Il BASIC PREMISES Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata). ~ Aristotle, On Interpretation 1. Statutory construction, defined.—Three definitions of statutory construction are adopted in this book: a. The process by which courts interpret the meaning of statutes, or the actual process or act of interpreting a statute’s meaning." 1 Webster's New World Dictionary, Wiley Publishing, Inc. 2010.2 Canons or STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa b. Statutory construction, as applied to written law, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with Te- spect to the application to a given case, where that inten- tion is rendered doubtful either by reason of apparently conflicting provisions or directions, or by Teason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law? ¢. “It is the art of seeking the intention of the legisla- ture in enacting a statute and of applying it to a given state of facts.”? 2. Statutory interpretation, defined.—Statutory interpreta- tion, as applied to written law, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning which the authors of the law designed it to convey to others.4 3. Statutory interpretation distinguished from statutory construction. —Three discussions on the distinction between statu- tory interpretation and statutory construction are herein presented: a. A distinction was eloquently and precisely captured by Henry Campbell Black: “In law, interpretation usually implies either that a work or phrase, read in the light of other parts of the “Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 1896, reprinted by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd, 2008. See also Caltex Phils, v. Palomar, G.R, No, L-19650, September 29, 1966 [18 SCRA 247. ‘ Ruperto G, Martin, Statutory Construction, 6® ed., p. 1 (1984). “Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, ibid.Basic Premises 3 instrument or of extrinsic evidence, is found to have a meaning different from that first apparent upon its face, or that a word or passage, not clear in itself, is found, by transposition or reconstruction of the order of words, or by different punctuation, to have a clear meaning,” or, we may add, that a technical word, or term of art, is explained in its technical signification (which may differ from the vernacular) or is found, upon examination, to connote numerous elements not shown upon its face. Interpretation, according to the more strict etymological view of it, implies a prece- dent obscurity in the language to be interpreted. It is the explanation, or rendering in intelligible or familiar terms, of that which before was ambiguous, hidden, or unintelligible. But on wider considerations it is not to be restricted to the expounding of ambiguous or doubtful laws. For its services may become necessary when the question is raised whether the terms of a law, in themselves unambiguous, apply to a given state of facts. If this question is solved from the text alone, by discovering and explaining the meaning of the words used, the process is properly called “inter- pretation.” So, also, it is the office of interpretation to give a signification to such terms as “due process of law,” “bona fides,” “conveyance,” and the like, which cannot be said to be ambiguous, still less unintelligi ble, but which have acquired a very exact technical meaning in the law. The term “construction,” on the other hand, implies a combination of elements, In grammar, it signifies the syntactical arrangement of the words in a sentence. In the mechanic arts, it denotes the building or combin- ing together of the structural parts of anything. So, in law, the fundamental idea of construction is that ofCANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa more elements (premises) and thence drawing an inference (conclusion). Hence con- struction, as applied to written instruments, means the putting together of two or more indicia of the writer’s meaning (whether found within or without the text) and thence deriving a conclusion in regard to that meaning. putting together two or It will thus be seen that there is a substantial differ- ence between interpretation and construction as met- hods for the exegesis of written laws. In strictness, in- terpretation is limited to exploring the written text, while construction goes beyond and may call in the aid of extrinsic considerations. “Interpretation,” says Dr. Lieber, “differs from construction in that the for- mer is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense which their author in- tended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from ele- ments known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter, of the text. Interpretation only takes place if the text conveys some meaning or other. But construction is resorted to when, in comparing two different writings of the same individual, or two different enactments by the same legislative body, there is found contradic- tion where there was evidently no intention of such contradiction one of another, or where it happens that part of a writing or declaration contradicts the rest. When this is the case, and the nature of the document or declaration, or whatever else it may be, is not such as to allow us to consider the whole as being invali-Baste Premises 5 dated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be had to construction, So, too, If required to act in cases which have not been foreseen by the framers of those rules by which we are nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate as well as we can our action respecting the unforeseen case.” As an illustration of construction, we may suppose the following case: A statute provides a penalty for any person who offers resistance to “magistrates, she- riffs, constables, bailiffs, marshals, or other officers,” in the discharge of their official duty. The defendant offered resistance to a county surveyor in the dis- charge of the latter’s official