Guidelines on Freedom

of Peaceful Assembly
Guidelines on Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly
Published by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
Al. Ujazdowskie 
- Warsaw
Poland
www.osce.org/odihr

© OSCE/ODIHR 
All rights reserved. The contents of this publication may be freely used and copied for
educational and other non-commercial purposes, provided that any such reproduction
is accompanied by an acknowledgement of the OSCE/ODIHR as the source.

ISBN 83-60190-34-8

Designed by Homework, Warsaw, Poland

Cover design by Graphic Design Damla Süar, Geneva, Switzerland
Printed in Poland by Sungraf
Guidelines on Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly

Prepared by the OSCE/ODIHR Panel Of Experts

on the Freedom of Assembly

Nina Belyaeva
David Goldberger
Neil Jarman
Muatar S. Khaidarova
Serghei Ostaf
Vardan Poghosyan
Andrzej Rzepliński
Alexander Vashkevich
Yevgeniy A. Zhovtis

Michael Hamilton, Secretary to the Panel

Warsaw, 2007
Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SECTION A. Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly . . . . . . . . 

SECTION B. Interpretative Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction (§-)

part i: Freedom of Peaceful Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. Regulation of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The importance of freedom of assembly (§-)
The legal framework (§-)
Freedom of peaceful assembly in the context of other rights and freedoms (§- )
Principal definitions and categories of assembly (§-)
Peaceful and unlawful assemblies (§-)

. General Principles (§) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Presumption in favour of holding assemblies (§)

State’s duty to protect peaceful assembly (§-)
Legality (§-)
Proportionality (§ - )
Good administration, transparent decision-making, and access to justice (§ - )
Non-discrimination (§ -)

. Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly (§) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Legitimate grounds for imposing restrictions on assemblies (§- )
Legislation intended to counter terrorism and ‘extremism’ (§-)
Derogations in times of war or other public emergency (§
-)
Types of restrictions (§
-)

. Procedural Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Advance notification (§- )

Notification, not authorization (§-)
Spontaneous assemblies (§-
)
Other exceptions from the notification process (§)


Simultaneous assemblies (§-)

Decision-making and review process (§-)

part ii: Implementing Legislation on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly . . . . . . . 

Introduction (§- )

. Rights and Responsibilities of Law Enforcement Officials(§-) . . . . . . . 

Training (§-)
Policing assemblies — general principles of good practice (§-)
Regulating peaceful unlawful assemblies (§-)
Peaceful assemblies that turn into non-peaceful assemblies (§)
Dispersal of assemblies (§- )
Use of force (§ - )
Liability and accountability (§ -
)

. Responsibilities of the Organizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The organizer (§ -)
Ensuring the peaceful nature of an assembly — principles of good practice (§-)
Stewarding assemblies (§-)
Liability (§-)

. Human Rights Monitors, Media, and Other Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Human rights defenders, observers, and monitors (§-)
Media (§
-)
Other stakeholders (§-)

Annex A: Cases Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Annex B: English-Russian Glossary of Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Annex C: Expert Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foreword

The right to assemble peacefully is an essential condition for the exercise of other
human rights such as the freedom of expression. As a true foundation of democracy, the
right to assemble is guaranteed by major human rights treaties and by a commitment
made by OSCE participating States in , in Copenhagen. My Office has been
providing legislative support to participating States to assist them in ensuring that their
legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly complies with OSCE commitments and
international standards. These Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly are a new
cornerstone of this assistance, adding to the ODIHR’s Legislationline.org database,
where lawmakers can obtain examples from other countries’ legislation that can help
them prepare legislation regulating the exercise of the freedom of assembly.

International standards certainly offer a clear general framework; however, too little
guidance is available to legislators and executive branches on how the exercise of
freedom of peaceful assembly may be regulated in law and practice at the national
level. Good laws by themselves cannot mechanically generate improvements in
practice. In countries where special legislation on the subject has been passed, one
can, in a number of cases, identify an inclination towards limiting the risks associated
with the so-called command-and-control approach, as reflected in more regulations,
more control, and more bureaucratic hurdles. Public demonstrations and rallies, for
instance, are not always seen as part of the routine that makes up pluralistic democracy.
They are frequently considered suspicious by those in power, hence the trend towards
more regulations and control. This trend certainly contributes to the widening of a gap
between civil society and governments. In short, I believe that some of the legislation
and practice we encounter across the OSCE region reflects the conviction that it is
the state that regulates this freedom in a way that often results in its de facto denial.
This prompted the ODIHR to develop guidelines with a view to formulating minimum


standards that should be met by national authorities in their regulation of this right. The
resulting Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly are aimed at both lawmakers
and practitioners responsible for implementing laws.

In order to be used in the contexts of different countries, the Guidelines cannot provide
one-size-fits-all solutions; rather, they should reflect best international practice. The
ODIHR therefore set up an expert panel and convened four roundtables to make the
drafting truly inclusive and participatory. These roundtables helped us to discern trends
and patterns at the juncture between the law and real-life situations. In the course of
, the roundtables brought together as many as  participants — practitioners and
academics — from a majority of OSCE participating States.

At the end of this process, we are pleased to present these Guidelines to the OSCE
participating States and to the wider public. They are a living instrument and will benefit
from periodic review. They demarcate parameters for implementation consistent
with international standards, and illustrate key principles with examples of good
practice from individual participating States. We hope they will find many users — legal
drafters, police officers, government officials, judges, academics, and members of non-
governmental organizations — and we count on these users to contribute their expertise
and experience in order to further enrich this document.

Ambassador Christian Strohal

ODIHR Director
Introduction

These Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly together with the Interpretative

Notes were prepared by the Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly of the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in consultation with the European Commission
for Democracy though Law (the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe.
The Document takes into account comments received from members of the Venice
Commission who were consulted on an initial draft of these Guidelines.

The Interpretative Notes constitute an integral part of the Guidelines, and should be
read in concert with them.

The Guidelines were originally drafted by the ODIHR, providing a solid foundation
on which to build. They were posted on the ODIHR website and circulated to all
those who contributed to the drafting process, particularly those who took part in
consultative roundtable events held in Tbilisi, Belgrade, Almaty, and Warsaw. In
total, these roundtable sessions (all held in ) were attended by as many as 
participants from  different OSCE participating States. The participants represented
many diverse interests, bringing together police officers, non-governmental human
rights advocacy groups, government ministers, organizers of assemblies, academic
commentators, and practicing lawyers. The Guidelines and the notes attached to them
take into account comments made by participants in the course of the events, as well
as afterwards. Without this input, which reflects a wealth of hands-on experience in
widely differing contexts, this would be a less comprehensive document.

The legal regulation of freedom of assembly is a complex matter. A wide range of

issues (both procedural and substantive) must be considered so as to best facilitate the


enjoyment of the freedom. Moreover, the approach to regulation varies greatly across
the OSCE space: from the adoption of a single consolidated law to the incorporation of
provisions concerning peaceful assemblies in an array of different laws (including laws
governing police powers, criminal and administrative codes, anti-terrorism legislation,
election laws, and even architectural regulations). Recognizing these differences, as
well as the great diversity of country contexts (particularly in relation to democratic
traditions, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary), the Guidelines and
the notes attached to them do not provide ready-made solutions. It is neither possible
nor desirable to draft a single transferable model law that could be adopted by all
OSCE participating states. Rather, the Guidelines and the notes attached to them clarify
key issues and discuss possible ways to address them.

The Guidelines and the notes attached to them are based on international and
regional treaties relating to the protection of human rights, evolving state practice
(as reflected, inter alia, in judgments of domestic courts), and the general principles
of law recognized by the community of nations. They demarcate a clear minimum
baseline in relation to these standards, thereby establishing a threshold that must be
met by national authorities in their regulation of freedom of peaceful assembly. The
Guidelines and the notes attached to them differ, however, from other texts that merely
attempt to codify these standards or summarize the relevant case law. Instead, they
promote excellence, and therefore provide examples of good practice (measures that
have proven successful in a number of jurisdictions or that have demonstrably helped
ensure that the freedom of assembly is accorded adequate protection).

In regulating the enjoyment of the freedom of assembly, well-drafted legislation is vital

in framing the discretion afforded to the authorities. This demands that governments
and those involved in the drafting of legislation consult with the individuals and
groups affected by it (including local human rights organizations) as an integral part
of the drafting process. Often, however, it is not the text of the law that is at issue,
but its implementation. Therefore, while these Guidelines and the notes attached to
them will inform those involved in the drafting of legislation pertaining to freedom of
assembly, they are also aimed at those responsible for implementing such legislation
(the relevant administrative and law enforcement authorities), and those affected
by its implementation. The Guidelines and the notes attached to them are aimed at
practitioners in many sectors: legislative drafters, politicians, legal professionals, police
officers, local officials, trade unionists, assembly organizers and participants, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and those involved in monitoring both freedom
of assembly and policing practice.

While Section A contains the Guidelines, Section B, the Interpretative Notes, is not
only essential to a proper understanding and interpretation of the Guidelines, but
 

it provides examples of good practice, which is what makes this document special.
Part I of Section B (Chapters - ) emphasizes the importance of freedom of assembly
and sketches its parameters. It outlines a number of general principles that should
govern its regulation (Chapter ); sets out the legitimate grounds for, and types
of, restrictions (Chapter ); and examines relevant procedural issues (Chapter ).
Part II (Chapters –) has a more practical focus, and it examines the implementation
of legislation on freedom of assembly. It covers the rights and responsibilities of law
enforcement officials (Chapter ), event organizers (Chapter ), and the role of other
stakeholders (Chapter ). Appendix A contains a list of cited cases, and Appendix B
provides a glossary of terms (with a Russian translation). This glossary defines major
terms and notions used in the Guidelines and the notes attached to them. Appendix C
contains biographical outlines of members of the ODIHR’s Panel of Experts on Freedom
of Assembly.

The Guidelines and the notes attached to them can be downloaded from the ODIHR
website, as well as from the ODIHR’s legislative database, www.legislationline.org,
where national legislation on public assemblies and other related legal materials can
also be found.

The Guidelines and the notes attached to them are a living document, and will
undoubtedly be revised over time. The ODIHR welcomes comments and suggestions,
which should be e-mailed to [email protected].
SECTION A

Guidelines on Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly
 

Regulation of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

The importance of freedom of assembly. Peaceful assemblies can serve many

purposes, including the expression of views and the defence of common interests.
The freedom of peaceful assembly can be an important strand in the maintenance
and development of culture, and in the preservation of minority identities. It is also
recognized as one of the foundations of a functioning democracy, and its protection is
crucial for creating a tolerant society in which groups with different beliefs, practices,
or policies can exist peacefully together.

Definition of assembly

a. For the purposes of these Guidelines, an assembly is the intentional and temporary
presence of a number of individuals in a public place that is not a building or
structure for a common expressive purpose.
b. This definition should not be interpreted so as to preclude protection being
extended to other types of peaceful assembly, such as assemblies taking place
at publicly or privately owned premises or structures. While all types of peaceful
assembly deserve protection, public assemblies that take place in public spaces
that are not buildings or structures raise particular regulatory issues, and are
therefore the subject of these Guidelines.

Only peaceful assemblies are protected. An assembly should be deemed peaceful

if its organizers have peaceful intentions. The term “peaceful” should be interpreted
to include conduct that may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas
or claims that a particular assembly is promoting, and even conduct that deliberately
impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties. Participation in a public assembly
must be voluntary.

Six Guiding Principles

principle . Presumption in favour of holding assemblies. As a fundamental right,

freedom of peaceful assembly should, insofar as possible, be enjoyed without regulation.
Anything not expressly forbidden in law should be presumed to be permissible, and
those wishing to assemble should not be required to obtain permission to do so. A
presumption in favour of the freedom should be clearly and explicitly established
in law.


principle . The state’s duty to protect peaceful assembly. It is the responsibility

of the state to put in place adequate mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the
freedom of assembly is enjoyed in practice and is not subject to unduly bureaucratic
regulation.

principle . Legality. Any restrictions imposed must have a formal basis in law. The law
itself must be compatible with international human rights law, and it must be sufficiently
precise to enable an individual to assess whether or not his or her conduct would be in
breach of the law, and what the consequences of such breaches would likely be.

principle . Proportionality. Any restrictions imposed on freedom of assembly

must be proportional. The least intrusive means of achieving the legitimate objective
being pursued by the authorities should always be given preference. The dispersal of
assemblies may only be a measure of last resort. The principle of proportionality thus
requires that authorities not routinely impose restrictions that would fundamentally
alter the character of an event, such as routing marches through outlying areas of a city.
The blanket application of legal restrictions tends to be overly inclusive and thus fails
the proportionality test because no consideration is given to the specific circumstances
of the case in question.

principle . Good administration. The public should know which body is responsible
for taking decisions about the regulation of freedom of assembly, and this must be
clearly stated in law. The regulatory authority should ensure that the general public
has adequate access to reliable information, and it should operate in an accessible and
transparent manner.

principle . Non-discrimination.
a. Freedom of peaceful assembly is to be enjoyed equally by everyone. In regulating
freedom of assembly, the relevant authorities must not discriminate against any
individual or group on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.
The freedom to organize and participate in public assemblies must be guaranteed
to both individuals and corporate bodies; to members of minority and indigenous
groups; to both nationals and non-nationals (including stateless persons, refugees,
foreign nationals, asylum seekers, migrants, and tourists); to both women and men;
and to persons without full legal capacity, including persons with mental illness.
b. The law must recognize the child’s right to participate in and organize peaceful
assemblies. With due regard to the evolving capacity of the child, the right of
children to organize an assembly may be subject to restrictions such as a certain
minimum age for organizers or a requirement that the consent of their parents or
legal guardians be obtained.
 

c. Freedom of assembly of police or military personnel should not be restricted

unless the reasons for the restriction are directly connected with their service
duties, and only to the extent absolutely necessary in light of considerations of
professional duty.

Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly

. Legitimate grounds for restriction. Legitimate grounds for restriction are

prescribed in universal and regional human rights instruments, and these should not
be supplemented by additional grounds in domestic legislation.

. Restrictions on time, place and manner. A broad spectrum of possible restrictions

that do not interfere with the message communicated are available to the regulatory
authority. As a general rule, assemblies should be facilitated within sight and sound of
their target audience.

Procedural Issues

. Advance notice. The legal provisions concerning advance notice should require
a notice of intent rather than a request for permission. The notification process
should not be onerous or bureaucratic. The period of notice should not be
unnecessarily lengthy, but should still allow adequate time prior to the notified
date of the assembly for the relevant state authorities to plan and prepare for
the event, and for the completion of an expeditious appeal to a tribunal or court
should the legality of any restrictions imposed be challenged. If the authorities do
not promptly present any objections to a notification, the organizers of a public
assembly should be able to proceed with the planned activity in accordance with
the terms notified and without restriction.

. Spontaneous assemblies. The law should explicitly provide for an exception from
the requirement of advance notice where giving advance notice is impracticable.
Even if no reasonable grounds for the failure to give advance notice are provided,
the authorities should still protect and facilitate any spontaneous assembly so long
as it is peaceful in nature. Organizers who ignore or refuse to comply with valid
advance-notice requirements may be subsequently prosecuted.


. Simultaneous assemblies. Where notification is given for two or more assemblies

at the same place and time, they should be facilitated as much as possible. Emphasis
should be placed on the state’s duty to prevent disruption of the main event where
counter-demonstrations are organized.

Implementing Legislation on Freedom of Peaceful

Assembly

. Pre-event planning with law enforcement officials. Where possible and where
special security concerns exist (for instance, in the case of large assemblies or
assemblies on highly controversial issues), it is recommended that the organizer agree
with law enforcement officials prior to the event about what security measures will be
put in place. Such discussions can cover the deployment of police and stewards, and
concerns around the nature of the policing operation.

. The use of negotiation and/or mediation to help resolve disputed assemblies.

If a proposed assembly, or its time, place, or manner, is disputed and no resolution
emerges between the organizer, designated regulatory authority, law enforcement
officials, or other parties whose rights might be affected, then negotiation or mediated
dialogue is recommended to help reach a mutually agreeable accommodation. The
facilitation of negotiations or mediated dialogue can usually best be performed by
individuals or organizations not affiliated with either the state or the organizer.

. Policing assemblies. The state must protect participants of a peaceful assembly

from any person or group (including agents provocateurs and counter-demonstrators)
that attempts to disrupt or inhibit it in any way. The costs of providing adequate
security and safety (including traffic and crowd management) should be fully covered
by the public authorities. The state must not levy any additional monetary charge for
providing adequate policing. Organizers of non-commercial public assemblies should
not be required to obtain public liability insurance for their event.

. The use of force. The use of force must be regulated by domestic law, which
should set out the circumstances that justify the use of force (including the need to
provide adequate prior warnings), as well as the level of force acceptable to deal with
various threats. Governments should develop a range of means of response, and
equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition so as
to enable a differentiated use of force. These should include the development of non-
lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situations.
 

. Liability and accountability of police officers. If the force used is not authorized
by law, or more force is used than necessary in the circumstances, police officers should
face civil and/or criminal liability, as well as disciplinary action. Police officers should
also be held liable for failing to intervene where such intervention may have prevented
other officers from using excessive force. Where a complaint is received regarding
the conduct of law enforcement officials or where a person is seriously injured or is
deprived of his or her life as a result of the actions of law enforcement officers, an
effective official investigation must be conducted.

. Liability of organizers. Organizers of assemblies should not be held liable for

their failure to perform their duties if they make reasonable efforts to do so, nor should
organizers be held liable for the actions of non-participants or agents provocateurs.
Organizers should not be liable for the actions of individual participants. Instead,
individual liability should arise for any participant if they commit an offence or fail to
carry out the lawful directions of law enforcement officials.

. Stewarding assemblies. While the police have overall responsibility for public
order, it is recommended that organizers of assemblies be encouraged to deploy
stewards during the course of a large or controversial assembly. Stewards are people
who work with assembly organizers and who are responsible for facilitating an event
and helping ensure compliance with any lawfully imposed restrictions. Stewards should
not have the powers of law enforcement officials and should not use force, but should
rather aim to persuade assembly participants to co-operate. Stewards should receive an
appropriate level of training and a thorough briefing before the assembly takes place,
and it is the responsibility of the organizer to co-ordinate the stewarding operation. It
is also recommended that stewards be clearly identifiable.

. Monitors. For the purposes of these Guidelines, monitors are defined as non-
participant third-party persons or groups whose primary aim is to observe and record
what is taking place. The monitoring of assemblies can provide an impartial and
objective account of what takes place, including a factual record of the conduct both
of participants and of law enforcement officials. While the primary responsibility to
promote and protect freedom of assembly lies with the state, NGOs play an important
role in furthering the cause of human rights. Human rights defenders should therefore
be permitted to operate freely in the context of freedom of assembly.

. Media access. Journalists have an important role to play in providing independent

coverage of public assemblies. As such, they must be distinguished from participants
and be given as much access as possible by the authorities.
SECTION B

Interpretative Notes
Introduction

. These Interpretative Notes constitute an integral part of the Guidelines, and

thus should be read in concert with them. They are not only essential to a proper
understanding and interpretation of the Guidelines, but they provide examples of
good practice, which is what makes this document special.

