Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

NINTH (9th) DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CA-G.R. CR No. 45917

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Members:
- versus -
CRUZ, R.A., Chairperson,
ROBERTO GUIEB y DELA PEÑA, ACOSTA, L.P., and
Accused-Appellant. CARINGAL, J.F.A., JJ.

Promulgated:
31 JAN 2023
____________________
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

Cruz, R.A., J.:

THE CASE

This is an ordinary appeal, filed under Rule 122 of the Rules of

Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the August 3, 2020
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch
63, Tarlac City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2070-2013, the fallo of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused ROBERTO

GUIEB y dela Pena GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. For his failure to lend
assistance on the spot to the injured party, the Court imposes upon
him the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correcional in its medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years,
prision mayor in its minimum, as maximum.

Accused is also ordered to pay the private complainant the

amounts of Php226,700.00 as actual damages and Php75,000.00
as civil indemnity with interest rate of six (6) percent per annum
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.2
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 2 of 13
DECISION

THE ANTECEDENTS

Roberto Guieb y dela Peña (Guieb) was charged with reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide in an Information3 dated February
14, 2013, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about February 14, 2013 at around 1:20 o’clock in

the morning in the City of Tarlac and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
negligently, recklessly and imprudently, drive a Honda TMX 155
with Plate No. QV-3672 with body No. 10403 with inexcusable lack
of precaution thereby hitting and bumping a pedestrian identified as
JOSE VIRAY y Sison causing instantaneous death. Thereafter[,]
the driver immediately fled xxx without rendering assistance to his
victim.4

The public prosecutor recommended bail in the amount of

₱30,000.00. Before being arraigned, Guieb filed a Motion for
Reduction of Bail.5 The RTC granted the motion and reduced the bail
to ₱15,000.00.6 Guieb posted bail for his provisional liberty and was
ordered release while undergoing trial.7

On April 23, 2013, Guieb was arraigned with the assistance of

counsel de oficio. After the Information was read to him in Tagalog,
the accused pleaded ‘not guilty.’8

At the Pre-Trial, the parties stipulated on the identity of the

accused and his address as stated in the Information. 9

Immediately thereafter, the prosecution proceeded with the

presentation of its evidence. The prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Brendon B. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa), an eyewitness to the
vehicular accident summarized in the Information; Vivian M. Viray
(Vivian), daughter of the deceased victim of the vehicular accident;
and Police Officer 3 Raniel L. Ramos (PO3 Ramos), a police officer
who was tasked with investigating this case.

Dela Rosa identified the Sinumpaang Salaysay10 he executed

before the police. He affirmed the contents of the same which
constituted his direct examination. Dela Rosa, a tricycle driver, related
that on the day of the accident, he was in front of the EZ Mart
Grocery Store in San Sebastian Phase 3, Tarlac City. At around 12:00
o’clock in the midnight of February 14, 2013, he saw an old man,
subsequently identified as the deceased Jose S. Viray (Jose), alight a
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 3 of 13
DECISION

jeepney. Jose was crossing the highway when a tricycle suddenly hit
him. Jose fell on the ground in the middle of the road. The driver of
the tricycle also fell on the ground. Dela Rosa saw the driver
immediately stand up and board his tricycle with body number 10403.
The driver then fled the scene.11

Dela Rosa rode his own tricycle and decided to follow the driver
who proceeded to Barangay Paraiso, Tarlac City. The driver entered a
gate, parked the tricycle in the premises and went inside the house. 12

After learning the driver’s destination, Dela Rosa went to Police

Community Precinct No. 8 in Barangay San Sebastian, Tarlac City to
report the whereabouts of the driver. The police, accompanied by
Dela Rosa, immediately went to the address relayed by the latter.
However, they did not find the driver in the location. Upon
investigation, the police identified the driver as Guieb. The police then
impounded Guieb’s tricycle as part of their investigation. 13

Dela Rosa identified Guieb in open court and pointed to him as

the driver of the tricycle that hit Jose.14

Vivian, the daughter of the late Jose, corroborated the story

about her father’s accident. On February 14, 2013, at around 1:20
a.m., they received word that her father was rushed to the provincial
hospital after being hit by a tricycle. She immediately went to the
hospital to check on her father who, at that time, was in critical
condition. After a few hours, Jose passed away because of the
injuries he sustained from the collision with the tricycle. 15

