SDN & ACI Security for IT Pros
SDN & ACI Security for IT Pros
Local knowledge.
Cisco Connect Dubrovnik
Croatia
Demystifying ACI Security
Dragan Novaković
Consulting Security Engineer
March 2019
The Case for SDN
…while requiring…
Frequent updates and
Highest Availability (SLAs)
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Challenge for Infrastructure
…to keep up with the pace of change imposed on the:
Network
Security
…functions, while maintaining application:
Capacity
Resiliency
Agility
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Software-Defined Networking
…Comes to the Rescue
“…is an emerging architecture that is dynamic, manageable, cost-
effective, and adaptable, making it ideal for the high-bandwidth,
dynamic nature of today's applications. This architecture decouples
the network control and forwarding functions enabling the network
control to become directly programmable and the underlying
infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network
services.”
Source: www.opennetworking.org
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What are the
critical Security
Functions in the
DataCenter?
Automatic
Micro- Segmentation Remediation
Programmability
Embedding security
policy within Application Ease of Service Insertion
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ACI Devices Role
Spine Nodes
Leaf Nodes
Service Producers
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ACI Whitelist Policy supports “Zero Trust” Model
Whitelist policy = Explicitly configured ACI contract between EPG 1 and EPG 2 allowing
traffic between their members
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
EPG 1 EPG 2
“WEB” “APP”
Web App DB
External
Network
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ACI Communication Abstraction
APIC All TCP/UDP:
- Accept
- Redirect to FW and IPS
Security Policy All Other :
“App” → “DB” - Drop
ACI Fabric
“DB” “App”
Security Services
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A Policy Based on Groups
Web Tier App Tier DB Tier
EP EP EP EP EP EP
EP EP EP EP EP EP
EP EP EP EP EP EP
EP EP EP EP EP EP
In the ACI model, we do this using the End Point Group (EPG).
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Endpoint Groups Communications
EP EP EP EP EP EP
EP EP EP EP EP EP
Devices within an Endpoint group can communicate, provided that they have IP
reachability (provided by the Bridge Domain/VRF).
Communication between Endpoint groups is, by default, not permitted.
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Contract
“EPG Web” “EPG App” “EPG DB”
EP EP EP EP EP EP
EP EP EP EP EP EP
s
Contract
Once we have our EPGs defined, we need to create policies to determine how they
communicate with each other.
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Contract : Kind of reflexive “Stateless” ACLs
“EPG Web” “EPG App” “EPG DB”
EP EP EP EP EP EP
EP EP EP EP EP EP
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Create a Contract
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Access Control From Outside
Contract
Client-Web
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Segmentation Using Contracts
Stateless Firewall(Contract)
Stateless Access Control (Contract)
Load Balancer
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Application Profile
EP EP EP EP EP EP
Contract Contract
EP EP EP EP EP EP
IT Internet
Shared Test /
IPTV
Tenants can provide traffic
Services Dev
and RBAC isolation…
ACI Fabric
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VRF aka Context aka Private Network
Engineering-Tenant
VRF-1 VRF-3
VRF(also called contexts) are
defined within a tenant to allow
isolated and potentially
overlapping IP address space.
VRF-2 VRF-4
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Bridge Domain: Not a VLAN but almost…
Engineering-Tenant
A bridge domain is a L2
VRF-2 VRF-4
forwarding construct within
Bridge Domain 3 Bridge Domain 7
the fabric, used to constrain
Bridge Domain 4 Bridge Domain 8 broadcast and multicast
traffic
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But what if I want
all EPGs to be able
to send syslog,
query DNS,
communicate with
the AD, etc…?
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vzAny applies rules to all EPGs in a VRF
Any EPG can EPG A can consume Any EPG in the VRF
consume syslog that Syslog from any EPG can consume or
EPG A provides in the VRF provide syslog
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/kb/b_KB_Use_vzAny_to_AutomaticallyApplyCommunicationRules_toEPGs.html#concept_F2BC3533B
F984F1F88A18B712ED9C072
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But what if I want
some EPGs to
communicate
freely between
themselves?
