IR Endsem
IR Endsem
Common assumptions
States operate in an anarchic (disorderly) international system where there is no central authority
unlike what exists within states
States are rational actors( capable of thinking in terms of costs and benefits) and unitary
actors( sole actors- no other force within state can substitute its position).
States establish regimes, not private actors. Even regimes formed through the initiative of non-
state actors require the approval and support of the state.
Regimes are a reflection of the extent of cooperation that exists in the int.system.
Regimes promote international order.
The differences
neo-realists and neo-liberals agree that the international system is anarchic. The major point of contention
is that neo-liberals are sure such a system will not constrain the foreign policy options of the state to simple
survival, with neo-realists essentially believing the opposite (ibid). As neo-realists have the idea that man
by nature has a restless desire for power (Keohane 1986 pp. 211-212), cooperation becomes more difficult
to achieve, because in trying to gain power a state will upset another state in doing so. Neo-liberals agree
that states act in their own interests, but have a greater belief in cooperation, for the very reason that “it is
in the self-interest of each [actor] to cooperate” However, neo-realists are certain that cooperation “will
not happen unless states make it happen” (Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 190). It is unlikely that states will often
“make it happen” because, from the viewpoint of the state, involvement in international cooperation and a
strengthening of your own position rarely go hand in hand..
Additionally, following cooperation, we have the debate between the two theories about the importance
of absolute and relative gains, with focus on the latter proving a considerable obstruction to cooperation.
Neo-realists speak of how vital relative gains are in state considerations, or to put it another way, states
“are compelled to ask not “will both of us gain?” but “who will gain more?”” (Mingst 2004, p. 69) As
highlighted by Tim Dunne in a recent lecture, this neo-realist philosophy can be seen in mercantilist
economics. To illustrate this point, if a state adopted a mercantilist approach they would rather that their
own economic growth stood at 3% and rival states at 3%, than that their own economy grew by 5% and
their rivals’ by 6%. In other words, under neo-realist thought states simply want to gain a comparative
advantage, whatever that may be, ahead of performing very well along with other states Neo-liberals, on
the other hand, are sure states are happy to have any gain for themselves. This is a focus on absolute gains,
i.e. “state leaders will accept any accord that makes the state better off regardless of the gain achieved by
any other state” (www.ssc.upenn.edu). For example, the Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi happily
accepted that “we are better off… +without Saddam Hussein”, yet at the same time America probably gains
more from the democratisation of Iraq as “terrorists will suffer a dramatic defeat” (www.bbc.co.uk).
The next area of debate is of the respective importance of capabilities (essentially power) and interests.
Neo-realists “are likely to emphasise capabilities more than intentions” (Baldwin 1993, p. 7). Clearly, power
is of the utmost importance to neo-realists, as the fact that the US and the USSR were the two cold war
superpowers “explains the similarity in their behaviour [at the time]” (Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 185).. On
the other hand, any assertion about capability “begs two vital questions-“capability to get whom to do
what?”” (Baldwin 1993, p. 17) If these questions cannot be answered satisfactorily, then a dent in the
crucial neo-realist argument that capabilities help shape state behaviour can be found. Neo-liberals are
keen to say how vital intentions and interests are to state behaviour. The notable neo-liberal Stein argues
that “capabilities count only insofar as they affect the preferences and intentions of states” (Baldwin 1993,
p. 8). I feel that it is essential to point out that it is rather dangerous to assume that states always know
exactly what their capabilities are. Mingst describes power as “the ability to influence others” (Mingst
2004, p. 321). The clear potential for capabilities to affect the intentions of states supports this argument of
states and the neo-liberals. This conviction that capabilities are not important in themselves, only for
intentions and interests, is perhaps the most convincing of all the neo-liberal arguments,
Finally, we have somewhat different views on international institutions and regimes. With both of these,
there are a clear set of rules for state behaviour (Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 189). While neo-realists have
not exactly derided institutions and regimes, they believe that neo-liberals have overestimated their
importance and believe themselves that states only “work to establish these regimes and institutions if
they serve their interests” (Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 192), not if they do not. With regard to this neo-realist
argument, it is worth bearing in mind that the ordering principle of the international system is anarchy
(Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 185). Anarchy is defined as “a situation where nobody obeys laws or rules”
(Hanks 1993). This may be a somewhat simplistic definition, but it is clear nonetheless that institutions and
regimes cannot get round this dominance of anarchy in the international system. The fact that an
institution such as the UN could not stop the Iraq war would appear to support the neo-realist argument
very well. As I have touched upon earlier, neo-liberals believe institutions and regimes facilitate
cooperation, and that institutions “moderate state behaviour” (Mingst 2004, p. 85). Furthermore, neo-
liberals believe institutions “make it easier to punish cheaters” (Baldwin 1993, p. 124). This may be true
when they are effective, but unfortunately a lot of the time they are not. Not only were they ineffective
over Iraq, but going back in history, the League of Nations failed “to take assertive action against Japanese,
Italian, and German aggression in the 1930s” (Baylis and Smith 2001, p. 56).
