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FIRST DIVISION

APRIL 16, 2018

G.R. No. 209031

ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN, Petitioner
vs
MARCO DAN, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari  seeks to set aside the December 14, 2012
1

Decision  and August 29, 2013 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
2 3

Petition in CA-G.R. CV No.95112 and herein petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration,  respectively, thus affirming the January 4, 2010 Decision  of the
4 5

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in Civil Case No. LP07-
0155.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian national -

met "in a chatroom [o]n the internet"  sometime in May, 2005. They soon became
6

"chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew them emotionally
closer to each other"  even though petitioner was in the Philippines while respondent
7

lived in Italy.

In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he flew in

from Italy and tied the knot with petitioner on January 23, 2006.

Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed thereafter, or
on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together in Italy.

On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition  for declaration of nullity of her
8

marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-0155with the RTC of Las Piñas City,
Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the
Philippines opposed the petition.

On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on the
ground that petitioner's evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner stated that sometime in May 2005,
she chanced upon the respondent, an Italian, in the internet xxx and they became
regular chatmates. x x x In their exchanges of chat messages and letters, she found
respondent to be sweet, kind and jolly. He made her feel that he really cared for her.
He was romantic. X X X [A]lthough at times, respondent was impatient and easily got
irritated, X X X.

xxxx

On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they got married
on 23 January 2006 X X X. During their honeymoon, petitioner noticed that the
respondent was not circumcised, x x x [R]espondent (also) asked her where to find
marijuana since he had to sniff some. This made petitioner angry and she quarrelled
with him. Respondent apologized later.

On 29 January 2006, X X X respondent flew back to Italy and on 26 February 2006,

xxx petitioner left to join respondent in Italy. Xxx After a few days, respondent started
displaying traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco whom she had
known thru the internet. He was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He
depended on his mother to do or to decide things for him. It was even his mother who
decided where they lived and how the house should be arranged. When they
transferred to a separate house. it was respondent's mother who managed the
household.

Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing video
games was always the first thing he does when he wakes up and the last thing he
does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the whole day.
There was never a quality time he spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible
husband would spend with his wife.

Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing video
games was always the first thing he does when he wakes up and the last thing he
does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the whole day.
There was never a quality time he spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible
husband would spend with his wife.

Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the household
chores. He also has extremely poor hygiene. He seldom takes a bath and brushes his
teeth. For him to be able to take a bath, petitioner would literally push him to the
bathroom or hand him his toothbrush with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to
put deodorant on his underarms for he would not do it himself. He refused
circumcision.

Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using marijuana. When
confronted, he get mad and pushed her [hard] and hit her in the arm, [and told] her to
go back to the Philippines. X X X

In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a separate house

from his mother did not improve their marital relationship. His addiction to video
games worsened. They seldom talk to each other as he did not want to be disturbed
while playing games. His addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He would often invite
his friends to their house for pot sessions, X X X to her extreme fright and discomfort.

xxxx

On 18 April 2007. she flew back to the Philippines. XXX Since then, there was no
communication between them. XX x Petitioner took this as lack of interest on his part
to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file this petition (TSN, August 11,
2008, pp. 6-10).

xxxx

She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her moncy for food. He spent most
of his income for video games. If they ran out of food, it was her mother-in-law who
supported them.

xxxx

Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified x x x in her
direct-examination that petitioner xxx was subjected to a series of psychological tests,
written and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother of the petitioner to
clarificatory analysis x x x.

In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological incapacity of

the petitioner, while respondent is suffering from a xxx Dependent Personality
Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his parasitic attitude, allowing other
people to be the handler of his own personal sustenance, even hygienic wise, which
somehow distorted the notion on how to handle marital obligations in terms of mutual
understanding, communication and emotional intent. She was able to arrive at these
findings on respondent although he did not submit himself for the same psychological
tests, through the clinical assessments and information supplied by the petitioner, and
the description of the petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the
respondent.

On cross-examination, x x x she described respondent x x x as "Mama's Boy", which

attitude can be narcissistic because of his attachment to the mother. He can do
whatever he wants because the mother will always be at his back. She likewise stated
that the respondent is an unhygienic person and the reason why he opted to lure
herein petitioner to be his wife was because he wanted her to be an extension of his
maternal needs to sustain his own desire.

