in behalf of E in the crucial days before
Pres. Arroyo took her oath as President. Admissions of an agent (Secretary
Angara) are binding on the principal (E).
3. Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. The AD contains statements of E which reflect his state of mind and
are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign.

SEVILLANA V. I.T. CORP

16 Apr. 2001

Facts: In a labor case, the NLRC considered P’s complaint-affidavit as mere hearsay
evidence since P was not cross-examined.

Issue: Should the complaint-affidavit be considered hearsay evidence?

Held: No. Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attention
to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process. In this
light, the NLRC, like the labor arbiter is authorized to decide cases based on the position
papers and other documents submitted, without resorting to technical rules of evidence.

D.M. CONSUNJI V. CA
20 Apr. 2001

Facts: A police officer investigated the death of P and filed a police report. P’s widow
filed in the RTC a complaint for damages against P’s employer, D. The police report was
admitted in evidence and the police officer who prepared the same testified during trial.

Issue: Was the police report hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible?

Held: The report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of the officer who executed the report. In any case, the Court held that
portions of the report which were of the personal knowledge of the police officer suffice
to prove the cause of death of P.

CITY GOV’T V. MONTEVERDE

21 May 2001

Facts: A witness gave hearsay testimony. It was not objected to.

Issue: Does the testimony have probative value?

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Held: No. Hearsay evidence has no probative value, whether objected to or not.

MOLLANEDA V. UMACOB
6 June 2001

Facts: An administrative case was filed against A. Complainant sought A’s dismissal as
Schools Division Superintendent. Complainant offered in evidence the testimony of
witnesses who heard the complainant’s grievance against A. A contended that such
testimony is hearsay.

Issue: Whether the testimonies of the witnesses constitute hearsay.

Held: No. The testimonies were not presented to prove the truth of complainant’s
accusations against A, but only to establish the fact that complainant narrated to them
what transpired between her and A. While it is true that the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the
facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose
of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has
been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be
shown. Evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact.

DYING DECLARATIONS

PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS
349 SCRA 1 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The prosecution called X to testify on Y’s “dying declaration.” Y, however, was
alive and later even testified in court.

Issue: Is X’s testimony admissible as dying declaration?

Held: No. One of the requisites—that the declarant dies—is missing.

PEOPLE V. MACANDOG et. al.

6 June 2001

Facts: V, the victim, was able to tell E the names of his assailants before he died. A, the
accused, questioned the admissibility of V’s statement as a dying declaration.

Issue: Whether V’s statement is admissible as a dying declaration.

Held: Yes. For a dying declaration to be valid and admissible in evidence, the following
requisites must concur:
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness
of an impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case in which the declarant is the victim.
The positive declaration of the deceased as to the identity of his assailants, given the
consciousness that death is imminent is undoubtedly entitled to great weight considering
the seriousness of his wounds and his very weak physical condition as shown by the fact
that death supervened 30 minutes after his disclosure to E.

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RES GESTAE

PEOPLE V. MANSUETO
336 SCRA 715 (July 2000)

Facts: A and B were accused of killing V. The prosecution presented W, the daughter of
V, during trial. W identified A as the culprit. A attempted to impeach W’s credibility. A
argued that W’s failure to mention A as the driver of the getaway vehicle when she
reported the shooting incident to the police immediately after it occurred should form part
of the res gestae. A contended that the omission, as part of the res gestae, should have
been afforded evidentiary weight.

Issue: Whether res gestae applies.

Held: No. Since W herself testified, there is absolutely no room for the application of
the rule on res gestae. Also, subject matters not mentioned or are outside the
statements or explanations given by the declarant do not form part of the res gestae.

PEOPLE V. PALMONES
336 SCRA 80 (July 2000)

Facts: A was charged with the crime of murder. Before the victim died, he was able to
talk with his nephew W. He told W the names of the assailants. A contended that the
declaration was hearsay—it was not a dying declaration or a statement constituting part
of the res gestae.

Issue: Whether the declaration is admissible.

Held: No. A was correct. The following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been
made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was
made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence
or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative
thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. In this case, the
declaration did not meet the test of spontaneity because: (a) an appreciable amount of
time had elapsed before the statement was made; (b) he made the statement at the
hospital and not at the scene of the crime; and (c) there was an intervening event (trip to
the hospital) that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation.

PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS
349 SCRA 1 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A poisoning incident occurred. X took Y’s ante-mortem statement 39 hours after
the incident.

Issue: Is Y’s statement admissible as part of the res gestae?

Held: No. The element of spontaneity is lacking in the alleged ante-mortem statement.
39 hours is too long a time to be considered “subsequent immediately to the startling
occurrence.”

TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

CARIAGA V. CA et. al.

6 June 2001

Facts: Prosecution subpoenaed witness W but he failed to appear. Thus, the

prosecution offered W’s testimony given out of court and this was admitted. A argued
that his right to meet the witness against him face to face was violated.

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Issue: Was A’s constitutional right violated when the court admitted W’s out-of-court
testimony?

Held: Yes. The preconditions set forth in § 47 Rule 130 for the admission of testimony
given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied with and there is more reason to
adopt such a strict rule in the case of § 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of
evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by § 47, more
importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right of an
accused person “to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face” (Toledo, Jr. v.
People) In Tan v. CA, it was ruled that ’unable to testify’ or for that matter ‘unavailability’,
does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. This
rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, “mere sending of subpoena and
failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its
coercive power to arrest.” In this case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness
arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who
are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. The sworn statement of W should not have been
admitted as evidence for the prosecution.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

LADIGNON V. CA
336 SCRA 42 (July 2000)

Facts: P filed a complaint against D for recovery of possession of real property. P

claimed that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged. D invoked the
presumption of regularity of public documents.

Issue: Whether P was able to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption
of regularity of public documents.

Held: No. As a public document, the Deed of Absolute Sale had in its favor the
presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is
clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant; otherwise the document should
be upheld. P’s mere denial will not suffice to overcome the positive value of a notarized
document.

AUTHENTICATION

PROPLE V. BANZALES
336 SCRA 64 (July 2000)

Facts: A was charged with illegal recruitment. The POEA issued a certificate stating that
A was an unlicensed illegal recruiter. A argued that the prosecution filed to establish 1
element of the offense considering that no representative of the POEA was presented in
court to testify as to the authenticity of the certificate.

Issue: Whether authenticity of the certificate needs to be proved.

Held: No. A POEA certification is a public document issued by a public officer in the
performance of an official duty; hence it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated (Rule 132 § 23). Public documents are entitled to a presumption of regularity;
consequently, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary.

ESTRADA V. ANIANO DESIERTO

03 Apr. 2001

Facts: The Court, in a previous decision, relied not upon the original but only a copy of
the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule on authentication of private writings and
best evidence?

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Held: No.
1. The Supreme Court, citing Wigmore, stated that: “ Production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring publication.
2. Estrada had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the AD when he filed his
Memorandum, Supplemental Memorandum and Second Supplemental Memorandum,
but he did not object to its admissibility. He was not therefore denied due process.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

PEOPLE V. GIVERA
349 SCRA 573 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was charged with murder. The prosecution formally offered the testimony of
the medico-legal officer taken in the first case involving 3 other accused for the death of
the same victim.

Issue: Whether the said testimony is admissible.

Held: No. The defense did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the medico-legal
officer so his testimony cannot be used in evidence against the accused.

FORMAL OFFER

PEOPLE V. ROBLES
349 SCRA 569 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: A was charged with the murder of V. At the preliminary investigation stage, 1
eyewitness executed an affidavit corroborating the testimony of another witness. But this
affidavit was not offered in evidence nor was the eyewitness presented during the trial. It
was argued that the affidavit might be treated as evidence since it formed part of the
records of the preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether the affidavit is admissible.

Held: No. It is merely hearsay. That the affidavit formed part of the record of the
preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the
record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the records of the case in
the RTC. To be considered part of the records of the case, the record of the preliminary
investigation must be introduced as evidence during trial.

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

GUTANG V. PEOPLE
335 SCRA 479 (July 2000)

Facts: A, B, C, and D were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search

warrant. The accused argued that the Receipts of Property Seized should not have been
admitted in evidence because these were obtained in violation of their constitutional
rights. The accused were made to sign the receipts without the assistance of a lawyer.

Issue: Whether the Receipts of Property Seized are admissible.

Held: No. The signature of the accused in the Receipts of Property Seized is
inadmissible in evidence because it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The
signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a
tacit admission of the crime charged for the reason that, in this case, mere unexplained
possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the

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accused on the receipts are not admissible, being tantamount to an uncounselled extra-
judicial confession.

PEOPLE V. RAYOS
7 Feb. 2001

Facts: A was charged and convicted of the rape-slay of a 9-year old mental retardate.
He executed an extrajudicial confession but claimed he was only forced to do so by the
policemen.

Issue: When is an extrajudicial confession admissible?

Held: There are four fundamental conditions needed for admissibility of a confession:
a. must be voluntary
b. must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel
c. must be express
d. must be in writing

PROVING MOTIVE

PEOPLE V. GIGANTO
336 SCRA 294 (July 2000)

Facts: A, B, C, and D were convicted of murder. The accused argued that the
prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The motive for
killing the victim was also not adequately shown.

