Logical problem of evil[edit]
The earliest statement of the problem of evil is attributed to Epicurus, but this is uncertain. See note–
34.
Possibly originating with Greek philosopher Epicurus,[36] Hume summarizes Epicurus's
version of the problem as follows: "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is
not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and
willing? Then from whence comes evil?"[37]
The logical argument from evil is as follows:
P1. If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god exists, then evil does not.
P2. There is evil in the world.
C1. Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god does not exist.
This argument is of the form modus tollens: If its premise (P1) is true, the conclusion (C1)
follows of necessity. To show that the first premise is plausible, subsequent versions tend
to expand on it, such as this modern example:[2]
P1a. God exists.
P1b. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.
P1c. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.
P1d. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils.
P1e. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and
knows every way in which those evils could be prevented.
P1f. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to
prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the
existence of that evil.
P1. If there exists an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient God, then no evil exists.
P2. Evil exists (logical contradiction).
Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the 'logical' problem
of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed premises lead to a logical contradiction that
cannot all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the suggestion that God
would want to prevent all evils and therefore cannot coexist with any evils (premises P1d
and P1f), but there are existing responses to every premise (such as Plantinga's response
to P1c), with defenders of theism (for example, St. Augustine and Leibniz) arguing that God
could exist and allow evil if there were good reasons.
If God lacks any one of these qualities—omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence
— then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. Process theology and open theism are
modern positions that limit God's omnipotence or omniscience (as defined in traditional
theology) based on free will in others.
Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free-will defense and see the logical problem of evil
as having been fully rebutted. [38]
Evidential problem of evil[edit]
The evidential problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version of
the problem) seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the
existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism. Both
absolute versions and relative versions of the evidential problems of evil are presented
below.
A version by William L. Rowe:
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good
being.[2]
Another by Paul Draper:
1. Gratuitous evils exist.
2. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings
they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than
theism.
3. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by
theists, exists.[39]
Skeptical theism is an example of a theistic challenge to the premises in these arguments.
Problem of evil and animal suffering[edit]
See also: Wild animal suffering and Predation problem
William L. Rowe's example of natural evil: "In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree,
resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for
several days before death relieves its suffering."[40] Rowe also cites the example of human evil where
an innocent child is a victim of violence and thereby suffers.[40]
The problem of evil has also been extended beyond human suffering, to include suffering of
animals from cruelty, disease and evil.[9] One version of this problem includes animal
suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators,
natural disasters, over the history of evolution.[41] This is also referred to as the Darwinian
problem of evil,[42][43] after Charles Darwin who wrote in 1856 "What a book a Devil's chaplain
might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low & horridly cruel works of nature!", and in
his later autobiography said "A being so powerful and so full of knowledge as a God who
could create the universe, is to our finite minds omnipotent and omniscient, and it revolts
our understanding to suppose that his benevolence is not unbounded, for what advantage
can there be in the sufferings of millions of the lower animals throughout almost endless
time? This very old argument from the existence of suffering against the existence of an
intelligent first cause seems to me a strong one".[44][45]
The second version of the problem of evil applied to animals, and avoidable suffering
experienced by them, is one caused by some human beings, such as from animal cruelty
or when they are shot or slaughtered. This version of the problem of evil has been used by
scholars including John Hick to counter the responses and defenses to the problem of evil
such as suffering being a means to perfect the morals and greater good because animals
are innocent, helpless, amoral but sentient victims.[9][46][47] Scholar Michael Almeida said this
was "perhaps the most serious and difficult" version of the problem of evil. [43] The problem of
evil in the context of animal suffering, states Almeida, can be stated as: [48][note 1]
1. God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.
2. The evil of extensive animal suffering exists.
3. Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world.
4. Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world only if God
does actualize an evolutionary perfect world.
5. Necessarily, God actualized an evolutionary perfect world.
6. If #1 is true then either #2 or #5 is true, but not both. This is a contradiction,
so #1 is not true.
Evolutionary theodicy is a theistic response.