Vivian continued to testify on the death of her father and the

expenses that their family incurred as a result of such death. 16
Bringing with her receipts, Vivian enumerated the following
expenses:17 (a) ₱2,000.00 for the hospital bill, 18 (b) ₱140,000.00 paid
to Lotus Memorial Service for the funeral arrangements, 19 (c)
₱25,000.00 for the burial plot at the Garden of the Ascension
Memorial Park,20 (d) ₱13,200.00 paid to Prudentialife Tarlac Memorial
Park, Inc. as internment fee, 21 and (e) ₱73,500.00 paid to E&J
Dizon’s Canteen for catering services during the commemoration on
the 40th day and the death anniversary.22

Lastly, PO3 Ramos took the witness stand and identified the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report23 which he prepared to
document the collision between Jose and the tricycle driven by
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 4 of 13
DECISION

Guieb. In the report, PO3 Ramos summarized the investigation that

the police conducted which included an interview with one Carlito N.
Lacsina (Lacsina) who witnessed how, on February 14, 2013, at
about 12:25 a.m., Guieb’s tricycle hit Jose as the latter was crossing
MacArthur Highway in front of Rusi Motors in the vicinity of Barangay
San Sebastian, Tarlac City. When Guieb fled the scene, Lacsina and
another witness, Dela Rosa, followed the former to Barangay
Paraiso, also in Tarlac City.24

Subsequently, Guieb, accompanied by the tricycle operator,

voluntarily surrendered to the police.25

The defense was given several dates to present its evidence.

However, as of the hearing on December 4, 2019, it was yet to
present its evidence. By this time, the defense counsel manifested
that it was submitting the case for decision.26

On August 3, 2020, the RTC rendered the Decision27 appealed

from finding Guieb “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.”28

The RTC ruled that “[t]he testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses are sufficient to convict the accused.” 29 It then summarized
the testimonies as follows:

xxx, the prosecution witness Brendon dela Rosa positively

identified the accused as the person who accidentally bumped the
victim. He personally witnessed the incident. In fact, upon seeing
the accused fleeing from the scene of the accident, he immediately
followed and chased [the accused to his] home. Further, he took
notice and identified the body number of the tricycle. His testimony
was corroborated by PO[3] Ramos.30

Elucidating on the offense of reckless driving as applied to the

specific circumstances of this case, the RTC stated:

Here, the prosecution was able to establish that the victim

alighted from a passenger jeepney and was about to cross the road
when he was hit by a vehicle driven by the accused. The road was
well lighted and the passenger jeepney can be clearly seen by any
person or any incoming vehicle. Evidently, the accused was driving
fast and disregarded the jeepney which stopped by the road. As [a]
tricycle driver, he is fully aware that once a passenger jeepney
stop[s], a commuter is surely bound to board [on] or alight from it.
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 5 of 13
DECISION

He failed to exercise ordinary care by slowing down upon seeing a

stopped passenger jeepney. In failing to do so, he did not see the
victim who alighted from the vehicle and was about to cross the
road. Such acts constitute negligence on his part.31

Aggrieved by the judgment of the RTC, Guieb filed a Notice of

Appeal32 which was given due course by the RTC in an Order33 dated
February 1, 2021.

THE ASSIGNED ERRORS

Guieb charges the RTC with committing the following errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING IN HOMICIDE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATOR
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING IN HOMICIDE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS THEREOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.34

The accused-appellant believes that the prosecution failed to

prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime. He disagrees with the pronouncement of the RTC that Dela
Rosa positively identified him as the perpetrator. 35

Guieb, citing a portion of the re-direct examination of Dela

Rosa,36 points out that Dela Rosa “identified the accused-appellant as
the perpetrator xxx only because of the license that [Guieb] allegedly
left at the place of incident.” 37 Dela Rosa “gave no prior description of
the perpetrator”38 and “failed to describe to the police the
perpetrator’s physical features or any distinguishing mark that could
set him apart from other people.” 39 Guieb maintains that Dela Rosa’s
supposed identification of him as the perpetrator “is insufficient.” 40

The accused-appellant likewise submits that the prosecution

failed to prove all of the elements of reckless imprudence. 41
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 6 of 13
DECISION

Specifically, he questions the finding on his supposed reckless

driving. He points out that “no one testified as to the manner by which
[he] was allegedly driving before he supposedly hit Jose.” 42 According
to Guieb, the prosecution failed to establish that he was “driving fast
in a reckless manner” or there was inexcusable lack of precaution on
his part when he was driving the tricycle.43

Aside from contesting the finding on his supposed negligence,

Guieb also claims that “the prosecution failed to prove that Jose’s
death resulted from [his] alleged reckless imprudence.” 44 The death
certificate of Jose may have been presented, but “[t]he records are
bereft of evidence to prove direct causal connection between the
alleged negligence of the accused-appellant in driving a motorcycle
and the injuries sustained by Jose.” 45 Guieb points out that “no doctor
testified xxx regarding the cause of death of Jose.” 46 Hence, “the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-appellant’s imprudence in driving the tricycle was the
proximate cause of Jose’s death.”47

OUR RULING

We dismiss the appeal.

