1.

Reasons for growth of Administration Law

The most notable and important development of the modern state is the rapid growth of
Administrative law. The growth which took place in the 20th century can be considered as a
radical change. The role and the functions of the state have undergone an extreme alteration.
There is a multiplication of government functions. The state which is functioning today act as
a progressive democratic state it as to make sure whether the essential needs of the citizens
are full filled by the state. It as to ensure Social peace and security, control the over
production, manufactures and distributes essential commodities, ensures equal pay for equal
work it should work on the improvement of slums, health and education of the citizens the
modern state takes care of its citizen till their existence inside the state. Such kind of
development have increased the reach and scope of Administrative law. It is the law which
governs the duties, powers and also the manner in which those powers are executed.
Administrative law limits the authorities from using their powers in an abusive manner.
Determining the Reasons for the Growth of Administrative law which helps in Analysing
whether such growth has witnessed an efficient functioning of the Administrative authorities.
Administrative law developed principles which assist to ensure that the Administrative or
public authorities works in a legal, reasonable and efficient manner. This article is mainly
concentrated on knowing the reasons for the growth of Administrative law with a brief
introduction to the subject as well as the chronicle of administrative law and it’s functioning,
through which a better understanding of Administrative can be gained and also the need for
administrative law can be known.

In India there present several Administrative bodies appointed by the Central or the State
government to ensure a proper and systematic functioning of Government Agencies and
Public Enterprises established either by the state or the central governments. Administrative
agencies can be shortly classified into three the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary
All the administrative activities can be covered under these three main heads. It becomes
necessary to keep an eye on these Administrative Agencies. To regulate the activities of the
Administrative Authorities the concept of Administrative law was introduced. Administrative
law deals with the powers of the Administrative authorities, the manner in which the powers
are exercised and the remedies which are available to the aggrieved persons when those
powers are abused by these authorities. Administrative law is a part of constitutional law and
all concerns of administrative law are also concerns of constitutional law. The main object of
the study of administration law is to unravel the way in which these administrative authorities
could be kept within their limits so that the discretionary powers may not be turned into
arbitrary powers.

Chronicle of Administrative Law:

Administrative law is not a codified, document or well-defined law. It is essentially

unwritten, uncodified or a judge-made law. The evidence of administrative law can be
evidenced even in the ancient times. The concept of dharma ruled and observed by the kings
and administrators. The basic principles of natural justice and fair play were followed by the
kings and officers as the administration could be run only on those principles accepted by
dharma, but still there was no administrative law in existence in the sense in which it is
studied today. After the establishment of the East India Company and the rule of British rule
in India, the powers of the government had increased. Many Acts, statutes and legislations
were passed by the British government regulating public safety, health, morality, and
transport and labour relations. The practice of granting administrative license began with the
state with the Stage Carriage Act 1861.

The first public corporation was established under the Bombay Port Act, 1873. Delegated
legislation was accepted by the Northern India canal and Drainage Act, 1873and the Opium
Act, 1878. Proper and effective steps were taken to regulate the trade and traffic in explosives
by the Indian Explosives Act, 1884.In many statutes, provisions were made regarding holding
of permits and licenses and for the settlement of disputes by the administrative authorities and
tribunals. In the present century, social and economic policies of the government had
significant impact on private rights of citizens, e.g. housing, employment, planning,
education, health, service, pension, manufacture of goods etc., Traditional legislative and
judicial system could not effectively solve these problems. It resulted in increase in delegated
legislation as well as tribunalisation. Administrative law thus became a living subject. Since
independence, the activities and the functions of the government have further increased.
Under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Minimum wages Act, 1948, the factories Act,
1948 and the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, important social security measures have
been taken those employed in industries. The philosophy of a welfare state has been
specifically embodied in the Indian constitution. In constitution itself provisions are there to
secure social, economic and political justice, equality of status and opportunity to all citizens.
The ownership and control of material resources of the society should be so disturbed as to
best serve the common good. The operation of the economic system should not result in the
concentration of wealth and means of production with few. For the implementation of all
objects, the state is vested with the power to impose reasonable restrictions even on the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. While interpreting all these Acts and the
provisions of the constitution, the judiciary started taking into consideration the objects and
ideals of social welfare.

In Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel vs RBI, the Supreme Court held that under the banking
companies Act, 1949, the Reserve Bank was the sole judge to decide whether the affairs of a
banking company were being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the depositors interest and
the court had no option but to pass an order of winding as prayed for by the reserve bank.
In Javid Rasool Bhat vs state of J&K, the Supreme Court observed that a member of the
Selected Committee can even ask irrelevant questions to explore the candidate’s capacity to
detect irrelevancies.

Definitions of Administrative Law:

 Ivor Jennings has defines Administrative law is the law relating to the administration.
It determines the Organisation, powers and duties of the administrative authorities.
This is the most widely accepted definition.
 According to Wade, administrative law is the law relating to the control of
Governmental power. According to him, the primary object of administrative law is to
keep powers of the government with in their legal bounce so as to protect the citizens
against their abuse. The powerful engines of authority must be preventive from
running amok.
 According to K.C.Davis administrative law is the law concerning the powers and
procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law governing judicial
review of administrative action.
 According to garner also adopts the American approach advocated by K.C.Davis.
According to him administrative law may be describe as those rules which are
recognized by the courts as law and which relate to regulate the administration of
government.
 According to Griffith and Street, the main object of administrative law is the
operation and control of administrative authorities. It must deal with three aspects
o What sought power does the administration exercise?
o What are the limits of those powers?
 What are the ways in which the administration is contained within those limits?

Functions of Administrative Law:

 The primary function of administrative law is to keep governmental powers within the
limits of law and to protect private rights and individual interests. As already noted,
the scope of activities of the government have expanded. Today the state is “ the
protector, provider, entrepreneur, regulator and arbiter”. Rulemaking power and an
authority and an authority to decide are described as effective and powerful weapons
of administration. All powers have two inherent characters 1) they are not absolute or
unfettered, and 2) they are likely to be abused. Administrative law attempts to control
the powers of the government, and its agencies. To achieve the object Administrative
law provides an effective mechanism and adequate protection. It helps to bring a
balance between two conflicting forces individual rights and public interest.

Reasons for the Growth of Administrative Law:

 The following factors are responsible for the growth of administrative law:
There is a radical change in the philosophy of the role played by the state. The
negative policy of maintaining law and order and social welfare is changing. The state
has not confined its scope to the traditional and minimum functions of defense and
administration of justice, but has adopted the positive policy and as a welfare state has
undertaken to perform varied functions.
 The judicial system was proved to be an inadequate to decide and settle all types of
disputes. It was slow, costly, inept, complex and formalistic. It was already
overburdened and it was not possible to expect speedy disposal of even very
important matters. The important problems could not be solved by mere literally
interpreting the provisions of some statutes, but required consideration of various
other factors and it could not be done by the ordinary courts of law. Therefore,
industrial tribunals and labour courts. Were established, which possessed the
techniques and expertise to handle these complex problems.
 The legislative process was also inadequate. It had no time and technique to deal with
all the details. It was impossible for it to lay down detailed rules and procedures, and
even when detailed provisions were laid down by the legislature, they have found to
be defective and inadequate. Therefore, it was necessary to delegate some powers to
the administrative authorities
 There is scope for experiments in administrative process. Here unlike, in legislation, it
is not necessary to continue a rule until commencement of the next session of the
legislature. Here a rule can be made, tired for some time and if it is defective, can be
altered or modified within a short period. Thus, legislation is rigid in character, while
the administrative process is flexible.
 The administrative authorities can avoid technicalities. Administrative law represents
functional rather than a theoretical and legislative approach. The traditional judiciary
is conservative, rigid and technical. It is impossible for courts to decide cases without
formality and technicality. Administrative tribunals are not bound by rules of
evidence and procedure and they can take a practical view of the matter to decide
complex problems.
 Administrative authorities can take preventive measures. Unlike regular courts of law,
they do not have to wait for parties to come before them with disputes. In many cases,
these preventive actions may prove to be more effective and useful than punishing a
person after he has committed a breach of law. As freeman says, Inspection and
grading of meat answers the consumers need more adequately than does a right to sue
the seller after the consumer injured.
 Administrative authorities can take effective steps for the enforcement of the
aforesaid preventive measures e.g. suspension, revocation and cancellation of license,
destruction of contaminated articles etc., which are not generally available through
regular courts of law.

