Bar Matter No.

1625 Petition To Use Maiden Name

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, G.R. No. 169202
Petitioner,
-versus.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Promulgated:
Respondent. March 5, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] of the 27 May 2005 Decision[2] and 2 August 2005 Resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, which in
turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioner’s request to revert to the use of her maiden name
in her replacement passport.

The Facts

Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring on 27
October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: “Rallonza” as her
surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport,
petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.

Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request.

On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating thus:

This has reference to your letter dated 17 August 2000 regarding one Ms. Maria Virginia V. Remo who is
applying for renewal of her passport using her maiden name.

This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a
woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the
husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these conditions.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October
2000.[5]
On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President.

On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal[6] and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act
No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of
divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport
purposes.” The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will
control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA
8239.

On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration.[7]

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of
the President. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the resolution dated July 27, 2004, and the
order dated October 28, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 2 August 2005.

Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code[9] and Section 5(d) of RA 8239.[10]
The Court of Appeals held that for passport application and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when a married
woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree,
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner's marriage to Francisco Rallonza has
been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name
in the replacement passport after she had adopted her husband’s surname in her old passport. Hence, according to the Court of
Appeals, respondent was justified in refusing the request of petitioner to revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport.

The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil
Code provides:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME, OR
(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR
(3) HER HUSBAND’S FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS
“MRS.”

We agree with petitioner that the use of the word “may” in the above provision indicates that the use of the
husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court.[11]

In Yasin,[12] petitioner therein filed with the Shari’a District Court a “Petition to resume the use of maiden name”
in view of the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after
marriage of her former husband to another woman. In ruling in favor of petitioner therein, the Court explained that:

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband’s name by
prefixing the word “Mrs.” before her husband’s full name or by adding her husband’s surname to her maiden first name. The law
grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death
of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as use of her former husband’s is optional and not obligatory for
her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her
but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the
marriage as no law requires it. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways
provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.[13] She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article
370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is
married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is
in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.[14]
 In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husband’s surname in
her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using
her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case.
Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, petitioner’s
marriage remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement
passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.

The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is Section 5(d), which
states:

Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. — No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the
Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the
following requirements: x x x

(D) IN CASE OF A WOMAN WHO IS MARRIED, SEPARATED, DIVORCED OR WIDOWED OR WHOSE MARRIAGE
HAS BEEN ANNULLED OR DECLARED BY COURT AS VOID, A COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE, COURT
DECREE OF SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT OR CERTIFICATE OF DEATH OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE DULY
ISSUED AND AUTHENTICATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL: PROVIDED, THAT IN CASE OF A
DIVORCE DECREE, ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF MARRIAGE AS VOID, THE WOMAN APPLICANT MAY REVERT
TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT SUCH DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED UNDER EXISTING
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES; X X X (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, argues that the
highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 “limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of
her maiden name in her passport.” These instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage.
Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 provides:

The passport can be amended only in the following cases:

A) AMENDMENT OF WOMAN’S NAME DUE TO MARRIAGE;

B) AMENDMENT OF WOMAN’S NAME DUE TO DEATH OF SPOUSE, ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE
INITIATED BY A FOREIGN SPOUSE; OR
C) CHANGE OF SURNAME OF A CHILD WHO IS LEGITIMATED BY VIRTUE OF A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF
HIS PARENTS.

Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of
RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.[15] This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an
implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code.

PETITIONER IS MISTAKEN. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARTICLE 370 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND SECTION
5(D) OF RA 8239 IS MORE IMAGINED THAN REAL. RA 8239, INCLUDING ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MARRIED WOMAN FROM USING HER MAIDEN NAME IN HER PASSPORT. IN
FACT, IN RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT, THE DFA ALLOWS A MARRIED WOMAN WHO APPLIES FOR A PASSPORT FOR
THE FIRST TIME TO USE HER MAIDEN NAME. SUCH AN APPLICANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND'S
SURNAME.[16]

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously
use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the
submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name,
she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.[17]

HOWEVER, ONCE A MARRIED WOMAN OPTED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME IN HER
PASSPORT, SHE MAY NOT REVERT TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME, EXCEPT IN THE CASES ENUMERATED IN
SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239. THESE INSTANCES ARE: (1) DEATH OF HUSBAND, (2) DIVORCE, (3) ANNULMENT, OR (4)
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. SINCE PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO HER HUSBAND SUBSISTS, SHE MAY NOT RESUME HER
MAIDEN NAME IN THE REPLACEMENT PASSPORT. OTHERWISE STATED, A MARRIED WOMAN'S REVERSION TO THE
USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME MUST BE BASED ONLY ON THE SEVERANCE OF THE MARRIAGE.

EVEN ASSUMING RA 8239 CONFLICTS WITH THE CIVIL CODE, THE PROVISIONS OF RA 8239 WHICH IS
A SPECIAL LAW SPECIFICALLY DEALING WITH PASSPORT ISSUANCE MUST PREVAIL OVER THE PROVISIONS OF
TITLE XIII OF THE CIVIL CODE WHICH IS THE GENERAL LAW ON THE USE OF SURNAMES. A BASIC TENET IN
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS THAT A SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL LAW,[18] THUS:

[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a
special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.[19]

Moreover, petitioner’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. T he apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each
shall be effective.[20] For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be
so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.[21] This petitioner failed to establish.

The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she
opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first
applied for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before, in her previous
passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s present request, definitely nothing
prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's
name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents,[22] cannot be countenanced.
Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance
purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will.

