Australian Army Occasional Paper April 2018

Conflict Theory and Strategy 001

Understanding war’s theory:

What military theory
is, where it fits, and
who influences it?
Australian Army Occasional Paper
Conflict Theory and Strategy 001

Understanding
war’s theory:
What military theory is, where it
fits, and who influences it?
Lieutenant Colonel Nick J Bosio, CSC
© Commonwealth of Australia 2018
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ISSN: 2209-1270 (printed version)

ISSN: 2209-1289 (digital version)

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY OCCASIONAL
PAPER SERIES
This paper is an Occasional Paper published by the Australian Army
Research Centre (AARC). AARC was established by Chief of Army to foster
knowledge of, and debate on, the profession of arms. To achieve this, AARC
will sponsor research into the future of land power and related topics, and
publish the results as either Occasional Papers or Monographs under one of
the following seven themes:

1. Future of Army Series

2. Conflict Theory and Strategy Series
3. Command and Leadership Series
4. Human Performance Series
5. Operational Development Series
6. Technical Development Series
7. Ethos and Ethics Series
All papers published in this series will have the aim of advancing knowledge
in an area related to Army, or fostering debate which is likely to enhance
thinking about the profession of arms.

For further debate in some of these areas please see:

https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/blog

CONFLICT THEORY AND

STRATEGY SERIES
This paper is part of the Occasional Paper – Conflict Theory and Strategy
Series and is published in line with the Chief of Army’s primary task for
AARC: to foster knowledge and debate about the profession of arms. Since
warfare began, military leaders have considered what they do and studied
the theories behind their actions. Today we study many of these thinkers
and writers from the past while considering how their thinking fits into the
modern construct of warfare both now and into the future. The unique
challenges of modern conflict prompt the military thinkers of today to study
the theory of warfare with renewed enthusiasm. This paper, and the others
in this series, will add significantly to the body of knowledge in the area of
conflict theory and strategy.

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Abstract
Many military professionals and academics outline the importance of military
theory and the need to study it. Some, like Colin Gray, even highlight how
understanding it allows the profession of arms to better adapt in war. Given
these wise words, would it not seem important to know ‘what’ military
theory is? Is it not significant to know who has shaped it? How do we,
as professionals, tell if something is military theory, or just opinion and
conjecture? Knowing what military theory is, and what it is not, is vital. It
helps identify what writings further our understanding of war and warfare,
and guides professional military education and research for future doctrine
and training. This work answers the questions of what military theory is,
where it sits within the wider context of the study of conflict, and which
theorists are key in defining its body of knowledge.

The work first defines what military theory is. Military theory is a field of
study that seeks to understand the phenomena of war and its links to wider
conflict; and provides a framework for the valid creation and dissemination
of the knowledge of war and warfare. In other words, military theory is the
epistemology of war. This definition highlights that research into military
theory is grounded in the philosophy of scientific inquiry and, much like
applied history, must use broad scientific methods – using hypothesis
and empirical data based in history; not just a single incident, war or
technological advancement – to develop its concepts. Understanding this
also provides a guide to test whether a new or modern idea is effective
‘military theory’, or merely ‘military notion’. The definition also indicates
that the focus of military theory is the development of first principles
knowledge about war and warfare. It is this knowledge that allows planners,

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commanders and senior decision makers to adapt their know-how of war
fighting to changing situations, environments and political objectives. It is
also this knowledge that can be enhanced through wider study.

The analysis of what military theory is, also demonstrates where military
theory fits within wider academic disciplines. Although other humanities
disciplines like history can support military theory, its focus on applied theory
gives it strong links to other applied social sciences like political science,
international relations and economics. These other disciplines overlap with
military theory, and provide an avenue to potentially advance military theory’s
understanding of power, influence and war’s wider links to conflict. Such
links assist in broadening the military theory body of knowledge – a body
of knowledge that is not codified, but is instead shaped by foundational
theorists.

Who these foundation theorists are, or who is most influential, is also

answered by this work. By analysing the curriculums of staff colleges around
the world, this work has identified the top 20 theorists currently accepted as
most influential. The analysis also suggests a normalising of military theory
across the globe, including a possible convergence between the conceptual
Eastern and Western ways of war.

Overall, this work provides a definition for military theory and highlights
the key theorists that shape our views on it now and into the future.
This is supported with guidance that allows us to test future theories.
Understanding what military theory is and who shapes it lays the foundation
to allow the profession to debate where future advancements in military
theory should focus to best support planners, commanders and senior
decision makers.

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Acknowledgements
This monograph is based in part on my ongoing PhD research entitled
‘On War’s Theory: Finding a Relationship Between Military and Systems
Theory.’ It is derived from one of my foundational chapters that considers
what military theory is and who influences it. As an edited version, the data
collected from staff colleges, as well as the analysis of Agenda-Setting
Theory and its adaption to military education, is not included. However, it is
available on request.

Because this monograph has been so heavily based on my ongoing

research, I would like to firstly thank my PhD committee; Professor John
Blaxland (Chair), Dr Russell Glenn and Honorary Associate Professor Barry
Newell; for the assistance they have provided up until this point.

The data collected from staff colleges would not have been possible without
the support and efforts of the Directorate of Protocol and Visits, International
Policy Division (Australian Department of Defence); the Directorate of
International Engagement – Army and their liaison officers (Australian Army);
and the Defence Attachés stationed in Canberra. Furthermore, I wish to
acknowledge the support provided by the commanders and staff of the
following institutions (in national alphabetical order): the Royal Brunei Armed
Forces Defence Academy; the Canadian Forces College; Bundeswehr
Command and Staff College (Germany); Netherlands Defence College;
the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Massey University, New
Zealand); the New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College; the
Singaporean Armed Forces Command and Staff College; Spanish Joint Staff
School; US Army War College; and US Marine Corps Command and Staff
College. Without these institutions’ support, there would have been no staff
college information for the research.

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I would also like to thank Timothy Thomas and Lester Grau from the Foreign
Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth for their assistance on Russian
military theorists. This has been critical to provide additional breadth to the
work.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Kristen, and my three daughters.

The author
Lieutenant Colonel Nick Bosio CSC is currently the Commanding Officer of
the 6th Engineer Support Regiment. His postings cover tactical, operational
and strategic positions in both command and staff roles, including troop and
squadron command in the 1st Combat Engineer Regiment; and staff roles
in the Australian Defence Staff – Papua New Guinea (Lae), the Directorate
of Future Land Warfare (Army Headquarters), and Contestability Division
(Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group). He has a wide range of operational
experiences in the Region and the Middle East. These experiences include
command positions, plans officer and most recently the first Chief of
Campaign Plans for Operation Inherent Resolve – the US led operation to
defeat Islamic State. Academically, he holds a Bachelor of Engineering with
Honours, a Master of Engineering Science, a Master of Systems Engineering
and a Master of Military and Defence Studies. He is a graduate of the
Australian Command and Staff College and is a member of the Institute of
Engineers Australia. He is currently studying a research PhD at the Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, focusing on
military theory.

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Chapter 1 – Why military theory?

An introduction
General theory [of war] has no difficulty coping adequately with
changing strategic contexts and recently novel-seeming conflict. The
general theory both of war and of strategy insists that they address
and command phenomena that effectively are permanent in nature,
but also are ever certain to manifest themselves in belligerencies that
can be very different in character. Furthermore, the rich diversity in
character of conflict was as plainly discernible in ancient times at it is
today. Then, now, and in the future, the phenomena are captured well
enough in the general theories of war and strategy.

Colin Gray, ‘Politics, Strategy and the Stream of Time’1

Colin Gray’s discussion highlights how understanding theory enables

militaries to operate in, and adjust to, changing circumstances within war
and broader conflict. Given these wise words, would it not seem important
to know what military theory is? Should we not understand where it fits
within the great disciplines of knowledge? Is it not vital to know who has
shaped it? How do we, as professionals, further military theory if we do
not know what it is? Is writing a blog on ideas such as Clausewitz’s centre
of gravity a part of military theory, or just general discussion? What about
doctrine – does it come before or after theory? If understanding military
theory allows the profession of arms to better adapt in war, then why should
we, military professional and academics alike, consider other areas of study?
If we do, which other disciplines are useful?

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Knowing what military theory is, and what it is not, is vital. It helps highlight
what writings relate to military theory – furthering our understanding of war
and warfare – and what is opinion or historiographical discussion. It guides
professional military education, shaping our awareness of the general
theories that relate to war and specific theories relevant only in certain
contexts. It helps to define the body of knowledge, and is itself defined by
the theorists we chose to study. More importantly, it helps us understand
which other disciplines relate to the phenomenon that is war – linking military
theory to areas of political, economic and social study.2

Although many texts detail the importance of theory to military endeavours,

few describe what is meant by the term. Colin Gray’s description above
highlights what military theory provides, but does not define what military
theory is. His words are echoed by many historical military thinkers. Antoine-
Henri Jomini, a Swiss officer who was a French and Russian general during
the Napoleonic Wars, viewed theory – or ‘the art of war’ – as essential ‘…
for a general, or for a staff officer, [as] this knowledge is indispensable.’3
Julian Corbett, one of the great maritime theorists, highlighted that theory’s
‘…main practical value is that it can assist a capable man to acquire a
broader outlook’, thereby increasing the likelihood of success.4 Mao Tse-
tung, the founding father of the People’s Republic of China and a skilled
insurgency general, indicated that ‘[e]pistemologically speaking, …[only by]
taking an objective all-sided view in making a study of war can we draw
correct conclusions on the question of war.’5 These, and other, military
thinkers highlight its importance, but do not define what military theory is.
This is further clouded by the Encyclopaedia of Military Science. It provides
an entry for ‘military science’ as an overarching area of study. It then
highlights that ‘…military science often addresses related issues including…
military theory’, but it does not go on to define what military theory is.6 Jan
Angstrom and JJ Widen, in their book Contemporary Military Theory, outline
the key themes of military theory but do not settle on a succinct definition.7
With so many views, how can we possibly define military theory and identify
who are the key theorists shaping its future?

Given its importance, this work focuses on military theory: what it is, how
it relates to wider theory, and who has shaped it. In doing so, this work
not only defines military theory, it places it within the wider military and
conflict studies context. The work comprises of five chapters, including
this introduction. Chapter 2 defines military theory, highlighting how it is an

8
epistemology of war. Chapter 3 then places military theory within the context
of the wider study of conflict and national power. This illustrates how military
theory links with other applied social science disciplines. With this context
understood, Chapter 4 identifies the key theorists who shape current,
and influence future, military theory, including which areas of study they
are most associated with. Finally, Chapter 5 highlights how the definition
guides a military professional’s ability to test if something is military theory or
conjecture, and provides some initial observations that can be drawn from
the work, providing a starting point for future avenues of research.

In addition to the chapters, this work seeks to increase general awareness

of the importance of theory more broadly and, where applicable, enhance
understanding of theory’s link to decisions. By doing this, the work provides
a basis to enable informed discussion on what theory means for current and
future education and operational planning. Furthermore, the work includes
text boxes that provide definitions of key words in bold-italic; highlight
additional facts; or explain linked theories and methodologies. These
definitions are all captured in Annex A – Glossary.

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Chapter 2 – What is military theory?

An epistemology of war
Theory and practice, explanatory and normative, can thus be
understood as two sides of the same coin. Rather than a choice
between practical utility and explanatory value, military theory is
a means of achieving both objectives… Just like politics, war and
warfare, without theory, are also in danger of being controlled by
prejudice, gut feelings, and untested and potentially invalid causal
propositions.

Jan Angstrom and JJ Widen, Contemporary Military Theory8

Theory – ‘…a coherent group of general propositions used as principles of

explanation for a class of phenomena’9 – forms the foundation of mental
models and world views.10 Within each discipline, theory defines the field of
study; bounds its problem space; and
brings order by categorising the Mental models
phenomena under consideration – also
known as the field’s taxonomy and Mental models are defined
typology.11 Through these actions, as ‘…deeply ingrained
theory helps explain the phenomena and assumptions, generalisations,
develops the concepts, ideas, language or even pictures or images that
and practical applications of a discipline. influence how…’ an individual,
This increases knowledge and allows for organisation or discipline
the ‘…teaching of the truth or understands different theories,
development of the truth of a subject.’12 concepts and the real world.

