The Inconceivability of Zombies

Author(s): Robert Kirk

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition , May, 2008, Vol. 139, No. 1 (May, 2008), pp. 73-89
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40208892

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Philos Stud (2008) 139:73-89
DOI 10.1007/sl 1098-007-9103-2

The inconceivability of zombies

Robert Kirk

Received: 12 August 2006 /Accepted: 5 March 2007 / Published online: 15 May 2007
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract If zombies were conceivable in the sense relevant to the 'conceivability

argument' against physicalism, a certain epiphenomenalistic conception of conscious-
ness - the 'e-qualia story' - would also be conceivable. But (it is argued) the e-qualia story
is not conceivable because it involves a contradiction. The non-physical 'e-qualia' sup-
posedly involved could not perform cognitive processing, which would therefore have to
be performed by physical processes; and these could not put anyone into 'epistemic
contact' with e-qualia, contrary to the e-qualia story. Interactionism does not enable
zombists to escape these conclusions.

Keywords Zombies • Consciousness • Epiphenomenalism • Physicalism •

Conceivability • Conceivability argument • Qualia • Mental causation •
Privacy • Chalmers

1 Introduction

Zombies would be like us in all physical respects, but without phenomenal consciousness.
It is widely agreed that if zombies are possible, physicalism is false. A much debated
argument for the possibility of zombies starts from the claim that they are conceivable,
then urges that whatever is conceivable is possible. Many physicalists agree that zombies
are conceivable - even in a strong sense - but disagree that conceivability entails possi-
bility. Whatever may be the correct view on that last point, I think all are wrong about the

R. Kirk (El)
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, 97 Westhorpe, Southwell, Notts NG25 ONE, UK
e-mail: [email protected]

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 74 R. Kirk

conceivab
strong en
There are
idea is so
somethin
surely it i
involving
appeal the
which has
That is w
My appro
be explain
physical
which are
two stage
sense) bec
so is the

(A) The e
(B) If zom
Therefor
(A) is def

2 'Zombies' and 'conceivable'

The idea of zombies suggests itself as soon as one accepts the causal closure of
physical. If every physical effect has a physical cause, all human behavior is explica
physical terms. But then how does consciousness - phenomenal consciousness, t
involved in there being 'something it is like' to have experiences - fit into the
Apparently it can only be a causally inert by-product, and epiphenomenalism or
lelism must hold. In that case, as G. F. Stout argued,

it ought to be quite credible that the constitution and course of nature would
otherwise just the same as it is if there were not and never had been any experien
individuals.4

What Stout envisaged is a 'zombie twin' of our world: a physical duplicate of the
world on the assumption that the physical world is closed under causation - s
everything physical goes on just the same - but without phenomenal consciou
Zombies must be understood to be complete physical systems in the sense that all ef

1 For the view that the zombie possibility entails the falsity of physicalism see e.g. Chalmers (199
Kirk (1974, 2005, pp. 7-23). For the conceivability argument see e.g. Kripke (1980), Chalmers (2
other essays in Gendler and Hawthorne (2002).
2 Indirect objections: Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1953); direct ones: e.g. Dennett (1991, 1995)
(2005, pp. 37-57); Shoemaker (1981, 1999); Tye (2006).
3 This outline mirrors that of Kirk (2005, pp. 39-55). However, the arguments here are signi
different (and I think clearer and more cogent) and take account of objections not considered in t
4 Stout (1931, 138f).

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The inconceivability of zombies 75

them are produced physically. They ca

nomenal consciousness but physically
physical world is causally closed.5
Once the zombie idea has been explaine
that such things are at least conceivab
ceivable in some sense, but that sense
ceivability argument. For our purposes i
counts as inconceivable if it can be know

3 The e-qualia story

Does the possibility of zombies entail ep

but that seems to be a mistake.6 Why
world is interactionistic? Later I shall de
zombies entails the conceivability of th
nomenalism. This story consists of th
nomenalism as usually understood,
epiphenomenalists' views, nor of curren

(El) The world is partly physical and it

every physical effect has a physical
(E2) Human beings are physical syst
properties, 'e-qualia'. E-qualia make h
(E3) E-qualia are wholly caused by phy
either on the physical world or amon
(E4) Human beings consist of nothing b
(E5) Human beings are able to do such t
and (on occasions) remember their e

I take it that (El) and (E4) are clear enou

(E2) now, and say more about (E3) and
The notion of e-qualia is significantly
qualia. David Chalmers defines qualia, o
mental states that type those states by w
of qualia in that sense could be accepted
entail that these properties must be non
it entail that they could be stripped off
in that sense exist amounts to no more

5 Some authors use "zombie" for merely behavio

output functions; but those senses too are ir
behavioral and dispositional similarity is insuff
440): Kirk (2005, pp. 97-118). The definition o
6 See for example Perry (2001). Interactionist zo
hence cannot define zombies as physically lik
argument is not epiphenomenalism, but "the
interactionism" (1999, p. 493; see also Chalme
7 Even those epiphenomenalists who maintain t
that the physical world should have been caus
8 Chalmers (1996, p. 359, n.2).