Guieb was charged with and convicted of the crime of reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide. He prays for his acquittal by
emphasizing the supposed shortcomings of the prosecution, to wit:
(1) his identification as the alleged perpetrator was doubtful; (2) not
all of the elements of reckless imprudence have been proven in that
his alleged recklessness or negligence in driving was not established;
and (3) his alleged imprudence in driving was not shown as the
proximate cause of Jose’s death.

Contrary to the accused-appellant’s contention, he was properly

identified as the perpetrator of the crime. It bears stressing that Dela
Rosa, the prosecution eyewitness, positively identified Guieb as the
perpetrator. By the end of his direct examination, Dela Rosa was
asked, in open court, to identify the perpetrator whom he saw driving
the tricycle which hit Jose. Dela Rosa pointed to Guieb. 48 This
positive and categorical identification was the culmination of his
testimony in which he narrated that he saw how a tricycle suddenly
hit Jose as the latter was crossing the highway. He further saw how
both Jose and the driver of the tricycle fell on the ground in the middle
of the road. Dela Rosa then witnessed how the driver immediately
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 7 of 13
DECISION

stood up, rode his tricycle again and drove off. 49 Determined to
identify the man driving the tricycle, so that he could report him to the
authorities, Dela Rosa followed the driver until the latter reached his
house. As soon as he ascertained the whereabouts of the driver, he
went to the police to report the same. He even accompanied the
police to the house where he last saw the driver and the tricycle. 50
Dela Rosa may not have immediately known the name of the driver,
but as an eyewitness to the incident and as one who even followed
the driver home, Dela Rosa acquired enough familiarity which
enabled him to positively and categorically identify Guieb. Or, as the
RTC put it:

xxx, the prosecution witness Brendon dela Rosa positively

identified the accused as the person who accidentally bumped the
victim. He personally witnessed the incident. In fact, upon seeing
the accused fleeing from the scene of the accident, he immediately
followed and chased [the accused to his] home. Further, he took
notice and identified the body number of the tricycle. His testimony
was corroborated by PO[3] Ramos.51

Hence, Guieb’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove

beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the perpetrator lacks basis
and should, therefore, be struck down.

The accused-appellant’s theory that reckless imprudence has

not been established should likewise be struck down. His theory is
based on the supposed lack of evidence that his driving was reckless
or characterized by inexcusable lack of precaution.

Article 36552 of the Revised Penal Code defines reckless

imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his/her employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place. 53

For reckless imprudence cases involving the operation of a

motor vehicle, to establish the motorist’s liability for the negligent
operation of such vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving,
the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle—a willful and wanton disregard of the
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 8 of 13
DECISION

consequences is required.54

Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others

within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to
involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures
another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved,
or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person. It is the inexcusable lack of precaution or
conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to
whether the private offended party may himself/herself be considered
likewise at fault.55

The RTC squarely passed upon the issue of recklessness or

negligence, and We quote with approval its discussion on the matter,
viz.:

Here, the prosecution was able to establish that the victim

alighted from a passenger jeepney and was about to cross the road
when he was hit by a vehicle driven by the accused. The road was
well lighted and the passenger jeepney can be clearly seen by any
person or any incoming vehicle. Evidently, the accused was driving
fast and disregarded the jeepney which stopped by the road. As [a]
tricycle driver, he is fully aware that once a passenger jeepney
stop[s], a commuter is surely bound to board [on] or alight from it.
He failed to exercise ordinary care by slowing down upon seeing a
stopped passenger jeepney. In failing to do so, he did not see the
victim who alighted from the vehicle and was about to cross the
road. Such acts constitute negligence on his part.56

Suffice it to say that “[a] prudent driver would have immediately

slowed down and stopped the vehicle to give way to the pedestrian
crossing the road.”57 Hence, the RTC correctly found that Guieb was
negligent in driving his tricycle.

And, turning to the last point in Guieb’s appeal, it was precisely

his negligent driving that was the proximate cause of Jose’s death.