The Role of administrative law is to limit the powers of the government agencies and
keep a check in on the administrative authorities. it is not always possible to rely upon
some general statutes for rising disputes between the individuals and the public
authorities thus there should be a proper law to govern such disputes, Administrative law
act as the proper law which governs the administrative actions.
 2. Administrative Discretion

Discretion in layman’s language means choosing from amongst the various available
alternatives without reference to any predetermined criterion, no matter how fanciful that
choice may be. A person writing his will has such discretion to dispose of his property in any
manner, no matter how arbitrary or fanciful it may be. But the term ‘discretion’ when
qualified by the word ‘administrative’ has somewhat different overtones. ‘Discretion’ in this
sense means choosing from amongst the various available alternatives but with reference to
the rules of reason and justice and not according to personal whims. Such exercise is not to be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular.

The problem of administrative discretion is complex. It is true that in any intensive form of
government, the government cannot function without the exercise of some discretion by the
officials. It is necessary not only for the individualization of the administrative power but also
because it is humanly impossible to lay down a rule for every conceivable eventually in the
complex art of modern government. But it is equally true that absolute discretion is a ruthless
master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of man’s other inventions. Therefore, there
has been a constant conflict between the claims of the administration to an absolute discretion
and the claims of subjects to a reasonable exercise of it. Discretionary power by itself is not
pure evil but gives much room for misuse. Therefore, remedy lies in tightening the procedure
and not in abolishing the power itself.

Judicial behaviour and administrative discretion in India

Though courts in India have developed a few effective parameters for the proper exercise of
discretion, the conspectus of judicial behaviour still remains halting, variegated and residual,
and lacks the activism of the American courts. Judicial control mechanism of administrative
discretion is exercised at two stages:

(1) Control at the stage of delegation of discretion;

(2) Control at the stage of the exercise of discretion.

(1) Control at the stage of delegation of discretion.– The court exercises control over
delegation of discretionary powers to the administration by adjudicating upon the
constitutionality of the law under which such powers are delegated with reference to the
fundamental rights enunciated in Part III of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, if the law
confers vague and wide discretionary power on any administrative authority, it may be
declared ultra vires Article 14, Article 19 and other provisions of the Constitution. In case of
delegated legislation, courts have after been satisfied with vague or broad statements of
policy, but usually it has not been so in cases of application of fundamental rights to statutes
conferring administrative discretion. The reason is that delegated legislation being a power to
make an order of general applicability presents less chance of administrative arbitrariness
than administrative discretion which applies from case to case.

(2) Control at the stage of the exercise of discretion.– In India, unlike the USA, there is no
Administrative Procedure Act providing for judicial review on the exercise of administrative
discretion. Therefore, the power of judicial review arises from the constitutional
configuration of courts. Courts in India have always held the view that judge-proof discretion
is a negation of the rule of law. Therefore, they have developed various formulations to
control the exercise of administrative discretion. These formulations may be conveniently
grouped into two broad generalizations:

(a) That the authority is deemed not to have exercised its discretion at all or failure to
exercise discretion–“non application of mind” ;

(b) That the authority has not exercised its discretion properly or excess or “abuse of
discretion”.