On clarificatory questions of the Court x x x Ms. Tayag testified that she was able to
describe the respondent xxx because of the description made by the petitioner and
her mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her by the petitioner, she
(petitioner) was not able to have a bonding or to know well the respondent because
more often than not the respondent was always in the company of the mother that a
pathological symbiotic relationship developed between the mother and son.

Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the mother of herein
petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was adopted as her direct-testimony, which was
entirely in corroboration of the testimony of petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan.

On cross-examiration x x x. She testified that respondent had not assumed his

responsibilities as a married man, his dependency on drugs, his dependency on his
mother with regard to their finances were just toid by her daughter, petitioner herein,
during their conversations in the internet and therefore she has no personal
knowledge to what happened to her daughter, petitioner herein.

xxxx

Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration of marriage,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, (240 SCRA 20, 24)
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (6)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.

In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found respondent to be suffering from x x
x Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Antisocial traits, x x x which x
x x is 'grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment'. x x x

XXXX

The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion were derived from her interviews
of petitioner and her mother. However, from petitioner's Judicial Affidavit xxx, it was
gathered that respondent's failure to establish a common life with her stems from his
refusal, not incapacity to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. How she arrived at the conclusion that respondent was
totally dependent (on] his mother, his propensity [with] illegal substance, his instability
to maintain even his personal hygiene, and his neglect to assume his responsibilities
as a husband, Nedy Tayag failed to explain. It bears recalling that petitioner and
respondent were chatmates in 2005 and contracted marriage in 2006 when
respondent was already 35 years old, far removed from adolescent years.

Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and respondent met in a chat room in
the internet. Respondent was very sweet, kind and jolly. He was romantic. He made
her feel that he cared even if they were apart. He remembered important occasions
and he would always send her sweet messages and funny jokes x x x which revealed
the harmonious relationship of the couple before their marriage. From this, it can be
inferred how responsible respondent was to faithfully comply with his obligations as a
boyfriend. During marriage, respondent was working and giving her money though not
enough as she said (TSN, August 11, 2008, p. 15). With this premise, it is therefore
safe to conclude that no matter how hard respondent would try to show his best, to
show his capability as husband to petitioner, she would always find reason to say
otherwise.

As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x x it was admitted by no less

than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag that in a country like Italy wherein the weather is
different from the Philippines, the people there do not bathe regularly x x x. With
respect to circumcision, we all know that circumcision is not common in European
countries. You cannot compel respondent to undergo circumcision since it is against
their culture. However, respondent expressed his willingness to be circumcised, but
later on, changed his mind.

As to her allegation that respondent was a drug dependent, petitioner never showed
that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband. Undeniably, drug
addiction is curable and therefore it can hardly be considered as a manifestation of
the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

With regard to the dependency of respondent to his mother, it was not well
established by the petitioner. X X X What is clear was that respondent's mother was
all out in helping them since the salary of the respondent was not sufficient to sustain
their needs.

All told, the Court cannot see how the personality disorder of respondent would render
him unaware of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by him, At the most, the psychological evaluation of the parties proved
only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, considering also their culture
differences, which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Along this line,
the aforesaid psychological evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is unfortunately one sided
(and) based only on the narrations made by petitioner who had known respondent
only for a short period of time and too general to notice these specific facts thereby
failing to serve its purpose in aiding the Court in arriving at a just resolution of this
case.

In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her petition is

miserably wanting in force to convince this Court that her marriage with respondent
comes and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the Family Code and hence
unable to discharge completely her burden of overcoming the legal presumption of
validity and the continuance of her marriage with respondent, declaration of nullity of
same marriage is not in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage

is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit and accordingly, the same petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las
Piñas City, for their information and guidance. 9

Petitioner moved to reconsider,  but in an April 28, 2010 Order,  the RTC held its
10 11

ground.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 95112. In its
assailed December 14, 2012 Decision, however, the CA denied the appeal and
affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring thus:

x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage xxx null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus, the court a
quo correctly denied the petition for annulment of marriage x x x.

XXXX

In Toring v. Toring, the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina

and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:

xxxx
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines
to varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos.
Insofar as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in
reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the
application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality
disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the
afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.
Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from
the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article
36 xxx does not really dissolve a marriage: it simply recognizes that there never was
any marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing - was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.