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 76 R. Kirk

(E2) of th
is our rel
Although
(E5), man
aims to sh
are incom
tions env
trouble ov

4 E-quali

By (E3), e
that the q
seem to h
a thorn in
caused pa
physical
physical
but in fac
this accou
note a co
Like all v
the metap
that is, in
them, an
notice, at
experienc
condition
qualities
must be a
their e-qu
Epistemi
and the s
changes a
points. If
effects la
these trac
about, att
retrieved
it depend
contribut

9 Chalmer
consider th
indicated.

10 It might
But the ne
capable of

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The inconceivability of zombies 77

But e-qualia are inert, and so cannot the

would be necessary int to put E-worlders
do not persist through time (at least n
perform the cognitive functions necessa
(E4), human beings consist of nothing
that in an E-world, the cognitive func
processes. You might suggest that non-
those functions; but by (E4) there are no
The fact that the cognitive work in a
presents a fatal difficulty for the e-quali

5 How is epistemic contact possible?

According to the e-qualia story, physic

of e-qualia constituting an individual's
individual is supposed to be in epistemic
that time. But what ensures there is suc
startby imagining an E-world w that be
e-qualia. Since by (El) the physical com
the absence of e-qualia leaves the phys
difference is that its inhabitants are z
extended complex of e-qualia, ^, is intro
qualia
complex that every E-worlder is su
example it is not caused by physical pro
Might some E-worlder nevertheless be in
compare, or remember some of the e-qu
No. ij/ is an e-qualia complex suitable f
be in epistemic contact with it. However,
one particular E-worlder rather than w
particular E-worlder into epistemic con
stream of consciousness all by itself, it
one could attend to, think about, or re
inhabitant. Nor would it matter how ma
the zombie world w\ nor how numerou
qualia complexes and zombies would not
those complexes.
However, the e-qualia story does not e
qualia is supposed to be caused by some o
human-like body; and that might at fi
epistemic contact with it. Causation a
physical processes can cause non-physic
ment's sake) there is no reason a priori wh
for any arbitrary type of e-qualia com
body caused an e-qualia complex of ju
counterpart K in w. There is no a priori

1 ' E-qualists cannot deny that such a situation

existence nor their non-existence can entail or

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 78 R. Kirk

an e-qual
included
slight exp
e-qualiast
into epist
my count
with that
An obviou
neural pr
an approp
sequence
be tempo
might no
argue tha
difficulty

6 The pr

It is agree
referent
be inert,
e-qualia s
epipheno
arguing a
depend on
epiphenom
The follo

(Q) How,
to anyon
hook the

I will arg
of an E-w
qualia bec
would ha
qualia. Th
if e-quali
epistemic

7 My cra

Suppose t
those of o
electrical
on them.

12 Epiphen

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The inconceivability of zombies 79

just as it is supposed to be mirrored by

by activity in my visual cortex, for ex
visual experiences - hence (as the e-qua
As it happens, no one actually observes
them. It follows that their being caused b
not enough to put anyone into epistemic
epistemic history they might as well no
change character, without affecting the
counter-example to the suggestion that
something would be enough to put some
That result applies directly to e-quali
morphic to my e-qualia, that cannot put
like my cranial currents, could cease or
epistemic situation. They are so thorough
not be there at all. So far, then, e-qual
But if causation and isomorphism will
to? It must be something additional or dif
world but its physical component and i

(a) The intrinsic properties of the phy

(b) The intrinsic properties of e-qualia
(c) The ways in which natural necessity
subjects in epistemic contact with the

None of these can help e-qualists.