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Without theory, knowledge could only be attained through direct empirical
observation – experience, experiment, practice and application. For
militaries, such empirical experience only comes from war, meaning militaries
would have to be constantly at war. However, theory allows military
practitioners to understand conflict before any ‘practical application’ must
occur. It is theory, specifically military theory, that this chapter discusses and
defines. To do this, the chapter first highlights the links between theory and
knowledge. Using this, the chapter then considers how military theory is
focused predominately on first principles, or propositional, knowledge. This
then allows the chapter to define military theory as an epistemology of war
that provides a framework to create and disseminate knowledge.

Theory and knowledge – intrinsically linked

Theory (general)

A specific ‘theory’ is a statement that:

• outlines a set-of-laws, the empirical generalisation about a

phenomenon;
• is axiomatic, meaning it details terms, language, truisms and
derived ideas (definitions, axioms and propositions) that define
the boundaries of study and a phenomenon; or
• details the causal processes, or the inter-relationships and causal
links, that occur within a phenomenon.
More broadly, a theory of a topic covers all the theory statements related
to that topic.

Theory forms the foundation of knowledge, and knowledge expands theory,

thereby building further knowledge.13 This cycle is normally intuitive, and can
be seen through the research into single and double loop learning, or John
Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop concept.14 Although there
are many types of knowledge, two are critically influenced by, and directly
affect, theory: propositional and procedural knowledge.15 These two types of
knowledge provide the ‘how, where, what and why’ of theory and process.16
Procedural knowledge, or ‘knowledge of how’,

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 ...is concerned with how things are done. …An example is the military
appreciation process [a planning process used to develop military
plans for operations and combat]. The intent of a [training] lesson on
this is to teach students how to plan. Tactical exercises …are focused
on implementation, reinforcing how to use the process. Collective
training through command post exercises… enhance understanding
on where to use the process.17 [Emphasis added]

The ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of knowledge

In Figure 2.1, the ‘how’ knowledge does not overlap with the ‘why’
knowledge. This is intentional within both the diagram and the Australian
Army’s Ryan Review. When one considers propositional and procedural
knowledge – both separately and their overlap – it is seen that one does
not need to understand ‘why’ something works to make it work. Nor
does understanding ‘how’ something occurs give insight into ‘why’ it
works that way.

An example is the internal combustion engine found in a car.

Understanding why an engine works – thermodynamics, fluid mechanics,
chemistry and physics – does not mean a person will understand how
the engine works or, more importantly, how to fix it when it breaks. Nor
does understanding how the engine operates lead one to understand
the underlying chemistry and physics of the engine (the ‘why’).

A historic example can be seen within Civil Engineering and the

development of the arch. Through trial and error, the Romans understood
how to build an arch and where it should be built. However, they had
a limited understanding of the underlying principles (what), and no real
understanding of the concept of forces and their vector transition (why).
Fast forward to today, and a modern civil engineer graduate, straight
out of university, can (should) explain where to use an arch, what are its
principles, and why it works. However, they are highly unlikely to have any
clue as to how to build one in any practical sense.

Meanwhile, propositional knowledge, or ‘knowledge of that’, consists of

knowledge that is fact (sometimes argued as truth). In the above example,
propositional knowledge would explain what the process is attempting
to achieve – in this case, it is a catalyst to force human mental models to

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be tested and challenged – and why the process is executed like it is – to
align with human cognition and heuristic usage to make the process more
natural for people to execute.18 Although these two types of knowledge are
often discussed separately, they actually overlap (Figure 2.1). It is the inter-
relationship between these knowledge types that creates and shapes the
‘…general propositions… for a class of phenomena.’19 The principles that
guide this inter-relationship for a specific area of inquiry are contained within
the philosophy of knowledge – or epistemology.20 Military theory is one
such area of inquiry.

KNOWLEDGE OF SOMETHING
Propositional
knowledge
WHAT
HOW is the underlying
something is done principle of it

WHERE WHY
to do something does it work
Procedural
knowledge

Figure 2.1 – Interrelationship between procedural and propositional knowledge

This diagram is adapted from the Australian Army’s Ryan Review (Ryan, 2016) into
training, education and doctrine. It highlights the relationship between prodedural
knowledge – the how and where of something (knowledge of procedures and
processes) – and propositional knowledge – understanding the what and why of
something (knowledge of the underlying first principles of theory).

Discovering what military theory is

As already discussed in Chapter 1, many texts detail the importance of
military theory, while few define it. Angstrom and Widen probably best
summarise the case as to why military theory is important with their
comment that without this theory the study, discussion and knowledge
concerning war and warfare is likely to descend into ‘…prejudice, gut
feelings, and untested and potentially invalid causal propositions.’21 Such

14
situations can lead to false conclusions
Epistemology
concerning the nature of war and
the characteristics of warfare – or, as Narrowly, epistemology is
Lieutenant General HR McMaster calls defined as ‘…the branch of
them, ‘the four fallacies’ (see sidebar philosophy which deals with the
‘The Four Fallacies’22) that ‘…try to turn origin, nature, methods, and
war into something alien to its nature.’ 23 limits of human knowledge.’
This highlights the importance of first However, more broadly, it is
understanding ‘what’ military theory the field of philosophy that
‘is’. Only by knowing what it is, is it considers ‘…issues having
to do with the creation and
possible to test if an idea furthers
dissemination of knowledge in
military theory’s body of knowledge,
particular areas of inquiry.’
or falls into the fallacies produced by
prejudice. Luckily, Clausewitz provides
both reasons for, and an initial definition of, military theory.

Clausewitz argued that theory is ‘…an analytical investigation leading to a

close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience – in our case,
to military history – it leads to thorough familiarity with it.’24 Clausewitz also
stated that:

[t]he primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas

that have become …confused and entangled. Not until terms and
concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in
examining the question clearly and simply’25

In essence, Clausewitz highlighted that by using theory to examine the

question of war, knowledge of war can be formed. This indicates how
studying theory assists in the ‘…teaching of the truth or development of the
truth of a subject.’26 Clausewitz’s view is then echoed by Milan Vego, who
describes military theory as:

...a comprehensive analysis of all the aspects of warfare, its patterns

and inner structure, and the mutual relationships of its various
components/elements. It also encapsulates political, economic, and
social relationships within a society and among the societies that
create a conflict and lead to a war. Sound military theory explains how
to conduct and win a war. It also includes the use of military force to
prevent the outbreak of war.27

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Although the above includes aspects of procedural knowledge concerning
‘how’ to conduct war, the focus of the definition is on the development
of first principle theory, or propositional knowledge, concerning war and
society.28

The four fallacies

LTG McMaster highlights that the learning and advancement of military

theory is often hampered by four fallacies. These fallacies; normally based
on technological or postmodern concepts; ignore, at least in part, history
and the human/political nature of war.

The Vampire Fallacy. Called the ‘Vampire Fallacy’ because the idea seems
to never die, it focuses on technology. The concept is that technology
will make ‘…the next war fundamentally different from all that had come
before …[shifting] uncertainty to that of certainty.’ The idea has been
around since the 1920s (strategic bombing) and has led to ‘Shock and
Awe’, and the deterministic use of Effects Based Operations and Network
Centric Warfare.

The Zero Dark Thirty Fallacy. This fallacy see strategic focus on special
forces, drone and counter-terrorist operations at the expensive of
joint (and combined joint) operations. As McMaster highlights, these
operations ‘…are often unable to affect the human and political drivers of
armed conflict or make progress toward achieving sustainable outcomes
consistent with vital interests.’

The Land Proxy Fallacy. This is a belief that proxy land forces will achieve,
in full, the expected strategic outcomes. The fallacy ignores human nature
and the potentially divergent goals of the proxy force.

The RSVP Fallacy. This fallacy seeks to solve the complex nature of future
war by ‘opting out’ of certain types of conflict. Such approaches ignore
both the ‘…enemies in wars or the adversaries between wars.’
Military theory defined
The focus on knowledge seen in Clausewitz and Vego’s work is reinforced by
the war theorists cited in Chapter 1. These theorists advocated developing
knowledge and understanding on all aspects of war – not just the procedural
‘know-how’ of waging warfare. Using this as a premise highlights that military
theory is focused on the ‘…creation and dissemination of knowledge in
particular areas of inquiry.’29 This is reinforced by the key themes Angstrom
and Widen identified (see sidebar ‘The Themes of Military Theory’).30 Each
of these themes support the creation of knowledge, through valid
methodologies, and provide a framework to understand and disseminate
that knowledge. This suggests an epistemology focusing on war.

Therefore, military theory can be

viewed as an epistemology relating Military theory
to all aspects of war – including its
An epistemology relating to the
relationship to society and wider
phenomenon of war, and all its
conflict. It specifically seeks to
related aspects, that seeks to
understand the phenomenon known as
understand it and its links to
war, while also providing a framework
wider conflict; and provide a
for the valid creation and dissemination
framework for the valid creation
of this knowledge. Validity is important
and dissemination of knowledge
and directly relates to two military
concerning war and warfare.
theory themes: Methodology of Military
Theory and Theory and Practice. This
definition also highlights that the focus of military theory is broader than the
limited modern interpretation of war, being ‘…a conflict carried on by force
of arms, as between nations or states, or between parties within a state.’31
Therefore, to understand the relevance and importance of military theory
as an epistemology of war, it is necessary to recognise how military theory
relates to the wider study of conflict.

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Chapter 3 – Military theory placed in a
wider context

Placing war’s theory within the wider conflict

studies
…many important elements of security studies cannot be separated
from the political, economic or social elements of the international
system. One cannot simply study the military implications of war
without understanding the roots of the rivalry between actors, such as
considerations of power, status, ideology and wealth. Politics remains
at the very roots of war.

Craig Synder, Contemporary Security and Strategy32

Craig Synder highlights that military theory cannot be considered in isolation.

It is intrinsically linked to the wider study of politics and society. However,
the extent of that overlap is difficult to define. This chapter provides a
framework to consider this overlap. It uses the analogy that conflict is a logic
set, meaning a Venn diagram can be used to illustrate not only how military
theory is entwined with other disciplines, but also how the study of war
more generally requires a multi-disciplinary approach. After all, the study of
politics and power is considered by many disciplines, why should war – an
extension of politics – be any different? However, to set the scene for this
discussion, it is useful to consider the history of the word ‘war.’

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The history of a word tells a story – the story of the
word ‘war’
The distinction between war and conflict can be, and historically has been,
blurred. The history – or etymology – of the word ‘war’ stems from the root
Proto-Germanic word of werz-a (to confuse, perplex), and then into Old
French (guerre: difficulty, dispute, hostility, fight, combat, war).33 This history
indicates that the word ‘war’ was derived from ideas and concepts that
covered more than just the modern interpretation of nation-state military
action. The word included concepts like disputes, rising diplomatic and
cultural hostility, tensions, and broader conflict. Compare this to the modern
definition for war. The modern definition is derived from the Proto-Italic and
Latin word bellum (battle, combat, military force).34 How did today’s ‘war’
diverge from its original Proto-Germanic roots? According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, which both defines and traces the history of words,
language historians believe the change occurred during the rise of the
Roman Empire to stop the expanding empire getting confused over two
similar sounding, but very different, words.35

Apparently, the expanding Roman society often confused the two Latin
words bellum and bello (beautiful).36 Therefore, the Romans chose the
Germanic word werra; one linked to Gaul, Spain and Saxon; to replace the
word bellum, but not the definition. In effect, werra took on the meaning
of, and replaced, bellum.37 Through this transition, and the subsequent
morphing of certain European languages due to Roman influence, modern
day languages like English have been heavily influence by the Roman’s
use of the word ‘war.’38 This has led to today’s limited definition, where
war consists of discrete activities ‘…carried on by force of arms, as in a
series of battles or campaigns.’39 The possible effect on interpreting and
translating historical texts due to the Roman influenced definition of the
word ‘war’ is an interesting point, but beyond the extent of this work.
However, this discussion is useful in two ways. Firstly, it suggests the need
for further research that may partly explain why translated historical texts,
and their ongoing interpretations, refer only to ‘war’ without often a wider
consideration of broader ‘conflict’. Secondly, it highlights that through the
history of the word ‘war’, there are links between war and wider conflict.

