May an MTC Judge issue a search warrant in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC?

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE EDMAR CASTILLO, JR. G.R. No. 204419, November 7, 2016
A search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal
action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.
Facts: 
Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued a search warrant against the premises of Rabino for violation of
RA 9165. A search was conducted wherein the PDEA and PNP found 1 sachet of shabu inside the house of Rabino in
Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 6,
Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge Castillo.

Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence,
citing lack of probable cause among other grounds. Judge Castillo granted the motion to quash, holding that because the
minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of 12 years and 1
day to 20 years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of 6 years, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the application for and to issue the search warrant. As such, the search warrant is null and void and all
proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

Issue: May a municipal trial court issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction?

Held: The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:

(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she
may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 
Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1)
the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted
grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the
Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides

  Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with
the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed
if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the crime
was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to
issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a
place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge
found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for
compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also have
jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What
controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain
cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction
over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are
present. (People vs. Judge Castillo, G.R. No. 204419, November 07, 2016)

The place to be searched indicated in the search warrant is different from the place indicated in the
application by the police when they applied for a warrant:

1. PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400

FACTS:
– A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued
by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant.
– An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
– The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1,
immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number
of different explosives and firearms.
ISSUE:
1. WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents were then
actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the
warrant.
HELD:
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the
rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search.
The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS
ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.

As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the
place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim
that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the
validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal
knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change
is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.

It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in
the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to
the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

a. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informer’s tip.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626
Facts:
After alighting from a bus from Baguio City, accused Aruta was pointed to by the informant as the one transporting
marijuana. The NARCOM agents approached Aruta, introducing themselves as such and asked Aruta about the contents
of her bag. The accused handed it to them. Upon inspection, marijuana was found. Aruta was then arrested and brought
to the NARCOM Office.
Despite challenging the legality of the search and arrest, Aruta was convicted by the RTC for transporting prohibited
drugs and sentenced to life imprisonment. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: W/N the warrantless search resulting to Aruta’s arrest was valid.
Held:
No. there was no valid warrantless search. Generally, a warrant must be issued first by a judge based on probable cause.
However, the following cases of warrantless searches are allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she
just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was
only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana
that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it
not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason
whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned
tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution. “(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703

On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would
be arriving from Baguio to Dasmariñas carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant
pointed at Ruben Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed in Brgy. Salitran, Dasmariñas. Montilla was
then carrying a bag and a carton. The police officers approached Montilla and then asked him what was in his luggage.
Montilla replied that they contained his personal belongings. The police officers then asked Montilla to open his luggage
and Montilla voluntarily complied. Upon opening, the police saw the marijuana bricks (28 kilos in total) and right then
and there, they arrested Montilla.
In court, Montilla denied the allegations and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any
effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. The Court did not believe him and he was sentenced to
death. On appeal, Montilla averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and,
during trial, he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that since the informant
has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have
ample time to secure a search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search.
The police cannot obtain a warrant due to the exigency of the matter. In the case at bar, it should be noted that the
information relayed by the informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by
a courier coming from Baguio in the “early morning” of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not
pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an
indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could
readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying
therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining
warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be
considered, especially in rural areas.

The search was consented by Montilla. Montilla, when he was asked to open his luggage readily complied. As a rule,
silence in warrantless searches and seizures does not necessarily mean yes nor consent for it could just be a compliance
upon the part of the person being searched BUT in this case, the Supreme Court is convinced, based on evidence, that
Montilla spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
PEOPLE VS. RACHO, GR No. 186529, August 3, 2010
FACTS:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of
shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the
appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a
Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person
he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the
police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then
brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results
for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

RTC Decision: Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:
1. Can appellant assail, for the first time on appeal, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent
warrantless search?
2. Is the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search admissible in evidence against him?
RULING:
1. No. He can no longer question the validity of his arrest but the subsequent warrantless search is not valid. He is
deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he never objected to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. It is his first time to raise the issue. He actively participated in the trial of the case and
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
2. No. The sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him. It was
confiscated during a warrantless search incidental to an unlawful arrest. There was no sufficient probable cause to effect
a valid warrantless arrest because appellant herein did not perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit an offense. The tip or “reliable information” alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.

P VS. CLAUDIO, 160 SCRA 646 April 15, 1988

Facts:
On or about 21 July 1981, in the Olongapo City, Philippines, the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which
are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City.

