Problem statement:
As we all know that one of the safest form of transportation is air travel. Globally aviation
contributes over 838 billion USD in revenue (2019, Statistics). Regardless of this, Boeing
(American) with its 7-series jets and Airbus (European) with its A-series dominates the aviation
industry. In 2011, 737 MAX series were launched by Boeing in order to compete within the
market. Compared to its previous model (737 NG) and competitors (A320), this new series were
supposed to be more fuel-efficient. But everything changed in October 2018 and March 2019,
because of the two 737 MAX lethal crashes that killed all passengers and crew onboard (Total =
346). Now these crashes raised some pretty serious number of questions as to how secure 737
MAX is for further operation. Let’s assume that Boeing's initial objective was to quicken their
737 MAX project so that they don’t have to lose time, as there was tough competition, but
clearly their plan didn’t succeed. As designing and building of a plan is a very complex, long,
time-consuming and large project so it is comprehensible to take decisions that are not at the
best possible level. However to crash a plane it requires more than some bad decisions. Aircraft
crashes or accidents can only happen when small errors have been ignored whether mechanical
or human. These small errors that are ignored contribute as a threat to aviation industry and
aircraft safety and maintenance. In the beginning the pilots were being blamed that they
caused the crash. However now the reports show that because of wrong decisions, this project
was jeopardized from the start. Here the question arises that if this project was compromised
since the beginning then why was it further continued and why were people’s lives put at stake
just for some competition. All this will be further investigated and discussed in detail in this
study.
Contrary to Boeing's initial statements after the crashes, pieces of evidence brought to the
public eye now show what went wrong, and what could have been done better: Analysis
evidenced that the new engines needed to be extended up and well in front of the wing, in
order to increase ground clearance. However, by doing so, Boeing changed the way the plane
behaves when thrust is applied to the engine. In this configuration, when the pilot applies
power to the engine, the plane has a high propensity to "pitch-up" or raise its nose. This fact
increases the angle of attack or the angle between the wings and the airflow over the wings.
However, if the angle of attack is high enough, the plane enters in an aerodynamic stall; The
analysis also evidenced that Boeing chose to create a piece of software, named Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS, in order to correct the faulty airframe.
Whenever the software detects a high angle of attack, it forces the plain nose down, to avoid a
stall. However, the measurement of the angle of attack was reliant on a single sensor. There
was no redundancy, no "cross-check." Findings analyzed suggest that MCAS was also
responsible for giving feedback to pilots whenever it engages. This situation happens by
pushing the pilot's control columns forward. Unfortunately, even when pilots could see there is
nothing wrong, they could not pull the control column back, due to the extreme force applied
by the MCAS. In order to reduce costs, and speed up the process, Boeing also opted to hide the
differences between the 737-MAX and its predecessors in order to avoid the requirement of a
new certification. By showing that the 737-MAX was the same of the old 737’s, any pilot trained
in the old 737’s models could also fly the MAX, without any recertification or any hours on the
simulator. Boeing also hide the MCAS system purposefully on the manuals, and just made
MCAS a part of the flight computer system.