(a) If the intrinsic properties of my

epistemic contact with anything, they
don't. Nor could any changes to them m
depends only on the broad features of
details.
(b) Keep in mind that the cranial curr
suggestion that if certain suitable
isomorphic to something - anything-
enough to put someone into epistem
regardless of the intrinsic properties o
to the physical processes in question.
happens to consist of e-qualia, and rega
e-qualia may be. Their intrinsic prop
they remained inert); I should still n
remember, or compare them.

If e-qualists are going to be able to escap

be on the basis of (c) the ways in which
E-world are related (presumably by
isomorphism to, physical cognitive proc
else might e-qualists appeal to? The
counterfactual dependence of particula
might be enough. But that will not w
counter-example. If ours were an E-wo

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 80 R. Kirk

e-qualia a
counterfa
present s
remain ou
The crani
discussed.
insulated
ined) caus
cases have
properties
the detail
between e-
world cou
would equ
given the
cranial cu
(See also O
We have
able to esc
It is the o
less the d
world fro
generally
E-qualists
will reinf

8 The arg

1. E-qual
2. Being
attending
3. These a
structure
(Sect. 4).
4. That ra
contact w
5. One sug
physical p
e-qualia (
6. The exa
physical
7. It is als
physical
suggestio
preceding

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The inconceivability of zombies 81

8. The same example helps to bring out

qualia model of consciousness which p
into epistemic contact with e-qualia
9. Thus no one in an E-world could be
clause (E5) of the e-qualia story, and
inconceivable in the relevant sense (S

9 Objections

Objection 1: 'It looks as if the argume

reference. If so, you're after all just p
nents - and begging the question.'
Reply 1: That's a misunderstanding. T
depend on a causal account of aboutne
cognitive processing and are epistemica
such processing. Certainly, part of th
mere counterfactual dependence would
provide for the persisting unconsciou
upshot is that the relevant cognitive p
cesses; while the cranial currents examp
model of consciousness is guaranteed to
individual into epistemic contact with e
one to favor a causal account of aboutn
on a causal account.
Objection 2: 'Your presentation reflects a tendentious view of the subject of experience.
You imply it is the functioning body or brain: a conception in which e-qualia are add-on
extras. From that perspective the notion of e-qualia can seem mysterious. But for e-qualists
a different perspective is more natural, according to which the primary locus of the subject
is in the stream of consciousness itself. Far from the subject being constituted by physical
processes, those processes are in a way peripheral.'
Reply 2: Suppose for argument's sake that the e-qualia caused by physical processes in
an individual's body did form a stream of consciousness - even a subject. By the argument
in Sect. 7, those e-qualia' s inertness would still ensure that they and the putative subject
were epistemically insulated from all cognitive processes. No subject could think about,
notice, attend to, or remember items in that stream of consciousness: no one could be in
epistemic contact with them in the relevant sense. So this objection does nothing to
undermine the argument based on the cranial currents case.13
Objection 3: 'You overlook a crucial possibility: we might stand in an epistemic
relation of acquaintance to e-qualia. That would break the analogy between e-qualia and
cranial currents. Its mere possibility blocks the inference from cranial currents to e-qualia,
rendering the cranial currents case irrelevant and demolishing the whole argument of Sect.
7. When e-qualia are caused by bodily processes, the acquaintance relation puts the subject
into epistemic contact with them, within the stream of consciousness. Beneath the surface

13 It would not help e-qualists to say e-qualia are subjectless: that would only support my claim that no one
could be in epistemic contact with them. On the other hand, I see no objection to the notion of integrated,
nonrelational processes of having-qualia (see Kirk, 2005, pp. 154-158)- but that is obviously inconsistent
with the e-qualia story.

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 82 R. Kirk

of conscio
counterfa
they have
notice, co
Reply 3:
physical p
contact w
4 acquaint
Evidently
hand and
the differ
know the
(b) intrin
those prop
(a) is ruled
the physi
cranial cur
related to
them.

