(1) Mercado v.

De Vera
Facts:
Atty. De Vera was the counsel of Rosario Mercado, the petitioner in a civil case for
the "dissolution/liquidation of conjugal partnership. The case was decided in favor
of Rosario and was awarded the sum of over P9 million pesos.
After the conclusion of the case, Rosario terminated the services of Atty. De Vera,
offering the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She also demanded
an accounting and the turn-over of the money still in the possession of Atty. De
Vera in excess of the attorney’s fees. However, Atty. De Vera refused to heed the
demand, claiming that pursuant to the decision, he should, be entitled to
P2,254,217.00 by way of attorney's fees. Failing to recover what she had felt was
lawfully due to her, R. Mercado filed disbarment proceedings against Atty. de
Vera.
Issue:
Whether or not the retention of the Attys Fees in excess of P350, 000.00 by Atty.
De Vera was proper
Ruling:
No, Atty. De Vera appeared to have gone over the bounds of propriety when he
refused to turn-over to his client the amount in excess of the P350,000.00 which
he was allowed to retain. His disagreement with the client, entitled him to take
proper legal steps in order to recover what he might feel to be his just due but,
certainly, it was not a matter that he could take into his own hands.
WHEREFORE, in Administrative Case No. 3066, Resolution No.
X-93-41, dated 23 March 1993, of the IBP Board of Governors, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months and he is further DIRECTED to return to Rosario K.
Mercado the amount in his possession in excess of P350,000.00, without
prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his unsatisfied
attorney's fees, if any. His suspension stands until he has satisfactorily shown to
the Court his compliance therewith. Copies of this resolution shall be circulated to
all Courts of the country and spread on the personal record of Atty. De Vera.
(6) Malvar v. Kraff Food G.R. No. 183952
FACTS:
Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI
and Bautista in the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of Malvar,
which was also affirmed by NLRC and CA.
Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution but the execution failed due
to an error to the computation of the award. Malvar requested for the 2nd
issuance of the writ of execution and was partially complied with but with protest
on the part of Kraft by filing a TRO for further execution since the computation is
incorrect. In its decision to the computation, CA ruled in favor of Kraft.
Malvar appealed, but while her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and the
respondents entered into a compromise agreement. Thereafter, Malvar filed a
Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw Case in view of the compromise agreement, and
that the case be considered closed and terminated.
A Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights from Retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo was filed before the court, whereby the
Intervenor seeks to recover in full its compensation based on its written
agreement with Malvar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights
can prosper.
RULING:
Yes, the motion for intervention to protect attorney’s rights can prosper
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention
of the attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control
over the subject matter of the litigation and may at any time, if acting in good
faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court before judgment, even
without the attorney’s intervention. It is important for the client to show,
however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third
persons who are not parties to the agreement. By the same token, a client has
the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time with
or without cause. But this right of the client is not unlimited because good faith
is required in terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19
of the Civil Code, which mandates that “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
The attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect
his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien
upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been
retained by the client. In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and
to receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the
special instance and request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good
faith and honesty in representing and serving the interests of the client should
be reasonably compensated for his service.
(7) Lingan v. Calubagnib AC No. 5277
FACTS: 
Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga was found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer’s Oath. They were
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued a resolution suspending him from
his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional
Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty.
Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his
post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended."
Later on, the court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. Alleging that Atty.
Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
The court required atty. baliga and chr to file their comment on the letter filed by
Lingan.
ATTY. BALIGA’S comment:
Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally,
managerial functions," which did not require the practice of law. Atty. Baliga
claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending
him from the practice of law]."
CHR’s COMMENT:
It argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is
separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public
official for the same acts." According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension
from the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon
a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it
does within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body.”
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's
resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this
court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 
ISSUE: 
A.) WON the duties of a Regional Director of CHR constitutes practice of law.
B.) WON the CHR has the power to reinstate Atty. Baliga despite the fact that he
is still suspended in the practice of law.
HELD:
A.) YES. The powers and functions of a regional director are characteristics of the
legal profession. The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional
Director must be an attorney — a member of the bar in good standing and
authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such
as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the
Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is
holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position
of Regional Director.
B.) NO. The CHR has no power and authority to reinstate Atty. Baliga while the
latter is still suspended from the practice of law.
The Supreme Court have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice
of law. The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and other issuances, modify
or defy this court’s orders of suspension from the practice of law. Although the
Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers and
employees, it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the
positions they are holding.
Lawyer X wrote a letter to the SC Justices denouncing the Court. Saying “shame
on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitors throat a ruling, which from
all appearances, it could not justify. Is his conduct proper?
No, a lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. Every
right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
(11) Letter dated February 21, 2005 AM No. 05-3-04 FC
FACTS:
Atty. Sorreda sent a letter to the Chief Justice and furnished all the Associate
Justices of the Court, other government entities, RTC judges and counsels. In his
letter, he expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and the
manner by which the Court resolved the ten cases he handled.
Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
the very first case he filed with the Court and expressed his frustration in a letter
addressed to the Chief Justice.
The Court, required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly
disciplined "for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using
vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it".
In response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more
letters to the Court. On February 21, 2005, Atty. Soreda sent again a letter to the
Chief Justice.
The Court required Atty. Sorreda to show cause for the second time, why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for maliciously
attacking the Court and its Justices.
By way of compliance to the second "show cause" order, Atty Sorreda states that
he does not see the need to say any more because the cause has already been
shown as clear as day in his earlier letter dated 21 February 2005, adding that
"The need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and
decisively". While admitting "the great seriousness of the statements and
imputations I have leveled against the Court", he dared the Court whether "it is
capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the ‘Supreme Judge’".
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Sorreda is guilty of contempt of court and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that unfounded accusations or allegations or words
tending to embarrass the court constitute direct contempt of court or contempt
in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Atty Sorreda’s conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.03 and Rule 11.04, Canon 11.
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxx

Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the courts.

Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or having no materiality to the case.

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
client’s genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
client’s rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must
do so only within the bounds of the law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism
within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which
must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. The lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be
pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be
done within the confines of reason and common sense.
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the
rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with
error. But, certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and
malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is
duty-bound "to act to preserve its honor and dignity … and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession".20

For the enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition
in Sollegue not only for failure to have it filed within the period fixed in Sec. 4,
Rule 65 but also for failure to submit the duplicate original or certified true copy
of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1999 in
accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule
56.13 In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case
was dismissed on the mere ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda
must be reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective
verification but more so because the petition was evidently used as a substitute
for a lost remedy of appeal.14 We see no need to belabor the grounds for the
dismissal of the other cases enumerated by counsel, said grounds having been
stated in the respective minute resolutions which were plain, clear, simply
worded and understandable to everyone, even to those who do not have a formal
education in law. Suffice it to say that the dismissal of those petitions was the
result of a thorough deliberation among members of this Court.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court
and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby
indefinitely SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging
in the practice of law until otherwise ordered by this Court.
(12) Andres v. Cabrera G.R. No. 585
FACTS:

Respondent Stanley R. Cabrera was a successful Bar

examinee in 1977 while Petitioner Atty. Emilia E. Andres was a
legal officer in the Ministry of Labor, and the investigator who
recommended the dismissal of the case filed by Cabrera’s
mother.

Upon Atty. Andres’ recommendation, the ministry of labor

dismissed the case filed by Cabrera’s mother. Such dismissal
prompted Cabrera to file, against Atty. Andres, criminal charges
of infidelity in the custody of documents, falsification of public
documents, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Atty. Andres then filed a petition for the denial of Cabrera’s
admission as member of the Bar on the ground of lack of good
moral character as shown by his propensity in using vile,
uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of being
reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for
his proclivity in filing baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal
cases.