duty. Is the case within the law? If we observe the rule that general terms fol- lowing an enumeration by specific terms are to be taken as applying only to others of the same class with those enumerated; if we notice that the officers enumerated in the statute are all of the class of offi- cers having to do with the administration of justice or the execution of the laws; if the title of the act shows us that it was intended to be restricted to such offi- cers; if we find from an examination of the condition of affairs which induced the passage of the statute, and the evil which it was designed to remedy, that only judicial officers were intended to be thus pro- tected; if we discover that the language of the act was copied from that of a similar statute existing in an- other state, and the law, in that state, had already re- ceived a judicial construction whereby its operation was limited to that class of officers; and if from these several premises (all of which are indicia of the mean- ing of the legislator) we deduce the conclusion that a county surveyor is not within the terms of the statute, then the process which has led to this result is prop- erly called “construction.” On the other hand, it hasCanons or StaTUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa been settled, by the decisions of the courts, that the term “ex post facto laws,” as used in the constitutions, applies only to penal and criminal proceedings and not to civil actions. This explication of the meaning of this term was the result of “interpretation.” Again, “the constitution of the United States says that con- gress shall have the power of regulating commerce, but it does not say how far this regulatory power shall extend. This, sentence, then, must be interpreted, if we are desirous to ascertain what precise meaning the framers of our constitution attached to it, and con- strued, if we are desirous of knowing how they would have understood it respecting new relations, which they could not have known, at the time, and which nevertheless fall decidedly within the province of this provision.” In practice, however, both courts and text-writers are in the habit of using the two terms “interpretation” and “construction” as synonymous or interchange- able. This is because either or both of these methods may be resorted to freely, whenever the necessity of elucidating the meaning of a statute becomes appar- ent; and niceties of language are not much observed when they do not correspond with an imperative ne- cessity of maintaining a distinction between the two terms will not be scrupulously observed in the follow- ing pages. It should also be observed that the two terms in ques- tion may be applied to the art, the process, or the re- sult of the elucidation, It is in the latter sense that we employ them when we say that a court has put a “narrow interpretation” upon a statute, or that a case has been brought within the terms of a statute “by construction,”Basic Premises 7 b. In US. w. Keitel, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that while abstractly there may be a difference between “inter- pretation” and “construction,” in common usage, the words have the same significance, and “construction,” includes interpretation. Thus, according to Justice White: It may not be doubted that, in common usage, interpreta- tion and construction are usually understood as having the same significance. This was aptly pointed out in Coo- ley’s Constitutional Limitations, 6th edition, where, after stating the theoretical difference, it is observed (p. 51): “In common use, however, the word ‘construction’ is generally employed in the law in a sense embracing all that is properly covered by both, when each is used in a sense strictly and technically correct.” We think, when the context of the Act of March 2, 1907, is taken into view, and the remedial character of the act is eight, it becomes apparent that the word ’” is employed in the statute in its common and hence includes both construction and interpretation, although there may be an abstract differ- ence between them. This being so, it follows that we have jurisdiction to review the action of the court in quashing the indictment. given due wi “construction signification, “One who ‘interprets’ does not get outside of the while one who ‘constructs’ has to f the statute and seek the c context of the statute, go outside of the language ©! help of extrinsic aids.”* ee 5211 USS, 370 (1908), ¢ Vicente J. Francisco, ‘Am Jur. 197-198. Statutory Construction, 3° ed., p. 2, 1968, citing 50ICTION cons OF STATUTORY ConsTRut 8 = Dennis B. Funa onstruction?— Staty. . d for statutory ¢ t 4. Why is there a need 108 i ction of wi tory amnion recognizes the inherent imperfec paces “ten tutes, The laws written by man may not alway’ ly con. statutes. The laws for this imperfection are it i ‘asons vey the desired legislation. The re: | varied. Among these reasons are a) the words adopted in the stat. tute do not accurately convey what was in the minds of A legisla. tors, b) the words used and adopted are capable of dual meanings and thus are inherently ambiguous, c) the words used and adopted are intentionally or unintentionally broad, and thus may be deliberately ambiguous in order to cover varied circumstances, d) there were outright mistakes or omissions in the writing of the statute, and e) the term or word used has, over time, acquired other meanings not contemplated at the time they were used and adopted. 5. Legal hermeneutics, defined.