The objection seems to envisage that (b) what underlies the relation is an intrinsic
property of e-qualia. But this thought was anticipated and dismissed in Sect. 7. My cranial
currents are a counter-example to the suggestion that if something - regardless of its
nature - were caused by and isomorphic to some of my physical processes (while not
affecting them), then these would put me into epistemic contact with that something in the
relevant sense (Sect. 7). It follows, as we saw, that the intrinsic properties of the item in
question make no difference to the argument. Whatever they may be, they are locked up
beyond the epistemic reach of my cognitive processing. So if what underlies the
acquaintance relation is an intrinsic property of e-qualia, then both that property and the
subject are marooned within that realm, and cannot put me into any relevant kind of
epistemic contact with e-qualia.
It is suggested that (c) acquaintance operates in combination with the counterfactual
dependence of underlying physical processes on relations among e-qualia. This depen-
dence, together with the effects of those physical processes on the stream of consciousness,
is supposed to put the subject 'in a position to notice, compare, and remember e-qualia'.
However, I argued in Sect. 7 that counterfactual dependence could not provide for that kind
of epistemic contact; and we have just seen that the suggested relation of acquaintance
does not block that argument.
Objection 4: 'You're construing the special epistemic access that e-qualists claim we
have to our qualia on the model of familiar kinds of epistemic access such as sense
perception. But according to e-qualists, our epistemic access to qualia is private in this
sense: to have them is to know them. The accessibility of electric currents is just
observability: they are observable by anyone suitably equipped. So the cranial currents
example doesn't work because patterns of electric currents are nothing like what e-qualia
are supposed to be.'
Reply 4: The argument shows there is no way anyone could 'have' e-qualia in the
relevant sense: no one could be their subject and know them. E-qualia are certainly very

Thanks to a reviewer for this and the preceding objection, and for the phrasing of the suggested per-
spective on consciousness in an E-world.

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The inconceivability of zombies 83

different from electric currents, and ou

relation to such things. But the argume
different those relations and their rela
activities involved in epistemic contact
performed by physical processes (Sect. 4
qualia (Sect. 7).
Objection 5: 'E-qualists need only poin
might be devised, according to which t
Reply 5: That is not in the e-qualia stor
itself, not some variant of it, is inconc
I conclude that the conclusion stands. E-
into epistemic contact with their e-quali
with the rest of the e-qualia story. That
sense, the e-qualia story is inconceivable
of zombies would entail the conceivabil
phases, set out in the next two sections.

10 Conceivability of zombies would en

The claim is not that the conceivability o

true,15 only that it was conceivable. So I
would entail that the e-qualia story canno
The broad idea is simple: if zombies wer
as a zombie twin of our world could be t
held.I expect many readers will concede
apparent escape routes are blocked; this
Not all zombists are dualists: some are
However, as I will explain shortly, all zom
of dualism: the view that the world con
component which are 'separate existences
the other; and the non-physical compon
ponent might consist of our minds, or
consciousness. For convenience I will refe
Here is why zombists are committed to
nition of zombies (Sect. 2), the conceiva
purely physical world that is closed und
behaviorally like us, but physically just a
I assume it is at least conceivable that
suppose we are. So, since zombies would
would lack must be non-physical. This no
us conscious, would be logically independ
So if zombies are conceivable, so is dualis

15 See n. 8 above.
16 'Logically' independent in the sense that its e
physical component.

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 84 R. Kirk

I will now
very clos
argue tha
We can t
Now, epip
system, w
Just as th
componen
ceivably,
would res
epiphenom
lowing se

(C) A caus
world so
phenome
compone

Parallelist
non-phys
relations
that it should do so.

Zombist interactionists, however, may think they can escape commitment to (C), first
because they reject the causal closure of the physical; second because they insist that the
non-physical component of our world is causally active (ert?). I will argue that, even so,
they must concede that (C) is conceivable. Before defining zombist interactionism I will
refine the definition of a 'zombie twin' world. A world z is a zombie twin of ours just in
case:

z is a purely physical, causally closed system; z is physically as lik

as possible (with physical causes substituted for non-physical ones
the human-like inhabitants of z lack phenomenal consciousness.
Zombist interactionism can now be defined:

(ZI) Zombies are conceivable and the actual world consists of a physical component and
a non-physical component. The latter includes (or consists of) something i/^* such
that: (i) ij/* makes us phenomenally conscious and keeps us in epistemic contact
with our experiences; (ii) i/^* has effects on the physical component of the world and
is affected by it.

I will argue that (ZI) entails that conceivably our world as thus characterized - I will refer
to it as i - could be transformed into a world like z*; hence that (C) is conceivable. What
forces zombist interactionists into this position is their peculiar conception of conscious-
ness. For (ZI) entails the following three propositions.

(1) Conceivably the laws of nature governing i (the world according to (ZI)) could
change at a certain time so that from that time on: (i) no non-physical items in i had
effects; (ii) whatever had been directly or indirectly caused by non-physical items

17 Conscification need not be thought of as zombies becoming conscious, but only as the coming into
existence of conscious subjects whose physical components had been zombies.