THE ACQUISITION OF A PHILIPPINE PASSPORT IS A PRIVILEGE. THE LAW RECOGNIZES THE

PASSPORT APPLICANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL. HOWEVER, THE STATE IS ALSO MANDATED TO
PROTECT AND MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS
PROCEEDING FROM IT[23] AS A PHILIPPINE PASSPORT REMAINS AT ALL TIMES THE PROPERTY OF THE
GOVERNMENT. THE HOLDER IS MERELY A POSSESSOR OF THE PASSPORT AS LONG AS IT IS VALID AND THE SAME
MAY NOT BE SURRENDERED TO ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS
REPRESENTATIVE.[24]

As the OSG correctly pointed out:

[T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of identity and
nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its
citizens requesting other governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and
protection. x x x

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondent’s competence to regulate any amendments intended
to be made therein, including the denial of unreasonable and whimsical requests for amendments such as in the instant
case.[25]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2 August 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 EN BANC
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law."chanrobles virtual law library
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.chanrobles virtual law library
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am- 6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSONchanrobles virtual law library
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.chanrobles virtual law library
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.
1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,
2
reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could
deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that
it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright
to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of
law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the
very name being used by respondent - "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly,
the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services.
In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt
may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services"
as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that
legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary
to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union,"
the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do
not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in
the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto.
It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.c
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of
illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services,
but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and
Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services.
Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings
because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should
be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating
his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the
trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services
through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for
it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for
malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject
to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage
in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited
to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are
wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated
in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and
convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which
activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the
bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general
public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to
offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name - The Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not help matters. It gives
the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them.
Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there
are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even
by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such
act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of
this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is
not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless
he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law - accurate or
inaccurate - moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example
is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony
with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required
by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law?
In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel
man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or
lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a
certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily
to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law.
This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before
me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law
only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind
of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice
or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which
are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance,
if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select
an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate
sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends
on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer
and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here,
since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State
of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel,
or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where
the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines
by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact
or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE - THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation - in their publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law
. . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was
no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however,
the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice
in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in
the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice
or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light
that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of
this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available."
11
chanrobles virtual law library
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
12
chanrobles virtual law library
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13chanrobles
virtual law library
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14chanrobles virtual law library
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court,
is also practicing law. 16Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and
rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17One
who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for
it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18chanrobles virtual law library
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19after citing the doctrines in several cases,
we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business
of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act
or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3
[1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."chanrobles virtual law library
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the
extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating
parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20chanrobles virtual law library
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge
and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January
13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled
"Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations
of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices
on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what
the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so
on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple
deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's
just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you
had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions
of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real
estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation
would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to
arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in
this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-
shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from
simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22chanrobles virtual law library
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law
who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law.
26
The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is
found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public
from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware
that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association.
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law.
31
That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their
legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice
law in the state.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35Prior to the
adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics
had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director
of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39was held to constitute
improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to
a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions.
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of
the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented."
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law.
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains
a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46This goes to show that an
exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise,
the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member
of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s
for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we
are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not
within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely
administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice
of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action,
50
after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from
the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action
in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
Endnotes:

1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left side
of "The Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were published in a newspaper
of general circulation.chanrobles virtual law library
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.chanrobles virtual law library
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10, 1991,
Rollo, 328.chanrobles virtual law library
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1, 10;
Rollo, 209, 218.chanrobles virtual law library
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar
Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-416, 425-427.chanrobles
virtual law library
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on
Lawyers' Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo,
241-242.chanrobles virtual law library
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano M.
Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.chanrobles virtual law library
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-
106.chanrobles virtual law library
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-
371.chanrobles virtual law library
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free
Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.chanrobles virtual law library
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne C.
Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.chanrobles virtual law library
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.chanrobles virtual law library
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.chanrobles virtual law library
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode Island Bar
Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.chanrobles virtual law library
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.chanrobles virtual law library
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.chanrobles virtual
law library
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.chanrobles virtual law library
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.chanrobles virtual law
library
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).chanrobles virtual law library
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.chanrobles virtual law library
21 Rollo, 130-131.chanrobles virtual law library
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.chanrobles virtual law library
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al., 42
SCRA 302 (1971).chanrobles virtual law library
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.chanrobles virtual law library
26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.chanrobles virtual law library
27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and
Client 64, 865.chanrobles virtual law library
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.chanrobles virtual law library
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974) and Shayne, The
Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-
117.chanrobles virtual law library
30 Illustrations:
(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear
for the Government of the Philippines in a case in which the government has an interest
(Sec. 33, Rule 138, id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the purpose of
conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, who is
appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities where members of the bar
are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine Patent Office
(now known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer) in
trademark, service mark and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark
Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or any
Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2) he represents an
organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that
he is properly authorized; or (3) he is duly-accredited members of any legal aid office duly
recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case falling
under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the studies of law in
a reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient qualification for appointment
(Sec. 233, Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.chanrobles virtual law library
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New York vs.
U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.chanrobles virtual law library
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.chanrobles virtual law library
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.chanrobles virtual law library
34 Rule 3.01, id.chanrobles virtual law library
35 Rule 3.04, id.chanrobles virtual law library
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.chanrobles virtual law library
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.chanrobles virtual law library
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).chanrobles virtual law library
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license promptly secured
thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.".chanrobles virtual law library
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.chanrobles virtual law library
41 Op. cit., 80.chanrobles virtual law library
43 * * * Missing * * * .
44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); A.B.A.
Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284
(Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). .chanrobles virtual law library
45 Supra, Fn 2.chanrobles virtual law library
46 Id., 810, 825.chanrobles virtual law library
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American Bar
Association Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.chanrobles virtual law library
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, supra,
Fn 38.chanrobles virtual law library
49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968
(1958).chanrobles virtual law library
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A and
Sec. 121, Corporation Code.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio city

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 2519             August 29, 2000

TEODORO R RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles on the grounds of
Deceit and Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint1 reads as follows:

"1. The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City;

2. Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and his office is located at Suite 335, URC
Building, 2123 España, Manila;

3. That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases;

4. That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriff's return, dated November 10,
1982, stating that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the defendants;

5. That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the defendants in said
cases had already given Atty. Angeles a partial settlement of the judgment in the amount of P42,999.00 (as
evidenced by xerox copies of Partial Settlement of Judgment dated September 21, 1982 and Receipt of
Payment dated September 22, 1982, hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B", respectively), without our
knowledge.