6. Feminist contributions to IR
IR was a latecomer to the humanities and social science disciplines that have been profoundly affected by
feminist interventions since the 1960s. In 1988 the concerns of feminist interventions into the discipline
were largely of two kinds: first, to demonstrate the gender bias inherent in the mainstream theoretical
approaches and research agendas within the study of international politics; second, to demonstrate how
bringing women and gender into analysis of the international shifted conceptual boundaries and altered
preconceptions about what was relevant to understanding, explaining and judging international affairs.
• Tickner argued that Morgenthau’s principles privileged masculinity by giving priority to the terms in
the binary divisions that have been traditionally associated with masculine attributes and values.
• Also, the abstraction and idealization involved in the reduction of the meaning of international
politics to the pursuit of national interest in terms of power, did not allow any recognition of the
ways in which gendered relations of power might play a part in the international arena
• In this vein, feminists argued for a reformulation of conceptions of the state, power, interest and
security in ways that were neither trapped into hierarchical binary divisions nor assumed to be
objective. For example, the traditional sharp distinction between inter-state and intra-state politics
confined the relevance of social and economic structures to the internal politics of states. In the
context of the international realm, states were considered as sui generis creatures, operating
according to a logic dictated by anarchy regardless of their internal constitution. The idea of a
sharp distinction between state as opposed to inter-state politics was undermined by work which
traced the ways in which gendered relations of power enabled practices of diplomacy and war,
supposedly specific to the international domain, for instance in the roles of diplomats’ wives, or of
prostitutes in the Philippines servicing American military bases
• Tickner reformulated Morgenthau’s principles to include a conception of power as enabling and
not only as power over. Sylvester rethought security/insecurity through a focus on women’s
peace activism at Greenham and women’s cooperatives in Zimbabwe, arguing for the need for a
more flexible understanding which encompassed economic and family domains as well as the
realm of inter-state politics
• 1988- bringing women in
• 1998- intersectionality and compexity of gender. Intersectional analysis involves the concurrent
analyses of multiple, intersecting sources of subordination/oppression, and is based on the
premise that the impact of a particular source of subordination may vary, depending on its
combination with other potential sources of subordination (or of relative privilege).
• 2008 - Men and masculinity
Contributions
• Feminists have successfully demonstrated how the lives of sex workers, domestic servants, home-
based workers and those who work at unremunerated caring and reproductive labor, are intertwined
with global politics and the global economy
• They have also suggested that the security of states is sometimes dependent on rendering insecure the
lives of certain, often marginalized, people
• They also demonstrated how the Global capitalist economy could not function without unremunerated
and under-remunerated labor, the majority of which is performed by women.
• IR feminists have also pointed to the inadequacies of social scientific methodologies for answering
many of the questions they want to ask. For example, IR feminists are drawn to ethnographic
fieldwork and linguistic text analysis, methodologies that are rarely used in social scientific IR.
• Indeed IR itself (in its traditional un- or non-gendered form) is also so identified and critiqued. Hooper’s
Manly States argues that the two world politics as a power ridden and violent process, and IR itself as a
lens through which it is studied construct each other in ongoing dialogue and representation.