Issues:
a)Whether or not the accused is also liable Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 aside from Sec. 8, Art. II of the same Act?
b)Whether warrantless search, seizure, and apprehension is unlawful under Rule 126, Sec.12?
Held:
a. Yes. In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself. Moreover,
it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony. The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Sec. 4, Art II of R.A. 5425
The provision provides the Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs where the
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. Although the
accused contends that she may not be convicted of this provision, the court held that contention is without merit. A
closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale,
administration, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of
marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.

As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three
plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate
anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.

b. Rule 126, Sec. 12

The provision provides that Search incidental to lawful arrest may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant in paragraph (12a). Thus,
appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio
as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

P. VS. AMINNUDIN Y AHNI, July 6, 1988

Facts: The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was on board
a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for
him in the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed
as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed
against Aminnudin.

Issue: Whether the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence justifies the warrantless arrest
Held: No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court. The present case presented no such
urgency. It is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9.

His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the
PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was
not necessary.”
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon
9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that
authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. While this is not to say that the accused-
appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding
that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is
weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT, 198 SCRA 401, June 19, 1991
FACTS:
 Accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt is a Swedish National who’s a returning tourist and has been in the
Philippines for three times now.
 In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
 Accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City where he’s
planning to take another bus to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989.
 Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
 The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by
the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.
 The bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that
they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
 Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus and was seated at the rear thereof.
 During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist
to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist.
 The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the
officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open
one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
 Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused
stopped to get two (2) traveling bags from the luggage carrier.
 Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
 Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam
stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
 Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further investigation.
 At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same
was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
 In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
 Accused raised the issue of the illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) traveling bags were not owned by him,
but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in
said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would
meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
 The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM Officers
because when accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer
that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said
investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) traveling bags as well
as having hashish in his pouch bag.
 The trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended
ISSUE:
WON the search was illegally done
HELD:
 NO. The search was validly done.
 The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or
a private person under the circumstance laid down in the Rules of Court, Sec. 5. Rule 113.
 Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.
 While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
 Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received
by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on
his way to Baguio City.
 When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian traveling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
obtain a search warrant.
 It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where
accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when
one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do
so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so.
 The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused.
 In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening
one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two
(2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's
own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession.
 To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without a
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
P v. Cuison, 326 Phil. 345 (1996)
Facts:
Prosecution
The case involves the arrest of Antolin Cuizon, his wife Susan Cuizon, Steve Pua and Paul Lee on February 21, 1992, at
the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati, Metro Manila. The arrest was made by a team from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) after a tip from an informant in Hong Kong that Antolin and his wife were arriving at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport with a large quantity of drugs. Antolin and Susan arrived with four travel bags, which they
handed over to Pua and Lee at the airport. The bags were loaded into a taxi and the team followed the taxi to the Manila
Peninsula Hotel. After coordinating with the hotel's chief security officer, the bags were searched and found to contain
three plastic packages containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphethamine hydrochloride or
"shabu". Pua and Lee were then arrested and brought to the residence of Antolin and Susan in Caloocan City, where
they were all arrested.

Defense:
Appellant Pua claims that he and co-appellant Lee were in their room at the Manila Hotel at the time of the alleged
crime. Pua testified that he and Lee were in the room to check-in for a personal friend and that they were later
approached by two individuals claiming to be NBI agents, who entered the room and found shabu in the friend's
luggage. Appellant Cuizon denied the prosecution's version of events and claimed that he was forcibly taken from his
home by NBI agents, along with his wife and cousin. The defense of co-appellant Paul Lee was not presented due to lack
of an interpreter as he only knows Chinese-Cantonese. Only accused Cuizon submitted a memorandum after the trial.

Ruling:
The search of the house of appellant Cuizon was conducted illegally without a warrant and not as an incident of a valid
warrantless arrest. As a result, the shabu seized during the search is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be used against
Cuizon in the trial. The trial judge argued that Cuizon's responsibility was based on the bags of shabu that he handed to
Pua and Lee at the airport, but this was rejected by the ruling, which states that all evidence seized is considered fruit of
the poisonous tree and inadmissible against Cuizon. The ruling also notes that the warrantless search of Pua and Lee was
illegal, conspiracy between Cuizon and the other two appellants was not established, and Cuizon raised the issue of the
legality of his own arrest and search. Therefore, the ruling concludes that Cuizon should be acquitted.