As such, the Court required Cabrera to file an answer to why

he should not be disqualified and ordered, at the same time, that
his oath-taking be held in abeyance. In his answer, Cabrera
admits the filing of criminal cases against Atty. Andres but denied
that his language was vile, uncouth, and uncivil due to the simple
reason that the same is the truth and was made with good
intentions and justifiable motives. Cabrera’s Answer, however,
repeats the use of unfit language by calling Atty. Andres a
“moron”, among others.

Because of Cabrera’s persistence of using abusive and

vituperative language, the Court resolved to defer his oath-taking
pending showing that he has amended his ways and has
conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. His
subsequent motions, however, show that Cabrera still persists in
using unfit, highly disrespectful as well as insolent language. For
this reason, the Court resolved to require Cabrera to show cause
why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.
Cabrera then answered the citation for contempt against him by
apologizing to the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabrera should be cited and punished for

contempt of court.

RULING:

Yes, Cabrera should be cited and punished for contempt of

court.

Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal

profession, it is his duty as every lawyer to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec.
20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule
138).

According to the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty

of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not
being wholly free to defend themselves, are particularly entitled
to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and
clamor. This duty is likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a
lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath solemnly
enjoins him to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the Courts as to my client”.
 Because of all of these, Cabrera is, therefore, guilty of
contempt for his improper conduct in the use of highly
disrespectful, insolent language in which he has tended to
degrade the administration of justice, and has disparaged the
dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the
Court.

(13) Soller v. COMELEC G.R. No. 139853

FACTS:
Ferdinand Thomas Soller and Angel Saulong were both candidates for Mayor of
the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 1998 elections.
Soller was proclaimed by the municipal board of canvassers as the duly elected
mayor. Such victory prompted Saulong to file with the COMELEC a petition for
annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return. Saulong also filed an
election protest before the RTC. Soller filed his answer to the RTC with counter
protest. Soller moved to dismiss Saulong’s protest on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, forum- shopping and failure to state a cause of action. On July 3,
1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition filed by Saulong. On the other hand,
the RTC denied Soller’s motion to dismiss. Soller then filed a petition for certiorari
with the COMELEC contending that the RTC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the election protest.
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. Hence, this suit.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has jurisdiction over Soller’s petition
2. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's election
protest.
HELD:
1. No. Sarmiento v. COMELEC applies. The SC held that the authority to resolve a
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the
questioned order of the trial court falls within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by
division and not en banc and any decision by the Commission en banc as regards
election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
2. Yes. The Comelec gravely abused its discretion. It shows that Saulong failed to
pay the filing fee of P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules.
A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to
dismiss Saulong’s election protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not
ordering the dismissal of Saulong’s protest case. The SC also held that the
verification of the protest was defective. Since the petition lacked proper
verification, it should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed.
The protest likewise failed to comply with the required certification against forum
shopping. Saulong successively filed a petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return and an election protest. Yet, he did not
disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
(16) Ramos v. Manalac 89 Phil 27
FACTS:
FACTS:
The siblings of Eladio, executed a power of attorney in his favor giving him
authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a parcel of
land. Eladio executed in favor of Rivera a mortgage on to guarantee the payment
of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. 
When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation Rivera filed an action to foreclose
the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and
sisters of Eladio Ramos
The summons was served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service
in his own behalf and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his
appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf.
The decision was rendered in favor of Rivera. As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the
judgment within the period therein specified, the court ordered the sale at public
auction of the mortgaged properties, which was sold to Felipa Lopez, who later
filed a motion praying that she be placed in possession thereof.
When ordered to vacate the land, the petitioners alleged that the sale conducted
by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly served with
summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit.
ISSUES:
Whether or not term “appearance” would include only presence in courts.
HELD:
No, the word or term “appearance” includes not only arguing a case before any
such body but also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as “by simply filing a
formal motion, plea or answer”.
While the Supreme Court granted for the sake of argument that petitioners were
not properly served with summons, as they claim, the defect in the service was
cured when the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint thru
their attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in their behalf in all
stages of the case.
Since Attorney Maiquez appeared for the petitioners, it must be presumed that he
was authorized by them when he appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the
case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor to
overcome such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is specially
so when, as in the instant case, it is only after the lapse of more than nine (9) years
after the judgment has been rendered those petitioners thought of challenging the
jurisdiction of the court.
(18) Noriega v. Sison AM No. 2266
FACTS: 
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison
as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to
engage in the private practice of law; yet Noriega alleged that Sison has created
another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in
private practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the
same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself
out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to
Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never represented
himself deliberately and intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC
where, in the early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as
“Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary
correction when the court staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due
to the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were sent
to “Atty. Manuel Sison”,
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD: 
No. the disbarment case cannot prosper. The arguments of presented by Sison is
well merited and backed by evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not
warrant disbarment of Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has committed an
act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful
disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing
as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to do so. His isolated
appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private practice of law, more so
since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because Sison
and Sacquing were close family friends. Such act of Sison in going out of his way
to aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an
instrument of harassment against him.
(20) OCA v. Atty. Liangco AC No. 5355
Facts:
Gozun was in an open and adverse possession of subject land for a period
of more than thirty years. His family's house was built on the land. Gozun
inherited the house and lot from his parents. However, the municipality of San
Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot. The Sangguniang Bayan issued a
Resolution stating that the subject lot is owned by the Municipal Government of
San Luis, Pampanga and that the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise in it.
Batu, the municipal vice-mayor, and on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan,
filed with the MTC a petition for declaratory relief wherein respondent Atty.
Daniel Liangco was the judge.
Content:

