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Cognitive Radio Network: Dr. L. Murali

Security issues and challenges of cognitive radio networks were discussed. Cognitive radio allows unlicensed users to access licensed spectrum when primary users are not actively using it. However, this introduces security risks like primary user emulation attacks, where attackers emulate primary users to prevent secondary usage. Cooperative sensing and techniques like localization can help detect such attacks. Overall, cognitive radio promises efficient spectrum usage but developing solutions for dynamic spectrum access poses technical challenges around sensing, decision making, and security.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
116 views69 pages

Cognitive Radio Network: Dr. L. Murali

Security issues and challenges of cognitive radio networks were discussed. Cognitive radio allows unlicensed users to access licensed spectrum when primary users are not actively using it. However, this introduces security risks like primary user emulation attacks, where attackers emulate primary users to prevent secondary usage. Cooperative sensing and techniques like localization can help detect such attacks. Overall, cognitive radio promises efficient spectrum usage but developing solutions for dynamic spectrum access poses technical challenges around sensing, decision making, and security.

Uploaded by

murlak37
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Security Issues and Challenges of

Cognitive Radio Network

Dr. L. Murali
Associate Professor
Electronics and Communication Engineering
P.A. College of Engineering and Technology
Pollachi
Keysight Technologies
Cognitive Radio
Algorithm Development
and Testing

A basic cognitive radio


Motivation behind Cognitive Radio

2/22/2019
Filling the whitespace 3
Cognitive Radio Architecture

2/22/2019 4
CR Basic Building block

2/22/2019 5
Challenges and Barriers to Cognitive Radio
Development
 Real-world spectral environments.
 Difficult in emulating real-world CR spectrum to design and test CR algorithms.
 Difficult to test methodically in field environments.
 Testing with real-world impairments such as intermodulation distortion and
spurious signals are required.

CR requirements for maximum Performance and


minimum interference
 Quick and accurate detection of signals under dynamic channel conditions.
 Identifying underutilized spectrum – False Positive Detection.
 Making intelligent decisions that maximize radio system performance.

2/22/2019 6
A Paradigm Flow in Algorithm Development
and Testing

• Capture live signals from more locations


• Synthesize signals using simulated
I sources

• Combine captured and synthesized


signals.
II • Test spectrum-sensing algorithms

• Test cognition engine performance.


• Test radio link performance.
III

2/22/2019 7
2/22/2019 8
2/22/2019 9
A Mobile WiMAX CR Whitespace Algorithm
Flow

2/22/2019 10
2/22/2019 Step 1 11
2/22/2019 Step 2,3 and 4 12
Security Threats of Physical Layer in
Cognitive Radio Networks

 Primary User Emulation Attack


 Objective Function Attack
 Learning Attack
 Jamming
 Eavesdropping
 Primary Users’ Location Attack

2/22/2019 13
2/22/2019 14
Results Evaluation Techniques

2/22/2019 15
DESIGNING CR PLATFORMS
The design and deployment of CR platform requires flexible
hardware and software packages.
SDR Software Packages SDR Hardware
 GNU Radio Software Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)
 IRIS eFalcon
 ASGARD COBRA
 OSSIE
Hybrid Platforms
 WARP
 SORA
 COgnitive RAdio Learning (CORAL)
 Berkeley Emulation Engine (BEE2)
 Lyrtech’s small form factor (SFF) SDR

2/22/2019 16
2/22/2019 17
Investigation of Primary User
Emulation Attack in Cognitive
Radio Networks

2/22/2019 18
Outline
 Background
 Cognitive radio technology
 Security issues in cognitive radios
 Spectrum sensing in cognitive radios
 Primary user emulation attack
 Cooperative sensing in the presence of primary user
emulation attack
 Cooperative sensing in the presence of PUEA with channel
estimation error
 Cooperative sensing with multiple PUE attackers
 Cooperative Sensing with multiple antennas in the
presence of PUEA

2/22/2019 19
Wireless Communication Background

Wireless communication system design


 higher data rate

 larger channel capacity

 quality of service and

 spectrum utilization efficiency

 Security issues

2/22/2019 20
Cognitive Radio Technology

1. Frequency spectrum —— a scarce resource

Frequency allocation chart in US as of 2003

2/22/2019 21
Cognitive Radio Technology

2. Spectrum access is a more significant problem than


spectrum scarcity.