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War is more than ‘war’
Acknowledging the historical development of the word ‘war’ helps to
highlight how war and conflict are connected. It indicates that:

[a]ll war is conflict, yet not all conflict is termed war, with the spectrum
extending from ‘no conflict’ situations – like humanitarian relief – up to
and including ‘total war’ between states. This reaffirms that conflict,
at any level, is a competition of political and human will that can use
violent and non-violent means to influence a diverse group of actors
to achieve the political objective.40

Given this idea of competition, ‘conflict’ can be seen to include economic,

trade and diplomatic conflict, trade sanctions, espionage, sabotage,
terrorism, insurgency, human security, and other non-traditional military
considerations.41 This helps to explain why the concepts of ‘economic war’
and ‘trade war’ exist in other, non-military, areas of study – even though
these phrases do not relate to the modern definition. Furthermore, since
war is conflict, the ‘conflict set’ includes all aspects of military theory: from
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs); up to and including operational
and strategic concepts and war philosophies. Therefore, even though the
modern definition of war may have diverged from its original etymology, it is
possible to place military theory within the context of both ‘war’ and conflict
more broadly.

Military theory within conflict studies – a Venn

diagram representation
Using the term ‘conflict set’ in the previous paragraph is deliberate. It sets
the stage for an analogy – that conflict is a logic set, and can be represented
as a Venn diagram.42 A ‘set’ is a grouping of objects, and in this analogy
the different theories and ideas that make up the study of conflict form
the ‘objects’ that can be grouped together to understand how they may
conceptually overlap. Conflict as a logic set is very broad. When one
considers the root of the words ‘war’ and ‘conflict’, it makes sense that the
study of conflict includes all possible violent and non-violent competition
between social groups – be it nation-states, non-state actors, international
actors, or even cultural groupings within a larger social construct (ie Sunni

21
and Shiite conflict within Iraq).
What about philosophy?
Such a diverse range forms the
universal set of the Venn diagram Philosophy exists in all disciplines
representation – the set that in some way. Every discipline
contains all the different information has its own philosophical view
types and possibilities under points and paradigm debates.
consideration. It is this analogy, and These shape different schools of
its Venn diagram representation, thought and a discipline’s world
that provides a useful way to views and ideal-types. Philosophy
visualise how military theory – being interacts with all concepts and
a ‘set’ within the wider ‘universal disciplines. Therefore, philosophy
set’ – fits within conflict, as well – though relevant to all theory – is
as how it interacts with other not included within this analogy.
disciplines that influence thinking on Instead, it is taken as an ‘axiom’
national power: economics, law and that underpins all ‘information sets.’
international relations. To establish
this representation, it is first necessary to provide the scope of the study of
conflict.

Conflict studies – infinite permutations within

multiple disciplines
There are potentially infinite permutations of topics, research areas and
theories within conflict studies. Issues covering environmental threats, food
and resource concerns, women and children’s safety, cultural stability,
poverty, and societal disenfranchisement have all been included as a part of
the study of conflict.43 However, to help illustrate the breadth of study and
the possible links across disciplines, twenty concepts have been selected as
indicative ideas within the wider field. These topics, listed at Table 3.1, form
the ‘data elements’ of the Venn diagram framework, and broadly provide
a useful representation of the areas of concern within the wider study of
conflict and its relationship with state, non-state and multi-national actors.

These twenty concepts straddle a number of different academic disciplines.

For example, in the table above, serial six, Law of Armed Conflict, is studied
by students of law as well as military professionals. Serial three, Strategic
Concepts, though a major focus for senior military professionals, is also
a key part of a diplomat’s study. Therefore, it is necessary to group these

22
concepts, or data elements, as an illustration of the possible relationships
between disciplines. This starts to form the ‘information sets’ of a Venn
diagram.

Table 3.1 – Conflict Venn diagram concepts (‘data elements’)

Serial Concept Serial Concept

Tactics, Techniques and

1 11 Espionage
Procedures

2 Operational Concepts 12 Sabotage

3 Strategic Concepts 13 Corporate Actions

4 Military Power Construct 14 Arms Trade

5 Military Economics 15 Piracy

6 Law of Armed Conflict 16 Human Security

7 Economic War 17 Human Rights

8 Trade War 18 Terrorism

9 Sanctions 19 Trans-National Crime

Resource Limits and

10 Diplomatic Disagreement 20
Constraints

It is acknowledged that when considering conflict there are many fields of

study that overlap. Conflict and peace studies, philosophy, history, political
science (broadly), sociology and psychology are all examples of areas of
research that either contribute to, or are a significant part of, understanding
conflict. However, for simplicity, only those applied areas of study that could
have a direct correlation with the national levers of power – diplomacy,
information (and legal), military and economic – have been considered. These
form the ‘information sets’ under the four disciplines of international relations,
law studies, economics and military theory.44 Using this as a guide, it is
possible to identify which discipline primarily considers a particular concept,
and which disciplines may be related. Using the Strategic Concepts example,
military theory would be a prime discipline for its study. However, both
international relations and economics would relate to strategy, and therefore

23
would be incidental disciplines. From this simplified analysis, the concepts
are related to different disciplines, as seen in Table 3.2. This data can then
be developed into a visual representation that shows the inter-relationships
between different disciplines and the study of conflict.

The data in Table 3.2 highlights how concepts relate to different disciplines. It
is much like a matrix, indicating how different data elements relate to various
information sets. Using this, it is possible to group the ‘data elements’ –
concepts – by their primary disciplines within the ‘conflict universe set’. This
starts to demonstrate the spread of issues across the different disciplines, as
is seen in Figure 3.1, allowing the concepts to be grouped.

Figure 3.1 – The Conflict Universe Set

The concepts that form the conflict studies spectrum are placed within the universal
set called ‘conflict’. Using the identified primary fields of study, the concepts are
grouped into Military Theory, Economic, International Relations and Law Studies.
These start to highlight the breadth of the fields of study – or the ‘information sets’.

Grouping concepts – forming the Venn diagram

framework
The work so far starts to show the links between military theory and the
study of wider conflict. Using this as a foundation, it is possible to create a
visual representation of conflict studies and the overlap between disciplines.
To do this, the incidental fields of study, outlined in Table 3.2, can be used
to illustrate the idea of multi-discipline overlap. To visually represent this,
one builds the Venn diagram one information set at a time. Because military
theory is wholly concerned with war – though not necessarily concerned
with the full spectrum of conflict – the entire discipline is contained within
the universal conflict set. Therefore, it should be the first field that is visually
represented, as seen in Figure 3.2

24
Table 3.2 – Conflict concepts linked to fields of study

Field of Study
Serial Concept
Primary Incidental
Tactics, Techniques
1 Military Theory NA
and Procedures
2 Operational Concepts Military Theory NA
International Relations,
3 Strategic Concepts Military Theory
Economics
Military Power International Relations,
4 Military Theory
Construct Economics, Law
5 Military Economics Military Theory Economics
6 Law of Armed Conflict Military Theory Law
7 Economic War Economics International Relations
8 Trade War Economics International Relations
International Relations,
9 Sanctions Economics
Military Theory
Diplomatic
10 International Relations NA1
Disagreement
11 Espionage International Relations Law2
12 Sabotage International Relations Economics
13 Corporate Actions International Relations Economics, Law
Economics, Military,
14 Arms Trade International Relations
Law
Military Theory,
15 Piracy Law Studies
International Relations
16 Human Security International Relations Economics, Law
17 Human Rights Law Studies International Relations
Military Theory, Law,
18 Terrorism International Relations
Economics
19 Trans-National Crime Law Studies Military Theory
Resource Limits and
20 Economics International Relations
Constraints

25
Figure 3.2 – Military Studies as an Information Set

Military Theory, as a discipline, is wholly focused on conflict and war. As such, the
entire information set – or discipline – sits within the wider universal conflict set

Figure 3.2 suggests some of the overlap between other disciplines

and military theory. Concepts like Serial 18 – Terrorism, and Serial 9
– Sanctions, are primarily considered by law studies and economics
respectively. However, as Figure 3.2 shows, they are also of interest to
military theory, particularly at the operational and strategic level. The same
visual representation can be developed for the remaining three disciplines.
However, these three disciplines cover more than conflict and war. Law
studies cover a wide range of international, domestic, civil, criminal and
contract law. Economics considers both wider national and trans-national
impacts, as well as the mathematics of finances. International relations cover
not only the conflict of degrading relations, but also the management of bi
and multi-lateral organisations, diplomacy and trans-national corporations.
As such, the information sets of these disciplines are greater than the
universal conflict set. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.3, with the final Venn
diagram framework represented at Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.3 – Building the Visualisation

Each field of study is added to the diagram to represent their conceptual overlap
and relationships. The information sets for Law Studies, Economics and International
Relations extend beyond the universal set to highlight that they cover more than the
study of conflict. Philosophy is not seen as it is an ‘axiom’ – a given truth.

26
Military theory must consider more than ‘war’
This visual representation, seen in Figure 3.4, illustrates the conceptual
disciplinary overlap – or the metaphoric ‘mathematical intersections’ of
information sets. This framework can be further extended to conceptually
understand how key sub-disciplines, such as war studies and international
security studies, relate to each other and wider military theory. However,
what does this analogy show? It reinforces one of the key themes of military
theory: that military theory is related to other areas of study – particularly the
applied social sciences such as economics, political science, international
relations and law – and these other areas of study can inform military
theory.45 It also supports the fact that military theory’s focus on war is
not limited to discrete nation-state conflict, and must consider the wider
phenomena known as war and conflict. This includes its relationship with
law, economics, diplomacy and society. This simple visual representation
reinforces Clausewitz’s point that ‘…war is not merely an act of policy, but
a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on
with other means.’46 It also leads to the question: Who are the theorists that
influence military theory’s development now and into the future?

Figure 3.4 – Overlapping and Inter-related Disciplines Studying Conflict

The complete Venn diagram representation that highlights the conceptual overlap
between key disciplines and military theory

27
28
Chapter 4 – Influencing military theory

Who are the key theorists that shape research and

future development?
What then qualifies someone as a ‘philosopher’ in the art of war? The
general definition often given for that word is someone that seeks
wisdom and is an expounder of theory or a specific area of experience.
…It is for this reason too that many famous military commanders do
not warrant [the title]. The simple practice of war, however successful,
is not to be equated with the actual study of war. …[However,] [a]s
with all figures in history, the impact of individuals varies wildly.

Daniel Coetzee and Lee W Eysturlid, Philosophers of War:

The Evolution of History’s Greatest Military Thinkers47

In the book Masters of War, Michael Handel details the ‘great classical
theorists’ of Clausewitz, Corbett, Jomini, Machiavelli, Mao Tse-tung, Sun
Tzu, and Thucydides. However, there is no description, or definition, as to
why these theorists are the ‘greats.’ Although Handel is not wrong to say
these thinkers are great theorists, one could argue that the strategic theory
they support could have also been provided by Julius Caesar, Napoleon,
Hans Delbruck, Alexander Svechin, or any other military thinker who meets
the common assumptions Handel identifies in his introduction.48 This does
not make Masters of War an invalid work. However, it does demonstrate the
issue with selecting ‘influential’ or ‘important’ theorists: what are the selection
criteria and why are they more important than others? Identifying these key
theorists is critical to understanding what ideas make up military theory.

29
Unlike some disciplines, military theory does not have a codified ‘body
of knowledge.’49 Instead, in a similar vein to some humanities and social
sciences, it is the key theorists that shape what is understood to be
‘military theory’. Much of the study of foundational military theory consists
of considering history and past theorists; understanding their ideas and
historical settings; and then placing them within modern contexts.50 This
raises more questions – questions often debated in staff colleges and
officers’ messes – which theorists to study? Which are ‘important’ and
‘influential’? How does one tell if Clausewitz is considered more important
than Jomini, Svechin, or even Delbruck? This chapter answers these
questions. Firstly, the chapter adapts Agenda-Setting Theory to the situation
of military education. This demonstrates that one of the key facets in
determining influence is identifying which theorists are taught in military
education institutions. Using this insight, the chapter reviews the curriculums
of staff colleges around the world. This analysis not only ranks the theorists,
it also identifies the key areas of study that they are associated with.
Knowing this identifies which theorists currently shape military theory and
are likely to inform its future development.

Shaping who is influential – Agenda-Setting

Theory in a military context
Agenda-Setting Theory, developed in 1972 by Maxwell McCombs and
Donald Shaw, highlights how the media influences the population’s view
of what issues are important. Broadly speaking, the theory demonstrates
that:51

…editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in

shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue but
also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount
of information in a news story and its position. …[T]hat is, the media
may set the ‘agenda’…52

Underpinning this theory is the availability heuristic. This specific cognitive

tool shapes a person’s perception of importance – the quicker a piece
of information can be recalled, the more important the information is
perceived to be.53 Therefore, when the media focuses on an issue – giving
it significant ‘air time’ across multiple sources and news articles – it

30
becomes easier for the issue to be recalled by the public. This triggers the
availability heuristic, which in turn makes the issue seem more important.
Because of confirmation bias, this increases the weight people place
on the issue at hand.54 This process is not isolated to mass media and
policy development.55 The same concept of presenting selected ideas
to an audience, and thereby shaping their perception of importance and
influencing their future work, could be considered in the area of military
education and theory.

