The Chilean Labor Movement under Salvador Allende: 1970-1973

Author(s): Francisco Zapata S

Source: Latin American Perspectives , Winter, 1976, Vol. 3, No. 1, Imperialism and the
Working Class in Latin America (Winter, 1976), pp. 85-97
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

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 THE CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT UNDER
SALVADOR ALLENDE:
1970-19731

by
Francisco Zapata S. *

[The original text has been substantially revised and shortened and the author is not responsible
for changes in the text. The Editors.]

During the duration of the Unidad Popular (UP) government presided over
by Salvador Allende, the Chilean labor movement faced a series of new chal-
lenges which put to severe test its traditional autonomy and independence
from the state. This article identifies the alternatives that faced the labor
movement and the way that it chose to solve them through an analysis of the
agreement between the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT) and the govern-
ment, worker participation in management, the CUT National Executive Com-
mittee election of May 1972, and the position of the labor movement during the
offensive of the rightist parties, particularly during the El Teniente workers
strike of April-June 1973. The article concludes by analyzing the transforma-
tion of the labor movement in terms of its direction away from autonomy and
independence toward integration with the Allende regime. This paper further
illustrates some of the problems encountered by the labor movement in the
process of transition to socialism, the explicit objective of the Allende govern-
ment, and of the so-called "Chilean way to socialism."

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILEAN LABOR

Historically as well as structurally the Chilean labor movement combines

anarco-sindicalist and economistic aspects with the classic Leninist perspec-
tive on trade unionism (Lenin, 1970:354-363). Union elections have been highly
politized, and frequently leftist congressmen have been recruited from the
leadership of labor unions. Thus union leaders have tended to participate si-
multaneously in unions and political parties of the left and center. Labor or-
ganizations have been tied to the political parties of the left through union
membership. Since 1920, all Chilean administrations have been forced to rec-
ognize and make concessions to the power of the labor movement.
'This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Working Group on Trade Unions in Contem-
porary Society, Eighth World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, Canada, August 1974. The author
wishes to thank Jeff Bortz and Timothy Harding for their helpful critiques of the original versions
of this paper.

Latin American Perspectives: Issue 8, Winter 1976, Vol. III, No. 1 85

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 86 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

From the legal perspective, there are two sectors of labor in Chile: the first
is comprised of workers organized within provisions of the labor code; the
second includes groups of workers such as government employees who are
organized without having the legal right to do so, as well as workers in small
establishments of less than 25 employees or employees in service activities
who are difficult to organize. Workers in the second sector unionized despite
legal prohibitions and have negotiated agreements that were sometimes re-
spected by the authorities. Since the second or "extra legal" section of organ-
ized labor includes government employees, it represents about half of the total
of the Chilean labor movement, and this has important political implications,
as we will see below.
The Chilean labor movement has naturally combined the tactics of nego-
tiating and collective bargaining with strikes and political protests. Strikes
were considered "legal" if they took place after the failure of a negotiation
attempt in the collective bargaining process, and "illegal" if they were "wild
cat" or called to protest political rights violations or the arbitrary use of power
by factory managers, or to protest against imperialism or related political is-
sues. In the 1951-1970 period the average number of "legal" strikes was 541 per
year while "illegal" strikes reached at least twice that number. This strike ac-
tivity was concentrated in the key segments of the economy: copper, coal, and
manufacturing, indicating the gravity of the consequences of the strikes and
indirectly showing the power of the labor movement.

TABLE 1
Legal Strikes in Chile and Number of Workers Affected: 1951-1970

Year Number of strikes Number of workers affected

1951 193 88,633
1952 215 151,715
1953 208 123,108
1954 364 99,069
1955 274 128,206
1956 147 105,438
1957 80 29,771
1958 120 48,395
1959 204 82,188
1960 257 88,518
1961 262 111,911
1962 401 84,212
1963 416 117,084
1964 564 138,474
1965 723 182,359
1966 1073 195,435
1967 1114 225,470
1968 1124 292,794
1969 1277 362,010
1970 1819 656,170
Average 542 Average 165,548

Source: International Labour Organization, Yearbook of Labour Statistic

1973.

