SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
TECHNICAL NOTE ON SYSTEM OPERATION
SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT
NATIONAL POWER CONTROL CENTRE
JUNE 2023
1. Power system reliability is defined as the probability that an electrical power system can perform
a required function under given conditions for a given time interval. Power system reliability
consists of power system security and power system adequacy. An adequate power system has
sufficient generation, transmission and distribution facilities in the system to satisfy aggregate
energy demand taking into account scheduled and unscheduled outages of the system
components. System security on the other hand describes the ability of the system to handle
disturbances, such as the loss of major generators or transmission facilities.
2. A vulnerable system is a system that operates with a reduced level of security. A Vulnerable Area
is a specific section of the system where vulnerability begins to develop. The occurrence of an
abnormal contingency and highly stressed operating conditions define a system in the Verge of
Collapse State. Vulnerable Areas are characterized by five types of system stress: transient
instability, poorly damped power oscillations, voltage instability, frequency deviations outside
permissible limits and thermal overloading, i.e., congestion.
3. Deviation from the Economic Merit Order (EMO) is commonly referred in the industry as a
“redispatch”. Redispatch is required if the market-clearing / EMO-based generation schedules
result in Vulnerable Areas. In case of congestion or stability constraints, redispatch shifts
generation away from export-constrained zones to import-constrained / unconstrained zones.
4. The primary focus of power system planning in NTDC in recent years has been interconnection of
new generators, removal of system constraints and associated transmission expansion plans
which are either inadequate or delayed in their implementation which has comprised system
security. As a result, two permanent Vulnerable Areas have been inadvertently created, i.e., the
Southern half of the 500kV network (which includes the AC Corridor) and the Lahore ring.
Vulnerable Area 1: Southern network
5. Jamshoro grid station is a one of the most important nodes in the network. It is the:
a) Sole transit point for cheap power generated by K2, K3, China Power Hub and Hubco
to meet demand in the north.
b) One of two transit point for Port Qasim, Lucky and Thar coal power plants using the
AC Corridor after maximum utilization of HVDC Available Transfer Capacity (ATC).
c) Only transit point for evacuation of wind power from Jhimpir/Gharo (after
transformation from 220kV to 500kV).
d) Primary common delivery point (CDP) for supplying power to HESCO and one of two
CDPs for KE with the national grid (up to 350 MW on 220kV via Jhimpir-2 to KDA).
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
Figure 1: Southern network
6. Jamshoro grid station is a major congestion point due to both insufficient incoming and outgoing
transmission capacity. All bulk power generation that is either directly or indirectly connected to
Jamshoro lies in an export-constrained zone. This includes:
a) Direct (on 500kV): K2 (1050 MW), K3 (1050 MW), China Power Hub (1250
MW)/HUBCO (1200 MW) less KE demand at NKI (-850 MW) = 3700 MW
b) Direct (after step-up transformation from 220kV): Wind IPPs (1845 MW)
c) Indirect via Matiari (on 500kV): Thar coal (2400 MW), Lucky (600 MW), Port Qasim
(1250 MW) = 4250 MW
7. Due to oscillatory stability concerns, power flow is limited to 800 MW on the Jamshoro-Dadu
circuit (which is tri-bundle) and 1000 MW on the two Jamshoro-Matiari circuits (which are quad-
bundle). To maintain N-1 contingency compliance, total power flow on this section (known as AC
Corridor Interface-1) is restricted to 1800 MW under normal conditions. In case any of these
three circuits is unavailable, loading is restricted to 800-1000 MW.
8. Due to transient stability concerns, the Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) from south to north on
the combined AC/DC Corridors is restricted to 4500 MW in summer and 2500 MW in winter
under normal operations (Annex 1). Under maintenance mode, the limits reduce to 2000 MW in
winter. Therefore, if AC Interface-1 is loaded at 1800 MW, the maximum loading for the HVDC
line would be 2700 MW, i.e., 1300 MW of HVDC capacity would be unutilized. Conversely, if
HVDC is carrying 3200 MW, AC Corridor section-1 would be restricted to 1300 MW. Annex 2
contains the EMO-based generation dispatched in the North and South from 10 GW to 20 GW.
For example, if generation is 10 GW, 4784 MW should be dispatched in the south as per EMO.