. Part I of the Interpretative Notes (Chapters - ) emphasizes the importance of

freedom of assembly and sketches its parameters. It outlines a number of general
principles that should govern its regulation (Chapter ); sets out the legitimate
grounds for, and types of, restrictions (Chapter ); and examines relevant
procedural issues (Chapter ). Part II (Chapters -) has a more practical focus,
and it examines the implementation of legislation on freedom of assembly. It
covers the rights and responsibilities of law enforcement officials (Chapter ),
event organizers (Chapter ), and the role of other stakeholders (Chapter ).
Appendix A contains a list of cited cases, and Appendix B provides a glossary
of terms (with a Russian translation). This glossary defines major terms and
notions used in the Guidelines and the Interpretative Notes. Appendix C contains
biographical outlines of members of the ODIHR’s Panel of Experts on Freedom of
Assembly.
PART I

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

. Regulation of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

The importance of freedom of assembly

. Throughout the Guidelines and the Interpretative Notes, the term freedom of
peaceful assembly is used in preference to that of the right to peaceful assembly.
This emphasizes that any right to assemble is underpinned by a more fundamental
freedom, the essence of which is that it should be enjoyed without interference. 
Participation in public assemblies should be entirely voluntary.

. Peaceful assemblies can serve many purposes, including (but not limited to)
the expression of views and the defence of common interests, celebration,
commemoration, picketing, and protest. Freedom of peaceful assembly can have
both symbolic and instrumental significance, and can be an important strand in
the maintenance and development of culture and in the preservation of minority
identities. It is complemented by other rights and freedoms such as freedom of
association, the right to establish and maintain contacts within the territory of a
state, freedom of expression, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

As such, freedom of assembly is of fundamental importance for the personal

development, dignity, and fulfilment of every individual and the progress and
welfare of society.

. It is also recognized as one of the foundations of a functioning democracy.

Facilitating participation in peaceful assemblies — in addition to holding elections
in line with international standards — helps ensure that all people in a society have
the opportunity to express opinions that they hold in common with others. As
such, freedom of peaceful assembly constitutes a form of direct democracy. It
facilitates dialogue within civil society, as well as between civil society, political
 

leaders, and government. With appropriate media coverage, public assemblies

communicate with the world at large, and in countries where the media is limited
or restricted, freedom of assembly is vital for those who wish to draw attention to
local issues. This communicative potential underlines the importance of freedom
of assembly in advocating and effecting change. States should therefore recognize
the profound and long-term benefits of freedom of assembly. Indeed, the financial
costs entailed by protecting freedom of assembly are likely to be significantly less
than the costs of policing disorder borne of repression.

. In addition to serving the interests of democracy, the ability to freely assemble

is also crucial to creating a tolerant society in which groups with different, and
possibly conflicting, beliefs, practices, or policies can exist peacefully together.

The legal framework

. Regulating freedom of assembly in domestic law. Freedom of peaceful assembly

should be accorded constitutional protection that ought to contain, at a minimum, a
positive statement of both the right and the obligation to safeguard it. There should
also be a constitutional provision that guarantees fair procedures in the determination
of the rights contained therein. Constitutional provisions, however, cannot provide
for specific details or procedures. As such, general constitutional provisions can
be abused and, of themselves, afford unduly wide discretion to the authorities.

. Consequently, many countries have enacted specific legislation dealing with public
assemblies in addition to constitutional guarantees. Such legislation should not
inhibit the enjoyment of the constitutional right to peaceful assembly, but should
rather facilitate and ensure its protection. In this light, it is vital that any specific
law avoid the creation of an excessively regulatory, bureaucratic system that seeks
to prescribe for all matters and that may thus infringe fundamental rights. This
is a real risk in many countries, and has been raised as a particular concern by
the Venice Commission. Well-drafted legislation, however, can help ensure that
freedom of assembly is not over-regulated.

. Domestic laws regulating freedom of assembly must be consistent with the

international instruments ratified by that state, and the legitimacy of domestic
laws will be judged accordingly. Domestic laws must also be interpreted
and implemented in conformity with the relevant international and regional
jurisprudence.

. Universal and regional instruments. The sources of law identified in this section
are among the most important treaties that the ODIHR makes reference to when


reviewing legislation. The universal and regional standards concerning freedom

of assembly mainly derive from two legal instruments: the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  and the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as well as the
optional protocols thereto. The American Convention on Human Rights is also of
particular relevance to member states of the Organization of American States.

. The significance of these treaties derives, in part, from the jurisprudence developed
by their respective monitoring bodies: the UN Human Rights Committee, the
European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. This body of case law is integral to the interpretation of these standards,
and should be fully understood by those charged with implementing domestic
laws on freedom of assembly. It is recommended, therefore, that governments
ensure that accurate translations of key cases are made available to the relevant
authorities, and indeed, more widely.

. The key provisions in relation to the right to freedom of peaceful assembly are
reproduced below (noting that a number of other human rights instruments will
also often be applicable in certain cases).

Article (), Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association.

Article , International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed
in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order,
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.

Article , European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms
) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join
trade unions for the protection of his interests.
 

) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other

than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise
of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the state.

Article , American Convention on Human Rights

The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized. No
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
imposed in conformity with the law and necessary in a democratic
society in the interest of national security, public safety or public order,
or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedom of others.

OSCE Copenhagen Document

. [The participating States reaffirm that] everyone will have the right
of peaceful assembly and demonstration. Any restrictions which may
be placed on the exercise of these rights will be prescribed by law and
consistent with international standards.

Freedom of peaceful assembly in the context of other rights and freedoms

. It is essential that those involved in drafting and implementing laws pertaining

to freedom of assembly give due consideration to the interrelation of the rights
and freedoms contained in these treaties. The imperative of adopting a holistic
approach to freedom of assembly is underscored by the destruction-of-rights
provisions contained in Article  of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), Article  of the ICCPR, and Article  of the ECHR.

Article , Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein.


Article , International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

() Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the present Covenant.
Article , European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for
in the Convention.

 . The imposition of restrictions on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly also

potentially encroaches on the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. Where issues under these other rights are also
raised, the substantive issues should be examined under the right most relevant
to the facts (the lex specialis), and other rights should be viewed as subsidiary (lex
generalis). Significantly, the European Court of Human Rights has stated that the
ECHR is to be read as a whole, and that the application of any individual article
must be in harmony with the overall logic of the Convention.

Principal definitions and categories of assembly

For the purposes of the Guidelines, an assembly is the intentional and

temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place that is not
a building or structure for a common expressive purpose.

. An assembly, by defi nition, requires the presence of at least two persons.
Nonetheless, an individual protester exercising his or her right to freedom of
expression, where their physical presence is an integral part of that expression,
should also be afforded the same protections as those who gather together as part
of an assembly.

. A range of activities are covered by freedom of peaceful assembly, including

both static assemblies (such as meetings, mass actions, demonstrations, rallies,
 

sit-ins, and pickets) and moving assemblies (such as parades, funerals, weddings,
pilgrimages, and convoys).  These examples are not exhaustive, and domestic
legislation might emphasize the need for an inclusive and expansive interpretation
of “assembly” as demonstrated, for example, by the following extracts from
laws in Kazakhstan and Finland. These examples also serve to highlight that the
term ‘temporary’ should not preclude the erection of protest camps or other
impermanent constructions.

Article , Decree of the President in force of the Law on the Procedure

for the Organization and Conduct of Peaceful Assemblies, Mass
Meetings, Processions, Pickets and Demonstrations in the Republic of
Kazakhstan ()
…the forms of expression of public, group and personal interests
and protest referred to as assemblies, meetings, processions and
demonstrations shall also include hunger strikes in public places and
putting up yurts, tents, other constructions and picketing.

Finland’s Assembly Act ()

In a public meeting, banners, insignia, loudspeakers and other
regular meeting equipment may be used and temporary constructions
erected. In this event, the organizer shall see to it that no danger
or unreasonable inconvenience or damage is thereby caused to the
participants, bystanders or the environment.

. These Guidelines apply to assemblies held in public places that everyone has an
equal right to use and that are not buildings or structures (such as public parks,
squares, streets, avenues, sidewalks, pavements, and footpaths).


. Participants in public assemblies have as much a claim to use such sites for a
reasonable period as everyone else. Indeed, public protest, and freedom of
assembly in general, should be regarded as an equally legitimate use of public
space as the more routine purposes for which public space is used (such as
pedestrian and vehicular traffic). This principle was clearly stated in a decision of
the Israeli Supreme Court in :


Israeli Supreme Court decision, Sa’ar v. Minister of Interior and

Police ()
“… In exercising the ‘traffic’ consideration, a balance must always be
struck between the interests of citizens who wish to hold a meeting
or procession and the interests of citizens whose right of passage is
affected by that meeting or procession. Just as my right to demonstrate
in the street of a city is restricted by the right of my fellow to free
passage in that same street, his right of passage in the street of a city
is restricted by my right to hold a meeting or procession. The highways
and streets were meant for walking and driving, but this is not their only
purpose. They were also meant for processions, parades, funerals and
such events.”

. Other public facilities that are buildings and structures — such as publicly owned
auditoriums, stadiums, or the lobbies of public buildings — are proper sites for
public assemblies to the same extent that such facilities are made available for
similar activities. Their use is subject to relevant health and safety laws, and to anti-
discrimination laws (see paras. –).

. Furthermore, private property capable of accommodating assemblies, meetings, or

gatherings may, of course, be used for such activities, but the property owner may
open his or her property to whoever he or she chooses, subject only to relevant
health and safety laws, and applicable anti-discrimination laws (see paras. –).
While the freedom of peaceful assembly has been held to cover both public
and private meetings, the use of private property for speech activities raises
issues that are different from those raised by the use of public property. On this
basis, indoor assemblies fall outside the scope of these Guidelines. Nonetheless,
provisions in public-order law and criminal law will also often generally apply to
private property. This ensures that appropriate action can be taken if events on
private property harm other members of the public.

. It is, however, important to note that there has been a discernable trend towards
the privatization of public spaces in a number of jurisdictions. This raises serious
concerns about the regulation of such space and the implications for assembly,
expression, and dissent, and is an issue deserving of close attention.  In the
freedom-of-expression case of Appleby and Others v. The United Kingdom
(), the European Court of Human Rights stated that the effective exercise
of freedom of expression “does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to
interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of
 

relations between individuals” (see the extract below).

Freedom of assembly in
privately owned spaces may be deserving of protection where the essence of the
right has been destroyed.

Extract from Appleby and Others v. The United Kingdom

Where … the bar on access to property has the effect of preventing
any effective exercise of freedom of expression or it can be said that
the essence of the right has been destroyed, the Court would not
exclude that a positive obligation could arise for the State to protect
the enjoyment of Convention rights by regulating property rights. The
corporate town, where the entire municipality was controlled by a
private body, might be an example.

Peaceful and unlawful assemblies

. Peaceful assemblies. Only peaceful assembly is protected by the right to freedom
of assembly. An assembly should be deemed peaceful if its organizers have
peaceful intentions. This should be presumed unless there is compelling and
demonstrable evidence that those organizing or participating in a particular event
will themselves use, advocate, or incite imminent violence. The term “peaceful”
should be interpreted to include conduct that may annoy or give offence to persons
opposed to the ideas or claims that an assembly is promoting, and even conduct
that deliberately impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties.  Thus, by way
of example, assemblies involving purely passive resistance, or sit-down blockades,
should be characterized as peaceful. If this fundamental criterion of peacefulness
is met, it triggers the positive obligations entailed by the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly on the part of the state authorities (see paras. –). Peaceful
assemblies can properly be subjected to limitations in certain circumstances.

. Unlawful assemblies. Clearly, assemblies that are deemed non-peaceful will also
be unlawful because of the existence of a compelling and demonstrable threat
of imminent violence. However, assemblies that are deemed peaceful might still
potentially be unlawful. This could be because: () the assembly does not comply
with the requisite preconditions established by domestic law (which itself must
be compatible with international human rights standards); or () it pursues a
purportedly unlawful objective (see para. ). The regulation of peaceful but
unlawful assemblies raises important issues for those whose role it is to implement
and enforce the law, and this is discussed further in paras. – below.


. General Principles

 . Respect for the general principles discussed below must inform all aspects of
the drafting, interpretation, and application of legislation relating to freedom of
assembly. Those tasked with interpreting and applying the law must have a clear
understanding of these principles. To this end, three principles — the presumption
in favour of holding assemblies, the state’s duty to protect peaceful assembly, and
proportionality — should be clearly articulated in legislation governing freedom of
assembly.

Presumption in favour of holding assemblies

. As a basic and fundamental right, freedom of assembly should, insofar as possible,
be enjoyed without regulation. Anything not expressly forbidden in law should
therefore be presumed to be permissible, and those wishing to assemble should
not be required to obtain permission to do so. A presumption in favour of the
freedom should be clearly and explicitly established in law. In many jurisdictions,
this is achieved by way of a constitutional guarantee, but it can also be stated in
legislation specifically governing the regulation of assemblies (see the extracts
from the laws of Romania and Armenia below). Such provisions should not be
interpreted restrictively by the courts or other authorities. Furthermore, it is the
responsibility of the state to put in place adequate mechanisms and procedures
that are not unduly bureaucratic to ensure that this freedom is enjoyed in practice.
The relevant authorities should assist individuals and groups who wish to assemble
peacefully.

Article , Constitution of Romania

Freedom of assembly
Public meetings, processions, demonstrations or any other assembly
shall be free and may be organized and held only peacefully, without
arms of any kind whatsoever.
 

Article , Law of the Republic of Armenia on Conducting Meetings,

Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations ()
The objective and the subject of regulation of the law
. The objective of this law is to create necessary conditions for citizens
of the Republic of Armenia, foreign citizens, stateless persons (hereafter
referred to as citizens) and legal persons to exercise the constitutional
right to conduct peaceful, weaponless meetings, assemblies, rallies and
demonstrations that is set forth in the Constitution and international
treaties.

State’s duty to protect peaceful assembly

. The state has a positive duty to actively protect peaceful assemblies (see paras.
–
) and this should be expressly stated in any relevant domestic legislation
pertaining to freedom of assembly and police powers. This positive obligation
requires the state to protect the participants of a peaceful assembly from any
person or group (including agents provocateurs and counter-demonstrators) that
attempts to disrupt or inhibit it in any way.

. The importance of freedom of assembly for democracy was emphasized in para. 
above. In this light, the costs of providing adequate security and safety (including
traffic and crowd management) should be fully covered by the public authorities.
The state must not levy any additional monetary charge for providing adequate
policing. Furthermore, organizers of non-commercial public assemblies should
not be required to obtain public liability insurance for their event. The cost of
doing so could create a significant deterrent for those wishing to enjoy their right
to freedom of assembly, and may actually be prohibitive for many organizers.
Similarly, the responsibility to clean up after an event will normally lie with the
municipal authorities. Unreasonable or prohibitive clean-up costs should not
be imposed on an assembly organizer. This is particularly the case where non-
profit assemblies are concerned. However, the mere existence of commercial
sponsorship of an event should not be used by the authorities as an excuse to
impose unreasonable clean-up costs.


Article , Law of the Russian Federation on Rallies, Meetings,

Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing ()
The maintenance of public order, regulation of road traffic, sanitary
and medical service with the objective of ensuring the holding of a
public event shall be carried out on a free basis [by the authorities].


. The state’s duty to protect peaceful assembly is of particular significance where
the persons holding, or attempting to hold, the assembly are espousing a view that
is unpopular, as this may increase the likelihood of violent opposition. However,
potential disorder arising from hostility directed against those participating in a
peaceful assembly must not be used to justify the imposition of restrictions on
the peaceful assembly. In addition, the state’s positive duty to protect peaceful
assemblies also extends to simultaneous opposition assemblies (often known as
counter-demonstrations). The state should therefore make available adequate
policing resources to facilitate demonstrations and related simultaneous
assemblies within sight and sound of one another (see paras.
 and ).

. The duty to protect peaceful assembly also implies that law enforcement officials
be appropriately trained to deal with public assemblies, and that the culture and
ethos of law enforcement agencies adequately prioritize the protection of human
rights. This not only means that they should be skilled in techniques of crowd
management that minimize the risk of harm to all concerned, but also that they
should be fully aware of, and understand, their responsibility to facilitate as far as
possible the holding of peaceful assemblies.

Legality

. Any restrictions imposed must have a formal basis in primary law. The law itself
must be sufficiently precise to enable an individual to assess whether or not his or
her conduct would be in breach of the law, and to foresee what the consequences
of such breaches would likely be.
The incorporation of clear definitions in
domestic legislation is vital to ensuring that the law remains easy to understand
and to apply, and that regulation does not encroach upon activities that ought
not to be regulated. Definitions should therefore be neither too elaborate nor too
broad.

. While this foreseeability requirement does not necessarily mean that a single
consolidated law on freedom of assembly needs to be enacted, it does require
consistency between the various laws that might be invoked to regulate freedom
 

of assembly. Any law that regulates freedom of peaceful assembly should not
duplicate provisions already contained in other legislation in order to help ensure
the overall consistency and transparency of the legislative framework.

. The more specific the legislation, the more precise the language used ought to be.
Constitutional provisions, for example, because of their general nature, may be
less precise than other legislation.  Legislative provisions that confer discretionary
powers on the regulatory authorities should be narrowly framed. Clear guidelines
or criteria should also be established to govern the exercise of such powers and
limit the potential for arbitrary interpretation.

. To aid certainty, any prior restrictions should be formalized in writing and

communicated to the organizer of the event. Furthermore, the relevant authorities
must ensure that any restrictions imposed during an event are in full conformity
with the law and consistent with established jurisprudence. The imposition, after an
assembly, of sanctions and penalties that are not prescribed by law is not permitted.

Proportionality

 . Any restrictions imposed on freedom of assembly must pass the proportionality

test. Given that a wide range of interventions might be suitable, the least intrusive
means of achieving the legitimate objective  being pursued by the authorities
should always be given preference.

. The regulatory authority must be aware that it has the authority to impose a
range of restrictions, rather than viewing their choice as one simply between non-
intervention or prohibition (see paras.
–
). Any restrictions should closely
relate to the particular concerns raised, and should be narrowly tailored to
meet the specific aim(s) pursued by the authorities. The state must show that
any restrictions promote a substantial interest that would not be served absent
the restriction. The principle of proportionality thus requires that authorities not
routinely impose restrictions that would fundamentally alter the character of an
event, such as routing marches through outlying areas of a city.

. The question of whether or not a particular restriction will be proportionate

requires the consideration of a number of factors:
• The nature of the right;
• The importance of the purpose of the limitation;
• The nature and extent of the limitation;
• The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
• Whether there are any less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.


. “The principle of proportionality is a vehicle for conducting a balancing exercise.

It does not directly balance the right against the reason for interfering with it.
Instead, it balances the nature and extent of the interference against the reason
for interfering.”  The principle of proportionality requires that there be a full and
objective evaluation of the individual circumstances affecting the holding of an
assembly. The European Court of Human Rights has further held that the reasons
adduced by national authorities to support any claim of proportionality must be
“relevant and sufficient” and based on “an acceptable assessment of the relevant
facts”.  Mere suspicion or presumptions cannot suffice. 

Extract from Article (III)-(IV), Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on

Freedom of Assembly ()
“Restriction of the freedom of assembly must be proportionate to
pursued goals. To reach the goal such a restriction must not exceed
necessary and sufficient limits. … measures taken for restriction of the
freedom of assembly must be highly needed for reaching the goal that
was the cause for making the restriction.”


. Consequently, the blanket application of legal restrictions — for example, banning
all demonstrations during certain times or in any public place that is suitable for
holding assemblies — tend to be overly inclusive and will thus fail the proportionality
test because no consideration has been given to the specific circumstances of each
case.

. The time, place, and manner of individual public assemblies can, however, be
regulated to prevent them from unreasonably interfering with the rights and
freedoms of other people. This refl ects the need to strike a proper balance
between the rights of persons to express their views by means of assembly and
the interest of not imposing unnecessary burdens on non-participants. Such
regulation must not be based on the content of the message communicated by
the assembly.

. If, having regard to the relevant factors, the authorities have a proper basis
for concluding that restrictions should be imposed on the time or place of an
assembly (rather than merely the manner in which the event is conducted), a
suitable alternative time or place should be made available. Any alternative must
be such that the message that the assembly seeks to convey is still capable of being
effectively communicated to those it is aimed at — in other words, within sight and
sound of the target audience (see paras. –).
 

