Week 1:

INTRODUCTION
CRIMINAL LAW

Definition
Criminal law is that branch or division of public law which defines crimes,
treats of their nature, and provides for their punishment.
Crime is defined as act committed or omitted in violation of public law
forbidding or commanding it. It is a positive or negative act in violation of penal law;
an offense against the state. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
Accused is a person formally charges in court for having violated a penal law –
either the Revised Penal Code or a special law; a person against whom an accusation
is made. (Black’s Law Dictionary)

Sources of Philippine Criminal Law

1. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) which took effect on January 1, 1932,
and its amendments;
2. x x x and Congress of the Philippines which do no constitute amendments to the
Revised Penal Code;
3. Unrepealed Presidential Decrees;
4. Unrepealed Executive Orders.

Rights of the Accused

A. Constitutional Right
1. Right to bail except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua (and/or death) when evidence of guilt is strong. (Sec.13, Art. III)
2. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face-
to-face, and the right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses,
and production of evidence. (Sec. 14, Art. III)
 3. Not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Sec. 17 Art. III)
4. Right against excessive fines or cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. (Sec
19, Art. III)
5. Right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. (Sec.
2, Art III)

B. Statutory Rights
1. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt;
2. To be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him;
3. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings; to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can protect his rights without the assistance of counsel;
4. To testify as a witness in his own behalf;
5. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself;
6. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;
7. To have a compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in his behalf;
8. To have a speedy, impartial and public trial; and
9. To have the right to appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed
by law. (Sec. 115, Rules of Court)

It must be taken note of that the right to appeal is not a constitutional right.
Congress may therefore pass a law eliminating or taking away this right.
Week 2:

Cardinal Features or Main Characteristics or Components of Philippines Criminal

Law
There are three (3):
1. General
- meaning that Philippine criminal laws are binding on all persons who live or
sojourn in the Philippines. Whoever you are, whatever be your creed, religion,
sex or nationality, as long as you reside in the Philippine territory, penal laws of
the Philippines shall apply on you. Thus, the contention of the accused that
being an American citizen he cannot be prosecuted of, much less convicted of,
illegal possession of firearm because it is a constitutional right of the right of
the citizens of the U.S.A. “to keep and bear arms” without need of securing
government license therefor is untenable since the Philippines, as a sovereign
state, has a right to uphold its law and maintain order within its domain, and
with the general jurisdiction to punish persons for offenses committed within
its territory. (People vs. Galacgac, C.A. 54 O.G. 1027)

There are exceptions to this general application of criminal law:

A. Principles of Public International Law

Thus, sovereigns and other chiefs of state, Ambassadors, Ministers
plenipotentiary, Minister residents, and charges d’ affaires even if residing or
sojourning in the Philippines, and committing crimes herein are not subject to
our penal laws.
B. Treaties or Treaty Stipulations
The persons who are exempted from the operation or application of our
criminal laws under the provisions of the treaties entered into by the
Philippines with another country are likewise exempted. Under the defunct
Military Bases Agreement entered into by Philippines and U.S.A. on March 14,
1947 – any offense committed outside the bases by any member of armed
forces of the United States where the offended party is also a member of the
said armed forces is not cognizable by Philippine courts. Under the VFA, an
American soldiers committing a crime during military exercises is also exempt
from the operation of Philippine criminal law.
C. Laws of Preferential Application
 An example is Sec. 11 of Art. VI of the Constitution which provides that
“No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.” Thus, if Senator A
delivers a libelous speech in Congress against B, he cannot be punished or be
held liable even if he is residing in the Philippines.
2. Territorial
– that our criminal law undertakes to punish crimes committed only within the
Philippine territory. Outside of the parameters of the Philippine archipelago,
Philippine criminal laws cannot be enforced.
There are exceptions however. Under Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
there are (5) instances where the provisions shall be enforced outside of the
jurisdiction of our country against those who:

A. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;

B. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippines or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippines;
C. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the Philippines of
the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
D. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions; or

E. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of
nations defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

3. Prospective
– meaning that a penal law cannot make an act punishable when it was not
punishable when committed. In other words, crimes are punished under the laws
in force at the time the same were perpetrated. It is in consonance with the
constitutional prohibition against Ex Post Facto Law. It reflects the maxim: nullum
crimen sine poena; nulla poena sine lege – that is, there is no crime without a
penalty and there is no penalty without law.

Exception however is provided for by Art. 22. It says:

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code x x x.
 The retroactive effect shall benefit the accused even if at the time of
the time of the publication of the law, a final judgment has been pronounced
and the convict is serving sentence.

Even if the law uses the words “felony” and “habitual criminal as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62,” this is applicable to special laws which
provide more favourable conditions to the accused. (People vs. Soliman, 36
Phil. 5; People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555; People vs. De Lara, 236 SCRA 291)

There is no retroactive effect however, even if the law is favourable to

the accused if he is a habitual delinquent or where the law is expressly made
inapplicable to pending actions. (Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 468)

If the repealing law favors the accused by diminishing the penalty, or

doing it away altogether, then the same should be applied the extent it is
favourable to the offender. (People vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5)

If a repealing law contains provisions which are favourable to the

accused and also provisions unfavourable to the accused only those parts which
are favourable to the accused shall be given retroactive effect.

Although R.A. No. 8294, took effect on July 6, 1997, or after the crimes
involved in the case at bar were committed in 1994, it is advantageous to the
accused, hence it should be given retrospective application insofar as it spares
the accused from a separate conviction to the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm. (People vs. Candido, 383 SCRA 296)

Judicial decisions which are favourable to the accused who is not a

habitual delinquent shall also be accorded retroactive effect.

If the new law fails to penalize the act, then the Court loses jurisdiction,
as in effect, there is no crime existing.
 INTERPRETATION IN CASE OF DOUBT
Where doubt exists, the penal law must be interpreted liberally in favour of
the accused and strictly against the state. Thus, a boy who killed his classmate on his
ninth (9th birthday) and acting with discernment is not criminally liable since there is
a doubt in the provision of the law. Article 12, par. 2 provides that a person under
nine (9) years of age is exempt from criminal liability (even if he acted with
discernment) while a person over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years old is not
exempt if he acted with discernment. So if the boy will kill his classmate when he was
exactly nine (9) years old because it was his birthday, doubt would exist as to his
criminal responsibility. He will be considered exempt as penal laws are to be
interpreted liberally in favor of the accused. This is the Pro Reo doctrine.

Under R.A. No. 9344, a child exactly fifteen (15) years of age below is exempt
from criminal responsibility, if he is more that fifteen but below eighteen (18), he is
exempt unless he acted with discernment.
The Supreme Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be interpreted in
favour of the grantees in order to give full force and effect to the clear intent of such
law. (Estolas vs. Mabalot, 381 SCRA 702)
However, when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation – there is only room for
application. (Cooperative Development Authority vs. Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., 382 SCRA 552)

Title One
FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

CHAPTER ONE
FELONIES

Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by law. (Art. 3, par. 1) The word
“felony” has been understood to mean an act or omission punished by the Code; it
does not cover a crime punished by special law. (Filipinas Life Assurance Co. vs.
Tolentino, SP-5858, October 1, 1976).
They are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) – that is, when the act
is performed with deliberated intent, but also by means of fault (culpa) meaning,
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill. (Art. 3, pars. 2 and 3)
 Felonies take the form of a positive act – like killing a person – homicide or
murder, or taking unlawfully personal property –theft or robbery, or an omission or
failure to perform an act, like failure to issue a receipt of a public officer entrusted
with collection of taxes (Illegal exaction) or failure to deliver within the prescribed
time a person arrested (Delay in the delivery of detained person). In felony by
omission however, there must be a law requiring the doing or the performance of an
act. Thus, mere passive presence at the scene of crime, mere silence and failure to
give the alarm, without the evidence of agreement or conspiracy is not punishable.
Where therefore R, about a meter away from M, her live-in partner, did not anything
despite M’s threat that he would burn the house which he actually put on fire, she
cannot be held criminally liable with M, there being no proof if conspiracy between
them. (People vs. Silvestre & Atienza, 56 Phil. 358)
The act or omission however, must be punishable by laws. This is based on the
maxim NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE – that is, “there is no crime where
there is no law punishing it.”

CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES
A. According to manner or mode of execution (Art. 3)

1. Intentional felonies – committed by means of deceit or malice

Example: Murder, Estafa

2. Culpable felonies – where the wrongful acts result from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Example: Homicide through reckless imprudence or reckless imprudence or
reckless resulting to homicide.

B. According to stage of execution (Art. 6)

1. Consummated – when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.

2. Frustrated – when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
3. Attempted – when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
 produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

C. According to gravity (Art. 9)

1. Grave felonies – those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive in accordance with Art. 25 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Example: Rape, Parricide
2. Less Grave felonies – those which the law punishes with penalties which in their
maximum period are correctional.
Example: Attempted Homicide, Illegal Discharge of Firearm
3. Light felonies – those infractions of law for the commission of which penalty of
arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred (200) pesos, or both, is provided.
Example: Slight physical injuries, Alarm and scandal under Art. 155
While Art. 3 classifies the crimes into Intentional and Culpable, a third class
can be grouped with it – that is, those defined and penalized by special laws which
include crimes punished by city or municipal ordinances. They are generally referred
as mala prohibita. As rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
The act alone irrespective of the motives, constitutes the offense. Good faith is not a
defense.
Mala in se and Mala prohibita, distinguished
Mala in se are crimes which are wrong from their nature, such as murder,
theft, rape, etc., while those that are mala prohibita are wrong, merely because they
are prohibited by statute, like illegal possession of firearm or violation of the Omnibus
Election Law.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for
the almost unanimous condemnation of its members, while crime mala prohibita are
violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation
of the affairs of society.
When the acts however are inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if
punished under special law and before the actor can be held liable, there must be
malice or criminal intent.
Thus, election inspectors and poll clerks who were tasked to transfer the
named of excess voters in one precinct to a newly created precinct and because of
pressures of work and fatigues, omitted some names of persons, who then were not
allowed to vote, when charged with violation of the Election Code, relied on good
faith as a defense.
 The CFI, reasoning that the offense is malum prohibitum and good faith is not a
defense, convicted them. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in acquitting the accused
ruled that the failure or omission to include a voter’s name in the registry list of
voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited, it is wrong per se because it
disenfranchises a voter and violates his constitutional right. To be held liable, the
election inspectors and poll clerks, must act wilfully and maliciously. (People vs.
Sunico, et al., C.A. 50 O.G. 5880)
INCURRENCE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminal liability shall be incurred:
(1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended, and
(2) By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (Art. 4)
This article does not mean to exclude offenders who are liable even if they do
not fall under any of the situations spoken of in the said article. Thus, a person who
committed a crime which he really intended is no doubt liable for that offense like, if
A, intending to kill his father, shot him, he is liable for the death of his father. The
opening sentence of Art. 4 should have been: “Criminal liability shall also be incurred
by.”
No. 1 speaks of a situation where a person was committing a felony but the
consequence was not the one he had intended. He must, however, be perpetrating or
committing an offense otherwise there can be no criminal liability. Thus if A, in
attempting to commit suicide, jumped out from the window of a four (4)-storey
building and fell on another person who was killed, you cannot hold him criminally
liable for intentional homicide because he was not committing a felony that time
since committing suicide is not a felony.
There are three (3) scenario under par. 1 of Art. 4:
A. Error in personae (mistake in the identity of the victim)
– Two (2) peace officers were ordered to arrest Balagtas, an escaped
notorious convict, and proceeding to the father’s house, saw a man
sleeping with his back towards the door and fired at him but the man
turns out to be Serapio Tecson, the Supreme Court ruled the are guilty of
murder. (People vs. Oanis, et al., 74 Phil. 257)
When they fired on the sleeping man without making any inquiry
and believing him to be the notorious escapee, the peace officers were
committing a felony. Their wrongful intent was to hit or kill Balagtas but
the wrongful act that was done was the killing of Serapio Tecson.
 B. Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) – Thus, if X, intending to kill Y, fired
at the latter but the shot hit Y only superficially and killed Z, his own
father, he (X) is criminally liable for attempted homicide with parricide.
When X shot Y, he was perpetrating a felony with the wrongful intent to kill
Y. The wrongful act committed was the killing of his own father which he
never intended. In People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307, the accused who threw
a hand grenade at Pres. Roxas but killed Simeon Varela and injured several
persons was found guilty of murder with assault and multiple attempted
murder.

C. Praeter intentionem (injurious result is greater than that intended) – Thus,

if A slapped his wife who fell on the ground her head hitting a hard
pavement rendering her unconscious and thereafter died, A is liable for
parricide. When he slapped his wife, A was committing a felony. His
wrongful intent is only to cause injury but the wrongful act done was
greater – the killing of the spouse.
In U.S. vs. Marasigan, 27 Phil. 504, where the accused attacked the offended
party with a knife, and in the process of warding off the same, his left hand was
injured, severing the extensor tendon in one of the fingers, the Supreme Court held
that the accused is criminally liable. The fact that the original condition of the finger
could be restored by a surgical operation is immaterial and the victim is not obliged
to submit to a surgical operation to relieve the accused of the natural and ordinary
results to his crime.
The wrong done, however, must be direct and natural consequence of the
felonious act. Stated otherwise, the felony committed must be proximate cause of
the resulting injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that “cause, which in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” (Vda. De
Batacan, et al. vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, citing Vol. 38 Am. Jur.)
In Bringas vs. People, et al., 125 SCRA 687, where the conductor shouted
“Lusacan, Lusacan” knowing that the train would reach the Lucasan Station full three
(3) minutes more and deceased Martina Bool, a passenger, walked towards the left
front door facing the direction of Tiaong, Quezon carrying a child with one hand and
holding her baggage with another, and when the train that slowed down suddenly
picked up speed causing Martina Bool and the three (3)-year-old child she was
carrying to fall from the door causing their deaths, the Supreme Court said:
“The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and
erroneous announcement of the conductor. This announcement prompted the
two (2) victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective
seats when the train jerked as it picked speed. The connection between the
 premature and erroneous announcement of the accused and the deaths of the
victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.”
Even if other causes cooperated in the producing the fatal result as long as the
wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, the actor
is liable. This is true even though the immediate cause of death was erroneous or
unskilful medical or surgical treatment, refusal of the victim to submit to surgical
operation, or that the deceased was suffering from tuberculosis, heart disease or
other internal malady or that the resulting injury was aggravated by infection. (See
The Revised Penal Code, Book I by Luis B. Reyes, citing U.S. vs. Marasigan , 27 Phil.
504; People vs. Illustre, 54 Phil. 594; People vs. Reyes, 61 Phil. 341, People vs.
Quianson, 62 Phil. 162; and People vs. Red, C.A. 43O.G. 8072)
There must, however, be no efficient intervening cause. In U.S. vs. Valdez, it
was ruled that if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed, reasonably
believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape,
jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is
responsible for homicide – the resulting from drowning owing to his possible inability
to swim or the strength of the current. The inability to swim and the strong current
can be considered intervening causes but not efficient once since they are not acts or
facts absolutely foreign from the criminal act. On the other hand, in People vs.
Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503, an American case, the assailant was not held responsible for
the death of a person whom he knocked down with his fist but who was jumped on a
nearby horse killing him, because the act of the horse constitutes an efficient
intervening cause.