However, since ATC is only 2500 MW in winter, 2284 MW has to be redispatched in the North.
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
EMO-based day-ahead unit 6350 MW (Thar Coal, K2, K3, China Power Hub,
commitment Lucky)
Wind power generation forecast 1500 MW
Demand -500 MW (HESCO) -1100 MW (KE)
Transfer capacity required 6250 MW
Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) 4500 MW (2700 DC, 1800 AC)
SCS1 tripping strategy (bipole failure) 2640 MW (Engro Thar, TEL, SECL, Thal Nova)
SCS tripping strategy (monopole failure) 990 MW (Engro Thar Unit-1, SECL Unit-1)
Redispatch / curtailment 1750 MW (China Power Hub, Lucky / wind power)
Table 1: Export constraint example under normal operating conditions (all lines in service)
9. Jamshoro grid station is also extremely vulnerable due to its ageing infrastructure:
a) Transformer T1 was installed in 1987, T2 in 2007 and T8 in 2020. T8 has an ongoing
problem with its tertiary busbar which fails periodically resulting in wind power
curtailments.
b) The 220kV yard dates back even further, with T3 installed in 1984 and T7 in 2003.
c) Shunt reactors: 2 x 66 MVAR was installed in 1987, 2 x 66 MVAR in 1995 and 3 x 111
MVAR in 2007, 2018 and 2021.
d) The two oldest 500kV circuits connected to Jamshoro date back to 1987, i.e.,
Jamshoro-Dadu and Jamshoro-Matiari-Dadu.
10. In addition to the technical vulnerabilities due to ageing infrastructure, Jamshoro grid station is
also understaffed. 37 operations staff and 33 maintenance staff are sanctioned whereas the
actual deployment is 20 operations staff and 13 maintenance staff. (Annex 3).
11. As explained in paras 5-8, all bulk power generation connected directly or indirectly to Jamshoro
grid station lies in an export constrained zone. Any additional power generation (e.g., Jamshoro
coal Unit-1 or 500 MW wind power) would only result in additional redispatch and curtailment. It
should be noted that due to its location on the 500kV AC Corridor, Jamshoro CPP Unit-1 is
beneficial for system security. Operating Jamshoro CPP Unit-1 would improve both transient
(rotor-angle) stability and oscillatory stability. However, as it is an export constrained zone,
operating Jamshoro CPP Unit-1 may require offsetting the equivalent power from Thar Coal.
12. A 100km 500kV double circuit transmission line from K3 up to the existing double circuit from
Port Qasim / Lucky to Matiari is currently under construction. These two new circuits would
improve network capacity and redundancy (N-1 contingency compliance) south of Jamshoro.
However, the new circuits do not alleviate the export capacity constraints on the AC Corridor.
13. KE’s transmission investment plan has the potential to reduce power exports from the south by
increasing local consumption of southern power generation:
1 SCS (Stability Control System) is a Special Protection Scheme designed to trip generators in the south in case the HVDC link
fails or is temporarily blocked. The instantaneous increase in power flow on the AC Corridor would result in an increase in
load angle past the transient (rotor-angle) stability limit. Without generator tripping, the generators north of the AC
Corridor would lose synchronism with the generators clustered in the south. To avoid network protections tripping the AC
Corridor forming two unconnected unstable islands, the SCS trips generators to reduce the load angle on the AC corridor.
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
KKI 900 MW This grid station is to be looped in/out on one of the two new transmission
lines being constructed by NTDC described in para 12.
NKI 1100 MW Presently 2 x 600 MVA 500/220kV autotransformers are installed and up to
850 MW is drawn by KE.
As per KE’s investment plan, installation of a third 600 MVA transformer at a
cost of PKR 7.604 billion would increase capacity to 1100 MW (with N-1
contingency compliance). However, this does not consider the rating of the
connecting transmission lines, i.e., K2/K3-NKI and NKI-Jamshoro.
The maximum rating of the shorter, heavier loaded line from K2/K3 to NKI is
1350 MW.
The conductors for these two transmission lines would also have to be
replaced (at KE’s cost). This cost is not included in the transmission plan
submitted to NEPRA.
Jhimpir-2 500 MW ATC restricted to 350 MW due to thermal rating of the 220kV transmission
lines, not 500 MW.
