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Japan–India Relations: Peaks and Troughs

Purnendra Jain

To cite this article: Purnendra Jain (2010) Japan–India Relations: Peaks and Troughs, The Round
Table, 99:409, 403-412, DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2010.498977

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The Round Table
Vol. 99, No. 409, 403–412, August 2010

Japan–India Relations: Peaks and

Troughs
PURNENDRA JAIN
Centre for Asian Studies, University of Adelaide, Australia

ABSTRACT Despite the absence of ill-will between Japan and India for most of the period since
the end of World War II, bilateral relations have not reached their full potential in any field—
political, economic or socio-cultural. This article identifies peaks and troughs across the six
decades of post-war relations, first in the early post-war period and again in the mid-1980s. More
recently, the nadir following India’s nuclear testing in 1998 was followed by significantly
improved relations in the early 2000s, with the relationship reaching its post-war best in most
areas when Abe Shinzo (2006–07) was Japan’s prime minister. This article considers both
domestic and external factors that have caused these peaks and troughs. The final section
considers the near future of the bilateral relationship as a new government led by the Democratic
Party of Japan came to power in September 2009, replacing the long-term political monopoly of
the Liberal Democratic Party.

KEY WORDS: India, Japan, China, security, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum,
ASEAN Regional Forum, Strategic and Global Partnership, India–Japan Joint Study Group,
official development assistance, bilateral trade

Introduction
For both Japan and India, a stable Asia is imperative to their own national growth
and stability; but while the two Asian nations share many aspirations and interests, a
solid economic, political and strategic partnership has eluded these two nations since
the end of World War II. Indeed, Japan–India post-war relations can best be
described as following a trajectory of peaks and troughs across the past six decades.
Japanese interest in India has waxed and waned, depending largely on India’s foreign
policy orientation; but rather than through independent assessment of India’s
importance in its own right, Tokyo has viewed relations with India through the
prism of Japan’s close relationship with its primary strategic partner, the United
States. In other words, Tokyo’s approach towards New Delhi can be described as
reactive rather than proactive. Despite India’s commitment to democratic
institutions and desire to cultivate relations with a democratised Japan in the
post-war era, Tokyo continued to keep New Delhi outside its construct of Asia,
which was focused narrowly on Asia’s East, in which Japan is located. Japanese

Correspondence Address: Professor Purnendra Jain, Centre for Asian Studies, University of Adelaide, SA
5005, Australia. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0035-8533 Print/1474-029X Online/10/040403-10 Ó 2010 The Round Table Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2010.498977
404 P. Jain

policy-makers considered India to be distant, difficult to deal with, and devoid of

serious material or strategic value for Japan.
India’s membership of the Commonwealth held no appeal for Japan as it
transformed into a great trading nation, preoccupied with economic growth through
relations mostly concentrated in the Asia-Pacific, and pursuing strategic interests
narrowly to that end until the 1990s. Throughout this period, the principal factors
guiding Japan’s foreign policy were cultivation and protection of overseas markets
for exports of manufactured products, and imports of resources needed to produce
them. Another factor was maintaining strategic political ties through US security
and political networks in keeping with the security treaty with the United States, in
which Japan’s national security has been firmly grounded. India offered none of
these reasons for linkage.
Developments in the relationship during the first decade of the 21st century,
however, suggest a noteworthy shift by Japan. After Japan’s severe response to India’s
nuclear testing in 1998 sent the bilateral relationship to its nadir, Prime Minister Mori
Yoshiro’s visit to India in 2000 signalled an upward swing in the relationship. The
portentous ‘China factor’ and improvements in US relations with India spurred a new
peak in the relationship in 2006–07 as Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo oversaw
the design of a new roadmap for Japan–India relations, with much stronger concern
for its strategic as well as economic dimensions. The upward momentum was some-
what intercepted when Fukuda Yasuo replaced Abe as prime minister in September
2007. The election of a Democratic Party national government in September 2009 may
change the momentum even further as this new government considers alternative
possibilities for Japan’s foreign policy that position Japan more independently of its
hitherto strategic master, the United States—and more firmly ‘with Asia’.
Early days of the new government make any assessment of the future tenuous. Yet
we have every reason to expect that the relationship will not revert to its 1998 low
point, not least because Japanese policy-makers now have a deeper appreciation of
India’s security environment, not to mention its increasing economic and political
weight both regionally and globally. They see the potential for firm partnership with
India in all aspects of the relationship to mutual advantage and Japan is already
engaging India on that basis. Let us first consider the peaks and troughs that have
marked this bilateral relationship since the war, before turning to the potentially
strong future prospects for this bilateral relationship at a time of major power shifts
inside and outside Asia.