—Two definitions of legal hermeneutics are adopted in this book: a. The branch of science which establishes the princi- ples and rules of interpretation and construction of written laws. The application of the said principles and rules is termed exegesis.7 b. Itis a branch of philosophical hermeneutics. SS 7 : , ie pinnate a Politica! Hermeneutics, 1837, “In 1837 Francis rst edition of Li . years a resident of the United State gal and Political Hermeneutics. Ten s, this Prussian émi i ie Ba . migré sought to articulate Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics as his til tee ee tp The Hermeneutics made its appearance in a land the American public a ee ale ft 8 later editor it “opened to of Hermeneutics: Frants Listens oe NS. James Fare, Tie Americentsation 5 Legal arid Political Hermeneutics, Legal Herme- neutics: History, Theory, and Practi Ginn ctice, Edited By Gregory Leyh, University ofBasic Premises 9 6. Hermeneutics, defined.—Hermeneutics “means the the- ory of interpretation, i.e. the theory of achieving an understanding of texts, utterances, and so on.”8 Hermeneutics dealt originally with the bible or biblical inter- pretation. Hence, the field of biblical hermeneutics. One of the original writers in hermeneutics was Johann August Ernesti.? The approach of Ernesti to hermeneutics was discussed as follows: “Ernesti in particular takes five vitally important steps in hermeneutics. First, he argues that the Bible must be inter- preted in just the same way as any other text. He does not follow through on this principle fully or consistently — for, while he does indeed forgo any reliance on a divine inspira- tion of the interpreter, he assumes that, as the word of God, the Bible must be true and hence also self-consistent throughout, which is not something that he would assume in connection with profane texts. However, Herder and Schleiermacher would soon go on to embrace this principle ina full and consistent way. “Second, Ernesti identifies the following twofold obstacle that he sees facing interpretation in many cases: (1) different languages possess markedly different conceptual resources; and (2) a particular author's concepts often diverge signifi- cantly from those of his background language. The concep- tion that interpreters face such a twofold obstacle in many cases would subsequently be taken over by Herder and Schleiermacher, who would indeed make it even more fun- damental to their theories. In particular, this conception is © Michael N. Forster, Hermeneutics, philosophy.uchicago.edwfaculty/ files/forster/HERM. pdf ; ® August 4, 1707 ~ September 11, 1781, A German writer and theologian who wrote on hermeneutics through his book Institutio Interpretis Nove Testa- enti (Principles of New Testament Interpretation) published in1761,10 CTION Canons OF STATUTORY ConsTRU Dennis B. Funa the source of an acute awareness which they both share of e an ever-present danger in interpretation of falsely assimilat- it liefs, etc.) expressed by a text to tng the conan oe wth which one happens already to be especially familiar. And principle (2), specifically also grounds an intuition which they both share that inguistic interpretation needs to be complemented by a side of inter- pretation that focuses on authorial psychology, namely in or- der to make it possible to penetrate authorial individuality in conceptualization. “Third, Ernesti argues that the meaning of words depends on linguistic usage [usus loquendi], so that interpretation is fundamentally a matter of determining the linguistic usage of words. This is another vitally important move. It would eventually lead, in Herder, Johann Georg Hamann, and Schleiermacher, to a stronger version of the same thesis which grounded it in the further, revolutionary claim that it is true because meaning is word usage. Ernesti’s thesis also formed a sort of base line from which such successors would later set out to look for additional tasks that interpre- tation needs to accomplish (for example, det init Pects of authorial psychology), Yee oun Emesti insists — in opposition to a tradition of ex- : usively text-focused reading of the Bible which was still aie in ae day - that interpretation must deploy a detailed ge of a text's historical, Seographical, etc. context. Subsequently, Herder, Schle lermacher, and Ay gust Boeckh would all take oyey this theses, Position in their hermeneutical ner tS ON variou: s fi isan rms of holism in interpre- text ; Whole text and both of toed ion interpreted in light of the i ‘ Corpus and other related texts, anh ee = pee Is in particular “Fifth, Ernesti insis\ tation: the parts ofBasic Premises ul necessary in order to acquire sufficient evidence to be able to pin down word usages, and hence meanings. This prin- ciple of holism would subsequently be taken over and de- veloped much further by successors such as Herder, Frie- drich Ast, and Schleiermacher. Herder in particular would already place much greater emphasis on it, and also expand it to include consideration of the author's whole historical context, and of his whole psychology. Such a principle of holism leads to the notorious problem of a “hermeneutical circle” (later highlighted by Dilthey among others). For ex- ample, if interpreting parts of a text requires interpreting the whole of the text, then, given that interpreting the whole obviously also requires interpreting the parts, how can ine terpretation ever be achieved at all? Herder in the Critical Forests, and then following him Schleiermacher, already an- ticipate, and also develop a plausible solution to, that sort of problem: since understanding is not an all-or-nothing mat- ter but instead something that comes in degrees, it is possible to interpret the parts of a text in sequence with some meas- ure of adequacy, thereby achieve a measure of understand- ing of the whole text, then deploy that measure of under- standing of the whole text in order to refine one’s under- standing of the parts, thereby refining one’s understanding of the whole text, and so on (in principle, indefinitely).’"” 