Issue: Whether it was necessary to prove motive.

Held: Yes. In this case, there was no evidence of the prosecution on which a judgment
of conviction can be based. When the evidence of the prosecution is weak, it is
necessary to prove motive; otherwise, the guilt of the accused becomes open to
reasonable doubt, and the accused must be acquitted.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. PEDIGERO
337 SCRA 274 (Aug. 2000)

Facts: A was convicted of robbery with homicide. A claimed that the court erred in
holding that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently
established his guilt.

Issue: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict?

Held: Rule 133 § 4 enumerates the 3 elements that should be present in order for
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the culprit. The circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.

PEOPLE V. RAYOS
7 Feb. 2001

Facts: A was charged and convicted of the rape-slay of a 9-year old mental retardate.
He argued that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: When is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict?

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Held: When there are no eyewitnesses to a crime, resort to circumstantial evidence

becomes almost certainly unavoidable. In rape with homicide, the evidence against the
accused is basically circumstantial because of the nature of the crime. The
circumstances must be consistent with each other from which the only rational
hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom would be that the accused is guilty. The
circumstances must create a solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable,
that pinpoints the accused, to the exclusion of others, as being the perpetrator of the
crime and thereby sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. The
circumstantial pieces of evidence in this case, taken in their entirety, unmistakably point
to the guilt of A.

PROVING AGE

PEOPLE V. GERABAN
24 May 2001

Facts: In a qualified rape case, the prosecution relied on the testimony of the rape victim
and her mother to prove the minority of the victim for the purpose of imposing the death
penalty.

Issue: May the corroborative testimony of the victim’s mother suffice to establish the
minority of the victim in lieu of independent documentary evidence?

Held: Yes. The same must, however, be received with caution. In this case, the mother
is quite uncertain as to her daughter’s age. As a mother, she should have personal
knowledge of the ages and birth of her children. She could have stated the exact age of
her daughter or the date of her birth. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove with certainty
the minority of the victim.

RECANTATION

PEOPLE V. NARDO
1 Mar. 2001

Facts: A was charged with rape by his 14-year old daughter. He was convicted by the
TC and sentenced to death. A raised the defense that the victim desisted in pursuing
the case against her father by showing two letters. However, these were not subscribed
and sworn to by the victim.

Issue: Should the letters be admitted in order to acquit the accused?

Held: No. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable for there is always the
probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with
disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an
earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused
deserve only scant consideration. Even if sworn to, the victim’s recantation could hardly
suffice to overturn the finding of guilt by the TC which was based on her own clear and
convincing testimony given during a full-blown trial. An affidavit of recantation, being
usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.

CREDIBILITY

PEOPLE V. BUENAFLOR
27 June 2001

Facts: RTC found A guilty for raping 14-yr. old V who was asleep at the time of the
commission of the crime. During the initial reception of evidence for the prosecution, V
said she did not know A because it was her first time to see his face at the time the
incident took place, but later on cross-examination, she admitted that what she said was

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false because actually A is their neighbor. The TC thought that considering that the
offended party is a very young girl of 15 years, it is not uncommon for the young girl to
conceal the assaults because of the rapist's threats on her life.

Issue: Whether V is a credible witness.

Held: No. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single
most important issue. In this case, the testimony of the complainant is not credible
because it is replete with inconsistencies, and narrations that are contrary to common
experience, human nature and the natural course of things.

ALIBI

PEOPLE V. ABENDAN et. al.

28 June 2001

Facts: RTC found A et. al. guilty of murder. The trial court gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that there was treachery and conspiracy in the
killing of the victim, who was asleep when he was fatally shot. A argued that the trial
court erred in ignoring his alibi.

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in not giving weight to A’s alibi.

Held: Yes. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Alibi becomes
unworthy of credit when it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relative,
and not by credible persons.

MEDICAL/CHEMICAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. NUBLA
19 June 2001

Facts: A was convicted for the rape of V, committed by means of force and intimidation;
in particular, by inducing V to drink iced tea laced with drugs causing the latter to lose
consciousness. A denied that V was drugged and pointed to the absence of any medical
or chemical evidence to support her claim.

Issue: Whether the fact that V was drugged was sufficiently proven.

Held: Yes. While no chemical analysis was conducted on the blood of the complainant
immediately after the incident, the physical manifestations (dizziness, bodily weakness,
strong desire to sleep) were proved during the trial.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

MOLLANEDA V. UMACOB
6 June 2001

Facts: A, the Schools Division Superintendent, was criminally charged before the court.
A was acquitted. Complainants filed an administrative case against A to dismiss him
from the service. A argued that the dismissal of the criminal case against him meant that
the administrative case cannot prosper.