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 The inconceivability of zombies 85

was instead caused by physical items,

cause; (iii) all non-physical items othe
only non-physical item.
(2) If the changes described in (1) are
the changes ij/*, in spite of beingine
conscious and keep them in epistemic
(3) Given (1) and (2), (C) is conceivable.

If (ZI) entails (1), (2), and (3), obviously it entails that (C) is conceivable. I will argue that
(ZI) does indeed entail those premisses.
Premiss (1): Condition (i) is unproblematic. Causation is contingent, so zombists cannot
deny that conceivably anything that actually has effects - including i/^* - might have ex-
isted without having effects.18
(ZI) also entails that condition (ii) is straightforwardly conceivable together with (i), at
least for the case of physical effects. For (ZI) has it that zombies are conceivable; and in a
zombie world all physical events in i would be caused physically. (One result would be that
our successors in i behaved exactly like us. Some interactionists might deny that physical
events could cause human-like behavior, but they could not be zombists.)
As to won-physical effects, the question is whether there are any which could not
conceivably be produced physically; and interactionists can have no a priori objections to
that. So (ZI) entails that conceivably conditions (i) and (ii) are jointly satisfiable.
(iii): since (ZI), being a variety of dualism, entails that the non-physical component of
reality is logically independent of the physical component, it entails that that all non-
physical items in i might conceivably cease to exist; a fortiori that conceivably all non-
physical items other than \j/* could cease to exist, leaving ^* (now inert) as the only
surviving non-physical item. (In that case, notice, if i//* ceased to exist the result would be
a zombie twin of our world.) Clearly there is no inconsistency between that and conditions
(i) and (ii); so (ZI) entails (1).
Premiss (2): Evidently, one consequence of the changes envisaged in conditions (i) and
(ii) of premiss (1) would be that the physical component of i was closed under causation.
Also, because all those kinds of physical items that had previously been caused non-
physically would continue to be caused (though physically), i would remain physically
similar to what it had been; in fact the physical component of i would be exactly like a
zombie twin of our world. The question now is whether (ZI) entails that conceivably i/f*
would continue to make the inhabitants of i conscious and keep them in epistemic touch
with their experiences, or whether the changes would absolutely19 prevent that.
Consider, then, what differences the changes would make to i. They are that (in i after
the changes) (i) no non-physical items have effects; (ii) physical items have all the kinds of
effects that were originally produced by non-physical items; (iii) the only non-physical
item is i/^*. (i) and (ii) are crucial, of course, since they stop i from being an interactionist

18 Cartesian zombists might demur. If thinking - a kind of activity - is essential to the soul's existence, then
i//* cannot cease to be a cause without ceasing to exist. Also, some interactionist zombists might maintain it
is a priori necessary that consciousness involves non-physical causes. See, however, the discussion of
premiss (2) below. (Note that zombists cannot resist condition (i) by invoking causal essentialism, according
to which a thing's causal dispositions are essential to it. For if that doctrine is taken to entail that what
physicalists count as physical items cannot conceivably exist without causing or being caused by conscious
states, then zombies are inconceivable for that reason; while if it lacks that entailment, then it lets in (i).)
19 It would not be enough to claim that conceivably the changes might prevent ij/* from continuing to make
our successors conscious; (2) says only that (ZI) entails it is conceivable that it should do so.

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 86 R. Kirk

world and
contribut
(a) what {/
caused, wh
their natur
(a): what
preclude
zombist i
physically
(b): since
dismiss (b
Since \j/*
our experi
no non-ph
inhabitants of i conscious.
Thus there is at least a strong case for the claim that (ZI) entails the conceivability of
premiss (2). However, zombist interactionists might think I have not done them justice.
They might urge that it is not by merely nomic necessity that what provides for con-
sciousness is causally efficacious: they might claim it is a priori necessary; so that even if
\j/* continued to exist after the changes, its inertness would prevent its continuing to make
anyone conscious.20 Now, I agree with the widespread view that whatever makes us
conscious cannot be inert. But I will argue that zombists are committed to a conception of
consciousness which entails that the contrary is at least conceivable. (Interactionist
zombists might endorse the correct view about consciousness and causality; but if I am
right that would make them inconsistent: their zombism commits them to an incorrect view
as well. In that case, appealing to the correct view cannot protect their incorrect view from
the arguments of Sects. 3-9.)
Like most of us, zombists claim to know they are conscious. Unlike some of us, they
cannot justify this claim by reference to observation of physical facts such as behavior -
because they think zombies would be physically indistinguishable from us, at least
superficially. This means that interactionist zombists must think their knowledge that they
are conscious, hence their knowledge that i//* exists, comes from the fact that they have
conscious experiences themselves, not from knowing any physical facts. A consequence is
that they cannot consistently claim it is a priori that if/* must have effects in order to make
us conscious. If we can know we are conscious by actually having conscious experiences,
then we can know it without also knowing whether or not consciousness has effects. So
zombist interactionists cannot maintain it is inconceivable that \j/* should make us con-
scious in spite of being inert. They may point out that we observe what we take to be
effects of our being conscious. But we cannot observe that they are effects of i//*: that is
part of a theory which, for them, might conceivably be mistaken. (Consistently with our
experience, those effects and \j/* might be joint effects of some common cause, for
example.)
Zombist interactionists might raise another objection. They might accept that epistemic
contact requires consciousness to have effects, but maintain that even if ij/* continued to
make our successors conscious, its lack of causal efficacy would prevent it from continuing
to sustain epistemic contact.21 I find it hard to make sense of that suggestion. Significantly,