The search and arrest of appellant Pua and Lee were illegal, but Pua failed to challenge the validity of the arrest, search
and admission of the evidence obtained. This waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures has been upheld in previous cases. The court also considered the handwritten consent given by Pua and Lee as
a valid and voluntary consent to search their luggage, and therefore, the drugs found were admissible as evidence. The
prosecution's evidence, including the large amount of drugs found, was given full force against Pua's claim of innocent
presence, which was deemed weak and not credible.

Lee, was given his constitutional rights to counsel and due process. Lee was not able to effectively communicate with his
counsel and was also denied the right to have witnesses and evidence presented on his behalf, leading to a denial of due
process. The case must be retried in the court of origin. The court also found that the NBI agents handling the drug bust
operation violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures. The court
emphasized that protecting individuals' rights is essential to upholding the justice system and that law enforcers must
act within the boundaries set by the Constitution and the law. The end never justifies the means.

A legitimate arrest without a warrant may be accompanied by a search of the person and their belongings for dangerous
weapons or evidence of an offense. However, if a person is searched without a warrant and without justification for a
warrantless arrest, the search and arrest are illegal and any evidence obtained from the search is inadmissible in court.
The law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and their belongings, and if a search is
conducted first and then an arrest is made based on the evidence found, both the search and arrest are unlawful.
P v. Encimada, 345 Phil 301 (1997)
Facts: The case is an appeal of a 1994 judgment by the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City Branch 32, which convicted
Roel Encinada of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and its amendment,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 179. Encinada was charged with having in his possession, custody, and control dried marijuana
leaves, which he allegedly transported to Surigao City from Cebu City, well knowing that it was prohibited by law. Before
the arraignment, Encinada offered to plead guilty to a lesser offense, but there is no evidence of an agreement. Encinada
pleaded not guilty to the charge, but the prosecution's evidence was challenged with a "Demurrer to Evidence" by the
defense, questioning the admissibility of the evidence which was allegedly illegally seized from Encinada. The court
denied the motion, ruling that the arrest and search of Encinada were lawful because the police had to act quickly
without time to secure a search warrant and that Encinada was caught in actual possession of the marijuana. After trial,
Encinada was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand pesos, with the marijuana
and two plastic chairs being forfeited to the government.
Version of Prosecution
The Solicitor General recounts that on May 20, 1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia received a tip from an informant that Roel
Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City the next day with marijuana. Bolonia informed other police officers and
deployed them to intercept Encinada at the city wharf. When Encinada arrived, he was seen carrying two small colored
plastic baby chairs and was quickly followed by the police officers. Bolonia ordered Encinada to get off the tricycle and
hand over the chairs, which contained a package of dried leaves that smelled like marijuana. The package was confirmed
to be marijuana by a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory and weighed 610 grams.
Version of the Defense
Denial as defense. The accused denies ownership and possession of the plastic baby chairs. The defense's argument is
that on May 21, 1992, the accused was seen disembarking from a trip, boarded a motorela and was then stopped and
searched by police. The accused was then taken to the police station and underwent a custodial investigation. The
accused denies any knowledge of the marijuana leaves presented to him. The defense also presented five witnesses who
testified that the accused was picked up by the police despite protests and that the accused vehemently denied having
any knowledge of the marijuana leaves during the custodial investigation.
Trial Court
The trial court rejected the defense's argument that the accused was an innocent passenger and the package contained
mango and otap samples, not marijuana. The court believed the testimony of SPO4 Bolonia that he received information
about the accused's arrival and that the accused was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto. The court ruled that
the warrantless search following the accused's lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana obtained was admissible in
evidence.
Ruling:
 The First Issue deals with the prosecution's failure to prove the illegal possession of prohibited drugs. The
Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession of the plastic baby chairs but this claim is
not supported by the transcripts of stenographic notes and the testimony of the witness. The Appellant's denial
of possession is rebutted by the testimony of another witness. The choice of the trial court prevails in matters
involving the credibility of witnesses. Proof of ownership is not necessary in illegal drug cases as long as the drug
is found in the possession of the accused.
 The Second Issue deals with illegal search and seizure. Generally, a search and seizure must be validated by a
warrant, but there are exceptions such as search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of moving vehicles, seizure
in plain view, customs searches, and waiver by the accused. Any evidence obtained in violation of the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible as a "fruit of the poisonous tree."
 In this case, the warrantless search of the Appellant's belongings was considered valid by the trial court because
the Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of his arrest. However, the Appellant was not
committing a crime in the presence of the policemen and the search cannot be said to be merely incidental to a
lawful arrest. The intelligence report received by the police was not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest.
The search preceded the arrest, so the warrantless search was not valid. The evidence obtained, the marijuana,
is therefore inadmissible as it is a "fruit of the poisonous tree."
P vs. Cogaed, 740 Phil. (2014)
Facts:
In November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan of the San Gabriel Police Station in La Union received a
text from an informant about someone named Marvin Buya transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy to Poblacion
of San Gabriel. PSI Bayan set up checkpoints and a passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at a checkpoint set
up by SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, who approached two passengers Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao and
asked about the contents of their bags. Cogaed revealed three bricks of what looked like marijuana in a blue bag, leading
to their arrest and bringing to the police station. At the station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit
asked Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags, which contained suspected marijuana. The suspected marijuana was
tested and found to be marijuana with a total weight of 17,429.6 grams. Cogaed claimed he was helping Dayao carry his
bags without knowing their contents, a claim that was corroborated by an eyewitness. However, Cogaed and Dayao
were convicted with illegal possession of dangerous drugs by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting
from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag." Hence, this appeal was filed.