The accused-appellant insists that it was erroneous to attribute

Jose’s death to the former’s negligence when there is no evidence
linking his reckless driving to Jose’s injuries and eventual death.
Specifically, he faults the prosecution for failing to present a doctor to
testify on Jose’s cause of death.
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 9 of 13
DECISION

To reiterate, a motorist is held liable for the negligent operation

of a vehicle if it is shown that there was a direct causal connection
between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained
of.58

In this case, the RTC found that Guieb’s negligence in

operating the tricycle was the proximate cause of Jose’s death. Such
conclusion is derived from the following findings of fact: (1) on
February 14, 2013, at around 12:25 a.m., Dela Rosa saw Jose
crossing the highway when the tricycle driven by Guieb suddenly hit
Jose;59 (2) immediately thereafter, the responding police officers
brought Jose to Tarlac Provincial Hospital for medical treatment; 60 (3)
on February 14, 2013, at around 1:20 a.m., Jose’s daughter, Vivian,
after being informed that her father was hit by a tricycle and brought
to the hospital, rushed to the medical facility to check on her father’s
condition;61 (4) on February 14, 2013, at 2:45 a.m., Jose passed
away at Tarlac Provincial Hospital, 62 merely a couple of hours after
sustaining multiple physical injuries resulting from the collision with
Guieb’s tricycle. These facts, taken together, sufficiently proved that
Guieb’s negligence was the proximate cause of Jose’s death.

Viewed from the foregoing, the RTC correctly found Guieb

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Aside from the judgment of conviction, the indeterminate
penalty imposed by the RTC should be upheld, too, for being
consistent with the dictates of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and applicable jurisprudence. 63 The
award of ₱226,700.00 in actual damages should likewise be upheld
as this corresponds to the total amount of expenses in relation to the
death, funeral and burial of Jose. As stated by the RTC, the amount is
based on the receipts duly presented, marked and identified in court.
The expenses include: (a) ₱140,000.00 paid to Lotus Memorial
Service for the funeral arrangements, 64 (b) ₱13,200.00 paid to
Prudentialife Tarlac Memorial Park, Inc. as internment fee, 65 and (c)
₱73,500.00 paid to E&J Dizon’s Canteen for catering services during
the commemoration on the 40th day and the death anniversary.66

However, the civil indemnity awarded should be reduced to

₱50,000.00. The grant of moral damages in addition to the award of
civil indemnity is also in order. An award of ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages should be included to alleviate the suffering of Jose’s heirs
who have to struggle with emotional pain and mental anguish
because of his sudden demise.67
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 10 of 13
DECISION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

DISMISSED, and the Decision dated August 3, 2020 of the Regional
Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 63, Tarlac City, in Criminal
Case No. 2070-2013, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
Roberto Guieb y dela Peña is ORDERED to pay: (a) two hundred
twenty-six thousand, seven hundred pesos (₱226,700.00) as actual
damages, (b) fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity,
and (c) one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) as moral
damages. All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision
until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
RAMON A. CRUZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ORIGINAL SIGNED ORIGINAL SIGNED

LOUIS P. ACOSTA JAIME FORTUNATO A. CARINGAL
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
RAMON A. CRUZ
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Ninth Division

1
Penned by Presiding Judge Maria Roma Flor A. Ortiz, Records, pp. 151-159; see also Rollo,
pp. 43-51.
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 11 of 13
DECISION