6. That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00 he received from
Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;

7. That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on February 17, 1983,
but as of this date the undersigned have not yet received any reply. (See Exhibit "C" and "D" attached)."

In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that he has the right to retain
the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional fees due him under the subsequent
agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed
of Assignment (Annex "8")2 or under the previous agreement of P20% of P206,000.00.

Complainants, in their Reply,3 vehemently denied the assignment of their rights to respondent.

Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation in our
Resolution dated November 21, 1983. The Office of the Solicitor General considered this case submitted for
resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring respondent's right to present evidence as considered waived due to the
latter's failure to appear on the scheduled hearings. However, the records from said Office do not show any
resolution.

In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an Order requiring the parties to manifest whether or
not they are still interested in prosecuting this case, or whether supervening events have transpired which render
this case moot and academic or otherwise. The copy of said Order sent to the complainants was received by their
counsel on October 30, 1998 while the copy to the respondent was returned unclaimed.

Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report on April 29, 1999 finding respondent Atty. Sergio
Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01
thereof and recommends his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a resolution, the decretal
portion of which reads:

"RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151

Adm. Case No. 2519

Teodoro R Rivera, et al. vs.

Atty. Sergio Angeles

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
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record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Atty. Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for his having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his
client."

The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondent's act of deceit and
malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court
repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the
practice of his profession.4 For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.5 1âwphi1

The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but
such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There
should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for
having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.

This Resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and appended to respondent's personal record.

SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes:
1
Rollo, p. 1.
2
Annex "7", Unsigned Deed of Assignment; Rollo, p. 45.
3
Reply, Rollo, pp. 62 and 88.
4
Fernandez v. Grecia, A.C. No. 3694, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 425.
5
Busiños v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 4349, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 407.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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4/17/22, 11:13 PM A.C. No. 3910

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SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3910            June 28, 2001

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

On August 14, 2000, a Decision was rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case, finding respondent Atty.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. guilty of gross misconduct. The dispositive portion of the Court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct,
and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to
the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property
within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part
to do so will result in his disbarment.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

From the afore-quoted Decision respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. seeks this reconsideration.

The finding of guilt for gross misconduct was based on the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon whom the case was referred for investigation. We again
quote the said findings for emphasis:

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner.
The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the
truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the
complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against
him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full faith and
credence.

Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered
himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in
the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.

FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent
(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property
unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such
authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject
property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat,
Sr.) is not the owner of said property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether
gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider
himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the property by Jose
Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the complainant)
allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.
covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is
of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said
Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said
that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose
Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his
wife's signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of
Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his
claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat,
Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light
of the circumstances already mentioned.

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FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property
(which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable
character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims that
he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared
before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of
P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there
was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that
the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know
the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper
instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.1

We remain convinced that respondent was remiss in his duty to abide by his sworn oath as a member of the bar to
"do no falsehood nor consent to its commission"2 and further violated the mandate of his profession to "uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession."3

In the instant case, after a review of the records, we note that this is the first and only administrative complaint
against respondent Atty. Villalon in his long career as a member of the bar. At one time, he was even the President
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Manila 1 Chapter, and as such he introduced various programs to
uphold the confidence of the public in the integrity of the legal profession and to uplift the welfare of his brethren.
Furthermore, it appears that as of July 8, 1997, respondent Atty. Villalon already returned to the complainant himself
the owner's duplicate of the subject TCT No. M-3023 and the complainant acknowledged receipt4 thereof, thus there
is a need to delete the directive to deliver the said TCT from the Court's Decision. Hence, we agree to reduce the
penalty imposed on respondent Atty. Villalon.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and MODIFIES the Decision dated
August 14, 2000 in that respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of SIX (6) MONTHS only with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. The directive in the Decision to deliver TCT No. M-3023 to complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. is DELETED, the
delivery thereof having been accomplished as of July 8, 1997.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the
Integrated Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Records, Vol. I, Report and Recommendation, pp. 7-10.

2 See Lawyer's Oath.

3 Cannon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

4 Annex "A-1" of Manifestation and Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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1/31/22, 11:10 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 092

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF

THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.” LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P.
SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES, JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A.
LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN,
petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY

TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES.” RICARDO
J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA. REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC,
EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

Civil Law; Partnership; Firm Name; Use in the partnership

name of the names of deceased partners contrary to Art. 1815 of
the Civil Code; Names in a firm name of a partnership must be
living partners; Reasons.—Inasmuch as “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo” and “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
and Reyes” are partnerships, the use in their partnership names
of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815
of the Civil Code. x x x It is clearly tacit in the above provision
that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those
of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be
living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article
1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a
partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in

________________

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* EN BANC

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority

To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the

creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus,
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics “prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received
from the future business of the deceased lawyer’s clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and
because such payments will not represent service or responsibility
on the part of the recipient.” Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the
death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits
accruing, there can be no corresponding liability.
Same; Same; Same; Commercial Partnership; Art. 1840 refers
to commercial partnership with goodwill, not professional
partnerships; Goodwill cannot arise in a professional partnership.
—Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership
with a good will to protect rather than of a professional
partnership, with no saleable good, will but whose reputation
depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members.
Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a
commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Partnership for the
practice of law, nature of.—A partnership for the practice of law
cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or
for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically
allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy. “A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal
entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. x x x It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on a trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it
has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or
trade name in law practice is improper.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to practice law, nature of.
—“The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited, to
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persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly

ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in
its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also
the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking
of the nature of a public trust.”