Dhabeji 350 MW direct interconnection of wind and solar plants to KE on 220kV. Also
connected to NTDC 220kV network via Dhabeji SEZ. This connection does not
impact the 500kV Southern Network from an export constraint perspective.
14. Increasing tie-lines with KE would not change the Available Transfer Capacity on NTDC’s
AC/DC Corridors. However, it would increase the capacity factor for some of the cheaper
(baseload) generation located in the south as it would then be used to serve Karachi’s
demand instead of being constrained-off due to insufficient ATC.
15. KE’s investment plan states that the enhancement in interconnection capacity is necessary to
evacuate power from 82 MW hydropower plant (in KPK) and 330 MW Thar Coal power plant.
As per NEPRA’s Open Access Regulations, NTDC must allow wheeling on its network.
Wheeling of power from 82 MW HPP is not a concern as the contract path is in the opposite
direction of network congestion. There is presently no interconnection scheme for 330 MW
Thar Coal power plant. Wheeling on the existing 500kV lines would have to be studied for N-
1 contingency compliance. In case curtailment of the existing power plants is required in an
N-1 contingency case, the cost would be allocated to KE on a Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) basis.
16. Interconnection of Jamshoro CPP via Jamshoro grid station increases the risk associated with
the ageing and vulnerable infrastructure. Without an increase in export capacity or net
increase in demand in KE or HESCO, any additional generation transiting via Jamshoro would
be redispatched (thermal) or curtailed (wind).
17. The system needs a new 500kV grid station in the South. The new grid station (NGS) would
de-risk Jamshoro by interconnecting with existing 500kV transmission lines. Step-up
transformation from 132kV/220kV to 500kV can be used to connect new wind farms. The
220kV busbar may be used to supply KE through looping/in out of the existing Jhimpir2-KDA
transmission lines or through additional 220kV lines. With 4 x 200kV circuits, KE’s 330 MW
Thar Coal power plant may also be connected to this grid station, so that it may serve KE’s
load directly with N-1 contingency compliance.
18. The export constraints or the stability constraints on the AC Corridor can only be resolved by
constructing new 500kV transmission lines with adequate VAR compensation. Without the
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
additional AC transmission lines, EMO violations cannot be avoided, and system security
cannot be improved.
a) Option 1: 500kV single/double circuits to Shikarpur. One 500kV bay is readily
available at Shikarpur.
b) Option 2 (Figure 2): 500kV single/double circuits to Rahim Yar Khan (via Moro).
Figure 2
19. Expanding Total Transfer Capacity on the AC Corridor would also increase Available Transfer
Capacity on the DC Corridor as it would increase the stability margin for instantaneous
power transfer from DC to AC in the event of an HVDC failure or blocking event. The overload
capacity of a single monopole is 2200 MW. Therefore, to avail the full 4000 MW capacity of
the HVDC link, the capacity of the AC Corridor must at least be increased to absorb an
additional 1800 MW transfer from HVDC (in case of a monopole failure) without causing
transient instability, poorly damped power oscillations, or thermal overloading (congestion).
20. It should be highlighted that Option 2 (Figure 2) was included in the system expansion plan
for 2025/26 prepared by Planning Department in 2021. However, the latest expansion plan
for 2025/26 does not include this line. As per feedback from the Planning Department, the
line has been postponed indefinitely due to budget limitations.
21. In case NTDC is unable to commit funds to either build a new substation to de-risk Jamshoro
or build new transmission lines to expand the Total Transfer Capacity, the Sindh Transmission
& Despatch Company (STDC) and/or private investors may be approached. Section 4.3 of
NEPRA’s Open Access Regulations 2022 states that:
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
22. It is important to note that expanding the active power Transfer Capacity requires the
equivalent investment in reactive power compensation in both Vulnerable Areas. The
capacitive effect of lightly loaded transmission lines (typically when system load is below
15000 MW) raises voltages on the AC Corridor (D.G.Khan, Muzaffargarh, RYK). Without
reactive power compensation, the System Operator is forced to remove 500kV transmission
lines from service as a voltage reduction measure. Removing transmission lines from service
increases the network’s impedance making the system vulnerable to both oscillatory
instability (under normal operations) and transient instability (after large disturbances such
as a generator tripping). Removing transmission lines also creates congestion, violates N-1
contingency compliance and generally weakens the system.