Impossible Crime
An act performed with malice which would have been an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment
or on account of the employment of inadequate of ineffectual means. This is the only
crime provided for in Book I of the Revised Penal Code. The Court, having in mind the
social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender shall impose the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from P200.00 to P500.00. (Art. 59, RPC)

The requisites are:

A. The act performed would be an offense against persons or property like
parricide, murder, homicide, abortion, duel or physical injuries, or robbery,
brigandage, theft usurpation, culpable insolvency, estafa and other deceits,
chattel mortgage, arson and malicious mischief.
B. That the act was done with evil intent.
C. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible or that the means employed is
either inadequate or ineffectual.
 Examples: Inherent impossibility (Legal and physical)
A saw B lying down whom he thought was only sleeping. So with intent to
kill, he stabbed B several times on his chest. It turned out that B had been
dead twenty (20) or thirty (30) minutes ago.
Legal Impossibility
X stole the ring which Y inadvertently left on his desk. It turned out that the
said rings was the one X lost two (2) days ago.
Physical Impossibility
A, B, C, D and E, all armed, proceeded to the house of X whereupon A pointed
to the room that X used to occupy and all fired at the said room. Nobody was hit as no
one was inside the room. This is a case of impossible crime to commit murder. (Intod
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 215 SCRA 52)
A saw a beautiful lady lying down already dead, but thinking that she was only
sleeping, undressed and had sex with her. This is an impossible crime to commit rape
considering that under R.A. No. 8353, the crime of rape has been reclassified as an
offense against persons, no longer a crime against chastity.
Ineffectual means - Giving a person a drink mixed with sugar which accused
believed to be poison.
In case of inadequate means, the intended victim should not suffer any injury,
otherwise the crime could be attempted or frustrated homicide or murder as the case
maybe.
Accused took, stole, and deposited in their own account a check in the sum of
P10,000.00 representing payment made by a customer of the company of which
accused are employees, which however, was dishonoured.
The Supreme Court ruled that a worthless check cannot be object of the theft;
there is here, a factual impossibility akin to that given in Intod vs. Court of Appeals:
There is factual impossibility of obtaining money out of a check that bounced. Were it
not for the fact that the check bounced accused would have been guilty of qualified
theft, a crime against property. (People vs. Jacinto, July 2009)

Is There A Common Law Crime in the Philippines?

No, as the par. 1 of Art. 5 Revised Penal Code provides that whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, that is, dismiss the case, and
shall report to the Chief Executive through the Department of justice, the reasons
which induced the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is a product of this article, considering the difficulty of
securing a conviction for estafa committed by issuing a postdated check under Art.
315, par. 2[d] since the defense of having been issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation has always come out as a ready-made defense. Under this law, even if the
dishonoured check was issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, and the drawer
or maker commits no deceit, he is criminally liable.
The elements of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer and
issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(c) the check is subsequently dishonoured by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonoured for the same reason, had not the
drawer without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Bautista vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 360 SCRA 618)
In San Mateo vs. People (March 2013), the Supreme Court made it clear that
while Sec. 22 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer was aware of the
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonoured it, this
presumption arises only after it is proved that the issuer has received a written notice
of dishonor and that within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.
DUTY OF COURT WHEN PENALTY IS EXCESSIVE
Courts Are Not Concerned With Wisdom, Efficacy or Morality of Laws
The court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Dept. of Justice,
such statement as may deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and injury caused by the offense. (Art. 5, par. 2, RPC)
A daughter who killed her father while he was sleeping because the latter ad
raped her, resulting in her pregnancy, should be punished with death by the court
since parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and there is an
aggravating circumstance of treachery. The ordinary mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense, or passion or obfuscation will not affect the imposable
penalty as the same is an indivisible penalty. (Art. 63) However, the Judge may write
the President of the Philippines for granting of Executive Clemency to the poor
daughter on account of the circumstances of the case.

In People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA, it was ruled:

“We are aware of the trial judge’s misgivings in imposing the death
sentence because of his religious convictions. While this court sympathizes with his
predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a
protracted debate on the morality of propriety of the sentence, where the law itself
provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances.
The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an
ancient one but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice.”

STAGES OF EXECUTION
Felonies could be attempted, frustrated or consummated. It is consummated
when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
(Art. 6, par. 1) Thus, if A, intending to kill B, shoots the latter to death, the crime is
consummated homicide or murder, as the case may be.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. (Ibid.) In
the example above, if A hit B on a vital portion of the body which injury could cause
the death of B but because of timely medical attention B did not die, this is a case of
frustrated homicide or frustrated murder.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. (par. 3 Ibid.) So, if in the above-cited example, A shot B but missed or hit
B only on superficial part of his body which would could not cause B’s death, A is
liable only for attempted homicide or attempted murder. In the same vein, if A poked
a gun at B and squeezed the trigger but it jammed and no bullet was fired, the
attempted stage has been reached.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general terms, it shall be
understood as applicable to consummated felony (Art. 46 RPC) committed by the
principal. The penalty next lower degree shall be imposed to frustrated felony (Art.
50, RPC) while the penalty attempted felony shall be two (2) degrees lower.
Example the penalty for homicide is Reclusion Temporal (Art. 249, RPC) and it
shall be understood as applicable to consummated felony; as to frustrated homicide,
the applicable penalty is Prision Mayor; while for Attempted Homicide, Prision
Correccional is the proper penalty.

How To Properly Determine the Stage of Execution

 In determine whether the felony attempted, frustrated or consummated, it is
important consider (1) the nature of crime; (2) the elements constituting the offense;
and (3) the matter of committing the same.
Thus, considering the nature of crime of arson when a building is set on fire, it
is not necessary that it should be entirely consumed in order to constitute the
consummated stage, nor is it affected by prompt extinction of the fire. (U.S. vs. Po
Chengco, 23 Phil. 487)
Where the offender is about to set on fire a building but was apprehended
before ant portion gets burned, it would be attempted arson. Where rags and jute
sacks soaked in gasoline and place near the house that the offender intends to burn,
were put on fire before any part of the house catches fire, the crime would be
frustrated arson.
With respect to theft, the same is consummated once the offender takes or
gets hold of the material possession of the property with intent to gain. It is not
necessary that he be able to carry it away, Thus, the accused who abstracted a
leather belt from a Japanese tourist and placed it in the drawer of his desk, he being
inspector of the Bureau of Customs, is guilty of consummated theft, (U.S. vs. Adiao,
38 Phil. 754) So also, where the accused, after untying from a carabao from a tree
near the offended party’s house, was apprehended after pulling the carabao away by
about two (2) or three (3) meters, the crime is consummated qualified theft. In
Valenzuela vs. People, June 2007, the Supreme Court held that there is no such crime
as frustrated theft ruling out that before the offender takes hold of the personal
property with intent to gain, it is attempted, once he takes hold of it, it is
consummated. He need not be able to carry it away.
This is to be distinguished from estafa where damage to the offended party is
one of the elements to consummate it. In U.S. vs, Dominguez, 41 Phil. 408, the
accused, a salesman was held liable only for frustrated stafa even if proceeds of the
sale which he failed to turn over to the cashier was found out to be in his pocket.
There was no damage yet to the owner of the store because of timely discovery.
In robbery with force upon thing (Art. 299 or 302), where the accused had
entered the building or house, and had removed the property he intended to steal but
was apprehended before he could get out, the crime is frustrated robbery, (People vs.
Jose Del Rosario, C.A. 46 O.G. 332) if he was caught in the act of removing the
property, the crime would be attempted robbery. If he was able to bring the property
out of the house or building, her would be guilty of consummated robbery.
Anent the manner of committing crime, there are offenses which are
consummated in one instant and the act cannot be split into parts to be categorize as
attempted or frustrated like slander or libel, they are called formal crimes.
 There are also crimes which are consummated by mere attempt, proposal or
overt act. Thus the crime of flight to enemy’s country (Art. 121) is consummated by
mere attempt. In abuses against chastity (Art. 245), mere solicitation or proposal
consummates the offense. So also, Art. 185 (Machinations in public auctions) which
punished any person who shall solicit any gift or promised as a consideration for
refraining from taking part in ant public auction.
In material crimes like homicide, rape, murder, etc., there are three (3)
stages of execution. Thus, if A would stab or shoot B, missing him or injuring him only
superficially, the crime is attempted homicide or murder; but if he hit B and inflicted
injuries which otherwise would have been fatal were it not for timely medical
attention, it is Frustrated; if b dies, the cases is consummated homicide or murder.

In the crime of rape, the accused who placed himself on top of a woman,
raising her skirt and unbuttoning his pants, the endeavor to have sex with her very
apparent, is guilty of attempted rape.
Note: (If the effort to have sex is not clear, the crime is only acts of
lasciviousness)
On the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the female organ by penis,
even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, consummates the
crime. (People vs. Tayabas, 62 Phil. 559; People vs. Royeras, 56 SCRA 666; People vs.
Amores, 58 SCRA 505)

This bring us to the question of frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, 18

SCRA 105, the Supreme Court said:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has
carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and from that
moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished the
felony is consummated. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ
is sufficient. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender
merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by over acts. Taking
into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of
rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the
frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
The Court continued that the case of People vs. Erina, 50 Phil. 998, where the
accused was found guilty of frustrated rape, appears to be a "stray" decision in as
much as it has not been reiterated in their subsequent decisions, and that the
particular provision on frustrated rape in Art. 335 as amended by R.A. No. 2632 and
R.A. No. 4111 is a dead provision prompted probably by the Erina case. (NOTE: R.A.
No. 7659, Sec. 11 also contains the provision that when the rape is attempted or
frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death). In People vs. Aca-ac, 357 SCRA, it was
the ruling of the Supreme Court that there is no such crime as frustrated rape.

There are two (2) crimes which previously the Supreme Court said have a
frustrated stage: theft and rape. In People vs. Orita, there is no scenario by which
rape can be considered frustrated. The Supreme Court said before the penis touches
the vagina, that is attempted rape while mere touching of the external genitalia by a
penis that is capable of penetrating the female organ is consummated rape.
In Valenzuela vs. People, June 2007 and Natividad vs. People, June 21, 2007, it
was clear that before the offender takes hold of a personal property with intent to
gain, the offense is attempted theft; but once he took hold of that personal property
with intent to gain, he need not be able to carry it away, the theft is consummated.

There is therefore no frustrated stage in these two (2) cases unlike in arson
where the fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag soaked with kerosene oil beside
an upright of the house for purpose of burning the house, constituted the crime of
Frustrated arson (Valdes case).
LIGHT FELONIES
Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with the
exception of those committed against persons or property. Thus, a person who, within
any town or public place, attempts to fire or to discharge his gun is not criminally
liable even if his acts would fall under Art. 155 punishing alarms and scandals in its
attempted stage as this light felony is a crime against public order.
Likewise, in light felonies, only the principals and accomplices are liable (Art.
16) so that a policeman who assists in the escape of a person who slightly injured
another (Slight physical injuries) is not liable. (NOTE: See P.D. No. 1829 however)
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY
Conspiracy and Proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in
which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. (Art. 8, par. 1)
Conspiracy to commit a felony as well as proposal to commit a felony are,
generally speaking, not crimes. As such, they are not punishable. Thus, although
conspiracy to murder a person is apparent, the conspirators can not be held criminally
liable because there is no law punishing conspiracy to commit murder.
If what was done however was conspiracy to commit rebellion, then the
conspirators are liable because there is a law that punishes conspiracy to commit
rebellion. (Art. 136) The same is true with proposal to commit a felony. Unless there
is a law that punishes proposal to commit a crime, the proponents are not liable.
Article 115 punishes conspiracy and proposal to commit treason, while Sec. 5 of
R.A. No. 6968 penalizes conspiracy and proposal to commit Coup d'etat. On the other
hand, conspiracy to commit sedition (not Proposal) is punishable under Art. 141, while
Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 1613 punishes conspiracy (not proposal) to commit arson.

A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (par. 2, Ibid.) It could
be evidenced by a written agreement among the conspirators or by their verbal
covenant, or it could be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime. (People vs. Manuel, 234 SCRA 532)
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony
proposes its execution to some other person or persons. (par. 3, Ibid.) To constitute
proposal, in law, the proponent himself must be determined to commit the crime so
that if he only aired his grievances against the government and made suggestions on
how to fight the authorities, he cannot be considered liable for proposal to commit
rebellion.
Under Sec. 7 of P.D. No. 1613. Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by
prision mayor in its minimum period. It would seem that like in sedition there is no
crime of proposal to commit arson.
On matters of conspiracy, it is a settled rule that it need not be proved by
direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can
be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the perpetration
of the offense showing that all the accused acted in unison with each other, evincing a
common purpose or design. (See People vs. Pablo, et al., 349 SCRA 79)
In People vs. Dela Rosa, June 2013, it was made clear that conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense was penetrated.
Thus, the act of attacking the victim, boxing and stabbing, at the same time, for the
purpose of killing the victim, is considered an act of conspiracy by the offenders.
And in People vs. Rea, et al., (June 2013), a prosecution for the crime of illegal
recruitment, the fact that Azuk referred all the private complainants to Tendenilla
who made representations that she could deploy them abroad, and accused Rea met
some complainants at the training center and accompanied some of them to Thailand
showed unity of purpose and taken all together, leave no doubt that they are
conspirators.
OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE CODE
Special Laws
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Art. 10)
 Thus, in case of conflict between the provisions of the special laws and those
of the Revised Penal Code, the former shall prevail. The provisions of the latter
however shall be supplementary to special laws whenever applicable. In People vs.
Simon, 234 SCRA 555, citing People vs. Macatanda, 109 SCRA 35, it was held:
"While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties thereunder are
those provided for in the Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory
intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code
the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any
express, or implicit proscription in these special laws."
Week 3:
CHAPTER TWO
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
There are five (5) circumstances affecting the criminal liability of an individual.
They are justifying, exempting, mitigating, aggravating, and alternative
circumstances. (Arts. 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15)
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Self-Defense
No. 1 in justifying circumstances is SELF-DEFENSE. Thus, anyone who acts in
defense of his person or rights incurs no criminal liability provided that the following
circumstances concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
This includes defense of honor, defense of home as defense of property.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the injured or the victim is the first element
of self-defense. This is an indispensable requisite even in incomplete self-defense.
(People vs. Deopante, G.R. No. 102772, October 30, 1996) Without this requisite, we
can not speak of complete self-defense as a justifying circumstance, or incomplete
self-defense as a mitigating circumstance. (Art. 13, par. 1)
Unlawful Aggression means an assault or attack, or a threat in an imminent
and immediate manner which places the defendant's life in actual peril. (Philippine
Law Dictionary by Moreno, 3rd Ed., 1980) There must be an actual assault or a threat
but in case of the latter, it must be imminent and positively strong to palpably show
the wrongful intent to cause injury. Mere intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Thus,
barging on the door of the accused with shouts of threats to kill cannot be considered
unlawful aggression. (People vs. Trison, G.R. Nos. 106345-46 September 16, 1996)
Likewise, if the accused agrees to fight, unlawful aggression is wanting because by
accepting the challenge and immediately approaching the victim, the accused places
himself in an unlawful status and himself becomes an unlawful aggressor, as
aggression as an incident of the fight is bound to arise. (People vs. Galas, G.R. No.
114007, September 24, 1996)
To give rise to self-defense, the aggression must not be a lawful one like the
attack of a husband against a paramour of his wife whom he surprised in an
uncompromising situation, or a chief of police who threw stones at the accused who
was running away to elude arrest for a crime committed in his presence. Their
aggression was not considered unlawful.

Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or

imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude but
when its author does not persist anymore in his purpose or when he discontinues his
attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in peril, it ceases to
be an unlawful aggression and does not warrant self-defense. (People vs. Geneblazo,
361 SCRA 573)
The second element is reasonable necessity of the means Employed to prevent
or repel it. There must be a reasonable necessity of the course of action taken, and
reasonable necessity of the means used. In People vs. Jaurigue, 76 Phil. 174, while it
was ruled that when the deceased placed his hand on the upper thigh of the lady
accused, there was unlawful aggression but when the latter immediately stabbed him
with a knife killing him, there was no reasonable necessity of her course of action
since in the chapel where the killing took place, there were many people including
her father, it was well lighted and there is no possibility of her being raped.
Consequently, she was convicted.
When the deceased laid down his gun, unlawful aggression had already ceased
and it was no longer necessary for accused appellant to have fired successfully the
way he did at the victim. (People vs. Rabanal, 387 SCRA 685)

The means employed by the person making a defense must be rationally

necessary to prevent or repeal an unlawful aggression. What the law requires is a
rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the
emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the
instinct more than the reason that moves or impels the defense.
On the other hand, whether the means employed is reasonable or not depends
upon the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical
condition, character and size, as well as of the person defending and the place and
occasion of the assault. (See The Revised Penal Code Book 1 by Luis B. Reyes, 1993
Ed., p. 176)

Self-defense and accidental shooting cannot both be raised by the accused as a

defense. If accused is acting in self-defense, then he could only have deliberately
used the gun to repel the alleged aggression. On the other hand, if the shooting was
accidental, then it was immaterial whether the accused employed reasonable means
to repel the alleged aggression. (People vs. Florague, 360 SCRA 587)
In People vs. Gomez, October 2013, the Supreme Court's ruling was when the
aggression staged by the victim was not of continuous kind, as it has ceased, the
accused has no longer any justification to kill or wound the original aggressor. There is
no more reasonable necessity on the part of the accused to repel or prevent the said
assault; he is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation which is not the same
as self-defense.