(a) That the authority is deemed not to have exercised its discretion at all– “non application of
mind”.–Under this categorization, courts exercise judicial control over administrative
discretion if the authority has either abdicated its power or has put fetters on its exercise or
the jurisdictional facts are either non-existent or have been wrongly determined. The
authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise it, but not to exercise it in
a particular manner. When a discretionary power is conferred on an authority, the said
authority must exercise that power after applying its mind to the fact and circumstances of the
case in hand. Thus where the authority abdicates its power e.g. abdication of functions, acting
under dictation, conditional precedents, acts mechanically & without due care, imposes
fetters on the exercise of discretion, there is a failure to exercise discretion.

(b) That the authority has not exercised its discretion properly– “abuse of discretion”.– This
is an all-embracing formulation developed by courts in India to control the exercise of
discretion by the administrative authority. When discretionary power is conferred on an
administrative authority, it must be exercised according to law. When the mode of exercising
a valid power is improper or unreasonable there is an abuse of the power. Improper exercise
of discretion includes everything which English courts include in ‘unreasonable’ exercise of
discretion and American courts include in ‘arbitrary and capricious’ exercise of discretion.
Improper exercise of discretion includes such things as ‘taking irrelevant considerations into
account’, ‘acting for improper purpose’, ‘asking wrong questions’, ‘acting in bad faith’,
‘neglecting to take into consideration relevant factors’, ‘acting unreasonably’ etc.

(1) Mala fides. – Mala fides or bad faith means dishonest intention or corrupt motive. Even
though it may be difficult to determine whether or not the authority has exceeded its powers
in a particular case because of the broad terms in which the statute in question may have
conferred power on it, the administration action may, nevertheless, be declared bad if the
motivation behind the action is not honest. At times, the courts use the phrase “mala fides” in
the broad sense of any improper exercise or abuse of power. In Jaichand v. State of West
Bengal, the Supreme Court observed that mala fide exercise of power does not necessarily
imply any moral turpitude as a matter of law. It only means that the statutory power is
exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended.

In this sense, mala fides is equated with any ultra vires exercise of administrative power. The
term “mala fides” has not been used in the broad sense, but in the narrow sense of exercise of
power with dishonest intent or corrupt motive. Mala fides, in this narrow sense, would
include those cases where the motive force behind an administrative action is personal
animosity, spite, vengeance, personal benefit to the authority itself or its relations or friends.
Mala fide exercise of discretionary power is bad as it amounts to abuse of power.

In Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court used the phrase “mala fides” for
initiating administrative action against an individual “for satisfying a private or personal
grudge of the authority.” In this case, the appellant, a civil surgeon in the employment of the
state government, was initially granted leave preparatory to retirement, but, subsequently, it
was revoked, and he was placed under suspension and disciplinary action was started against
him on the charge that he had accepted a bribe of Rs. 16/- from some patient prior to going on
leave. The appellant alleged that the disciplinary action against him had been initiated at the
instance of the Chief Minister to wreak personal vengeance on him as he had refused to yield
to the illegal demands of the Chief Minister and members of his family. The Supreme Court
accepted the contention, held the exercise of power to be mala fide and quashed the order.

In Rowjee v. Andhra Pradesh, under the schemes prepared by the State Road Transport
Corporation, certain transport routes were proposed to be nationalized. The schemes owed
their origin to the directions by the Chief Minister. It was alleged that the Chief Minister had
acted mala fide in giving the directions. The charge against him was that the particular routes
had been selected because he sought to take vengeance on the private operators on those
routes, as they were his political opponents. From the course of events, and the absence of an
affidavit from the Chief Minister denying the charge against him, the court concluded that
mala fide on the part of the Chief Minister was established.

In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, the court struck down the land acquisition proceedings
for acquiring the land of the petitioners for a mandi on account of mala fides. From the course
of events, the fact that the acquisition proceedings were started at the behest of one of the
respondents who was a minister in the government and a politician to satisfy his personal
vendetta against the landholders, and also the fact that the allegations made by the petitioners
remained uncontroverted by the respondents, the court concluded that there was malice on the
part of the government in acquiring the land of the petitioners.