7. “Legislative intent” in legal hermeneutics compared with “authorial psychology” in hermeneutics (in general), —Le- gislative intent, or the intent of legislators, as studied in legal her- meneutics is akin to, or the counterpart, of authorial psychology in the general study of hermeneutics. Authorial psychology was dis- cussed as follows: "8 Michael N. Forster, Hermeneutics, philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/ files/forster/HERM pdfCANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa “But Herder" also took further seminal steps in his theory of interpretation. One of these was to argue for the need to complement the focus on language which Ernesti had al- ready championed with a focus on authorial psychology, Herder has several reasons for making this move. A first is the idea just mentioned that interpretation requires an ima- ginative recapturing of certain authorial sensations, A sec- ond is the idea that recourse to authorial psychology is of- ten necessary in order to resolve ambiguities in a text. A third is the idea that a focus on authorial psychology is an important means for penetrating an author's conceptual- linguistic individuality. Schleiermacher" would subse- quently take over Herder’s principle of complementing lin- guistic with psychological interpretation, and especially the third of the rationales for doing so just mentioned (which he developed significantly). Indeed, one good way of charac- terizing the development of hermeneutics after Herder more generally is as a sort of progressive confirmation of his thesis that linguistic interpretation needs to be comple mented with a focus on authorial psychology, a progressive confirmation taking the form of the identification of increas- ingly precise and additional reasons why that is so (exam- ples of this trend are, besides Schleiermacher’s development of Herder’s third rationale, a novel point of Schlegel’s that 2 text will often express thoughts not explicitly in any of its parts but instead implicitly and holistically, and Austin and Skinner's novel assignment of an essential role in interpreta tion to the identification of illocutionary force). “Herder also argues that interpretation, especially inits BF chological aspect, requires the use of what he calls divinay ” Referring to Johann Gottfried Herder, » Referring to Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. Nove! 1768 - February 12, 1834, Also a German theologian and philosopher. are ahBasic Premises 13 tion,” by which he essentially means (not some sort of di- vinely guided insight or infallible intuition, but instead much more reasonably) a method of fallible and corrigible hypothesis based on but also going well beyond the relati- vely meager linguistic and other behavioral evidence avail- able, Schleiermacher would again subsequently take over this principle, similarly holding that a method of “divi- nation” predominates on the psychological side of interpre- tation, and similarly conceiving this as a method of fallible and corrigible hypothesis based on but also going well be- yond the meager evidence available.” 8. Interpretation is a judicial function.—Interpretation of laws is for the courts (Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank, L- 8888, November 29, 1957, 102 Phil. 477; see 82 C. J. S. pp. 745, 746). “Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted the courts by the Constitution.” Even statutes declaring “what the law was before” are not binding on courts (Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil. 696). Thus, when necessary “the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true in- tent”15 In the Song Kiat Chocolate Factory case, “the question presen- ted is whether cocoa beans may be considered as ‘chocolate’ for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No, 601, as amended. Section 2 of said Act nowhere mentions cocoa beans as among, those exempted from the tax but } Michael N. Forster, Hermeneutics, philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/ files/forster/HERM.pdf ¥ Brandy v, Mickelson, 44 N.W. 341; see also 11 Am. Jur. 714. 15 RCBC v, IAC, GR. No. 74851, December 9, 1999, 320 SCRA 279; see also U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1; L.S. Moon & Co, v. Hamson, 43 Phil. 27.14 CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa on of Congress to include hen it approved Republic , by substituting ‘cocoa f quoted the statement House Bill No. 2576 plaintiff argued that it was the intenti cocoa beans in the word ‘chocolate’ w’ Act No. 1197, which amended said section 2, beans’ for ‘chocolate’ and in support thereo! of the Committee Chairman who reported which became Republic Act No. 1197: “Mr, Roces. Mr. Speaker, on line 8 page 1, after the word ‘canned’, strike out the words “fresh, frozen and’ and also the words ‘other beef’, on line 9 and on the same line, line 9, after the word ‘chocolate’, Insert the words ‘(COCOA BEANS). In parenthesis (). I am proposing to insert the word ‘(COCOA BEANS)’ In parenthesis ( ) after the word ‘chocolate’, Mr. Speaker, in order to clarify any doubt and manifest the intention of the past Congress that the word ‘chocolate’ should mean ‘cocoa beans.’ “In passing upon this argument the Court pointed out that ‘said Chairman could not have spoken of the Congressional inten- tion in approving Republic Act No. 601 (the law that was amended by Rep. Act No. 1197) because he was not a member of the Congress that passed said Act. Naturally, all he could state was his own in- terpretation of such piece of legislation.’ (Words in parenthesis supplied). It further declared: ‘Courts do not usually give decisive weight to one legislator’s opinion, expressed in Congressional de- bates concerning the application of existing laws.’”" Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law.” % Luis J, Gonzaga, Statutory Construction, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1958, See also Fleete v. Nickerson, 54 L.R.A. 554. See Paras v, Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81; Pe” ple v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607; Pesca v, Pesca, G.R. No, 135921, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 588. See also Senarillos v. Hermosisima, G.R. No. L-10662, December 14Basic Premises 15 9, Interpretation is a judicial function; Hence, Congress may not interpret or construe the Constitution.