First Peak: Early Post-war Goodwill

The first peak in the post-war bilateral relationship resulted from a bank of goodwill
emanating from India’s stance on a newly defeated Japan. During the military
tribunal after World War II, Indian judge Radha Binod Pal disclaimed the notion of
persecuting Japan’s wartime leaders. As a member of the Far Eastern Commission,
India also tried to convince allied powers to end their occupation of Japan. Later
India refused to participate at the San Francisco conference on the grounds that
peace could not last if China and the Soviet Union were not party to the peace treaty.
India instead signed a separate treaty with Japan soon after the conference and
renounced war reparations from Japan.
 Japan–India Relations 405

Diplomatically the relationship went from strength to strength. In 1951 India invited
occupied Japan to participate in the New Delhi Asian Games as an independent
nation, even while under military occupation. India was a central player in lobbying for
Japan’s entry into the United Nations (UN) and Japan’s participation in the first Afro-
Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955. Beyond the bilateral peace treaty, bilateral
trade and cultural agreements were also signed. Japanese Prime Minister Kishi
Nobusuke and his Indian counterpart Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru received huge
welcomes during their respective visits to New Delhi and Tokyo in the late 1950s.
Economically, too, the relationship took off. India became a major supplier of the
iron ore that fuelled Japan’s industrial engine. India was also the first nation to
receive a yen loan from Japan as official foreign aid in 1958. Some scholars have
suggested India’s role in Japan’s initial post-war industrialisation is similar to its role
in Japan’s industrialisation during the Meiji period (1868–1912) when India supplied
the raw cotton that helped Japan develop its textile industry and propelled Japan’s
industrialisation.1 There could have been no better start to this post-war bilateral
relationship. Yet the new bank of post-war goodwill did not translate into solid long-
term relations and instead petered out into roughly three decades of mutual neglect
and dissatisfaction.

First Trough, 1960s–1980s: The Cold War Sets the Stage

From the start of the 1960s, strategic alliances that were formed as the Cold War
divided the world effectively neutered the bank of bilateral goodwill built up in the
early post-war period. International and national factors impacted on each nation’s
understanding of the other. Japan tied itself firmly to the United States through the
1960 bilateral security treaty; India distanced itself from the two Cold War camps,
joining Third World forces and participating actively in the non-aligned movement.
These different strategic directions did not rupture bilateral relations but did produce
mutual disillusion and disinterest that saw the two nations drift apart. For instance,
when India sought Japan’s support in the 1962 war with China and the 1965 India–
Pakistan war, Japan favoured neutrality.2
Domestic factors were at work, too. Unlike many other Asian countries in East
and Southeast Asia, Japan saw no economic attractions in India. It was not just that
India’s economic growth remained very low. India’s highly regulated economy and
lack of both resources and markets that would complement Japan’s needs as an
international trader left little place for India in Japan’s international economic
mission. There was also no multilateral forum where Japan and India could engage
with each other to compensate for their weak bilateral ties. Further fuelling bilateral
disengagement was mutual ignorance. India’s image in Japan highlighted India’s
sporadic ethnic violence, periodic political turmoil and continuing war and conflict
with neighbouring states, especially its vexed relationship with Pakistan. Hirose calls
this period the ‘dark age’ of India–Japan relations.3