The third element - Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself - pictures a situation where there was total lack of provocation on
the part of the accused as when he was attacked without any reason at all, or when
the accused gave provocation but is not sufficient for the offended party to assault
him, or where provocation is sufficient but is not immediate to the act (U.S. vs.
Laurel, 22 Phil. 252) or where the sufficient provocation was given by the companion
of the accused of which the latter had no part.
Under the principle of Battered-Woman Syndrome, while there was an inkling
that this syndrome could be considered as a viable plea within the concept of self-
defense (People vs. Genosa, 341 SCRA), the Supreme Court in an En Banc decision has
ruled that the same cannot be considered a form of self-defense. It would only
mitigate the woman accused liability.
However, in Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 9262, it is provided that victim-survivors of
Battered Woman Syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liabilities despite the
absence of the elements of self-defense provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
In effect, the same has effectively amended par. 1 of Art. 11 of the Revised
Penal Code.
2. Defense of Relatives

The law speaks only of spouse; ascendants, meaning parents, grandparents,

great grandparents, etc.; descendants, meaning children, grandchildren, great
grandchildren, etc.; brothers and sisters, relatives by affinity in the same degrees,
that is, parents-in law, children-in-law, and brothers or sisters-in-law as relatives.
Outside of these people, the persons are considered, in criminal law, as strangers.
There are three (3) requisites - first is unlawful aggression, second is
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and third is that
the relative being defended gave no provocation. Anent the third requisite however,
the law gives a leeway - that is, even if the relative being defended gave the
provocation, if the relative making the defense had no part therein, he can
successfully invoke defense of relative.
3. Defense of Stranger
Outside of himself, and those relatives mentioned in Art. 11, par. 2, any person
who acts in defense of the person or rights of another can legitimately claim the
defense of stranger. The first two (2) requisites however, that is, unlawful aggression,
and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, must be
present. The law adds another requisite, which is, that the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
 Thus, one who, seeing his seventy-eight (78)-year-old neighbor held down on
the ground by a strong and robust young man and in serious danger of being throttled,
furnished the person assaulted with a gaff, as he himself is also old and may not be
able to cope with the assailant, with which his neighbor used to inflict a mortal
wound on the assailant is entitled to the claim of defense of strangers. (U.S. vs.
Subingsubing, 31 Phil. 376)

4. Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury

The fourth justifying circumstance speaks of a person who, in order to avoid an
evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another. The following however
must be present: first, that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists, second, that
the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it, and third, that there be no
other practical and less harmful means of preventing it (Art. 12, par. 4)
The doctor who had to kill a foetus to save the mother where both could not be
saved, and he is running out of time, may invoke this defense. This is different
however from Euthanasia - the so-called mercy-killing which is not justified in our
jurisdiction. A captain of a ship caught by storm and huge waves in his journey, who
ordered the jettison of cargoes against the will of the owners to prevent the ship from
sinking and save the passengers, can shield criminal liability behind this provision.
5. Fulfillment of Duty or Exercise of Right or Office

The fifth justifying circumstance provides that no criminal liability shall be

incurred by any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office.
Thus, a policeman who killed an escaping prisoner after making the warning
shot and shouting to him not to continue with his escape, and who prior to that even
attacked him with a spear, acted in the lawful fulfillment of duty.
A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office. But we must stress there are two (2)
requisites for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right, and (b) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
right or office. (People vs. Belbes, 334 SCRA 161)
So also, if A hit B with his fist inside a running passenger jeep because B was
snatching his (A's) watch, and as a consequence B fell from the jeep, his head hitting
the hard pavement causing his death, A acted in the lawful exercise of a right. And
the executioner of convicts sentenced to die, who would make the lethal injection in
the Bureau of Corrections on the day and time scheduled by the Court, does so in the
lawful exercise of an office.
 6. Obedience to an Order of a Superior
It is also a justified act if a person acts in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. (Art. 11, par. 6)
This justifying circumstance needs an order issued by a superior officer of the
accused which was for a lawful purpose and the latter obeyed the order. Where the
order of arrest was issued by his superior for the purpose of delivering the person's
subject of the order to the commanding officer who made the request that they be
apprehended and arrested for a crime they committed but because they resisted
arrest, the accused killed them, this justifying circumstance is applicable.
The order however of guerilla officer for the killing of a civilian is not lawful.
Week 4:
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 12 enumerates persons who are exempted from criminal liability. Unlike
in justifying circumstances, here there was a crime committed, there is a criminal but
for reasons of public policy, no penal liability shall be inflicted on him.
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An Imbecile or an Insane Person Unless the Latter has Acted During a Lucid
Interval.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of the freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or
to the very moment of its execution. (See People vs. Estrada, 333 SCRA 699; also
People vs. Valledor, 383 SCRA 653)

An imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while on insane person is

one who has unsound mind or who suffers from mental disorder. An insane person may
have suffers from mental disorder. An insane person may have lucid intervals but an
imbecile has none. (People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325, citing 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th
Ed.)
Imbecility is defined as feeble-mindedness or a mental condition approaching
that of one who is insane. It is analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile
within the meaning of Art. 12 is one completely deprived of reason or discernment
and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. While advanced in age, he
has a mental development of children between two (2) and seven (7) years of age.
The reasoning of the accused that he resorted to cutting grass instead of guarding his
victim could hardly be indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may be considered
negligence. (People vs. Nunez, G.R. Nos. 41242930, July 23, 1947)
In People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860, it was held that one who suffers from
insanity at the time of the commission of the offense can not in a legal sense
entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. In
People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, the ruling was that, in order that a person could
be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Revised Penal Code so
as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

Any deprivation therefore of reason or discernment at the time of the trial of

the case is not an exempting circumstance.
If the insanity occurs during the trial, such is not an exempting circumstance.
The proceedings shall be suspended, and the accused ordered to be confined at the
National Center for Mental Health or other government agency to await for his trial
when he regains his sanity.
2. A Person Fifteen Years of Age and below. (R.A. No. 9344)

3. A Person Over Fifteen (15) above and under eighteen (18) Unless He Has
Acted With Discernment. (R.A. No. 9344)

It is clear therefore that even if a person has acted with discernment, if he is

under fifteen (15) years of age, he is free from penal responsibility. On the other
hand, if he is over fifteen (15) years of age but under eighteen (18), he will be held
criminally liable if he acted with discernment.
An accused who knows the morality of his acts, or can fully appreciate the
consequences of his actuation has acted with discernment which can be shown by the
manner the crime was committed or his conduct after its commission.
4. Any Person Who, While Performing a Lawful Act With Due Care, Causes an
Injury by Mere Accident Without Fault or Intention of Causing It.

So, one driving his car duly licensed to do so, in the proper lane and within the
limits prescribed by law, who hits a boy who suddenly darted into the street is exempt
from criminal liability due to accident.
Problem:
A, armed with a 38 caliber and B, who has no weapon, robbed a store;
but in the course thereof, were seen by P, a policeman who was armed with a .
45 caliber gun, and when he demanded for the surrender of A and B, A shot him
but missed, and so P repelled the attack. In the exchange of shots, A was
killed, together with B, and the owner of the store. The three were killed by
the bullets fired from a .45 caliber. In such case, P is not liable for the death of
A due to self-defense as all the three (3) elements were present. He is also not
liable for the death of B, not because of self-defense because the latter being
weaponless cannot commit unlawful aggression, but because of performance of
duty. For the death of C, the store owner, P, is also not criminally liable
obviously not because of self-defense nor of fulfillment of duty but because of
accident provided for in par. 1 of Art. 12.
 5. Any Person Who Acts Under the Compulsion of an Irresistible Force.
Thus, a person who was compelled to bury the body of one who was murdered
by the killers, striking him with the butts of their guns, threatening to kill him too, is
not criminally liable as an accessory.

6. Any Person Who Acts Under the Impulse of an Uncontrollable Fear of an

Equal or Greater Injury.
If A with a revolver in his hand threw a knife at B, and ordered him to kill C, a
person sleeping nearby otherwise he will shoot B, the latter can ask exemption from
criminal liability if he stabbed C to death.
7. Any Person Who Fails to Perform an Act Required by Law When Prevented
by Some Lawful or Insuperable Cause.
A policeman who arrested a man who had just killed another in his
(policeman's) presence, at 6:00 p.m. of a Saturday in a small town in the province, is
not liable under Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code when he filed the criminal
complaint only in the morning of the following Monday (more than thirty-six [36]
hours as required by the said Article) since there was no court where to file the
complaint. He was prevented by a lawful or insuperable cause to comply with the
requirement of the law.
Absolutory Causes

Absolutory causes are those where the actors are granted freedom from charge
or immunity from burden for reasons of public policy and sentiment even if their acts
constitute a crime.
They are:
1. Accessories with respect to spouse, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters or relatives by affinity within the same degrees except those falling
under par 1 of Art. 19. (Art. 20, RPC)
2. Spouse or parents who inflicted less serious or slight physical injuries on his/
her spouse or their daughters living with them, whom they surprised in the act
of sexual intercourse with another. (Art. 247, RPC)

3. Any person who entered another's dwelling to prevent serious harm to

himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person or rendered some
service to humanity or justice, or entered cafes, taverns, inns and other public
houses while the same were open. (Art. 280, par. 3)
4. In case of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by spouses, ascendants and descendants or relatives by affinity in the
 same line, and brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law if
living together. (Art. 332)

If the crime committed is robbery like entering a house through a

window, or if the crime is theft, swindling (Estafa) or malicious mischief
complexed with other crimes, Art. 332 is not applicable.
But a live-in partner without the benefit of marriage with his/her
partner can avail of this Article. (Art. 332, RPC)
5. Instigation, where the actor otherwise innocent, was induced by a public
officer to commit the crime such that the latter himself becomes a principal by
inducement or by indispensable cooperation,
[NOTE: Entrapment however is not an absolutory cause. In entrapment, ways
and means are resorted to by the authorities to trap and capture the actor, already a
law-breaker, in the execution of his criminal activities. Buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment and the accused entrapped is liable. (People vs. Juma, 220 SCRA 432;
People vs. Nicolas, et al., G.R. No. 110116, February 1, 1995)
But in retrospect, prior surveillance is not required, especially if the buy-bust
team is accompanied by their informant. When time is of the essence, the police may
dispense with the need of prior surveillance. (People vs. Lucio, June 2013)

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Mitigating circumstances are those which do not entirely free the actor from penal
responsibility but serve only to lessen or reduce the penalty imposable. There are two
(2) classes - Ordinary mitigating which can be offset by aggravating circumstances,
and which if present tends to reduce the penalty by periods, and privileged
mitigating which cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance, and which if
present tends to reduce the penalty by degrees.
The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Incomplete justifying and incomplete exempting circumstances.
2. When the offender is over 15 and under 18 or over 70 years of age, the age
of over 70 must be at the time of promulgation of judgment of conviction not
at the time of commission of the offense.
3. When the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.
4. When there was sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party that immediately preceded the act.
 5. When the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the person committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, brothers or sisters or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees.
6. When the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.
7. Voluntary surrender to person in authority or his agents by the accused, or if
he voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to prosecution's
presentation of evidence.
8. If the offender is deaf and dumb, blind in two eyes, or otherwise suffering
from physical defect which restricts his means of action, defense or
communication with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness on the part of the offender as would diminish the exercise of his
will power without depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
10. Any other circumstance of a similar nature or analogous to those above-
mentioned. 11. Humanitarian reason - People vs. Jarillo (September 2007,
reiterated in the case of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, 2015)

1. Incomplete Justifying and Incomplete Exempting Circumstances

In incomplete self-defense, incomplete defense of relative and incomplete
defense of stranger, the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is an
indispensable requisite. It is the second (2nd) or the third (3rd) element that is
lacking, otherwise there is no incomplete justification as a mitigating circumstance
under par 1 of Art. 13.
An illustration of incomplete exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear is
one where the accused, while sleeping, was awakened by a shot, and because he was
expecting an attack by a group of armed men, shot a man he saw in the dark who
turned out to be an unarmed innocent person. (People vs. Magpantay, C.A. 46 O.G.
1655) He acted under an impulse of a fear which is not uncontrollable although it
promised an equal or greater injury.

In Nadyahan vs. People, March 2016, when accused, armed with a knife, was
ganged up by the four (4) people with wood and belt buckle, and the attackers were
already drunk before the fight, it was held that this is an incomplete self-defense and
thus mitigating.
2. Under eighteen (18) or over seventy (70) Years old
 For purposes of criminal liability, the age of a person may be divided as
follows:

1. nine (9) years or below - exempted from penal responsibility.

2. over nine (9) years but below fifteen (15) – conditional - liability that is, if he acted
without discernment, he is exempted.
3. over nine (9) and below fifteen (15) acting with discernment – mitigated liability at
least by two (2) degrees lower. (Art. 68, par. 1)
4. over fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age - mitigated liability by one
degree lower. (Art. 68, par. 2)
5. over eighteen (18) and below seventy (70) years of age - complete criminal liability,
6. over seventy (70) years of age-mitigated liability.

3. Lack of Intent to Commit so Grave a Wrong

Intention partakes of the nature of a mental process, an internal act. It can be
gathered from and determined by the conduct and external acts of the offender and
the results of the acts themselves. So, the accused who was charged with rape with
homicide, and who admitted that "My only intention was to abuse her, but when she
tried to shout I covered her mouth and choked her, and later I found that because of
that she died," is not entitled to this mitigating circumstance, for he knew that the
girl was very tender in age (six [6] years old), weak in body, helpless and defenseless
and he ought to know the natural and inevitable result of the act of strangulation.
(People vs. Y, 1 SCRA 199)
A husband who slaps his wife who fell down her head hitting a hard pavement
and died as a result can avail of this mitigating circumstance.
But this attenuating circumstance is not applicable in case of several accused
where conspiracy was proven for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. (People
vs. Bautista, 38 SCRA 184)
4. Sufficient Provocation or Threat
The sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim must immediately
precede the act of the offender. A killed his father-in-law who warned him to be
careful because he would kill him before the end of the day, after he told said father-
in-law that he cannot live anymore with his adulterous wife, the daughter of the
deceased, whom he caught in flagrante with her paramour. He is entitled to this
mitigating circumstance. (People vs. Rivero, 242 SCRA 354) He could have interpreted
this warning as a serious threat which prompted him to decide to eliminate his father-
in-law before he could carry out such threat.
5. Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense
 The word "immediate" in par. 5 is not an accurate translation of the Spanish
text which uses the term "proxima" and somehow a lapse of time is allowed between
the grave offense and the vindication unlike in provocation or threat (par. 4) that
should immediately precede the act.
Thus, in People vs. Parana, 64 Phil. 331, where it was after a few hours from
the time he was slapped by the deceased in the presence of many people, when he
killed said deceased, the Supreme Court considered this mitigating circumstance in
his favor since the influence of said offense "by reason of its gravity and
circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment the crime was
committed. However, in People vs. Pajares, 210 SCRA 237, where the brother of the
accused was mauled by the victim's companion and the victim himself ten (10) hours
earlier, the accused who killed the deceased was adjudged not entitled to the
benefits of this circumstance since such interval of time was more than sufficient to
enable him to recover his Serenity
It would seem that the rule is that, the court must consider the lasting effect
and influence of the grave offense to the offender when he resorted to commit the
crime to vindicate such grave offense.
6. Passion or Obfuscation
To be considered mitigating, the same must arise from lawful sentiments
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts of the offended party.