Article ()–(), Law of the Republic of Armenia on Conducting

Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations ()
. Should the authorized body find during the consideration of
notification that there are grounds to prohibit conducting a mass public
event pursuant to paragraphs ,  or the last paragraph of part  of
this Article, the authorized body shall offer to the organizer other dates
(in the place and at the time specified in the notification) and other
hours (in the place and on the date specified in the notification) for
conducting a mass public event or other conditions concerning the form
of the event.
. Should the authorized body find during consideration of the
notification that there are sufficient grounds to prohibit conducting
a mass public event in accordance with point  of paragraph  of this
Article, the authorized body shall offer to the organizer another place
for conducting the mass public event (on the date and time specified in
the notification).

Good administration, transparent decision-making, and access to justice

. The public should know which body is responsible for taking decisions about the
regulation of freedom of assembly, and this should be clearly stated in law. It is
important to have a properly mandated decision-making authority, as those who
have to bear the risk of taking controversial decisions about assemblies often come
under intense public pressure (potentially leading to decisions that do not adhere
to or reflect the human rights principles set out in these Guidelines). In some
jurisdictions, it may be appropriate for decisions about regulating assemblies to
be taken by a different body from the authority tasked with enforcing the law.
This separation of powers can assist those enforcing the law by rendering them
less amenable to pressure to change an unfavourable decision. In jurisdictions
where there are diverse ethnic and cultural populations and traditions, it may
be helpful if the regulatory authority is broadly representative of those different
backgrounds.

. The regulatory authority should ensure that the general public has adequate access
to reliable information relating to public assemblies.
Many countries already have
legislation specifically relating to access to information, open decision-making,
and good administration, and these laws should be applicable to the regulation of
freedom of assembly.


. Procedural transparency should ensure that freedom of peaceful assembly is not

restricted on the basis of imagined risks or even real risks that, if opportunities
were given, could be adequately reduced prior to the event. Article  of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that everyone
has the right to good administration.

Article , Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

(proclaimed on  December )
. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions
and bodies of the Union.
. This right includes:
• the right of every person to be heard, before any individual
measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken;
• the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while
respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of
professional and business secrecy;
• the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its
decisions.

. Laws relating to freedom of assembly should outline a clear regulatory procedure

and establish a protocol for interaction between event organizers and the
regulatory authorities. This should set out appropriate time limits working
backwards from the date of the proposed event, and allow adequate time for
each stage in the regulatory process.

Non-discrimination

. Freedom of peaceful assembly is to be enjoyed equally by everyone. The principle

that human rights shall be applied without discrimination lies at the core of the
interpretation of human rights standards. Article  of the ICCPR and Article 
of the ECHR require that each state secure the enjoyment of the human rights
recognized in these treaties to all individuals within its jurisdiction without
discrimination.

. Article  of the ECHR does not provide a freestanding right to non-discrimination

but rather complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its
Protocols. Thus, Article  is applicable only where the facts at issue (and arguably
also the grounds of restriction) fall within the ambit of one or more of the other
 

Convention rights. OSCE participating states and signatories to the ECHR are
encouraged to ratify Protocol  (see below), which contains a prohibition of
discrimination.

Protocol  to the ECHR, Article  — General prohibition of

discrimination
. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any
ground such as those mentioned in paragraph .

. Importantly, Article  of the ICCPR has been interpreted to include sexual

orientation in the reference to non-discrimination on grounds of sex.  Article
 of the Amsterdam Treaty also provides for the European Union to “undertake
necessary actions to fight discrimination based on … sexual orientation”, and
Article () of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits “any discrimination
on any ground”, including on the basis of sexual orientation.

. The regulatory authority must not therefore impose more onerous preconditions
on some persons wishing to assemble than on others whose case is similar. The
regulatory authority may, however, treat differently persons whose situations are
significantly different. Article  of the ICCPR guarantees all persons equality
before the law and equal protection of the law. This implies that decisions by the
authorities concerning freedom of assembly must not have a discriminatory impact,
and so both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited. Furthermore, if
criminal conduct occurs during an assembly (for example, participants being
physically attacked), law enforcement authorities have an obligation to investigate
whether discrimination was a contributory factor.

. Attempts to prohibit and permanently exclude assemblies organized by members

of one racial group from areas predominantly occupied by members of another
racial group may be deemed to promote segregation, and would thus be contrary
to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Article  of which affirms that “[p]arties particularly condemn racial segregation
and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this
nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”


. The following section highlights some of the key human rights provisions that
protect the freedom of peaceful assembly by groups whose freedoms are
sometimes not adequately protected.

. Groups and legal entities. Freedom of peaceful assembly can be exercised both
by individuals and by corporate bodies (as, for example, provided in the extract
from the Bulgarian Law on Gatherings, Meetings and Demonstrations below).
In order to ensure that freedom of peaceful assembly is protected in practice,
states should remove the requirement of mandatory registration of any public
organization and guarantee the right of citizens to set up formal and informal
associations.

Article , Bulgarian Law on Gatherings, Meetings and

Demonstrations ()
Gatherings, meetings and demonstrations can be organized and held
by citizens, associations, and political and other social organizations.

. Minorities. The freedom to organize and participate in public assemblies should
be guaranteed to members of minority and indigenous groups. Article  of the
Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities () provides
that “[t]he Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging
to a national minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association,
freedom of expression, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” 
Article
() of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities () states that “[p]ersons belonging
to minorities may exercise their rights... individually as well as in community with
other members of their group, without any discrimination.” 

. Non-nationals (stateless persons, refugees, foreign nationals, asylum seekers,

migrants, and tourists). International human rights law requires that non-nationals
“receive the benefit of the right of peaceful assembly”. It is therefore important
that the law does not extend freedom of peaceful assembly only to citizens, but
that it also includes stateless persons, refugees, foreign nationals, asylum seekers,
migrants, and tourists. Note, however, that Article  of the ECHR provides that
“[n]othing in Articles , , and  shall be regarded as preventing the High
Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.”
The application of Article  should be confined to speech by non-nationals that
directly threatens national security. There is no reason to stop non-nationals from
participating in an assembly that, for example, challenges domestic immigration
 

laws or policies. The increase in transnational protest movements also underscores

the importance of facilitating freedom of assembly for non-nationals.

 . Women. Under Article  of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), states parties are obliged to take all
appropriate measures to ensure the full development and advancement of women
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights
and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.

. Children. Like adults, children also have legitimate claims and interests. Freedom
of peaceful assembly provides them with a means of expressing their views and
contributing to society. Article  of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
requires states parties to recognize the right of children to organize and participate
in peaceful assemblies.

Article , UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of
association and to freedom of peaceful assembly.
. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

. In light of the important responsibilities of the organizers of public assemblies

(see paras.  –), the law may set a certain minimum age for organizers, having
due regard to the evolving capacity of the child (see the example from Finland’s
Assembly Act below). The law may also provide that minors may organize a public
event only if their parents or legal guardians consent to their doing so.


Section , Finland’s Assembly Act (): Right to arrange public

meetings
…A person who is without full legal capacity but who has reached
 years of age may arrange a public meeting, unless it is evident that
he/she will not be capable of fulfilling the requirements that the law
imposes on the organizer of a meeting. Other persons without full legal
capacity may arrange public meetings together with persons with full
legal capacity.

. Other persons without full legal capacity. International standards provide that
“[e]very person with a mental illness shall have the right to exercise all civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights as recognized in … the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in other relevant instruments”. The
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities similarly emphasizes the
need to “promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities”. Everyone’s
enjoyment of the freedom of peaceful assembly should thus be facilitated
regardless of their legal capacity.


. Police, military officers, and state officials. The ECHR allows legislation to im-
pose “lawful restrictions on the exercise of [the right to freedom of assembly and
to freedom of association] by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State”.  Any such restrictions must be designed to ensure that
both the responsibilities of those in the services concerned are properly discharged
and that any need for the public to have confidence in their neutrality is maintained.
The definition of neutrality is central. Neutrality should not be interpreted so as to
unnecessarily restrict the freedom to hold and express an opinion. Legislation should
therefore not restrict the freedom of assembly of the police or military personnel
unless the reasons for restriction are directly connected with their service duties,
and only to the extent absolutely necessary in light of considerations of professional
duty. Restrictions should be imposed only where participation in an assembly would
impugn the neutrality of police or military personnel in serving all sections of society.

. Human rights defenders. Article  of the UN Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
protects the freedom of peaceful assembly for the purpose of promoting and
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

 

. Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly

. While universal and regional human rights instruments affirm and protect the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly, they also allow states to impose certain
limitations on that freedom. This chapter examines the legitimate grounds for their
imposition and the types of limitations that can be imposed.

Legitimate grounds for imposing restrictions on assemblies

. Legitimate grounds for restriction (such as the prevention of disorder or crime, or

the protection of the rights and freedoms of others) are prescribed by the relevant
international and regional human rights instruments, and these should not be
supplemented by additional grounds in domestic legislation.

. The regulatory authorities must not raise obstacles to freedom of assembly unless
there are compelling arguments to do so. Applying the guidance below should
help the regulatory authorities test the validity of such arguments. The legitimate
aims listed below (as provided in the limiting clauses in Article  of the ICCPR and
Article  of the ECHR) are not a licence to impose restrictions, and the onus rests
squarely on the authorities to substantiate any justifications for the imposition of
restrictions.

. Public order. The inherent imprecision of this term  must not be exploited to
justify the prohibition or dispersal of peaceful assemblies. Neither a hypothetical
risk of public disorder nor the presence of a hostile audience is a legitimate basis
for prohibiting a peaceful assembly. Prior restrictions imposed on the basis of the
possibility of minor incidents of violence are likely to be disproportionate, and any
isolated outbreak of violence should be dealt with by way of subsequent arrest and
prosecution rather than prior restraint. The European Court of Human Rights
has noted that “an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly
as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in
the course of the demonstration, if the individual in question remains peaceful in
his or her own intentions or behaviour”.

 . Restrictions should only be imposed on public-order grounds when participants in

the assembly incite imminent lawless action and such action is likely to occur. This
principle is based on the doctrine of a clear and present danger drawn from US
jurisprudence, and it is very similar to Principle  of the Johannesburg Principles on
National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. This requires
that there be an intention to incite violence, a likelihood of imminent violence, and


a causal connection between that violence and the expression in question. This
approach is designed to extend protection to controversial speech and political
criticism as long as it does not present a real and imminent threat of violence. The
application of the “clear and present danger” test in freedom-of-assembly and
-expression cases therefore ensures consistency of the outcome with the right to
political participation.

. Public safety. There is a significant overlap between public-safety considerations

and those concerning the maintenance of public order. The state has a duty to
protect public safety, and under no circumstances should this duty be assigned
or delegated to the organizer of an assembly. That is not to say, however, that the
organizer and stewards cannot assist in ensuring the safety of members of the
public. An assembly organizer could counter any claims that public safety might be
compromised by his or her event by, for example, ensuring adequate stewarding
(see paras. –).

. Protection of health and morals. It should be noted that “the right to health is
closely related to and dependent upon the realization of other human rights …
including … the freedoms of association, assembly and movement. These and
other rights and freedoms address integral components of the right to health.” 

. Any limitations imposed on freedom of assembly should not undermine the

very essence of the freedom. Adherence to the principles of a particular political
ideology or religious creed cannot warrant the imposition of preventive or penal
sanctions on freedom of assembly. Furthermore, not only are the main human
rights treaties (the ICCPR and ECHR) “living instruments” and thus attuned to
changing moral values, but the moral views of the holders of political power are
not synonymous with public morals as intended in this context as a premise for
limiting freedom of assembly.


. As stated above under Legality (paras. –), any restrictions must have a basis in
domestic law, and this must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable individuals to
foresee the consequences of their actions. It is not sufficient for behaviour merely
to offend morality, but it must be behaviour that is deemed criminal and has been
defined in law as such. This requirement of legal certainty applies equally to
all types of restriction (prior, during, and retrospective), including, for example,
legislative provisions that purport to allow restrictions on assemblies deemed
“injurious to public morals”, and administrative offences that penalize the use of
“vulgar expressions in public”.
 

. Measures allegedly safeguarding public morals should also meet an objective

standard of whether they answer a pressing social need and comply with the
principle of proportionality. There should be a requirement of state neutrality
that precludes moral judgments on, for example, preferences for any sexual
orientation over another (see paras. –).

. Protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The regulatory authority has
a duty to strike a proper balance between the important freedom of peaceful
assembly and the competing rights of those who live, work, shop, trade, and
carry on business in the locality affected by an assembly. That balance should
ensure that other activities taking place in the same space may also proceed if
they themselves do not impose unreasonable burdens.  Mere disruption, or even
opposition to an assembly, is not therefore, of itself, a reason to impose prior
restrictions on it. Given the need for tolerance in a democratic society, a high
threshold will need to be overcome before it can be established that a public
assembly will unreasonably infringe the rights and freedoms of others. This is
particularly so given that freedom of assembly, by definition, amounts only to
temporary interference with these other rights.

. Where the regulatory authority restricts an assembly for the purpose of protecting
the competing rights and freedoms of others, the body should state:
• The nature of any valid rights claims made;
• How, in the particular context, these rights might be infringed (outlining the
specific factors considered);
• How, precisely, the authority’s decision mitigates against any such infringement
(the necessity of the restrictions); and
• Why less intrusive measures could not be used.

. The rights that might be claimed by non-participants affected by an assembly

include the right to privacy (protected by Article  of the ICCPR and Article
of
the ECHR),  the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (protected by
Article  of Protocol  to the ECHR),  the right to liberty and security of person
(Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR), and the right to freedom of
movement (Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of Protocol to the ECHR). It
may also be that restrictions on freedom of assembly could be justified to protect
the right of others to manifest their religion or belief (Article 
of the ICCPR and
Article  of the ECHR), but to uphold such a claim, it would have to be shown that
the assembly posed a direct and immediate threat to the exercise of the religious
beliefs of others. 


. National security. The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation

Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (
)
limit reliance on national-security grounds to justify restrictions of freedom of
expression and assembly:

‘National Security’, Part VI, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation

and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
. National security may be invoked to justify measures limiting
certain rights only when they are taken to protect the existence of the
nation or its territorial integrity or political independence against force
or threat of force.

. National security cannot be invoked as a reason for imposing
limitations to prevent merely local or relatively isolated threats to law
and order.
. National security cannot be used as a pretext for imposing vague
or arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked when there exists
adequate safeguards and effective remedies against abuse.
. The systematic violation of human rights undermines true national
security and may jeopardize international peace and security. A state
responsible for such violation shall not invoke national security as a
justification for measures aimed at suppressing opposition to such
violation or at perpetrating repressive practices against its population.

 . The issue of national security is often given too wide an interpretation in relation
to freedom of assembly. Drawing on Principles ,
, and  of the Johannesburg
Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 
the following examples of expression should not be regarded as constituting a
threat to national security:
• Mere advocacy of change of government policy, or of the government itself,
where that advocacy does not incite immediate and substantial violation of the
law or create a serious and imminent threat that a substantial violation of the
law will actually occur. A similar point has been made by the European Court
of Human Rights: “It is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political
projects to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way
a State is currently organised.” 
• Criticism of, or insult to, the nation, the state or its symbols, the government,
its agencies, or public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, go-
vernment, agencies or public officials.  Similarly, the restriction of assemblies
 

that promote views considered to be unconstitutional is a form of content

regulation and thus an unjustifiable incursion on freedom of peaceful assembly.
Concerns relating to territorial integrity must pass a high threshold in order
to justify restrictions on national-security grounds. In the case of Stankov
and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (),  which
concerned the actions of a separatist group in Bulgaria, the European Court of
Human Rights found that the Bulgarian government had unduly restricted the
applicants’ right to freedom of assembly. The Court ruled that, even though the
issues at stake touched on national symbols and national identity, that was not
sufficient reason for the national authorities to be granted broad discretion.
• Objection, or advocacy of objection, on grounds of religion, conscience, or
belief to military conscription or service, a particular conflict, or the threat or
use of force to settle international disputes.
• The transmission of information issued by or about an organization that a
government has declared threatens national security or a related interest, or
the expression of views in a particular language, especially the language of a
national minority.

Legislation intended to counter terrorism and ‘extremism’

. Efforts to tackle terrorism or “extremism” and to enhance security must never be
invoked to justify arbitrary action that curtails the enjoyment of fundamental human
rights and freedoms. The Berlin Declaration of the International Commission of
Jurists on Upholding Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism
( ) emphasizes that “the odious nature of terrorist acts cannot serve as a
basis or pretext for states to disregard their international obligations, in particular
in the protection of fundamental human rights”. Principle
of the Declaration is
of particular relevance:

Principle , Berlin Declaration of the International Commission of

Jurists on Upholding Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating
Terrorism
In the implementation of counter-terrorism measures, states must
respect and safeguard fundamental rights and freedoms, including
freedom of expression, religion, conscience or belief, association, and
assembly, and the peaceful pursuit of the right to self-determination;
as well as the right to privacy, which is of particular concern in the
sphere of intelligence gathering and dissemination. All restrictions on
fundamental rights must be necessary and proportionate.


. Counterterrorism measures pose a number of particular challenges to the right

to freedom of peaceful assembly. Commonly, emergency legislation is introduced
to increase police stop-and-search powers, and it may also extend the time
period allowed for administrative detention without charge. Other examples of
exceptional measures include the proscription of particular organizations and
the criminalization of expressing support for them, the designation of specific
sites or locations as prohibited areas, increased penalties for participation in
unlawful assemblies, and the imposition of border controls to prevent entry to
those deemed likely to demonstrate and cause disturbances to public order.
All of
these have a detrimental impact on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, and
all must be shown to be necessary and strictly proportionate (see paras.  – ).
The Ten Basic Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement Officials adopted
by Amnesty International provide that exceptional circumstances such as a state
of emergency or any other public emergency cannot justify any departure from
these standards.


. Domestic legislation designed to counter terrorism or “extremism” should

narrowly define these terms so as not to include forms of civil disobedience and
protest; the pursuit of certain political, religious, or ideological ends; or attempts
to exert influence on other sections of society, the government, or international
opinion.

Derogations in times of war or other public emergency


. Under Article of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR, in times of war or public
emergency threatening the life of the nation, states may take measures derogating
from their obligation to guarantee freedom of assembly. They may do so only to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, and provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international
law.
 The crisis or emergency must be one “which affects the whole population
and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is
composed”.
 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further state that neither
“[i]nternal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and imminent threat
to the life of the nation” nor “[e]conomic difficulties” can justify derogations under
Article .


. A public emergency must be both proclaimed to the citizens in the state concerned

and notified to other states parties to the ICCPR through the intermediary of
the UN Secretary General (Article () of the ICCPR), the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe (Article () of the ECHR) and the OSCE (para. 
.,
 

Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension,

). Derogations should have a time limit.

Types of restrictions

. Restrictions on time, place, and manner. The types of restrictions that might
be imposed on an assembly relate to its time, place, and manner. This originates
from US jurisprudence, and it captures the sense that a wide spectrum of possible
restrictions that do not interfere with the message communicated is available to
the regulatory authority. In other words, rather than the choice for the authorities
being between non-intervention and prohibition, there are many mid-range
limitations that might adequately serve the purpose(s) that they seek to achieve
(including the prevention of activity that causes damage to property or harm to
persons). These can be in relation to changes to the time or place of an event, or
the manner in which the event is conducted. An example of manner restrictions
might relate to the use of sound-amplification equipment or lighting and visual
effects. In this case, regulation may be appropriate because of the location or time
of day for which the assembly is proposed.