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 3

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority

To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

Same; Same; Same; Custom; Continued use of a deceased or

former partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships not
sanctioned by local custom; Reason; Possibility of deception upon
the public where the name of a deceased partner continues to be
used.—It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the
firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is
permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use. It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom
permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm
names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the
history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this
country would show how their firm names have evolved and
changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. The possibility of deception upon the public, real or
consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to
be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel
might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name
appearing in a firm title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Concept of
Customs; To be admissible custom must be proved as a fact;
Distinctions between juridical custom and social custom.—Not so
in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions
the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed
by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice
of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the
rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. We find
such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because
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something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that

Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from
social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Practice of law not
considered money-making trade but peculiarly related to the
administration of justice.—The practice of law is intimately and
peculiarly

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority

To Continue use of the Firm name "Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc."

related to the administration of justice and should not be

considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."

Aquino, J.: dissenting:

Civil Law; Partnership; Firm Name; Use of firm name of

deceased partner of law firm; Purpose of continued use of names of
decesed founders of law firms; is a legitimate motivation;
Retention of the name of the deceased partner in the law firm not
illegal per se.—Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in
continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to
retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and the benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation. The retention of
their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before
the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the
death of Judge Ross, the founder of the law firm of Ross,
Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the
frim name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the
firm name was illegal or unethical.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

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Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by

the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of the
firms, the names of partners who had passed awy. In the
Court's Resolution of September2, 1976, both Petitions
were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following
arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is notprohibited from
continuing its business uns=der a firm name which
includes the name explicity sanctions the practice when it
provides in the last paragraph that:

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 5

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

“The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of

the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part
thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the
deceased partner
1
liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partner-ship.”

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and

engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of
firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such
firm name, of the name of a deceased partner;2 the
legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy—a profession requiring the same
degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that
implicit in the relationship of attorney and client—to
acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there
is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued
use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where
such firm
3
name has acquired the characteristics of a “trade
name.”
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not
transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership
because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association declares that:

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“x x x The continued use of the name of a deceased or former

partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical, but
care should be taken that
4
no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. x x x”

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because

the deaths of their respective deceased partners were

________________

1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5; see also Petition of Romulo,

et al., p. 3.
2 Citing Sec. 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 342; Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act
No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic Act No. 184.
3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.
4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, et al.,
pp. 3-4.

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for

several days; the stationeries now being used by them
carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm;
petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories
5
of the fact of their respective
deceased partners’ deaths.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a6
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name;
there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name
of a law firm7
necessarily identifies the individual members
of the firm.
6. The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the
firm name of law partnerships has been consistently
allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice
8
in the
legal profession of most countries in the world.
The question involved in these Petitions first came
under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm
in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including
in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston.
The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm

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to desist from including in their firm designation the name

of C. D. Johnston, “who has long been dead.”
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as
an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds
of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of
Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus
curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of
April 15, 1957, stated that it “would like to be informed
why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty.
E. A. Perkins is already dead.” In a Manifestation dated
May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile,
raising substantially the

________________

5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.

6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.
8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18; Petition of
Romulo, et al., p. 5.

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 7

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,

prayed that the continued use of the firm name “Perkins &
Ponce Enrile” be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:

“After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys

Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the
name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to
depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required
Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist
from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D.
Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the
personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney
and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a
remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name “PERKINS”
from their firm name.”

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy

thus far enunciated by the Court.

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The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the

rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez
and Castillo” and “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes” are partnerships, the use in their partnership
names of the names of deceased partners will run counter
to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides:

“Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name,

which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners.
“Those who, not being members of the partnership, include
their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability of a
partner.”

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a

firm name of a partnership must either be those of living
partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be living
persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article
1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
including his name in the

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a

partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot he held liable as the old members to the creditors of
a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus,
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics “prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a
deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the
fees received from the future business of the deceased
lawyer’s clients, both because the recipients of such
division are not lawyers and because such payments will
not represent service or responsibility on the part of the
recipient.” Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can
be held liable for transactions entered into after the death
of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits
accruing, there can be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections
to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased
partners. The public relations value of the use of an old
firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able

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lawyer without connections will have to make a name for

himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who
can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s
reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the
Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to
consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the
Code entitled “Dissolution and Winding Up.” The Article
primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases
of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as
part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-
over situation preparatory: to formal reorganization.
Secondly Article 1840 treats more of a commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of
its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a
seleable goodwill can
9

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 9

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot9

arise in
a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.

“As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial

partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to
carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a
stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will
of the firm x x x x.” (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Italics supplied)

On the other hand,

“x x x a professional partnership the reputation of which depends

on the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good will to be distributed as a
firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such
skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision
in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. x x
x” (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Italics supplied)

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C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened

to partnerships formed by other professionals or for
business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically
allows the use of a trade 10
name in connection with the
practice of accoun-tancy.
“A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal
entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. x x x It is not a partnership formed for
the purpose11
of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom
de plume,12 assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.”