Second Peak, Mid-1980s: Nakasone–Gandhi and Beyond

Japan’s relations with India gathered new momentum when Prime Minister
Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–87) paid an official visit to India in 1984, 23 years after
406 P. Jain

the previous prime ministerial visit by Ikeda Hayato in 1961. At this time Japan was
concerned by its isolation as the only Asian nation at G7 summits and recognised the
strategic need for closer ties with other Asian nations while positioned as an
economic powerhouse with growing potential for regional leadership. Nakasone set
out to foster better understanding between Japan and India as one of Asia’s largest
nations and leader of the non-aligned movement. Both nations had reasons for closer
engagement with each other. For Japan, India’s diplomatic support would be useful
to establish a solid foundation in Asia, beyond Southeast Asia. For India, Japanese
economic cooperation would be invaluable for the success of its economic
liberalisation strategy, then in its infancy under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
Prime Minister Gandhi visited Tokyo three times in his rather short term (1984–89),
attesting to his enthusiasm for cultivating deeper ties between India and Japan.
Exchanges of official visits also delivered ongoing fuel for closer diplomatic ties.4
Political and economic conditions domestically and internationally seemed ripe to
take Japan–India relations on an upward trajectory as the 1990s began, heralding the
end of the Cold War and the international alliances on which it depended.
Disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that India was no longer an ally of Japan’s
adversary. India’s commitment to economic liberalisation during the Rajiv Gandhi
administration and subsequently under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991–96)
and his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh made New Delhi confident of wooing
Japan economically. Increasing investment and political exchanges helped to foster
closer economic and political relations.5 However, the mild improvement in this
bilateral relationship was virtually sundered in 1998 when India conducted nuclear
tests and Japan responded severely with economic and diplomatic sanctions and
freezing of its official aid to India.

Second Trough, 1990s: India’s Nuclear Testing

The trough in the relationship following India’s nuclear tests was the deepest bilateral
rupture ever between these two Asian nations. Japan reacted strongly even when
India tested its first ‘peaceful’ nuclear device in 1974 and passed a parliamentary
resolution condemning the test, followed by mildly punitive sanctions.6 After the 1998
nuclear testing, however, Japan’s reaction was much stronger practically and
symbolically. Japan temporarily recalled its ambassador in India and suspended
official dialogues, cutting official channels of communication. Japan was not just one
of the first Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development nations to
impose a range of economic sanctions on India, it also assumed the role of chief global
protagonist to ‘punish’ India for defying the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
regime—in the UN, at the G-8 summit, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
meeting and at other international forums soon after.
Many in the Indian government and among Indian public intellectuals were
stunned at the apparent duplicity in Japan’s harsh treatment of India alongside its
lenient attitude towards China in the event of both nations’ nuclear testing. One
senior diplomat in the Indian Embassy in Tokyo observed that ‘the language of
demands, rewards and punishments, benchmarks and so on, [was] reflective of a
donor syndrome at its worst, a departure from the earlier history of good sentiments
or with [sic] the Indian belief in mutuality of interests’. Even some Japanese
 Japan–India Relations 407

commentators regarded the strength of this move against India as ‘out of

proportion’ and ‘unnecessary’.7 Unambiguously, the aftermath of the nuclear
testing marked the lowest point in the bilateral relationship.

Contemporary Peak, 2000s: Post-nuclear Testing to the End of Liberal Democratic

Party Rule
After a brief diplomatic lull, each side began to realise the need to open dialogue and
restore relations in view of important strategic developments. Internationally,
Japan’s chief ally, the United States, had begun to claim better understanding of
India’s strategic environment, and the US move to develop closer relations with
India forced Japan to rethink its own position on India. With its mighty neighbour
China looming ever larger, Japan recognised India’s potential for helping to balance
power vis-à-vis China as a mainland Asian giant and for stretching Japan’s ties with
Asia westward. Furthermore, India’s economy was on the upswing, especially
through its IT revolution, and Japanese businesses recognised increasing economic
opportunities in India. India too was keen to restore relations, recognising Japan’s
motivations as serving its own interests strategically and economically. Following
US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in early 2000, Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro
visited India in August 2000, signalling Japan’s desire to mend fences and regenerate
the relationship almost broken only two years previously. Mori’s meeting with Prime
Minister Vajpayee produced agreement to build a ‘Global Partnership between
Japan and India in the 21st Century’,8 initiating the ‘global partnership’ concept that
all subsequent prime ministerial visits by both sides have sought to develop further
and bring to fruition.
Official-level contacts have expanded significantly alongside reciprocal visits by
Japanese prime ministers and their Indian counterparts. While visiting India in 2005,
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro agreed on an eightfold initiative to build the
global partnership, particularly reinforcing its strategic orientation. In 2006 during
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tokyo, the two nations established a
‘Strategic and Global Partnership’ with annual summits in 2007 and 2008 in each
other’s capital alternately; but the highlight of prime ministerial visits was that by
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in August 2007. His visit and the kind of reception he
received were reminiscent of the visit of Prime Minister Kishi, Abe’s grandfather, 50
years previously. While emphasising historical links and contemporary sharing of
interests as two democratic nations with vast populations, Abe signalled his
country’s intention to engage with India economically as never before by including
some 200 business and trade leaders as part of his entourage.9 Strategically, both
Abe and his successor Aso Taro favoured a quadrilateral framework involving
Japan, India, the United States and Australia and building an alliance of
democracies described as the ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’, with India as a key
player.10 Whereas Japan had long been reluctant to include India in regional
groupings such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum and the
ARF, Japan now persuaded other members to accept India as part of the East Asian
Summit process, clearly extending the political construct of ‘East Asia’.
Consistent with the sudden growth in high-level visits, new arrangements are
providing the groundwork for closer security ties.11 The United States’ signing of the
408 P. Jain