In G. Sadanandan v. State of Kerala, the petitioner, a businessman, dealing in wholesale

kerosene oil was detained under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 with a
view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies
and services essential to the life of the community. The petitioner challenged the validity of
the impugned order of detention mainly on the ground that it is mala fideand has been passed
as a result of malicious and false reports, prepared at the instance of Deputy Superintendent
of Police. The whole object of Deputy Superintendent in securing the preparation of these
false reports was to eliminate the petitioner from the field of wholesale business in kerosene
oil in Trivendrum so that his relatives may benefit and obtain the dealership. The Deputy
Superintendent did not file the affidavit to controvert the allegations made against him and
the affidavits filed by the Home Secretary were very defective in many respects. After
considering all the materials the Supreme Court declared the order of detention to be clearly
and plainly mala fide.

In P.B. Samant v. State of Maharashtra, the court held the distribution of cement against the
law and the circulars or guidelines issued by the Government on that behalf as bad. The
distribution of cement was in favour of certain builders in return for the donations given by
them to certain foundations of which the Chief Minister was a trustee. It was a clear case of
mala fide exercise of power. The power to control the distribution of an essential commodity
like cement is given to the Government with a view to ensuring its equitable distribution.
When this power is used for obtaining donations for a trust, it is a clear case of abuse of
power.

In Express Newspapers (Pvt.) Ltd v. Union of India, a notice of re-entry upon the failure of
lease of lease granted by the central government and of threatened demolition of the
Appellant’s officer buildings was held to be mala fide and politically motivated by the party
in power against the Express Group of Newspapers in general. The fact of the case was that
by an agreement of lease the petitioner was allotted certain plots for construction of its press
building by the Government of India. The Express Newspapers then constructed its building.
The Lt. Governor of Delhi alleged that the new Express building was constructed in
contravention of municipal corporation laws and served a notice for re-entry and for its
demolition. But the construction of new building was inconformity with the lease deed and
with the express sanction of the lessor i.e. the Union of India. The Supreme Court observed in
the instant case on the allegation of mala fide as follows: where the mala fides are alleged, it
is necessary that the person against whom such allegation is made should come forward with
an answer refuting such allegations. For otherwise such allegations remain unrebutted and the
court would in such case be constrained to accept the allegations so remaining unrebutted and
unanswered on the test of probability. The Court thus held that on the facts and circumstances
of the instant case the impugned notice was actuated with an ulterior and extraneous purpose
and thus was wholly mala fide and politically motivated.

In State of Punjab v. V.K Khanna, the Court held that the expression ‘mala fide’ has a
definite significance and there must be existing definite evidence of bias. The action would
not be mala fide unless the same is in accompaniment with some other factors which would
depict a bad motive or intent on the part of the doer of the act. Mala fide intent or bias
depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. The dispute in the appeals pertains to the
last phase of earlier government and the first phase of the present government in the State of
Punjab. Whereas the former chief secretary of the State of Punjab initiated proceedings
against two senior colleagues. When Prakash Singh Badal came into power not only chief
secretary had to walk out of the administrative building but a number seventeen officer in the
hierarchy of officers, was placed as the chief secretary and within a period of 10 days of his
entry at the secretariat, a notification was issued, though with the authority and the consent of
Chief Minister pertaining to cancellation of two earlier notification initiating a CBI inquiry.
The High Court attributed it to be a motive improper and mala fide. Absence of malice has
been the main contention in support of the appeal and adoption of a simple method of
disciplinary enquiry was key issue as given by the appellants. Shri Khanna, a respondent
contended that the entire proceeding was the event of gross violation of basic tenets by reason
of malice. Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court.