Measurements of spectrum utilization

2/22/2019 22
Cognitive Radio Technology

2/22/2019 23
Cognitive Radio Technology

 Main functions

Cognitive
Radios

Spectrum Spectrum Spectrum Spectrum


Sensing Management Sharing Mobility

2/22/2019 24
Security Issues in CR Networks

 Spectrum occupancy failures


 Policy failures
 Location failures
 Sensor Failures
 Transmitter/Receiver failures
 Operating system disconnect
 Compromised cooperative CR
 Common control channel attacks

2/22/2019 25
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios

 Spectrum sensing
A classical signal detection problem

n(t ) H0
x(t )  
hs(t )  n(t ) H1
channel gain
noise
primary signal

2/22/2019 26
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios

 Spectrum sensing methods

Spectrum
sensing

Interference
Transmitter Cooperative
temperature
detection detection
detection

Matched Cyclostationary
Energy
filter
detection detection
detection

2/22/2019 27
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios
 Transmitter detection
1) Matched filter detection

Advantages: Better detection performance and less time to achieve


processing gain
Disadvantages: Priori knowledge of primary signal is required (such as
pilots, preambles or synchronized messages).

2/22/2019 28
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios

 Transmitter detection
2) Energy detection

Decision statistic Y follows Chi-square distribution

2/22/2019 29
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios

 Transmitter detection
2) Energy detection
False alarm probability and detection probability
( M , T / 2)
Pf  Pr (Y  T | H 0 ) 
( M )
Pd  Pr (Y  T | H1 )  Qm ( 2 , 2T )

T is decision threshold

2/22/2019 30
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios

 Transmitter detection
3) Cyclostationary detection
Exploits built-in periodicity of modulated signals
couple with sine wave carriers, hopping sequences,
cyclic prefixes and etc.

Advantages: better performance than energy detection


Disadvantages: more computational complexity and
longer observation time.

2/22/2019 31
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios
 Cooperative detection

Transmitter detection problem

2/22/2019 32
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios
 Cooperative detection

Figure 6. Cooperative detection model

2/22/2019 33
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios
 Cooperative detection
Fusion rules:
 Hard combination (1 bit): AND rule, OR rule, majority

rule …

 Soft combination (n bits): soft sensing information


(e.g., signal energy) [3].

2/22/2019 34
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios

 Interference temperature detection

Figure 7. Interference temperature detection

2/22/2019 35
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios

 Challenges
 Hardware requirement
 Hidden primary user problem
 Primary users detection in spread spectrum
 Detection capability
 Decision fusion in cooperative detection
 Security issues

2/22/2019 36
Primary User Emulation Attack
An attacker occupies the unused channels
by emitting a signal with similar form as the
primary user’s signal so as to prevent other
secondary users from accessing the vacant
frequency bands.

2/22/2019 37
Primary User Emulation Attack

 Detection of PUEA

 Distance ratio test & distance difference test

 Wald’s sequential probability ratio test

2/22/2019 38
Primary User Emulation Attack

 Defense against PUEA

 Localization based transmitter verification


procedure

 Channel identification

 Dogfight and blind dogfight

2/22/2019 39
1. Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in
the Presence of PUEA
 System model
PUE attacker Primary user

Primary user

Secondary user
…...
SU1 SU2 SU3 SUN PUE attacker
…...
Channel between primary
and secondary user
Channel between attacker
Fusion Center
and secondary user

2/22/2019 40
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 System model
The signal received by the ith secondary user
at the kth time instant is
yi (k )   Pp hpi (k ) x p (k )   Pm hmi (k ) xm (k )  ni (k ), i  1, 2,..., N

x p (k ) : primary user’s signal with power Pp

xm (k ) : attacker’s signal with power Pm

hpi (k ) : channel gain between primary and ith secondary user


hmi (k ) : channel gain between attacker and ith secondary user

2/22/2019 41
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 System model
The combined signal in the fusion center at the
kth time instant is,