. The regulatory authority must not impose restrictions simply to pre-empt possible
disorder or interference with the rights of others. The fact that restrictions can
be imposed during an event (and not only before it takes place) enables the
authorities to both avoid imposing onerous prior restrictions and to ensure that
restrictions correspond with and reflect the situation as it develops. This, however,
in no way implies that the authorities can evade their obligations in relation to
good administration (see paras. – ) by simply regulating freedom of assembly
by administrative fiat. Furthermore (as discussed at paras.  and ), the use of
negotiation and/or mediation can help resolve disputes around assemblies by
enabling law enforcement authorities and the event organizer to reach agreement
about any necessary limitations.

. Given that there are often a limited number of ways to effectively communicate
a particular message, the scope of any restrictions must be precisely defined.
In situations where restrictions are imposed, these should strictly adhere to the
principle of proportionality and should always aim to facilitate the assembly within
sight and sound of its object/target audience.

. Restrictions imposed prior to an assembly (prior restraints). These are

restrictions on freedom of assembly either enshrined in legislation or imposed by
the regulatory authority prior to the notified date of the event. Such restrictions
should be concisely drafted so as to provide clarity both for those who have to


follow them (assembly organizers and participants) and for those tasked with
enforcing them (primarily, the police). They can take the form of restrictions on
time, place, and manner or outright prohibitions. However, blanket legislative
provisions that ban assemblies at specifi c times or in particular locations
require much greater justification than restrictions on individual assemblies.

Given the impossibility of having regard to the specifi c circumstances of each
particular case, the incorporation of such blanket provisions in legislation (and
their application) may be found to be disproportionate unless a pressing social
need can be demonstrated. As the European Court of Human Rights has stated,
“Sweeping measures of a preventive nature to suppress freedom of assembly and
expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic
principles — however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may
appear to the authorities, and however illegitimate the demands made may be — do
a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it.”


. Prohibition, therefore, is a measure of last resort, only to be considered when a

less restrictive response would not achieve the purpose pursued by the authorities
in safeguarding other relevant interests. Furthermore, given the state’s positive
duty to provide adequate resources to protect peaceful assembly, prohibition may
actually represent a failure of the state to meet its positive obligations. Where a state
body has prohibited an action unlawfully, legal responsibility of the state will ensue.

. Restrictions imposed during an assembly. The role of the police during an

assembly will often be to enforce any prior restrictions imposed in writing by
the regulatory body. On occasion, however, the situation on the ground may
deteriorate (participants, for example, might begin using violence or inciting
imminent violence), and the authorities may have to impose further measures
to ensure that other relevant interests are adequately safeguarded. In such
circumstances, it would be appropriate for other civil authorities (such as a
prosecutor’s office) to have an oversight role in relation to the policing operation,
and the police should be accountable to an independent body. In the same way
that reasons must be adduced to demonstrate the need for prior restrictions,
any restrictions imposed in the course of an assembly must be equally rigorously
justified. Mere suspicions will not suffice, and the reasons must be both relevant
and sufficient.

. Sanctions and penalties imposed after an assembly. The imposition of sanctions

(such as prosecution) after an event may sometimes be more appropriate than
the imposition of restrictions prior to, or during, an assembly. For example,
the European Court of Human Rights has held that prior restrictions imposed
on the basis of the possibility of minor incidents of violence are likely to be
 

disproportionate. Any isolated outbreak of violence should be dealt with by way

of subsequent arrest and prosecution rather than prior restraint.
 Such measures
include prosecution (for example, for participation in an unlawful assembly, or for
other public-order offences) or other disciplinary action. It is noteworthy, however,
that on several occasions, the Human Rights Committee and the European Court
of Human Rights have found subsequent sanctions to constitute disproportionate
interference with the right to freedom of assembly or expression.

. Legislation relating specifically to freedom of assembly should not contain any

general provisions regarding criminal or administrative liability, which should
instead be adequately covered by the relevant criminal or administrative
legislation. Some offences, however, might reasonably be included in legislation
dealing specifically with freedom of assembly, such as:
• Failure to comply with the requisite notice (or permit) requirements;
• Participation in an unlawful assembly;
• Failure to perform the responsibilities of organizer as specified;
• Carrying prohibited objects or substances in an assembly; or
• Obstructing a lawful assembly.

. All provisions that create criminal or administrative liability must comply with the
principle of legality (see paras. –). Furthermore, organizers and participants
should benefit from a “reasonable excuse” defence. For example, participants
in unlawful assemblies should be exempted from liability for the offence of
“participation in an unlawful assembly” when they had no prior knowledge that
the assembly was unlawful. Similarly, a participant should not be held liable for
anything done under the direction of a police officer.

. Individual participants who do not themselves commit any violent act cannot be
prosecuted solely on the ground of participation in a non-peaceful gathering. As
stated in the case of Ezelin v. France (), “[i]t is not ‘necessary’ in a democratic
society to restrict those freedoms in any way unless the person in question has
committed a reprehensible act when exercising his rights”.  Anyone charged with
an offence relating to an assembly should enjoy fair-trial rights.

. Assembly organizers should not be held liable for failure to perform their duties
if they make a reasonable effort to do so. Furthermore, organizers should not be
held liable for the actions of participants or third parties, or for unlawful conduct
that the organizer did not intend or directly participate in. Holding organizers of
the event liable would be a manifestly disproportionate response since this would
imply that organizers are imputed to have responsibility for acts by individuals
(including agents provocateurs) that could not have been reasonably foreseen.


. Procedural Issues

Advance notification

. It is common for the regulatory authority to require advance written notice of
public assemblies. Such a requirement is justified by the state’s positive duty to put
in place any necessary arrangements to facilitate freedom of assembly and protect
public order, public safety, and the rights and freedom of others. The UN Human
Rights Committee has held that a requirement to give notice, while a de facto
restriction on freedom of assembly, is compatible with the permitted limitations laid
down in Article  of the ICCPR. Similarly, the European Commission on Human
Rights, in Rassemblement Jurassien (), stated that: “Such a procedure is in
keeping with the requirements of Article (), if only in order that the authorities
may be in a position to ensure the peaceful nature of the meeting, and accordingly
does not as such constitute interference with the exercise of the right.” 

. The notification process should not be onerous or bureaucratic, as this would
undermine the freedom of assembly by discouraging those who might wish to
hold an assembly. Furthermore, individual demonstrators should not be required
to provide advance notification to the authorities of their intention to demonstrate.
Where a lone demonstrator is joined by another or others, then the event should
be treated as a spontaneous assembly (see paras. –
).

Article , Poland’s Law on Assemblies ()

. Assemblies organized in the open in areas accessible to unspecified
individuals, hereinafter referred to as “public assemblies”, must be
reported in advance to the commune authority with competence ratione
loci for the site of the assembly.
. If the assembly is to be held in the neighbourhood of a diplomatic
representation/mission, consular offices, special missions, or
international organizations, which are covered by diplomatic
immunities and privileges, the commune authority is obliged to notify
the responsible police commander and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
. The commune council may specify areas where the organization of
an assembly does not require notification.
 

. The period of notice should not be unnecessarily lengthy (normally no more

than a few days), but should still allow adequate time prior to the notified date of
the assembly for the relevant state authorities to plan and prepare for the event
(deploy police officers, equipment, etc.), for the regulatory body to give a prompt
official response to the initial notification, and for the completion of an expeditious
appeal to a tribunal or court should the legality of any restrictions imposed be
challenged.

 . The official receiving the notice should issue a receipt explicitly confirming that
the organizers of the assembly are in compliance with the applicable notice
requirements. The notice should also be communicated immediately to all
state organs involved in the regulatory process, including the relevant police
authorities.

Notification, not authorization

. Legal provisions concerning advance notice should require a notice of intent
rather than a request for permission. Although lawful in several jurisdictions, a
permit requirement accords insufficient value to both the fundamental freedom
to assemble and to the corresponding principle that everything not regulated by
law should be presumed to be lawful. Those countries where a permit is required
are encouraged to amend domestic legislation so as to require notification only.
It is significant that, in a number of jurisdictions, permit procedures have been
declared unconstitutional. Any permit system must clearly prescribe in law the
criteria for issuance of a permit. In addition, the criteria should be confined to
considerations of time, place, and manner, and should not provide a basis for
content-based regulation.

Section , the Netherlands’ Public Assemblies Act ()

. A condition, restriction or prohibition may not relate to the religion
or belief to be professed, or the thoughts or feelings to be expressed.

. If the authorities do not respond promptly to a notification, the organizers of a

public assembly may proceed with the activities according to the terms notified
without restriction. Even in countries where authorization rather than notification
is still required, authorization should be presumed granted if a response is not
given within a reasonable time.


. Spontaneous assemblies. The ability to respond peacefully and immediately

(spontaneously) to some occurrence, incident, other assembly, or speech is an
essential element of freedom of assembly. Spontaneous events should be regarded
as an expectable (rather than exceptional) feature of a healthy democracy. As
such, the authorities should protect and facilitate any spontaneous assembly so
long as it is peaceful in nature.


. The issue of spontaneous assemblies merits special attention with regard to the
requirement of prior notification. The law should explicitly provide for an exception
from the requirement of prior notification where giving prior notification is
impracticable. The law should also provide a defence for participants charged with
taking part in an unlawful assembly if they were unaware of the unlawful nature of
the event. Furthermore, if there are reasonable grounds for non-compliance with
the notification requirement, then no liability or sanctions should adhere.

. Other exceptions from the notification process. It will be for the legislature in
each jurisdiction to determine whether there should be any specific exceptions
from the notification process. Some jurisdictions, for example, do not impose a
notice requirement on small assemblies (see the extract from the Armenian law
below). Exceptions, however, must not be discriminatory in effect and should be
targeted towards a class of assembly rather than a class of organizer.

Article (), Law of the Republic of Armenia on Conducting

Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations ()
Citizens and legal persons shall have the right to convene non-mass
public events [a public event with the participation of fewer than 

citizens] without notification to the authorized body...

. Simultaneous assemblies. All persons and groups have an equal right to be present
in public places to express their views. Thus, persons have a right to assemble as
counter-demonstrators to express their disagreement with the views expressed
at another public assembly. On such occasions, the coincidence in time and
venue of the two assemblies is likely to be an essential part of the message to be
conveyed by the second assembly. Related simultaneous assemblies should be
facilitated so that they occur within sight and sound of their target insofar as this
does not physically interfere with the other assembly.

. As clearly stated in the ECHR case of Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria
(

), “the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise

 

of the right to demonstrate”. Thus, because each person or group has a right
to express their views undisrupted by others, counter-demonstrators may not
disrupt the activities of those who do not share their views. Emphasis should be
placed on the state’s duty to prevent disruption of the main event where counter-
demonstrations are organized. Furthermore, an evidential question is raised
where the intention of the organizer of a counter-demonstration is specifically to
prevent the other assembly from taking place — effectively, to destroy the rights of
the other. In such cases, Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR will be
engaged, and the counter-demonstration will not enjoy the protection afforded to
the right to peaceful assembly.

. Where notification is given for two or more assemblies at the same place and time,
each should be facilitated as best possible. A prohibition on conducting public
events in the same place and at the same time of another public event is likely to be
a disproportionate response. In some jurisdictions, a “first come, first served” rule
operates. Such a rule is permissible so long as it does not discriminate between
different groups, and an alternative venue and/or time for the other assemblies
is provided to the satisfaction of the organizers. The authorities might even hold
a ballot to determine which assembly should be facilitated in the notified location
(see the example from the Law of Malta below).

Article (), Malta’s Public Meetings Ordinance ()

When two or more persons whether as individuals or on behalf of
an association simultaneously give notice of their intention to hold a
meeting in the same locality and at the same time, preference shall be
given to the person whose name is extracted at a ballot held by the
commissioner of police or any other police officer deputed by him.

Decision-making and review process

. The regulatory authority should make publicly available a clear explanation of the
decision-making procedures. It should fairly and objectively assess all available
information to determine whether the organizers and participants of a notified
assembly are likely to conduct the event in a peaceful manner, and to ascertain the
probable impact of the event on the rights and freedoms of other non-participants.
In doing so, it may be necessary to facilitate meetings with the event organizer and
other interested parties.


 . The regulatory authority should also ensure that any relevant concerns raised
are communicated to the event organizer, and the organizer should be offered
an opportunity to respond to any concerns raised. This is especially important if
these concerns might later be cited as the basis for imposing restrictions on the
event. Providing the organizer with such information allows them the opportunity
to address the concerns, thus diminishing the potential for disorder and helping
foster a co-operative, rather than confrontational, relationship between the
organizers and the authorities.

. The law should be sufficiently flexible to allow assembly organizers and regulatory
authorities should make every effort to reach a mutual agreement on the time,
place, and manner of an assembly. Such negotiation serves as a preventive tool
helping avoid the imposition of arbitrary and unnecessary restrictions.

. Any restrictions placed on an assembly should be communicated promptly and

in writing to the event organizer with a brief explanation of the reason for each
restriction (noting that such explanation must correspond with the permissible
grounds enshrined in human rights law and as interpreted by the relevant courts).
Such decisions should be communicated to the organizer within a reasonable time
frame, i.e., sufficiently far in advance of the date of a proposed event to allow the
decision to be appealed to an independent tribunal or court before the notified
date of the event. If, for example, the required notification period is five days prior
to the date of the assembly, the regulatory authority should publish its decision at
least three days before the date of the event.

. The regulatory authority should also publish its decisions so that the public has
access to reliable information about events taking place in the public domain. This
might be done, for example, by posting decisions on a dedicated website.


. If restrictions are imposed on an assembly, the organizer should have recourse to
an effective remedy through a combination of administrative and judicial review.
The reviewing body should have access to the evidence on which the regulatory
authority based its initial decision (including, for example, relevant police reports),
as only then can it assess the proportionality of the restrictions imposed. The
burden of proof should be on the regulatory authority to show that the restrictions
imposed are reasonable in the circumstances.

. The availability of effective administrative review can both reduce the burden on
courts and help build a more constructive relationship between the authorities and
the public. Any administrative review procedures must themselves be sufficiently
 

prompt to enable judicial review to take place once administrative remedies have
been exhausted, prior to the notified date of the assembly.

. The assembly organizers should also be able to appeal the decision of the
regulatory authority to an independent court or tribunal. This should be a de novo
review, empowered to quash the contested decision and to remit the case for a
new ruling. Any such review must also be prompt so that the case is heard and
the court ruling published before the planned assembly date (in order to make
it possible to still hold the assembly if the court invalidates the restrictions). One
option to expedite this process would be to require the courts to give priority
to appeals against restrictions on assemblies so as to permit the completion of
judicial review prior to the date of the assembly.

Article (), Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations

()
A decision of a local governance body on forbidding the holding of an
assembly or demonstration may be appealed in court. The court shall
pass a final decision within two working days.

Article , Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Right of Citizens to

Assemble Peacefully, without Weapons, and to Freely Conduct
Meetings and Demonstrations ()
The decisions of bodies of local state administration or local self-
government... are subject to court appeal, and shall be considered
by the court within  hours if less than  hours remains before the
planned public assembly.

. It is considered good practice for the regulatory authority to submit an annual
report on the activity of the regulatory authority (including relevant statistics on,
for example, the number of assemblies notified and the number restricted) to
an appropriate supervisory body, such as a national human rights institution,
ombudsman, or parliament.
PART II

Implementing Legislation on
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

Introduction

. Part I of these Guidelines focused on the parameters of freedom of assembly

and the drafting of legislation that is consistent with international human
rights standards. These earlier sections addressed the substantive grounds for
restriction and the procedures that accord priority to the freedom to assemble.
The implementation of legislation on freedom of assembly, however, brings with
it different challenges. If laws are to provide more than mere paper guarantees,
and if rights are to be practical and effective rather than theoretical or illusory,
the implementation of laws relating to freedom of assembly by domestic law
enforcement agencies must also meet exacting standards. These standards are
the subject of this part.

. The socio-economic, political, and institutional context in which assemblies take

place often impacts upon the success of steps taken to implement the law. It is
vital to note, however, that the presence of certain socio-economic or political
factors does not of itself make violence at public assemblies inevitable. Indeed,
violence can often be averted by the skilful intervention of law enforcement
officials. Measures taken to implement legislation on freedom of assembly should
therefore neither unduly infringe the rights and freedoms of participants or other
third parties nor further aggravate already tense situations by being unnecessarily
confrontational. Such interventions must instead aim to minimize potential harm.
The guiding principles outlined in Chapter  (including good administration and
non-discrimination) are of particular relevance at the implementation stage.

 . Furthermore, the police and judicial systems in participating States play a crucial
role in the prevention of violence and the apprehension and prosecution of
offenders. It was often emphasized during the roundtable sessions that were part
 

of the drafting of these Guidelines that the independence of both the police and
judiciary from partisan influence or, in the case of the judiciary, from executive
interference must be assured. The police in some jurisdictions have, in the past,
failed to intervene to protect peaceful assemblies. States are urged to implement
measures (including policy development and targeted recruitment initiatives) to
increase trust and confidence in the police and justice system.



. Rights and Responsibilities of Law Enforcement

Officials

. The state has a positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures
to enable lawful demonstrations to take place without participants fearing
physical violence (see paras. –). The role of law enforcement officials goes
beyond recognizing the existence of fundamental rights and includes positively
safeguarding those rights. In particular, the state has a positive obligation to
protect the right to life (Article  of the ECHR), and an applicant complaining of
a breach of Article  need only show that the authorities did not do all that could
reasonably be expected in the circumstances to avoid the risk.

. In the implementation of legislation on freedom of assembly, consideration

should also be given to the rights, health, and safety of police officers. In addition,
it should be noted that the nature of their job may place police officers in
difficult, rapidly evolving and dangerous situations, in which they have to make
split-second judgments. What will be judged to be a reasonable action or reaction
must therefore depend on an objective and real-time evaluation of the totality
of circumstances. Specific defences such as self-defence — subject to important
qualifications (such as a reasonableness test, and requirements that an attack
was actual or imminent and that there was no other more peaceful response
available) — should be contained in domestic law.

Training

. Governments must ensure that law enforcement officials receive adequate training
in the policing of public assemblies. Training should equip law enforcement
agencies to act in a manner that avoids escalation of violence and minimizes
conflict, and should include “soft skills” such as negotiation and mediation.
Training should also include relevant human rights issues, and should cover
the control and planning of policing operations, emphasizing the imperative of
minimizing recourse to force to the greatest extent possible.


. The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, together with other
relevant international human rights standards, should form the core of law
enforcement training. Domestic legislation should also provide standards that
will guide police action, and such provisions should be covered in the training
and planning for major events. A “diversity awareness” perspective should be
integrated into the development and implementation of law enforcement training,
policy, and practice.
 

One example of a useful training resource is the ‘Manual of Guidance

on Keeping the Peace’ compiled by the national Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) in the UK.

. Public-order policies and training programmes should be kept under review to
incorporate lessons learned (through, for example, debriefing sessions or the
emergence of new technologies), and regular refresher courses should be provided
to law enforcement officials. These standards should be circulated as widely
as possible, and their implementation should be monitored by an independent
overseer, with investigative powers to compel witnesses and documentation, who
publishes periodic reports.

Policing assemblies — general principles of good practice

. The physical safety of all parties should be ensured. This emphasizes the mutual
responsibilities of the parties involved in organizing and facilitating peaceful
assemblies, and requires the establishment of structured means of communication
during an assembly.

. Police command structures should be clearly established. Command structures

enable proper co-ordination between police officers, and between the police
and the assembly organizer, and they also ensure accountability for operational
decisions. Such command structures can be role-specific rather than rank-related,
and need not compromise operational flexibility.