• Barry Buzan & Lene Hansen (2009) note that the first glimmer of concern with women and security
within international relations and peace studies was a site of tension: in the 1970s and into the 1980s,
women were not on the agenda of international relations at all. Peace theorists embraced the
concept of structural violence but also excluded women from their discussions. There are now new
inclusion/exclusion tensions within feminist international relations and its security wing. In this article
I address two tensions: (1) concern to maintain the stance that security is a peace issue as some
venture systematically into feminist war studies, and (2) a tendency to issue harsh judgments of
feminists whose views challenge the accommodation of cultural difference. I briefly consider examples
of these two tensions and suggest ways to work with and beyond the structure of international
relations to evolve (feminist) security studies further. That is, although militarization, militarized
masculinity, women in the armed forces and the effects of war on women have been considered,
feminism has positioned itself outside war, above it, and in ethical belligerence to it, despite also
expressing commitment to gender- and women-inclusive research. A new generation of feminist
security thinking is exposing the tensions around studying war by bringing once-neglected women
into security research: women who participate in the political violence of war.
International law is developed and agreed upon by those that make up the international system, but not
every nation state is a member or has a part in the process. Most nations are said to comply
with International Law, but that appears questionable considering the number of human rights violations
still occurring around the world. While the international community does attempt to hold all nations
to International Law, it is not always feasible. Force may be necessary in order to ensure compliance, and
the international community is generally against the use of force except in the dire circumstances.
There are also cultural issues that play a part in acceptance of and compliance with International Law.
Some nations have a theocratic, or religious, government rather than a secular one and feel more bound to
the tenets of their faith than to man-made law. In some cases, what most of the world views as human
rights violations according to International law, may be viewed by some nations as acceptable actions or
punishments prescribed by religion. This can create very sensitive situations.
While many nations have agreed to the UN Charter, they still retain sovereignty. Few would agree to live
completely under UN rule, especially in light of recent scandals and the inability of the institution to
achieve its goals. The United Nations has unfortunately been plagued by scandals and perceived
incompetence over the years. Critics give the Oil for Food program and the ineffectiveness in protecting
human rights in the Rwanda genocide and more recently the Darfur region of Sudan, as examples.
As the world seems to grow smaller, with people interacting on a global scale, International Law seems to
make sense. However, it must continue to evolve and it must be applied even-handedly. It is also necessary
for those with the duty to enforce it to be seen as being up to the task.
Jurisdiction
• power of a State to prescribe and enforce criminal and regulatory laws - ordinarily based on the
territorial principle,
• also claim jurisdiction based upon the nationality principle, even when in outside territory
• There is also a very narrow category of crimes – including genocide and war crimes - over which
States may assert jurisdiction based upon the universality principle, which gives all States
jurisdiction irrespective of nationality or location of the offence.
• Almost all States claim jurisdiction under the protective principle, over acts committed outside their
territory that are prejudicial to its security, such as treason, espionage, and certain economic and
immigration offences.
• Controversially, very few States have applied the passive personality principle, which establishes
jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim. States have asserted jurisdiction over terrorist
acts outside their territory directed against their nationals, thereby basing jurisdiction on a
combination of the protective and passive personality principles.
• A person who is alleged to have committed the offence established in the treaty (e.g, hijacking of
an aircraft) is present in their territory, a State Party to the treaty is under an obligation to take the
persons into custody, and to either prosecute them or extradite them to another State Party that
has jurisdiction over the offence. If two or more States have jurisdiction over a particular offence,
they are said to have concurrent jurisdiction. In such cases the State which is most likely to
prosecute the offender is the State which has custody over him.
• No jurisdiction within the territorial sovereignty of another State
• The police of State A cannot enter the territory of State B to arrest a person who has committed a
crime in State A. if a crime takes place in the territorial sea of a coastal State, no State other than
the coastal State my intercept and arrest the ship carrying the offenders.