US–India nuclear cooperation law in 2006 allowing India to receive US civilian

nuclear technology and fuel gave Japan the green light to proceed with establishing
bilateral relations with India in the defence and nuclear sectors.12 Japan has agreed
to engage in discussions with India on civilian nuclear cooperation under
‘appropriate’ international safeguards and there is indication that Japan, as a
member of the 44-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), will support India’s needs
for nuclear energy.13 Some have even passionately argued in favour of Japan
supplying nuclear technology to India.14
In the defence sector, Japan and India are increasingly cooperating in securing
vital sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf from where Japan procures a substantial part of
its oil supplies. In 2008 the two nations signed a joint declaration on security
cooperation, only the second such cooperation agreement, after Tokyo signed a
similar agreement with Canberra in 2007. In relation to this, high-level contacts have
been developed between uniformed personnel of the two nations, including joint
exercises and cooperation in piracy control. Security and defence dialogues at both
official and semi-official levels are also undertaken periodically.15
Belated intensification of this bilateral relationship is surely clear in economic
cooperation. The report of the India–Japan Joint Study Group (IJJSG) in June 2006
recommended further development and diversification of bilateral economic
engagement, earmarking trade in goods and services, investment flows and Japanese
official development assistance (ODA).16 Bilateral trade has grown from US$4bn in
2002 to $13bn in 2008. Japanese direct investment in India has also seen phenomenal
growth, from 18.7bn yen in 2002 to 542.9bn yen in 2008. It is no surprise therefore
that the Japan Bank of International Cooperation regards India as the most
promising destination for Japanese long-term trade and investment, and as of
October 2008 some 555 Japanese-affiliated companies have established branches in
India.17
Following this recent trend in the bilateral economic relationship, and given the
matrix of Japanese ODA with its emphasis on economic growth, since 2003 Japan
has been the largest ODA donor to India, building infrastructure such as roads and
subways essential for faster movement of goods and services. A large infrastructure
project now under way is the Delhi–Mumbai industrial corridor and the Dedicated
Freight Corridor linking the two poles of India’s development.18 In recent years
Japanese companies have increased their presence through mergers and acquisitions,
the most important being Daiichi Sankyo gaining majority control of Ranbaxy
Laboratories in pharmaceuticals and NTT DoCoMo’s investment (a 26% share) in
Tata Teleservices.19
The number of Indian residents in Japan has soared from only 3,000 in 1990 to
17,000 in 2005, and is rising.20 Broadening the definition of East Asia to include
India, under the Japan–East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths
(JENESYS) program, some 550 Indian youths have been invited to visit Japan every
year since 2007.21 Educational linkages at the tertiary level, virtually absent between
India and Japan until recent years, have also seen new initiatives, such as between the
University of Tokyo and the Tokyo Institute of Technology and the Indian Institute
of Technology. Following the establishment of a Contemporary Islamic Centre and
a China Centre, the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science established an India
Centre in 2010.22
 Japan–India Relations 409

Developments appear to have slowed, however, since the departure from the
national helm of Abe Shinzo, even under the short-lived administrations of Fukuda
Yasuo and Aso Taro that were both of the same Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
stripe as Abe’s administration. Not surprisingly, questions are now being asked
whether the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration elected to govern from
September 2009 has the will and intention to maintain the pace from the national
political level. It is still early days for the new administration, though it is useful here
to consider possibilities based on the platforms the new government put forward in
electoral campaigning and its actions since taking government.