While watching a TV show, the ballcaster of the swivel chair on which the
accused was seated broke and got detached, and so he called E, his stepson, to buy
one but because it took time for the latter to awaken, accused started shouting bad
words to F who finally got up, got dressed and went to the comfort room to brush his
teeth. This further angered the accused who boxed him (F), and when F got out of the
house, accused followed him, and because he could not see Fat once, he shot him
when finally he saw him returning to the house. Held: No mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation as the anger of the accused did not arise from lawful
sentiments. The delay in obeying his request to buy the ballcaster is too trivial a
matter as to fairly and justly cause such overreaction on his part. (People vs. Tiongco,
236 SCRA 458)
7. Voluntary Surrender and Plea of Guilty
Accused who went into hiding for two-and-a-half (2 1/2) years after killing the
victim cannot claim this mitigating circumstance for in order that voluntary surrender
may be appreciated, it is necessary that the same be spontaneous in such manner
that it shows the intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. (People vs. Ablao, 183 SCRA
658, citing People vs. Lingatong, G.R. No. L-34019, January 29, 1990)
 So also, it must be surrender of the body of the accused to the persons in
authority or their agents. So the surrender of his gun, not himself, by handing over
the weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room, and the surrender being
made to his brother who was not a person in authority nor an agent can not be
considered an attenuating circumstance. He holed in the faculty room, in effect
holding some teachers and students as hostages, as the faculty room was surrounded
by soldiers and there was no escape open to him. (People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601)
Voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been actually arrested;
that he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and that
the surrender was voluntary (People vs. Callet, 382 SCRA43) For surrender to be
voluntary, it must be spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (1) he acknowledges his guilt
or (2) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense incidental to his search and
capture. (People vs. Zeta, 382 SCRA 141)
8. Spontaneous Plea of Guilty
To be appreciated as an attenuating circumstance, the plea of guilty must be
made before the prosecution presents its evidence, and it must be an unconditional
plea. (People vs. Serafica, 27 SCRA 123) However, if it is a plea to a lesser offense -
let us say, where the charge is murder and the offer is a plea of guilty to homicide,
and the court allows the prosecution to present evidence to prove the qualifying
circumstance, and it fails to establish the aggravating circumstance that would qualify
the killing to murder, the accused is entitled to this mitigating circumstance. The
forum however must be the court that has jurisdiction over the offense.
Under the Benchbook in Criminal Procedure issued by the Supreme Court, the
plea of the accused in the plea bargaining phase in the pre-trial stage need not be
unconditional. Thus, the manifestation of the accused to plead guilty, if the penalty
to be imposed is only fine will be allowed to be mitigating if the offense is punishable
by fine, imprisonment, or both at the discretion of the court.
9. Illness Which Restricts Means of Action
The law says that the offender is deaf and dumb, meaning not only deaf but
also dumb, or that he is blind, meaning blind in both eyes, but even if he is only deaf
and not dumb, or dumb only but not deaf, or blind only in one eye, he is still entitled
to a mitigating circumstance under this article as long as his physical defects restrict
his means of action, defense or communication with his fellowmen. The restriction
however must relate to the mode of committing the crime. Thus, even if he is armless
or somehow limping because he was a polio victim in his younger days, if the charge is
libel or oral defamation, his illness does not give him the privilege to mitigate his
criminal liability for the said crime.
10.Illness Diminishing Will Power
 If the illness not only diminishes the exercise of offender's will power but
deprives him of the consciousness

of his acts, it becomes an exempting circumstance to be classified as insanity or

imbecility.
Feeblemindedness of the accused who, in a fit of jealousy, stabbed his wife,
then carried her up to the house, laid her on the floor and then lay down beside her,
warrants the finding in his favor of this mitigating circumstance. (People vs.
Formigones, 87 Phil. 658)
11.Mitigating Circumstances of Similar Nature
Return of the property stolen is analogous to voluntary surrender, testifying for
the prosecution by a co-accused divulging the truth of what really transpired is akin
to plea of guilty, esprit de corps is similar to passion or obfuscation; over sixty (60)
years old with failing sight is analogous to over seventy (70). (See The Revised Penal
Code by Reyes, 1993 Ed., pp. 312-314, citing People vs. Villamora, 86 Phil. 287;
People us. Reantillo and People vs. Navasca, 76 SCRA 72)
 Week 5:
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Those which if present in the commission of the crime serve to increase the
penalty imposable, without however exceeding the maximum period prescribed for
the offense.
Kinds of Aggravating Circumstances
A. Specific - those that apply only to some particular crimes like disregard of
respect due the offended party on account of rank, sex or age which are
applicable only to crimes against persons or honor. Ignominy which applies only
to crimes against chastity; cruelty which applies only to crimes against person.

B. Generic – those which generally, can be applied to all offenses like dwelling,
recidivism, in consideration of price, reward or promise.
C. Inherent - those which necessarily accompany or inhere in the commission of
the crime like evident premeditation in theft or robbery.
D. Qualifying - those which if attendant, alter the nature of the crime
necessarily increasing the penalty, such as by means of poison, with aid of
armed men in killing persons or grave abuse of confidence which makes
stealing one of qualified theft. All aggravating circumstances whether
qualifying or ordinary, must be alleged in the Information. This is now required
by the Rules of Court.
The aggravating circumstances are as follows (Art. 14):
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. (Art. 14,
par. 1)
Under Sec. 23, 1(a) of R.A. No. 7659, when in the commission of the crime,
advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed
shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
It would seem that when this aggravating circumstance is present in the
commission of heinous crimes, it can not be offset by any mitigating circumstance.

For this circumstance to be appreciated as aggravating, the accused must be a

public official who used his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives
him in realizing his purpose.
If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his
position, then there is no abuse of public position. Since no evidence was adduced to
prove that the killing was in any way facilitated by the public position of the accused,
in fact, it was not even shown whether the accused wore his uniform or used his
service firearm, this aggravating circumstance is not present. (People vs. Sumacy, 263
SCRA 460)

However in People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1, this circumstance was considered