• Bilateral treaties for the extradition of alleged offenders. Sending them without such treaties is
known as rendition
• The high seas and outer space are outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State. ships, aircraft and
spacecraft are subject to the jurisdiction of the “flag State”, or State of registration and cannot be
boarded without consent- the only exception piracy.
Immunities
• Official representatives of one State should not be subject to the jurisdiction of another State-law
of the sea provides that warships are subject only to the jurisdiction of the flag State. If they violate
the innocent passage principle, you can only escort them out of your territorial area
• Foreign sovereigns/ diplomats immune from criminal jurisdiction of the host state.
• immunity belongs to the sending State and not to the diplomat, it can be waived by the sending
State
• right to expel any diplomatic agent from its country by declaring them persona non grata, but
cannot enter embassy premises without consent even in emergencies
8. Why do we need regimes? Distinguish between the realist and liberal-
institutional approaches to regime formation.
Definition: Stephen D. Krasner defined International Regimes as “Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations”.
Principles: beliefs of fact, causation or rectitude
Norms: standards of behaviour- rights & obligations of states
Rules: designed to clarify resolve conflicts between principles and norms
Decision-making procedures: prescriptions for behaviour
Need for Regimes:
Regimes stand for rule-governed activity in our complex world in different issue-specific areas.
If International relations are characterized by anarchy it is the existence of regimes that minimizes
the bad effects of anarchy.
Regimes serve crucial functional needs in international relations. Powerful regimes are considered
by some scholars as independent actors in international politics.
Although ultimately states create and sustain regimes, regimes can exert influence in world
politics that is independent of state sovereignty.
In cases where they are organized by means of treaties among countries, regimes provide an
important source of formal international law. Regimes themselves can also be subjects of
international law.
In cases where they shape the behavior of states, the most influential regimes can also be a source
of customary international law. In this light, some liberal scholars see in regimes the early seeds of
peaceful world governance, likephilosopher Immanuel Kant's idea of perpetual peace through a
federation of world's states.
Liberal-institutional approaches to regime formation:
It is an interest-based approach - neutral and most dominant in regime theory.
It de-emphasizes the role of power in regime formation- less worried about cheating – free riding.
Adopts a problem-solving approach.
Transaction cost reduction- multilateral regimes better than bilateral ones on that count.
When all states expect the other participants to cooperate, the probability of sustaining
cooperation increases dramatically.
They focus more on environmental, trade and communication regimes.
Neoliberals believe that realists neglect the degree to which countries share interests and the iterative
nature of state relations.
Realists err by implicitly modeling the world using the classic single-play prisoner's dilemma, in
which the payoff structure makes defection a dominant strategy for both players.
The difference between this model and reality is that states are not like prisoners, states must
continually cooperate whereas prisoners will never see one another again.
One's decisions today, then, have future consequences. Mutual cooperation is thus rational: the
sum of relatively small cooperative payoffs over time can be greater than the gain from a single
attempt to exploit your opponent followed by an endless series of mutual defections.
In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, the actors' behavior is determined by the following assumptions:
1. States are rational, unitary, gain maximizing actors, living in anarchy and ridden by the security dilemma.
2. There are future consequences for present actions. The prisoner's dilemma is not a one-shot event.
Thus;
3. It is in the interest of states to cooperate in the present because, in the future, other states will defect on
them (Tit-for-Tat strategy). Thus;
4. The theory presupposes that states are concerned with absolute gains, that is, states do not consider the
gains or losses of other states in their utility analysis. In contrast, neorealists argue that states are
concerned with relative gains. That is, states are concerned with the advantages they gain versus the
advantages of other states in the anarchic system.
Probably the most famous neoliberal IR theorist Robert Keohane argues that international regimes can
increase probability of cooperation by:
A. Providing information about the behavior of others by monitoring the behavior of members and
reporting on compliance.
Regimes clearly define what constitutes a defection and often clearly prescribe punishments for
defection.
This reduces the fear that the state is being exploited by other members of the regime and
minimizes the chance for misunderstanding. Prescribing sanctions reduces the incentive to secretly
defect.
B. Reducing transaction costs.
By institutionalizing cooperation, regimes can reduce the cost of future agreements. By reducing
the cost of reaching an agreement, regimes increase the likelihood of future cooperation.