“The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being

applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business
is that the law is a ‘profession.’ x x x

________________

9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd 7 NY 2d
846, 196 NYS 2d 986, 164 NE 2d 860.
10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.
11 In re Crawford’s Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.
12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon 33, par. 2,
Canons of Professional Ethics.

10

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

“Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey

of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern
Times, p. 5) defines a profession as ‘a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service,—no
less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood.’

x x x           x x x           x x x

“Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession

from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a

byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and
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reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment 13
on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.”

“The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional

14
right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with 15
special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly
16
personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust.”
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons17 of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association in
support of their petitions.

________________

13 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.

14 7 C.J.S. 708.
15 5 Am Jur 270.
16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Fifth Ed., p. 8.
17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1908 were also adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The
American Bar Association adopted Canons 33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46 in
1933 and Canon 47 in 1937. On April 20, 1946,

11

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 11

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the

continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local
custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or
former partner’s name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the
more active and/or more senior members or partners of the
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law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of

petitioners and of other law firms in this country would
show how their firm names have evolved and changed from
time to time as the composition of the partnership changed.

“The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more
of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by
local custom and not where by custom this purports to identify the
active members. x x x
“There would seem to be a question, under the working of the
Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner
and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who
was never a partner with the new one.” (H.S. Drinker, op. cit.,
supra, at pp. 207-208) (Italics supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or

consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring
of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently
allowed the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in
the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it
is sanctioned by custom.

________________

when Canons 33 to 47 where already in effect, the Revised Constitution

of the Philippine Bar Association was approved and it provided that the
Association “adopts and makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American
Bar Association.” (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed. p. 341).

12

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance

Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al.
quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme
Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander &
Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm
bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the
parties. The Court stated therein:

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“The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom

and offends no statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33
of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar
Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in
part as follows: ‘The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical,
but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.’ There is no question as to local
custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members
with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the
courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached the conclusion that such
practice should not be prohibited. (Italics supplied)

x x x           x x x           x x x

“Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein 18is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners.”

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom

that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a
rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced)
19
as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must
20
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of

________________

18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.

19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Fourth Ed.,
Vol. 1, p. 7.
20 Article 12, Civil Code.

13

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 13

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

justice unless such custom is properly 21

established by
competent evidence like any other fact. We find such proof
of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom Juridical custom must be
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differentiated from social custom. The former can

supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of
such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying
22
or interpreting the
laws form part of the legal system. When the Supreme
Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions
directing lawyers to desist from including the names of
deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a
legal rule against which no custom or practice to the
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of
our civil law which clearly ordains that 23
a partnership is
dissolved by the death of any partner. Customs which are
contrary to law,
24
public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related
to the administration of justice and should not be
considered like an ordinary “money-making trade.”

“x x x It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a

spirit of public service. ‘A trade’ x x x ‘aims primarily at personal
gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind.’
If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer
and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in
their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world’s good
as he may within the limits allowed him by law. But the member
of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the
artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as
the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a
lawyers’ or physicians’ strike. The best

________________

21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).

22 Art. 8, Civil Code.
23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.
24 Art. 11, Civil Code.

14

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent

or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in
a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of
reward. This spirit of public service in which the profession of law
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is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound

administration of justice according to law. The other two elements
of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art
have their
25
justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit.”

In fine, petitioners’ desire to preserve the identity of their

firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediments.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied
and petitioners advised to drop the names “SYCIP” and
“OZAETA” from their respective firm names. Those names
may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who
have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.

          Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez,

Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
     Fernando, C. J., and Abad-Santos, J., take no part.
          Barredo, J., joins Justices Antonio and Aquino in
their dissent.
     Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Ramon C. Aquino.
     Aquino, J., see attached dissent

CERTIFICATION

FERNANDO C.J.:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for
granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice
Ameur-

________________

25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, (1953),

pp. 9-10.

15

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 15

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

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fina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the

under-signed did not participate in the disposition of these
petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner,
the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother-in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned,
and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: “Those
names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the
listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms
indicating the years during which they served as such.” It
represents a happy compromise.

DISSENTING OPINION

AQUINO, J.:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip,

Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition
of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use
of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1075 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as
the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the
law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in
their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be
allowed to continue using the said firm name
notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice
Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and
February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation
of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by
Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law
firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.
16

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority
To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc.

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Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by

the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part
of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions.
Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, “when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical” as long as “no imposition
or deception is practised through this use” (Canon 33 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted
with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of
the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip,
former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or
the period when they served as partners should be stated
therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing
the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain
the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and
esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate
motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That
practice was followed before the war by the law firm of
James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with
an indication of the year when he died. No one complained
that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.
Petition denied.

Notes.—To organize a corporation or a partnership that

could claim a juridical personality of its own and transact
business as such, is not a matter of absolute right but a
privilege which may be enjoyed only under such terms as
the State may deem necessary to impose. (Ang Pue & Co.
vs. Secretary of Commerce and Industry, 5 SCRA 645).
Although the heir of a partner ordinarily becomes a
limited partner for his own protection, yet the heir may
disregard it and instead elect to become a collective or
general partner,
17

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 17

Verzosa vs. Magdaluyo

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with all the rights and obligations of one. (Goquiolay vs.

Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).
An action for the liquidation of a partnership is a
personal one, which may be brought in the place of
residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.
(Claridades vs. Mercader, 17 SCRA 1).
A general partner cannot sell partnership property
without authority from other partners. (Goquiolay vs.
Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).
Condonation by creditor of share in partnership debt of
one partner does not increase pro rata of other partners.
(Island Sales, Inc. vs. United Pioneers Construction
Company, 65 SCRA 554.)
A partner has no obligation to account to anyone for
properties acquired after dissolution of partnership in
absence of proof he violated trust of deceased partner
during existence of partnership. (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete,
66 SCRA 425.)
The partnership profits distribution to the partners
should be reduced by the amounts of income tax assessed
against the partnership. (Ona vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 45 SCRA 74.)