—In the case of Endencia v. David,!® the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Ma- nila declared section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordered the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The lower court held that the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a dimi- nution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 provides: Sec. 13. No salary wherever received by any public of- ficer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be consid- ered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be diminution of his compensa- tion fixed by the Constitution or by law. The issue was whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particu- larly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax 1956, 100 Phil. 501, wherein the Court stated that “the interpretation placed by this Court upon Republic Act 557 constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into ef- fect.” 8G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953 [93 Phil. 696].16 Canons oF StatuToRY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa on the salary of judicial officers in the light of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution then provided: Sec. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or be- come incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an an- nual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. Congress promulgated the challenged Republic Act No. 590, to counteract the ruling in a prior Supreme Court decision to au- thorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. The Supreme Court ruled: “By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial of- ficer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear ex- ample of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their con- tinuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and es- tablished province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislativeBasic Premises 7 definition of a word as used in a statute is not con- clusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial func- tion in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied) The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a decla- ration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied) “We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Con- stitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final ‘court determination of a case based on a judicial interpreta~ tion of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative depart- ment, That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides be- ing clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.” 10, Judicial interpretation of a statute may still be subject e.—-Note that while interpretation of the to congressional influenc interpretation constitution remains in the domain of the judiciary,i Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa of statutes may still be influenced by Congress. Thus, it has been stated: “Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation” (Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 [1996], citing Ilinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 [1977])- Thus, Congress may amend a statute to produce a different interpretation. Such correc- tive amendments are not uncommon. It may be that the law would provide a provision on “statu- tory construction”. An example would be Republic Act No. 9031, “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001”, also known as the EPIRA law. Section 75 thereof provides: “SEC. 75. Statutory Construction.—This Act shall, un- less the context indicates otherwise, be construed in fa- vor of the establishment, promotion, preservation of competition and people empowerment so that the widest participation of the people, whether directly or indi- rectly, is ensured. With respect to NPC’s debts and IPP and related contracts, nothing in this Act shall be con- strued as: (1) an implied waiver of any right, action or claim, against any person or entity, of NPC or the Philip- pine Government arising from or relating to any such contracts; (2) a conferment of new or better rights to creditors and IPP contractors in addition to subsisting rights granted by the NPC or the Philippine Government under existing contracts.” Thus, the Court ruled: “Likewise, it may not be asserted with success that the power to grant provisional rate adjustments runs counter to the statutory construction guide provided in Section 75 of the Jaw, The section ordains that the EPIRA shall be con- strued in favor of market competition and people powerBasic PREMISES 19 empowerment, thereby ensuring the widest participation of the people.” Another example would be Section 5 of the Local Govern- ment Code which provides: Section 5. Rules of Interpretation.—In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local gov- ernment unit concerned; (b) Incase of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local gov- ernment unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it; 11. Interpretation by the courts is essentially discretion- ary.—When, how, and what canon to use in interpreting a statute is essentially discretionary on the part of the court. Thus: “The phrase ‘canons of construction’ is understood to en- compass a set of background norms and conventions that are used by courts when interpreting statutes. While the Su- preme Court recently referred to them as “simply rules of ¥ Freedom from Debt Coalition, et al, v. Energy Regulatory Commission et al, (GR. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157), % Also referred to by other writers as “maxims of interpretation.”20 CANoNs oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa thumb which will sometimes help courts determine the meaning of legislation,” the reality of their use is more com. plicated. Federal judges regularly exercise broad discretion in deciding when the canons should apply, which ones to invoke in a particular setting, and how to) reconcile them with other contextual resources such as specific legislative history, general statutory policy or purpose, and deference to agency determinations.”" The rules of statutory construction are not mandatory. “The rules of construction are not rules of positive law, unless expressly provided by statute. They rest on the authority of the courts, which have gradually evolved them, and they are not imperatively bind- ing in the same sense as are the enactments of the legislature.” “Rules of interpretation are not imperative like the manda- tory provisions of law; they are rather in the nature of sug- gestions leading up to the probable meaning where it has been carelessly or inartificially expressed; and where the words are susceptible of more than one interpretation they (the rules) may possibly guide us to the one intended.”3 12. Interpretation by the executive branch of government— “The executive department of government is frequently called upon to interpret statutes long before they appeal in court for judicial con- struction. While the interpretation placed upon a statute by the ex- 2 James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, USC Law School and California Institute of Technology, ® Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, p. 7, 1896; see also Republic Flour Mills, Inc, v. Commissioner of Cus- toms, 39 SCRA 268, % Cooley, Taxation, 265,Basic Premises 21 ecutive department is not absolutely binding upon the courts, it is entitled to great weight and is often accepted by the judiciary.” 13, Opinions of the Secretary of Justice not binding upon the courts.—“It can also be said that the opinions of the Secretary of Justice are not binding on the courts. In Abad Santos v. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, the Supreme Court said: ‘It is superfluous to say that the opinions of the executive department of the govern- ment have no compulsive force over courts of justice in cases which are decidedly judicial in character.’ In that case the widow of Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos who was killed by the Japanese during World War II, sued for the proceeds of his government in- surance after she had been granted a gratuity by special law on condition that ‘no other gratuity under existing law or laws shall be granted to the late Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.’ One of the issues was whether or not the proceeds of the government in- surance of Chief Justice Abad Santos could be regarded as gratu- ity. ‘The Auditor General claimed that it was gratuity and he cited an opinion to that effect which had been rendered by Jose Abad Santos when he was Secretary of Justice. But the Supreme Court, as aforestated, held that it was not bound by the opinion. “It goes without saying that opinions of the Secretary of Jus- tice do not bind private parties. In an opinion on the Termi- nation Pay Law given to the Secretary of Labor, a caveat had to be give by Secretary Tuason as follows: ‘Remember that the Secretary of Justice’s opinions are purely advisory, not decisions which bind private parties to a controversy purely private in character, As against his private employer an employee can assert his right only in a court of competent jurisdiction.’ (Op. No, 222, s, 1955), In the final analysis, the 4 Vicente J. Francisco, Statutory Construction, 3* ed., p. 7, 1968, citing Crawford, Statutory Construction, sec. 180, p. 300.22 Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa treatment accorded to an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, whether by executive, legislative, ot judicial officials of the government and even by private persons, will depend on his well-earned reputation for integrity and competence in law.”5 14. Construction by administrative agencies.— An adminis- trative officer, such as the BIR Commissioner, may revoke, Tepeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office, The construction of a statute by those administering it is not bind- ing on their successors if, thereafter, the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should be given.* In PNOC v. Court of Appeals et al. (G.R. No. 109976, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 32), the Court ruled: “It is evident in this case that the new BIR Commissioner, Commissioner Ong, construed E.O. No. 44 and its imple- menting rules and regulations differently from that of his predecessor, former Commissioner Tan, which led to Com- missioner Ong’s revocation of the BIR approval of the com- Promise agreement, dated 22 June 1987. Such a revocation was only proper considering that the former BIR Commis- sioner’s decision to approve the said compromise agree- ment was based on the erroneous construction of the law (ie, E.O. No. 44 and its implementing rules and regula- tions) and should not give rise to any vested right on PNOC. “Furthermore, approval of the compromise agreement and acceptance of the compromise payment by his predecessor cannot estop BIR Commissioner Ong from setting aside the ?5 Vicente Abad Santos, Advisory Opinions of the Secretary of Justice, 36 Phil, Law Journal, 523, 1961, * Hilado v. Collector of Internal Revenue, et al., 100 Phil 288 (1956).Basic Premises 23 compromise agreement, dated 22 June 1987, for lack of legal basis; and from demanding payment of the deficiency with- holding tax from PNB.” 15. Kinds of construction.—There are different kinds of con- structions: First, the strict construction and the liberal construc- tion. Depending on the kind of statute, it may be one or the other. Thus, penal statutes are given strict or literal construction. Reme- dial laws are given liberal construction. Second, the prospective interpretation and the retrospective interpretation. Prospective interpretation makes the provision ap- ply only to future cases or transactions; while retrospective inter- pretation makes them apply to cases or transactions which oc- curred before the passage of the law. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not back- ward.” It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.> When a construction is made from words entirely different from its plain and obvious meaning, and in the process creating an entirely different meaning in order to avoid an absurd or unjust consequence, it is called “artificial”, “forced”, or “strained” con- struction, or as Dr. Lieber described as “extravagant” construc- tion. ® Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 2 Union Carbide Labor Union v. Union Carbide Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. L- 41314, November 13, 192, 215 SCRA 554, % Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, p. 7.24 Canons oF StatuTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa 16. Retroactive distinguished from retrospective, — come into force on a date prior to its enactment means Tef and to be operative with respect to transactions Occurring prior to its enactment means retrospective, but neither is to be construed ag having either retrospective or retroactive Operation unless such a construction is expressly or by necessary implication Tequired by the language of the Act.”3° "To have troactive, 17. Progressive interpretation, defined. — eral signification employed in a statute should b absence of legislative intent to the contrary, only peculiar conditions obtaining at the time those that may normally arise after its approval as well, This rule of construction, known as progressive interpretation, extends by con- struction the application of a statute to all subjects or conditions within its general purpose or scope that come into existence subse- quent to its passage, and thus keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory.”3! “A word of gen- construed, in the to comprehend not of its enactment but 18. Purpose of Statutory Construction.—It has been said that “(s)tatutory interpretation as a branch of the law has increased hugely in significance over the last 100 years or so”. “The pur- pose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statute is to discover the true intention of the law, they are use- ful only in cases of doubt, they are never to be used to create doubt ® Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd, v. Minister of National Revenue, 1 SCR. 271;7 N.R. 401, Canada, 1977, * Orceo v. Comelee, Concurring Opinion of Justice Brion, GR. No. 190779, March 26, 2010, citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 177-178 (2008). * Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 (1) Statute Law Review 40, 2004,Bastc Premises 25 but only to remove it, and cannot be invoked to defeat or destroy natural justice or substantial equities” Thus, as further expounded upon by Black: “Statute law is the will of the legislature; and the object of all judicial interpretation of it is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or by implication, by the lan- guage used, so far as it is necessary for determining whet- her the particular case or state of facts presented to the in- terpreter falls within it. The wisdom, policy, or expediency of legislation is a matter with which the courts have nothing whatever to do. Whether or not a given law is the best that could have been enacted on the subject; whether or not it is calculated to accomplish it avowed object; whether or not it accords with what is understood to be the general policy of legislation in the particular jurisdiction - these are questions which do not fall within the province of the courts. And hence a court exceeds its proper office and authority if it at- tempts, under the guise of construction, to mould the ex- pression of the legislative will into the shape which the court thinks it ought to bear. The sole function of the judici- ary is to expound and apply the law. To enact the law is the prerogative of the legislative department of government. Nor can the courts correct what they may deem excesses or omissions in legislation, or relieve against the occasionally harsh operation of statutory provisions, without danger of doing more mischief than good.”*4 8 Vicente J. Francisco, Statutory Construction, 3" ed., p, 5, 1968, citing 59 CJ. sec, 563, p, 943, 4 Black on Interpretation of Laws, sec, 4, pp. 11-12,26 CANons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa According to Crawford: “The object or purpose of all construction or interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the lawmakers, and to make it effective. The basic principle has been announced time after time that if the statute is plain, certain and free from ambi- guity, a bare reading suffices and interpretation is unneces- sary. Or stated conversely, if the statute is ambiguous, or its meaning uncertain, interpretation is required in order to as- certain what the legislators meant. But interpretation may be required and justified by various factors. Besides the doubt created by the doubtful meaning of words and phra- ses, there are other instances where the words used do not express the legislative intent perfectly, in which case inter- pretation’ is needed. Such is the case where the language used exceeds or falls short of expressing the meaning in- tended.” 19. Civil Code provisions relating to statutory construc- tion.—The following provisions of the Civil Code are pertinent to the study of statutory construction: Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. Art. 9, No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Art, 10, In case of doubt in the interpretation or applica- tion of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body in- tended right and justice to prevail. 35 Crawford, Statutory Construction, sec. 158, p. 244,Basic PReMises 27 20. Putting statutory construction in its proper perspec- tive.