Thanks to visit codestin.com
Credit goes to www.scribd.com

0% found this document useful (0 votes)
67 views10 pages

Qram8600 Lecture13

This document provides an overview and outline of a course on theory of risk sharing. It introduces the instructor and their background and experience. It outlines the course topics which will include arbitrage, expected utility, and risk sharing. It details course assignments including problem sets, exams, and participation. It also provides an introduction to key concepts in the course like capital markets, financial assets, and a simple discrete-state model that will be used to explore concepts of arbitrage, optimality, and equilibrium.

Uploaded by

Rahul Reddy
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
67 views10 pages

Qram8600 Lecture13

This document provides an overview and outline of a course on theory of risk sharing. It introduces the instructor and their background and experience. It outlines the course topics which will include arbitrage, expected utility, and risk sharing. It details course assignments including problem sets, exams, and participation. It also provides an introduction to key concepts in the course like capital markets, financial assets, and a simple discrete-state model that will be used to explore concepts of arbitrage, optimality, and equilibrium.

Uploaded by

Rahul Reddy
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 10

Roadmap

• Introductions, course outline, and administration


QRAM 8600 • Arbitrage
Theory of Risk Sharing • Expected Utility

Lecture 1

Stephen H. Shore
Fall 2022

1 2

Stephen Shore: Introduction Get to know each other


• Raised in San Francisco Bay Area
• Princeton undergraduate 1998
• Harvard Ph.D. 2003 (studied finance)
• Taught at Wharton 2003-2007
• Taught at Johns Hopkins 2007-2011
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
2011-2012
• At GSU since 2012; now RMI Department Chair.
• In my research, I look at risks faced by
households, income risk and consumer credit.

3 4

Contact Information Course Resources


• Office hours: Wednesdays 11am-noon am or by • Course website on iCollege
appointment
• Textbook: Eeckhoudt, L., C. Gollier, and H.
• Location: My office on 11th floor of 35 Broad St.
Schlesinger, Economic and Financial
• Email [email protected] Decisions under Risk, Princeton University
Press, 2005.
• Handouts

• iCollege Tour/Content

5 6

1
Course Assignments
• Go to iCollege Monday after 4:30pm to find
assignments for the week. (Practice problems,
videos, class instructions, etc.)
• Do these assignments in advance of Thursday What Are Capital Markets
4:30pm-7:00pm class. and What Are They For?
• Come to class, engage with the material, and
interrupt me! (1/12 class participation grade)
• 3 problem sets (1/12 each homework grade)
• 2 midterms, 1/6 each midterm grades
• Final exam, 1/3 of the grade

7 8

What Are Capital Markets? Classifying Financial Assets


• Real assets (investments) require an input of • Fixed-income securities promise to make fixed
resources today and deliver an output of payments in the future.
resources later. (example: farm) – bills (short-term), bonds (longer-term)
• Financial assets (investments) are claims to the • Equities (stocks) are claims to a share of the
output produced by real assets. profit of a corporation.
• Capital markets (financial markets) are the • Derivative securities (derivatives) make
markets in which financial assets are traded. payments that depend on the prices of other
• Time and uncertainty are crucial! financial assets.
– futures, swaps, options

9 10

Classifying Financial Assets What Are Capital Markets For?


• Shift the timing of consumption so it need not
Uncertainty of payoff
coincide with the timing of income
Stocks • Allocate risk (e.g. share it among many people,
Options
or concentrate it on those who are most willing
to bear it)
• Allocate resources to the most productive real
investments (e.g. by separating the ownership
Bills Bonds and management of companies)
(money market) • Aggregate the information of market participants,
thereby revealing it to others.
1 year Time to payoff

11 12

2
Sketch of the Financial System

The Institutional Perspective


and the Functional Perspective

13 14

Perspectives on the System Institutional Sketch


Institutional perspective:
• Example: what do banks do?
– Meeting place for borrowers and lenders
– Pool resources of lenders to make large loans
– Diversify by lending to many borrowers
– Build expertise through volume of lending
• Takes existence of banks as given

15 16

Perspectives on the System Functional Sketch


Functional perspective:
• Example: what needs to be done?
– Workers need to accumulate funds for retirement
– A large factory needs to be financed
– Homeowners need insurance against fires and
hurricanes
• Takes clients’ needs as given

17 18

3
Our Perspective
• In this course, we will emphasize functions of the
financial system
• This functional approach is a great strength of
the academic field of finance
Basic Concepts of Finance

19 20

Basic Concepts of Finance


• Arbitrage
– What do we know about asset prices by just
assuming that there are no risk-free profit
opportunities?
The Discrete-State Model
• Optimality
– What is the best combination of risky financial assets,
given their returns and an individual investor’s
preferences?
• Equilibrium
– What is the nature of asset prices and allocations
when all investors have optimized and the markets
clear?