——o0o——

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4/17/22, 11:14 PM B.M. No. 44

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 10, 1989

EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

B.M. No. 59 February 10, 1989

BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 624 February 10, 1989

CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, complainants,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Alberto Concha for Eufrosina Yap Tan.

Nelbert Poculan for respondent.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending administrative
complaints filed against him, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath. He then filed a Petition to be admitted to
the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Rollo of Attorneys. The complainants, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan,
Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes D. Agnis, opposed the Petition on several grounds.

In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29 November 1983, respondent's petition was denied, the
Court finding, inter alia, that:

... the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent's infraction may
be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were
parties, it is clear from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only after the
opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" (Exhibit "A-l"). He called himself "attorney"
knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositors evidence sufficiently shows that
respondent had held himself out as an "attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by
said oppositors. Respondent cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily
asked for rectification. ... Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses
testified as to respondent's being their lawyer and their compensating him for his services (Exhibits "D-
8" and "D-9"). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What
he did, however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of
Roxas, complaining of harassment to "our clients." when he could not but have known that he could not
yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is "dependent or person under the
protection of another and not a person who engages in the profession" is puerile. (126 SCRA 60, at 67
& 68)

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was filed by respondent on 23 January 1984, which was
opposed by Complainants, who stated that the "span of time was so short to determine with sufficient definiteness
whether or not respondent has reformed;" that "the testimonials are self-serving obviously prepared by respondent
himself and had them signed by the signatories who could not refuse him." In its Resolution of 8 May 1984 the Court
denied reconsideration.

On 23 May 1985 respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath, which was again opposed by Complainants, and which was denied by the Court on 16 July 1985,
with the Court stating that no other Motions of this kind would be entertained.

Undaunted, on 2 December 1985, respondent filed another Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal for Mercy and
Forgiveness, which the Court simply NOTED in its Resolution of 7 January 1986.

In a letter dated 4 December 1986 respondent's children echoed his appeal to the Court to allow him to take the
lawyer's oath, which the Court noted without action on 7 July 1987.

On 28 June 1988, respondent filed a second Petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. Complainants were
required to comment but they have not done so to date.

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In a letter dated 23 November 1988 addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court, respondent
asks for forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the
Philippine Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer's oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.

Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of
the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to practice
law.

In several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the following criteria were considered:
the person appreciates the insignificance of his dereliction and he has assured the Court that he now possesses the
requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law (Magat
vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 1); the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the
application for reinstatement, his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment, his active
involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 721 [1981]); the
favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens
of his community (In Re: Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1); the pleas
of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of his family (Andres vs. Cabrera, SBC-585, February 29, 1984,
127 SCRA 802).

The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to respondent's case. After the lapse of ten (10) years from the time
respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar Examination, he has shown contrition and willingness to reform. He has
also submitted several testimonials, including one from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath, with the Court
binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the
Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

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4/17/22, 11:14 PM G.R. No. L-363

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. L-363             July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal
case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon
Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of
death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but
the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a
conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted
"on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified
complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,
section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding
pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a
crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur.
Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him
beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The
respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent
viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the
fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the
assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the
case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ.
App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no
longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence,
was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a
conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A
pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of
executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there
cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any
of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new
man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion
of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and
amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United
States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged
upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was
qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official
position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and
moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
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preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed
with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer
is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of
the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

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1/31/22, 10:50 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 093

VOL. 93, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979 87

Pangan vs. Ramos

*
Adm. Case No. 1053. September 7, 1979.

SANTA PANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DION1SIO

RAMOS, respondent.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Practice of Law; Role of Attorneys;

Nature Of; Lawyer enjoined to use the name inscribed in the Roll
of Attorneys in his practice of law.—The attorney’s roll or register
is the official record containing the names and signatures of those
who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to
use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys
in his practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Oath of Attorney; Obligation of attorney
under his oath of office is to be candor and frank in his dealings
with the court.—The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to
swear that he “will do no falsehood”. As an officer in the temple of
justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of “truthfulness,
candor and frankness”. Indeed, candor and frankness should
characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to
be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in
ascertaining the truth.
Same; Same; Duty of attorney to the courts; General duty of
entire devotion of attorney to client.—The duty of an attorney to
the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and
honor, cannot be overemphasized. These injunctions circumscribe
the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As
stated in a case, his “high vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of
office when he resorts to deception, or permits his client to do so.”
Same; Same; Same; Lawyer who use before the courts a name
other than the name inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys resorted to
deception and demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the
courts; Offending attorney reprimanded and warned; Case at bar.
—In using the name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before the courts

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instead of the name by which he was authorized to practice law—

Dionisio D. Ramos—respondent in effect resorted to deception. He

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

88

88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangan vs. Ramos

demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts, The

circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard
precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty. x x x In view
of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt
act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the practice
of law.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa

Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It
appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and
March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case
were postponed on the basis of respondent’s motions for
postpone-ment. These motions were predicated on
respondent’s allegations that on said dates he had a case
set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case
No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the
accused in said case is one “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306
Doña Salud Bldg., Dasmariñas, Manila.” Respondent
admits that he used the name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before
said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but
avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth
Certificate (Annex “A”), his name is “Pedro Dionisio
Ramos”, and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the “D.D.” in “Pedro D.D. Ramos” is but