Past Imperfect—Future Uncertain: The Hatoyama Administration

The words and actions of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and his DPJ
administration appear to send mixed signals about how important Japan perceives
India to be and how Japan wishes to steer relations with this newly rising giant on
the Asian mainland after a decade of strong relationship building. Electoral
manifestos and prime ministerial speeches do not indicate serious attention to India
within the DPJ’s foreign policy. For example, in Hatoyama’s maiden speech in the
Diet, the section ‘Japan as a ‘‘Bridge’’’ that presented his foreign policy vision
revealed several nations of importance to Japan but made no mention of India.23 His
address titled ‘Japan’s new commitment to Asia’ given in Singapore in November
immediately after the 2009 APEC summit mentioned India twice, but only in the
context of the possibility of an economic partnership agreement (EPA) and
cooperation on anti-piracy.24
The relative silence on India may—or may not—be a strategic move in the context
of dramatic change under way in the power stakes of Japan’s principle ally, the
United States, and its geographic neighbour, China. If we uphold the maxim that
actions speak louder than words, a more positive picture emerges. In late December
2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama made an official visit to India to attend the fourth
annual summit between the prime ministers of India and Japan since 2006, a meeting
that his LDP predecessor failed to make earlier in the year. Prime Ministers
Hatoyama and Singh discussed ways to expand, enhance and strengthen the
India–Japan Strategic and Global Partnership initiated in 2006, including
counter-terrorism measures and other forms of security cooperation, an economic
partnership agreement, management of climate issues and nuclear weapons.25
Hatoyama’s visit to India so early in his tenure sends a strong diplomatic signal of
the importance his administration places on relations with India, even if his official
rhetoric has been quiet.
Consistently, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials claim that India has not been
downgraded in Japan’s foreign policy under the new administration, as many
commentators seem to believe.26 Apparently, the Hatoyama administration is clearly
working hard on relations with Asia, at times even at the expense of relations with
the United States. Smoothing troubled relations with China is particularly
important, as is juggling to rebuild relations with the United States in a different
form. We could say that to some extent Japan’s responses to India are ways of
managing, or responding to, relations with China and the United States while a new
configuration of power takes shape regionally and globally. This is indeed suggestive
410 P. Jain

of the fact that not just China and the United States but also Japan and India are key
players in this landscape.
Under the Hatoyama administration, US–Japan ties have become slightly strained
owing to Tokyo’s insistence on negotiating the relocation of the US airbase and
troops from Okinawa. At the same time the new administration is committed to
improving ties with China, so much so that even long-standing Japanese protocols
have been broken to accommodate China’s position. Visiting Chinese Vice President
Xi Jinping, who is expected to succeed Hu Jintao as China’s President in 2012, was
quickly granted a meeting with the Japanese Emperor, breaking an Imperial
Household protocol that requires foreign visitors to file their requests to meet the
Emperor one month in advance.27
This incident highlights the relative importance of Asia-Pacific neighbours to
Japan, particularly China—and by comparison, India’s subaltern status. Suffice it to
say, it is unthinkable that a similar exception would be made to enable a visiting
dignitary from India to visit the Japanese Emperor, as was the case for the Chinese
Vice President. In similar vein, the type of high-level support for China within the
ruling DPJ is not evident vis-à-vis India. Even within the LDP, now in opposition,
the strong ‘China’ group does not have a counterpart ‘India’ group. High-profile
visits such as by India’s Defence Minister A. K. Antony in early November 2009
after the Hatoyama Government took office paled in the shadow of the new
government’s effort to cultivate and improve relations with China. When India’s
Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna visited Tokyo in July 2009 while the LDP was still in
power, leading DPJ parliamentarian Maehara Seiji described the bilateral ties as
‘extremely important’; but such expressions did not find a place in either the DPJ’s
manifesto28 or in Hatoyama’s speeches, as mentioned above.
If Japan’s stronger outreach to India over the past decade is a serious long-term
move rather than simply one more ephemeral ‘peak’ that may be followed by one
more trough, Japanese academic observers are yet to register this in their
publications. Scholarship by Japan’s multitude of observers interested in Japan–
Asia relations generally registers only passing attention to relations with India or
fails to acknowledge them at all. A typical example is the recently published
comprehensive study by Tanaka Akihiko, an eminent Japanese scholar of Japan–
Asia relations, which considers Japan’s post-war relations with Asia up to and
including Prime Minister Abe. The book offers no discussion of India, notwith-
standing the moves to build relations from roughly 2000, including Abe’s strong
demonstrated commitment to India from 2005.29 Its firm focus is on Southeast and
Northeast Asia, and it explores how Japan can improve relations with nations in
these two regions. This points to the generally poor knowledge of India within Japan
and suggests promotion of India studies as a prudent move for a government keen to
foster closer relations with the subcontinent.
At the popular level, people of the two nations have held each other in a positive
light, in direct contrast to the position with some of Japan’s neighbours, most
notably China, especially in recent years when perceptions have fuelled unprece-
dented bilateral tensions at the popular level. A 2009 Japanese government survey of
people in India found 92% said they considered Japan a reliable partner and 76%
perceived Japan–India relations to be very friendly or friendly.30 Goodwill is surely
vital to building and sustaining strong bilateral relations, and it seems that this
 Japan–India Relations 411