Mala fide is a psychological factor to allege but very difficult to prove. The burden of
proving mala fides is on the person making the allegations, and burden is ‘very heavy’.
Neither express nor implied malice can be inferred or assumed. It is for the person seeking to
invalidate an order to establish the charge of bad faith. The reason is that there is presumption
in favour of the administration that it always exercises its power bonafide and in good faith.
Seriousness of allegations demands proof of a high order and credibility. The Supreme Court
in E.P. Royappa v. Tamil Nadu, brought out difficulties inherent in proving mala fides. The
factors which are important in proof of mala fides: (i) Direct evidence (e.g. documents, tape
recordings etc.), (ii) Course of events, (iii) Public utterance of the authority, (iv) Deliberate
ignoring of facts by the authority and (v) Failure to file affidavits denying the allegations of
mala fides. However, if the allegations are of wild nature, there is no need of controverting
allegations. Mala fides may also be inferred from the authority ignoring apparent facts either
deliberately or sheer avoidance.

(2) Improper purpose. – If a statute confers power for one purpose, its use for a different
purpose will not be regarded as a valid exercise of the powers and the same may be quashed.
The cases of exercise of discretionary power from improper purposes have increased in
modern times because conferment of broad discretionary power has become usual tendency.
The orders based on improper purpose were quashed first in the cases concerning the exercise
of powers of compulsory acquisition in England.

So where the power is exercised for a purpose different from that specified in the statute, the
court will declare the exercise of the power as ultra vires. Where the land is acquired by
Municipal Corporation ostensibly for a public purpose but in fact to enable another body to
acquire it through the medium of corporation for some other purpose, the acquisition order
would be quashed by the court. Similarly, where Municipal Corporation refused to approve
the construction of buildings with a view to pressurizing the petitioner to provide drainage for
the adjoining building, and where the construction scheme of the petitioner does not
contravene.

“Improper purpose” is broader than mala fides, for whereas the latter denotes a personal spite
or malice, the former may have no such element. The action of an authority may be motivated
by some public interest (as distinguished from private interest) but it may be different from
what is contemplated by the statute under which the action has been taken. Here it is not so
much relevant to assess whether the authority is acting in good faith or bad faith. What is
relevant is to assess whether the purpose in view is one sanctioned by the statute which
confers power on the authority concerned.

In a few cases on preventive detention the Supreme Court has held that the power of
preventive detention cannot be used as a convenient substitute for prosecuting a person in a
Criminal Court. In Srilal Shav v. State of West Bengal, a preventive detention order was
issued against a person mainly on the ground that he had stolen railway property. He had
documents in his possession to prove his bona fide and to prove that he had purchased the
goods in the open market. A criminal case filed against him was dropped and the mentioned
preventive detention was passed in its place. The order was held to be bad by the court. Again
in L.K. Dass v. State of West Bengal, the court held that the power of detention could not be
used on simple solitary incident of theft of railway property and the proper course to
prosecute the person was in a criminal court.

(3) Irrelevant considerations.– A discretionary power must be exercised on relevant and not

on irrelevant or extraneous considerations. It means that power must be exercised taking into
account the considerations mentioned in the statute. If the statute mentions no such
considerations, then the power is to be exercised on considerations relevant to the purpose for
which it is conferred. If the authority concerned plays attention to, or takes into account
wholly irrelevant or extraneous circumstances, events or matters then the administrative
action is ultra vires and will be quashed. Thus where an administrative order is issued on
formal grounds or considerations which are irrelevant, it will quashed. The exercise of
discretionary power should not be influenced by considerations that cannot be lawfully taken
into account. The determination of the considerations which are relevant, and those which are
irrelevant, is a matter of inference from the general terms of the statute.
The decision of the House of the Lords in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, lays down the
parameters of judicial control of administrative discretion in England. In this case under the
statutory mil-marketing scheme, the prices paid to milk producers in different areas are fixed
by the Milk Marketing Board which consists of representatives of the producers. The
producers near the area of London complained that though they were in proximity of the
London market, yet the price paid did not reflect the higher value of their milk, and requested
the minister to refer the matter to the Statutory Committee for Complaints. To direct or not to
direct a complaint to the committee was the sole discretion of the minister. The minister in
exercise of his unfettered discretion refused to direct the complaint. One of the reasons given
by the ministry was that minister would be in a difficult political position if, despite the
committee’s acceptance of the complaint, the minister should take no action. The House of
Lords held that the minister’s reasons were unsatisfactory and his decision was unreasonable.
The purpose of the Act was that every genuine complaint must be forwarded to the
committee and anything contrary to this would frustrate that purpose