"In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to
petition your good office to render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit:

"1. The validity of the attached Resolution.

"2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.

"3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said
Resolution.

On that same day of the filing of petition, Judge Liangco issued a resolution
effecting the eviction of Gozun and all other persons in the subject lot, even
without serving summons or giving notice of the petition for declaratory relief to
complainant Gozun.
Reasoning:

1. The Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use
of property within its jurisdiction. 

2. The subject resolution is not contrary to law, morals and public policy.
 3. The municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine National
Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce or implement the
resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. 

4. Squatting in government property is considered a "nuisance per se". 

Agents of the municipal government demolished Gozun’s house, using

respondent judge's resolution and the mayor's executive order as basis. Gozun
then filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator, alleging that respondent judge's issuance of the resolution
amounts to "gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence”.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Liangco should be disbarred for misconduct as a
member of the bar?
Ruling:
Yes, Liangco should be disbarred for misconduct as a member of the bar.
The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there
was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of
respondent. It was observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of
well-established rules and procedures, that the present complaint was not the
first of its kind to be filed against him, and that before his dismissal from the
judiciary, respondent was suspended for 6 months, and that he still have pending
administrative cases for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct
bribery. The IBP found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and
partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules
of Procedure.
Atty. Liangco acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to
Gozun who would be affected by the action. As judge of a first-level court, Liangco
is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge,
he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question.
Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the
public's confidence in the competence of our courts. He also demonstrates his
ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and
issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must
uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes. Contrary to
this edict, Liangco malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun
not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the
Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice . In this
case, Liangco recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice.
(21) Rillaroza v. Eastern Telecom 308 SCRA 566
FACTS:
Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm
SAGA (San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin), filed with the RTC a complaint
for the recovery or revenue shares against PLDT.
Atty. Rilloraza, a partner of the SAGA law firm, appeared for ETPI. During
the course of the trial, SAGA law firm was dissolved and the junior partners
formed RADA (Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa ), which took over as counsel
in the case for ETPI. ETPI signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was
stated that in cases of collection or judicial action, “our attorney’s fees shall be
15% of the amounts collected or the value of the property acquired or liability
saved.” The retainer agreement was terminated in 1988.
The next day after the termination of the retainer agreement, RADA filed a
notice of attorney’s lien. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were
negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the same was
entered as a judgment, hence, the RADA filed a motion for the enforcement of
attorney’s lien.
ISSUE:
Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorney’s fees they are claiming?
HELD:
Yes, RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees, however, the court is not convinced
with the petitioner's arguments that the services RADA rendered merit the
amount they are claiming. Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees is based on two
grounds:
First, RADA contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the
complaint. However, when a client employs the services of a law firm, he does
not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the
case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. Thus, RADA could not claim to have
initiated the filing of the complaint considering that ETPI hired SAGA. 
Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, the attorney's
fees shall be fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts collected or the value of the
property acquired or liability saved. However, to award the attorneys' fees
amounting to 15% of the sum of more than One Hundred Twenty Five Million
Pesos (P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT
to ETPI would be too unconscionable.
According to the court, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts
shall fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their
professional services through quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit, meaning 'as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for
determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but
recoverable by him from his client. In this case, the recovery of attorney's fees on