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Contract Preferred Groups
Allow traffic between a group of EPGs
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ACI Micro
Segmentation
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The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox
• Functional equivalent to
Isolated Private VLAN: ALL
endpoints in EPG are isolated
from each other
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The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox
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The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox
Use of attributes to classify Micro-segmented
endpoints in a specific kind of EPGs
EPG called µEPG with attributes
Network-based attributes:
IP/MAC
VM-based attributes: Guest
OS, VM name, ID, vnic, DVS,
Datacenter
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About Micro-segmented EPGs
• µSeg EPGs are not linked to a “Base” EPG (though virtual endpoints are still
“attached” to their corresponding Port Groups):
• They have their own Bridge Domain à Endpoints addressing must be taken into
consideration in the design
• They have their own set of Contracts à There is no contract inheritance from the “Base”
EPG.
• Attributes are matched using an “OR” operator with a precedence order in
case of conflict
• Any VM in the VMM Domain & Tenant matching an attribute will be put in the µSeg EPG
à Choose wisely the attribute(s) you want to match
• In the last 2 case studies, Custom Attributes would be a natural choice
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Use Cases
Securing infrastructure
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Security Services
Firewall at Each
Leaf Switch L4-7 Security Services
(physical or virtual,
Servers (Physical or Virtual) location independent)
L4−7 Security via Cisco ACI™
► L4 Distributed Stateless Firewall ► Service Graph
Line Rate Policy Enforcement Sizing at Scale: Can add ASA Cluster
L4-7 Security Policy Applied
Policy Follows Workloads Consistently for Any Workload
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Why Inserting Security Services ?
• Stateless Segmentation not sufficient for compliance
• More granular Access Control (i.e. user based)
• Dynamic protocol requiring better inspection
• Better protection and detection mechanisms
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Cisco Security Portfolio Overview
Firewall/IPS/AMP Analytics Cloud
Firepower NGFW/NGIPS/AMP StealthWatch ASAv, FMCv, NGFWv
Enterprise AWS, Azure
FMC
ASAv, FMCv, NGFWv on Hypervisor
StealthWatch Cloud Umbrella &
CloudLock
Cisco ASA
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Where to Connect Security Services in the Fabric ?
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Flexible Options for Services Insertion
ACI L2 Fabric Service Graph Service Graph
No Package Managed
• APIC defines Tenants • Fabric GW/Routing • Orchestrate with
Vendor:
• EPG is VLAN/Subnet • No Device Package: - Service Policy or
-Network Policy Mode - Service Manager
SecOps Control Service Device Packages
APIC in
Control
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Service Graph
technology was
designed to
automate and
accelerate the
deployment of L4-L7
sevices in the
network
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Why Use Service Graph ?
• Security is fully inserted to the Application as the service graph is an
extension of the contract in the Application Profile
• Granular way to send traffic to the Security Service using the contract
• Configuration Templates
• Automation of the Network configuration both for Fabric and Security
appliance (with Device Package)
• Statistics and health score automatically collected for the services
• Dynamic update of the ACLs based on End Point discovery in the EPG
• Insert several services seamlessly with Service Chaining
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ACI Zero Trust Model
APIC
CONTRACT
ACI Fabric
“DB” “App”
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Build a Policy with Service Graph
APIC All TCP/UDP:
- Accept
- Redirect to FW and IPS
Security Policy All Other :
“App” → “DB” - Drop
ACI Fabric
“DB” “App”
Security Services
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Add a Service graph to a Contract
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Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
• Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device Cisco APIC Script Interface
using device Python scripts
• Cisco APIC uses the device configuration Device-Specific Python Scripts
model provided in the package to pass
appropriate configurations to the device Device Interface: REST/CLI
APIC Node
Service automation
requires a vendor
•
zip file containing
Device specification
(XML file)
Device scripts (Python)
Service Device
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ASA Device Package Opt 1: Policy Orchestration
Managed – Service Policy
FirePOWER Services
Threat Defence Polices
Threat Policy on FMC Security team configures via FMC
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ASA PO & FI Device Package
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ASA DP Built-In Profiles
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Why Use Managed Service Graph ?
• Full Tenant orchestration with L4-L7 services
• ACL changes on the firewall can be offloaded to custom tools, using
Northbound API
• Device package allows for very fast deployment of security
• APIC monitors the service health and validates configuration
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Why Use Unmanaged Service Graph ?