2/22/2019 42
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 System model
When there is a PUEA, i.e., β = 1, the detection
problem is reformulated as,

After energy detector,

2/22/2019 43
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Optimal combining scheme
Objective: To design optimal weights to
maximize the detection probability under the
constraint of a prefixed false alarm probability
wopt  arg max{Pd | Pf   }
w

where
w  [w1 , w2 ,..., wN ]

wopt  [ w1opt , w2opt ,..., wNopt ]

2/22/2019 44
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Optimal combining scheme
Assumption: Block fading k is omitted in hpi (k ) and hmi (k )
For given h pi and hmi , the combined signal y(k ) is also a
complex Gaussian distributed random variable,

where,

2/22/2019 45
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Optimal combining scheme
Decision statistic Y is compliant with central chi
square distribution for both H0 and H1,

And Pd and Pf are expressed as,

2/22/2019 46
max

Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the


Presence of PUEA
 Optimal combining scheme
Optimal solution:

max is the largest eigenvalue of 1

2/22/2019 47
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Optimal combining scheme
Remarks:
1) if Pm = 0,
wopt  Pp  n2 hpH MRC
2) virtual antenna array
3) average detection probability over fading
channel
Pd    Pd ( wopt ) f (hp ) f (hm )dhp dhm

2/22/2019 48
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Optimal combining scheme
Remarks:
4) acquisition of channel information
a. priori knowledge such as pilots,
synchronization messages, preambles...
b. blind channel estimation

2/22/2019 49
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Simulation results
1 1
Conventional MRC,no attack,N=2 Conventional MRC, no attack, N=4
Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=2 Proposed combining scheme, attack, N=4
0.9 0.9
Conventional MRC, attack, N=4
Conventional MRC,attack,N=2
No cooperation, no attack No cooperation, no attack
0.8 0.8 No cooperation, attack
No cooperation, attack

0.7 0.7

d
d

Detection probability P
Detection probability P

0.6 0.6

0.5 0.5

0.4 0.4

0.3 0.3

0.2 0.2

0.1 0.1

0 0
-3 -2 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f False alarm probability P f

(a) N = 2 (b) N = 4
N is the number of secondary user

2/22/2019 50
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Simulation results
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
Pm
d


Detection probability P

0.6

0.5 Proposed combining scheme, =0.1 Pp


Proposed combining scheme, =1
0.4 Proposed combining scheme, =10
Conventional MRC, =0.1
0.3
Conventional MRC, =1
Conventional MRC, =10
0.2

0.1

0
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
SNR between primary and secondary user p (dB)

2/22/2019 51
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Different network scenarios of PUEA for two
users case
PUE attacker Primary user Primary user

SU2
SU2
SU1 SU1
PUE attacker
(a) (b)

PUE attacker Primary user


Primary user

PUE attacker

SU2
SU2
SU1 PUE attacker SU1

(c) (d)

2/22/2019 52
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 Simulation results
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
d
Detection probability P

0.6

0.5

0.4

case a,def ense


0.3
case a,attack
case b,def ense
0.2 case b,attack
case c,def ense
case c,attack
0.1 case d,def ense
case d,attack

0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f

2/22/2019 53
2. Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA with Channel Estimation
Error
 System model
PUE attacker Primary user

estimation error Primary user

Secondary user
…...
SU1 SU2 SU3 SUN PUE attacker
…...
Channel between primary
and secondary user
Channel between attacker
Fusion Center
and secondary user

2/22/2019 54
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA with Channel
Estimation Error
 System model

hˆp  hp  e p
hˆm  hm  em
hˆ : estimated channel gain
h : actual channel gain
e : estimation error

2/22/2019 55
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA with Channel
Estimation Error
 Average detection probability

Pd   Pd ( wˆ opt ) f (h p ) f (hm ) f (e p ) f (em )dhp dhm dep dem

2/22/2019 56
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the Presence
of PUEA with Channel Estimation Error
 Simulation results
1