Vulnerable Area 2: Lahore Ring & HVDC Commutation Failure
23. For line-commutated converter (LCC)-based high voltage direct current (HVDC) systems,
commutation failure (CF) is a frequent dynamic event that takes place at the inverter side,
i.e., Lahore Converter Station (LCS). It is caused by AC system faults. CF leads to a temporary
cessation of active power transfer. In asynchronous power systems connected through an
HVDC link, CF can severely impact the frequency stability of the AC systems. In the case of
the Pakistani power system, Matiari-Lahore is an embedded DC link as it is connected to the
same synchronous power system at both ends. Therefore, while a CF event does not cause a
frequency event, the instantaneous transfer of power to the AC Corridor results in other
security violations that have already been listed in para 22.
24. Under normal HVDC operation, the operation point is determined by constant current (CC)
control at the rectifier and constant extinction angle (CEA) control at the inverter. The
occurrence of commutation failure is related to the transformer reactance, operating
extinction angle, smoothing reactor characteristics, and short circuit ratio (SCR). It may occur
frequently at the inverter side because of the low extinction angle. In addition, the
probability of its occurrence increases if an AC system connected to the inverter has low SCR
owing to the weak AC network. However, these parameters are primarily determined pre-
construction. Since the SCR depends on proximity of voltage sources, the SCR is lower in
winter when fewer RLNG power plants are in operation. To ensure voltage stability in winter,
an alternate source of short-circuit power such as enhanced (super capacitor equipped)
Static Synchronous Compensators (STATCOM)s or battery energy storage systems (BESS) are
required.
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25. A single CF event may last between 40 and 200 milliseconds. However, if the AC system fault
at the receiving end (Lahore side) is not cleared in time, it may result in subsequent
commutation failures, reduction of DC transmission power, DC bias of converter transformer,
and voltage instability of the weak AC system on the inverter side causing additional
successive CF events. Reactive power balance of the converter station may also be upset
after AC faults, resulting in excess reactive power or insufficient reactive power which is a
deterrent to system recovery and may also lead to subsequent commutation failures. The
Matiari-Lahore DC link is designed to block after three successive CF events.
26. CF mitigation from HVDC modification such as improving the critical extinction angle (CEA) to
advance the firing angle is difficult once the system is in operation. Therefore, the only
option for CF mitigation is to stiffen the AC system near LCS, as recommended by PMLTC in
the Joint Working Committee on CF mitigation. It is important to mention that it is not just
faults on the NTDC network that result in CF events. In fact, a large percentage of CF events
are due to faults occurring in the LESCO 132kV network. A list of CF events from January to
May 2023 are listed in Annex 4.
27. The primary mitigation measure for reducing CF is dynamic reactive power compensation
from Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) devices such as Static VAR Compensators
(SVC) and STATCOMs. There is currently a 450 MVAR SVC installed at 132kV Kot Lakh Pat grid
station. However, this is insufficient to regulate the voltage on the entire Lahore Ring. In
addition to a high SCR, the System requires:
a) Delicensed generators converted to synchronous condensers. Feasibility studies
should be conducted for synchronous condensers at Guddu, Muzaffargarh and
Jamshoro.
b) STATCOMs for the Lahore Ring for fast voltage regulation to avert CF. The exact
amount of reactive compensation that is required will be established by the CESI
Study on system stability. That Study is expected to be completed by October 2023.
Enhanced STATCOMs provide rapid voltage support as well as increase of system
strength and system inertia. An indicative non-binding estimate (on FOB basis) for a
400 MVAR STATCOM (without any civil, installation/site works etc. and without
duties & taxes) is ca. USD 36 million whereas the cost for a 400 MVAR enhanced
STATCOM is ca. USD 58 million.
28. Despite the System Need for reactive compensation, the System Operator is wary of NTDC’s
ability to adequately maintain FACTS devices. Firstly, Asset Management is grossly
underfunded – only PKR 2.046 billion was allocated to Repair & Maintenance out of the
operating budget of PKR 74.343 billion for 2022/23. Secondly, the Asset Management
department consists primarily of Grid Station Operator (GSO) staff that lack the requisite
expertise in power electronics (PE) and FACTS devices. The chequered history of the “pilot”
SVC installed at Kot Lakh Pat2 serves as a cautionary example. It is currently operating
2The contract was signed with ABB in January 2011 with a delivery period of 18 months. The contractor received the
project completion certificate in January 2106 (invoking the five-year warranty period) but NTDC was unable to provide the
132kV busbar until two years later. Energisation finally took place on 14.05.2018. After suffering 17 outages in 20 months,
the contractor went into dispute when the 18th outage took place in January 2020. After 23 months, the SVC was eventually
reenergized on 24.11.2022. It suffered yet another outage on 04.01.2023. It was last reenergized on 28.03.2023.