21 22

A Simple Framework A Simple Framework


We will explore these concepts within a simple • Assets are defined by their payoffs. Asset i pays
framework: off Xij in state j.
• Two periods, “now” and “the future” • The price of asset i is written pi.
• A finite number S of states may occur in the • The N securities are jointly defined by an N-by-S
future. The states are numbered j=1…S. matrix X whose i,j element is Xij. (each security
• A finite number of assets are available. The is a row; each state is a column)
assets are numbered i=1…N. • The prices of the N securities can be stacked
into a N-by-1 vector p.

23 24

4
Portfolio Construction Example
• We can form a portfolio by buying wi shares of States:
asset i, i=1…N. If we stack the number of Farm: [3 2 1] (j= rain, small drought, large drought)
shares into a N-by-1 vector w, then
– the payoff on the portfolio is W=w’X Assets:
((1xN)x(NxS)=1xS, payoff in each of S state) • [3 2 1] (i=1 whole farm, p1=2)
and
• [2 2 1] (i=2, first 2 dollars produced, p2=1.75)
– the price of the portfolio is w’p. (1xN)x(Nx1)=1
• [1 1 1] (i=3 first dollar produced, p3=1)
• The portfolio is just a new asset that we have
constructed using the old ones.

25 26

Example continued portfolios


States are columns, assets are rows w (3x1) = (for example)
X (3x3) = p (3x1)=

1
3 2 1 2 -1
2 2 1 1.75 0
1 1 1 1

27 28

Comprehension Questions
• Consider a portfolio of 1 unit of asset 1
and -1 units of asset 2.
Complete Markets and Arrow
• What is the cost of buying this portfolio of
securities? Debreu Securities
• What are the payoffs of this portfolio in
the three states?

29 30

5
Complete Markets Complete Markets
• Suppose we can construct a portfolio that pays
• Markets are complete if S securities exist with
$1 in state j and $0 in all other states. This linearly independent payoffs.
asset is called an Arrow-Debreu security for • In this case the matrix X that we start with is S-
state j. by-S and has full rank. Thus its inverse exists.
• We write its price as qj and call it the state price • To construct S Arrow-Debreu securities, define
for state j. an S-by-S matrix of portfolio weights X-1.
• The payoff on the set of portfolios is X-1X=I.
• If there are S Arrow-Debreu securities, one for
• The cost of the set of portfolios is X-1p=q.
each state, then the payoff matrix X = I, the
• To construct any other vector of payoffs x, buy
identity matrix. x’X-1 shares of the securities at cost
• In this case we say that markets are complete. x’X-1p=x’q.
• We write the set of state prices in a vector q.

31 32

A-D security construction A-D construction, continued


w1 = w2= w3 W=inverse(X)= [w1 w2 w3]

0 1 -1 0
1 -1
-1 -1 2 -1
-1 2
2 0 -1 2
0 -1

33 34

A-D security prices Riskless rate


q1 = w1 ‘ * p = 0.25 • Sum of all A-D security prices is cost of
getting $1 for sure.
q ( 3 x 1) = w ‘ * p = • Riskless rate is just:
0.25
– 1/(sum of all A-D security prices)-1
0.5

0.25

35 36

6
Incomplete markets Complete Markets
Imagine asset 1 didn’t exist and someone tried to • The Law of One Price is most helpful when
introduce it; what do we know about its price? markets are complete
We know all A-D securities must have non-negative • Then any asset can be priced by breaking it into
prices primitive state-contingent payoffs, and adding up
p= q = W’p = the prices of each piece
p1 q1=p1-1.75>0
1.75 q2=-p1+2*1.75 -1 >0
1 q3=-1.75+2=0.25
p1>=1.75 or q1<0; p1<=2.5 or q2<0

37 38

Concept Check Lottery Tickets and rf


• The numbers lottery is a game where
– You buy one ticket with three-digit number for $1 (for
one particular integer from 1 to 1,000)
– A number is drawn randomly
– If your number comes up you make $900, otherwise 0
• There are 1000 states, and 1000 securities
• Question: If you buy a specific numbered ticket,
how many units of a specific Arrow-Debreu
security are you buying?
• Question: What is the riskfree rate of interest in
the numbers lottery?
(Go into breakout rooms and work it out.)

39 40

Are Markets Complete? Coin Toss Example


• At first sight, this seems most unlikely • Consider tossing a coin twice and counting the
• There are thousands of traded financial assets, number of heads
but surely there are far more states of the world • There may be 0, 1, or 2 heads so there are three
than assets final states
• Not so fast! • We can represent uncertainty by an event tree.
– We can ignore irrelevant dimensions of uncertainty,
i.e. those that do not affect asset payoffs
– Frequent trading in long-lived assets can sometimes
reduce the number of assets we need to get complete
markets

41 42

7
Coin Toss Example Coin Toss Example
2 ¼
• For each coin toss, suppose there are two
H½ assets:
H½ T½ – one “head” asset that costs $0.50 and pays $1 if the
½
toss is a head, $0 otherwise
1
H½ – one “tail” asset that costs $0.50 and pays $1 if the

toss is a tail, $0 otherwise

0
• To get $1 only if there are two heads, invest
¼
$0.25 at the first toss in half a unit of the head
asset. If the first toss is a head, reinvest your
winnings in one unit of the head asset.