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 ZAPATA: CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT 87

The average number of workers affected by legal strikes was 165,548 a

year during the same period (see Table 5). Strikes were accompanied by other
forms of collective confrontation. In 1969 and 1970 there was an increase in
land occupations by peasants, student occupations of schools, occupation of
factories. Thus the implementation of the program of the UP coalition in re-
gard to land distribution and nationalization of industry, commerce, and credit
was paralleled to the action of the labor movement.
Under Chilean labor law, before 1970 the union federations and the CUT
had no legal status and could not present petitions or demands, except through
their member unions. The CUT activities were "accepted" by successive ad-
ministrations on conditional terms. Leaders of federations and of the CUT
were arrested for the same actions for which they were sometimes congratu-
lated. During the Ibafiez government (1952-1958) the labor movement was
treated very well in its first period (1952-1953) only later (1954-1958) to be ener-
getically persecuted (Bray, 1961). Labor leaders were continually pursuing ob-
jectives that were on the fringe of legality. They could be easily pinned down
for apparent violations of the labor code and they often were.
A significant number of federations represented the sector of workers
which were not allowed to form legal trade unions, especially teachers and
health workers. Their leaders were never legally recognized. As we noted, al-
most half of the organized work force belonged to this illegal sector (Barria,
1973; Zapata, 1971).

UP-CUT AGREEMENT

In December 1970 a formal agreement was reached between the newly-

elected UP administration of Salvador Allende and the CUT in which the CUT
was officially recognized as the organization representing the working class.
The agreement committed the administration to provide 1) legal recognition of
the CUT; 2) the establishment of an obligatory system of union dues equiva-
lent to one half percent of salaries deducted by employers and paid to the CUT
and the national federations; 3) a general increase of salaries proportionally
greater for lower-income earners; 4) a supplementary allowance for workers'
dependents which was the same for white and blue-collar workers; 5) a food
allowance for employees who did not have free lunch provided; 6) a 100 per-
cent increase in pensions; 7) the introduction of worker participation in man-
agement; 8) the representation of workers on the social security organizations'
boards of directors; 9) the implementation of an immediate program to reduce
unemployment, and 10) the reform of the sections of the labor code (in effect
since 1925) which deal with the general norms concerning trade union organi-
zation and set the rules concerning strikes and collective bargaining.
These policies agreed to by the leaders of the government and the labor
movement came out of internal discussions in the National Executive Commit-
tee of the CUT, which since 1968 included the Christian Democrats. Recom-
mendations were therefore a reflection of a consensus of the political currents
of the working class with respect to the priorities that faced Chilean workers.
Allende could not get significant changes in the labor codes because of the
UP's minority of seats in Congress, yet the agreed-upon labor program was
realistic and could be implemented by executive action and minimum
legislation.
Latin American Perspectives: Issue 8, Winter 1976, Val. 111, Na. 1

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 88 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

The CUT also began a new system of collective bargaining at the national
federation level instead of at the local union or factory level (national federa-
tions were composed of all unions in a given field such as copper mining, or
textiles). This was part of an attempt to centralize collective bargaining in the
CUT and to overcome the previous practice of local unions ignoring CUT and
federation recommendations.
The UP-CUT agreement was essentially economistic rather than political-
ly revolutionary, although the Communists and Socialists were the main politi-
cal forces in the CUT. This was partly the result of the pressures from workers
for higher wages in the face of the serious deterioration of wages during the
last two years of the Christian Democratic administration. In addition, work-
ers were hurt by the economic panic that followed Allende's election in Sep-
tember 1970 which resulted in an artificial crisis between time of the election
and the inauguration in November. The agreement was signed in December
1970 and reflected the immediate problems encountered by the working class
and the labor movement.

WORKER PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT

Despite the emphasis on economic issues in the CUT-UP agreement, I pro-

pose to concentrate on the implementation of the system of worker participa-
tion in management, because from the long-range point of view the efforts of
the Allende administration in this area are among the most significant.