Issue: Whether A is correct.

Held: No. The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case does not foreclose the
administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In

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dismissing the case, the court is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove
the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. In administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. A’s culpability has been proven
by substantial evidence. The dismissal of the criminal case cannot bind this Court in the
disposition of the instant administrative case. There was justifiable ground for A’s
dismissal from the service.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

VDA. DE MANALO V. CA
349 SCRA 135 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The surviving children of Manalo filed a petition for the judicial settlement of the
estate of their deceased father. The oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the case is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the
same family. They argued that petitioners failed to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving the members of the same family have been made prior to the filing
of the petition but the same have failed (pursuant to Art. 222 of the Civil Code).

Issue: Whether the petition should be treated as an ordinary civil action.

Held: No. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint/petition shall be controlling. In this
case, the petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for
settlement of estate. Indeed, the petition contained certain averments that may be typical
of an ordinary civil action and the oppositors took advantage of the said defect. But
oppositors may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of an essentially valid petition by
raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to said petition. The jurisdiction of a
court as well as the concomitant nature of the action is determined by the averments in
the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer.

EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY V. FERNANDEZ et. al.

6 June 2001

Facts: P’s co-heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate without notifying P.

The property was then expropriated by the government. Title to the property was issued
to the government in 1982. In 1996, P filed an action for reconveyance of property
alleging that he was unlawfully deprived by his co-heirs of his participation in the
settlement of the estate.

Issue: Whether P’s action should be allowed to prosper.

Held: No. Persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may
assert their claim only within the 2-year period after the settlement and distribution of the
estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or
had no notice of the settlement. § 4, Rule 74, is not meant to be a statute of limitations.
An extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte proceeding, would not affect third
persons who had no knowledge thereof. By its registration in the manner provided by
law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively.
P is deemed to have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement
by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot.
From the time of registration, P had 2 years, within which to file their objections or to
demand the appropriate settlement of the estate. The only exception is when the title
remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the
subject property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value. The title to the property in the present case was no longer in the

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name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for
value – the government. The government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the
acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise
Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings.

JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT

HEIRS OF SANDEJAS V. LINA

05 Feb. 2001

Facts: During his lifetime, D, the decedent conveyed real property to X. In the
proceeding for the settlement of D’s estate, X filed a motion to approve the deed of sale.
The administrator filed an opposition to the said motion.

Issue: Does the probate court have jurisdiction to approve the deed of conditional sale?

Held: Yes. Probate jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of a probate court’s recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or
otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. In this case, the Motion for
Approval was meant to settle the decedent’s obligation to X; hence, that obligation
clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require X to file a separate
action will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estate of D.

RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS

HEIRS OF SANDEJAS V. LINA

05 Feb. 2001

Facts: During his lifetime, D, the decedent conveyed real property to X. In the
proceeding for the settlement of D’s estate, X filed a motion to approve the deed of sale.
The administrator filed an opposition to the said motion.

Issue: Does X have the right to intervene?

Held: Yes. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real
property contracted by the decedent while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of
the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the right
to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under
administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the probate court
inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be
entitled to the avails of the suit.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

PNB V. CA, et. al.

29 June 2001

Facts: S was the special administrator of the intestate estate of X. The court authorized
S to obtain a loan from PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land. For failure to pay the loan in full, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder but since there was still a
deficiency, PNB filed an action with the RTC against S. RTC dismissed PNB’s complaint.
CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether the mortgagee can still recover the deficiency.

Held: No. Rule 89 § 7 (f) provides that if the court grants authority to mortgage
property of the estate, it shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased
in his lifetime. Thus, Rule 86 § 7 also applies as to the remedies of the mortgagee. Case
law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee 3 distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the

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satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before
it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his
right to recover any deficiency from the estate. The 3 rd mode includes extrajudicial
foreclosure sales; the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any
further deficiency claim.

HABEAS CORPUS

TUNG CHIN HUI V. RODRIGUEZ

02 Apr. 2001

Facts: P, a Taiwanese national, was charged and, in due course, found guilty by the
BID Board of Commissioners of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by
Taiwanese authorities. The BID Board of Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation
Order. P filed before the RTC a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Issue: Should the Writ for Habeas Corpus be issued?

Held: No. P’s confinement is in accord with § 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended, which reads as follows: Ҥ 37. (a) The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: XXX (7) Any alien who remains
in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted
as a non-immigrant.”

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