The education that military academics and practitioners receive acts as a

foundation for the research they subsequently undertake. Such research
may have different objectives. It could be something as simple as an
assignment for a military college. It may have a practical outcome, like the
research undertaken to update military doctrine and training. No matter
the reason, undertaking research further internalises ideas and theories,
increasing the researcher’s understanding of specific theorists and their
concepts. At the core of this cycle is the original education provided.
Agenda-Setting Theory influences the cycle of education, research and
new education.56 The military theorists initially taught to the students of war
are the ones most easily recalled. This makes these theorists appear more
important, increasing the likelihood of their use within research endeavours.
These endeavours further advance the theorist within education, training and
doctrine – thereby further feeding the cycle of perceived importance. This
complex interplay indicates that the theorists most often taught as a part of
military theory are the ones perceived as the most important. This perception
influences research and therefore future military theory. Although other
theorists may provide similar (or even alternative) views, the perception of
them is less and – because of the availability heuristic – they are given lower
weight. This insight is valuable as it provides a mechanism to determine
which theorists are currently seen as important, and therefore shape ‘what’
is understood to be the breadth of military theory. Understanding this, and
adapting Agenda-Setting Theory to the military context, provides two criteria
that can be used to determine the influence a theorist has:

1. The breadth of coverage of each theorist, or the number of

institutions that teach the theorist; and
2. The depth of penetration of the theorist, or the number of subjects
that the theorist’s concepts and ideas are used to illustrate the area
under discussion.

31
Using these criteria, data collected from military colleges can be reviewed to
identify who is perceived as the most important theorists, and therefore who
is currently the most influential.

Data collection – understanding what staff

colleges teach
Although training and education occurs throughout military service, there are
certain points in a professional’s life that are major educational experiences.
These points, often key milestones in an officer’s career, are designed
to shape an officer’s mind, preparing them for the next stage of their
service.57 Although initial officer training and War College for senior officers
are examples of such educational interventions, it is often the staff college
– for mid-ranked officers of major to lieutenant colonel (service/nation
equivalent) – that has the greatest effect. This is the college that transitions
military officers from their tactical, often rote learned, skills towards the first
principles theory of operational and strategic thinking. In many ways, Staff
College can be likened to secondary school: transitioning from elementary
education – initial officer training necessary to do one’s immediate role
– towards the underlying theory behind the training, or outlining why
battles and wars are fought in different ways. It is also this level, much like
secondary school, where key theorists are introduced and used to illustrate
conceptual thinking. Because of the importance given to staff colleges
for military development and senior officer selection, understanding which
theorists are taught helps demonstrate which theorists are most likely to
remember by military professionals and academics alike, and therefore be
consider important and influential.

To discover which theorists are taught, it was necessary to collect

information from different staff colleges around the world. This was achieved
through three methods. Firstly, a formal request for information was sent
to the Defence Attachés stationed in Canberra, Australia.58 Secondly, the
Australian Army provided assistance by contacting several countries via
its Australian Army liaison officer network.59 Finally, a series of secondary
sources were used to enhance the data overall.60 These approaches elicited
data from 14 staff colleges: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Germany, Indonesia,
Japan (Army), the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Thailand, Singapore,
Spain and the United States of America (US Army and US Marine Corps).

32
This is a broadly even spread of colleges from across four continents: North
America (three colleges), Asia (five colleges), Oceania (two colleges) and
Europe (four colleges). It is also a strong number of ‘Five-Eyes’; or American,
British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand, staff colleges.

Although the ‘Five-Eyes’ construct is an intelligence specific agreement,

these five nations share a range of integration, standards, training, concepts
and doctrine to ensure the nations can easily operate together in coalition
environments. This often has flow on effects in key military institutions across
the world like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Five
Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA), thereby shaping other militaries’
thinking, training and doctrine. Given this, it is important to have good
data spread from Five-Eyes nations. Of the eight possible Five-Eyes staff
colleges, data was collected from five of them.61 Furthermore, 11 of the staff
colleges were joint, meaning their students came from all arms and services
of the nation’s defence force. This ensures that the data provides a broad
view across all services and domains. Although still a relatively small sample,
the combination of geographical spread, Five-Eyes inclusion, and joint
colleges indicates that the 14 staff colleges provide a useful representation
of military education across the globe. This data identified 74 separate
theorists studied across 41 different areas of study.62

As Agenda-Setting Theory highlights, there is a correlation between teaching

a specific military theorist and the perception of the importance and influence
of that military theorist. Although this is subjective, it is possible to estimate
the perceived importance of a specific military theorist by first identifying how
many institutions study the theorist, and then cross-referencing this with the
number of subjects that include the theorist. The first criterion, number of
institution, is known as the theorist’s breadth of coverage.

Breadth of coverage – which theorists are taught

the most
Using the data collected, it is possible to rank the theorists by the number
of institutions that use them for instructional purposes. All 74 theorists were
ranked from one – the theorist taught in the most institutions – through
to 74. This ranking highlights that the top five theorists are studied in
approximately three-quarters of all staff colleges (71%). Meanwhile, the

33
top ten theorists, outlined at Table 4.1, are studied in just under half of
all colleges (43%). Although four of the top five, and eight of the top ten,
theorists are Western in origin, it is interesting to note that all Asian staff
colleges study the top five theorists.63 Furthermore, there is an approximately
even distribution of staff colleges from Europe, Asian and Five-Eyes nations
that study the top ten theorists.

Table 4.1: Top 10 theorists by breadth of coverage only

Ranking Theorist

1 Carl von Clausewitz

2 Antoine Henri Jomini

3 Sun Tzu

4 Alfred Thayer Mahan

5 Basil Liddell Hart

6 Julian Corbett

7 Giulio Douhet

8 Helmuth von Moltke the Elder

9 JFC Fuller

10 Mao Tse-tung

The analysis provides a quick reference to who may be considered as

the most important theorist for military studies at this time. However, as
the above discussion on Agenda-Setting theory highlights, importance is
affected not only by who is studied, but also how often they are studied
within a curriculum – or the theorist’s depth of penetration. Therefore, this
initial analysis – the theorist’s breadth of coverage – provides only half the
story. For example, a theorist like Mahan (fourth in Table 4.2) is taught in
many staff colleges. However, if he is only associated with sea power –
one area of study – then his importance, and therefore influence, may be
perceived as less when compared to another theorist associated with more
areas of study – even if this theorist is lower on Table 4.1. Liddell Hart (fifth
in Table 4.2) is one such theorist. This discussion highlights the need to
cross-reference with which areas of study each theorist in used in. It is only

34
this cross-referencing that determines their influence in military theory more
generally. For this, it is necessary to define what the key areas of study
within military theory are.

Studying military theory – identifying the different

areas of study
The Encyclopaedia of Military Science highlights that military studies, or
military science as it defines the term, is not codified within a specific
discipline or body of knowledge.64 Furthermore, its nine separate, but
related, fields of study do not necessarily align with the different areas of
study identified in the staff college data.65 Angstrom and Widen discuss eight
different areas of study in their book Contemporary Military Theory. Although
informative, their work does not separate political level theory (like grand
strategy) and specific types of conflict (like insurgencies and nuclear theory)
from strategy and domain theory.66 Milevski’s book, The Evolution of Modern
Grand Strategic Thought, highlights the importance of grand strategy as a
separate area of study. Given this, and the informative nature of other texts,
the 41 study categories identified in the staff college data were reviewed.
This identified eight broad areas of study:

• War Philosophy. This is the highest level of conceptual study on

and about war. It considers the philosophy, rationale, ethics and
theoretical first principle links to other disciplines. This area of study
considers war’s nature and its abstract links to human endeavour.
• Grand Strategy. This area of study considers the theory, historical
development and current thinking of how all-of-nation, or groups-of-
nations, direct their national power towards a political and security
goal.67
• Strategy. Although linked to Grand Strategy, this area of study
considers the theory, historical development and current thinking of
how military power specifically is integrated within national power
towards a political goal.68
• Operational Theory. This is the area of study that considers the
theory, historical development and current thinking of the operational
level of war – or the campaign.69 It is strongly influenced by strategic
study.

35
 Broad military study focuses

The eight areas of military study can be clustered to form four broad, and
overlapping, military study focus areas that helps to group thinking and
assists in wider analysis of theorist and theory overlaps. These four broad
focus areas are:

War Philosophy – War philosophy corresponds with its area of study

name sake.

Strategic Thinking – Covering the areas of study of grand strategy and

strategy, this theme includes discussions on the theoretical and historical
development of the inter-play of national and military power.

Operational Thinking – This directly correlates with the operational theory

area of study.

Domain Theory – Domain theory relates the study of the specific physical
domains: land, sea and air. This theme most relates to domain specific
thinking for the integration of land, sea and air power into military and
national power, as well as the tactical theory of the employment of land,
sea and air capabilities.

Other – Although not a theme, there are theorists whose ideas cannot
be allocated to any of the above themes. This includes specific context
theories (insurgency/counter-insurgency) and growing areas of discussion
(Cyber, Information Operations).

• Land / Sea / Air Power. Leveraging the lay definitions of land/sea/

air power, these three separate areas of study each considers the
historical development and current thinking for domain specific
theory.70 Most of this study relates to tactical theory, often at
the formation level (corps, division, brigade for land; fleets, fleet,
squadrons for sea; fleet, groups, wings, squadrons for air), with
links into operational theory. Due to the developments of operational
theory and operational art over the last 100 years, many of the
theorists that may have been associated with strategy in the past
are now more associated with domain specific theory.71

36
 • Specific Warfare Characteristics. The final area of study covers
specific studies in selected areas of warfare, like irregular or counter-
insurgency warfare.

These eight areas of study, which generally align with previous works, form
the framework to consider the depth of penetration of each theorist.

Who is most influential – ranking the military

theorists overall
The number of institutions that associate a theorist with a particular area
of study suggests the relative weight of influence that theorist has. The
more institutions that associate the theorist with that area of study, the
more weight the theorist has in that topic. Furthermore, where a theorist
is associated with more than one area of study, this may indicate they
have influence over military theory more widely. The more areas of study a
theorist covers, the wider their influence is across military theory. This forms
the theorist’s depth of penetration into the curriculum specifically and, by
inference, into military theory generally. In most cases, the data provided by
the 14 staff colleges not only identified which theorists were studied, but
also which part of the curriculum the theorist was associated with.72 This
information allows theorists to be correlated with the eight areas of study,
showing the depth of penetration a theorist has across military theory.

The top twenty theorists (by breadth of coverage) were cross-referenced

with their associated areas of study. This provided a ranking of theorists
that had both breadth and depth of coverage across military theory.73
An example of the outcomes of this analysis is seen when comparing
Clausewitz and Jomini. In Clausewitz’s On War, he discusses a wide range
of topics including the tactics of battle. However, the staff college data
indicates that Clausewitz is rarely used to discuss land theory. Instead, most
staff colleges use Clausewitz to illustrate war in the abstract, with a primary
focus on war philosophy and grand strategy. However Jomini, Clausewitz’s
contemporary who discussed similar ideas from a different perspective,
is considered more important than Clausewitz in operational theory and
landpower. This analysis identified the final top 20 theorists that influence

37
Table 4.2 – Top 20 theorists

Rank Theorists Rank Theorists

1 Carl von Clausewitz 11 Julian Corbett
2 Sun Tzu 12 Giulio Douhet
3 Basil Liddell-Hart 13 J F C Fuller
4 Antoine Henri Jomini 14 Napoleon
5 Helmuth von Moltke the Elder 15 Alexander Svechin
6 Mao Tse-Tung 16 Billy Mitchell
7 John Boyd 17 Halford Mackinder
8 Thucydides 18 Heinz Guderian
9 Niccolo Machiavelli 19 T E Lawrence
10 Alfred Thayer Mahan 20 M. Tukhachevsky

military theory (Table 4.2). The analysis also highlights not only the relative
weight a theorist has within a defined area of study, it also demonstrates
the depth of penetration each theorist has across multiple areas of study.
A visual representation of this for selected theorists is seen at Figure 4.2.74
This analysis provides a list of theorists that are perceived as important at
this time, and therefore influential for future theory. These theorists currently
act as the foundational theorists – forming the corner stone to military
theory’s body of knowledge. The analysis also provides insight into the
differences between the so-called ‘art’ and ‘science’ of military theory.