In the present case, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence

insufficient to prove respondent-appellee was psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of respondent-appellee as
irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games,
addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, are not enough. These traits do not equate to an
inability to perform marital obligations due to a psychological illness present at the
time the marriage was solemnized. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. It is
not enough the respondent-appellee, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral
element in the respordent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown.

Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will
on the part of the spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity x x x, as the same may only
be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. It is essential that the spouse must be shown to be incapable of performing
marital obligations, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Respondent-appellee's condition or personality disorder
has not been shown to be a malady rooted on some incapacitating psychological
condition.

It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer psychological tests on respondent-
appellee. The conclusion in the psychological report of Ms. Tayag that respondent-
appellee was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder, with underlying Anti-
Social traits, was based merely on information supplied by petitioner-appellant and
Violeta (mother of the petitioner-appellant).

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in
character. The court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care
and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined
above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity
that is grave, severe, and incurable. Thus, We cannot credit Ms. Tayag's findings as
conclusive, as she did not conduct an actual psychological examination on
respondent-appellee. The information relied upon by Ms. Tayag could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of respondent-appellee's psychological condition. The
methodology employed (i.e., gathering information regarding respondent-appellee
from petitioner-appellant and Violeta, without interviewing respondent-appelles
himself), simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder.

Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological

incapacity, and to establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. The psychological report, was based entirely on petitioner-appellant's
assumed knowledge of respondent-appellee's family background and upbringing, Ms.
Tayag was not able to establish with certainty that respondert-appellee's alleged
psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the inability of the
respondent-appellee to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the
same was medically permanent or incurable. Also, it did not fully explain the details of
respondent-appellee's alleged disorder and its root cause; how Ms. Tayag came to
the conclusion that respondent-appeliee's condition was incurable; and how it related
to the essential marital obligations that respondent-appellee failed to assume.

in this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that respondent-appellee is
psychologically incapacitated, is his allegedly being irresponsible, childish, overly
dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor
hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 X X X contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.

This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by petitioner-appellant failed to

establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband x x x. Therefore, there
is no basis to declare their marriage null and void x x x.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the
basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. "The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4 January 2010, in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.  (Citations omitted)

12
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013 Resolution,
the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly contends that –

THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND SATISFIED THE
STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA AND OTHER
PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE IN POINT. 13

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was
clinically identified, sufficiently alleged in the petition, and proved by adequate
evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity was shown to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, and that the same is medically permanent,
incurable, and grave enough as to bring about the inability of respondent to assume
his obligations in marriage, and that as a consequence, respondent is incapable of
fulfilling his duties as a husband under the obligation to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support to her.

Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity are
specifically linked to medical and clinical causes as diagnosed by Dr. Tayag, which
diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the evidence in the
case; that such diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and expert determination, which
sufficiently prove respondent's psychological incapacity; that Dr. Tayag has
adequately determined that respondent's condition is grave, incurable, and existed
prior to and at the time of his marriage to petitioner; that respondent has been
suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait which
deterred him from appropriately discharging his duties and responsibilities as a
married man; that despite considerable efforts exerted by petitioner, respondent
remained true to his propensities and even defiant, to the point of exhibiting violence;
that no amount of therapy - no matter how intensive - can possibly change
respondent, but rather he would always be in denial of his own condition and resist
any form of treatment; and that respondent's condition is deep-rooted and stems from
his formative years - a product of faulty child-rearing practices and unhealthy familial
constellation that altered his emotional and moral development.

Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal examination of

respondent be conducted in order that he may be diagnosed or declared as
psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v. Marcos  and Antonio
14

v. Reyes,  as well as the case of Suazo v. Suazo,  in which latter case it was held
15 16

that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is

not necessarily mandatory, bụt merely desirable, as it may not be practical in all
instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the partics. She suggests
instead that pursuant to the ruling in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te,  "each case must be
17

judged, not on the basis of a priori presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but

according to its own facts"  and that courts "should interpret the provision on a case-
18

to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in

psychological disciplines x x x." 19

The State's Arguments

In its Comment  praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the CA
20

dispositions, arguing that no new issues that merit reversal have been raised in the
Petition. It contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability; that quite the contrary, petitioner even admitted that
incipiently, respondent was romantic, funny, responsible, working, and giving money
to her; that petitioner's allegations of video game and drug addiction are
uncorroborated, and her failure to seek medical treatment therefor in behalf of her
husband must be considered against her, that such addictions are curable and could
not be the basis for a declaration of psychological incapacity; that respondent's
irresponsibility, immaturity, and over-dependence on his mother do not automatically
justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code;
that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders - existing at the time of the marriage --
clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage, and depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the marital bond one is about to assume; that the psychological
evaluation of respondent was based on one-sided information supplied by petitioner
and her mother - which renders the same of doubtful credibility; and that while
personal examination of respondent is indeed not mandatory, there are instances
where it is required - such as in this case, where the information supplied to the
psychologist unilaterally comes from the side of the petitioner, which renders such
information biased and partial as would materially affect the psychologist's
assessment.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the petition.

Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155
on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at the time. They held that while
petitioner alleged such condition, she was unable to establish its existence, gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability based solely on her testimony, which is
insufficient, self-serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as she did not know
respondent very well enough - having been with him only for a short period of time;
Dr. Tayag's psychological report - which is practically onesided for the latter's failure
to include respondent in the study; and the account of petitioner's mother, which is
deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial
affidavits and testimonies of hermother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological
evaluation report on the psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent.
The deterınination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely
on petitioner's account and that of her mother, since respondent was presumably in
Italy and did not participate in the proceedings.

This is insufficient.

At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their
marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was
romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent
enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was
psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate
courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable differences and
basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture and upbringing, and the very short
period that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's
claimed addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are
correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not
shown that she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation
to render support and aid to respondent.

"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition.  "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical
21

manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the

celebration of the marriage"  such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is
22

enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical

examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 23

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental -- not merely physical - incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed in Article 38 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. 24

With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the
weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert findings.
However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted
on respondent himself - but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do
as well.

x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the

testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz.:

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side ---
the petitioner -- whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr.
Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did
not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted
and responded to the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this
basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and
unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used
love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner) extended
towards him.'. . .

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and

comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It
failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder
and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in
her Report -- i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable’- is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization
and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner
could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this
same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. 25

Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most respects
-are entitled to respect and finality.  The same being correct, this Court finds no need
1âwphi1

to disturb them.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the
facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-established
principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x. 26

To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, "The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after marriage, and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved."  Finally, the burden of proving
27

psychological incapacity is on the petitioner.

X X X Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence

presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity.  28

With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage was correctly dismissed by the courts below.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision and August
29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.95112
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
 On leave.

 Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2540 dated

**

February 28, 2018.

 Designated as additional member per October 24, 2017 raffle vice J.

***

Jardeleza who recused due to prior action as Solicitor General

1
 Rollo, pp. 9-26.

 ld. at 61-81; penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio

2

Valenzuela and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican

and Michael P. Elbinias.

3
 Id. at 94-95.

4
 Id. at 82-92.

5
 Id. at 36-42; penned by Presiding Judge Gloria ButayAglugub.

6
 Id. at 28.

7
 Id.

8
 Id. al 28-34.

9
 Id. at 37-42.

10
 ld. at 43-56.

11
 Id. at 57.

12
 Id. at 69-80.

13
 Id. at 16.

14
 397 Phil. 840 (2000).

15
 519 Phil. 337 (2006).

16
 029 Phil. 157 (2010).

17
 598 Phil. 666 (2009).

18
 Id. at 699

19
 Id.
 20
 Rollo, pp. 135-155.

21
 Marcus v. Marcos,supra note 14 at 850.

22
 Republic v. Galang, 565Phil. 658, 672 (201).

23
 Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 701, 708 (2007).

24
 Republic v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502, 509 (2014).

 Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, 751 Phil. 762, 775-775 (2015), citing Rumbaua

25

v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061 (2009).

26
 Perez-Ferruris v. Ferraris, 527 Phil. 722,727 (2006).

27
 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21.39 (1995).

28
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 698 Phil. 257, 267 (2012).

*
 Per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.

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