• Continuity of the SecOps management workflows and tools
• No device package available from a Vendor
• Quicker migration of security appliance configs and policies into ACI fabric
• Allow use of the full spectrum of product features, not just the features
supported by the device package
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Service Graph Hybrid Managed
• Leverage the network and interface configuration automation from APIC
with the Device Package
• Leverage the External Security management solution for the security team
to create the security policy
• Use the Service graph to tie together the policy and the network insertion
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ASA Device Package Opt 2: Fabric Insertion
Managed – Service Policy Managed – Service Policy
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ASA PO & FI Device Package
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FTD Device Package Workflow
Existing Rule - Security Admin uses FMC to create an ACP Rule to be used
with the new service graph. The rule includes allowed protocols, NGIPS,
and AMP protections.
• Network Admin uses APIC to attach Security Zones to a given Rule, directing
service graph traffic to an appropriate NGFW inspections.
New Rule – Network Admin uses APIC to create a new security Rule on FMC
using the service graph. This is a Deny rule, preventing traffic flow until
Security Admin gets a changes to update it.
• Security Admin uses FMC to update the new ACP Rule with an appropriate allowed
protocol, NGIPS, and AMP policy. To prevent deletion of this rule on service graph
detach, Security Admin can preserve configured security policy by updating ACP
Rule comments.
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Security team configures via FMC
App DB
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FTD Device Package for ACI
1.0.1 1.0.2 1.0.3
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FTD FI Device Package Version 1.0.3
APIC configures FMC 6.2.3, using REST-APIs to manage the following devices:
Ø Pre-registered FTD devices in either Stand-alone, HA or Cluster mode
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Matching FTD/ACI Deployment Modes
• Firewall Modes
GoTo
• Routed
Service Graph
• Transparent
GoThrough
• NGIPS/IDS Modes Service
• Inline (managed) Graph
• or Inline TAP (unmanaged)
• Passive (unmanaged)
Copy
Service Graph
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Security Service
insertion using PBR
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Policy Based Redirect is your Best Friend
With PBR Service Graph
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PBR for micro-Segmentation
Based only on Contract
192.168.10.254 Because this is a
BD: MyApp
communication between two
192.168.10.0/24
L3 Enabled
End-Points in different EPG,
the forwarding decision is
made in the leaf switch
EPG EPG EPG
Web App DB
192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200
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PBR for micro-Segmentation
Leveraging PBR
192.168.10.254
192.168.200.254
BD: MyApp
192.168.10.0/24
L3 Enabled
BD: ASA
L3 Enabled
EPG EPG EPG
192.168.200.254
Web App DB
192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200
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PBR for micro-Segmentation
Leveraging PBR
192.168.10.254
BD: ASA
EPG EPG EPG L3 Enabled
Web App DB
192.168.200.254
192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200
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New features
related to PBR
ACI Version 3.2
• Multi-node PBR
PBR Non-PBR
• ACI 3.2: Support more than 1 node PBR in a Service Graph. (up to 3 nodes)
• We can mix PBR node and non-PBR node in same Service Graph
EPG EPG
Client
Contract
Web
consumer
Redirect provider
VRF1 VRF1
consumer provider
Client Web Client Web
vzAny Contract vzAny
Contract
Redirect App DB
Redirect App DB
vzAny vzAny
PBR Node PBR Node
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Resilient Hash PBR Before
• Symmetric PBR is supported today, but if one of the PBR nodes is down,
traffic will be re-hashed. So existing connection having been going through
available PBR nodes could be affected.
Thanks to Symmetric PBR, incoming Some traffic could be load-balanced to different PBR
and return traffic go to same PBR nodes that don’t have existing connection info.
node.
X
User1 User1
Incoming Return Incoming Return
Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic
User2 User2
User3 User3
User4 User4
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ACI
Resilient Hash PBR 3.2
• With Resilient Hash PBR, only the traffics that went though failed node will
start using different PBR node.