Art and science – defining the perceived

categories of theorists
Consider Clausewitz and Jomini. Their names have become synonymous
with creative thought and qualitative considerations (Clausewitzian); or
process and quantitative analysis (Jominian) respectively.75 This ignores
the fact that the majority of Clausewitz’s work, On War, relates to tactics,
terrain and the superiority of numbers; things that one would associate
with quantitative processes. However, this generalisation does highlight
one thing: the perceived divide within military theory between war as an art
versus war as a science.76 This raises the questions: what do these terms
mean, who wrote theories that are art/science, and does it matter?

38
Figure 4.2 – Relative weighting of a selection of theorists from the Top 20

This graph show the relative weight of selected theorists for different study focus
areas. As an example, one can see the perceived importance of Clausewitz in War
Philosophy and Strategic Thinking. However, Clausewitz’s perceived importance is
low in Operational Thinking and Land Power.

The concept of ‘art’ versus ‘science’ is not new. Vego, in his articles
‘Science vs the Art of War’ and ‘On Military Theory’, traces the history of
military theory as both a science and an art. From his analysis he highlights
that ‘[o]ur knowledge and understanding of warfare is a science, but the
conduct of war itself is largely an art.’77 Glenn Voelz also highlights the
links to scientific endeavour and military theory.78 This is reinforced by
Angstrom and Widen who indicate it is both an ‘art’, in that it is grounded
in the humanities and social sciences, and a ‘science’ as it must use
scientific method to validate its theories.79 The issue of whether war is an
art, science or both remains a hotly debated topic at colleges, courses
and on military blogs around the world.80 Even in the fields of business
and philosophy, there are debates on what is ‘art’, ‘science’, how are they
different, and which is ‘better.’81 To make matters more confusing, many of
these debates do not use the dictionary definitions of the words to frame
their discussions.82 Although these debates highlight that war, and wider
theory more generally, is a combination of both art and science, they create
a perception that art and science are opposites: art is genius, creative
thinking and intuitive; science is process, predictable and repeatable. What
can be identified is that the concepts of ‘art’ and ‘science’ are often used by
military professionals to categorise, and at times deride, ideas. Because the

39
perception of art and science is so pervasive throughout military discourse,
it is worth understanding which theorists are considered to reflect ‘art’ and
which reflect ‘science.’

Although the data provided by the staff colleges allows for military theorists
to be categorised by area of study or focus area, it does not provide a
useful medium to identify who is perceived as ‘art’ or ‘science’. However,
the works of Vego and Voelz provide the following guide: is a theorist’s
work considered general in nature, not reliant on technology of the
era; or is the theory context specific, reliant on technology or historical
intellectual views?83 Using this guide, both academics discuss the perceived
categories of 12 theorists.84 For the remaining eight theorists, the guidance
above can be used to allocate them to the art and science categories
respectively.85 Using this information, the top 20 theorists from Table 4.2 can
be categorised by study focus area and across the art/science divide, as
seen in Table 4.3.

This analysis is insightful for a few reasons. It firstly demonstrates that

the art/science divide is evenly split across the 20 theorists identified as
influential. This suggests that the concept of art/science is more one of
subjective discussion, often context specific, rather than an objective
‘universal’ analysis of different approaches to developing military theory.
As such, the concepts of art/science form ideal-types that help people
understand the characteristics of different approaches to military theory
and military thought. Although these ideal-types do exaggerate the different
approaches to developing military theory, they assist in comparing and
considering the different approaches and outcomes of research.86 This
also leads to the second insight.

The analysis illustrates which theorists are currently considered the most
important, and therefore act as the foundational theorists whose ideas and
concepts currently underpin military theory. Finally, by highlighting which
areas of study these theorists are most influential in, it is possible to see how
specific ideas shape the sub-disciplines of military theory. Knowing this helps
military professionals to understand which theorists should be studied, and
which theorists’ work should be used to cross-reference new ideas – testing
and, through valid methodologies, synthesising new theory. It also provides
guidance for future areas of research.

40
 War Strategic Operational Domain
Other ‘Art’ ‘Science’
Philosophy Thinking Theory Theory
Mahan
Clausewitz Clausewitz Jomini Mao Clausewitz Liddell-Hart
(Maritime)
Jomini
Thucydides Sun Tzu Liddell-Hart T E Lawrence Sun Tzu Jomini
(Land)
Douhet Moltke the
Machiavelli Machiavelli Boyd Tukhachevsky Boyd
(Air) Elder
Corbett
Jomini Clausewitz Mao Mahan
(Maritime)
Moltke the Liddell-Hart
Mao Machiavelli Douhet
Elder (Land)
Mitchell
Napoleon Svechin Thucydides Fuller
(Air)
Fuller
Mackinder Corbett Napoleon
(Land)
Guderian
Svechin Mitchell
(Land)

Mackinder Guderian
Table 4.3 – Top 20 theorists categorised by military study theme and art/science

Lawrence Tukhachevsky

41
42
Chapter 5 – Observations and
conclusion

What can this mean for the future?

…[W]e should distinguish between military thought in general and
military theory. The relationship between them can, perhaps, be most
easily expressed as follows: while all theories constitute thought,
not all thought amounts to theory. …[N]ot all ideas or opinions that
concern military matters are military theory. [Military theory is an
attempt] at systematically organising evidence of the empirical world
to a varying degree of universal validity. Theories are thereby of a
generalising nature, which not all ideas need to be.

Jan Angstrom and JJ Widen, Contemporary Military Theory87

Because military theory is not a codified body of knowledge, to understand

what military theory is, it is necessary to define it and identify who shapes
it. This work has answered both of these questions, and thereby provides
a starting point to critically consider if the views put forward in modern
concepts are military theory or, as Angstrom and Widen highlight, form a
part of wider military opinion and thought. How to tell the difference comes
from the definition of military theory and its themes.

43
Using the framework – the difference between
military theory and opinion
This work has defined military theory as the epistemology of war. This
definition highlights that military theory seeks to understand war and
warfare, including its links with wider conflict and society. Furthermore,
military theory provides a framework for the valid creation and dissemination
of that knowledge. This framework is founded on the philosophy of
scientific inquiry, using the scientific method (see sidebar ‘Strategies for
Research’).88 Much like applied (or public) history, the ‘hypothesis’ is the
general idea of a theorist; ‘empirical data’ is the history of war, warfare,
and society; and the final theory is the combination of the idea aligned with
history that forms a bounded ‘universal validity’ that helps to explain the
evidence.89 Understanding this definition allows military practitioners and
academics to critically question new ideas, impressions and concepts in
two ways. First, does the idea fit within the phenomenon of war and its
links to wider conflict? Second, was the idea developed through a method
or methodology grounded in the philosophy of scientific inquiry – in other
words, does it use history or focus purely on a single instant in time or
technology? Answering these questions can help define which modern
concepts are military theory, and which are opinion. However, the work does
more than just define military theory, it also has identified which theorists
have shaped its body of knowledge and has raised some interesting areas
of future inquiry.

Some observations and areas of future research

This work has identified the most influential theorists. Their work shapes
understanding and the body of knowledge of military theory. They also
influence the future direction that theory takes. Although it is possible that
there is a risk of self-perpetuation – theorists reinforcing theorists – this list
provides a reference guide to support military officers understand what
military theory is, the nature of war, and the characteristics of different types
of warfare. Furthermore, this work also identifies four areas of discussion
that provide a starting point to further the development of military theory,
and consider additional research to enhance military education.

44
 Strategies for research

Paul Reynolds’ discussion on developing knowledge in A Primer in

Theory Construction summarises the many methodologies into two
broad strategies:

Research-then-Theory – This strategy first reviews the empirical data

of the phenomenon – in military theory’s case, the history of war or the
circumstances of a particular war(s) – and lists the characteristics of the
phenomenon. Then the strategy seeks patterns in the characteristics and
formulates theory statements that summarise and explain the patterns.

Theory-then-Research – As the title suggests, this approach starts with

a theory and then seeks to test this theory against the empirical data.
Where the empirical data does not support the theory, the theory is
adjusted (synthesis) or discarded.

These two strategies represent different philosophies within scientific

inquiry. The first believes that there are patterns that can be identified
and documented. The second seeks statements that provide useful
representations of causality in general terms.

Both have their uses. However, when Reynolds’ discussion is considered,

it is identified that for military theory Research-then-Theory probably
better supports specific theories that are bounded within a defined
context (a type or war, or a specific level of war, as examples). Meanwhile,
Theory-then-Research is relevant for the general theories of war and
warfare that underpin military theory and shape specific theories’ focus.

Military theory is primarily the ‘whats’ and ‘whys’

of conflict and war
Although this work has identified that military theory does have a link to
procedural knowledge, or the ‘hows’ and ‘wheres’ of war-fighting, its
primary focus is to develop first principle knowledge that considers the
underlying principles of warfare and the causal relationships that occur
within war. This is the ‘what is the principles of warfare and why does war
occur and change’, or propositional knowledge, on war. This observation

45
directly links to the definition of theory. Focusing military theory around this
observation can help shape a person’s understanding of what is possible
within war and conflict – at the tactical, operational and strategic level. It also
allows people to adapt procedural knowledge to changing situations.90 This
is critical because, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, it is not possible to
have experience in all aspects of war, warfare and conflict. Therefore, it is
theory that helps guide planners, commanders and senior decision makers.

If military theory is focused too heavily on the ‘how to conduct warfare’ and
the ‘where to fight’, or worse, is the result of ‘…prejudice, gut feelings, and
untested and potentially invalid causal propositions’,91 then military officers
will be very limited in their ability to plan for future battles, campaigns and
wars. Given this, the importance of a strong military education curriculum
leading up to Staff College cannot be understated. Not only does this
prepare the officer for Staff College – seen as a critical turning point in their
career – it also assists in shaping their minds for planning and principle staff
roles. After all, in the Australian Army, it is the senior captain and major that
is often the planner in small task forces, and an embedded officer within
larger coalition operations. Understanding the propositional knowledge of
war and warfare can be enhanced through inter-disciplinary study.

Military theory should include a study of power

and influence
The conceptual analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrates how military theory is
intrinsically linked to other applied social science disciplines. This provides
two observations. Firstly, it reinforces the fact that war is linked to human
nature and the concepts of power and influence. Although some would
argue that war is only focused on coercion, it must be remembered that
coercion is a form of influence and for it to be successful, there must be a
clear understanding of power.92 Therefore, to better understand power and
influence in a broader sense – particularly at the campaign and war level
– military practitioners should take time to study the concept of power in
political science and economics, particularly Steven Lukes’ three dimensions
of power (see side bar ‘Three Dimensions of Power).93 Undertaking such
study also links to the second observation.

46
 Three dimensions of power

In their book Contemporary Military Theory, Angstrom and Widen discuss

Lukes’ theory of the three dimensions of power. Their discussion places
these ideas in a military context, and thereby helps illustrate how studying
power and influence can assist in advancing military theory. The three
dimensions of power are:

Decision-Making Power – This form of power consists of the ability to

make groups do what you want. It is the one most readily understood by
military professionals, both at the personal level (command) and through
the traditional lens of deterrence, coercion and military power.

Non-Decision-Making Power – This is the power to influence the agenda.

It is a ‘…form of power where one avoids direct influence by controlling
the issues to be decided upon.’ This form of power is focused on
removing options by setting the agenda. A military example used by
Angstrom and Widen is a ‘fleet-in-being’, where the existence of a fleet,
not necessarily its use, forces an enemy to blockade. Other examples
could exist in counter-insurgency operations, or military deception.

Ideological Power – This final dimension of power relates to ‘…influencing

someone without the other party noticing that the use of power occurs.’
It is the power to influence mental models by shaping the environment
and playing on subjective interests of those manipulated. This is targeting
the cognitive domain. Although this exists, to a limited degree, in military
doctrine (eg. information operations), using power to better explain the
interplay between physical and informational actions provides a different
perspective on the concept.