particular ingredient is already in place for Japan if it seeks to continue developing

economic, strategic and other links in the longer term.

Conclusion
Identifying peaks and troughs in Japan–India relations generally reveals the lack of
substance and of mutual interest that has largely shaped this bilateral relationship
for roughly half a century; even today this still remains evident in some aspects of the
relationship. The peaks I have identified in the early post-war period and in the 1980s
are peaks only in relation to the overall course of the relationship, which in general
remained lacklustre. Only recently has Japan sought to put some flesh on the bones
of this relationship after Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India in 2000 signalled the
emergence of a new phase on the Japanese side: a genuine will to build the
relationship for strategic and economic objectives, which is suggestive of the mutual
interests that are dictating and guiding the relationship. The new roadmap produced
when Abe Shinzo held power took the bilateral relationship to a new height. It
appeared that finally Japan and India were ready for greater mutual cooperation and
to work together regionally and globally in pursuit of shared goals.
The course of the relationship since Abe left the national helm does not suggest the
development of a trough following this peak. In some ways it virtually cannot. India
today is itself a rising Asian giant and offers much that Japan needs—not just in
economic and security relations but particularly in terms of geo-strategic benefit.
While Japan seeks to position itself best in relation to a dramatically surging China
and an apparently declining United States, India presents itself as the ideal strategic
balancer for Japan.
Japan’s relations with India over the past decade have been marked firmly by
symbolism and by a harder-nosed pragmatism. That is why Manmohan Singh was
afforded the historic honour—a first for an Indian prime minister—of addressing the
joint session of the Japanese parliament during his December 2006 visit to Tokyo,
and why Japan did an about-face in warming very quickly to India not long after
responding very punitively to India’s atomic bomb testing in 1998. India has
continued to respond positively to Japan’s gestures. While India continues its
upward trajectory in global power stakes, Japan will continue to seek more diverse
and closer ties as part of the proactive diplomacy it requires while a new
configuration of power takes place regionally and globally in the 21st century.
Developments so far this century suggest that Japan and India have recognised each
other’s potential to help balance the power shift in Asia. Japan and India thus now
have clear reason to create the strategic, economic and political partnership that
eluded these two Asian partners throughout the second half of the 20th century.