the basis of quantum meruit is allowed because, although there is a formal
contract for attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or
unreasonable by the court.
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer
on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally:
(1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy;
(2) the extent of services rendered; and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer.
A determination of these factors would indispensably require nothing less
than a full-blown trial where private respondents can adduce evidence to
establish the right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute
the same.  The trial court has the principal task of fixing the amount of attorney's
fees. Hence, the necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
(22) Abella v. Banitor Jr. AM No.7332
FACTS:
Abella obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals involving a
Labor Case (illegal dismissal case) and was able to secure monetary awards.
Abella then filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional
Arbitration Branch which Banitor was the Labor Arbiter.
After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant’s motion remained unacted,
prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution. However, 8 months have
elapsed and there was still no action until Abella personally visited the
respondent wherein he was asked how much would be Banitor’s share on the
monetary awards. Although he was shocked, he agreed to give Banitor 20,000
pesos, but Banitor demanded to make it 30,000 pesos.
After 3 days, Banitor issued a writ of execution, but PT&T, the employer of
the complainant moved to quash the said writ. It was dismissed by Banitor. But
PT&T filed a supplemental motion to quash which is identical to the previous one
dismissed by respondent. Eventually, Banitor issued a new writ of execution
wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced to the effect that it
modifies the DECISION of the CA.
Abella now filed the instant disbarment complaint before the (IBP),
averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality
HELD:
 Yes, Banitor is guilty of gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct in
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN

THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.

xxxx

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.

A lawyer’s compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules

should be taken into consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in
the practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession."28 This proceeds from the lawyer’s
duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s
integrity.29 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the
lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension
or disbarment.
(24) Areola v. Mendoza
Facts:
Areola alleged that during Prisoners’ Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional
Trial Court where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed
that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
“O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay
maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang
makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng
kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin
at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot
ang puso noon.”

Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their
motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. 
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent violated the code professional responsibility
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Mendoza is GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in
violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 1.02 - "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system."
 Rule 15.07 - "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
the principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge
and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. She made it
appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as
begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public
in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence
from external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s
careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate.
His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable
and unethical.
(25) Dumadag v. Lumay
FACTS:
Lumay was Dumadag's counsel in a Civil Case involving a sale of a parce.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement which provided that Sps.
Avellanosa would pay Dumadag the amount of P4,644.00 and in turn Dumadag
would execute in favor of the Avellanosas a deed of reconveyance of the land.
Avellanosas failed to comply with their obligation within the stipulated
period, which necessitated the filing by Dumadag of a motion for execution.
However, despite the request of Dumadag to prepare such pleading, Lumay failed
to do so.
When the writ of execution was issued, the Sheriff connived with Lumay by
selling one (1) hectare portion of the subject land to Astudillo to satisfy
Dumadag’s claim out of the proceeds of the sale, without however Dumadag's
knowledge and consent. The Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas and Astudillo
was notarized by Lumay.
After the sale to Astudillo, the Sherriff made a Return of Service stating the
Sps. Avellanosa paid 4,344 to Lumay as Dumadag’s counsel. The said amount,
however, was not delivered to Dumadag by Lumay, even after the former made a
demand on the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a breach of the canons of professional responsibility.
RULING:
Yes, Lumay violated Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent
on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.