(4) Mixed considerations.– Sometimes, it so happens that the order is not wholly based on

irrelevant or extraneous considerations. It is founded partly on relevant and existent
considerations and partly on irrelevant or non-existent considerations. The judicial
pronouncements do not depict a uniform approach on this point. In preventive detention
cases, the courts have taken a strict view of the matter and has held such an order invalid if
based on any irrelevant ground along with relevant grounds, arguing that it is difficult to say
to what extent the bad grounds operated on the mind of the administrative authority and
whether it would have passed the order only on the basis of the relevant and valid grounds. In
Shibbanlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh,the petitioner was detained on two grounds: first, that his
activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, and
second, that his activities were injurious to the maintenance of public order. Later the
government revoked his detention on the first ground as either it was unsubstantial or non-
existent but continued it on the second. The court quashed the original detention order. In
Dwarka Das v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Supreme Court has observed that if the
power is conferred on a statutory authority to deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective
satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is stated to be based on a
number of grounds or for a variety of reasons, all taken together, the exercise of the power
will be bad if some of the grounds are found to be non-existent or irrelevant. In the opinion of
the court if some of the grounds are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court can’t
predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the said authority would have been on the
exclusion of those grounds or reasons. However, the Court has made it clear that in applying
this principle the court must be satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if
excluded, might reasonably has affected the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate
authority. However in the case of preventive detention generally the courts have quashed the
orders of detention based on relevant as well as irrelevant grounds. But the cases may be
found where the courts have upheld the order of detention valid even where it was based on
mixed considerations.

(5) Leaving out relevant considerations.– If in exercising its discretionary power, an

administrative authority ignores relevant considerations, its action will be invalid. An
authority must take into account the considerations which a statute prescribes expressly or
impliedly. In case the statute does not prescribe any considerations but confers power in a
general way, the court may still imply some relevant considerations for the exercise of the
power and quash an order because the concerned authority did not take these into account.
Unless detailed reasons are given from which it can be inferred that the authority took action
after ignoring material considerations it is hard to have the action quashed on this basis.

(6) Colourable exercise of power.– At times, the courts use the idiom “colourable exercise of
power” to denounce an abuse of discretion. Colourable exercise means that under the
“colour” or “guise” of power conferred for one purpose, the authority is seeking to achieve
something else which it is not authorized to do under the law in question then the action of
the authority shall be invalid and illegal. Viewed in this light, “colourable exercise of power”
would not appear to be a distinct ground of judicial review of administrative action but would
be covered by the grounds already noticed, improper purpose or irrelevant considerations.
The same appears to be the conclusion when reference is made to cases where the ground of
“colourable exercise of power” has been invoked. In the Somawanti v. State of Punjab, the
Supreme Court stated as the follows with reference to acquisition of land under the Land
Acquisition Act: “Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a
public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied about subject to one
exception. The exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will
be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. If it appears that what the
Government is satisfied about is not a public but a private purpose or no purpose at all action
on the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it
by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity.”

The above quotation would show that the term “colourable exercise of power” is used in the
sense of using a power for a purpose not authorized by the Act conferring the power on the
authority concerned. The term “colourable” has also been used at times in the sense of “mala
fide” action. “Mala fide” as a distinct ground to quash administrative action has already been
considered. Colourable means that the power is exercised ostensibly for the authorized end
but really to achieve some other purpose; in other words, the exercise of power is illegal but it
has been given the guise of legality. Colourable exercise and improper purpose appear to
converge and the two phrases can be used inter-changeably. In the context of preventive
detention, when the court felt that the power of detention could not be used as a substitute for
criminal prosecution, it used the phrase “colourable exercise of power” by the executive. The
court could have as well said that the power was exercised for an improper purpose to evade
the normal process of criminal law.