C. Generating the expectation of cooperation among members.
By creating iteration and the belief that interaction will continue for the foreseeable future,
regimes increase the importance of reputation and allow for the employment of complex
strategies.
Realist approaches to regime formation
Power is the main factor behind regime formation and efficiency
Regimes generate differential benefit for states, mainly in favour of states dominating the
international system (relative gains).
Therefore Realists argue that regimes are only efficient if they serve the interests of the hegemony.
The main purpose of regimes is they promote a world order in the international system.
Regimes are an instrument for states to deal with the anarchy, especially in areas in which
unilateral action will not lead to a positive outcome (like the battle of sexes).
Realists and liberals differ over the nature of international cooperation and how much of a role
international institutions play.
Liberals believe regimes (cooperation) comes about through a convergence of state interests, and
that international institutions help create that synthesis of interests, while realists believe that
regimes simply reflect the distribution of power in the international system.
Powerful states create regimes to serve their security and economic interests. Regimes have no
independent power over states, particularly great powers. As such, regimes are simply intervening
variables between the real independent variable (power) and the observed outcome (cooperation).
Realists focus on security regimes and diplomacy.
9. Trace the evolution of modern Diplomacy. Briefly state the functions of modern
diplomats.
Diplomacy refers to the ability or skill to negotiate. Negotiate between groups but is applied more exactly
to negotiations on the international scene between nations or groups of nations. Diplomacy is engaged in
by diplomats representing the views or interests of their nations.
Diplomacy is a communication process between international actors to prevent conflicts or resolve them
through nonviolent means.
Evolution of Diplomacy:
• The first modern diplomats were merchants who established commercial branches abroad. These
merchants collected information about the social and political life in the host countries and even
conducted negotiations with the political leaders of these host countries.
• Modern diplomacy's origins are often traced to the states of Northern Italy in the early
Renaissance, with the first embassies being established in the thirteenth century. Milan played a leading
role, especially under Francesco Sforza who established permanent embassies to the other cities states of
Northern Italy. The practice spread from Italy to the other European powers.
• As the diplomatic profession gained prominence and prestige, political leaders started to appoint
relatives and supporters for diplomatic posts.
• Francois de Cailleres, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, published in 1713 is perhaps the
first textbook on Diplomacy. This book included a list of qualities considered crucial for competent
performance of the tasks of diplomacy. These qualities included:
1. Natural qualities: agreeable character, intelligence, sense of humor, good looks, patience, self-control
2. Acquired qualities: Knowledge and understanding of history and society, languages, experience and
understanding of negotiations, etc.
• The elements of modern diplomacy slowly spread to Eastern Europe and arrived in Russia by the
early eighteenth century.
• The 18th and 19th centuries were the golden age of diplomacy.
• People like Talleyrand of France, Meternich of Austria-Hungary, Bismarck of Germany, D’Israeli of
Great Britain, and Thomas Jefferson of the United States have made their mark on the profession, making it
second in importance only to absolute monarchs.
• In the 20th century, The July-August 1914 crisis was a major test of traditional diplomacy, as
diplomats on all sides tried to find a way to avoid war.
• However, the domination of military considerations over diplomatic ones were responsible to the
outbreak of World War I, a war that nobody wanted and all sides tried to prevent.
• The scope and destructiveness of the war brought about some important new ideas about the
practice of diplomacy. President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points, which formed the platform for US
joining the war emphasized two important principles that were to guide diplomats following the war.
• The principle of public diplomacy and transparent agreements
• The formation of an international organization—the League of Nations—that is intended to help states
resolve conflicts peacefully
• Wilson’s principles helped shape the postwar agreements and influenced international diplomatic
practices in the 1920s. The 1920s were again a good era for diplomacy. Many disputes and conflicts were
managed through the use of negotiation and in some cases the League of Nations proved instrumental in
settling disputes between states. However, the rise of Hitler to power in Germany in February of 1933
introduced a new style of aggressive diplomacy into the European arena.