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an abbreviation of “Dionisio Dayaw”, his other given name

and maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name
appearing in the “Roll of Attorneys” is “Dionisio D. Ramos”.
The attorney’s roll or register is the official record
containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to
use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear
that he “will do no falsehood”. As an officer in the temple of
justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of
“truthfulness, can-
89

VOL. 93, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979 89

Pangan vs. Ramos

1
dor and frankness”. Indeed, candor and frankness should
characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This
has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon
him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to
the court as “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D.
Ramos”, respondent has violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means as are consistent with truth and honor, cannot be
overemphasized. These injunctions circumscribe the
general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client.
As stated in a case, his “high vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid
it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He
violates his oath of office when
2
he resorts to deception, or
permits his client to do so.”
In using the name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before the
courts instead of the name by which he was authorized to
practice law—Dionisio D. Ramos—respondent in effect
resorted to deception. He demonstrated lack of candor in
dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his
first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing
a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and
warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant
his suspension or disbarment from the practice of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been
unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is directed
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forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as

soon as possible. The request of complainant to appear in
the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty.
Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED.

          Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Abad

Santos, JJ., concur.

_______________

1 Jessup, Professional Ideals of the Lawyer 18, Malcolm, Legal and

Judicial Ethics, 116-120.
2 People v. Beattie, 137 111. 553, 31 Am. St. Rep. 384.

90

90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangan vs. Ramos

     Santos, is on official leave.

     Aquino, J., in the result.

Respondent reprimanded.

Notes.—A lawyer as counsel de oficio is duty bound to

exert his best efforts in behalf of an indigent client. (People
vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106).
An attorney’s duty of prime importance is to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers. (People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106; Cruz vs.
GSIS, 27 SCRA 174).
It is the duty of lawyers to evaluate the urgency and
importance of registered letters sent by courts. (Antonio vs.
Ramos, 2 SCRA 731).
An award of 15% as attorney’s fees is reasonable.
(Cosmopolitan Insurance Co. vs. Reyes, 15 SCRA 258).
A lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct in office where he
displays his revolver and puts it on his lap in order to
intimidate his client into signing a petition which the
former has prepared. (Vda. de Barrera vs. Laput, 26 SCRA
44).
The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or nonprofessional activities. (Rayong vs.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859).
The standard of personal and professional integrity
which should be applied to persons submitted to practice

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law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them

to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty. (Royong vs.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.)
When the lawyer’s integrity is challenged by evidence, it
is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all is expected of
him. (Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439.)
Where a lawyer makes false statement just to get or
extract money from his client, his acts constitute
professional miscon-

91

VOL. 93, SEPTEMBER 10, 1979 91

Abaigar vs. Paz

duct, for which he deserves disciplined. (In re: Arafiles, 35

SCRA 61.)
The false statement made by a lawyer on an information
sheet sworn and subscribed by him to be true, upon which
same statement, administrative and criminal charges have
been filed against him, may be a ground for disbarment.
(Calo vs. Degamo, 20 SCRA 447.)

——o0o——

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4/17/22, 11:15 PM A.M. No. 944

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 944 July 25, 1974

FLORA NARIDO, complainant,

vs.
ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that
at times zeal in the defense of one's client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the motives of opposing counsel. Some such reflection
is induced by these two administrative cases wherein respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen's
compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the
attorney's oath by submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma
accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan called
"embarrassment, humiliation and defamation" of a brother in a profession.

On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative cases to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on May 31 of this year.

1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is concerned, the report contains the following:
"In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court, complainant Narido heavily relies on the refusal of
respondent Linsangan to withdraw — despite warning — the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios ..., which
affidavit Narido claims to be perjured. ... Mrs. Narido and Atty. Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with disbarment
should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios."1 Nonetheless, such affidavit was filed. It was found
as a fact that there was nothing improper in presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it
were otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney's oath for submitting a
perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: "With respect to the other allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say
that there is no evidence showing Atty. Linsangan's awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they
are indeed false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial
body, or of violating his attorney's oath."2

2. As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: "This administrative complaint stemmed
from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma 'by virtue of his financial interest in the Award,' instigated the filing
of Administrative Case No. 944 'in order to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even by intimidation or
unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due process and at the expense, embarrassment, humiliation, and
defamation of his undersigned brother-respondent.' ... It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is
perhaps more apt to state that Atty. Risma's missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him into
filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Risma's dedication in championing the cause of the poor.
Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She needed every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the
payment thereof meant grave injustice; it meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client,
Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that it
must have been the plight of Mrs. Narido — rather than his alleged financial interest — that Compelled Atty. Risma
to advise his client to file the case against Atty. Linsangan. ... There being no direct evidence to show the alleged
bad faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty. Linsangan, the benefit
of the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma. Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of
'disbarment proceedings against a brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground' necessarily
fails."3

3. From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents should be exculpated. It
being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not one of the charges in the counter-complaint filed
against him that respondent Risma would seek to collect fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client,
contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and
that only where the case is appealed, there was likewise a recommendation for admonition or reprimand. The
aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from
the client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for attorney's fees would not be enforced. In the meanwhile, he had
been serving his poverty-stricken client faithfully and well, even advancing some of the necessary expenses. What
was recommended commends itself for acceptance.

4. This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to heed these words from
Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo:4
"It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickering and
unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not
receive any sympathy from this court."5

5. One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by thoroughness and diligence, but
its quality would have been improved had there been on the part of the Solicitor concerned a more adequate grasp
of notable opinions of this Court on legal ethics from Justice Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on
secondary authorities, both Philippine and American.