20 Here I take into account the worries mentioned in note 18.

21 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

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 The inconceivability of zombies 87

Chalmers has said there is "not even a co

red experience "without any epistemic co
After all, we are discussing phenomenal c
like for the subject. If there is nothing i
Now, could there be anything it was lik
experiences but could not notice, attend
from what it was like to be completely
their claims about what is conceivable on
situation described? When I imagine m
cally imagine myself having experiences
pare. When I try to imagine not being a
take the first step of an argument for the
that seem to
It be a psychological defect.
in epistemic contact with one's consciou
Absent any argument to the contrary, I
i should be conscious without being in ep
right, the objection fails.23
Premiss (3): We noted that after the c
closed under causation and resemble a zom
and a zombie world is of course ^*, wh
leastconceivably so caused24) is inert. As
conscious and ensure they were in episte
confirms that if we take i//* = ^, those
features of z*. Hence if (ZI) commits its
conceivability of (C).
Earlier I argued that all zombists are c
that epiphenomenalists and parallelists a
cification as defined by (C). I have just ar
(1), (2), and (3), and conclude they too a
that all dualists belong to one or other
committed to the conceivability of inert

11 Conceivability of inert conscificat

story

It is easy to see that the definitions of a 'zombie twin' world and of (C) ensure that the
conceivability of (C) entails the conceivability of a world z* satisfying the following
conditions, which mirror (E1)-(E5):

(Zl) z* is partly physical and its physical component is closed under causation: every
physical effect has a physical cause.

22 Chalmers (1996, p. 197).

23 Zombist interactionists might consider maintaining that i^*'s loss of causal efficacy would cut off not
only epistemic contact but consciousness too. But by the argument of the last paragraph that would prevent
them from being zombists.
24 (ZI) does not appear to entail that t/f* is caused by physical items in i, only that it is affected by them.
However, given causation is contingent (n. 18), (ZI) does entail it is conceivable that i/f* should be caused
physically.

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 88 R. Kirk

(Z2) The h
\j/ make
(Z3) \j/ i
physical
(Z4) The h
(Z5) The h
and (on o

So the co
conceivab
(E1)-(E5)
"human
qualia". T
(E5)are a
have been
which is
assumptio
conceivab
The third
conceivab
componen
makes z*
Chalmers
like to ha
sense of Q
for these
But then
(E2), (E3)
So the co
(E5). We
the conce

(B) If zo

But we a

(A) The

By contr

References

Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (1999). Materialism and the metaphysics of modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 59, 475^96.
Chalmers, D. (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? In T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Con-
ceivability and possibility (pp. 145-200). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown.

25 Special t
comments,

£} Springer

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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The inconceivability of zombies 89

Dennett, D. C. (1995). The unimagined preposter

322-326.
Gendler, T., & Hawthorne, J. (Eds.) (2002). Conceivability and possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kirk, R. (1974). Zombies v. materialists. Aristotelian Society Proceedings, supplementary vol. 48, 135-152.
Kirk, R. (2005). Zombies and consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard.
Perry, J. (2001). Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson.
Shoemaker, S. (1981). Absent qualia are impossible. Philosophical Review, 90, 581-599.
Shoemaker, S. (1999). On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 59, 475^96.
Stout, G. F. (1931). Mind and matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tye, M. (2006). Absent qualia and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review, 115, 139-168.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans). Oxford: Blackwell.

£l Springer

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