As already highlighted, the 20 theorists identified are considered the most

influential because they are the ones taught in most institutions, thereby
making them appear to be the most important. Although one cannot deny
the importance of these theorists, particularly to enable junior officers to
understand key parts of military theory, diversifying the study of power and
influence more generally does assist in overcoming the possible stagnation
of the field. By understanding a broader perspective of power and influence,
military practitioners and academics can test external ideas against military
theory – thereby creating greater synthesis and advancing the field.94

47
War is more than ‘war’ – both in translations and reality

By discussing the history of the word ‘war’, it is seen that the current English
definition may have different connotations to that used in historical writing,
or other languages. As already highlighted, one possible effect could be a
misrepresentation of the word ‘war’ within historical texts. This may partly
explain why translated historical texts, and their ongoing interpretations, refer
only to ‘war’ without a wider consideration of broader ‘conflict’. Given that
12 of the 20 most influential theorists are not native English speakers;95 and
the native languages of eight of them are not part of the Romantic language
group;96 future research may wish to consider if the narrow definition used
in English has affected modern interpretations of past works.97 It could also
explain why there are different views on what ‘war’ is across different, but
overlapping, disciplines. This may also be linked to the apparent normalising
of theorists across the world.

Military theory is normalising – is there really an Eastern/Western way

of war?
From Chapter 4, it is seen that many staff colleges around the world are
teaching the same theorists – particularly the top ten theorists. This may
imply a normalising of the perceived importance of key military theorists
across the worlds’ militaries. It may also suggest, with further study, that the
‘eastern’ and ‘western’ ways of war are now less pronounced than they may
once have been. This, as well as the cultural impact of these predominantly
European theorists on Asian militaries, could be further areas of study.98

48
Concluding thoughts
This work has answered the questions: ‘what is military theory?’, ‘where
does it fit?’ and ‘who influences it?’. It has defined military theory as the
epistemology of war. This means it seeks to understand the phenomenon
of war and its links to wider conflict, and provides a framework for the valid
creation and dissemination of knowledge concerning war and warfare.
Although military theory can cover a range of topics – from the procedures
of weapon handling up to and including the philosophical reasons for war
– its primary focus is the development of first principles knowledge, general
and specific, on the nature of war and the characteristics of warfare. Its
body of knowledge is shaped by key theorists who form its foundation.
This work has also identified these theorists through analysis of staff
college curriculums. By providing answers to these questions the work
has established what military theory is, who the foundational theorists are
that make up its body of knowledge, and how military practitioners and
academics should use the framework to further that knowledge, or test
other people’s ideas – thereby confirming what is theory and what is a
matter of opinion.

49
50
Annex A – Glossary
This glossary gives definition for key terms and phrases within the context
of this work and military theory more broadly. It is derived from the wider
research work being undertaken entitled ‘On War’s Theory: Finding a
Relationship Between Military and Systems Theory.’ The definitions provided
are either directly from source documents, or have been derived from the
research into military theory.

Cognitive Domain. The cognitive domain is one of the three vertical

domains in conflict. It is

…where individual and organisational collective consciousness exists.

It is where information is used to form perceptions and attitudes and
make decisions.99

Conceptual Metaphor. A conceptual metaphor is defined as ‘…

understanding one conceptual domain [idea/concept] in the terms of
another conceptual domain.’100 Conceptual metaphors work by mapping a
known, often physical, experience onto an abstract idea/concept to assist in
describing it.101 The known experience is referred to as the source domain,
which is used to map expressions onto the target domain.

Conceptual Repertoire. A conceptual repertoire is the internalized set

of concepts and mental models that forms an individual’s, organisation’s
or discipline’s world view and understanding. This shapes the subjective
meaning of words, phrases and conceptual metaphors used to express
ideas and concepts.102 For organizations and disciplines, a conceptual
repertoire is built on shared theoretical and educational experiences.

51
Congruence. Congruence is defined as being in a ‘…condition of agreeing;
agreement.’103 This can occur where two (or more) theories merge into one
theory (like the Eastern and Western ways of war). It can also occur where
one theory’s underlying themes/concepts are found in another theory’s
themes, forming invariants of a meta-theory. This is how external ideas, like
business or systems theories, can be ‘imported’ into military theory or used
to support the advancement of military theory.104 In these cases, it can be
said that the two theories have a relationship that allows them to be used
together. The strength of this relationship assists in understanding the links
between the theories, and if there is congruence between them. If there is
little or no relationship, then the theories are not in agreement and there is no
congruence. If the relationship is modest, this may imply that the use of one
theory to support the development of the second theory may have limited
utility. This suggests that there may be congruence, but it is only relevant
for specific parts of a discipline, or specific characteristic. Finally, if there is a
strong relationship, then both theories are in agreement (or in congruence),
indicating that both a relevant to each other.

Epistemology. Narrowly, epistemology is defined as ‘…the branch of

philosophy which deals with the origin, nature, methods, and limits of
human knowledge.’105 However, more broadly, it is the field of philosophy
that considers ‘…issues having to do with the creation and dissemination
of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry.’106 Therefore, epistemology is the
theory of knowledge, either within a specific field of study or more broadly.107

Ideal-Types. Ideal-Types outline the common characteristics and elements

of phenomena. They are not pure examples of a scenario. However, they
can be used to compare and consider cases, theories and methods to
identify which conform broadly with a phenomenon.108 An example of ideal-
types are the concepts of ‘war as art’ and ‘war as science’. Each represents
an exaggerated version of the two different strategies for research – Theory-
then-Research and Research-then-Theory respectively – and demonstrate
the common characteristics and elements of methodologies and methods
that are grounded within each of these strategies or world views.

Information Domain. The information domain is one of the three vertical

domains in conflict. It is

…formed by the intersection of the physical and cognitive domains,

and is the abstract space where information exists. The domain

52
 consists of information and is where the functions of information
systems (ie, information collection, processing, and dissemination)
create information content and flow. The information domain is the link
between the reality of the physical domain and human perceptions
and decision-making in cognitive domain.109

Invariants. Invariants are ‘unvarying;… constant.’110 Within the context of

theory, invariants are the themes that underpin the theory and should be
unchanging over time.

Mental Model. Mental models are defined as ‘…deeply ingrained

assumptions, generalisations, or even pictures or images that influence
how…’111 an individual, organisation or discipline understands theories,
concepts and the real world. These directly influence actions by shaping
the decisions made under normal human cognitive decision-making. This
is achieved through schemas – mental models of organized patterns of
thought – and stereotypes – mental models of patterns of understood
human behavior – being compared to current situations through the
cognitive process known as heuristics.112 Mental models for organisations
or disciplines are known as ‘shared mental models’.

Meta-Theory. Meta-theory is defined as

…primarily the study of theory, including the development of

overarching combinations of theory, as well as the development
and application of theorems for analysis that reveal underlying
assumptions about theory and theorizing.113

Within the context of military theory (or using external theories within
military theory), a meta-theory exists if the underlying themes of one
theory are found to be invariants within another theory. The degree that
these invariants exist highlights the overlap between the theories, thereby
demonstrating the relevance of the meta-theory that combines two or more
separate theories.

Military Theory. An epistemology relating to the phenomenon of war,

and all its related aspects, that seeks to understand it and its links to wider
conflict; and provide a framework for the valid creation and dissemination of
knowledge concerning war and warfare.

Physical Domain. The physical domain is one of the three vertical domains
in conflict. It is ‘…the real world environments of land, sea, air, and space.’114

53
Source Domain. Source domain is part of conceptual metaphor theory.
This is the conceptual domain, or idea/concept, that is used to understand
another conceptual domain (target domain) through the mapping of a
conceptual metaphor. Source domains are

…typically less abstract or less complex than target domains. For

example, in the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, the
conceptual domain of journey is typically viewed as being less
abstract or less complex than that of life.115

Target Domain. Target domain is part of conceptual metaphor theory.

Target domains are the conceptual domains, or ideas and concepts, that
uses another conceptual domain – called a source domain – to better
understand the abstract idea presented by the target domain through
conceptual metaphor mapping. Target domains are ‘…typically more
abstract and subjective than source domains.’116 In the example of LIFE IS
A JOURNEY, although the concept of life is considered more complex than
a journey, it can be better understood through the experience of the source
domain of a journey.

Theory. Theory is discretely defined by the dictionary as ‘…a coherent

group of general propositions used as principles of explanation for a class
of phenomena.’117 However, a specific ‘theory’ is a statement that:118

1. outlines a set-of-laws, the empirical generalisation about a

phenomenon;
2. is axiomatic, meaning it details terms, language, truisms and
derived ideas (definitions, axioms and propositions) that define the
boundaries of study and a phenomenon; or
3. details the causal processes, or the inter-relationships and causal
links, that occur within a phenomenon.
More broadly, a theory of a topic cover all the theory statements related to
that topic.

54
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66
(Endnotes)
1 Colin S. Gray, ‘Politics, Strategy, and the Stream of Time,’ Infinity Journal 3, no.
4 (2014): 6.
2 Greater discussion of these links can be seen in Jan Angstrom and J.J. Widen,
Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War (New York City, New York,
USA: Routledge, 2015), 4-9.
3 Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War [Précis de l’Art de la Guerre: Des
Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande Tactique et de la
Politique Militaire], trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill, Apple eBook
ed. (West Point, New York, USA: United States Army, 1836; repr., 1862
Translation), 6.
4 Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, ePub Apple Books ed.
(London, UK: Apple iBooks, 1911), 3.
5 From Mao, cited by Handel: Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical
Strategic Thought, 3rd Revised and Expanded Kobo eBook ed. (Southgate,
London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), 50.
6 Kelly C. Jordan, ‘Military Science,’ in Encyclopedia of Military Science, ed. Kurt
G. Piehler (Los Angeles, California, USA: Sage Refence, 2013), 881.
7 Angstrom and Widen spend significant time defining the themes of military
theory and its differences between doctrine, military thought and other
disciplines. This book is a key reference for anyone that wishes to understand
the breadth of military theory. See: Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary
Military Theory.
8 Contemporary Military Theory, 173.
9 ‘Theory,’ in Macquarie Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler (Sydney, NSW,
AUST: Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2014).
10 Paul Davidson Reynolds, A Primer in Theory Construction, Sixth Printing - First
ed. (Indianapolis, Indiana, USA: The Bobbs-Merrill Comapny, 1976), 21-43;
Yvonna S. Lincoln, ‘The Making of a Constructivist - A Remembrance of
Transformations Past,’ Chap. 4 in The Paradigm Dialog, ed. Egon G. Guba

67
 (Newbury Park, Caligornia, USA: Sage Publications, 1990), 79-87; Gary
Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, Second Printing ed.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press, 1998), 152-153, 261-269; Rich
Ganske, ‘Personal Theories of Power: Theory Properly Constructed’, Offiziere.
ch: Security Policy – Armed Forces – Media, 2014, Accessed 16 Jul 2016,
http://www.offiziere.ch/?p=16961; John D. Sterman, Business Dynamics -
Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (Boston, USA: McGraw-
Hill Higher Education, 2000), 14-20; Michael S. Gary and Robert E. Wood,
‘Mental models, decision rules, and performance heterogeneity,’ Strategic
Management Journal 32, no. 6 (2011): 583-585; Nicholas J. Bosio, ‘Want the
edge? More ‘ME’ in ‘PME’’, Land Power Forum, 2015, Accessed 16 Jul 2016,
http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Blog/Articles/2015/02/Want-the-edge-
more-me-in-pme.
11 Reynolds, Theory Construction, 10-11; Ganske ‘Personal Theories of Power:
Theory Properly Constructed’.
12 Milan N. Vego, ‘On Military Theory,’ Joint Force Quarterly 3rd Quarter 2011,
no. 62 (2011): 60.
13 John O’Shaughnessy, Inquiry and Decision (Ruskin House, London,
England, UK: Alden Press, 1972), 62-69, 74-79, 130, 136; Reynolds, Theory
Construction, 26-42, 104-107; Egon G. Guba, ‘The Alternative Paradigm
Dialog,’ Chap. 1 in The Paradigm Dialog, ed. Egon G. Guba (Newbury Park,
Caligornia, USA: Sage Publications, 1990), 18-19; Jennifer C. Greene, ‘The
Views on the Nature and Role of Knowledge in Social Science,’ Chap. 18 in
The Paradigm Dialog, ed. Egon G. Guba (Newbury Park, Caligornia, USA:
Sage Publications, 1990), 227-228; Margaret D. LeCompte, ‘Emergent
Paradigms - How New? How Necessary?,’ Chap. 19 in The Paradigm Dialog,
ed. Egon G. Guba (Newbury Park, Caligornia, USA: Sage Publications, 1990),
249-251; Klein, Sources of Power, 170-172, 260-261; Gerd Gigerenzer,
Peter M. Todd, and A. B. C. Research Group, Simple Heuristics That Make
Us Smart, Electronic PDF ed. (Oxford, England, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 197-209; Martin J. Brown Jr, ‘Rapid Knowledge Formation in
an Information Rich Environment,’ in 9th Command and Control Research
and Technology Symposium Coalition Transformation, ed. David S. Alberts
(Demark: Command and Control Research Program, 2004), 2-3.
14 Murat Baç, ‘Propositional Knowledge and the Enigma of Realism,’ Philosophia
27, no. 1 (1999): 200-221; Sterman, Business Dynamics, 14-22; Alan C.
McLucas, Decision Making: Risk Management, Systems Thinking and Situation
Awareness (Canberra, ACT, AUST: Argos Press, 2003), 14-20; Brown Jr,
‘Rapid Knowledge Formation in an Information Rich Environment,’ 3; Nicholas
J. Bosio, ‘Realistic Balance Scorecards: Systemic Understanding via the
Balanced Scorecard Cascaded Construction Method’ (University of New South
Wales, 2005), 54-56; Frans P. B. Osinga, ‘Science, Strategy and War: The
Strategic Theory of John Boyd’ (Univeristy of Leiden, 2005), 108-120.