• Some of Woodrow Wilson’s ideas re-emerged in the negotiations leading up to the termination of
World War II, including the focus on public diplomacy and the formation of the United Nations.
• The diplomatic effort of the two superpowers centered on mobilizing allies to their respective
camps and on preventing existing allies from defecting to the opponent
A diplomat is a person appointed by a state to conduct diplomacy with another state or international
organization.
The main functions of a modern diplomat are:
1. Representing the sending State in the receiving State;
2. Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and its nationals, within the
limits permitted by international law;
3. Negotiations with the government of the receiving state;
4. Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting
thereon to the Government of the Sending State;
5. Promote friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their
economic, cultural and scientific relations.
The main functions of diplomats revolve around the representation and protection of the interests
and nationals of the sending state, as well as the promotion of information and friendly relations.
• Diplomats in posts collect and report information that could affect national interests, often with
advice about how the home country government should respond. Then, once any policy response has
been decided in the home country's capital, posts bear major responsibility for implementing it.
• In this way, diplomats are part of the beginning and the end of each loop in the continuous process
through which foreign policy is made.
Advocacy
The home country will usually send instructions to a diplomatic post on what foreign policy goals to pursue,
but it is the diplomats overseas who need to take decisions on tactic :
• who needs to be influenced,
• what will best persuade them,
• who are potential allies and adversaries,
• and how it can be done.
In this operation, the intelligence, integrity, cultural understanding and energy of individual diplomats are
critical. Ideally, over their years of service, diplomats will have developed relationships grounded in trust
and mutual understanding with influential members of the country in which they are accredited. They will
have worked hard to understand the motives, thought patterns and culture of the other side.
Negotiation
The diplomat should be an excellent negotiator but, above all, a catalyst for peace and understanding
between peoples. The role is the principal element in the peaceful relations between states because its
scope ends when the fighting starts war and could, at best, act simultaneously.
18. What is the ‘Tragedy of the Commons” and how can it be overcome? Illustrate
your answer with the help of examples.
The tragedy of the commons is a dilemma arising from the situation in which multiple individuals and
communities, acting independently and rationally consulting their own self-interest, will ultimately deplete
a shared limited resource even when it is clear that it is not in anyone's long-term interest for this to
happen. This dilemma was first described in an influential article titled "The Tragedy of the Commons,"
written by Garrett Hardin and first published in the journal Science in 1968.
In brief, this notion shows how it is possible that rational individual actions can lead to irrational collective
practices resulting in catastrophic over exploitation of common resources. When access to a common
resource is open and unregulated, each user continues to have an individual interest in exploiting it to the
maximum. Each user gains the extra benefit of further resource extraction, while the cost of over
exploitation is shared by all of the communities that use the resources.
The notion of tragedy of the commons can be explained using a parable - of the use of common fish
resources. Consider a sea or a large lake on which many local fishing communities depend as a source of
food and income. Each fisher has an immediate interest in making as large a catch of fish as he/she can sell
or eat, in order to improve his or her standard of living. For centuries, this arrangement has worked
satisfactorily. Human population was sufficiently low and fishing technologies were sufficiently primitive,
that there was no over fishing. Gradually, living conditions improved and human populations grew,
increasing the number of people fishing and also the demand for the fish. At the same time, fishing
technologies improved. In recent years, the sea or lake has been fished at unsustainable levels, ant the
total fish stock is falling.
In spite of this, each fisher continues have an interest in maintaining or improving their catch. Each
fisher gains the full extra benefit of catching additional fish, but bears only a small part of the extra cost of
fishing a depleted fish stock because this cost is shared throughout the whole community. Even concerned
and environmentally aware fishers may be sorely tempted to continue to make large catches: they know
that even if they desist, others are likely to continue to maximize their own catches while they can. The
tragedy of the commons, in this parable is that this process continues until the fish stock is destroyed along
with the fishing communities that depended on it.