against the accused, a law officer, as he committed the crime (robbery with
homicide) with the aid of a gun which he had been authorized to carry as a peace
officer, and he succeeded in going through the check point unmolested and
unsuspected because of his official position. Where the public position is an element
of the offense like bribery (Direct – Article 210, Indirect – 211, or Qualified Bribery –
Sec. 4, R. A. No. 7659), this circumstances can not be taken into consideration.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to public
authorities. (par.2)
Public authorities are public officers directly vested with jurisdiction and who
have the power to govern and execute the laws. They are also called persons in
authority. So that if X, despite his knowledge of the presence of the Mayor of
Governor or a Judge, who made known of his presence to him, still continued to
assault his opponent, this circumstance must be taken against him. If it were
however, a policemen or an NBI agent, this aggravating circumstance cannot be
considered, as a policeman or an NBI agent is a mere agent of a person in authority.
The public authority however must be engaged in the exercise of his duties,
must not be the person against whom the crime is committed, and the offender must
know that he is a person in authority.
3. That the act be committed (a) with insult or in disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex, or that (b) it be
committed in the dwelling of the offended party if the latter has not given
any provocation. (par. 3)
a. Insult or Disregard of Rank, Age or Sex
Considering the fact that the deceased, Silvina Cuyos, was already sixty (60)
years old at the time she was killed by the accused who was then only twenty-three
(23) years old, whom witnesses saw as if wrestling with the said deceased who
sustained fatal injuries at the neck, there is disregard of the respect sue the offended
party on account of her age. (People vs. Rubio, 257 SCRA 528)
A clerk in the Cash Section of the Civil Service Commission who attacked the
Assistant Chief of the Personnel Division of the said government office has committed
a crime aggravated by disrespect due to the offended part on account of his rank.
(People vs. Benito, 72 SCRA 271)
Where the accused took turns in hitting the victim, a seventy (70)-year old
woman, with the pieces of wood they brought in going to the house of the said victim,
the circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her
sex and age is present. (People vs. Lapaz, 171 SCRA 539)
 NOTE: While nighttime is absorbed in treachery, the aggravating circumstance
of disregard of sex and age can not be similarly absorbed, as treachery refers to the
manner of commission of the crime, while the latter pertains to the relationship of
the victim with the offender. (Ibid.)
It would seem that for this circumstance to be taken against the accused, there
must be a showing of insult or disregard of the age, sex or rank of the offended party.
b. Dwelling
It must be taken note of, that dwelling is a building or structure exclusively
used and devoted for rest and comfort, and it includes every dependency of the house
which forms as integral part thereof. It may mean only the room of the bedspacer in a
boarding house. Thus, the crime of rape against the offended party who was renting a
bedspace in a boarding house is aggravated by dwelling. (People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA
511)
Dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part
thereof including staircase of the house, and much more its terrace. (People vs. Rios,
G.R. No. 132622, June 19, 2000)
In People vs. Perreras, 362 SCRA 202, it was ruled: He who goes to another’s
house to hurt him or do wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. For
the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused
should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense – it is
enough that the victim who gave no provocation was attacked inside his own house,
as the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside.
Where the complainant was forcibly from her house, brought to a nearby
Barangay where she was raped, dwelling is an aggravating circumstance. (People vs.
Lacanieta, 330 SCRA 519)
To consider it however, as an aggravating circumstance, the victim must not
have given the provocation. However, even if the attacker was outside the house, and
the victim was inside his dwelling when he was fired upon, as long as the latter had
not provoked the offender, there is dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. So also,
if the assault was commenced inside the dwelling and terminated outside the same,
dwelling can be considered. The victim should be the owner, occupant or lessee of the
house. However, in People vs. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566, it was held that the victim need
not be the owner or occupant of the dwelling where he was shot since “the stranger,
as an invited guest, is sheltered by the same proof and protected by the same
intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief moment,
home to him.”
While this aggravating circumstance cannot be considered in trespass to
dwelling or robbery in an inhabited house as it is included necessarily in these crimes
(Art. 62), it can be considered in Robbery with Homicide because this kind of Robbery
can be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the house.
(People vs. Pareja, 265 SCRA 429)
 4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious
ungratefulness. (par. 4)
Where the accused is the uncle of the victim and who had taken shelter in the
house of the victim’s parents, the rape that he committed against his niece is
attended with abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness. (People vs. Cabresas,
244 SCRA 362)
5. That the crime be committed in the place of the Chief Executive, or in his
presence, or where authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties
or in place dedicated to religious worship. (par. 5)
To consider the palace of the President, or a place dedicated to religious
worship, the accused must have the intention to commit the crime in such place so
that if the meeting of the offender and the victim was only casual, this circumstance
cannot be considered.
In a place where authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, it is
necessary that actual fulfilment of function be going on, so that if the Judge declared
a recess, and during such recess a crime was committed in his courtroom, the
circumstance is not present. However, if it is a place dedicated to religious worship,
any offense committed thereat even if no ceremony is taking place, is aggravated by
this circumstance.
The President or Chief Executive need not be in the Palace to aggravate the
liability of the offender. As long as he was present, and his presence is known to the
accused when he did the crime, there is aggravating circumstance.
6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime or in an uninhabited place, or
a band whenever such circumstance may facilitate the commission of the
offense.
Night has been defined as a period of time from sunset to sunrise. (Art. 13 Civil
Code) Viada poetically defined it as the beginning of dusk to the end of dawn. (See
The Revised Penal Code by Reyes, p. 356) It is not however the period or the time
that is material. It is more of the darkness or nocturnity that enshrouds the situation.
Thus, if at 10:30 p.m. a killing occurred in a dance party where the place was bright
or keenly illuminated, there is no nighttime to speak of.
And even if it was really dark, for nocturnity to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, it must have been particularly sought for by the accused, or taken
advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his
immunity from capture or otherwise to facilitate his getaway. (People vs. Pareja, 265
SCRA 429)
So also if the criminal act was commenced while the atmosphere or
environment was still bright, and terminated when it was already dark, this
aggravating circumstance is not present. Contrariwise, if the offender began to
perpetrate the crime while it was still dark, but finished it already at daybreak where
the place is already bright, there is likewise no nighttime as an aggravating
circumstance.
In the case of forcible abduction with rape which was committed at 2:00 a.m.,
it was held that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime should be considered.
(People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596)
In People vs. Canbangcala, 362 SCRA 361, it was ruled that for nighttime to be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the Court must be convinced that the
cover of darkness was purposely sought for the purpose of ensuring the consummation
of the crime, or where the accused took advantage of the blankness of the night.
There is a band whenever more than three (3) armed malefactors shall have
acted together in the commission of the offense. (People vs. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1)
Thus, at least four (4) must be the number (People vs. Polones, 230 SCRA 279) and
they must be armed although the arms need not be limited to firearms. When the two
(2) groups are almost similarly armed, like where the group of the offended party
numbered five (5) but only three (3) were armed so that there is no band, while the
offenders were four (4) who were all armed and therefore constituted a band, there
is no band aggravating circumstance as it did not facilitate the commission of the
crime. Likewise, if the meeting is casual, the homicide committed by the killers
comprising a band is not aggravated.
The uninhibitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of the commission,
there was no reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering
that the killing was done during nigttime and many fruit trees and shrubs obstructed
the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim
to receive any assistance. (People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35)
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
If the crime coincidentally took place during the occasion of the misfortune or
calamity, this aggravating circumstance is not present because the offender did not
take advantage of the situation. It must be noted that the reason behind this
circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst
of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by
taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them. (U.S. vs. Rodriquez, 19 Phil.
150)
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armend men or persons who
insure or afford impunity.
The law uses the words “men” and “persons” – meaning in the plural form and
so at least two (2) persons are involved.
If the accused relied on the presence of armed men, availing himself of the aid
of the latter, his liability is aggravated. However, where it appeared that appellants
were not merely present at the scene of the crime but were in conspiracy with the
assailant, shooting the victim and leaving the scene together after apparently
accomplishing their purpose clearly evincing conspiracy, this circumstance can not be
appreciated. (People vs. Umbrero, 196 SCRA 821)
If accused, upon assurance of policeman A and B that they would not patrol the
area so that he could commit theft or robbery thereat, the commission of burglary in
the said area where no routine patrolling was done is aggravated by the aid of persons
who insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
The law defines recidivist as one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in
the same title of the Revised Penal Code.
Where accused was convicted of Homicide on September 15, 1983 and there
being no appeal, judgment became final on October 1, 1983 and the second
conviction was rendered on October, 26, 1983 for murder, he is recidivist. (People vs.
Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611)
If accused committed theft on June 1, 1990 and robbery on July 1, 1990 but
after his apprehension, the trial for the two (2) crimes were consolidated in one
hearing as there was only one (1) victim, and thereafter the court rendered a Joint
Decision finding him guilty of bot offenses, there is no recidivism as there was no
previous final judgment of conviction. While he was convicted of theft committed on
June 1, 1990 when the same was promulgated, there was no prior or previous final
judgment. His conviction for theft was not yet final. Another requisite is that the
crimes involved must be embraced in the same title under the Revised Penal Code; so
that if the previous conviction is for homicide and when it was already final there is a
subsequent conviction for rape – recidivism exists as rape is now a crime against
persons. (R.A. No. 8353)
10.That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the
law attached an equal or greater penalty or for two (2) or more crimes to
which it attaches a lighter penalty.
The crimes should not be embraced in the same title of the Code for accused
will then be classified as a recidivist. Thus, if A has been convicted of Murder, and
after grant of parole committed. Homicide, he labors under this par. 10 known as
reiteracion, but he is also suffering from the recidivism (reincidencia). In such a case,
he will be considered only as recidivist, and par. 10 will no longer apply to him.
The previous crimes for which accused underwent punishment must be at least
two (2) in number if the law imposes a penalty lower than the crime he had been
currently convicted; but if the penalty is equal or greater, a single offense is
sufficient.
Thus, if A had been punished for slight physical injuries in 1985 and then
underwent punishment again for perjury in 1986, and later on committed rape, his
liability for the last offense will be aggravated by reiteracion. On the other hand, if
the previous conviction is homicide, and later on the conviction is for falsification
(lighter than homicide), reiteracion is also present.
11.That the crime be committed in consideration of a price reward or promise.
To consider this circumstance, the price, reward or promise must be the
primary reason or the primordial motive for the commission of the crime. Thus, if A
approached B and told the latter what he thought of X, and B answered “he is a bad
man” to which A retorted, “you see I am going to kill him this afternoon,” and so B
told him “If you do that, I’ll give you P5,000.00” and after killing X, A again
approached B, told him he had already killed X, and B, in compliance with his
promise, delivered the P5,000.00, this aggravating circumstance is not present.
Whenever present however, this aggravating circumstance affects not only the
accused who is perpetrated the crime because of the money or consideration but also
the accused who offered, as the former becomes a principal by direct participation
while the latter, a principal by inducement. (People vs. Gerolaga, 263 SCRA 143)
Mere promise, as long as it is the reason why the offense was done, is
sufficient.
12.That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, standing of a vessel or intentional damage thereto, derailment of
a locomotive or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and
ruin.
The purpose in employing the means – that is, inundation, fire, poison, etc.,
must be kill the offended party to consider it as aggravating. Thus, where the purpose
of the offenders in putting in flames the polo shirt of the victim was for further
merriment because the victim continued to dance even while his clothes were on fire,
to the delight of the crowd, there is no aggravating circumstance of by means of fire,
as obviously the objective of using fire to kill the victim is not present.
Under R.A. No. 8294 which amends P.D. No. 1866, when a person commits any
crime under the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use of explosives
including but not limited to pillbox, Molotov cocktail bombs, detonation agents or
incendiary devices resulting in the death of a person, the same is aggravating. (Sec. 2)
13.That the act be committed with evident premeditation.
The following requisites must be proved before this circumstance may be
appreciated: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act or act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequence of his acts.
So, where A and B had a fistic fight and A found himself at the receiving end
despite his size and threatened to kill B shouting, after they separated “Hanggang
bukas na lang ang buhay mo.” And thereafter forgot everything but when he saw B in
the afternoon of that day, he stabbed him, there is no evident premeditation to speak
of because requisite no. 2 is lacking. However, if after making the threat A went to his
friends borrowing firearm, and when nobody lent him, he bought bolo, sharpened it
the whole morning of the following day and looked for B whom he killed with the said
bolo, evident premeditation shall be taken against him.
In People vs. Mojica, 10 SCRA 515, the lapse of one (1) hour and forty-five (45)
minutes (4:15 p.m. to 6 p.m.) was considered by the Supreme Court as sufficient. In
People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187, where at 1:00 p.m., the accused opened his
balisong and uttered “I will kill him (referring to the victim),” and at 4:30 p.m. of the
said date accused stabbed the victim, it was held that the lapse of three-and-a-half
hours (3 1/2 hours) from the inception of the plan to the execution of the crime
satisfied the last requisite of evident premeditation.
Where it appears that after the fight was broken up, the accused returned to
kill the victim after four (4) hours, it cannot be deduced with certainty that he clung
to his decision to kill the victim. There is no evident premeditation. (People vs. Nell,
et al., G.R. No. 109660, July 1, 1997)
Evident premeditation while inherent in crimes against property, may be
considered in robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides stealing.
So also, where treachery obtains in this special complex crime, such treachery obtains
in this special complex crime, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance although it will not qualify the killing to murder, robbery
with homicide being a case of a composite crime with its own definition and special
penalty in the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Cando, 344 SCRA 331)
In case of mistaken victim, evident premeditation cannot be considered against
the accused because he focused all his acts and plans against the intended victim.
However, in treachery, it shall be considered in case of mistaken victim as long as
there was a treacherous attack, since it cannot be denied that whether the victim is
the intended one or the mistaken person, the assault was treacherously made.
14.That craft, fraud or disguise be employed.
Craft is present since the accused and his cohorts pretended to be bona fide
passengers of the jeep in order not to arouse suspicion; when once inside the jeep,
they robbed the driver and other passengers. (People vs. Lee, 204 SCRA 900)
However, in People vs. Aspile, 191 SCRA 530, appellants are ruled not to have
employed craft since they has already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy
Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even
without such pretense, they could nonetheless have carried their unlawful scheme.
While craft is a circumstance characterized by trickery or cunning resorted to
by the accused (People vs. Barrios, 92 SCRA 195) fraud involves acts, or spoken or
written words, by a party to misled another into believing a fact to be true when it is
not so. (Antazo vs. People, 138 SCRA 292) Thus, where A, armed with a knife and
ready to meet B, who was holding a lead pipe, told the latter that if he (B) would just
drop his weapon their differences would be settled amicably but once B dropped his
lead pipe, A immediately attacked him with his knife, fraud is said to be present.
There is only a hairline distinction between craft and fraud and the Supreme
Court in various cases has used them interchangeably. Justice Luis Reyes in his book,
The Revised Penal Code, Book 1, 1993 Ed., p. 399, has distinguished the two (2)
terms, in that when there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations,
fraud is present; otherwise, the act of the accused done in order not to arouse the
suspicion of the victims constitute craft.
Disguise is the use of any device or artifice by the accused to conceal his
identity. Thus, where the accused wore masks to cover their faces, even if the masks
subsequently fell down, thus paving the way for their identification, this aggravating
circumstance is present as there could have been no other purpose but to conceal
their identities. (People vs. Cotabato, 160 SCRA 98)
If the offender put charcoal on his entire naked body, entered the house of his
neighbour and raped her, the crime of rape is aggravated by this circumstance.
But the accused must be able to hide his identity during the initial stage, if not
all throughout, commission of the crime and his identity must have been discovered
only later on, to consider this aggravating circumstance. If despite the mask worn by
the accused, or his putting of charcoal over his body, the offended party even before
the initial stage knew him, he was not able to hide his identity and this circumstance
cannot be appreciated.
15.That advantage be taken of superior strength or means employed to weaken
the defense.
The accused who, with sand his hand, threw the same into the eyes of the
offended party when they were about to strike each other causing momentary
blindness on the part of the latter has employed means to weaken the defense.
The fact however that there were two (2) persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive
force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend
himself (People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37)
Where appellants’ group numbered more than five (5), two (2) of whom were
armed with bladed weapons while the victim was unarmed surrounded by the group,
with his hand held by at least once (1), and was stabbed fatally sustaining two (2)
frontal wounds and other injuries, the crime is aggravated by abuse of superior
strength in as much as no alevosia was proven as the appellants did not consciously
adopt their mode of attack. (People vs. Daen, Jr., 244 SCRA 382)
Had treachery or alevosia been proven, it would have absorbed abuse of
superior strength. (People vs. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91)
 The attack of the three (3) men all armed with bladed weapons against an
unarmed woman whose body bore seventeen (17) stab wounds, clearly shows the
presence of this circumstance.
16.That the act be committed with treachery.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For treachery to be present, two (2) conditions must concur: (a) the
employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender
from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving said victim no opportunity to
defend himself, and (b) the means, method and manner of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender. (People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA
198)
Where the accused, suddenly and without any warning, shot the deceased from
behind knowing he was carrying a bolo, there is treachery. (People vs. Escander, 265
SCRA 444)
Even if the attack on the victim, although preceded by a warning “Tara Sergio,”
was undoubtedly sudden and unexpected and prevented the unsuspecting victim, who
had just stood up, from defending himself. (People vs. Estanislao, 265 SCRA 810)
For the treachery to be appreciated however, this circumstance must be
present at the inception of the attack and if absent, and the attack is continuous,
treachery at a subsequent stage is not to be considered. (People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA
382) However, if there is a break in the continuity of the aggression, it is not
necessary that treachery be present in the beginning of the assault; it is sufficient
that when the fatal blow was inflicted, there was treachery. (U.S. vs. Balagtas, 19
Phil. 164)
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is
treachery if such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the
purpose of depriving the victim of chance to either fight or retreat. (People vs. Real,
242 SCRA 671) However, mere suddenness of the attack, or one made from behind,
does not necessarily compel a finding of treachery for the essence of this
circumstance lies in the adoption of ways and means that minimize or neutralize any
resistance which may be put by the offended party. (People vs. Gonszagan, Jr., 247
SCRA 220)
17.That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace
and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime, so that killing a man in the
presence of the wife does not constitute ignominy (U.S. vs. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417) but
raping her in the presence of the husband shows ignominy and aggravates the offense.
 Where before the victim, a landowner, was killed he was made to kneel in front
of his househelpers, this aggravating circumstance would be present. (U.S vs. De
Leon, 1 Phil. 163)
When the victim was raped with the accused forcing her, using the same
position as dogs do, the dog-style position in the sexual act, the rape is aggravated by
ignominy. (People vs. Saylan, 130 SCRA 159)
The original intent of the accused did not comprehend the commission of rape.
Hence, the crime of rape cannot be regarded as principal offense. But since it
attended the commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate
the crime. Instead of ignominy, it is rape itself that aggravates the crime. (People vs.
Aspile, 191 SCRA 530)
There is likewise ignominy when the accused “plastered” with mud the vagina
of the offended party right after raping her. (People vs. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511)
The ruling that if robbery with homicide was committed with additional killings
and/or rape, the additional killings or the rape shall be considered aggravating
circumstances has been rendered obsolete by the Supreme Court’s decision in People
vs. Regala, 329 SCRA 709, holding that there is no law providing that additional rape/s
or homicide/s committed on the occasion of robbery should be considered as
aggravating circumstance. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender
and no person should be brought within its terms if it is not clearly made so by the
statute.
In People vs. Gano, 353 SCRA 126, the Supreme Court citing the Regala case
held:
It should be noted that there is no law providing that additional rape/s
or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The
enumeration of aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed
to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating
circumstances where there is specific paragraph (par.10) providing for
analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide
on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an “anomalous situation” where from
the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with multiple rapes. However,
the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favour of the
offender x x x.
18.That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
In taking away certain valuable articles from the house, accused entered
through the window. The crime committed is robbery; but because this circumstance
is not alleged in the information, the offense is classified as theft. However, the crime
is aggravated by unlawful entry. (People vs. Sunga, 43 Phil. 205)
 Since the accused entered the second-floor window of the residence of the
accused, a way not intended for ingress, the crime of robbery with homicide is
aggravated by unlawful Entry. (People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA 218)
Where the escape was done through the window, the crime is not attended by
this circumstance since there was no unlawful entry.
19.That as a means to the commission of a crime, a wall, roof, floor, door or
window be broken.
The breaking of the parts of the house must be made as a means to commit the
offense. So, if A entered the door of his neighbour and after killing him, escaped by
breaking the jalousies of the window or the door, this aggravating circumstance is
absent.
While the law uses the words “wall, roof, floor, door or window,” in one case,
where accused entered a field tent by cutting the ropes at the rear of the tent, and
killed the victim soldiers sleeping thereat, the Supreme Court considered the crime of
murder, attended by the aggravating circumstance of forcible entry.
20.That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen (15)
years of age, or by means of motor vehicles, airships or other similar means.
The minors here could be accessories, accomplices or principals who aided the
accused in the commission of the crime.
Said minors could avail of the exempting or mitigating circumstance due them
on account of minority. The law intends to put a stop to the practice of professional
criminals of employing people whom they know could be exempt from criminal
liability or would not be fully punished under the law.
The crime is aggravated by the use of motor vehicle where the accused
deliberately availed themselves of a tricycle in order to consummate their dastardly
act and to use it as a cover to facilitate the commission of murder. (People vs. De la
Cruz, 190 SCRA 328)
Likewise, the use of motor vehicle by the accused aggravated the commission
of robbery with homicide scene of the crime. (People vs. Bartulay, 192 SCRA 621)
Other similar means provided for in this article should be understood to refer
to motorized vehicles or other efficient means of transportation similar to automobile
or airplane (See The Revised Penal Code Book 1 by Reyes, 1993 Ed., p.459) since the
purpose of aggravating the penalty is to discourage the criminals from taking
advantage of the great facilities offered by modern means of transportation.
21.That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately
augmented by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission.
This is cruelty provided for in Art. 248 as a qualifying circumstance, There is
cruelty when the offender deliberately and inhumanly augment the suffering of the
victim.
 The fact that the victims decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab
wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, was found dumped in the stress is not
sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that the accused, for his
pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully and
inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. (People vs. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231)
It would seem that there must be proof showing that when the second and
subsequent stab wounds were inflicted, the victim was still alive because the essence
of cruelty is that the culprit finds delight in prolonging the suffering of the victim.
In People vs. Binondo, 214 SCRA 764, when the victim was decapitated, the
Supreme Court considered the presence of this aggravating circumstance stating that:
“no greater outrage, insult or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to sever
the head therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the person and any violence
directed towards it can not but be deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering
of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.”
Aggravating circumstances not provided under the Revised Penal Code.
A. Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 promulgated on March 2, 1982 provides:
“The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a crime
is committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs,
such shall be considered as qualifying aggravating circumstance.”
In People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601, it was said that “in the absence of
competent medical or other direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts
must be wary and critical of indirect evidence considering the severe consequences
for the accused of a finding that he acted under the influence of a prohibited drug.”
However, if the evidence is clear that the accused perpetrated the act while
under the influence of illegal drugs, the crime is aggravated.
B. Use of Unlicensed Firearm
Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed with the use of
unlicensed firearm is not aggravating under Art. 14, Revised Penal Code, it may still
be taken into consideration to increase the penalty because of the explicit provisions
of P.D. No.1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Section 1, par.3 of said law says that if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Further, under
Sec. 3 thereof, when a person commits any of the crimes defines in the Revised Penal
Code or special laws with the use of explosives like pill box, molotov cocktail bombs,
fire bombs or other incendiary devises which result in the death of any person, such
use shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The use of a loose firearm when inherent in the commission of a crime
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance; Provided, that if the crime committed with use of loose
firearm, is penalized by the law with the maximum penalty which is lower than that
prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for
illegal possession shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged:
Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is
penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed for
illegal possession of the firearm, the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime under the Revised Penal
Code or special laws if he is found guilty.
In case of rebellion or insurrection or attempted coup d’etat, illegal possession
shall be absorbed.
If the crime is committed without using the loose firearm, which however was found in
his possession, it shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense. (R.A. No. 10591, Sec.
29)
C. Organized/Syndicated Crime Group
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person
who belongs to an organized/ syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the
commission of any crime. (Art. 23, R.A. No. 7659)
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 15)
They are those circumstance which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its
commission.
The law enumerated them as (1) relationship of the offender and the offended party
(2) intoxication, and (3) degree of instruction and education of the offender.
1. Relationship
Relationship shall be considered when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender, like
parents-in-law, children-in-law, or brothers-in-law or sisters-in-law. The relationships of step-
daughter and step-father is included (People vs. Tan, Jr., 264 SCRA 425) but not that of
uncle and niece. (People vs. Cabresos, 244 SCRA 362)
When is relationship a mitigating circumstance? In crimes against property, it is
mitigating, applying by analogy Art. 332 which provides that there is no criminal but
only civil liability in case of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by spouses, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, and
relatives by affinity in the same line, with a proviso that in case of brothers or sisters
and brothers-in-law or sisters-in-law, they must be living together.
In crimes against persons except serious physical injuries, where relationship is
always aggravating the rule is where the offended party is a relative of a higher
degree, or where he is of the same level as the offender, relationship is aggravating,
otherwise it is mitigating. If it results in the death of the victim even if he is of a
lower level, the relationship is aggravating. However, this rule is subject to the “other
conditions attending the commission of the crime.”
2. Intoxication
The ordinary rule is that, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or
mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if the intoxication is not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime; upon the other hand, when
intoxication is habitual or intentional, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The person pleading intoxication must present proof that he had taken, a quantity of
alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the
effect of blurring his reason; and at the same time, he must prove that not only was
intoxication not habitual but also that his imbibing the alcoholic drink was not
intended to fortify his resove to commit the crime. (People vs. Buenaflor, 211 SCRA
492)
3. Degree of Instruction and Education of the Offender
High degree of education and instruction of the offender is always aggravating,
never mitigating when applicable. In a case for homicide or murder, the liability of
the offender is not aggravated for homicide or murder, the liability of the offender is
not aggravated even if he is a bar or board examination topnotcher, and has
graduated summa cum laude from his college degree. On the other hand, the liability
of an accountant or a lawyer who commits estafa by means of “Kiting” or violation of
the Trust Receipts Law shall be aggravated since he used his high degree of education
and knowledge in committing the criminal act.
Low degree of instruction or education, on the other hand is always mitigating,
never aggravating when applicable. Where the accused did not finish even the first
grade in elementary school, the murder he committed is attenuated by this
alternative circumstance (People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35); so also in perjury where
the affidavit is written in English this mitigating circumstance is present.
The rule however is that not only illiteracy, but also lack of sufficient
intelligence, is necessary to successfully avail of this alternative circumstance as
mitigating.
In Molesa vs. Director of Prisons, 59 Phil. 407, the Supreme Court ruled:
“This Court has held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction should not be taken into consideration in connection with crime of rape. x
x x No one is so ignorant as not to know that the crime of rape is wrong and violation
of the law.”
Week 7 Module

Person Criminally Liable for Felonies

Who are the particeps criminis-that is, those participants in the crime?
They are the principals, accomplishes, and accessories. However, for light
felonies, the persons criminally liable are only the participants and the
accomplices.