TABLE 2
Workers Affected by the Chilean Participation Scheme by Economic Sectors:
May 1972

No. of
workers Percent
1. Agriculture, food 9,249 4.7
2. Fisheries 1,910 1.0
3. Textiles and clothing 21,712 11.0
4. Wood, paper and furniture 5,032 2.0
5. Mining (copper, iron, other) 37,076 18.9
6. Chemical industry 1,799 0.9
7. Transport and mechanical products 18,527 9.4
8. Construction materials 2,433 1.2
9. Communication, media, electrical industry 11,003 5.6
10. Transport 35,775 18.2
11. Energy and fuel 40,907 20.8
12. Commerce 3,399 1.7
13. Research institutes 4,165 2.1
14. Tourism and other services 1,788 0.9
15. Housing and urbanism 1,771 0.9
Total 196,546 99.3

Source: ODEPLAN, 1972. The table was constructed by adding employment data from a list of
230 enterprises that had the participation scheme working. For many of those enterpris-
es the employment data was not available in that list. Therefore it can be said that the
number of workers participating is higher than is indicated in the table. We could say
that it underestimates the total by approximately 50,000 workers.

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 ZAPATA: CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT 89

The program of worker participation in management, originating in the

CUT consensus, had held an important place in the long-range program of the
labor confederation since the 1968 CUT congress. After the CUT and the gov-
ernment signed the 1970 agreement, various proposals for implementing it
were finally summarized in a document called the "Basic Norms for Workers
Participation in the Administration of Firms in the Social (government-owned)
and Mixed (government-private) Sectors." This was jointly published by the
CUT and the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) in July 1971. The docu-
ment provided for representation of the rank and file (through elections held at
the plant level) on the board of directors of the publicly owned sector of the
economy, and for representation of the workers in the different levels of au-
thority as counselors to the executives at each administrative level. At the dif-
ferent administrative levels, workers formed comit6s de produccion (produc-
tion councils) which were to meet with management to discuss improving pro-
duction, uses of raw material, maintenance, and other ways in which all the
members involved in production could contribute effectively.
At its height, worker participation involved more than two hundred thou-
sand workers in the publicly owned sector of the economy, principally in tex-
tiles, mining, energy (coal, electricity), steel, and transport. Other sectors also
introduced worker participation, but the number of workers involved was con-
siderably less, as shown in Table 2.
One main characteristic of the worker-participation scheme was the exclu-
sion from the governing boards of all trade union representation. The reason-
ing was that trade unions should remain autonomous in relation to manage-
ment and that worker participation in management therefore could not be ex-
ercized through the unions.
As worker participation was implemented, it became clear that the All-
ende administration and the labor movement had different expectations. Even
within the political apparatus of the UP administration there were different
perceptions as to what political benefits worker participation would bring.
Some maintained that the objective was limited to the improvement of produc-
tivity, while others thought it was an effective way of mobilizing workers that
had not voted for the UP in 1970. Some UP leaders close to the labor move-
ment thought that the participation system could build communication be-
tween government and workers, enabling the administration to inform on eco-
nomic priorities and to generate incentives to fulfill economic objectives (Mil-
las, 1972).
Let us examine briefly some of the problems involved in the application of
worker participation in the Chuquicamata copper mine in Northern Chile.2 In
December 1971, the new board of directors of the Compafiia de Cobre Chuqui-
camata including the elected representatives of the workers met for the first
time. The political composition of the elected worker representatives reflected
the political composition of the trade unions. Previous to the election of repre-
sentatives, a coalition had been achieved between the UP and a small socialist
party, the Uni6n Socilista Popular (not part of the UP), and this coalition had
the majority in both trade unions represented in the mine (Zapata 1972). The
Partido Dem6crata Cristiano (PDC) officially ordered its members not to parti-

2The author was a sociologist for the Industrial Relations Department of Compafifa de Cobre Chu-
quicamata from February 1972 to September 11, 1973.

Latin American Perspectives: Issue 8, Winter 1976, Vol. ttt, No. I

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 90 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