0.9

0.8
Proposed combining scheme
0.7
d
Detection probability P

0.6

0.5

0.4 Conventional MRC

0.3

Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -15dB


0.2
Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -10dB

0.1 Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -5dB


Conventional MRC
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f

2/22/2019 57
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the Presence
of PUEA with Channel Estimation Error
 Simulation results
1
2
Proposed combining scheme, ep = -15dB
0.9 2
Proposed combining scheme, ep = -10dB
2
Proposed combining scheme, ep = -5dB
0.8
Conventional MRC, 2 = -15dB
ep

0.7 Conventional MRC, 2 = -10dB


ep
d

Conventional MRC, 2 = -5dB


Detection probability P

ep
0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3 Proposed combining scheme Conventional MRC

0.2

0.1

0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f

2/22/2019 58
3. Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of Multiple PUE Attackers
 System model
Primary user
PUE attacker 1
PUE attacker 2

Primary user

Secondary user
…...
SU1 SU2 SU3 SUN PUE attacker
…...
Channel between primary
PUE attacker 3 PUE attacker K and secondary user
Channel between attacker
Fusion Center
and secondary user

2/22/2019 59
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of Multiple PUE Attackers
 System model
The signal received by the ith secondary user
at the kth time instant is
K
yi (k )   Pp h pi (k ) x p (k )    Pmj hmij (k ) xmj (k )  ni (k )
j 1

i  1,2,..., N

2/22/2019 60
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of Multiple PUE Attackers
 Optimal weights

2/22/2019 61
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of Multiple PUE Attackers
 Simulation results
1 1
Conventional MRC, no attack Conventional MRC, no attack

0.9 Proposed combining scheme, tw o attackers 0.9 Proposed combining scheme, four attackers
Conventional MRC, tw o attackers Conventional MRC, four attackers

0.8 0.8

0.7 0.7
d

d
Detection probability P

Detection probability P
0.6 0.6

0.5 0.5

0.4 0.4

0.3 0.3

0.2 0.2

0.1 0.1

0 0
-3 -2 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f False alarm probaility P f

(a) K = 2 (a) K = 4

2/22/2019 62
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of Multiple PUE Attackers
 Normalized attacking power
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
d
Detection probability P

0.6

0.5

0.4
Proposed combing scheme, two attackers
0.3 Proposed combing scheme, four attackers
Proposed combing scheme, six attackers
Proposed combing scheme, eight attackers
0.2
Conventional MRC, two attackers
Conventional MRC, four attackers
0.1 Conventional MRC, six attackers
Conventional MRC, eight attackers
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
False alarm probaility P f

2/22/2019 63
4. Cooperative Spectrum Sensing with
Multiple Antennas in the Presence of PUEA
 Multiple antenna technology

2/22/2019 64
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing with
Multiple Antennas in the Presence of PUEA
 System model

PUE Primary
Attacker User

…...

... ...
Secondary …... Secondary
User 1 User N

…...

Fusion Center

2/22/2019 65
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing with
Multiple Antennas in the Presence of PUEA
 System model
The received signal at ith user at the kth detection
instant is,
 
M
yi (k )   wij  Pp hpi (k ) x p (k )   Pm hmi (k ) xm (k )  ni (k ) , i  1,2,..., N
j 1

the final combined signal at the fusion center


is given as,

 
N M
y(k )   wi wij  Pp hpi (k ) x p (k )   Pm hmi (k ) xm (k )  ni (k )
i 1 j 1

2/22/2019 66
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing with
Multiple Antennas in the Presence of PUEA

2/22/2019 67
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing with
Multiple Antennas in the Presence of PUEA
 Simulation results
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
d
Detection probability P

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3
Conventional MRC,no attack, N=4, 1 antenna
0.2 Conventional MRC,no attack, N=2, 2 antennas
Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=4, 1 antenna
Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=2, 2 antennas
0.1
Conventional MRC,attack, N=4, 1 antenna
Conventional MRC,attack, N=2, 2 antennas
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
False alarm probaility P f

(a) 2 antenna case

2/22/2019 68
2/22/2019 69

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