. Inter-agency communication should be ensured. It is imperative that law

enforcement and other public-safety agencies (fire and ambulance services, for
example) are able to communicate with one another and exchange data during
critical situations. As Chapter  states, it is also vital that assembly organizers
do everything within their power to assist these agencies in responding to
emergencies or criminal conduct. Thorough inter-agency contingency planning
can help ensure that lines of communication are maintained.

. Police officers should be clearly and individually identifiable. Police officers,

while in uniform, must wear or display some form of identification (such as a
nameplate or number) on their uniform and/or headgear and not remove or
cover this identifying information or prevent people from reading it during an
assembly.


 . Law enforcement officials should differentiate between participants and non-

participants. The policing of public assemblies should be sensitive to the possibility
of non-participants (such as bystanders or observers) being present in the vicinity
of an assembly.

. Law enforcement officials should differentiate between peaceful and non-
peaceful participants. Neither isolated incidents of sporadic violence nor the
violent acts of some participants in the course of a demonstration are themselves
sufficient grounds to impose sweeping restrictions on peaceful participants in
an assembly. Law enforcement officials should not therefore treat a crowd as
homogeneous if detaining participants or (as a last resort) dispersing an assembly
(see paras. – ).

. Protocols for the stop and search, detention, or arrest of participants should
be established. It is of paramount importance that states establish clear and
prospective protocols for the lawful stop and search or arrest of participants in
assemblies. Such protocols should provide guidance as to when such measures
are appropriate and when they are not, how they should be conducted, and
how individuals are to be dealt with following arrest. In drafting these protocols,
consideration should be given to the jurisprudence of Article  of the ICCPR and
Article  of the ECHR, which protect the right to liberty. While mass arrests are to
be avoided, there may be occasions involving public assemblies when numerous
arrests are deemed necessary. However, large numbers of participants should
not be deprived of their liberty simply because the police do not have sufficient
resources to effect individual arrests — adequate resourcing forms part of the
positive obligation of participating States to protect the right to assemble.
 

Section , First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act

(), District of Columbia, United States

Use of police lines.

No emergency area or zone will be established by using a police line
to encircle, or substantially encircle, a demonstration, rally, parade,
march, picket line, or other similar assembly (or subpart thereof)
conducted for the purpose of persons expressing their political, social,
or religious views except where there is probable cause to believe that
a significant number or percentage of the persons located in the area
or zone have committed unlawful acts (other than failure to have an
approved assembly plan) and the police have the ability to identify
those individuals and have decided to arrest them; provided, that this
section does not prohibit the use of a police line to encircle an assembly
for the safety of the demonstrators.

. Restrictions imposed on individuals during an assembly may violate their rights
to liberty  and freedom of movement. Individuals should not be stopped and
searched unless the police have a reasonable suspicion that they have committed,
are committing, or are about to commit, an offence, and arrests must not be made
simply for the purpose of removing a person from an assembly or preventing
their attendance. Indeed, arrests made during an assembly should be limited
to persons engaging in conduct that is creating a clear and present danger of
imminent violence.


. Planning by the relevant authorities must be adequate to ensure provisions for first
aid, basic necessities (water and food), an opportunity to consult with lawyers, and
the separation of minor from adult and male from female detainees. Minors, though,
should be provided with an opportunity to communicate with a parent or legal
guardian. Detainees must not be ill-treated while being held in custody. Where
detention facilities are inadequate to deal with the number of individuals, arrested
individuals must be freed unless doing so would pose a threat to public safety.
Procedures must be established to limit the duration of detention to a strict minimum.

. Photography and video recording (by police and participants) should not
be restricted, but data retention may breach the right to private life. During
public assemblies, the photographing or video recording of participants by the
police is permissible. However, while monitoring individuals in a public place for
identification purposes does not necessarily give rise to interference with their


right to private life, the recording of such data and the systematic processing
or permanent nature of the record kept may give rise to violations of privacy.
Moreover, the photographing or video recording of assemblies for the purpose
of gathering intelligence can discourage individuals from enjoying the freedom of
peaceful assembly, and should therefore not be done routinely. The photographing
or video recording of a policing operation by participants and other third parties
should not be prevented, and any requirement to surrender film to the police
should be subject to prior judicial scrutiny.

. Post-event debriefing of law enforcement officials (particularly after non-

routine events) should become standard practice. Event organizers should be
invited to participate in debriefing sessions held by law enforcement officials
after an assembly. Debriefing might usefully address a number of specific issues,
including: 
• Human rights issues;
• Health and safety considerations;
• Community-impact considerations;
• Pre-operational planning and risk assessment;
• Communications;
• Command issues and decision-making;
• Tactics;
• Commendable actions;
• Fears and concerns;
• Resources;
• Equipment;
• Training needs; and
• Media.

. Law enforcement offi cials should have access to professional counselling

services. On occasion, law enforcement officers may suffer the emotional, physical,
and behavioural consequences of critical-incident or post-traumatic stress. In such
cases, law enforcement agencies should have recourse to skilled mental-health
professionals to facilitate confidential individual debriefings.

Regulating peaceful unlawful assemblies

. Powers to intervene should not always be used. The existence of police powers
to intervene and disperse an unlawful assembly or to use force does not mean
that such powers should always be exercised. Where an assembly occurs in
violation of applicable laws, but is otherwise peaceful, non-intervention or active
facilitation may sometimes be the best way to ensure a peaceful outcome. In many
 

cases, dispersal of an event may create more law enforcement problems than
accommodating and facilitating it. Post-event prosecution for violation of the law
remains an option.

. The response of law enforcement agencies must be proportionate. A wide

range of options are available to the relevant authorities (including toleration of
unlawful assemblies and negotiation with the event organizer), and their choice is
not simply one between non-intervention or the enforcement of prior restrictions,
and termination or dispersal.

 . Peaceful assemblies that do not comply with the requisite preconditions

established by law or that substantially deviate from the terms of notification.
If the organizer fails or refuses to comply with any requisite preconditions for
the holding of an assembly (including valid notice requirements, and necessary
and proportionate restrictions based on legally prescribed grounds), they might
face prosecution. However, such assemblies should still be accommodated by law
enforcement authorities as far as is possible. If a small assembly is scheduled to
take place and, on the day of the event, it turns into a significantly larger assembly
because of an unexpectedly high turnout, the assembly should be accommodated
by law enforcement authorities and should be treated as being lawful so long as
it remains peaceful.

. Peaceful assemblies that are for a purportedly unlawful objective. While the
content or message of an assembly should not of itself lead to its classification as
unlawful, a difficulty arises where the subject matter constitutes a criminal offence,
or could be construed as inciting others to commit an offence. While a speaker can
be arrested for incitement if he or she intentionally provokes people to commit
violent actions, this is inevitably a question that must be assessed based on the
particular circumstances, and a high threshold must be overcome. To suggest
that assemblies might legitimately be restricted on the basis of their having unlawful
objectives errs dangerously close to content-based restriction (also see paras. 
and  ). In all cases, the touchstone must be the existence of an imminent threat of
violence. This is illustrated by the following examples of peaceful assemblies:
• Rallies urging non-violent reform of the law or constitution. There are two
essential conditions under which such change may legitimately be promoted:
“firstly, the means used to that end must be legal and democratic; secondly,
the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic
principles”. Calls for the imminent and violent overthrow of the constitutional
order might provide a sufficient ground for restricting an event, whereas an
assembly where non-violent change of the constitutional order is advocated
would be deserving of protection.



• Protests opposing the deportation of illegal immigrants. Such assemblies

should not be declared illegal simply because they support the rights of those
presently in breach of immigration law.
• Public assemblies where hatred is expressed. Speech and other forms of
expression will normally enjoy protection under Article  of the ICCPR and
Article  of the ECHR. This is the case even where such expression is hostile
or insulting to other individuals, groups, or particular sections of society.
However, as provided by Article  of the ICCPR, “[a]ny advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence shall be prohibited by law.” Principle of the Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R() further provides that
specific instances of hate speech “may be so insulting to individuals or groups
as not to enjoy the level of protection afforded by Article  of the European
Convention on Human Rights to other forms of expression. This is the case
where hate speech is aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid
down in the Convention or at their limitation to a greater extent than provided
therein.”  Even then, resort to such speech by participants in an assembly
does not of itself turn an otherwise peaceful assembly into a non-peaceful or
unlawful assembly, and the regulatory authorities should arrest the particular
individuals involved rather than dispersing the entire event.
• Demonstrations supporting a military offensive against another sovereign
state. Such assemblies should not be deemed illegal even if such military action
might itself be illegal under international law.

Peaceful assemblies that turn into non-peaceful assemblies

. Assemblies can change from being non-violent to being violent. Should there be, at
any stage during a peaceful assembly, a declaration of unlawful intent, it may change
from being peaceful to non-peaceful (and thus forfeit the protection afforded to it
under human rights law), and/or from being lawful to being unlawful (and may thus be
terminated in a proportionate manner). However, the making of unlawful statements
by participants in an assembly (whether verbal or written) does not of itself turn an
otherwise peaceful assembly into a non-peaceful assembly, and any intervention should
again arrest the particular individuals involved rather than dispersing the entire event.

Dispersal of assemblies

. So long as assemblies remain peaceful, they should not be dispersed by law

enforcement officials. Indeed, dispersal of assemblies should be a measure of last
resort and should be governed by prospective rules informed by international
standards. While these need not be elaborated in legislation, they should be
 

expressed in domestic police guidelines, and legislation should require that such
guidelines be developed.


. Guidelines should specify the circumstances that warrant dispersal, and who is
entitled to make dispersal orders (for example, only police officers of a specified
rank and above). Dispersal should not occur unless law enforcement officials have
taken all reasonable measures to facilitate and protect the assembly from harm
(including, for example, quieting hostile onlookers who threaten violence), and
unless there is an imminent threat of violence.

. Dispersal should not therefore result where:

• A small number of participants in an assembly act in a violent manner. In such
instances, action should be taken against those particular individuals;
• Agents provocateurs infiltrate an otherwise peaceful assembly. Here, the
authorities should take appropriate action to remove the agents provocateurs
rather than terminating or dispersing the assembly, or declaring it to be
unlawful; or
• An assembly is deemed to be unlawful either because the organizer has not
complied with the requisite preconditions established by law, because the
assembly is for a purportedly illegal purpose, or because of the presence of a
proscribed organization.

 . If dispersal is deemed necessary, the assembly organizer and participants should

be clearly and audibly informed prior to any police intervention. Participants
should also be given reasonable time to disperse prior to such intervention. Third
parties (such as monitors, journalists, and photographers) may also be asked to
disperse, but they should not be prevented from observing and recording the
policing operation.

Extract from Section , First Amendment Rights and Police

Standards Act (), District of Columbia, United States
(d) The [police] shall not issue a general order to disperse to
participants in a[n]... assembly except where:
() A significant number or percentage of the assembly participants
fail to adhere to the imposed time, place, and manner restrictions, and
either the compliance measures set forth in subsection (b) of this section
have failed to result in substantial compliance or there is no reasonable
likelihood that the measures set forth in subsection (b) of this section
will result in substantial compliance;


() A significant number or percentage of the assembly participants are

engaging in, or are about to engage in, unlawful disorderly conduct or
violence toward persons or property; or
() A public safety emergency has been declared by the Mayor that
is not based solely on the fact that the First Amendment assembly is
occurring, and the Chief of Police determines that the public safety
concerns that prompted the declaration require that the... assembly be
dispersed.
(e) () If and when the [police] determines that a[n]... assembly, or part
thereof, should be dispersed, the [police] shall issue at least one clearly
audible and understandable order to disperse using an amplification
system or device, and shall provide the participants a reasonable and
adequate time to disperse and a clear and safe route for dispersal.
() Except where there is imminent danger of personal injury or
significant damage to property, the MPD shall issue multiple dispersal
orders and, if appropriate, shall issue the orders from multiple
locations. The orders shall inform persons of the route or routes by
which they may disperse and shall state that refusal to disperse will
subject them to arrest.
() Whenever possible, MPD shall make an audio or video recording of
orders to disperse.

Use of force

 . The inappropriate, excessive, or unlawful use of force by law enforcement

authorities can violate fundamental freedoms and protected rights, undermine
police-community relationships, and cause widespread tension and unrest. The
use of force should therefore be regulated by domestic law. Such provisions
should set out the circumstances that justify the use of force (including the need
to provide adequate prior warnings), as well as the level of force acceptable to deal
with various threats. Governments should develop a range of means of response,
and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition
so as to enable a differentiated use of force. These should include the development
of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situations. Moreover,
law enforcement officials ought to be provided with self-defence equipment such
as shields, helmets, fire-retardant clothing, bullet-proof vests, and bullet-proof
transport in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind. This again
emphasizes the requirement that the state provide adequate resources for its law
 

enforcement agencies in satisfaction of its positive duty to protect freedom of

peaceful assembly.

 . Police owe a duty of care (to prevent death or physical injury) to members of any
assembly that they are, or should be, managing. This implies that the police must
have the necessary legal powers and competencies to enable them to fulfil these
duties, including the power to use reasonable force to ensure that members of
a crowd stay where the police reasonably require them to stay for as long as is
necessary to allow them to disperse safely.

 . International standards give detailed guidance regarding the use of force in the
context of dispersal of both unlawful non-violent and unlawful violent assemblies.
The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials () provide that, “[i]n the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but
non-violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is
not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.”  The
UN Basic Principles also stipulate that, “[i]n the dispersal of violent assemblies, law
enforcement officials may use firearms only when less dangerous means are not
practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary. Law enforcement officials
shall not use firearms in such cases, except under the conditions stipulated in
principle .” 

Principle , UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by

Law Enforcement Officials
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except
in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death
or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious
crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such
a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape,
and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these
objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be
made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.

 . The following principles should underpin all occasions when force is used in the
policing of public assemblies:
• Where pepper spray or other irritant chemical may be used, decontamination
procedures must be set out;
• The use of energy-attenuating projectiles (also known as baton rounds or
plastic/rubber bullets), water cannon, and other forceful methods of crowd


control must be strictly regulated;

under no circumstances should force be
used against people who are unable to leave the scene; and
• The use of force should trigger an automatic and prompt review process after
the event. It is good practice for law enforcement officials to maintain a written
and detailed record of force used (including weapons deployed).

 . It is vital that governments and law enforcement agencies keep the ethical issues
associated with the use of force, firearms, and emerging technologies constantly
under review. Standards concerning the use of firearms are equally applicable
to the use of other techniques of crowd management that are potentially harmful,
such as batons, horses, tear gas or other chemical agents, and water cannon (see
paras. – for issues concerning liability for abuse of force by the police).

Extract from: Ten Basic Human Rights Standards for Law

Enforcement Officials (Amnesty International)

Basic Standard : Do not use force except when strictly necessary and
to the minimum extent required under the circumstance.

Basic Standard : Avoid using force when policing unlawful but non-
violent assemblies. When dispersing violent assemblies, use force only
to the minimum extent necessary.

Basic Standard : Lethal force should not be used except when strictly
unavoidable in order to protect your life or the lives of others.

Section (), Hungary’s Act XXXIV on the Police ()

Of several possible and suitable options for police measures or means
of coercion, the one that is effective and causes the least restriction,
injury or damage to the affected person shall be chosen.
 

Extract from: ‘Principles for Promoting Police Integrity’ (United

States Department of Justice)
Policing requires that at times an officer must exercise control of a
violent, assaultive, or resisting individual to make an arrest, or to protect
the officer, other officers, or members of the general public from a risk
of imminent harm. Police officers should use only an amount of force
that is reasonably necessary to effectively bring an incident under
control, while protecting the lives of the officers and others.
(…)
When the use of force is reasonable and necessary, officers should, to
the extent possible, use an escalating scale of options and not employ
more forceful means unless it is determined that a lower level of force
would not be, or has not been, adequate. The levels of force that
generally should be included in the agency’s continuum of force include:
verbal commands, use of hands, chemical agents, baton or other impact
weapon, canine, less-than-lethal projectiles, and deadly force.

Liability and accountability

 . If the force used is not authorized by law, or more force is used than is necessary
in the circumstances, police officers should face civil and/or criminal liability, as
well as disciplinary action. Police officers should also be held liable for failing to
intervene where such intervention may have prevented other officers from using
excessive force.

Paragraph . of the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the

Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, , urges
participating States to “ensure that law enforcement acts are subject to
judicial control, that law enforcement personnel are held accountable
for such acts, and that due compensation may be sought, according to
domestic law, by the victims of acts found to be in violation of the above
commitments”. Similarly, paragraph  of the UN Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials states that
“governments shall ensure that the arbitrary or abusive use of force and
firearms by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence
under their law”.


 . Where a complaint is received regarding the conduct of law enforcement officials

or where a person is seriously injured or is deprived of his or her life as a result of
the actions of law enforcement officers, an effective official investigation  must
be conducted.


. The core purpose of any investigation should be to secure the effective
implementation of domestic laws that protect the right to life and bodily integrity,
and in those cases involving state agents or entities, to ensure their accountability
for deaths or physical injuries occurring under their responsibility. The particular
form of investigation required to achieve those purposes may vary according to
the circumstances.
 

. Responsibilities of the Organizer

The organizer

 . The organizer is the person or persons with primary responsibility for the
assembly. It is possible to define the organizer as the person in whose name prior
notification is submitted.

Article , Montenegro’s Public Assembly Act ()

The organizer of a peaceful assembly is any legal or physical entity
(henceforth referred to as: the organizer) that, in line with this Act,
organizes, holds and supervises the peaceful assembly. Peaceful
assembly under paragraph  of this article can also be organized by a
group of citizens, or more than one legal entity.

. Those who organize assemblies should co-operate with police to ensure that
participants in their assemblies comply with the law and the terms of the submitted
notification. There should be clarity as to who precisely is involved in the
organization of any assembly, and it can be assumed that the official organizer is
the person or persons in whose name prior notification is submitted. This need
not be a legal entity, and could, for example, be a committee of individuals or an
informal organization.

Ensuring the peaceful nature of an assembly — principles of good practice

. The use of negotiation and/or mediation to help resolve disputed assemblies.
If a proposed assembly, or its time, place, or manner, is disputed and no
resolution emerges between the organizer, the designated regulatory authority,
law enforcement officials, or other parties whose rights might be affected,
then negotiation or mediated dialogue may help reach a mutually agreeable
accommodation. Genuine dialogue between relevant parties can often yield a
more satisfactory outcome for everyone involved than formal recourse to the
law. The facilitation of negotiations or mediated dialogue can usually best be
performed by individuals or organizations not affiliated with either the state or the
organizer. The presence of parties’ legal representatives may, however, also assist
in facilitating discussions between the assembly organizer and law enforcement
authorities.


. Pre-event planning with law enforcement officials. Where possible, it is a good
practice for the organizer(s) to agree prior to the event with law enforcement
officials about what security measures will be put in place. Such discussions
can cover the deployment of the police and stewards (see paras. –) and
concerns about the nature of the policing operation. Sometimes, for example, a
police presence in a particular location may be perceived as being unnecessarily
confrontational or provocative and the organizer might request that the police
maintain a low visibility).

Article , Act on Public Assembly (), Slovenia

(Police assistance)
When as regards the nature of the gathering or event or as regards
the circumstances in which the gathering or event is held … there
exists a possibility that police measures will be necessary, the police,
in agreement with the organizer, shall determine the number of police
officers necessary for assisting in the maintenance of public order at the
gathering or event. In the event of such, the ranking police officer shall
come to an agreement with the leader on the method of co-operation.
In the instances specified in the previous paragraph, the organizer
of the gathering or event is obliged to co-operate with the police also
regarding the planning of measures for the maintenance of order at the
gathering or event.