cipate in the election for labor representatives, but its members voted as indi-
viduals in the different sections of the company. The quantity of the votes
evidenced high interest. Almost 55 percent of the workers voted, a normal tur-
nout comparable to a trade-union leadership election, and high, given restric-
tions on voting such as vacations, different shifts of workers, etc.
The election of the worker representatives to the board of directors
brought into confrontation the positions of the UP and the Christian Demo-
crats over the question of worker participation. The Christian Democrats
maintained that the adopted system of labor representation was not effective
because it did not give workers the majority on the board (only seven out of
fifteen). In a sense both the Christian Democrats and the UP were caught in a
contradiction on this point. The PDC opposed workers' control of the "stra-
tegic sections" of the economy because they opposed that degree of nationali-
zation, but then criticized the UP in the sectors already nationalized because
workers were given less than a majority control. The UP forces had promised
sweeping nationalization, but once in power the administration opposed ma-
jority workers' representation in copper-mine administration because of the
strategic importance of the copper sector and because it had only recently
been transferred to the state sector.
The general superintendent (manager) of the company was appointed by
the Corporaci6n del Cobre, a government entity responsible (after copper na-
tionalization) for management of the five copper mines that belonged to the so-
called Gran Minerfa del Cobre. The board of directors at each mine company
was composed of fifteen persons: seven were elected (December 1971) by di-
rect vote of the blue-collar, white-collar, and technical personnel (four by the
blue-collar workers, two by the white-collar, and one by the tecnicos); seven
more were named by the Corporaci6n de Cobre; and the chairman of the board
(the fifteenth member) was named by President Allende.
In Chuquicamata, the first serious incident after the 1971 nationalization
and the implementation of worker participation that revealed the latent con-
flict between workers' participation and trade unions was a strike. The strike
was called in support of a worker called Titichoca who had been fired for
leaving his workplace early, resulting in the breakdown of a convertor for
which he was held responsible. The worker's representatives on the board of
directors supported the company position, finding the worker guilty of serious
negligence, an act usually punished with expulsion from the firm. The local
labor leaders, without denying the gravity of the negligence, defended the
worker and called a strike of the whole smelter on his behalf. After the strike
had lasted more than three days (every twenty-four hour interruption of work
meant a loss to the government of five hundred thousand dollars or more, de-
pending on the copper price), the company revoked the expulsion of the work-
er, reinstating him to his post. This generated a crisis at the management level,
and the general superintendent who opposed the reinstatement decision re-
signed (Gall, 1972).

Incidents like the "Titichoca conflict" had been frequent before nationali-
zation, and continued to arise after. However, the incident was a test case be-
cause it involved a multi-lateral conflict between the union, the workers on the
board of directors, the government-appointed manager, and the technical per-
sonnel that had entered the company before the nationalization. At another

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 ZAPATA: CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT 91

level, it was a test of the ability of the nationalized copper sector to increase
production, implying the rapid resolution of labor disputes. Copper exports
were vital to assure a supply of foreign exchange for the economic develop-
ment of the country, and Chuquicamata alone provided one-third of the total
foreign exchange earned by copper, a sum of approximately $300 million a
year.
Important objectives of nationalization were to demonstrate that high
productivity could be maintained through worker participation and that the
mines could operate effectively without foreign management. These objectives
were blocked by a series of strikes, (some fostered by U.S. agents - see Spald-
ing this issue), the union-management conflict, and by the disruptive tactics of
part of the technical personnel, including sabotage.
In the ensuing months, the conflict at Chuquicamata intensified. The
workers tended to perceive their elected representatives on the board as be-
longing to management, and the representatives in turn identified with the ad-
ministration of the mine. For the first time in the mine's history, discussions
were held by the rank and file on the meaning of the nationalization program,
the importance of copper in the Chilean economy, the aspirations of workers,
the difficulties that Chile was undergoing because of the nationalization, the
organization of production, and repairs and technical problems. These discus-
sions were fostered by the UP labor leaders and the UP militants at the mine.

The opposition was represented by Christian Democrats and by those

workers who criticized the worker-participation program as propaganda with
no basis in reality. Engineers, supervisors, and technical employees who, until
nationalization, had benefited from a series of privileges including earnings in
dollars, also became involved in the discussions and favored the traditional
position which tended to reaffirm the necessity for authoritarian methods of
management. This discussion process produced by the end of 1972 a growing
consensus favoring worker participation and attracting some support from the
Christian Democrats. This consensus led to a de facto alliance between the UP
and the PDC among the employees, which replaced the USOPO-UP alliance
for control of the union in 1973. Before 1970, the UP forces had controlled the
Chuquicamata union; from 1970 to 1973 the USOPO won control of both the
blue- and white-collar unions at the mine, and in February 1973 the Christian
Democrats won control of the white-collar union while the UP won control of
the blue-collar union. During the last months of 1972 and first four months of
1973 (until the beginning of the El Teniente strike which had serious effects in
Chuquicamata) it was possible to implement a series of steps such as produc-
tivity incentives and to clarify the respective roles of the trade union and of
the board of directors. The economistic trade union demands were reconciled
with the workers' need to solve problems at the production level through par-
ticipation (Zapata, 1974). While there was a de facto alliance between the UP
and the Christian Democratic workers in the mine company, political competi-
tion between them nevertheless continued.
The individual worker was affected by labor participation in management.
When workers began to be able to express their opinions about the job, the
department, and the company, their objective situation changed. When the
conflict between the union leaders and labor representatives in management
exploded during the Titichoca incident, the rank and file experienced a conflict
Latin American Perspectives: Issue 8, Winter 1976, Vol. 111, No. I