43 44

Coin Toss Example Coin Toss Example


• The same approach works to get $1 only if there • The lesson: Dynamic trading in two assets can
are zero heads (two tails). achieve complete markets for more than two
• Question: How should you invest in order to get final states.
$1 only if there is one head? • In fact, you only need as many assets as there
are branches leaving each node of the event
• (Costs $0.5. Buy half of each asset at start $0.25 each. One pays off for $0.5. Then buy one of the asset that didn’t pay off last time with the $0.5.)

tree.
• It is common to value options by modelling
uncertainty with two-branch (binomial) or three-
branch (trinomial) event trees.

45 46

So Are Markets Complete?


• Even with dynamic trading, we must recognize
the possibility of events that are not captured in
a simple model: extra branches on the event
tree Arbitrage in Theory
• Nonetheless, complete markets models are
extremely useful devices for thinking about
valuation of complex securities.

47 48

8
Arbitrage Arbitrage
An arbitrage opportunity is an investment strategy Financial theory assumes there are no arbitrage
that opportunities
• never requires a cash outflow now or in the • Any opportunities that may arise are exploited so
future quickly that we never observe them
• This theory should not be taken literally, but as a
• generates a cash inflow either benchmark that helps us to identify, profit from,
– in one or more states in the future but not now (type 1 and rapidly eliminate arbitrage opportunities
arbitrage opportunity), or
– now and possibly in one or more states in the future
too (type 2 arbitrage opportunity)

49 50

Implications of No-Arbitrage Arbitrage and q>0


• Law of One Price. Two assets or portfolios with Imagine asset 1 existed with a price above 2.5 or
the same payoffs in every state of the world below 1.75. How could you make money?
must have the same price.
– If not, short the expensive one and buy the cheap
We know all A-D securities must have non-negative
one! Cash inflow today with no costs in any future prices
state of the world. (Type 2 arbitrage.) p= q = W’p =
• Arrow-Debreu securities must have positive p1 q1=p1-1.75>0
state prices.
– If one has a negative price, buy it! Cash inflow today 1.75
and in one future state of the world, with no costs in q2=-p1+2*1.75 -1 >0
any other state. (Type 2 arbitrage.)
– If one has a zero price, buy it! Cash inflow in one 1 q3=-1.75+2=0.25
future state of the world, with no costs in any other p1>=1.75 or q1<0; p1<=2.5 or q2<0
state. (Type 1 arbitrage.)

51 52

Implications of No-Arbitrage Stochastic Discount Factor


• If markets are complete, these restrictions allow • Absence of arbitrage means there exists an SDF
us to price all possible assets. (Stochastic Discount Factor):
– q(j)=pi(j) * m(j) (m(j) is the SDF for state j, q is the
• We already have the state price vector q.
price of the A-D security, pi is the probability)
• To price any other asset i with payoff vector xi, – SDF indicates how much more or less the A-D
just use pi = xi’q. security for a state costs than its probability.
• The “Happy Meal Theory”: the price of a Happy – The prices of existing assets can be priced as if there
Meal is the sum of the prices of small fries, is are A-D securities.
cheeseburger, drinks, and toy. – With complete markets, A-D security prices are
unique. When incomplete, may be multiple sets of A-
D security prices that rationalize asset prices.

53 54

9
Expected Utility Expected Values?
• Up to now, we only required that agents • Why not choose the portfolio with the
are not satiated, that is, they like more to highest expected value?
less - the implication is the absence of • Portfolio w (Nx1 shares in N assets) has
arbitrage opportunities, and the payoff w’X (1xN)x(NxS)=(1xS) payoffs in
consequences discussed. each of S states.
• How do agents choose among risky • Let pi be the Sx1 vector of probabilities of
(uncertain) alternatives? each of S states pi(j)
• Decision theory under risk: expected utility • Expected payoff is w’Xpi (1xS)x(Sx1)=1x1
theory – Sum over all states j of pi(j)*payoff(j)

55 56

St Petersburg Paradox
• A casino offers a game of chance for a single player in
which a fair coin is tossed at each stage. The pot starts
at 2 dollars and is doubled every time a tail appears. The
first time a head appears, the game ends and the player
wins whatever is in the pot. Thus the lottery pays 2n if the
first head appears at the n-th toss (and pays zero before
a head occurs and after that).
• What is the expected value of this gamble X, known as
the “St. Petersburg lottery"?
• EX =0.5*2+0.25*4+0.125*8+…=inf
• How much would you pay for this gamble?

57

10

You might also like