By the personal nature of criminal liability, only natural persons can be

active subject of a crime. However, corporations and juridical persons
can be the active subject of a crime. However, corporations and juridical
persons can be ordered to pay fine as a punishment under some special
laws, like the corporation law, General Banking Act, Omnibus Election
Code, etc. In some cases, the officers of the corporation and/or
partnership are the ones personally liable.

1.Principals

These are three(3) classes of principals-(a)Principals by direct

participation- that is, those who take a direct part in the execution of the
act; (b) Principal by Inducement or induction- those who directly force or
induce others to commit the crime;and(c) Principals by Indispensable
Cooperation, those who cooperate in the execution of the offense by
another by another act without which the crime would not have been
accomplished.(Art.17)

Principals by Direct Participation are those who, participating in the

criminal resolution, proceed to perpetuate the crime and personally take
part in its realisation, executing acts, which directly tend to the same
end. (People vs. Guballo 16401-R February 19,1957) To hold liable thus as
principals by direct participation, they must have conspired with each
other(and with other participants if there are any) and went to the scene
of the crime to personally execute what they agreed upon, their acts
tending towards the same objective. Thus, if A, B, C and D conspired with
each other to kill X and then proceeded to the house of X, but reaching
the same, D pretending to answer the call of nature went out of the way
and did not join A, B, and C anymore when the three (3) [A, B, and C]
killed X, D cannot be considered a principal by direct participation since
even if he conspired with the three, he did not proceed to the scene of
the crime.
So also, if X, Y and Z passed by the house of W who was apparently
not in the mood and upon Z’s loud calling, went out of his house with a
bolo whereupon Z tried to wrest possession of said bolo, and while
grappling with W, the latter’s wife came out from nowhere and stabbed Z
with her spear, W cannot be classified as a principal by direct
participation as he did not conspire with his wife in killing Z even if he
was at the scene of the crime.
The acts of the participant must be towards the same end in
carrying out their plan. So that in the first example above, even if A only
acted as look-out in the yard of X’s house, and B just accompanied C to
the room where X was sleeping, ready to assist C if the need arises, and it
was only C who fired the gun that killed X, all the, three (3), meaning A,
B, and C are principals by direct participation. Where the accused
conspired with this three (3) co-accused to kill the two (2) victims and
the role assigned to him was to kill one of the victims which he did, he is
a principal by direct participation in the two (2) murders.
Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, there is collective
criminal responsibility, for in conspiracy, the act of one us the act of all.
On the other hand, if there is no conspiracy proved, individual criminal
liability may ensue.
Principals by Induction are of two (2) classes: those who directly
induce others to commit the crime, and those who directly force another
to perpetrate the offense. The one forced or induced is the principal by
direct participation.
There are two (2) ways of directly inducing another to commit a
crime:
(a)By giving price, reward or promise. To fall under the scenario,
the price reward or promise must be the primordial consideration
why the principal by direct participation proceeded to commit
the crime. So that if he would commit the offense just the same
with or without the price, promise or reward, the one who gave
 the price or reward is not liable. Necessarily, there must be
conspiracy between the giver of the consideration, and the doer
of the act.
(b)By using words of command. To hold the principal by inducement
liable, it is necessary that the inducement be made directly to
secure the commission of the crime, and that such inducement
be the determining cause of the execution of the act by the
principal by direct participation.
Mere suggestion, or a thoughtless expression or a chance word
spoken without any intention or expectation that it would produce the
result can not hold the utterer liable as principal by inducement. Thus, if
A, in response to B who was narrating to him his (B’s) bitter experience
with X in a chance conversation, told B, “Kung ako ikaw eh papatayin koi
yang si X,” and later on, B killed X, A can not be considered a principal by
inducement.
Even if the inducement be directly made, with the inducer insistent
and determined to procure the commission of the crime, he still cannot
be classified as principal by induction if the inducement is not the
determining cause for committing the crime. Thus, if the actor has reason
of his own to commit the offense, there can be no principal by induction.
Those directly forced another to commit a crime are also
categorized as principals by inducement.
Thus, with a gun in his hand, A gave B a knife and ordered him to
kill X who was sleeping nearby otherwise he (A) would shoot him (B). If B
would stab X to death, A is a principal by inducement by directly forcing
another to perpetrate a crime. B, on the other hand, is a principal by
direct participation although he would be exempt from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 6.
Principals by Indispensable Cooperation are those who cooperate in
the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished. Like in the case of principal by inducement, it
presupposes the existence of the principal by direct participation
otherwise with whom shall he cooperate with indispensably.
The cooperation spoken here is an assistance knowingly or
intentionally rendered which can not exist without previous cognizance of
the criminal act intended to be executed. (Phil. Law Dictionary by
Moreno, 3rd Ed., p. 213) In other words, before an accused can be tagged
as a principal by direct participation or must have a unity of criminal
purpose and intention with him immediately before the commission of
the offense, but his cooperation is in the performance of another act
without which the criminal act would not have been accomplished.
Where both accused conspired and confederated to commit rape,
and one had sex with the offended party while the other was holding her
hands, and thereafter the latter was the one who raped the victim, both
are principals by direct participation and by indispensable cooperation in
the two (2) crimes of rape committed. (People vs. Fernandez, 183 SCRA
511)
Where A, a municipal treasurer, conspired with B for the latter to
present a false receipt was the basis of the reimbursement approved by
A, and both thereafter shared the proceeds, A is the principal by direct
participation and B by indispensable cooperation in the crime of
malversation.

2. Accomplices
An accomplice is one who, not having participated as principal,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
act. (Art. 18) He is sometimes referred to as accessory before the fact.
The existence of an accomplice presupposes the existence of a
principal by direct participation. The accomplice does not conspire with
the principal although he cooperated in the execution of the criminal ct.
If A approached B, borrowing the latter’s gun, telling him that he
(A) is going to kill X, and B knowing A’s criminal design, lent his gun with
which A shot and killed X, B is an accomplice cooperating by previous act.
In the above example, take note that while B conspire with A to kill
X, he (B) concurred with A in his purpose. Had he conspired with A, B is a
principal by indispensable cooperation. The act of A however must have a
relation to the participation of B. Thus, if while B, knowing A’s purpose to
kill X, then B cannot be considered an accomplice.
While X was choking Y, W went behind Y without any knowledge of X
and once within striking distance, stabbed Y. Even upon seeing the
stabbing made by W, X contributed choking Y, who died of stab wounds.
Choking contributed to the death of Y. In this case, W is an accomplice
cooperating by simultaneous act.
 If the offender, however, even if performing the acts of an
accomplice, has, participated as a principal, he will be punished as a
principal, and no longer as an accomplice.

3. Accessories (Art. 19) (Also accessory after the fact)

They are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime, and without having participated as principals or accomplices, take
part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
The most common example is a person who, without having
participated as principal or accomplice in robbery or theft but
knowing that the property being offered to him is the proceeds or
subject matter of the said crime, bought or purchased or death in
any manner with such property, obtaining benefit from said
transaction or helping the thief or robber to profit therefrom. If the
robber or thief requests him to sell the property stolen, and he does
so and thereafter given a share, he is also an accessory.
Under P.D. No. 16 12, otherwise known as “Anti-fencing Law,”
any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and, sell or in any other manner deal in any article item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should have known
to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft shall be punished depending on the value of the property
involved. (Sec. 2)
The accessory however should not take the property without
the consent of the principal or accomplice in possession of the
same, otherwise he is a principal in the crime of theft since a stolen
property can also be the subject of theft or robbery.
A person who profits or assist the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime is also illustrated in a kidnapping case where
the kidnappers ask a person who has not participated in the actual
kidnapping, to contact the parents of the victim to negotiate the
delivery of ransom money, and having successfully done so, receives
a share from the same. He is also an accessory.
 But if a person being a co-conspirator in theft or robbery, sold
some of the property stolen, he should no longer be punished as an
accessory since he will be held already as a principal.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or

instrument thereof to prevent its discovery.
Where A, knowing that B and C had killed X, buried the corpse
to prevent the discovery of the killing, he is an accessory.
The body of the crime however does not only mean the body
of the person killed. This phrase refers to CORPUS DELCTI – that is,
the body or the substance of the offense. (People vs. Bantagan, 54
Phil. 841) Corpus delicti simply means the fact a crime has actually
been committed. (People vs. Madlanbayan, 94 SCRA 685)
Placing a weapon in the hand of the deceased who was killed
by his friend, to make it appear that his friend had killed the victim
in self-defense constitutes an act of an accessory.
Where the wife misled the authorities by informing them that
the person who killed her husband was a thief who was fled, when
in truth, the killer was her paramour, the wife is liable as an
accessory for concealing the body of the crime.
If A, after killing a person, went to B and told the latter to
hide the gun he used, which B did with the objective of concealing
the crime, B is an accessory by concealing the instrument of the
crime. So, also, if X would deliver the car he had carnapped, to Y,
telling the latter of the carnapping he did, and asking him to
conceal the car so that the crime would not be discovered, and Y
did so he is an accessory by concealing the effects of the crime.

3. By harbouring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal

of the crime provided the accessory acts with abuse of public
functions, or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be guilty of some other crime.
If the one who harbors or assists in the escape of the
principal is a public officer, whatever be the crime committed
by the said principal provided it is not a light felony, will make
him an accessory. Thus, if A rapes a woman, and he is assisted
in his escape by a public officer, the latter is liable as an
accessory.
However, if the one who assists the rapist in his escape
is a private individual, he is not liable as an accessory under
this article because in case of a private individual assisting the
escape of the principal, the crime committed must be
treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of
the Chief Executive.
Thus, if A and B agreed to fight, and after killing B, A
was assisted by private individual C in his escape, C is not
liable as an accessory because the crime committed by A is
only homicide there being an agreement to fight
While accessories' liability is subordinate to that of the
principal, the acquittal of the latter does not mean acquittal
of the accessory. So that if A, charged as principal in a murder
case, with B indicted as accessory for helping him escape
before he was finally arrested, and A was acquitted because of
self-defense or that the court adjudged the crime to be only
homicide, B is not liable as an accessory. But it A was
acquitted because of insanity, or the case against him
dismissed because he died during the trial, B can still be held
liable as accessory as long as it was proven that the crime was
murder, and he assisted A in his escape.
In connection with this matter, PD. No. 1829 provides
that the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period, or a fine ranging from P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of
any person whom he knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and
conviction. This is what is popularly known as obstruction of
justice.
Week 8 Criminal Law

Title Three
PENALTIES
In General
Penalty is the punishment imposed by lawful authority upon a
person who commits an unlawful, deliberate or negligent act. (People vs.
Moran, 44 Phil. 432)
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission
but the law cannot impose cruel and unusual punishment as the
Constitution prohibits it. In a judgment of conviction for any crime, the
court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty provided for in
the Revised Penal Code or in special laws. (People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA
851)
Classification of Penalties
Article 25 categorizes penalties into Principal penalties which death
is the Capital punishment; reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal,
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or temporary
special disqualification and prison mayor which are considered Afflictive
penalties; prision correcional, arresto mayor, suspension and destierro
which are Correcional penalties: arresto menor and public censure which
are Light penalties; and Accessory penalties which are perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or temporary special
disqualification, suspension from public office, civil interdiction,
indemnification, forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of
the offense, and the payment of costs. Principal penalties are those
expressly imposed by the part while Accessory penalties are those that
are deemed included in the principal penalties imposed.
In the order of severity and for the purpose of successive service of
sentences, the penalties have the following scale:
1. Death
2. Reclusion Perpetua
3. Reclusion Temporal
4. Prision Mayor
 5. Prision Correccional
6. Arresto Mayor
7. Arresto Menor
8. Destierro
9. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification
10. Temporary Absolute Disqualification
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for
the right to follow profession or calling
12. Public censure

The maximum duration however of the convict's sentence shall not

be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most
severe of the penalties imposed. Said maximum period shall in no case
exceed forty (40) years. (Art. 70)
With respect to Reclusion Perpetua and Life Imprisonment which
more often than not become somehow confusing the following are their
differences
1. Reclusion Perpetua is imposed by the Revised Penal Code while Life
Imprisonment is by
Special Law;
2. Reclusion Perpetua entails imprisonment for only thirty (30) years
after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon while Life
Imprisonment does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration, and
3. Reclusion Perpetua carries Accessory penalties, while it is not so in
Life Imprisonment. (People vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA 373)

For the purpose of graduating the penalties in the light of the

mitigating and aggravating circumstances present in the commission of
the offense, the courts shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO.1
1. Death
2. Reclusion Perpetua
3. Reclusion Temporal
4. Prision Mayor
5. Prision Correccional
6. Arresto Mayor
7. Desterro
8. Arresto Menor
9. Public censure
10.Fine

SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification
2. Temporary absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, and
the right to follow a profession or calling
4. Public censure

5. Fine (Art.71)

A fine, however, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative

penalty, shall be considered afflictive if it exceeds P6,000.00;
correctional penalty, if it does not exceed P6,000.00 but not less than
P200.00, and light, if it be less than P200.00.

Week 9 Criminal Law

Duration of Penalties

Article 27 specifies the duration of penalties. This was amended by

Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 7659 which provides:
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
Art. 27. Reclusion Perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion
Perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years.
Reclusion Temporal. -- The penalty of reclusion temporal shall
be from twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years.
Prision Mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration
of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification
shall be from six (6) years, and one (1) day to twelve (12) years,
except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the
principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension and destierro. — The duration
of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro
shall be from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, except
when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case,
its duration shall be that of the principal penalty
Arresto mayor - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor
shall be from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Arresto menor. -The duration of the penalty of arresto menor
shall be from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.
XXX
Reclusion perpetua, despite its "defined duration" in R.A. No. 7659 -
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years --- is still to be
classified as an indivisible penalty (People ns. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537), and
should be imposed in its entire duration in accordance with Art. 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305)

Preventive and Subsidiary Imprisonment

Preventive imprisonment is the incarceration undergone by a person
accused of a crime which is not bailable, or even if bailable, can not
afford to post the bond. During the trial of his case, he is detained in jail.
He is known as detention prisoner.
Subsidiary imprisonment, on the other hand, is the personal penalty
prescribed by law in substitution of the payment of fine embodied in the
decision when the same can not be satisfied because of the culprit's
insolvency. (People vs. Jarumayan, 52 0.G. 248)
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the
offense charged to which he may be sentenced, and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. (Art. 29, RPC)
So that, if the trial of A for attempted homicide is still going on for
more than six (6) years, and he has been detained from the beginning of
the trial for failure or inability to post bail bond, he shall be ordered
immediately released, for the crime is punishable by prision correccional
(Art. 249 in relation to Arts. 6 and 51), and the range of this penalty is six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years only. (Art. 27) But the trial
shall proceed so that in case of acquittal, he will have no criminal record
in case of conviction, he will not be imprisoned anymore.
The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused shall be
credited fully, to be subtracted from his sentence, if he agrees in writing
to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners;
otherwise, only four-fifths (4/5) of the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be deducted.
The following are exceptions however:
1. If the convict is a recidivist or has been previous convicted twice
or more of any crime:
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence,
he shall have failed to surrender voluntarily. (Art. 29, RPC)
 There is no subsidiary imprisonment if the penalty is more than six
(6) years. Moreover the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-
third (1/3) of the principal penalty or one (1) year which ever is lesser.