X
User1 User1
Incoming Return Incoming Return
Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic
User2 User2
User3 User3
User4 User4
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Policy Based Redirect Requirements
• APIC must be v 2.0.1 or Higher
• The Service switch must be at least ‘-EX’ or more recent
• If not all the fabric is ‘-EX’, the Service switch must be dedicated to
Services (i.e. no workload connected with the L4-7 services)
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What about IDS ?
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Service Copy Configuration Steps
• Identify the source and destination endpoint groups.
• Configure the contract that specifies what to copy according to the subject and what
is allowed in the contract filter.
• Configure Layer 4 to Layer 7 copy devices that identify the target devices and
specify the ports where they attach.
• Use the copy service as part of a Layer 4 to Layer 7 service graph template.
• Configure a device selection policy that specifies which device will receive the traffic
from the service graph. When you configure the device selection policy, you specify
the contract, service graph, copy cluster, and cluster logical interface that is in copy
device.
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Copy Service : Service Graph Template
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/1-x/L4-
L7_Services_Deployment/guide/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211_chapter_0110
1.html#id_28562
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Threat Protection
with IPS
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Automation
ACE Object-group
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FMC to APIC Rapid Threat Containment
Step 4: APIC quickly contains/quarantines Step 3: Attack event is configured to trigger
the infected App1 workload into an isolated remediation module for APIC that uses NB API
uSeg EPG to contain the infected host in ACI fabric
4 3
ACI Fabric
uSeg
EPG
FMC
1 2
App2 Infected App1
Step 1: Infected End Point launches an attack Step 2: Intrusion event is generated and sent to
that NGFW(v), FirePOWER Services in ASA, FMC revealing information about the infected
or FirePOWER(v) appliance blocks inline host
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TrustSec
with TrustSec
Traditional Security Policy
Software Defined
TrustSec Security Policy
Segmentation
Network Fabric
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Enabling Group-Based Policies across the
Enterprise
• Cohesive security policy
• Simplified security management
• End-to-End segmentation
TrustSec Policy Domain ACI Policy Domain
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TrustSec Security Groups Provisioned in ACI
TrustSec ACI
Max: 200 Security Groups
ISE Dynamically provisions TrustSec APIC Up to 4000/32 mappings (gen1)
Security Groups in ACI Fabric DC
Up to 10K/32 mappings (gen2) (-
EX)
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TrustSec Groups Shared with ACI
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TrustSec Groups Shared with ACI
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Sharing Application Context to TrustSec Policies
TrustSec ACI
ISE dynamically learns internal
EPGs and APIC
DC
VM Bindings from ACI fabric
VM1
TrustSec Domain
VM100
TrustSec Policies Controlling 0
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StealthWatch
HQ
Network
Branch Users
Data Center
Roaming Users
Admin
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Flow-based Anomaly Detection
1 2
• # Concurrent flows • Number of SYNs
• Packets per second received
• Bits per second • Rate of connection
• New flows created resets
• Number of SYNs • Duration of the flow
sent • Over 80+ other
• Time of day attributes
threshold threshold
threshold
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NetFlow
It Can :Security Use cases
§ Detect Sophisticated and Persistent Threats. Malware that makes it past perimeter
security can remain in the enterprise waiting to strike as lurking threats. These may be zero
day threats that do not yet have an antivirus signature or be hard to detect for other reasons.
§ Identify BotNet Command & Control Activity. BotNets are implanted in the enterprise to
execute commands from their Bot herders to send SPAM, Denial of Service attacks, or
other malicious acts.
§ Uncover Network Reconnaissance. Some attacks will probe the network looking for attack
vectors to be utilized by custom-crafted cyber threats.
§ Find Internally Spread Malware. Network interior malware proliferation can occur across
hosts for the purpose gathering security reconnaissance data, data exfiltration or network
backdoors.
§ Reveal Data Loss. Code can be hidden in the enterprise to export of sensitive information
back to the attacker. This Data Leakage may occur rapidly or over time.
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StealthWatch Solution Components
StealthWatch
Management
Console
NetFlo
w
NBAR NSEL
StealthWatch
StealthWatch
FlowSensor FlowSensor
VE Users/Devices
Cisco Network
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How do I send
Traffic to my
FlowSensor ?
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In Conclusion
• ACI helps tackling DC Security Challenges by :
• Integrating security in the Application
• Accelerating security deployment
• Automating security insertion
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