. From outside the OSCE region, South African legislation provides a useful model
of a good practice, in that it specifically requires a signed contract detailing the
duties and responsibilities of both the police and the demonstrators:

Regulation of Gatherings Act, No.  (), South Africa

The Act states that the peaceful exercise of the right to assemble is
the joint responsibility of the convenor (organiser) of the event, an
authorised member of the police and a responsible officer of the local
authority. Together, these three parties form a “safety triangle” with
joint responsibility for ensuring order and safety at public events. The
success of the safety triangle is based upon collective planning and co-
ordination between the three parties and a willingness to negotiate and
compromise where disputes arise.
 

 . Risk assessment. Organizers — in co-operation with the police and other agencies
(such as fire and ambulance services) — should consider what risks are presented
by their assembly, and how they would deal with them should they materialize. The
imposition by law of mandatory risk assessments for all open-air public assemblies
would, however, create an unnecessarily bureaucratic and complicated regulatory
regime, and would unjustifiably deter groups and individuals from enjoying their
freedom of peaceful assembly.

. Responsibility to obey the lawful directions of law enforcement officials. The law
on assemblies might legitimately require that organizers (as well as participants)
obey the lawful orders of law enforcement officials. Refusal to do so may entail
liability (see paras. –).

Stewarding assemblies

. Stewards and marshals (these terms are often used interchangeably) are
individuals who assist an assembly organizer in managing an event.
Laws
governing freedom of assembly may provide for the possibility of organizers being
assisted by volunteer stewards. While the police have overall responsibility for
public order, organizers of assemblies are encouraged to deploy stewards during
the course of a large or controversial assembly. Stewards are persons who work
with assembly organizer(s) and who are responsible for facilitating the event and
helping ensure compliance with any lawfully imposed restrictions. Stewards do not
have the powers of law enforcement officials and cannot use force, but they should
rather aim to persuade assembly participants to co-operate. Their presence can
provide reassurance to the public, and help set the mood of an event. The primary
role of stewards is to orient, explain, and give information to the public and to
identify potential risks and hazards before and during an assembly. In cases of
public disorder, the stewards (and organizer) should promptly inform the police.
Police should work in partnership with event stewards, and each must have a clear
understanding of their respective roles.

. Training, briefing, and debriefing. Stewards should receive an appropriate level
of training and a thorough briefing before the assembly takes place (in particular
stewards should be familiar with the geography of the area in which the assembly
is being held), and it is the responsibility of the organizer to co-ordinate the
stewarding operation. For larger events, a clear hierarchy of decision-making
should be established, and stewards must at all times during an assembly be able
to communicate with one another and with the organizer. As with law enforcement
officials, it is important that stewards — together with the event organizer — hold a
thorough post-event debriefing and evaluation after any non-routine assembly.



. Identification. It is desirable that stewards be clearly identifiable, e.g., by wearing
a bib, jacket, badge, or armband.

. Requirement to steward certain assemblies. Under some circumstances, it may

be legitimate to impose on organizers a condition that they arrange a certain
level of stewarding for their gathering. However, such a condition should only be
imposed as the result of a specific assessment and never by default. Otherwise,
it would violate the proportionality principle. Any requirement to provide
stewarding in no way detracts from the positive obligation of the state to provide
adequately resourced policing arrangements. Stewards are not a substitute for
the police, and the police still bear overall responsibility for public order. However,
efficient stewarding can help reduce the need for a heavy police presence at
public assemblies. This ultimately facilitates any negotiation process where the
authorities may have concerns about public safety, and reduces the likelihood that
an assembly will be restricted on public-order or safety grounds.

. In some jurisdictions, it is commonplace for professional stewards or private

security firms to be contracted and paid to provide stewarding for assemblies.
Yet there should never be a legal obligation upon organizers to pay for stewarding
arrangements. To impose such a cost burden would seriously erode the essence of
freedom of assembly, and undermine the core responsibility of the state to provide
adequate policing.

Liability

. Organizers and stewards have a responsibility to make reasonable efforts to

comply with legal requirements and ensure that their assemblies are peaceful,
but they should not be held liable for failure to perform their responsibilities if
they made reasonable efforts to do so. The organizer should not be liable for the
actions of individual participants or for stewards who fail to act in accordance with
the terms of their briefing. Instead, individual liability will arise for any steward or
participant if they commit an offence or fail to carry out the lawful directions of
law enforcement officials.

. The organizer may wish to take out public liability insurance for their event.
Insurance, however, should not be made a condition of freedom of assembly, as
any such requirement would have a disproportionate and inhibiting effect on the
enjoyment of the freedom. Moreover, if an assembly degenerates into serious
public disorder, it is the responsibility of the state, not of the organizer or event
stewards, to limit the damage caused. In no circumstances should the organizer
of a lawful and peaceful assembly be held liable for disruption caused to others.
 

. Human Rights Monitors, Media, and Other

Stakeholders

Human rights defenders, observers, and monitors

. The monitoring of assemblies can provide an impartial and objective account of

what takes place, including a factual record of the conduct of both participants
and law enforcement officials. Monitoring might, for example, be carried out
by local NGOs. Domestic ombudsman offices and human rights commissions
may also undertake monitoring roles, as can international human rights NGOs
(such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International) or intergovernmental
organizations (such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE).

 . While the primary responsibility to promote and protect freedom of assembly

lies with the state, NGOs play an important role in furthering the cause of human
rights. Human rights defenders should therefore be permitted to operate freely
in the context of freedom of assembly.

. For the purposes of these Guidelines, monitors are defined as non-participant

third-party persons or groups whose primary aim is to observe and record what
is taking place.

. Monitoring public assemblies is a difficult task, and the precise role of monitors
will depend on why, and by whom, they have been deployed. Monitors may, for
example, be tasked with monitoring particular aspects of an assembly, such as:
• The policing of an event (and whether the state is fulfilling its positive obligations
under human rights law);
• Whether parties adhere to a prior agreement about how an assembly is to be
conducted;
• The interaction between participants in a demonstration and counter-
demonstrators; or
• The conduct of participants in a procession that passes a sensitive location.

. Sections of the guidance contained below are closely modeled on the United
Nations Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring.


Guidance for Monitors

Prior to the assembly

Monitors should be briefed before they attend an assembly. This
briefing should be focused solely on the specific event to be covered.
Monitors should also be briefed to focus on certain aspects of the
assembly, rather than attempting to observe and report on everything
that happens. This may mean that it is necessary to deploy several
(even many) monitors at the same event. If possible, the monitor should
establish contact in advance with the organizers and collect information
about the scenario, including: the site, planned activities, route, number
of participants, duration, goals, expected response of the authorities,
and alternative courses of action. Prior to an assembly, monitors
should acquaint themselves with the route planned by the organizers.
Familiarity with the route will assist monitors in identifying possible
difficulties, dangers, parking areas, and escape routes. If possible,
monitors should request that the organizers advise participants not to
approach monitors or impede them from carrying out their task

During the assembly

On the day of the demonstration, monitors must avoid participating
or being seen to participate in any way. They must make every effort
to be viewed as observers, and not as demonstrators, and should
normally be clearly identifiable. Where visibility might compromise
their personal safety, monitors should instead carry identification
cards. Monitors should keep a prudent and sufficient distance between
themselves and the demonstrators, as well as between themselves and
the military and/or police, and should leave the scene at the first sign
of serious danger. Monitors and human rights defenders can serve a
more active role by placing themselves in a position to intervene, either
through their physical presence, or through mediating, facilitating
negotiation, or providing a line of communication between parties
(including the police). Monitors should be aware of, or inquire as to
the identity of, the police chief or of the responsible authority, so that
they know who to approach about difficulties, and they should later
include this information in the report. The police should be informed of
the presence and location of monitors to enable the police to promote
their safety. It also enables the police to facilitate the monitor in his/her
role, perhaps in passing through police lines, or attaining a particular
 

observation position, or in being informed of an unfolding situation.

Monitors should be equipped with equipment (phones or radios) to
communicate with other monitors. Monitors have no additional powers
and can only request assistance from the police in the same way and to
the same degree as any other individual. If arrests take place during or
after a demonstration, and depending on the focus of the monitoring
operation, it may be necessary to try to obtain the names of persons
arrested, and possibly the names of witnesses to the arrest. In order to
do so, the monitor should proceed cautiously and avoid any behaviour
or language likely to exacerbate an already tense situation.

After the assembly

Following the demonstration, the monitors who attended the
demonstration should write a detailed report. Monitor reports should
be factual, precise, objective and neutral — under no circumstances
should monitors report something that they did not see. Monitors’
reports should not express any opinion on the legality or illegality of
demonstrations under national or local law. Monitors should take part in
a post-event debriefing and evaluation. The written report might include
the following information:
• Monitor’s location;
• Time of monitor’s arrival and departure;
• Organizations involved in the assembly and its stated purpose;
• Estimated number of participants;
• Conduct of participants (including slogans, banners, etc.);
• Presence of any simultaneous assembly (and the conduct of
participants);
• Attitude, behaviour, and visibility of law enforcement officials; and
• Any threats or provocations against the monitors.

Media


. Journalists have an important role to play in providing independent coverage of
public assemblies. As such, they must be distinguished from participants in the
event, and be given as much access as is possible by the authorities. In order
to avoid confusion and facilitate such access, it may be necessary to require
journalists and other media personnel to be clearly identifiable (by, for example,
wearing fluorescent bibs).


. “Assemblies, parades and gatherings are often the only means that those without
access to the media may have to bring their grievances to the attention of the
public.”  Media footage also provides an important element of accountability
both for organizers of events and law enforcement officials. The media must
therefore have access to assemblies and the policing operations mounted to
facilitate them. This is in satisfaction of the media’s fundamental right to freedom
of expression.

Other stakeholders

. Peaceful assemblies will often impact on the rights of non-participants such as
business owners, local residents, road users and pedestrians, observers, and
bystanders. Mere interference with these rights does not, of course, immediately
justify the imposition of restrictions on freedom of assembly. Interference with the
rights of others must reach a certain threshold before restrictions on freedom of
assembly can properly be justified. Moreover, the fact that freedom of assembly is,
by definition, of only a temporary nature should be considered when determining
the necessity and proportionality of any restrictions.

. While such stakeholders do not normally have a right to be consulted, where
their rights might be affected, it is a good practice for the organizer and law
enforcement agencies to discuss with the affected parties how the various
competing rights claims might best be protected to the mutual satisfaction of all
concerned. In situations where face-to-face discussions are problematic, it may be
possible to agree a mediated process of dialogue.
Annex A: Cases Cited

European Court of Justice

• Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzuge v. Republik
Osterreich (Case C-/, ECR I-, )
• Commission v. France (Case C-/, ECR I-, )

European Court of Human Rights

• Ahmed and Others v. The United Kingdom (
) (Application No.  /)
• Amann v. Switzerland () (Application No. 
/)
• Oya Ataman v. Turkey () (Application No.  /) (text of judgment
available in French only)
• Anderson v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. 
/)
• Appleby v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. /
)
• ARM Chappell v. The United Kingdom (
) (Application No. 
/
)
• Axen v. Germany (
) (Application No.
/
)
• Bączkowski and Others v. Poland () (Application No.  /, admissibility)
• Chassagnou and Others v. France () (Application Nos. 

/ , 
/,

/)
• Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova ( May ) (Application No.

/, unreported)
• Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) v. The United Kingdom (
)
(Application No.
/
)
• Chorherr v. Austria () (Application No. 
/
)
• Çiraklar v. Turkey (
) (Application No. /)
• Cisse v. France () (Application No.  /)
• Djavit An v. Turkey () (Application No. /)
• Ezelin v. France () (Application No. 
/
)
• Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey () (Application No.


/ )
• Friedl v. Austria () (Application No. /
)
• G v. Federal Republic of Germany (
) (Application No. /
)
• Greece v. The United Kingdom (
–), No. / Yearbook European
Commission of Human Rights
• Gülec v. Turkey (
) (Application No. /)
• Güneri and Others v. Turkey () (Application Nos. 
/
, /
,
/
)
• Guenat v. Switzerland () (Application No.  / )
• Gustafsson v. Sweden () (Application No. /
)
• Guzzardi v. Italy (
) (Application No. /)


• Handyside v. The United Kingdom () (Application No.  /)

• Haas v. Netherlands ( ) (Application No. 
/)
• Hashman and Harrup v. The United Kingdom () (Application No.  / )
• Herbecq and Another v. Belgium (
) (Application Nos. / and
/)
• Incal v. Turkey (
) (Application No. 
/)
• Jordan v. The United Kingdom () (Application No.   / )
• Kaya v. Turkey (
) (Application No. /)
• Kelly and Others v. The United Kingdom () (Application No.  /)
• Lawless v. Ireland () (Application No. /)
• Leander v. Sweden (
) (Application No. 
/
)
• Mammadov (Jalaloglu) v. Azerbaijan () (Application No.  / )
• McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. 

/)
• McKerr v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. 

/)
• McShane v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. /
)
• Mkrtchyan v. Armenia () (Application No. /)
• Moreno Gómez v. Spain ( , final ) (Application No.  /)
• Müller and Others v. Switzerland (

) (Application No. /

)
• Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria () (Application Nos. /
and /
)
• Norris v. Ireland (

) (Application No. 

/
)
• Observer and Guardian v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. 
/

)
• Öllinger v. Austria () (Application No. /)
• Osman v. The United Kingdom (
) (Application No.  / )
• Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria ( ) (Application No.  /
)
• Perry v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. /)
• P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. 
/
)
• Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (

) (Application No. /

)
• Rai, Almond and “Negotiate Now” v. The United Kingdom () (Application No.
/ )
• Rassemblement Jurassien Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland () (Application No.

/
)
• Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party)and Others v. Turkey () (Application Nos.
 /
,  /
and  /
)
• Rekvényi v. Hungary () (Application No. / )
• Rotaru v. Romania () (Application No. 
 /)
• Shanaghan v. The United Kingdom () (Application No. /)
• Simsek v. Turkey () (Application Nos. / and  /)
• Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (
,
admissibility) (Application Nos. / and /)
• Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria ()
(Application Nos. / and /)
 

• Steel v. The United Kingdom (

) (Application No.  /
)
• Thlimmenos v. Greece () (Application No.  /)
• Tsonev v. Bulgaria () (Application No. /)
• X and Y v. The Netherlands (
) (Application No.

/
)
• Ziliberberg v. Moldova ( , admissibility) and () (Application No.

/)

UN Human Rights Committee

• Kivenmaa v. Finland ( ) CCPR/C//D/ /
• Nicholas Toonen v. Australia, UN Human Rights Committee, No.

/, UN
Doc. CCPR/C//D/

/ ( / / )
• Patrick Coleman v. Australia () CCPR/C/
/D// (Jurisprudence)
Communication No. /: Australia. /
/
• Ernst Zündel v. Canada, Communication No. /, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
/
D// ()
• Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. /, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
/
D// ()

National case law

Georgia
• Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association Zaal Tkeshelashvili, Lela Gurashvili and
Others v. Parliament of Georgia ( November ) N//
–


Germany
• BVerfGE ,  ( November 
)
• BVerfGE , 
• BVerfGE  ,  (FN  & )
• BVerfGE ,  (Brokdorf decision),  May 

• BVerfGE ,  (,  )

Israel
• Sa’ar v. Minister of Interior and Police ()  (II) PD 

Nigeria
• All Nigeria Peoples Party v. Inspector General of Police (unreported,  June )
(Fed HC (Nig))

Poland
• Judgement of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 
January , K /,
Requirement to Obtain Permission for an Assembly on a Public Road, English


translation available at: ht tp:// w w w.tr ybunal.gov.pl/eng /summaries/

documents/K _ 21_05_GB.pdf.

United Kingdom
• Austin v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner () EWHC
 (QB)
• Gillan v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Another () United
Kingdom HL  (
March )
• Nicol and Selvanayagam v. Director of Public Prosecutions () Justice of the
Peace Reports 

United States of America

• Collin v. Chicago Park District,  F.d   (th Cir. )
• Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,  US  ()
• Schneider v. State, 
U.S.   ()
• Texas v. Johnson,  US  (
)

Zambia
• Mulundika and Others v. The People, Supreme Court, Zambia,  BHRC  (
January ).
Annex B: English-Russian Glossary of Key Terms

This glossary defines major terms and notions used in the Guidelines and gives their
equivalents in Russian. Definitions in the glossary have been derived or adapted from
official or other authoritative sources and cross-checked.

Where the term in the Guidelines differs from general usage, the glossary gives the
definition that best fits the context of the Guidelines.

The ODIHR acknowledges the use of the Merriam-Webster dictionary in wording some
definitions.

English Term Definition Russian Term

Accountability An obligation to accept responsibility for Ответственность

one’s actions.
Assembly Intentional and temporary presence of a Собрание
number of individuals in an open-air public
place for a common purpose.
Authorization The act of authorizing; permission Разрешение; Санкция
(expressly provided in writing).
Blanket (e.g., ban, Effective or applicable in all instances. Автоматический
restriction) (например, запрет,
ограничение)
“Clear and present Doctrine that allows the imposition of Анализ на выраженное
danger” test restrictions only when participants in an присутствие
assembly incite imminent lawless action непосредственной
and such action is likely to occur. опасности
Concurring An assembly that takes place at the same Собрание, сходящееся
assembly time and place as another one, and conveys во мнениях с другим
a message that does not run counter to the собранием
message of the other assembly.
Content neutrality A principle that only allows restricting Нейтральный подход
(principle of) expression without regard to the content к содержанию
or communicative impact of the message
conveyed.
Content-based A restriction that limits expression because Ограничения на
restrictions of the message it conveys. содержание
Counter- See Dissenting assembly См. Dissenting assembly
demonstration


Data retention Storage or preservation of recorded Хранение данных

information, regardless of form or the
media on which it may be recorded.
Demonstration A public display of group feelings toward a Демонстрация
person or a cause.
Derogation Partial repeal of the norm. Временное отступ-
ление государства от
выполнения взятых на
себя международных
обязательств
Dispersal Forceful termination of an assembly Принудительное
прекращение
Disruption Interruption of the normal course of action. Прерывание; Срыв
Dissenting assembly An assembly that is convened to express Собрание в знак
disagreement with the views expressed at несогласия с другим
another public assembly, and takes place at собранием
the same or almost the same time and place
as the one it disagrees with.
Human rights Individuals, groups or other organs of Защитник прав
defender society that work or act to promote and человека
protect universally recognized human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
Liability The state of one who is bound in law Ответственность
and justice to do something that may be (в т.ч. за вину)
enforced by action.
Marshal See Steward См. Steward
Monitor See Observer Монитор; Наблюдатель
National security The quality or state of being capable of Национальная
resisting hostile or destructive acts from безопасность
inside or outside a state.
Non-lethal weapons A weapon that is designed to incapacitate Специальные средства
the target rather than kill or seriously
injure.
Non-nationals Those who are not citizens of a given state. Неграждане
Notification A notice that provides information on Уведомление
an upcoming assembly that does not
constitute a request for permission.
Observer Someone who oversees and reports on Наблюдатель
the progress of an assembly from a neutral
point of view.
 