Application of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances

The court must first consider whether the penalties imposable are
Divisible or Indivisible. Indivisible penalties are those which have no fixed
duration like death, reclusion perpetua perpetual absolute or special
disqualification, and public censure; while Divisible penalties are those
having fixed duration and can be divided into three (3) periods.
In case the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, like reclusion
perpetua to death (the penalty for infanticide, parricide, murder, etc.),
the presence of one mitigating circumstance would result in the
application of the lesser penalty, while the presence of an aggravating
circumstance would mean the application of the greater penalty. If there
is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. If there be present both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another. (Art. 63)
When the penalty is single indivisible, like the penalty for piracy
under Article 122 as amended by Sec. 3, R.A. No. 7659 - which is
reclusion perpetua, such penalty shall be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance present except in case of
privileged mitigating circumstance such as minority, in which case, the
penalty may be reduced by a degree Such is also the rule in case of two
(2) indivisible penalties like reclusion perpetua to death. If the mitigating
circumstance in attendance is privilege mitigating the penalty shall be
lowered by one degree Thus, when the crime proven is murder, (the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code
as amended by Sec. 6 of RA. No. 7659), and the accused is a minor below
sixteen (16) years old, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
When the penalty is divisible and there is neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in medium period if
there is one ordinary mitigating circumstance it shall be applied in its
minimum period, and if there is one (1) aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. If the mitigating
circumstance present is privileged one, the reduction of the penalty shall
be by degree, not only by period. If there are both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the court shall reasonably offset them
according to their relative weight. (Art. 64)
If the commission of the crime was attended by both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the rules (Art. 62) are as follows:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime
specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in
defining a crime shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.
Example: “By means of fire” (Art. 14, par. 12) shall not be
considered in the crime of arson. That the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party (Art.
14, par. 3) shall not aggravate the liability of the
offender convicted of trespass to dwelling.
So also, “by means of poison” (Art. 14. r. 12) will not be
considered to increase the liability in murder qualified by using
poison.

2. Aggravating circumstances which are inherent in the crime to such a

degree that they must of necessity accompany the crime shall not
increase the penalty.
Example: Abuse of confidence (Art. 14. par. 4) shall no longer be
considered in qualified theft with grave abuse of confidence to
increase the penalty.

3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral

attributes of the offender or from his private relations with the
offended party or from any personal cause shall serve to aggravate
or mitigate the liability of the culprit to whom they are attendant.
Example: X, Y and Z. conspiring with each other, killed W who is
X's brother-in-law. Z committed it with evident
premeditation while Y is a recidivist. The aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation applies only to Z
the fact that the victim is X's brother-in-law would
affect the liability only of X while recidivism which is
personal to Y shall increase the liability of Y only.
 However, the mitigating circumstance of abandonment by the
husband provided for in adultery under Art. 333 applies to both the
wife and her lover because their act is only one, judicially speaking.
(People vs. Avelino, et al. [C.A.] 40 O.G. 194)

4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the

act, or in the means employed to accomplish it shall aggravate or
mitigate the liability of those who had knowledge of them at the
time of the execution of the act.
Example: A, B and C agreed to kill X and so armed with guns, they
proceeded to the house of the latter whereupon A told B
and C that he would just stay in the yard to prevent any
relative of X from helping the victim. When B and C
entered the room of X, and saw him sleeping it was who
shot him. The treachery that attended the commission
of the crime shall also affect B and not only who
treacherously killed X in his sleep because B had
knowledge of the employment of the treacherous act
being present actually during the shooting A's liability is
not aggravated by treachery as he had no knowledge of
it, being in the yard.
So also, A, B and C agreed to kill X and in a drinking spree. A
saw the opportunity and put poison in the glass of X B saw (X should
be substituted by A) pouring the poison while C did not see it and
was unaware of it X died after taking the poisonous drink The
aggravating circumstance of “by means of poison” affects only A
and B.

Other Effects of Penalty

Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry
with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or
tools with which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments or
tools shall be confiscated in favor of the Government unless they be
property of a third person not liable for the offense; but those articles
which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed. (Art. 45)
This forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the
offense is provided for as an accessory penalty under Art. 25. If A stole
the gun of B who is duly licensed to possess it, and used it in killing the
gun will no longer be confiscated in favor of the government but would
be returned to C If the proceeds or tools can not be subject of lawful
transaction like marijuana or shabu, then they shall be ordered burned or
destroyed.
When to use the phrase “eligibility for parole” in the RTC Decision
(AM No. 15-08-02-SC)
(1) In cases where the death penalty is not warranted, there is no
need to use the phrase “without eligibility for parole” to quality the
penalty of reclusion perpetua” and
(2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of
death penalty, but said death penalty cannot be imposed because R.A.
No. 9346, the qualification of "without eligibility for parole” shall be used
to quality reclusion perpetua to emphasize that the accused should have
suffered death penalty.

Complex Crimes and Their Penalties (Delito Compuesto)

When a singles act constitutes two (2) or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed to be
applied in its maximum period. (Art. 48)
Article 48 is not applicable in case of special complex crimes
specifically provided for in the Revised Penal Code like robbery with
homicide or rape or with arson (Sec. 9, R.A. No. 7659 amending par 1 of
Art. 294), or rape with homicide (Sec. 11, R.A. No 7659 amending Art.
335) and applies only when no specific penalty is stated in the law.
Article 48 speaks of two (2) types of complex crimes: (1) when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, otherwise
known as compound crime, and (2) when an offense is a necessary means
of committing the other, which is the complex crime proper.
An example of No. 1 - that is, compound crime, is when A with a
revolver shot B, missing him but the bullet hit X who is A's father. A
committed the crime of attempted homicide with parricide. Or, when in
recklessly driving his car Y hit the car of W which in turn hit the car of A,
the damages suffered by the two (2) cars resulting in grave or less grave
felonies (not merely light).
An example of No. 2 - that is complex crime proper is when the
Municipal Treasurer, who received P10,000.00 from a taxpayer placed in
the duplicate original of the receipt the amount of P1,000.00 and then
misappropriated the difference of 9,000.00 is guilty of malversation
through falsification of a public document because falsification is a
necessary means to commit malversation.
 It is however, estafa through falsification of public document, not
malversation of public funds through falsification of public document,
when a casual employee of the Bureau of Lands encashed a treasury
warrant by affixing his signature thereon, when in fact the treasury
warrant is not payable to him He is not an accountable officer. (Sabiniano
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 249 SCRA 24)
The accused, who, through intimidation, brought out the victim
from her house to a nearby school building where he raped her is guilty of
the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. (People vs. Grefiel,
215 SCRA 596)
In complex crimes, one offense should not be punishable under
another law. Both must be a violation of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
while illegal possession of firearm could be argued as a necessary means
to commit murder or homicide, there is no complex crime committed
because one crime is punishable under a special law while the other is by
the Revised Penal Code
While one can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders,
robberies and kidnapping were committed as a means to or in furtherance
of the rebellion, offenses which were not committed in furtherance of
the rebellion but for personal reasons or other motives, are to be
punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the rebellious
acts. (People vs. Oliva, 344 SCRA 435)

Continuing Crime (Delito Continuado)

A single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division. (Philippine Law Dictionary
by Moreno)
In People vs. Encila, 76 O.G. 5824, it was defined as a continuous,
unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an unintermittent force however long a time it may occupy.
When the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated,
commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character,
merely constitutes a partial execution of A single particular delict such
concurrence of delictual acts is called “delito continuado.” (Gamboa vs.
Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 314)
The taking of several cows belonging to different owners while
admittedly committed through several acts was held to be punished only
as one crime when done or perpetrated during the same occasion.
Where, however, in a train, the accused-twins ran amuck killing
eight (8) persons and wounding one during that occasion, it was held that
the eight (8) murders and one attempted murder were committed
qualified by treachery. (People us. Toling, 62 SCRA 17)

Indeterminate Sentence Law

(Act 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225)
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which, shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by
any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.
Since the opening sentence of this law says: “x x x in imposing a
prison term x x x” this Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
destierro. So that if a concubine is found guilty under Art 334, the court
shall impose a straight penalty of not less than six (6) months and one (1)
day nor more than six (6) years as this is the range of destierro provided
for in Art. 27. The Judge thus can sentence a concubine to a straight
prison term of six (6) months and one day, or ten (10) months, or one (1)
year, or five (5) years, etc.

How to Apply the indeterminate Sentence Law

To cite a specific example: If A who is only seventeen (17) years old
was found guilty of homicide with a mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the court shall first determine the applicable penalty by
applying the mitigating circumstances present. Since the accused is only
seventeen (17) years old, he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance of
minority which is a privileged one. Thus, the penalty of reclusion
temporal prescribed for homicide (Art. 249) will be reduced to prision
mayor, which is one (1) degree lower. The court will then consider the
other mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender so that the
maximum period under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is prision mayor
minimum which has a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years.
 The minimum term shall be any range of prision correcional which
is the penalty next lower in degree to prision mayor. The sentence of the
court thus is as follows:
“Accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of six (6) months and one (1) day for more but not exceeding six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6) years and one
(1) day [or more but not exceeding eight (8) years] of prision mayor
as maximum.

If in the above example, the seventeen (17)-year-old con vict did

not voluntarily surrender but is a recidivist, then the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence is prision mayor in its maximum period, that
is ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years but the minimum is
the same any range within prision correccional.
This Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to special laws as it
says: “if the offense is punished by any other law.” Thus, in People vs.
Viente, 225 SCRA 361, the accused was found guilty of carnapping under
R.A. No. 6539 and was sentenced by the trial court to a straight
imprisonment of thirty (30) years. The Supreme Court, ruling that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to violation of special laws, modified
the penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to
thirty (30) years as maximum since Section 14 of the said Republic Act
provides that, if carnapping is committed by means of violence or
intimidation, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years.
There are exceptions to the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Thus, Sec. 2 provides that the law shall not apply to
persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to
commit treason, misprision of treason rebellion, edition or espionage or
piracy to those who are habitual delinquents to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentences to those who violated the
conditional pardon Granted by the Chief Executive; to those whose
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year; nor to
those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of
the Act.
Accused Mary Rose Ondo, having been sentenced to life
imprisonment for large scale illegal recruitment is not entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. (People vs. Ondo, 227 SCRA
562) The Court also refused to grant her the benefits of P.D. No. 603,
otherwise known as the “Child and Youth Welfare Code.”
Although there is a great distinction between reclusion perpetua
and Life Imprisonment, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not
mention reclusion perpetua as an exception, the courts have uniformly
refused to apply this law to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and
the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed such ruling.
Recidivists are entitled to the availment of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law since those disqualified are habitual delinquents. (People
vs. Venus, 63 Phil. 435)
When the accused escaped from jail while his case was on appeal,
he is not entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(People vs. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712)
A youthful offender whose sentence is suspended under Sec. 192 of
P.D. No. 603 and who escaped from his confinement is still entitled to the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The same is true with an
accuse confined in the National Center for Mental Health (formerly
National Mental Hospital) since their confinement can not be considered
punishment but more of administrative matters for their rehabilitation.
(People vs. Soler, 63 Phil. 868; People vs. Co, C.A. 67 O.G. 7451)
A person sentenced to destierro who entered the prohibited area
within the prohibited period has evaded the service of his sentence
(People vs. Abilog, 82 Phil. 174) and when he committed a crime in that
area, he will not be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law for the new crime.
Where the prison term does not exceed one (1) year, it is error to
apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the accused has to be
sentenced to a straight penalty.
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is based on the
penalty actually imposed, not on the imposable penalty, and its purpose
is to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness.
Week 10 Criminal Law

Probation Law

Probation is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction

and sentence is released, subject to conditions imposed by the court and
to the supervision of a probation officer. (Sec. 3 [a], P.D. No. 968 as
amended by P.D. No. 1257. P.D. No. 1990 and B.P. Blg. 76)
Under Section 4 of the law, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period of perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions at it may deem best: provided
that no such application shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation is a mere privilege, not a right of the accused. It is rather
an act of grace or clemency or immunity conferred by the State which
may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who
thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law.
The benefits of the law shall not be extended to those:
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum of imprisonment of more than six
(6) years.
2. Convicted of subversion or any crime against national security or
the public order.
3. Who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month
and one (1) day and/ or a fine of not more than (should be not
less than) P200.00.
4. Who have been once on probation.
5. Who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable.
6. Those convicted of violation of the Revised Election Code;
7. Those convicted of violation of R.A. No. 9165 (Anti Dangerous
Drugs Law), provided he is a first minor offender and that the
 offense is only illegal possession of dangerous drugs, so that even
if the penalty is more than six years, he is entitled to probation;
8. Those who appealed the case provided that appellate court
imposes a probational penalty.

If the accused is sentenced to more than six (6) year imprisonment

even by a day, he is no longer entitled to the benefits of the Probation
Law.
However, multiple prison terms imposed against the accused found
guilty of several offenses in one decision should not be added up, and
their sum total should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation since the law uses the word “maximum”
not “total” term of imprisonment. (Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
243 SCRA 384) Thus, if A, having been charged for five (5) cases which
were jointly heard is sentenced in one decision for one (1) year and eight
(8) months for each of the charges so that the totality of the prison term
is more than six (6) years, he is not disqualified to avail of the provisions
of the Probation Law.

Conditions of Probation

Every probation order issued by the court shall contain the following
conditions:
1. That probationer shall present himself to his designated
supervising probation officer within seventy two (72) hours from
receipt of the order.
2. He shall report to the probation officer at least once a month at
such time and place specified in the order.
The trial court may impose other conditions for the probationer to
comply.

Other Instances When Probation Not Applicable

1. When the accused is convicted under R.A. No. 9165 – the new Anti-
Dangerous Drugs Law except when he is the first offender minor in
which case he is eligible for probation even if the penalty imposed
is more than six (6) years. However if he is convicted of drug
trafficking or pushing he is disqualified.
 2. If accused appeals his conviction irrespective of the purpose of the
appeal even it is only to question the propriety of the penalty
imposed.
3. Conviction of an election offense under the Revised Election Code.

Title Four
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY: TOTAL AND PARTIAL

Criminal liability is totally extinguished by:

1. Death of the convict;
2. Service of the sentence;
3. Amnesty;
4. Absolute Pardon;
5. Prescription of the crime;
6. Prescription of the penalty; and
7. Marriage of the offended woman as provided for in Art. 344. (Art.
89)

On the other hand, it is partially extinguished by:

1. Conditional Pardon;
2. Commutation of the sentence; and
3. Good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while serving
sentence.

The grant of probation may be considered as a form of extinction of

criminal liability which was bestowed while accused who has never been
incarcerates, was out on bail, may thus be categorized as total extinction
thereof. However, if it was granted after the conviction of the accused
who was in jail, it can be considered as partial extinction only. It must be
noted however, that unlike in service of sentence, in probation, the
probationer is still required to report to a Probationer Officer at a certain
period until the duration of the probation period.