The tragedy of commons is that this depletion of ‘open access’ common resources can continue
remorselessly to its destructive conclusion, even if each user involved is well intentioned, well informed,
and exercising only its traditional and legal rights. Unilateral acts of public spirited restraint are insufficient
to tackle the problem. Many environmental problems of industrial society have a similar structure. The
owners of a factory have an interest in continuing to produce goods in the cheapest way, even if that
involves dispersing untreated pollutants into the rivers or atmosphere. The costs of pollution are
externalized, since the polluters do not have to include them in its production cost.
Peloponnesian War
Democracies : Athens vs. Sparta
Rebuttal : They were both actually slave states and so not true democracies( so was the Us
until about 150 years ago). They were independent, volunteer guerrilla forces operating out
of Pakistan, not regular troops.
Counter-Rebuttal : The argument behind the democratic peace is that the people doing the
fighting are also the ones doing the ruling and so don't want to bear the costs of warfare. In
Athens and Sparta citizens, not slaves did the fighting.
Defining Democracy
Basically it all depends on how “Democracy” is defined. If it is defined as a system of
government in which policy is set by unpunished, unrestricted debate among the citizens of a nation
and put into action by their elected representatives, then all of the above nations are democratic. On
the other hand, if you start narrowing the definitions, then obviously you'll get fewer democracies
to work with, so of course you're going to have fewer wars between democracies.
If slavery and democracy are to be mutually exclusive, then no major power was a
democracy until the French Revolution, and the United States passed nearly its entire first
century without being a proper democracy.
If it is insisted that a democracy must be free from all corruption, bribery, vote fraud etc
then even a fine old democracy like the United States fails the test as its 1960 and 1972
presidential elections had enough questionable activities.
Some would avoid labeling a nation democratic until after the first peaceful, orderly transfer
of power to the opposition following an electoral defeat. This makes little sense as one can't
be sure whether the elections are real or just for show, until ruling elite steps down. Under
this rule USA didn't become a democracy until 1801, a quarter century after the Declaration
of Independence. West Germany didn't become a democracy until 1969, 20 years after the
Allied occupation ended.
If women's suffrage is also considered to be an essential component of democracy, then no
nation was a democracy until the 20th Century. Switzerland didn't pass this criteria until
1971 (and at the local level until 1990). France fought two World Wars without being a
proper democracy.
If all the above conditions are imposed on democracy, it significantly trims the number of
democracies in the world at any given time.
The term "democratic peace theory" is used because it is a convenient shorthand term.
However, strictly speaking, the claim that democracies do not fight democracies is a proposition, or
hypothesis, rather than a theory. Democratic peace "theory" proposes a causal relationship between
an independent variable (democratic political structures) and the dependent variable (the absence of
war between democratic states).However; it is not a true theory because the causal relationship
between the independent and dependent variables is not proven.
Normative Logic
According to normative logic one argues that one important effect of democracy is to
socialize political elites to act on the basis of democratic norms whenever possible. In essence,
these norms mandate nonviolent conflict resolution and negotiation in a spirit of live-and-let-live.
Because democratic leaders are committed to these norms they try, as far as possible, to adopt them
in the international arena. This in turn means that democracies both trust and respect one another
when a conflict of interest arises between them. Sentiments of respect derive from a conviction that
the other state adheres to the same norms and is therefore just and worthy of accommodation. Trust
derives from the expectation that the other party to the dispute is also inclined to respect a fellow
democracy. Together these two causal mechanisms:
Norm externalization and
Mutual trust and respect
-make up the normative logic and explain why democracies rarely fight one another.
Institutional Logic
According to the institutional logic, democratic institutions and processes make leaders
accountable to a wide range of social groups that may, in a variety of circumstances, oppose war.
Accountability derives from the fact that political elites want to remain in office, that there are
opposition parties ready to capitalize on unpopular policies, and that there are regular opportunities
for democratic publics to remove elites who have not acted in their best interests. Moreover, several
features of democracies, such as freedom of speech and open political processes, make it fairly easy
for voters to rate a government’s performance. In short, monitoring and sanctioning democratic
leaders is a relatively straightforward matter.Because they are conscious of their accountability,
democratic leaders will only engage in large-scale violence if there is broad popular support for
their actions.