Organizer The person or persons with primary Организатор

responsibility for an assembly.
Parade See Procession. Парад
Participant A person intentionally and voluntarily Участник
present at an assembly and supporting the
message of the assembly.
Peaceful enjoyment The right to protection of property and Право на уважение
of one’s possessions against its deprivation. своей собственности
(right to)
Penalty A punishment established by law for its Мера наказания
breach.
Peremptory norm A fundamental principle of international Императивная норма
law considered to have acceptance among
the international community of states as a
whole. Peremptory norms do not require
consent and cannot be violated by any
state.
Permit The formal consent of the regulatory Разрешение
authority to hold an assembly.
Presumption in The presumption that an assembly may Презумпция в пользу
favour of holding proceed in the absence of well-founded проведения собрания
assemblies justifications for the imposition of
restrictions or for preventing the assembly
from occurring.
Prior restraint Restrictions imposed in advance of an Предварительное
event. ограничение
Procession A gathering that moves along public Шествие; Процессия
thoroughfares. A procession may involve
the use of vehicle or other conveyances.
Proportionality The principle requiring that the least Соразмерность
(principle of) intrusive means of achieving the legitimate
objective being pursued by the authorities
should always be given preference.
Protection of health The notion refers to public health and Охрана здоровья
and morals public morals. и нравственности
Protection of rights Prevention of major interference with the Защита прав и свобод
and freedoms of conflicting rights and freedoms of others. других лиц
others
Public order Security in public places. Общественный
порядок


Public safety A broad notion involving the protection of Безопасность

the population at large from varied kinds населения
of significant damage, harm, or danger,
including emergencies.
Public space A space where everyone is free to come Общественная
and leave without restriction (e.g., streets, территория
parks etc.).
Rally A static demonstration. Митинг
“Reasonable excuse” A defence applicable where failure to Защита на основании
defence comply was not willful but a matter of наличия объективных
impossibility. препятствий
к соблюдению закона
Regulatory authority The authority responsible for taking Орган регулирования
decisions about public assemblies.
Riot control Measures taken to control an act of public Действия по
violence by an unruly mob. пресечению массовых
беспорядков
Risk assessment Assessment of the magnitude of a potential Оценка риска
loss and the probability that a loss will
occur.
Sanction A coercive measure intended to ensure Мера принуждения
compliance with the law.
Simultaneous Two or more assemblies taking place at the Одновременные
assemblies same place and time. собрания
Sit-in A static demonstration in which Сидячая демонстрация
participants seat themselves in a particular
place and refuse to move.
Spontaneous An assembly that takes place without prior Стихийное собрание
assembly notification.
Steward A person, working in co-operation with Распорядитель
assembly organizer(s), with a responsibility (на собрании)
to facilitate an event and help ensure
compliance with any lawfully imposed
restrictions.
Supporter Someone who is in the close proximity Сочувствующее лицо
of the assembly and shares the views
expressed.
Unlawful assembly An assembly that proceeds in Собрание с
noncompliance with the law. несоблюдением закона
Use of force Exertion of physical force as a means of Применение силы
compulsion or coercion.
 

Violence Illegal or abusive exertion of physical force. Хулиганские действия;

применение насилия.
Annex C: Expert Panel

Neil JARMAN (Panel Chairperson, United Kingdom)

Neil Jarman is Director of the Institute for Conflict Research in Belfast, Northern
Ireland, UK. His academic interest is primarily in peacebuilding activity and conflict
mitigation, with specific focus on public assemblies and their policing, and community-
based responses to violence and public disorder. He was a Specialist Adviser with the
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee for the inquiry into hate crime in Northern Ireland.
He is the author of numerous publications on issues such as policing public order,
human rights and conflict resolution, and combating hate crime.

Nina BELYAEVA (Russian Federation)

Nina Belyaeva is the Head of the Public Policy Department of the State University-
Higher School of Economics, the first Western-type state university in Russia, created
in  with the assistance of the EU and several European universities. Her academic
interests focus on the legal environment for the public participation of civil society and
legal forms of citizen-government interaction. She is the principal author of the Russian
Law on Public Associations of , which attracted a lot of attention and comments
from the international community after recently introduced amendments imposing
new restrictions on NGO activities. Being a recognized practitioner and organizer of
innovative forms of NGO activities, she is also Chair of the Board of an international
coalition of NGOs called We — the citizens! and President of Interlegal, an international
foundation for political and legal research.

She has participated in numerous working groups on Russian federal and regional
legislation regulating the activities of public associations and NGOs, as well as many
international expert groups created by CIVICUS, the World Bank, and the EU aimed
at compiling best practices and elaborating model legislation in the field of civil society
and relations between civil society and state authorities.

David GOLDBERGER (United States)

David Goldberger is the Isadore and Ida Topper Professor of Law at Ohio State
University. He teaches a course on the First Amendment to the US Constitution, a
survey course on the US Constitution, and a course in clinical skills in which he
supervises upper-level law students representing clients in pending cases. His academic
writing focuses primarily on the scope of the right to freedom of speech under the US
Constitution. Prior to becoming an academic, he was legal director of the American
 

Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division. He specializes in free-speech cases. Through

the years, his clients have included, among others, anti-Vietnam War demonstrators,
the National Socialist Party of America (in its effort to get a permit to demonstrate in
Skokie, Illinois), the Communist Party of Illinois, and the Ku Klux Klan. He has also
represented political candidates for state and county office from America’s major
political parties.

Muatar S. KHAIDAROVA (Tajikistan)

Muatar S. Khaidarova is a Legal Consultant with the International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law in Tajikistan and President of the NGO Society and Law. She has authored
a number of publications on issues of civil liberties, religion and the law, and the state
and the law.

Serghei OSTAF (Moldova)

Serghei Ostaf is the Director of the Resource Center for Human Rights (CReDO),
a non-profit organization that develops the capacity of civil society organizations to
advocate for democratic changes and that is engaged in the promotion of democratic
policies in Moldova. CReDO offers change-oriented consultancy and policy research
and carries out advocacy actions. Ostaf has been involved in human rights advocacy
work in Moldova and lobbying with the Council of Europe, UN human rights bodies,
and the ODIHR by means of presenting advocacy research, monitoring, and presenting
shadow reports, bringing human rights cases to national courts and the European
Court of Human Rights (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, religious liberty
and personal liberty, privacy and cases related to forced labour). His current interests
include lobbying for the adoption of democratic public policies by the government,
consulting on effective implementation of such policies through the use of legal and
institutional mechanisms. He teaches master-level courses in public policy, policy-
process analysis, and democratic policy implementation.

Vardan POGHOSYAN (Armenia)

Vardan Poghosyan is the founder of the NGO Democracy, an Armenian think

tank focusing on legal and political research. He is also the Legal Advice Project
Coordinator with GTZ in Armenia. His primary academic interest is in constitutional
and administrative law, as well as in comparative political systems. He has participated
in a number of legislative drafting projects in Armenia, including membership in the
Working Group on Drafting the Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and
Demonstrations, as well as participation in drafting constitutional amendments and the
Administrative Procedure Code.


Andrzej RZEPLIŃSKI (Poland)

Andrzej Rzepliński is a Professor of Law at Warsaw University’s Faculty of Applied

Social Sciences and Resocialization. He specializes in the fields of basic rights and
freedoms, crimes of totalitarian regimes, laws on the police and security services, as
well as in penology, and he has published extensively on these topics. He is a member of
the Board of Directors of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the International
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, and the Polish Section of the International
Commission of Jurists. He is an expert for the Council of Europe in training judges and
monitoring freedom of expression.

Alexander VASHKEVICH (Belarus)

Dr. Alexander Vashkevich is an Associate Professor at the Department of the International

Law at Belarusian State University and a former Justice of the Constitutional Court of
Belarus. He teaches Comparative Constitutional Law and European Human Rights
Law and has published extensively on human rights issues. He is the head of a working
group that carries out reviews of the compliance of Belarusian domestic legislation and
practice with the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

Yevgeniy A. ZHOVTIS (Kazakhstan)

Yevgeniy A. Zhovtis is Director of the NGO Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human
Rights and the Rule of Law and a member of the Board of Directors of Interlegal. He has
an extensive track record as a defence lawyer. His primary interest is in civil liberties.

Michael HAMILTON (Secretary to the Expert Panel, United Kingdom)

Dr. Michael Hamilton is a lecturer in human rights law at the Transitional Justice
Institute, University of Ulster. His research has focused on the legal regulation and
mediation of public protest, particularly parade disputes in Northern Ireland.
Endnotes

See CDL-AD()  Opinion on the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines for Drafting Laws
Pertaining to Freedom of Assembly adopted by the Venice Commission of the Council of
Europe at its  th Plenary Session, Venice, - October . Note that a member of the
Venice Commission (Peter Paczolay of Hungary) participated in the roundtable in Warsaw,
one of the four roundtables where the Guidelines were discussed.

Principally, the relevant standards contained in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence of
the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights,
respectively.

Including the constitutional courts both of OSCE participating States and of non-
participating states.

See, for example, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland (, admissibility decision), p. : “The
Constitution clearly guaranteed the freedom of assembly, not a right. It was not for the State
to create a right to assembly; its obligation was limited to securing that assemblies be held
peacefully.”

Tajik law, for example, defines “participant” in terms of a person’s support for the aims of the
event.

Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR.

Article  of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities, which
draws upon paras. . and . of the Copenhagen Document of the CSCE.

Article () and () of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR. Freedom of expression
includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. The European Court of
Human Rights has often recognized that freedom of assembly and freedom of expression
are often, in practice, closely associated. See, for example, Ezelin v. France (), paras.
, ; Djavit An v. Turkey (), para. ; Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova
(), para. ; Öllinger v. Austria (), para. 
.

Article 
of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR.

See “Joint Statement on Racism and the Media by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the
OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression”. Also see Helen Fenwick, “The Right
to Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation”, Modern Law Review,
Vol. , .

Op. cit., note , point .

The ICCPR sets out universally accepted minimum standards in the area of civil and political
rights. The obligations undertaken by states ratifying or acceding to the Covenant are meant
to be discharged as soon as a state becomes party to the ICCPR. The implementation of the
ICCPR by its states parties is monitored by a body of independent experts: the UN Human
Rights Committee. All states parties are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee
on how the rights are being implemented. In addition to the reporting procedure, Article 
of the Covenant provides for the Committee to consider interstate complaints. Furthermore,


the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR gives the Committee competence to examine
individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the Covenant by states parties to
the Protocol.

The ECHR is the most comprehensive and authoritative human rights treaty for the
European region. The treaty has been open for signature since . All member states
of the Council of Europe are required to ratify the Convention within one year of the
state’s accession to the Statute of the Council of Europe. The ECHR sets forth a number
of fundamental rights and freedoms, and parties to it undertake to secure these rights
and freedoms for everyone within their jurisdiction. Individual and interstate petitions are
dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. At the request of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Court may also give advisory opinions
concerning the interpretation of the ECHR and the protocols thereto.

As provided by Article of the American Convention, “[a]ny person or group of persons,
or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of
the Organization [of American States], may lodge petitions with the [Inter-American]
Commission [on Human Rights] containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this
Convention by a State Party.”

For example, following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (),
the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice sent the judgment of the ECtHR, translated into
Bulgarian, and accompanied by a circular letter, to the mayors of the cities concerned.
In order to inform the courts and the public of the new binding interpretation
of the law, the court also posted the Bulgarian translation of the judgment on its
website at http://w w w.mjeli.government.bg/. See Human Rights Information
Bulletin, No.  , , December  -
February , pp. -, available at
http://w w w.coe.int/ T/ E/ Human_ Rights/ hrib64e.pdf.

For example, Article  of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that “[f]or the purpose of promoting and
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, everyone has the right, individually
and in association with others, at the national and international levels … to meet or assemble
peacefully.” The  OSCE Charter of Paris also states that, “without discrimination, every
individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, freedom of
expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly”.

See Article  of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for the general limitations
clause.

See, for example, Çiraklar v. Turkey (
), Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (

).
Thus, if the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is considered to be the lex specialis in a
given case, it would not be plausible for a court to find a violation of the right to freedom of
expression if it had already established, on the same facts, that there had been no violation
of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. This question was touched upon by Mr. Kurt
Herndl in his dissenting opinion in the case of Kivenmaa v. Finland ( ), CCPR/C//
D/ /, at para. ..


Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria ( ), para. .

 


Also see Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary
(Kehl, Strasbourg, Arlington: Engel Publisher, ), p. . “The term ‘assembly’ is
not defined but rather presumed in the Covenant. Therefore, it must be interpreted in
conformity with the customary, generally accepted meaning in national legal systems,
taking into account the object and purpose of this traditional right. It is beyond doubt that
not every assembly of individuals requires special protection. Rather, only intentional,
temporary gatherings of several persons for a specific purpose are afforded the protection
of freedom of assembly.”

See (generally) the decisions of the German Constitutional Court in relation to roadblocks in
front of military installations. BVerfGE , ; BVerfGE , ; and BVerfGE  , .

In Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) v. The United Kingdom (
), the
European Commission accepted “that the freedom of peaceful assembly covers not only
static meetings, but also public processions” (at p. 
, para. ). This understanding has
been relied upon in a number of subsequent cases, including Plattform Ärzte (

) and
Ezelin v. France (). In the latter case, it was stated that the right to freedom of assembly
“is exercised in particular by persons taking part in public processions” (Commission,
para. ).

For example, the standard of permanence permitted in Moldova is two months.

This draws on the United States doctrine of “public fora”. See, for example, Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,  US  ().

 (II) PD  at -
, per Barak J.

An owner of private property has far more discretion to choose whether to permit a speaker
to use his property than the government does. At a private assembly, access is restricted to
invited persons. Compelling an owner to make his or her property available for an assembly
may breach their rights to private and family life (Article
of the ECHR) or to peaceful
enjoyment of their possessions (Article  of Protocol  of the ECHR).

Djavit An v. Turkey (), para. ; Rassemblement Jurassien Unité Jurassienne
v. Switzerland (), p. .

See, for example, Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for
Public Space (New York: The Guilford Press, ), and Margaret Kohn, Brave New
Neighbourhoods: The Privatization of Public Space (New York: Routledge,  ); Kevin
Gray and Susan Gray, “Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space”, [] EHRLR
; Fitzpatrick and Taylor, “Trespassers Might be Prosecuted: The European Convention and
Restrictions on the Right to Assemble”, [
] EHRLR ; Jacob Rowbottom, “Property and
Participation: A Right of Access for Expressive Activities”, []  EHRLR 
-.


Appleby v. The United Kingdom (), para. , citing Özgür Gündem v. Turkey (),
paras. - , and Fuentes Bobo v. Spain (), para. 
. In Cisse v. France (), the
European Court of Human Rights held that the evacuation of a group of approximately
 illegal immigrants who had occupied a church in Paris for several months did amount
to interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly, but in this case,
the interference was both necessary and proportionate primarily on health grounds (see
para. ). The applicable domestic laws stated that: “Assemblies for the purposes of worship
in premises belonging to or placed at the disposal of a religious association shall be open to
the public. They shall be exempted from [certain requirements], but shall remain under the
supervision of the authorities in the interests of public order.”



At para. . In reaching its decision, the ECtHR examined the case law of Canada (para. )
and the United States (paras. -, and ). The Court considered: (a) the diversity of
situations obtaining in contracting states; (b) the choices that must be made in terms
of priorities and resources (noting that the positive obligations “should not impose an
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities”); and (c) the rights of the owner
of the shopping centre under Article  of Protocol .

In Cisse v. France (), para. , the European Court of Human Rights stated that, “In
practice, the only type of events that did not qualify as ‘peaceful assemblies’ were those in
which the organisers and participants intended [emphasis added] to use violence”. Also see
G v. The Federal Republic of Germany (
), in which the European Commission stated that
peaceful assembly does not cover a demonstration where the organizers and participants
have violent intentions that result in public disorder.

Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (

), para. , concerning a procession and

open-air service organized by anti-abortion protesters. Similarly, the European Court has
often stated that, subject to Article (), freedom of expression “is applicable not only
to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector
of the population. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness
without which there is no ‘democratic society’.” Handyside v. The United Kingdom (),
para. . Applied in Incal v. Turkey (
), para. ; Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria
( ), para. , and joint dissenting judgment, para. ; Müller and Others v. Switzerland
(

), para. ; Observer and Guardian v. The United Kingdom (), para. ; Chorherr
v. Austria (), Commission, para. .

See BVerfGE , () regarding roadblocks in front of military installations. See para. :
“Their sit-down blockades do not fall outside the scope of this basic right just because they
are accused of coercion using force.”

If a narrower definition of “peaceful” were to be adopted, it would mean that the scope
of the right would be so limited from the outset that the limiting clauses (such as those
contained in Article () of the ECHR) would be virtually redundant.

Rassemblement Jurassien Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland (), pp.  and ; Christians
Against Racism and Facism (CARAF) v. The United Kingdom (
), p. 
; G v. The Federal
Republic of Germany (
), p. ; Anderson v. The United Kingdom (), and Rai,
Almond and “Negotiate Now” v. The United Kingdom ().

See, for example, Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (

).

See, for example, Öllinger v. Austria ().

See, for example, Mary O’Rawe, “Human Rights and Police Training in Transitional
Societies: Exporting the Lessons of Northern Ireland”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. , No.
, August , pp.  -
; Mary O’Rawe, “Transitional Policing Arrangements In Northern
Ireland: The Can’t And The Won’t Of The Change Dialectic”, Fordham International Law
Journal, Vol. , No. , April , pp.  -.


See Hashman and Harrup v. The United Kingdom (), where a condition was imposed
on protesters not to behave contra bonos mores (i.e., in a way that is wrong rather than
right in the judgment of the majority of fellow citizens). This was held to violate Article 
of the ECHR because it was not sufficiently precise so as to be “prescribed by law”. Also see
Steel v. United Kingdom (
), and Mkrtchyan v. Armenia (), paras. -  (relating to
 

the foreseeability of the term “prescribed rules” in Article 

. of the Code of Administrative
Offences). In the latter case, the Armenian government unsuccessfully argued that these
rules were prescribed by a Soviet law that had approved, inter alia, the Decree of 
July


on Rules for Organizing and Holding Assemblies, Rallies, Street Processions and
Demonstrations in the USSR.

See Rekvényi v. Hungary (), para.  .

See, for example, Ezelin v. France (), para. .

See, for example, Rassemblement Jurassien Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland ().

The objectives or aims that may be legitimately pursued by the authorities in restricting the
freedom of assembly are provided for by Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR.
Thus, the only purposes that may justify the restriction of the right to peaceably assemble
are the interests of national security or public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the
protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

As such, the dispersal of assemblies must only be used as a measure of last resort.

D. Feldman, Civil Liberties & Human Rights in England and Wales (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, Oxford, ), nd edition.

Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (), para.
. Also
see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (judgment of  January 
),
para. .

See the Brokdorf decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (
) BVerfGE
,   BvR ,  /
.

Rai, Almond and “Negotiate Now” v. The United Kingdom ().


See, for example, the “Joint Statement on Racism and the Media by the UN Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom
of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression”. One example of
a good practice is provided by the Northern Ireland Parades Commission, which publishes
details of all notified parades and related protests in Northern Ireland categorized according
to the town where they are due to take place. See http://w w w.paradescommission.org.

See “General Comment 
: Non-Discrimination”, UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc.
CCPR General Comment 
(
).

See, for example, Haas v. Netherlands ( ), para. . In light of the judgement of the
European Court of Human Rights in Thlimmenos v. Greece (), Robert Wintemute
argues that the interpretation of Article  of the ECHR should be broadened to include “two
access routes” so that not only the opportunity denied, but also the ground for its denial,
could be deemed to fall “within the ambit” of another Convention right and so engage
Article  . See R. Wintemute, “‘Within the Ambit’: How big is the ‘gap’ in Article  European
Convention on Human Rights? Part ”, European Human Rights Law Review, No. ,  ,
pp. -
.

See Nicholas Toonen v. Australia, para.
..

Article  of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that,
“Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of


a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”
[] C /, available at http://w w w.europarl.eu.int/char ter/pdf/text_en.pdf.

In part, this was the argument raised by the applicants in Bączkowski and Others v. Poland
(, admissibility). The applicants stated that they were treated in a discriminatory
manner, first, because the organizers of other public events in Warsaw in  had not been
required to submit a “traffic organization plan”, and also because they had been refused
permission to organize the March for Equality and related assemblies because of the
homosexual orientation of the organizers.

Thlimmenos v. Greece (), para. .

Indirect discrimination occurs when an ostensibly non-discriminatory provision in law
affects certain groups disproportionately.

Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria ().

See Rassemblement Jurassien Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland (), p. , and Christians
against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) v. The United Kingdom (
), p. 
. Similarly, the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion can be exercised by a church body
or by an association with religious and philosophical objects, ARM Chappell v. The United
Kingdom (
), p.  .


Also see Article  of the Framework Convention on National Minorities: “() The Parties
undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to national minorities to
establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers with persons lawfully
staying in other States, in particular those with whom they share an ethnic, cultural,
linguistic or religious identity, or a common cultural heritage; () The Parties undertake not
to interfere with the right of persons belonging to national minorities to participate in the
activities of non-governmental organisations, both at the national and international levels.”

Adopted by General Assembly Resolution / of 
December .

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment , “The position of aliens under the
Covenant”.

See Donatella della Porta, Abby Peterson, Herbert Reiter, The Policing of Transnational
Protest (Canada: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,  ).

Article (c) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women also
safeguards the right of women to participate in non-governmental organizations and
associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.

Article , Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Principle (), United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness
and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, United Nations General Assembly Resolution
/.

Article , UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Article (), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.

See European Court of Human Rights, Ahmed and Others v. The United Kingdom (
)
and Rekvényi v. Hungary ().
 

Article  of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms provides: “For the purpose of promoting and protecting human
rights and fundamental freedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association
with others, at the national and international levels: (a) To meet or assemble peacefully.”
Also see Articles  and
().

In the Brokdorf decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (
) BVerfGE ,
  BvR ,  /
, for example, “public order” was understood as including the totality
of unwritten rules, obedience to which is regarded as an indispensable prerequisite for an
orderly communal human existence within a defined area according to social and ethical
opinions prevailing at the time.

Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (), para.  .

See Ezelin v. France () and Ziliberberg v. Moldova ( ).

In the case of Incal v. Turkey (
), the applicant’s conviction for helping to prepare a
political leaflet that urged the population of Kurdish origins to band together and “set up
Neighbourhood Committees based on the people’s own strength” was held by the European
Court to have violated the applicant’s freedom of expression under Article . Read in
context, the leaflet could not be taken as incitement to the use of violence, hostility or hatred
between citizens. Moreover, the Court stated that the “limits of permissible criticism are
wider with regard to the government than in relation to a private citizen”, para.  .

The right to the highest attainable standard of health: /
/ E/C.// . (General
Comments), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-second
session Geneva,  April –  May , Agenda item , “Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”,
General Comment No.  (), “The right to the highest attainable standard of health”
(Article  of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).

See Judgement of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 
January , K /, Requirement
to Obtain Permission for an Assembly on a Public Road, English translation available at
http://w w w.tr ybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/ K _ 21_05_GB.pdf.

See, for example, Hashman and Harrup v. The United Kingdom () regarding the
common law of offence of behaviour deemed to be “contra bones mores”.

For criticism of a recent legislative provision, see http://www.bahrainrights.org/node/208;
http:// hr w.org/english/docs/20 06/06/08/bahrai13529.htm.

Norris v. Ireland (

), paras. - .


See, for example, Tania Groppi, “Freedom of thought and expression, General Report”,
University of Sienna, . Available at
http://w w w.unisi.it/ricerca/dip/dir_eco/COMPAR ATO/groppi4.doc.

In the US case of Schneider v. State, 
US   (), it was held that there was a right
to leaflet even though the leafleting caused litter. In Collin v. Chicago Park District, 
F.d   (th Cir. ), it was held that there was a right to assemble in open areas that
the park officials had designated as picnic areas. In Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale
Transporte und Planzuge v. Republik Osterreich (), the European Court of Justice
held that allowing a demonstration that blocked the Brenner Motorway between Germany
and Italy for almost  hours was not a disproportionate restriction on the free movement


of goods under Article 

of the EC Treaty. This was for three reasons: () the disruption
was of a relatively short duration and on an isolated occasion; () measures were taken
to limit the disruption caused; () excessive restrictions on the demonstration could have
deprived the demonstrators of their rights to expression and assembly, and indeed possibly
caused greater disruption. The Austrian authorities considered that they had to allow the
demonstration to go ahead because the demonstrators were exercising their fundamental
rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly under the Austrian constitution.
Also see Commission v. France (). This case concerned protests by French farmers
directed against agricultural products from other EU member states. The Court held that,
by failing to adopt all necessary and proportionate measures in order to prevent the free
movement of fruit and vegetables from being obstructed by actions of private individuals,
the French government had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article  of the EC Treaty, in
conjunction with Article  of the Treaty.

The right to “private life” covers the physical and moral integrity of the person (X and Y v.
The Netherlands (
)), and the state must not merely abstain from arbitrary interference
with the individual, but must also positively ensure effective respect for private life. This can
extend even in the sphere of relations between individuals. Where it is claimed that a right
to privacy is affected by freedom of assembly, the authority should seek to determine the
validity of that claim, and the degree to which it should tolerate a temporary burden. The
case of Moreno Gómez v. Spain ( , final ) might give some indication of the high
threshold that must first be overcome before a violation of Article
can be established.

See, for example, Chassagnou and Others v. France (). Also see Gustafsson v. Sweden
(). The right to peacefully enjoy one’s possessions has been strictly construed by the
European Court of Human Rights so as to offer protection only to proprietary interests.
Moreover, for a public assembly to impact on the enjoyment of one’s possessions to an
extent that would justify the placing of restrictions on it, a particularly high threshold must
first be met. Businesses, for example, benefit from being in public spaces and, as such,
should be expected to tolerate alternative uses of that space. As previously emphasized,
freedom of assembly should be considered a normal and expectable aspect of public life.

Öllinger v. Austria (), para. .

The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, UN Doc. E/CN. //
().

Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey ().

See, for example, Texas v. Johnson,  US  (
) in which the US Supreme Court found
that flag-burning was protected under the First Amendment to the US Constitution, and
invalidated laws in
US states that prohibited the desecration of the American flag.

See Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria ().

Available from http://w w w.icj.org. Similarly, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy adopted by member states on
September  emphasizes in part IV “that
effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting
goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing”, and that “States must ensure that any
measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law,
in particular human rights law”.
 

See, for example, Lluis Maria de Puig (rapporteur) “Democratic Oversight of the Security
Sector in Member States”, Report for the Political Affairs Committee, Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe ( June , Doc. ), para. .


Amnesty International Index: POL / /
, United Kingdom (
).


Also see para.  of the  Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on
the Human Dimension of the CSCE.


See Lawless v. Ireland (), para. 
. Also see the Questiaux Principles: Nicole Questiaux,
“Study of the implications for human rights of recent developments concerning situations
known as states of siege or emergency”, UN Doc. E/CN. /Sub./
/,  July 
. In
addition, General Comment No.  of the UN Human Rights Committee (August )
provides examples of rights that cannot be derogated from.


Siracusa Principles, paras. - . Annex, UN Doc. E/CN. /
/ (
),
http://w w w1.umn.edu/ humanr ts/ instree/siracusaprinciples.html.


See Article () of ICCPR, and Greece v. The United Kingdom (
-).


See Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, ), nd edition, p. .


Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (), para. .


Ibid., para.  .

For example, Patrick Coleman v. Australia (), para. . (the Human Rights Committee
considered a fine and five-day custodial sentence to be a disproportionate penalty for
making a speech without a permit). Also see Ezelin v. France () (assembly); Incal v.
Turkey (
) (expression).

An example of such a defence is contained in Sections () and (

) of the Public
Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 
. There may be a number of ways to provide for
the “reasonable excuse” defence in the law, but good practice suggests that words such
as “without reasonable excuse” should be clearly identified as a defence to the offence
where it applies, and not merely as an element of the offence that would have to be proved
or disproved by the prosecution. See “Preliminary Comments on the Draft Law ‘On
Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on National Security
Issues’”, OSCE/ODIHR Opinion Nr. GEN-KAZ//, 
April .

At p. . In Ziliberberg v. Moldova ( ) (admissibility), p. , it was stated that “an
individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic
violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if
the individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour”.

See UN Human Rights Committee, Kivenmaa v. Finland ( ).

Rassemblement Jurassien Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland (), p. .

The Constitutional Court of Georgia has annulled part of the law (Article
, para. ) that
allowed a body of local government to reject a notification (thus effectively creating a system
of prior license rather than prior notification), Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association Zaal
Tkeshelashvili, Lela Gurashvili and Others v. Parliament of Georgia ( November ),
N//
-
. Also see Mulundika and Others v. The People, Supreme Court of Zambia,
 BHRC  ( January ). All Nigeria Peoples Party v. Inspector General of Police
(Unreported, June  , ) (Fed HC (Nig)).



See Oya Ataman v. Turkey (), paras. , .

See Öllinger v. Austria (), paras. -, which provides guidance as to the factors
potentially relevant to assessing the proportionality of any restrictions on counter-
demonstrations. These include whether the coincidence of time and venue is an essential
part of the message of the counter-demonstration, whether the counter-protest concerns the
expression of opinion on an issue of public interest, the size of the counter-demonstration,
whether the counter-demonstrators have peaceful intentions, and the proposed manner of
the protest (use of banners, chanting, etc.).

See Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (

), para. .

In Axen v. Germany (
), which related to the issue of fair trial, the ECtHR considered “that
in each case the form of publicity to be given to the ‘judgment’ under the domestic law of the
respondent State must be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in
question and by reference to the object and purpose of Article ().”

Article  () of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms provides that: “The State shall ensure and support, where
appropriate, the creation and development of further independent national institutions for
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all territory
under its jurisdiction, whether they be ombudsmen, human rights commissions or any other
form of national institution.”


See also, for example, the Resolution on the Increase in Racist and Homophobic Violence in
Europe, passed by the European Parliament on  June , para. L, which urges member
states to consider whether their institutions of law enforcement are compromised by
institutional racism.

Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (

), para. .

See, for example, the Council of Europe’s European Code of Police Ethics () and related
commentary, which sets out principles for the governments of member states in preparing
their internal legislation and policing codes of conduct.

The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that “State parties should take measures not
only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary
killing by their own security forces”. General Comment No. , Article , th Session (
),
para. .

Osman v. The United Kingdom (
), para. .

See, for example, Article  of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that: “The State has the
responsibility to promote and facilitate the teaching of human rights and fundamental
freedoms at all levels of education and to ensure that all those responsible for training
lawyers, law enforcement officers, the personnel of the armed forces and public officials
include appropriate elements of human rights teaching in their training programme.”

Issues around police training may be relevant in assessing whether a state has fulfilled its
positive obligations under Article  of the ECHR. See, for example, McCann v. The United
Kingdom (), para. .
 


For example, Amnesty International, Ten Basic Human Rights Standards for Law
Enforcement Officials (Amnesty International Index: POL / /
); Council of Europe,
European Code of Police Ethics ().

Available at http://w w w.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/ Data/ keeping _the_peace.pdf.

See, for example, “ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace”, p. .


Some codes of administrative offences refer explicitly to “active participation”. Also see
Ziliberberg v. Moldova ( ), para. .

Ziliberberg v. Moldova ( ), p. , citing Ezelin v. France (
), para.  .

Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR protect the right to liberty and security
of person. Guenat v. Switzerland () was a case involving detention for the purpose of
making enquiries (thus falling short of arrest). The police actions were found not to have
violated Article  of the ECHR. While not every restriction imposed on a person’s liberty
will necessarily amount to a deprivation of liberty as stipulated in Article  of the ECHR,
any restrictions must be deemed strictly necessary and be proportionate to the aim being
pursued. See, for example, Guzzardi v. Italy (
), paras. -: “The difference between
deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is … merely one of degree or intensity, and not
one of nature or substance.” This argument was raised in a freedom-of-assembly case in the
UK. See Gillan v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Another (), UKHL ,
paras. - . Moreover, restrictions on liberty may still constitute a violation of the freedom
of movement as protected by Article  of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR.

Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR.

Mammadov (Jalaloglu) v. Azerbaijan ().

The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy is a significant, though not conclusive,
factor in determining whether the right to private and family life protected by Article
of
the ECHR is, in fact, affected. See P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom (), para. .
A person’s private life may be affected in circumstances outside their home or private
premises. See, for example, Herbecq and Another v. Belgium (
). In Friedl v. Austria
(), the police photographed a participant in a public demonstration in a public
place, confirmed his identity, and retained a record of his details. They did so only after
requesting that the demonstrators disperse, and the European Commission held that the
photographing did not constitute an infringement of Article
.

See, for example, Leander v. Sweden (
), para.
; Rotaru v. Romania (), paras. - .
In Amann v. Switzerland (), paras -: the compilation of data by security services on
particular individuals even without the use of covert surveillance methods constituted interference
with the applicants’ private lives. Also see Perry v. The United Kingdom (), para. 
.

This list is neither exhaustive nor prescriptive. It draws upon “Derbyshire
Constabulary: Debriefing of Policing Operations”, p. , available at
http://w w w.derbyshire.police.uk/sei/s/864/f10.pdf.

In CDPP v. Moldova (), for example, the European Court of Human Rights was “not
persuaded that the singing of a fairly mild student song could reasonably be interpreted as a
call to public violence”.

See Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey (), para. 
. Note that, in Tsonev v. Bulgaria
(), the European Court of Human Rights found that there was no evidence that merely
by using the word “revolutionary”, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party represented a


threat to Bulgarian society or to the Bulgarian state. Nor was there anything in the party’s
constitution that suggested that it intended to use violence in pursuit of its goals.


See, for example, para.  of the Johannesburg Principles, op. cit., note
.

In the case of Cisse v. France (), the ECtHR stated (at para. ) that “[t]he Court does
not share the Government’s view that the fact that the applicant was an illegal immigrant
sufficed to justify a breach of her right to freedom of assembly, as ... [inter alia] ... peaceful
protest against legislation which has been contravened does not constitute a legitimate aim
for a restriction on liberty within the meaning of Article  § .”

The Appendix to Recommendation No. R()  defines hate speech as “covering all
forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia,
antisemitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance
expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against
minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin”. See further, the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and Resolution (
)  of the Committee
of Ministers on Measures to be taken against incitement to racial, national and religious
hatred. Also see the Holocaust-denial cases of Ernst Zündel v. Canada, Communication No.
/, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
/D// (), para. .: “The restriction ... served
the purpose of protecting the Jewish communities’ right to religious freedom, freedom of
expression, and their right to live in a society free of discrimination, and also found support
in article , paragraph , of the Covenant”; and Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication
No. /, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
/D// (), para. .: “Since the statements
... read in their full context, were of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-semitic feelings,
the restriction served the respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear of an
atmosphere of anti-semitism.”

Note, however, that Section  of the Bill of Rights Chapter of the South African Constitution
explicitly excludes protection for propaganda for war (alongside incitement of imminent
violence and advocacy of hatred).

See Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (
, admissibility).

Paragraph  of Resolution  on the Declaration on the Police adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in  states that “police officers shall
receive clear and precise instructions as to the manner and circumstances in which they
may make use of arms”. Similarly, para.  of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that governments and law enforcement
agencies shall adopt and implement rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms
against persons by law enforcement officials.

See Simsek v. Turkey (), para. .

See, for example, the UK case of Austin v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (), para. .

Principle , Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

Ibid., Principle  .


An example of such guidance was issued to Army officers serving in Northern Ireland

To ensure comprehensive reporting of uses of non-deadly force, agencies should define
“force” broadly. See further, for example, “Principles for Promoting Police Integrity”, United
States Department of Justice (), pp. -, para. , “Use of Force Reporting”, available at
http://w w w.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf.
 


UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, para. ;
Simsek and Others v. Turkey, para. .

Amnesty International Index: POL / /
. The full text of these principles (available
online at: http://web.amnesty.org/ librar y/ index/engpol30 0 041998) contains further
useful explanatory guidance relating to their implementation.

Op. cit., note  , paras.  and .

Simsek and Others v. Turkey (), para. .

See McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom (), para. ; Kaya v. Turkey (
),
para. ; Kelly and Others v. The United Kingdom (), para.  , Shanaghan v. The
United Kingdom (), para.

; Jordan v. The United Kingdom (), para. ; McKerr

v. The United Kingdom (), para. ; McShane v. The United Kingdom (), para.  .

Kelly and Others v. The United Kingdom (), para.  ; Shanaghan v. The United
Kingdom (), para.

; Jordan v. The United Kingdom (), paras. , ; McShane

v. The United Kingdom (), para.  .

See Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria ().

This legislation draws upon recommendations contained in the Report of the Goldstone
Commission, Towards Peaceful Protest in South Africa (South Africa: Heymann, ).


For example, Article  of the Law of Assemblies in Georgia defines separate roles for
“principal”, “trustee”, “organizer”, and “responsible persons”.

See para.  of “Ensuring Protection—European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders”,
available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesDefenders.pdf.

See, for example, Christina Loudes, Handbook on Observations of Pride Marches (Belgium:
ILGA-Europe, ).

See UN Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, Chapter XV: Monitoring
Demonstrations and Public Meetings, Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Professional Training Series No.  (). Available at
http://w w w.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/train7_a.pdf.

See D. Bryan and N. Jarman, Independent Intervention: Monitoring the police,
parades and public order (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, ), available at
http://w w w.democratic dialogue.org/r12pp.pdf.

Justice Berger, Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (
).

See, for example, Article  of the ICCPR and Article  of the ECHR. Also see “Joint
Statement on Racism and the Media by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression” (March ). In the roundtable sessions held
during the drafting of these Guidelines, evidence was presented that, in some jurisdictions,
law enforcement agencies had destroyed property belonging to media personnel. Such
actions must not be permitted.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples includes a right to be consulted on
decisions and actions that have an impact on indigenous peoples’ rights and freedoms.
About the OSCE/ODIHR

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is the OSCE’s
principal institution to assist participating States “to ensure full respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of
democracy and (…) to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as
promote tolerance throughout society” ( Helsinki Document).

The ODIHR, based in Warsaw, Poland, was created as the Office for Free Elections at
the  Paris Summit and started operating in May . One year later, the name of
the Office was changed to reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and
democratization. Today, it employs more than  staff.

The ODIHR is the leading agency in Europe in the field of election observation. It co-
ordinates and organizes the deployment of several observation missions with thousands
of observers every year to assess whether elections in the OSCE area are in line with
national legislation and international standards. Its unique methodology provides an
in-depth insight into all elements of an electoral process. Through assistance projects,
the ODIHR helps participating States to improve their electoral framework.

The Office’s democratization activities include the following thematic areas: rule of
law, civil society and democratic governance, freedom of movement, gender equality,
and legislative support. The ODIHR implements more than  targeted assistance
programmes every year, seeking both to facilitate and enhance state compliance with
OSCE commitments and to develop democratic structures.

The ODIHR promotes the protection of human rights through technical-assistance

projects and training on human dimension issues. It conducts research and prepares
 

reports on different human rights topics. In addition, the Office organizes several
meetings every year to review the implementation of OSCE human dimension
commitments by participating States. In its anti-terrorism activities, the ODIHR works
to build awareness of human dimension issues and carries out projects that address
factors engendering terrorism. The ODIHR is also at the forefront of international
efforts to prevent trafficking in human beings and to ensure a co-ordinated response
that puts the rights of victims first.

The ODIHR’s tolerance and non-discrimination programme provides support to

participating States in implementing their OSCE commitments and in strengthening
their efforts to respond to, and combat, hate crimes and violent manifestations of
intolerance. The programme also aims to strengthen civil society’s capacity to respond
to hate-motivated crimes and incidents.

The ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on Roma and Sinti.
It promotes capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities
and encourages the participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making
bodies. The Office also acts as a clearing house for the exchange of information on
Roma and Sinti issues among national and international actors.

All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE
institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.

More information is available on the ODIHR website ( www.osce.org/odihr ).