1. Death of the Accused

 If the accused dies, at whatever stage of the case, personal
penalty is totally and permanently extinguished. You can not imprison
a dead person. With respect to pecuniary liabilities like fine or costs of
the proceedings, they are extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
With respect to civil liability of the accused, if he dies after the
judgment has become final, the same is not extinguished and it can be
enforced against the estate of the deceased. If he dies however,
before promulgation of the sentences, or even after, but the same is
not yet final, on account of an appeal or a motion for reconsideration
duly filed, the civil liability is also extinguished. The offended party
nevertheless is allowed to file separate civil action, this time based on
either contract, quasi-contact, law, or quasi-delicts (the other sources
of obligation under Art. 1157 of the Civil Code). The statute of
limitations on the civil liability in such a case is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case. (People vs. Bayotas, 236
SCRA 239)

2. Service of Sentence

When the accused has fully served his sentence, his personal or
criminal liability is to be considered permanently terminated.

3. Amnesty and Absolute Pardon

Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts granted by

the Government to a certain class of person, charged or guilty of
crime, usually political offenses, and often conditioned upon their
return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time. (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 108)
Pardon is an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom
it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he
has committed. (De Leon vs. Dir. of Prisons, 31 Phil.60)
It is the Chief Executive who can grant both but in the case of
Amnesty, it needs concurrence of Congress. While pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, Amnesty looks backward and abolishes
and puts into oblivion the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense. (Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al., 82 Phil. 642).
Thus, Art. 89 says “x x x by amnesty which completely extinguishes the
penalty and all its effects.”
Thus, if A was convicted of homicide and was granted absolute
pardon, and later on committed murder or homicide, he will be
considered a recidivist. However, if his first offense is rebellion and
was granted amnesty and later on was found guilty of sedition,
recidivism can not be considered against him.
Pardon, to be considered as a mode of extinction of criminal
liability should be pardon by the offended party which only
extinguishes civil liability. (Art. 23, RPC) Pardon by the offended party,
however, in cases of adultery, concubinage, rape, acts of
lasciviousness, seduction or abduction when granted before the
institution of the criminal action also extinguishes criminal liability.
(Art. 344, RPC) Under R.A. No. 8353, in the crime of rape, if it is the
husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty except when the
marriage is void ab initio. (Sec. 2)

4. Prescription of Crime

It is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute

the offender or file criminal action after the lapse of a certain period
of time. (See The Revised Penal Code, Book I by Luis B. Reyes) Crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years; those punishable by other afflictive
penalties (like prision major), in fifteen (15) years; and those by
correctional penalty, in ten (10) years except those by arresto mayor
which shall prescribe in five (5) years while grave oral defamation and
grave slander by deed prescribe in six (6) months. Light offenses shall
prescribe in two (2) months. When the penalty imposable is a
compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules on prescription. (Art. 90)
 The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of
discovery of the crime by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents. (Art. 91) Thus, if A witnessed the killing of X by B, and since A
not being related to X, got scared and did not report the crime to the
authority, the crime (murder or homicide) will never prescribe. But if A
is the son of X, or even if not related to X, he reported to the police
authorities what he witnessed, and no complaint is filed in court
within twenty (20) years, then the crime will prescribe, and after
twenty (20) years and one (1) day from the discovery of the crime, no
charge can be filed against B anymore.
The filing of the complaint even with the Fiscal’s office only
(Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538; Calderon-Bargas vs.
RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, 227 SCRA 56) or with the court shall
interrupt the prescriptive period. Thus, in the example above, if B was
charged before the court or the prosecutor’s office on the tenth (10th)
year from discovery, the prescriptive period is interrupted. If one (1)
year after the filing of the complaint or information, the proceedings
were stopped without fault on the part of B, or was dismissed, the
period shall begin to run again, and after nine (9) years and one (1)
day, the crime of B shall be deemed prescribed since the ten (10)-year
period that lapsed without filing any criminal complaint shall be
considered so that only nine (9) years and one (1) day would be
needed to complete the prescriptive of twenty (20) years.
Criminal cases, however, which are covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure under the Rules of Court must be filed with the
Court, otherwise, they shall prescribe even if filed already with the
Fiscal’s office, after the lapse of sixty (60) days. (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, et
al., 211 SCRA 277) However, in Cabelic vs. Geronimo, May 27, 2002, a
case of slight physical injury thus covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the Supreme Court ruled that the period by prescription
was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. The Zaldivia case involved a violation of a
municipal ordinance where the applicable law is not Art. 91 of the
Revised Penal Code but Act No. 3326.
Prescription of falsification of public documents shall begin from
registration of the falsified document with the Register of Deeds since
the registration is the official notice to the whole worlds; but the
crime of bigamy shall commence to prescribe from discovery by the
offended party or the authorities of the crime, and not from the time
the bigamous marriage was registered with the Local Civil Registrar
since marriage is not property which would be registered in the place
where it is located, and a bigamous marriage is generally entered into
in a place where the offender is not known to be a married person, in
order to conceal his legal impediment. (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 233 SCRA 155)
Even if libel is punishable by prision correccional, it prescribes
not in ten (10) but in one (1) year as expressly provided for in Art. 90.
With respect to offenses punished with a fine, to determine their
prescriptive period, such fine should not be reduced or converted into
a prison term and should be considered as afflictive, correctional or
light under Art. 26 of the Revised Penal Code.

5. Prescription of Penalty

Prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture of the right of

the State to execute the final sentence of conviction after the lapse of
a certain period of time.
The penalties of death and reclusion perpetua prescribe in
twenty (20) years; other afflictive penalties (like reclusion temporal
and prision mayor), in fifteen (15) years while correctional penalties
except arresto mayor which prescribes in five (5) years, prescribe in
ten (10) years. Light Penalties shall prescribe in one (1) year. (Art. 92,
RPC)
The penalty, to be subject of prescription must have been
imposed by final judgment. Thus, if A after conviction by the trial
court, appealed the decision, and escaped from jail where he has been
detained during trial, the penalty will never prescribe. In prescription
of penalty, the offender must be serving sentence, and must have
escaped, committing the crime of evasion of service of sentence. From
the day he escaped, the prescription of penalty commences to run. If
the penalty imposed is death or reclusion perpetua, he must be able
to hide from the authorities for a period of twenty (20) years, or if it is
reclusion temporal, for fifteen (15) years. If within the prescriptive
period he should give himself up, or be captured, or would go to a
 foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime, then the period is interrupted and the
penalty will not prescribe anymore.
Problem:
A was sentenced to reclusion temporal for Homicide and
while serving sentence, escaped on January 1, 1980. He must
be able to elude authorities up to January 2, 1995 to consider
the penalty prescribed. Suppose he was arrested after five (5)
years of escape – that is, on January 1, 1985, and was able to
re-escape on January 1, 1986, he must hide for just ten (10)
more years. The five (5)-year period during his first escape
must have to be considered for purposes of completing the
fifteen (15)-year period for the prescription of the penalty of
Homicide.

Reason for Prescription of the Crime and/or Penalty

During the period that the accused/ convict escaped, he lives a life
of a hunted animal, hiding mostly in the mountains and forest in constant
mortal fear, discomfort, loneliness and misery. As the distinguished penal
commentator Viada said, the convict who evades sentence is sometimes
sufficiently punished by his voluntary and self-imposed punishment, and
at times, his voluntary exile is more grievous than the sentence he was
trying to avoid. And all the time he has to utilize every ingenuity and
means to outwit the government extends to him a sort of condonation or
amnesty. (See Infante vs. Provincial Warden, 92 Phil. 310)

Marriage of the Offended Party with the Offender

In cases of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness

(SARA), the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon
him. The provision of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-
principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-
named crimes. (Art. 344, last par.)
In other crimes, marriage of the complainant and the accused does
not extinguish criminal liability. In the crimes of SARA (seduction,
abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness), the marriage must be
entered into in good faith, and if undertaken only to avoid criminal
prosecution, such marriage does not result in the extinction of penal
liability. (People vs. Santiago, 51 Phil. 68) If done in good faith however,
the marriage benefits the accessory or accomplice even if he is already
serving sentence. (Laceste vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 472) Under R.A. No. 8353,
the subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended
party in the crime of rape shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty imposed. In case of multiple rapes, however, the principle does
not apply. Thus, if A, B, and C raped W in that when A was having sex with
W, B, and C were holding the legs and arms of W, and when it was B’s
turn, A and C were the ones holding W’s legs and arms, and when C was
the one having sex with W, the ones holding her arms and legs were A and
B. Even if later on, A contracted marriage with W, there is no extinction
of penal responsibility because this is a case of multiple rapes.
Even if rapes is now a crime against person and no longer a crime
against chastity, the principle of marriage as a form of extinguishment of
criminal liability applies.

Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability

Conditional pardon by the Chief Executive partially extinguishes the

penal liability of a convict. It is that pardon granted to a prisoner which is
subject to some conditions, one of which is that he will not commit any
crime anymore. Oftenly, this kind of pardon is delivered to a convict sill
serving sentence who must accept the condition in order to be effective.
Thus, part of his sentence is remitted which he will no longer undergo.
Commutation is the substitution of a lesser penalty for that of a
greater punishment imposed on the convict by the Chief Executive. Thus,
instead of pardon, the President may commute the death penalty to
reclusion perpetua, or if the penalty is reclusion temporal, he may grant
a commutation altering or changing the penalty to prision mayor. There is
no doubt a partial extinction of criminal liability occurs. The
commutation of the original sentence for another of a different length
and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the
place of the former. (Art. 96) Unlike in conditional pardon, the
commutation of penalty in favour of the convict does not need his
acceptance. (22 R.C.L. 530)
With respect to Good Conduct Allowances, Art. 97 provides for the
guideline which by its nature may be expanded or supplemented by the
prison’s authority. The prisoner however, to be entitled, must be serving
his sentence. If the accused is enjoying liberty under a conditional
pardon, he can not be entitled to the good conduct allowances. (People
vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122)
The allowances for conduct granted by the Director of Prisons (now
Bureau of Corrections) shall not be revoked. (Art.99)
Under R.A. No. 10592:
1. “Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of
one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any
prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the
service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in
Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities
within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe
referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period
of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to
stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the
existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158
of this Code.
This article shall apply to any prisoner whether under-going
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.”
2. “Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. – Whenever lawfully
justified, the Director of Bureau or Corrections, the Chief of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/ or the Warden of a
provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances
for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be
revoked.

Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY

Person Civilly Liable for Felonies

 Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art.
100) Thus, if A committed murder, theft or rape, aside from
imprisonment, he is obliged to pay the offended party the civil liability
which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages. (Art. 104) Of course, if the
crime is one from which no civil liability may arise, like illegal possession
of firearm (P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294) or Illegal Sale,
Transport or possession of prohibited or regulated drugs (R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 7659), the convict incures no civil liability.
If an accused however was not held criminally liable, it does not
mean he is not civilly liable. In fact, under the Rules of Court, in case of
acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on
the civil liability of the accused in favour of the offended party. (Rule
120, Sec. 2)
Civil Liability of Parents and/or Guardians
For the crimes committed by minors and insane persons who are
exempt from criminal liability, the civil liability shall devolve upon those
having legal authority or control over them unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part or that they are insolvent, in
which case, the property of the minor or the insane shall be liable,
excepting property exempt from execution. (Art. 101, RPC) This is thus a
direct and primary liability of the parents or guardian.

Subsidiary Liability of Innkeepers, Tavern-Keepers, Employers,

Teachers, or Persons Engaged in Industry

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-

keepers and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
the crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees. (Art.
102)
A restaurant or movie house owner who opens his establishment
before 9:00 in the morning despite the existence of an ordinance that
they can open only after 9:00 a.m. so as not to coincide with rush-hour
traffic will be civilly liable if a person is killed inside their
establishments, and the accused-killer is insolvent to satisfy the civil
liability.
The same rule applies to employers, teachers or persons engaged in
any kind of industry, for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
(Art. 103)
The civil obligations arising from crimes devolve upon the heirs of
the person criminally liable, and the action to demand likewise descends
to the heirs of the person injured. (Art. 108, RPC)
Thus, if A was found guilty of killing B, and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of B, P50,000.00 but died while
serving sentence, his (A’s) heirs are bound to pay the heirs of B the said
amount of P50,000.00 if he left properties sufficient to cover the civil
liability.
However, if on account of a business transaction between the heirs
of A, and the heirs of B, the latter owe the former P30,000.00 the heirs of
the convicted man A, can deduct the said indebtedness from the
P50,000.00 award provided in the decision, since civil liability arising
from the crime shall be extinguished in the same manner as other
obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. (Art. 112
RPC)

This is subject however to the provision of Art. 1288 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines which provides:

Article 1288. Neither shall there be compensation if one of

the debts consists in civil liability arising from a penal offense.

If A, the convict, dies while serving sentence for homicide, and the
civil liability stated in the civil liability stated in the Decision, say
P100,000.00 is still unsatisfied, whatever debt B (the deceased) owed
from A, the heirs of A cannot deduct the same from the P100,000.00 civil
liability in the judgment.
The convict shall be obliged to satisfy the civil liability contained in
the judgment of conviction even if he has served his sentence, or has not
been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon,
commutation of sentence or any other reason. (Art. 113, RPC)
 Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY

Person Civilly Liable for Felonies

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art.
100) Thus, if A committed murder, theft or rape, aside from
imprisonment, he is obliged to pay the offended party the civil liability
which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages. (Art. 104) Of course, if the
crime is one from which no civil liability may arise, like illegal possession
of firearm (P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294) or Illegal Sale,
Transport or possession of prohibited or regulated drugs (R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 7659), the convict incures no civil liability.

If an accused however was not held criminally liable, it does not

mean he is not civilly liable. In fact, under the Rules of Court, in case of
acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on
the civil liability of the accused in favour of the offended party. (Rule
120, Sec. 2)

Civil Liability of Parents and/or Guardians

For the crimes committed by minors and insane persons who are
exempt from criminal liability, the civil liability shall devolve upon those
having legal authority or control over them unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part or that they are insolvent, in
which case, the property of the minor or the insane shall be liable,
excepting property exempt from execution. (Art. 101, RPC) This is thus a
direct and primary liability of the parents or guardian.

Subsidiary Liability of Innkeepers, Tavern-Keepers, Employers,

Teachers, or Persons Engaged in Industry
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-
keepers and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
the crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees. (Art.
102)
 A restaurant or movie house owner who opens his establishment
before 9:00 in the morning despite the existence of an ordinance that
they can open only after 9:00 a.m. so as not to coincide with rush-hour
traffic will be civilly liable if a person is killed inside their
establishments, and the accused-killer is insolvent to satisfy the civil
liability.

The same rule applies to employers, teachers or persons engaged in

any kind of industry, for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
(Art. 103)

The civil obligations arising from crimes devolve upon the heirs of
the person criminally liable, and the action to demand likewise descends
to the heirs of the person injured. (Art. 108, RPC)

Thus, if A was found guilty of killing B, and was sentenced to

reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of B, P50,000.00 but died while
serving sentence, his (A’s) heirs are bound to pay the heirs of B the said
amount of P50,000.00 if he left properties sufficient to cover the civil
liability.

However, if on account of a business transaction between the heirs

of A, and the heirs of B, the latter owe the former P30,000.00 the heirs of
the convicted man A, can deduct the said indebtedness from the
P50,000.00 award provided in the decision, since civil liability arising
from the crime shall be extinguished in the same manner as other
obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. (Art. 112
RPC)

This is subject however to the provision of Art. 1288 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines which provides:
Article 1288. Neither shall there be compensation if one of
the debts consists in civil liability arising from a penal offense.
 If A, the convict, dies while serving sentence for homicide, and the
civil liability stated in the civil liability stated in the Decision, say
P100,000.00 is still unsatisfied, whatever debt B (the deceased) owed
from A, the heirs of A cannot deduct the same from the P100,000.00 civil
liability in the judgment.
The convict shall be obliged to satisfy the civil liability contained in
the judgment of conviction even if he has served his sentence, or has not
been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon,
commutation of sentence or any other reason. (Art. 113, RPC)