Ruling:
The "stop and frisk" search is a type of warrantless search allowed in Philippine law enforcement. This type of search
should balance the need to prevent offenses with the protection of citizens' privacy under the Constitution. The
requirement of "suspiciousness" should be based on the police officer's observations and experience with criminal
behavior. In previous cases where a "stop and frisk" search was deemed valid, the police officers observed the individual
acting suspiciously based on their experience. In the case of Cogaed, the police officer did not observe anything
suspicious and only stopped the individual due to a gesture made by the jeepney driver, which is not acceptable. For a
"stop and frisk" search to be valid, it must have a genuine reason based on the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions. Probable cause is not required, but mere suspicion or a hunch is not enough.

A police officer can perform a "stop-and-frisk" search for the purpose of crime prevention and detection and for the
officer's safety. The search is limited to detecting dangerous weapons or dangerous drugs. If a person is arrested without
a warrant, the arrest must be based on the person committing, attempting to commit, or just having committed a crime
in the presence of the arresting officer. The "stop-and-frisk" in this case did not have a genuine reason, and it was not
compliant with the requirements to be considered lawful, therefore the search and subsequent evidence obtained were
illegal and inadmissible in court. The arrest was also not considered lawful because it did not fulfill the requirements for
a lawful warrantless arrest.

The search of Cogaed's bags was conducted in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

P vs. Yanson, GR No. 238543, July 31, 2019 (similar to Malmstedt case)
Facts:
On May 31, 1996, the Municipal Police Station in M'lang, North Cotabato received information about a silver gray Isuzu
pickup transporting marijuana. A police checkpoint was set up and when the vehicle arrived, it was stopped and
inspected. The police found two sacks of marijuana beside the engine and arrested the driver and two passengers. The
following day, the seized items were taken to the Davao City Crime Laboratory for examination and were reported to
have tested positive for marijuana weighing 5,637 grams. The three individuals were identified as Sison, Bautista, and
Yanson. The defense argued that the three were simply given a ride and did not know about the marijuana. However, in
a joint judgment in 2013, the Regional Trial Court convicted the three of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced each of them to life imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 pesos.
Yanson Appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's decision, finding probable cause for the search and ruling that
Republic Act No. 9165 could not be applied as the crime was committed prior to its effectivity. The Court also
maintained the finding of conspiracy.
Issue: Was the arrest valid?
Ruling: No. The arresting officers did not have a warrant for the search and seizure, which violates the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Philippine Constitution. As a result, the
seized evidence (the two sacks of marijuana) cannot be admitted in evidence. The prosecution lacks proof of corpus
delicti, which is essential in a drugs case, as it revolves around the seized drug being the body of the crime. Without
evidence of corpus delicti, the prosecution is unable to prove the accused's actual authorship or engagement in the
illegal activity of transporting dangerous drugs. As a result, the accused-appellant must be acquitted. This applies to his
co-accused, Sison and Bautista, as well.
There exist “implied acquiescence” as Yanson was surrounded by armed police officers instinctually making it unsafe to
disobey their commands.