(7) Judicial discretion.– At times, the courts have used a vague phrase “judicial discretion” to
restrict the exercise of discretionary power by an authority. For instance, it was observed by
Supreme Court in Registrar, Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit, with reference to the
power of the Registrar to register a trade mark that “the exercise of the power conferred on
Registrar always remained a matter of discretion to be exercised, not capaciously or
arbitrarily but, according to sound principles laid down for the exercise of all judicial
discretion.” Through the use of term “judicial discretion” the courts would read implied
limitations into statutory powers and quash an administrative order if the authority crossed
those limitations. The term, thus, indicates that such discretion is not absolute or unqualified.
However, its use does not seem to be necessary as the courts have read implied restrictions on
a discretionary power even without characterizing it as “judicial discretion”. In any case, the
term can be applied properly only to quasi-judicial bodies and not to administrative bodies.
Most of the principles which apply to control administrative discretion, and are being
discussed here, apply mutatis mutandis to the exercise of discretion by tribunals or other
quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, a quasi-judicial body cannot be directed by a higher authority to
exercise its discretion in a particular manner. Such a body is to exercise its discretion on
relevant grounds and not on irrelevant grounds and so on.
(8) Unreasonableness.– At times the statute may require the authority to act reasonably. The
courts have also stated that the authority should consider the question fairly and reasonably
before taking action. The term “unreasonable” means more than one thing. It may embody a
host of grounds mentioned already, as that the authority has acted on irrelevant or extraneous
consideration or for an improper purpose, or mala fide, etc. Viewed thus, unreasonableness
does not furnish an independent ground of judicial control of administrative powers apart
from the grounds already mentioned. The term may include even those cases where the
authority has acted according to law but in wrong manner and where it has acted according to
law and in a right manner but on wrong grounds. Sometimes statutes itself provides for
reasonable exercise of the discretionary power. Under such conditions the authority
concerned had to act reasonably. And, the court will interfere with the order where it has not
been passed under reasonable belief.

“Unreasonableness” may also mean that even though the authority has acted according to law
in the sense that it has not acted on irrelevant grounds or exercised power for an improper
purpose, yet it has given more weight to some factors than they deserved as compared with
other factors. Interference on this ground requires going into the relative importance of
different factors and their balancing which amounts to substituting the discretion of the
judiciary for that of the executive. Courts do not normally exercise such wide powers to
interfere in the exercise of the administrative discretion.

Unreasonableness may furnish a ground for intervention by the courts when the Constitution
of India or the statute so requires. Thus, Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality
before law but the courts have permitted reasonable classification to be made. Where the law
is valid under the article, a discriminatory action would still be violative of the equality
clause. Similarly, Article 19 requires only reasonable restrictions to be imposed on the rights
specified therein.

In Chandeshwari Prasad v. State of Bihar, the administration authority had cancelled certain
grants of property made to the petitioner by the previous owner on the ground that the
transfer was made with a view to defeating the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950,
and to obtain higher compensation. The court found that there was no evidence to support the
findings of the authority. The court observed : “the word ‘satisfied’ in Section 4(4) must be
construed to mean ‘reasonably satisfied’ and therefore the finding of the Collector under
Section 4(4) cannot be subjective or arbitrary findings but must be based upon adequate
materials.

The court does not infer the requirement of reasonableness from a statute by implication. The
Supreme Court refused to accept the plea in K.D. Co. v K.N. Singh, that the court should
judge whether the administrative action was reasonable or not where the statute was silent as
to reasonableness. Although the above Chandeshwari Prasad’s case is only an exception to
this proposition. In Rohtash Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, the Supreme Court quashed on
administrative action taken by the Government under Section 237 of the Companies Act,
1956 on the ground that no reasonably body would have reached impugned conclusions. Here
the court considered the question as to whether any reasonable body much less expert body
like Central Government would have reasonably made the impugned order on this basis of
the material before it. In such cases the test of judicial intervention is not what the court
considers as unreasonable but a decision which it considers that no reasonable body could
have come to i.e., when the action is “oppressive” or “falsely absurd”.