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 92 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

of interest. As a consequence of the later El Teniente strike, the conflict over

identification was resolved in favor of trade union as the primary representa-
tive organ, partly because unions still had the greatest legitimacy compared to
the participation system which was not even two years old. This trade-union
consciousness was an obstacle to developing real worker control. The problem
for the worker was to allow for the simultaneous existence of both agents of
representation.
Many of the contradictory problems arose from the introduction of a de-
gree of worker's control which went beyond that introduced in Yugoslavia or
other socialist countries. The economy was still largely controlled by private
and/or foreign interests, especially in the distribution sector; planning of the
economy, on the one hand, had the obstacle of private ownership and, on the
other hand, had to contend with the freedom of capitalist groups determined
to undermine the government's program. This freedom of action was guaran-
teed by the determination of the administration to maintain an open political
system (hence not a dictatorship of the proletariat).

THE MAY 1972 ELECTION OF THE CUT NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE

One of the principal resolutions adopted by the Sixth National Congress of

the CUT in December 1971 provided for a direct vote by the rank and file to
elect the members of the National Executive Committee. The previous method
of election had been to choose delegates who in turn met to elect the CUT
executive secretariat. The 1971 Congress assembled more than two thousand
delegates and elected a Provisional Executive Committee that was charged
with the responsibility of organizing the direct election (Angell, 1972).
The decision to make the elections direct was a result of two pressures.
First, Christian Democrats had not been able, during the Frei government (1964
to 1970), to organize a central confederation of their own, and they hoped to
gain control of CUT through a new electoral system. The election of the Na-
tional Executive Committee provided an occasion for the PDC to measure it-
self against the Socialist, Communist, and Radical parties in terms of direct
worker support. Second, some UP labor leaders wanted to establish universal
suffrage in the labor structure, and direct elections would provide a means of
measuring the relative power of each party belonging to the UP.
The CUT elections resulted in the spectrum shown in Table 3. The results
show: the predominance of the leftist parties which obtained more than 56
percent of the votes, counting only the Communist and Socialist parties, and
more than 64 percent if one includes the Radicals and the Movimiento de
Accion Popular Unitaria (MAPU); the relative importance of Christian Demo-
crats, which came out as the second political force among workers; the limited
appeal that Christian Democrat dissidents such as Izquierda Cristiana (IC) or
MAPU had among workers; and, finally, the existence of several small politi-
cal minorities.
There was a high degree of voter participation which revealed the prestige
and legitimacy that the CUT has acquired among all political tendencies. The
National Congress had given the CUT legal recognition and therefore the pow-
er to negotiate. Thus the CUT had a stronger basis for representing the work-
ing class. This, combined with economic strength based on the compulsory

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 ZAPATA: CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT 93

dues system, meant that for the first time in its history the CUT could claim to
be the nerve center of the labor movement both in organizational and political
terms.

TABLE 3
Results of
Election of the National Executive Committee of the Central Unica de
Trabajadores de Chile, May 1972

Political Tendency No. of votes Percent No. of lead-

received ers elected
1. Communist 173,068 30.89 18
2. Socialist 148,140 26.44 16
3. Christian Democrat 147,531 26.33 16
4. MAPU (Christian Democrat
dissidents, members of UP) 25,983 4.63 2
5. Radical 21,910 3.91 2
6. Movimiento de Izeuierda
Revolucionaria (MIR! guevarist) 10,192 1.81 1
7. Union Socialista Popular
(Socialist dissidents, not mem-
bers of UP) 5,420 0.96 -
8. Izquierda Radical 3,572 0.63 -
9. Comunista Revolucionario
(Maoist) 3,330 0.59 -
10. Izquierda Cristiana (another
Christian Democrat dissident
member of UP) 3,216 0.57 -
11. Social Democrats 1,616 0.28 -
12. Independent 1,599 0.28 -
13. Anarchist 673 0.12 -
14. Blank or nullified 13,990 2.49 -
Total 560,240 99.93 -

Source: Jorge Barrfa (1972).