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15 John N. Williams, ‘Propositional Knowledge and Know-How,’ Synthese 2008,
no. 165 (2008): 24-25; Mick B. Ryan, The Ryan Review: A study of Army’s
education, training and doctrine needs for the future (Canberra, ACT, Australia:
Department of Defence, 2016), 46-47.
16 The Ryan Review, 48.
17 The Ryan Review, 48-49.
18 This is an extension of the mathematic example outline by Moser, where 1+1=2
is a fact that is taken as given – therefore being propositional knowledge
that aligns with mathematical induction and the x=x axiom, where y+y=x
meaning that x/2=y – and the knowledge a person has on how to add the two
numbers together to demonstrate that they equal ‘2’ is procedural knowledge.
Propositional knowledge is also explained by Kant as knowledge that is
taken as truth without need for proof – such as ‘all bachelors are unmarried’.
Cited in: Paul K. Moser, ‘Propositional Knowledge,’ Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 52, no. 1 (1987):
91-92. The ‘what’ and ‘why’ is derived from Williams discussion: Williams,
‘Propositional Knowledge and Know-How,’ 24.
19 Quotation from: ‘Theory,’ in Macquarie Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler
(Sydney, NSW, AUST: Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2014). For discussion
on knowledge, and the types of knowledge, see: Wolfgang Schnotz and
Achim Preup, ‘Task-Dependent Construction of Mental Models as a Basis for
Conceptual Change,’ Chap. 7 in Mental Models in Discourse Processing and
Reasoning, ed. Gert Richheit and Christopher Habel, Advances in Psychology
(Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland Elsevier Science, 1999), 140-
147, 150-151; Mauri Laukkanen and Mingde Wang, Comparative Causal
Mapping - The CMAP3 Method (London, England, UK: Routledge, Taylor and
Francis Group, 2015), 16-19; Gabriel A. Radvansky and David E. Copeland,
‘Memory - Mental Models,’ Education Encyclopedia - StateUniversity.com,
Accessed 16 Jul 2016, http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/2219/
Memory-MENTAL-MODELS.html; James Clear, ‘Mental Models: How Intelligent
People Solve Unsolvable Problems’, Important Ideas, Explained Simply, 2016,
http://jamesclear.com/feynman-mental-models.
20 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies,
eBook ed. (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 32; Matthias
Steup, ‘Epistemology,’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta (Stanford University, USA: Center for the Study of Language and
Information, 2005).
21 Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 173.
22 The information for this sidebar come from three sources. These are
(quotations source first): Herbert R. McMaster, ‘H.R. McMaster: Thinking
Clearly about War and the Future of Warfare – The US Army Operating
Concept’, Military Balance Blog, 2014, Accessed 09 Nov 2016, http://www.
iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/october-831b/

69
 thinking-clearly-about-war-and-the-future-of-warfare-6183; ‘Discussing the
Continuities of War and the Future of Warfare: The Defense Entrepreneurs
Forum,’ Small Wars Journal 2014, no. Oct (2014); ‘Continuity and Change: The
Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War,’ Military Review
2015, no. March-April (2015); Christopher Mewett, ‘Understanding War’s
Enduring Nature Alongside its Changing Character’, War on the Rocks, 2014,
Accessed 05 Aug 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-
wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/.
23 McMaster ‘H.R. McMaster: Thinking Clearly about War and the Future of
Warfare – The US Army Operating Concept’.
24 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Indexed
eBook ed. (New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1989), 140.
25 On War, 132.
26 Vego, ‘On Military Theory,’ 60.
27 ‘On Military Theory,’ 60.
28 This discussion by Vego is reinforced by Angstrom’s and Widen’s extensive
work. Their book, particularly its final chapter, outlines the that military theory’s
key value is its enhancement of propositional knowledge. See: Angstrom and
Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 168-174.
29 Steup, ‘Epistemology.’
30 The key themes discussed in the side bar are from Angstrom and Widen. The
analysis, or ‘so whats’ is derived from this research. See: Angstrom and Widen,
Contemporary Military Theory, 168-174.
31 The dictionary defines war as: ‘…a conflict carried on by force of arms, as
between nations or states, or between parties within a state’. Cited in: ‘War,’
in Macquarie Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler (Sydney, NSW, AUST:
Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2014).
32 Craig A. Snyder, ‘Contemporary Security and Strategy,’ Chap. 1 in
Contemporary Security and Strategy, ed. Craig A. Snyder (New York City, New
York, USA: Routledge, 1999), 3.
33 Andrew L. Sihler, New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (New York,
USA: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4-6; ‘War,’ in Oxford English Dictionary,
ed. Judy Pearsall, Fiona McPherson, and Richard Holden (Oxford, England,
UK: Oxford University Press Oxford, 2014); Douglas Harper, ‘War (Noun),’
Online Etymology Dictionary, Accessed 16 Jul 2016, http://www.etymonline.
com/index.php?term=war.
34 Discussion from Sihler, Greek and Latin, 13-16. Bellum meaning from the
Oxford Latin Dictionary, cited in: Kevin D. Mahoney, ‘Bellum, Belli ‘ Latdict -
Latin Dictionary and Grammar Resources, Accessed 16 Jul 2016, http://www.
latin-dictionary.net/search/latin/Bellum.
35 ‘War,’ in Oxford English Dictionary.

70
36 ‘War,’ in Oxford English Dictionary.
37 ‘War,’ in Oxford English Dictionary; Harper, ‘War (Noun)’.
38 The morphing of languages due to Roman influence is known as
romanticisation. The subsequent languages are referred to Romance
Languages, which includes Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese. These
language derived many of their definitions from Latin (or Vulgar Latin as Latin
mixed with other languages). Interesting, English, though containing many Latin
and Ancient Greek words, is not a Romance Language. It is still technically
classified as a ‘Germanic (West) Language’. However, its growth has been,
and continues to be, influenced by other languages – or as the editor for the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary explains, it’s a mongrel language. Paraphrase
cited from: Heidi Stevens, ‘English: The Mongrel Language,’ Chicago Tribune,
04 Apr 2012 2012. Accessed 30 Sep 2016. http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2012-04-04/features/ct-tribu-words-work-language-history-20120404_1_
mongrel-language-second-language-english.
39 ‘War,’ in Macquarie Complete Dictionary.
40 Australian Army, LWD 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power, ed. Directorate
of Future Land Warfare, Land Warfare Doctrine (Canberra, ACT, Australia:
Department of Defence, 2014), 9.
41 Thomas C. Schelling, ‘The Diplomacy of Violence,’Arms and Influence, Henry
L. Stimson Lectures (New Haven, Connecticut, USA: Yale University Press,
1966), 26-34.
42 This analogy is a form of analogical reasoning, or an explicit conceptual
metaphor, that is used to assist in explaining the abstract idea of the study of
conflict and its multi-discipline overlaps. For more information on conceptual
metaphors and there effect on thinking see: George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,
Metaphors We Live By, Kindle Edition ed. (Chicago, USA: University of Chicargo
Press, 1980); Alan D. Beyerchen, Why Metaphors Matter - Understanding the
Power of Implicit Comparison and its uses within the Marine Corps, vol. 5,
Perspectives on Warfighting (Quantico, Virginia, USA: Marine Corps University,
1997); Nicholas J. Bosio, ‘Clausewitz and the CoG: Marriage Stability for Over
180 Years’, Land Power Forum, 2016, Accessed 08 Nov 2016, http://www.
army.gov.au/Our-future/Blog/Articles/2016/02/Clausewitz-and-the-CoG.
43 There are many summary studies and articles that outline the wide range of
issues covered by ‘conflict and peace studies’. The following provides an
overview only: Christine Cardone and Julie Nemer, eds., Issues in Peace
and Conflict Studies: Selections From CQ Researcher, Annotated ed., CQ
Researcher (Thousand Oaks, California, USA: SAGE Publications, 2010).;
Global Issues, ‘Issues on the Global Issues Website - Social, Political,
Economic and Environmental Issues That Affect Us All,’ Global Issues,
Accessed 15 Jun 2016, http://www.globalissues.org/issue. accessed 16 Jun
2016; Mehreen Khan, ‘These are the four biggest threats to the world right
now,’ The Telegraph, 15 Jan 2015 2015. Accessed 15 Jun 2016. http://www.

71
 telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11347752/These-are-the-four-biggest-
threats-to-the-world-right-now.html..
44 This aligns with the key findings by Angstrom and Widen with respect to the
themes of military theory, particularly its links to political science and war
studies more generally. See: Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military
Theory, 4-9.
45 These broad findings align with Angstrom and Widen findings on
understanding military theory’s links to social science more broadly. See:
Contemporary Military Theory, 177.
46 von Clausewitz, On War.99.
47 Daniel Coetzee and Lee W. Eysturlid, ‘Set Introduction,’ in Philosophers of War:
The Evolution of History’s Greatest Military Thinkers, ed. Daniel Coetzee and
Lee W. Eysturlid (Oxford, England, UK: Praeger, 2013), 1-2 to 1-3.
48 Handel, Masters of War, 3-6.
49 Jordan, ‘Military Science,’ 881.
50 This is suggested throughout the discussion of military theory. However,
two particular works highlight this best: Vego’s article on military theory and
Milevski’s discussion on the development of grand strategy and strategic
thought. It is also reinforced by Angstrom and Widen’s military themes. See:
Vego, ‘On Military Theory,’ 62-64; Lukas Milevski, The Evolution of Modern
Grand Strategic Thought, Kindle eBook ed. (Oxford, England, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2016), Loc 87-245; Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary
Military Theory, 168-174, 177.
51 Agenda-Setting Theory, and its extension and adaption into analysis of military
education and theorists, is an appendix to the PhD research and may be
released as an Australian Army Journal. A draft version is available from the
author.
52 Abstract from McCombs (2003); cited in: Amber M. Freeland, ‘An Overview of
Agenda Setting Theory in Mass Communications’ (Monograph, University of
North Texas, 2012), 2.
53 Stephen J. Hoch, ‘Availability and Interference in Predictive Judgment,’ Journal
of Experimental Psychology 10, no. 4 (1984): 658-660; Derrick Farnell, ‘How
Belief Works,’ THINK 12, no. 35 (2013): Section 9.
54 Raymond S. Nickerson, ‘Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises,’ Review of General Psychology 2, no. 2 (1998): 176-177.
55 Although Agenda-Setting Theory was originally focused on the media and
communication studies, its theoretical underpinnings are already being used to
consider how agendas and the perception of importance occurs in other areas
of study. See: Neta Kligler-Vilenchik, Yariv Tsfati, and Oren Meyers, ‘Setting
the Collective Memory Agenda: Examining Mainstream Media Influence on
Individuals’ Perceptions of the Past,’ Memory Studies 7, no. Early Release
(2014): 9-11; Sebastiaan Princen and Mark Rhinard, ‘Crashing and Creeping:

72
 Agenda-setting Dynamics in the European Union,’ Journal of European Public
Policy 13, no. 7 (2006): 1120-1123.
56 A full detail analysis that transitions Agenda-Setting Theory into military
education, and the influence this has on future research, as available from
the Author. It is an appendix to the wider PhD research and uses causal loop
diagrams to demonstrate the effect, and reinforcement, of military theorists on
future study.
57 Ryan, The Ryan Review, 25 (endnote 32), 33.
58 The request was formally sent by the Australian Department of Defence’s
International Policy Division to the Defence Attaches of 37 countries to seek
information from their staff colleges.
59 The requests were sent via the Australian Army’s Directorate of International
Engagement. The countries contacted were: Canada, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United
States of America.
60 Both Australia and Russia were not formally requested to provide information.
However, Australia’s 2013 staff college course curriculum was available for
review. In addition to this, Timothy Thomas’ book, Recasting the Red Star,
provides extensive analysis of the theoretical underpinnings, and associated
influential theorists, that continue to shape Russian military thinking.
Furthermore, for Thailand, Indonesia and Japan, an informal method was used
to ascertain the list of theorists and, for Thailand and Indonesia, the areas of
study the theorists are related to. The information was gained on a not-for-
attribution basis. Using these sources the approaches of five staff colleges
could be inferred: Australia, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia and Japan (Army).
For Thomas’ book, see: Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia
Forges Tradition and Technology through Toughness (Fort Leavenworth, KS,
USA: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), 23-81.
61 The eight staff colleges are: Australian Command and Staff College (Joint),
Canadian Forces College (Joint), New Zealand Command and Staff College
(Joint), the United Kingdom Joint Services Command and Staff College (Joint),
and the four US service staff colleges (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps)
62 Full details of the data, as well as the information collected, is available from
the author and is included in the ongoing PhD research work entitled ‘On War’s
Theory: Finding a Relationship Between Military and Systems Theory’. The final
14 staff colleges used in the study was: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Germany,
Indonesia, Japan (Army), the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Thailand,
Singapore, Spain and the United States of America (US Army and US Marine
Corps).
63 It is noted that Mahan was not studied at the Japanese Army Staff College.
Although no information was provided by the Japanese Naval or Air Force Staff
Colleges, it is inferred that the Naval staff college is highly likely to have studied
Mahan.

73
64 Jordan, ‘Military Science,’ 881.
65 The key fields of study are listed in the Military Science entry: ‘Military Science,’
883-885.
66 See: Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military Theory.
67 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd Revised (1st Meridian) ed. (London, UK:
Meridian, 1967; repr., Meridian 1991), 321-322.
68 Nicholas J. Bosio and Mark Ascough, ‘Providing the golden thread: Strategic
deterrence as the new strategic concept’, Land Power Forum, 2015, Accessed
15 Jul 2016, http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Blog/Articles/2015/11/
Providing-the-golden-thread.
69 Australian Army, LWD-1, 19-20.
70 The lay definition of land/sea/air power relates to a nation having an important
and powerful army, navy and/or air force. These definitions come from the
entries for Land Power, Sea Power and Air Power, cited in: Susan Butler,
Macquarie Complete Dictionary, (Sydney, NSW, AUST: Macquarie Dictionary
Publishers, 2014).
71 Bosio and Ascough ‘Providing the golden thread: Strategic deterrence as the
new strategic concept’.
72 11 of the 14 institutions provided enough data to either directly deduce this, or
infer it from theorist categorisation.
73 Full analysis is available from the author and is detailed in the ongoing PhD
research entitled ‘On War’s Theory: Finding a Relationship Between Military and
Systems Theory’.
74 Figure 4.2 uses a stacked graph. Using this graph, it is possible to highlight the
relative weight each theorist has within a specific military study theme. Because
domain theory covers the three physical domains, it was necessary to level the
analysis so that the ranking of land, sea and air power theorists was the same.
This was achieved by setting the highest ranked theorist within the relevant
domain to 4, and then using this to rank the rest of the theorists in descending
order. A similar graph for all 20 theorists is available from the author and as a
part of the wider research.
75 The first is often referred to as ‘Clausewitzian’, while the second is ‘Jominian’.
A discussion on these differences is provided by Willmott and Barrett (briefly),
Otero (briefly) and Nomura (detailed). Nomura’s discussion on the different
methods is interesting. Although he highlights that Clausewitz’s methods are
deductive and Jomini is inductive – meaning Clausewitz is technically aligned
with scientific methods – Nomura outlines that Clausewitz remains qualitative
compared to Jomini’s research that develops specific principles. H.P. Willmott
and Michael B. Barrett, Clausewitz Reconsidered (Santa Barbara, California,
USA: Praeger Security International, 2010), 22-24; Christopher Otero,
‘Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and
Design in the Post OIF Army,’ Small Wars Journal 2011, no. May (2011): 6;

74
 Ryan C. Nomura, ‘Issues in Strategic Thought: From Clausewitz to Al-Qaida’
(Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 20-22, 124.
76 Vego describes the development of both ‘war as a science’ and ‘war as an
art’. Milan N. Vego, ‘Science vs the Art of War,’ Joint Force Quarterly 3rd
Quarter 2012, no. 66 (2012): 62-63, 66.
77 ‘Science vs Art,’ 69.
78 See Voelz’s article: Glenn Voelz, ‘Is Military Science “Scientific”?,’ Joint Force
Quarterly 4th Quarter 2014, no. 75 (2014).
79 Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 170-174.
80 Some examples are: Eric Cummings and Michael Cummings, ‘The “Art” vs.
the “Science” of War’, On Violence, 2010, Accessed 05 Aug 2016, http://
onviolence.com/?e=188; desaxx, ‘The Art and Science of War’, International
Relations, National Security, and Military Art, 2010, Accessed 05 Aug 2015,
http://desaxx.blogspot.com.au/2010/09/art-and-science-of-war.html.
81 Some examples are: Stephen Mumford, ‘Art versus Science?’, UoN Blogs-
Arts Matters, 2012, Accessed 05 Aug 2016, https://blogs.nottingham.
ac.uk/artsmatters/2012/03/06/art-versus-science/; Anna Mar, ‘Inspiration vs
Perspiration (Flash of Genius versus The Repeatable Innovation Process)’,
Simplicable, 2011, Accessed 05 Aug 2016, http://business.simplicable.com/
business/new/inspiration-vs-perspiration.
82 For the purposes of this discussion, art is defined as ‘…a skill or knack; a
method of doing a thing’. Science is defined as ‘…the systematic study of
the nature and behaviour of the material and physical universe’. Cited in (in
order): ‘Art,’ in Macquarie Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler (Sydney,
NSW, AUST: Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2014); ‘Science,’ in Macquarie
Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler (Sydney, NSW, AUST: Macquarie
Dictionary Publishers, 2014).
83 Vego, ‘Science vs Art,’ 65; Voelz, ‘Is Military Science “Scientific”?,’ 89.
84 Vego and Voelz indicate that Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Moltke the Elder, Machiavelli
and Corbett as ‘art’ theorists. Meanwhile, they indicated that Liddell-Hart,
Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, Fuller, Napoleon and Mitchell as ‘science’ theorists.
See: Vego, ‘Science vs Art,’ 64; Voelz, ‘Is Military Science “Scientific”?,’ 85-87;
Vego, ‘On Military Theory,’ 65.
85 The remaining eight theorists are: Mao, Boyd, Thucydides, Svechin, Mackinder,
Guderian, Lawrence and Tukhachevsky. Thucydides is allocated to the ‘art’
category to align with the other realist political theorist, Machiavelli. Mao,
Svechin, Mackinder and Lawrence are also allocated to the art category as
their theories are not necessarily time or technology specific. Boyd is aligned
to the science category due to the strong systems framework that underpins
the OODA loop. Furthermore, Guderian and Tukhachevsky are also allocated
to science due to the technological links with their ideas.
86 Lange discusses a discussion on ideal-types and its use to compare theory

75
 and patterns. See: Matthew Lange, Comparative-Historical Methods, Kindle
ed. (London, England, UK: Sage Publications, 2013), Loc 827.
87 Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 4.
88 Reynolds provides significant discussion on the two strategies represented
in the side bar. He outlines the broad methodologies behind the strategies,
their philosophical viewpoints on the relationship between the real world and
knowledge, and discusses the difficulties associated with both strategies.
The sidebar provides an overview of this work and places it within the military
theory context. See: Reynolds, Theory Construction, 140-151.
89 A discussion of using history, either directly or through analogy, effectively as
well as the failures can be seen in the books Thinking in Time and Analogies
at War. Both books use case studies that effectively highlight the failures that
can occur where history is used without rigours methodologies to validate
the ideas. Both these books provide useful discussion on how to effectively
consider applied history for policy making. See: Richard E. Neustadt and
Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers,
Kobo eBook ed. (New York, New York, USA: The Free Press, 1986), 13-16 to
13-21; Yeun Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bein Phu,
and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton
University Press, 1992), 211-227, 245-250, 253-256.
90 Ryan, The Ryan Review, 48-49; Bosio ‘Want the edge? More ‘ME’ in ‘PME’’.
91 Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 173.
92 Influence is seen as a broad construct, with coercion being a sub-section. The
concept that military power is solely for coercive matters does not align with
the historical uses of militaries throughout history. In fact, military power has
been used to shape perceptions through engagement. This is the wider use
of the term influence, and goes beyond the traditional view of military power
as a purely coercive force. See: Schelling, ‘The Diplomacy of Violence,’ 1-34;
Lewis A. Dunn, Deterrence Today: Roles, Challenges and Responses, ed. IFRI
Security Studies Center, PDF ed., vol. Summer 2007, Proliferation Papers
(Paris, France: IFRI Security Studies Center, 2007), 20-22; Angstrom and
Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 169-170.
93 These are cited in Angstrom and Widen’s work, with a discussion on
their practicalities. This forms the basis of the sidebar in the chapter. See:
Contemporary Military Theory, 170.
94 This is advocating a move towards dialectic analysis, as used by Clausewitz,
where a thesis (military theorem) is placed against an antithesis (external idea
on power/influence) and the two are critically considered, leading to a synthesis
of ideas.
95 The Romance Languages identified in the list are: Italian and French.
96 The 12 are: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, Moltke the Elder, Mao, Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Douhet, Napoleon, Svechin, Guderian, Tukhachevsky.

76
97 The eight are: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Moltke the Elder, Mao, Thucydides,
Svechin, Guderian, Tukhachevsky
98 The study of the normalising of Eastern and Western ways of war would be
seen as a furthering of military theory. The cultural effect of European theorists
on Asian militaries, though interesting, would not be considered to be part of
military theory based on the definition. However, it is very relevant for political
science and anthropology, particularly how this may either flow into wider
society, or create a divergence between militaries and their societies.
99 Robert Cordray III and Marc J. Romanych, ‘Mapping the Information
Environment,’ IOSphere 2005, no. Summer (2005): 7.
100 Zoltan Kovecses, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction, (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2002). http://site.ebrary.com/lib/anuau/detail.
action?docID=10387244. 4.
101 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 10-11; Beyerchen, Why
Metaphors Matter, 5, 1-2.
102 Barry Newell, ‘Simple Models, Powerful Ideas: Towards Effective Integrative
Practice,’ Global Environmental Change 2012, no. 22 (2012): 777.
103 ‘Congruence,’ in Macquarie Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler (Sydney,
NSW, AUST: Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2014).
104 This is reinforced by Angstrom and Widen’s military theme of Methodology of
Military Theory. See: Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 170-
172.
105 ‘Epistemology,’ in Macquarie Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler (Sydney,
NSW, AUST: Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2014).
106 Steup, ‘Epistemology.’
107 Peter B. Checkland and Jim Scholes, Soft Systems Methodology in Action, 5th
Reprint with 30th Retrospective ed. (Chichester, London, UK: John Wiley and
Sons, 1990), 23-25; Peter B. Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice,
Kindle ePub 30th Retrospective ed. (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley
and Sons, 1993), Loc2550-2603.
108 Lange, Comparative-Historical Methods, 39.
109 Cordray III and Romanych, ‘Mapping the Information Environment,’ 7-8.
110 ‘Invariant,’ in Macquarie Complete Dictionary, ed. Susan Butler (Sydney, NSW,
AUST: Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2014).
111 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline, Kobo ePud ed. (London, England, UK:
Random House Business Books, 1990), 8.
112 Bosio, ‘Realistic Balance Scorecards,’ 30-32.
113 Steven E. Wallis, ‘Toward a Science of Metatheory,’ Integral Review 6, no. 3
(2010): 78.
114 Cordray III and Romanych, ‘Mapping the Information Environment,’ 7

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115 Kovecses, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction. 252
116 Metaphor: A Practical Introduction. 252-253.
117 ‘Theory.’
118 Reynolds, Theory Construction, 10-11.

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NOTES

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NOTES

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