2
Ibid. at p. 159; see also Rollo, p. 51.
3
Records, p. 1.
4
Id.
5
Records, pp. 9-10.
6
RTC Order dated February 25, 2013, Records, p. 12.
7
RTC Order dated February 25, 2013, Records, p. 13.
8
RTC Order dated April 23, 2013, Records, p. 50; see also Certificate of Arraignment,
Records, p. 49.
9
RTC Order dated November 13, 2013, Records, p. 62.
10
Exhibit “A” for the prosecution, Records, pp. 4-5.
11
Id., p. 4; Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) dated November 13, 2013, p. 9.
12
Id., p. 4.
13
Id., p. 4.
14
Id., p. 4.
15
Sinumpaang Salaysay (ni Vivian xxx), Exhibit “B” for the prosecution, Records, p. 3;
Certificate of Death (of Jose), Exhibit “C” for the prosecution, Records, p. 129.
16
TSN dated February 26, 2014, p. 3.
17
TSN dated February 26, 2014, pp. 10-14; TSN dated June 20, 2016, pp. 4-5.
18
Official Receipt (OR) No. TAR 2431795, Exhibit “D” for the prosecution, Records, p. 108.
19
Certification from Lotus Memorial Service, Exhibit “E” for the prosecution, Records, p. 109;
see also photocopy of OR No. 2378 from Lotus Memorial Service, provisionally marked Exhibit
“E” for the prosecution, Records, p. 76.
20
Certification from Garden of the Ascension Memorial Park, provisionally marked Exhibit “F”
for the prosecution, Records, p. 78.
21
OR No. 39876 from Prudentialife Tarlac Memorial Park, Inc., Exhibit “G” for the prosecution,
Records, p. 110.
22
OR Nos. 3079 and 3152 from E&J Dizon’s Canteen, Exhibits “H-1” and “H” for the
prosecution, Records, pp. 111 and 112.
23
Exhibit “J” for the prosecution, Records, p. 6.
24
Id.; TSN dated October 5, 2016, pp. 4-5.
25
Traffic Accident Investigation Report, Exhibit “J” for the prosecution, Records, p. 6; TSN
dated October 5, 2016, p. 5.
26
RTC Order dated December 4, 2019, Records, p. 148.
27
Supra note 1.
28
Supra note 1 at p. 159; see also Rollo, p. 51.
29
Supra note 1 at p. 155; see also Rollo, p. 47.
30
Supra note 1 at p. 157; see also Rollo, p. 49.
31
Supra note 1 at p. 158; see also Rollo, p. 50.
32
Records, p. 169.
33
Records, p. 171.
34
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, Rollo, p. 29.
35
Id., p. 33.
36
Id., pp. 33-34.
37
Id., p. 34.
38
Id., p. 34.
39
Id., p. 34.
40
Id., p. 34.
41
Id., p. 35.
42
Id., p. 37.
43
Id., p. 37.
44
Id., p. 36.
45
Id., p. 36.
46
Id., p. 37.
47
Id., p. 39.
48
TSN dated November 13, 2013, p. 7.
49
Sinumpaang Salaysay (ni xxx Dela Rosa), Exhibit “A” for the prosecution, Records, p. 4.
50
Id.; TSN dated November 13, 2013, p. 18.
51
RTC Decision dated August 3, 2020, Records, p. 157; see also Rollo, p. 49.
52
Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 12 of 13
DECISION

would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would,
otherwise, constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

(1) When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed, in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law [Act No.
3992 entitled “An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Motor Vehicles”], the death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical conditions and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands
to give.
53
Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015, 751 Phil. 218.
54
Id., citing Dumayag v. People, G.R. No. 172778, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 347, 359.
55
Gonzaga v. People, supra note 53, citing Caminos, Jr. v. People, 605 Phil. 422, 434-435
(2009).
56
RTC Decision dated August 3, 2020, Records, p. 158; see also Rollo, p. 50.
57
Heirs of Catalina P. Mendoza v. ES Trucking and Forwarders, G.R. No. 243237, February
17, 2020.
58
Gonzaga v. People, supra note 53.
59
Sinumpaang Salaysay (ni xxx Dela Rosa), Exhibit “A” for the prosecution, Records, p. 4;
Traffic Accident Investigation Report, Exhibit “J” for the prosecution, Records, p. 6.
60
Traffic Accident Investigation Report, Exhibit “J” for the prosecution, Records, p. 6.
61
Sinumpaang Salaysay (ni Vivian xxx), Exhibit “B” for the prosecution, Records, p. 3.
62
Certificate of Death (of Jose), Exhibit “C” for the prosecution, Records, p. 129.
63
See Tapdasan, Jr. v. People and Spouse Borja, G.R. No. 141344, November 21, 2002, 440
Phil. 864.
64
Certification from Lotus Memorial Service, Exhibit “E” for the prosecution, Records, p. 109;
see also photocopy of OR No. 2378 from Lotus Memorial Service, provisionally marked Exhibit
CA-G.R. CR No. 45917 Page 13 of 13
DECISION

“E” for the prosecution, Records, p. 76.

65
OR No. 39876 from Prudentialife Tarlac Memorial Park, Inc., Exhibit “G” for the prosecution,
Records, p. 110.
66
OR Nos. 3079 and 3152 from E&J Dizon’s Canteen, Exhibits “H-1” and “H” for the
prosecution, Records, pp. 111 and 112.
67
Fegarido and Milan v. Alcantara, et al., G.R. No. 240066, June 13, 2022; Heirs of Catalina
P. Mendoza v. ES Trucking and Forwarders, supra note 57.