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WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is dismissed
for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No. 1025 is exculpated from the charge of
having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is, however, admonished to exercise greater care in
ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by way of attorney's fees. The contract entered into between
him and his client as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmen's compensation
suit is declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only because he
had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a poor client. Let a copy of this
resolution be spread on the records of both respondents.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Report, 9-10.

2 Ibid, 11.

3 Ibid, 14-15.

4 63 Phil. 293 (1936).

5 Ibid, 295.

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4/17/22, 11:15 PM A.M. No. 219

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 219             September 29, 1962

CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG, respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with unprofessional and unethical conduct in
soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying that respondents be dealt with accordingly.

The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was retained by Nieves Rillas
Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate
Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner had contemplated the closing of the said administration
proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera
as universal heir and order the delivery to her of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of
final accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera
refused to countersign these two pleadings and instead advised petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later,
petitioner found in the records of said proceedings that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January
11, 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner
voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On February 7, 1955, the other respondent,
Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955.

Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper for the reason that they
had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the administratrix and, taking
advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs.
Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to close the administration proceedings; that before their appearance,
they brought petitioner's client to their law office and there made her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of
Power of Attorney" and sent the same by mail to several corporations and establishments where the Estate of
Macario Barrera is owner of certificates of stocks and which documents purported to disauthorize the petitioner from
further collecting and receiving the dividends of the estate from said corporations, when in fact and in truth the
respondents fully knew that no power of attorney or authority was given to the petitioner by his client, the
respondents motive being to embarrass petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees of said corporations,
picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted by his client — all with the purpose of straining the
relationship of the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his
appearance without notice to petitioner.

In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his appearance on January 11, 1955 the
administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had
in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11, 1955, entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and
Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput", which she herself had filed with the court. 1awphîl.nèt

In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his appearance on February 7, 1955, the petitioner
has already withdrawn as counsel.

After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General recommended the complete exoneration of
respondents.

It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug entered his
appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed with the court a pleading discharging the petitioner Atty.
Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty.
Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner as her
lawyer was that she did not trust him any longer, for one time she found out that some dividend checks which should
have been sent to her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being cheated by petitioner.
Moreover, she found that withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and Bank of the Philippine Islands have
been made by petitioner without her prior authority.

We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as counsel for the widow; much
less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from petitioner. The evidence as found by the Solicitor
General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow, a written contract
having been made as to the amount to be given him for his professional services.

Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty. Patalinghug had
entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his
attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the
widow. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was
unprofessional.

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Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his
appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year, after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with
petitioner's professional services on January 11, 1955, and after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance
on February 5, 1955.

With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney as complained of by
petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt
petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was hurt by
the issuance of these documents, and felt that he had been pictured as a dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case
before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug and the widow for libel and falsification. It was shown,
however, that the case was dismissed.

No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby dismissed and the case
closed.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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 THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Complainant, v. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN,
REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P.
BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Respondents.
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.:JVITUG
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics,
specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law."
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C.
Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos.
Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer
College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the
defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they
might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such
an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting
either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents
had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-
Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time
with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he
claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were
executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case
involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the
recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter
Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De
Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,, were
all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be
published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student
Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found
the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring
students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC
President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March
1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was
still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed
by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27
May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement
of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of
Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission
Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May
1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May
1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo
Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President;
and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents,
and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a
Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices
for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his
Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP")
passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against
the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case."
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements
were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff
students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact.
Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney
proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record
in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because
of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter
disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required
of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation 1 which, among
other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against
the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.
"x x x......x x x......x x x
"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 will by filed them."
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board
of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension
would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the
explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE , respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon
his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney
and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.6/27/00 3:07
PM
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, p. 21.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1261. December 29, 1983.]

TAN TEK BENG, Complainant, v. TIMOTEO A. DAVID, Respondent.

Basilio Lanoria for complainant.

Timoteo A. David for and in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MEMBER OF THE BAR; SOLICITING CASES AT LAW FOR THE
PURPOSE OF GAIN; CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — Where in the agreement
lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary
or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients, the
Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice
which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice
ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section
27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828,
amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary
notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek
or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional"
(2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 33 Phil. 37, 42).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CAUSE FOR CENSURE. — The

commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association. "Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that
which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We censure lawyer David for having
entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his
conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics)
but because David should have known better.
 DECISION

AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer
Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer
(alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorney’s fees
received by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"December 3, 1970

"Mr. Tan Tek Beng

"Manila

"Dear Mr. Tan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must
be followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our
terms and conditions shall be as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. On all commission or attorney’s fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of
the collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty.
Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and
commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved.

"2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.

"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the
cases referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.

"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be
turned over to our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached
or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.

"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest
and fair with you in connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must
be sincere, honest and fair with me.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Illegible

TIMOTEO A. DAVID

"P.S.

I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.

(Sgd.) Initial

"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as
stated in the last paragraph of this letter.

(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng

MR. TAN TEK BENG"

The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the
clients.

The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were
mutual accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek
Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office
of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to
enforce the agreement.

In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as
manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president
and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted,
David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part
of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that
respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the
scheduled hearings were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his
counsel.

On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound,
Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10,
1981 that the Solicitor General’s Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case
dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court.
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which
is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily
refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives
a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec.
21 of Act No. 190).

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself
or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re
Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce v. Philippine
National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is condemned in
certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"34. Division of Fees. — No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."cralaw virtua1aw library

"35. Intermediaries. — The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or

exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all
relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such
intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. — A lawyer should accept no

compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the
knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal
Ethics).

We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical
agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek
Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known
better.chanrobles law library

"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of
his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S.
743).

WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this

decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.

SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Makasiar (Chairman), J., took no part.