—It must be emphasized that the canons of statutory construc- tion are not rules which must be followed like laws. They are mere guides and “tools.” Thus: “Canons of construction are basically context-dependent ‘rules of thumb,’ That is to say, canons are general princi- ples, many of them of the common-sense variety, for draw- ing inferences about the meaning of language. Since lan- guage derives much of its meaning from context, canons should not be treated as rules of law, but rather as ‘axioms of experience’ that do ‘not preclude consideration of per- suasive [contrary] evidence if it exists.’ Context can provide that contrary evidence. Many of the difficulties that have been identified with reliance on canons of construction can be avoided if their importance is not overemphasized — if they are considered tools rather than ‘rules. 21. Applying Stare Decisis to statutory construction.—It has been said that “the case for giving stare decisis effect to doc- trines of statutory interpretation is stronger than the case for giv- ing stare decisis effect to doctrines of substantive law.” However, we have been reminded that what is stare decisis is not, as far as the Supreme Court is concerned, so necessarily cast in stone. Thus: “Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of % Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, Congressional Research Service, p. CRS-4, August 31, 2008. ¥ Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Inter- pretation Methodology?, Georgetown Law Journal, 2008,28 Canons of StaTUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same juris- diction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The deci- sions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of ap- pellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are proba- bly not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. “Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily be- come, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obe- dience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. “The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be gui- ded but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re- examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament, But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justifica-Basic Premises 29 tion to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.” The ‘doctrine of stare decisis,’ ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Article 8 of the Civil Code provides, “Judicial decisions applying or inter- preting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.” 22. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis.—A treaties on the doc- trine of stare decisis by Justice Antonio Carpio in Lambino et al. v. Comelec et al.2? is hereunder adopted for its educative value: “The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm.” The doc- trine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18% century, “it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation.” As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be fol- lowed if it were “plainly unreasonable;” (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or rea- soning used to reach the decision.” “The doctrine migrated to the United States, It was recog- nized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to 38 De Castro v, JBC, et al, (G.R, No. 191002, April 20, 2010, 618 SCRA 639), citing Price & Bitner, Effective Legal Research, § 9.7, Little, Brown & Co, New York (1962); Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v, Palomar, No. L-19650, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247, »® GR. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160,30 Canons oF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Dennis B. Funa prevent “arbitrary discretion in the courts.” Madison agreed but stressed that “x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be re- jected.” Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the countervailing policy consid- erations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent.” He added that their ideas ‘reveal a deep internal conflict be- tween the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.’ “Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy’s observation although stare decisis devel- oped its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involv- ing the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while hori- zontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution. “It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of hori- zontal stare decisis -- constitutional stare decisis and statu- tory stare decisis, Constitutional stare decisis involves judi- cial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis’ view on the binding effect of the doctrine in con- stitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated; “Stare decisis is not... a universalBasic Premises 31 and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not in- flexible, Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.” In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitu- tion itself and not what we have said about it.”' In con- trast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress it- self.” This stance reflects both respect for Congress’ role and the need to preserve the courts’ limited resources. “In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an en- semble of reasons, viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for pre- dictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates ille- gitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot ac- commodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them. “In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 4 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S, 405-06 (1932), 4) Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466.