Peace Process
Following the Fall of Kabul and the election of Pashtun tribal chief Hamid Karzai as a national
interim leader, the Taliban surrendered Kandahar following an offer of amnesty by Karzai.
However, the U.S. rejected a part of the amnesty in which Taliban leader Mullah Omar could
"live in dignity" in his native Kandahar. The Taliban were not invited to the Bonn Agreement of
December 2001, which many cite has been the cause of the Taliban's battlefield resurgence and
the continuation of conflict. This was partly due to the Taliban's apparent defeat but also a U.S.
condition that the Taliban would not be allowed to participate. By 2003 the Taliban showed signs
of a comeback and not long afterwards their insurgency was underway. UN negotiator Lakhdar
Brahimi admitted in 2006 that not inviting the Taliban to Bonn was "our original sin”. Insurgent
attacks in the country reportedly grew fourfold between 2002 and 2006, by late 2007
Afghanistan was said to be in "serious danger" of falling into Taliban control despite the
presence of 40,000 NATO-led ISAF troops.
Early outlook (2007–2010)
Negotiations had long been advocated by the former Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, as well as
the British and Pakistani governments, but resisted by the American government. Karzai offered
peace talks with the Taliban in September 2007, but this was swiftly rejected by the insurgent
group citing the presence of foreign troops. By 2009 there was broad agreement in Afghanistan
that the war should end, but how it should happen was a major issue for the candidates of
the 2009 Afghan presidential election that re-elected Karzai. In a televised speech after being
elected, Karzai called on "our Taliban brothers to come home and embrace their land" ] and laid
plans to launch a loya jirga. Efforts were undermined by the Obama administration's increase of
American troops in the country. Karzai reiterated at a London conference in January 2010 that he
wanted to reach out to the Taliban to lay down arms. US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton cautiously supported the proposal. At the United States Institute of Peace in May 2010,
Karzai stated that a "peace process" would be with the Taliban and other militants "who are not
part of al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks or ideologically against us". Of the Taliban
specifically, he stated, "They're countryside boys who don't hate the United States, perhaps a lot
of them would like to visit the United States given the opportunity".
Exploratory meetings and peace jirga (2010-2016)
The Taliban's co-founder and then-second-in-command, Abdul Ghani Baradar, was one of the
leading Taliban members who favoured talks with the US and Afghan governments. Karzai's
administration reportedly held talks with Baradar in February 2010; however, later that month,
Baradar was captured in a joint US-Pakistani raid in the city of Karachi in Pakistan. The arrest
infuriated Karzai and invoked suspicions that he was seized because the Pakistani intelligence
community was opposed to Afghan peace talks. Karzai declared after his re-election in the 2009
Afghan presidential election that he would host a "Peace Jirga" in Kabul in an effort for peace.
The event, attended by 1,600 delegates, took place in June 2010, however the Taliban and
the Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin, who were both invited by Karzai as a gesture of goodwill did not
attend the conference.
At the same time, talks with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin went
underway. Hekmatyar, who was the main beneficiary of American and Pakistani support during
the Soviet-Afghan War, had a softer stance regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the
country compared to the Taliban.
A mindset change and strategy occurred within the Obama administration in 2010 to allow
possible political negotiations to solve the war. The Taliban themselves had refused to speak to
the Afghan government, portraying them as an American "puppet". Sporadic efforts for peace
talks between the US and the Taliban occurred afterward, and it was reported in October 2010
that Taliban leadership commanders had left their haven in Pakistan and been safely escorted
to Kabul by NATO aircraft for talks, with the assurance that NATO staff would not apprehend
them. After the talks concluded, it emerged that the leader of this delegation, who claimed to
be Akhtar Mansour, the second-in-command of the Taliban, was actually an imposter who had
duped NATO officials.
Karzai confirmed in June 2011 that secret talks were taking place between the US and the
Taliban, but these collapsed by August 2011. Further attempts to resume talks were canceled in
March 2012, and June 2013 following a dispute between the Afghan government and the Taliban
regarding the latter's opening of a political office in Qatar. President Karzai accused the Taliban
of portraying themselves as a government in exile. In July 2015, Pakistan hosted the first official
peace talks between Taliban representatives and the Afghan government. U.S and China attended
the talks brokered by Pakistan in Murree as two observers. In January 2016, Pakistan hosted a
round of four-way talks with Afghan, Chinese and American officials, but the Taliban did not
attend. The Taliban did hold informal talks with the Afghan government in 2016.
Afghanistan–Gulbuddin deal (2016)
Following months of negotiations, the Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin, the second largest domestic
militant group after the Taliban, signed a peace agreement with the government of Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul. It was the first peace treaty since the war in Afghanistan
started in 2001. Government officials praised the deal as a step towards peace and potentially a
deal with the Taliban too. However, others shared concern due to controversial leader Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's alleged war crimes. The deal included the U.S. to whitelist him from a list of
"global terrorists". Some parts of Afghan society protested the peace treaty due to his past
actions.