Notes
1. Ogata Kohei (Ed.) (1978) Nihon to Indo (Japan and India) (Tokyo: Sanseido), pp. 41–48.
2. Savitri Vishwanathan (1993) Indo wa Nihon kara toi kuni ka? (Is India Too Far from Japan?) (Kyoto:
Kokusai Nihon Bunka Kenkyu Centaa).
3. Hirose Takako (1996) ‘Japan in a dilemma: the search for a horizontal Japan–South Asia
relationship’, in P. C. Jain (Ed.), Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia (New Delhi:
Sterling), p. 41.
412 P. Jain

4. Horimoto Takenori (1993) ‘Synchronizing Japan–India relations’, Japan Quarterly, 40(1), p. 38.
5. S. Jaishankar (2000) ‘India–Japan relations after Pokharan II’, Seminar, www.india-seminar.com/
2000/487/487%20jaishankar.htm, accessed 30 November 2009.
6. Frank Langdon (1975) ‘Japanese reactions to India’s nuclear explosion’, Pacific Affairs, 48(2),
pp. 173–180.
7. Authors’s personal interview with a senior diplomat who had served as Japan’s Ambassador to India,
19 August 1998.
8. See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0008/india_s.html, accessed 9 July 2010.
9. Purnendra Jain (2007) ‘New roadmap for Japan–India ties’, Japan Focus, September, http://www.
japanfocus.org/-Purnendra-Jain/2514, accessed 16 November 2009.
10. Abe Shinzo (2006) Utsukushii kuni e: jishin to hokori no moteru Nihon e (Towards a Beautiful Country:
a Confident and Proud Japan) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju); Aso Taro (2008) Jiyu to hanei no ko (The Arc
of Freedom and Prosperity) (Tokyo: Gentosha).
11. Purnendra Jain (2008) From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan’s Changing View of India—
1998–2007, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore; Purnendra Jain (2009)
‘Japan’s expanding security networks: India and Australia’, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 22(1–2),
pp. 1–17.
12. As it was not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the United States had earlier banned
India from receiving this technology and fuel.
13. Vivek Pinto, ‘A strategic partnership between Japan and India?’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan
Focus, www.japanfocus.org/-Vivek-Pinto/2321, posted 11 January 2007, accessed 11 December 2009.
14. David Brewster, ‘Bringing India in from the cold—and selling them nuclear technology’, East Asia
Forum, 22 December 2009, www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/22/bringing-india-in-from-the-cold-and-
selling-them-nuclear-technology/#more-8672, accessed 26 December.
15. Rajaram Panda (2009) ‘India and Japan: strengthening defence co-operation’, 22 December,
www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaandJapanStrengtheningDefenceCooperation_rpanda_221209, ac-
cessed 19 March 2010.
16. Vivek Pinto, ‘A strategic partnership between Japan and India?’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan
Focus, www.japanfocus.org/-Vivek-Pinto/2321, posted 11 January 2007, accessed 11 December 2009.
17. Data provided to the author by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 November 2009.
18. In Fiscal 2008, Japan committed some 238bn yen of ODA loan, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/
sw_asia/india_o.pdf, accessed 10 December 2009.
19. New York Times, ‘NTTDoCoMo buys major stake in Tata Teleservices’, 12 November 2008.
20. Sawa Munenori and Minamino Takeshi (2008) ‘Gurbaru keizaika no zainichi Indojin shakaini okeru
kukan no saihensei’, in Takahara Akio et al. (Eds), Gendai Ajia Kenkyu no. 1 (Studies in
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21. Embassy of Japan in India (2008) ‘Large contingent of Indian youth to visit Japan under the
JENESYS programme’, Japan–India Relations Press Release, No. 3, 12 May, New Delhi, www.in.
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22. Professor Horimoto Takenori informed me of this in a personal communication.
23. Diet Speech text of Prime Minister Hatoyama, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091028f4.
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24. Hatoyama Singapore speech, ‘Japan’s new commitment to Asia: toward the realization of an East Asian
community’, www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html, accessed 26
November 2009.
25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Joint statement by Prime Minister Dr Yukio Hatoyama and
Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’, 29 December 2009, www.mofa.go.jp/u_news/2/20091230_
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26. Personal interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 30 November 2009; 9 February 2010.
27. Japan Times, 15 December 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091215a6.html, accessed
19 March 2010.
28. Minshuto (2009) Minshuto seiken koyaku (DPJ Manifesto) (Tokyo: Minshuto honbu).
29. Tanaka Akihiko (2007) Ajia no naka no Nihon (Japan in Asia) (Tokyo: NTT shuppan).
30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Opinion survey on the image of Japan in India’, 8 May 2009,
www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2009/5/1191566_1134.html, accessed 10 December 2009.