P vs. Gardon-Mentoy, GR No. 223140, September 4, 2019

Facts:
The case is about a woman named "Rose" (accused-appellant) who was arrested by police officers on May 31, 2008, for
allegedly transporting and selling marijuana. The police officers were tipped off by an informant and conducted
surveillance. They flagged down the shuttle van that Rose was in and asked her where her baggage was. When they saw
that she transferred a block-shaped bundle from a pink bag to a black bag, they suspected it to be marijuana. When the
black bag was opened in the presence of the accused and other passengers, it was found to contain marijuana leaves.
The police officers arrested the accused and informed her of her violation of Republic Act No. 9165 and her
constitutional rights. The black bag was taken to the police station and its contents were examined by a forensic
chemist, who found the contents to be positive for marijuana. During trial, the prosecution presented evidence in the
form of the request for laboratory examination, the chemist's report, and the seized items, which were identified in
court by the police officers.
RTC: Found her guilty, the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant as validly made upon probable cause in the
context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; and concluded that the State had established the corpus delicti of
the crime by the testimonies of its witnesses.
CA: Affirmed
Issue: Validity of the warrantless arrest.
Ruling:
The general rule is that an arrest or search must be done with a judicial warrant, but a warrantless arrest may be made
by a peace officer or a private person under certain circumstances listed in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
These circumstances include:
(a) the person is committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officer,
(b) the officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed an offense, and
(c) the person is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement.
The warrantless arrest must be based on the officer's personal knowledge of the commission of an offense, either by
witnessing the crime or actually knowing that it was committed.
In this case, the RTC and the OSG believed that the arrest fell under Section 5(b), but this is factually unsupported
because the officers did not have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime, but only relied on an unverified
tip from an unidentified informant.
Saluday vs. People, GR No. 215305, April 3, 2018, 860 SCRA 231
Facts:
This is a criminal case involving a person (petitioner) who was arrested by SCAA(Special Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Unit Active Auxiliary) Junbert M. Buco, a member of the Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army, for illegal possession of
high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive. The arrest took place on May 5, 2009, at a checkpoint near the Tefasco
Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Buco noticed a small pack bag that was too heavy for its size and questioned the owner, who
was identified as the petitioner and his brother, who were seated at the back of the bus. After opening the bag, it was found
to contain an improvised .30 caliber carbine, a magazine with three live ammunitions, a cacao-type hand grenade, and a
hunting knife. The petitioner was unable to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives and was
immediately arrested and informed of his rights. He was then brought for an inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor
for Davao City, which found probable cause to charge him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under PD 1866. The Information was filed on May 8, 2009.

Cross-examination: The prosecution presented two witnesses, NUP Tabura and SCAA Buco, in the trial. NUP Tabura identified
a certification stating that the petitioner was not a licensed firearms holder, while SCAA Buco testified about the routine
inspection that led to the petitioner's arrest and the search of the bus, during which the firearm was found in a bag owned by
the petitioner's brother. The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense and denied ownership of the bag, but admitted
answering SCAA Buco about the contents of the bag and allowing him to open it. The petitioner also revealed that his brother,
who was the owner of the bag, was already dead. The petitioner admitted that he panicked and didn't tell the authorities that
the bag was owned by his brother, but clarified that he did mention he had a companion
Trial Court: Found him guilty.
CA: Affirmed.
Issue: Validity of the evidence seized.
Ruling:
 In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. This
means that the court is not required to examine or review the evidence presented during the trial. Instead, the court
defers to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and these findings are accorded great respect and
even finality.
 In the present case, the petitioner was convicted of illegal possession of high-powered firearms and ammunition
under P.D. 1866, and illegal possession of explosives under the same law. The elements of these offenses include the
existence of the firearms or explosives, ownership or possession of the firearms or explosives, and lack of a license to
own or possess them. The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution had successfully established these elements
and that the petitioner was in actual or constructive possession of the firearms, ammunition, and explosives without
the required authority.
 The petitioner challenged the validity of the conviction by raising questions of law, such as the competence of the
witness who testified on the absence of a license to own or possess firearms, and the legality of the search that led to
the discovery of the firearms and explosives. However, the court found these claims to be without merit. The court
cited previous rulings that a certification from the Philippine National Police or a testimony from a representative of
the PNP's Firearms and Explosives Office that the accused is not a licensed holder of firearms is sufficient to prove the
second element of illegal possession. In this case, the prosecution presented both, and the court found that the
petitioner was indeed in possession of the firearms and explosives.
 The elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition are: (1) the subject firearm exists; and (2) the person
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license. The prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
 Regarding the legality of the search, the court referred to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which protects
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, this protection does not extend to reasonable searches.
The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's case of Katz v. United States to explain what constitutes a reasonable
search, stating that a person has a reduced expectation of privacy in things that are knowingly exposed to the public.
In this case, the court found the search to be reasonable as the bus on which the petitioner was a passenger was
flagged down at a military checkpoint, and the search was conducted in the presence of the bus conductor, who
pointed to the petitioner as the owner of the bag containing the firearms and explosives.