In the Latin American context, the Chilean CUT was unique in that it
strengthened its power among the rank and file through its own initiative, and
not through dependence on the government. The CUT accomplished this in a
climate of toleration for Christian Democrats and other opposition parties that
was not typical in the political system as a whole. Suspicions about "Com-
munist" manipulation were disproved by the Communist Party's demonstra-
tion of its power through votes.

LABOR AND THE OPPOSITION

OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE UP

Between October 1972 and September 1973, the Christian Democrats and
the Partido Nacional, in alliance with several associations including truck
owners, pharmacy and shopowners, and other social categories, developed ac-
Latin American Perspectives: Issue 8, Winter 1976, Vol. III, No. 1

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 94 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

tions which expressed their o

ever-more insistently deman
fensive had four culminating
1972, the parliamentary election of March 1973, the strike by employees of El
Teniente (the second largest copper mine in Chile) in Rancagua Province, and
the second truck-owners strike in July-August 1973. This was no spontaneous
movement by deprived social categories, but rather an organized movement,
coordinated at the political level in close relation with the armed forces and
instruments of U.S. policy.
During this offensive, the labor movement played an ambiguous role be-
cause it was unable to provide strong unified support to the government, and
the government leadership did nothing to resolve that ambiguity (see Winn,
this issue). We will examine only the El Teniente strike in this context.

EL TENIENTE STRIKE

The three-month El Teniente copper strike which lasted from April

1973 was important because the Christian Democrat and Partido Nacional op-
position to the UP was able to use the strike to discredit the government in its
own base of power (labor) and to disrupt the production of copper on which
Chilean foreign exchange depended. It also played upon the political ambigui-
ties of the UP and made the administration blunder into a position where it
could be accused of persecuting the working class.
The strike was detonated by a disagreement over how much to increase
wages to compensate for inflation, based on a long-standing agreement be-
tween union and management that wages were to be periodically adjusted to
compensate for price increases. The labor leadership was closely balanced be-
tween UP and PDC leaders. The UP controlled the blue-collar workers' union
while the PDC controlled the white-collar union. The strike became embroiled
in the national political struggle as agents of the American Institute for Free
Labor Development (AIFLD) became involved in fomenting it (see Spalding,
this issue), and it was supported by public meetings and marches in Santiago
designed to discredit the Allende regime. The administration was inept in its
attempt to counter the pro-strike propaganda.
The UP administration decided to confront the economistic pressures of
the copper workers. The administration argued that the copper-workers'
wages were so high that they constituted an unduly privileged labor sector;
therefore, the government would resist their wage increase demands. The UP
success in the March 1973 elections undoubtedly gave the administration the
confidence to confront the El Teniente workers. Until April 1973, the
Corporaci6n del Cobre had given in to workers' demands in order to avoid
strikes at any cost and maintain copper production. Thus, the government de-
cided to stand firm and not to negotiate.
The UP supporters among the copper workers were confused. Their party
allegiance required them to urge workers to postpone their struggle for eco-
nomic and social benefits; their position as labor cadres pushed them to lead a
struggle for immediate benefits from an administration supposedly sympathet-
ic to labor.
The UP did not adequately assess the strike as part of a CIA-financed
strategy to set the basis for Allende's overthrow. The CUT and the

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 ZAPATA: CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT 95