Both parties failed to apprise the Court of the final disposition of Civil Case
No. 283. The Court took note of the RTC decision in said case where a finding was
made that the land earlier sold by the Avellanosas to Dumadag is separate and
distinct from the one (1) hectare portion sold by the Avellanosas to Astudillo.
However, the RTC in its decision also ordered Atty. Lumaya to pay Dumadag the
sum of P4,344.00 which the former had received from the Sheriff.
Therefore, even though Atty. Lumaya consistently denied liability to
Dumadag, the records points to his failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to
his client, which is a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Ernesto Lumaya
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law effective from date of his receipt of this
resolution.
Does a crime for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude?
It depends on the degree of the crime and the surrounding circumstances.
It is a question of fact and the inclusion or exclusion of the moral turpitude in any
crime must be left to the discretion of the court.
MORAL TURPITUDE - an act or behavior that gravely violates the sentiment
or accepted standard of the community

(26) Garcia v. Sesbreno A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457
FACTS:
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the
Bar Confidant.
Garcia alleged while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia
Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39
years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007,
Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about
his return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him.
Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733.
Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a
crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to
continue his practice of law.
SESBRENO’S CONTENTION:
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted
and the phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law” was
deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to
retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
ISSUES:
WON conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
RULING:
Yes, the crime of homicide committed by Sesbreno involves moral
turpitude.
According to the court, not all convictions of the crime of homicide do not
involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. 
While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether
moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as
malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely
involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the
wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate
firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his
full civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his
argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute and unconditional
pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not
present in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the
pardon was absolute and unconditional.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the
President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive
clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6
months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially
extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never wiped
out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was
released from prison.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
(27) Fernando v. Guico AC No. 10573
FACTS:
Guico was the counsel of Chu as complainant in an illegal dismissal case filed
against CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Chu alleged that Atty. Guico
asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. Chu called Atty.
Guico to inform him that he had raised PhP 300,000.00 for the purpose and which
he later delivered to the latter’s law office.
In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Guico then handed Chua a copy of an alleged
draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. Atty. Guico told Chu to raise another
PhP 300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision but
Chu could only produce PhP 280,000.00, which he again brought to Atty. Guico’s
office. Finally, the NLRC issued an adverse decision against Chu’s company and
there was no other recourse but to file an appeal to the CA.
ATTY. GUICO’S CONTENTION:
Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with lies and
inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for harassment. He
denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Atty. Guico’s
assistant Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit. He further denied handing to
Chu a draft decision printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising
that the used paper must have been among those freely lying around in his office
that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnesses in the criminal complaint he had
handled for Chu.
IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the CPRL and recommended his disbarment from
the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors, however, adopted leniency and
reduced the penalty to three (3) years suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Guico violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel
Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the
labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He
compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of
obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own
personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and a breach
of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for
money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an
individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he
ceased to be a servant of the law. Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and
disgraced the Legal Profession.
(28) Arcatomy v. Limpia AC No.10576
FACTS:
In 2004, Guarin was the former Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of One Card Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies. After his resignation, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy
Card, Inc. (LCI), filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a General
Information Sheet (GIS) for updating purposes. The GIS identified Guarin as
Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President. Later on, LCI applied for
voluntary dissolution with the SEC (there are allegations of anomalous business
transactions and practices).
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a
stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he
had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as
chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any
notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken
up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a
stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the
GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been
corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly
thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and
that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD
meeting.
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder because of a text
conversation between her and Guarin. Atty. Limpin asking Guarin to sign a Deed
of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin allegedly responded in the
affirmative but never really signed the instrument.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints
against the directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-
respondents. In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November
27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. Atty. Limpin averred that this Court
held that "when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still
pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act
must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings." 
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Limpim has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the
CPR.
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules
of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act
which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Grounds for disbarment proceedings against a lawyer may be found in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.
In allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los
Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite
the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with
the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation
and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president
of the company. It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin
was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same
in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due
verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that
Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the
instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the
allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS
that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did
not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.1âwphi1
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action m submitting a false
document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months
suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.