Confederaci6n del Trabajadores de Cobre (CTC) carefully maintained neutral-

ity during the strike and called for conciliation between the PDC and UP fac-
tions at El Teniente, a call which went unheeded. When El Teniente labor
leaders visited other copper mines, especially El Salvador and Chuquicamata,
to ask for solidarity, they were accompanied by representatives of the CUT
and the CTC who countered their arguments with "objective" terms about the
strike. However, the conflict continued because the government took an in-
transigent position, claiming it was defending the interests of the whole work-
ing class, whereas the copper workers were asking to be treated as an excep-
tion, using their strategic hold on the economy to force the government to give
in. Less than one percent of the labor force was producing more than ten per-
cent of the Gross National Product and asking to receive a disproportionate
share of that in wages.
Another implication of the decision of the government not to negotiate
placed the CUT and CTC in irreconcilable positions in relation to the El Ten-
iente workers. Contrary to the traditional style of Chilean politics, this deci-
sion resulted in a political appeal by the UP for the support of the PDC rank
and file. However, support from the Christian Democrats was already out of
the question because of their support for the coming coup. This confrontation
lasted until September 11, when the military intervened.
The El Teniente strike was the first time in many years of Chilean labor
history that the strategy of the dominant classes represented by the PDC and
the Partido Nacional coincided with the limited objectives of the working class
in one of its most important sectors, the copper workers.
Analysis of the copper workers' strike at El Teniente reveals that during
much of the time, the blue-collar workers (obreros) continued to work but
had to be protected from attacks made by the striking white-collar workers
(empleados). This separation, while exploited by the anti-Allende forces, was
partly the consequence of empleados occupying the higher posts within the
labor hierarchy and constituting a kind of lower-middle class which tended to
support the Christian Democrats. Some blue-collar workers did support the
strike (especially those working on the ore concentrator and in the mine). The
only place in the production system at El Teniente where work continued for
the duration of the strike was the smelter where workers maintained a produc-
tion of blister copper until there were no more concentrates to smelt.

The implications of the different attitudes toward the strike between blue-
and white-collar workers are clearer as we look at the solidarity strike that
took place in Chuquicamata in support of El Teniente from June 1 to July 15.
There, all the members of the blue-collar sindicato industrial continued to
work during the strike; the white-collar sindicato de empleados struck
throughout the period but with a varying number of employees actually fol-
lowing the union's order to strike. The political division between the two un-
ions were clearly defined at Chuquicamata, whereas at El Teniente the case
was more complex since more than two trade unions existed as a result of the
more complicated system of production. At El Teniente, there was no clear
division between blue- and white-collar unions. Each union had members be-
longing to conflicting political forces. The division took place within each un-
ion along political lines. Thus, at El Teniente some blue- and white-collar
workers were striking while others were working (Ruiz Tagle, 1973).
Latin American Perspectives: Issue 8, Winter 1976, Vol. 111, No. 1

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 96 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

CONCLUSION

Under the pressure of organized opposition, the UP forces in labor sacri-

ficed their frail unity with the Christian Democrats within the CUT as well as
the principle of autonomy from the government by asserting its support for the
UP government. The reason for this merging of the CUT with the administra-
tion was not inflation and the fall in real wages, but rather political need - to
stop the opposition to the UP.
During the transition to socialism the labor movement was pressured by
the rank and file to push for wage increases and social benefits. Workers de-
sired to regain the losses in real wages eroded by inflation. Pressure on labor
leaders (to sacrifice autonomy from the administration) brought the CUT into
line with the administration and conflicted in some instances with the role of
labor leaders as defenders of workers' immediate economic improvement.
Workers' participation in management in nationalized plants also tended to
weaken the union as the sole organ of workers' power outside of the political
party.

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The application
of political sociology
to Third World problems
and events INIERNAIIONAI
SCID Volume X (Fall) 1975 Number 3 D[II[IIOPM[NI
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
THE UGANDAN ECONOMY AND Michael J Schultheis
GENERAL AM IN, 1971-1974

INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY, Michael Armer and

ALLIENATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC Allan Schnaiberg
STATUS: A REPLICATION IN COSTA RICA

HOW ECONOMICALLY CONSEQUENTIAL Susan Eckstein

ARE REVOLUTIONS? A COMPARISON
OF MEXICO AND BOLIVIA

ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION Samuel L. Sharp

IN YUGOSLAVIA

THE ROLE AND STATUS OF Magdalena Sokotowska

WOMEN IN POLAND

DEVELOPMENT POLICY
STRATEGIES OF LEGITIMIZING Reuven Kahane
CULTURAL CHANGE: AN INDIAN
EXAMPLE

REVIEW-ESSAY
CUBA LIBRE? SOCIAL SCIENCE Irving Louis Horowitz
WRITINGS ON POSTREVOLUTIONARY
CUBA, 1959-1975
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