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
without sufficient spare parts and no mechanism exists for the supply of spares. Once the
spares run out the SVC will stop operating which would be extremely detrimental to voltage
stability on the Lahore ring as well as to the HVDC system.
29. NTDC also lacks the technical expertise to design (EMT, RTDS) and tender (evaluate technical
bids) fast switching PE-based transmission systems such as HVDC or FACTS devices. Despite
the SVC contract being signed in 2011 and in operation since 2018, no FACTS expert is to be
found in the company. Therefore, it is recommended that a subsidiary company with experts
in power electronics be considered for the complete lifecycle of FACTS devices. This
specialised company could have a business model such as NESPAK’s, whereby it may
eventually target business outside Pakistan. Incidentally, NTDC has already established a
company by the name of Transerv Private Limited in 2017. Rapid global deployment of HVDC,
FACTS and PE-based generation (i.e., inverter-based generation such as wind and solar) is an
opportunity for NTDC to tap the burgeoning international market for technical experts and
project consultants in power electronics. Power Grid India is already benefitting from
international projects using this business model.
30. The first version of the Transmission System Expansion Plan (TSEP) covering new projects up
to the year 2025-26 was prepared by Planning Department with the help of USAID’s Power
Sector Improvement Activity (PSIA) program in 2022. The TSEP recommends 450 MVAR
SVC/STATCOM in the QESCO area and 17 x 100 MVAR switched shunt capacitors in various
areas to address low voltage concerns and reduce transformer loading. Switched capacitors
only provide steady-state voltage support. They do not provide dynamic voltage support
needed for mitigation of CF events which occur after AC system disturbances. Only dynamic
reactive compensation elements such as STATCOMs can provide the requisite voltage
stiffness required adjacent to Lahore Converter Station to mitigate CF. Switched capacitors on
the Lahore Ring (132kV Ravi, Ghazi Road, Wapda Town, Punjab University and Lahore North)
may not be needed once the requisite STATCOMs are installed. As per feedback received
from PSIA, additional dynamic reactive compensation devices (FACTS) would be identified in
TSEP 2023, studies of which are currently underway.
Table 2: TSEP 2022 (Phase-1) proposed projects for voltage control & reliability improvement
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Ancillary Services
31. The System Operator License issued by NEPRA defines Ancillary Services as system services
that are required to operate and maintain power quality and a stable and reliable power
system including reactive power support, operating reserve, frequency control and black
start. Article 33 states that “the Licensee shall purchase or otherwise acquire ancillary
services from the most economical sources available to it, keeping in view the quantity and
nature of the services required to ensure system security.”
32. OC 5.4.13.1 of the Grid Code states that “The SO shall determine any reserve requirements,
including the amount of Primary Operating Reserve, Secondary Operating Reserve and
Tertiary Operating Reserve to ensure system security. For such reason, within twelve (12)
months of the approval of this Grid Code, the SO shall establish, and maintain permanently
updated, GCOP for Operating Reserve Requirements, detailing the methodology to be used
to determine the amounts of different types of reserve required by the Transmission System
in different operational conditions.”
33. The System Operator has entered into a technical assistance agreement with National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to conduct a gap assessment of its Operations Planning
processes and to conduct a detailed analysis and recommend the optimal mix of Operating
Reserves required to maintain load-frequency control. The analysis will also be applied to a
higher penetration of VRE generation. Discussions are also underway with USAID and with
Energinet, the Danish Transmission System Operator (TSO), to support the System Operator
in developing a framework for procurement, prequalification, and compliance testing for
delivery of ancillary services.
34. Many of the properties of the power system, including its generation output, load levels, and
transmission equipment availability are both variable and unpredictable. Therefore,
additional generation capacity is made available either on-line or on-standby. This capacity,
herein referred to as operating reserves, is principally divided into two categories – non-
event reserves and event reserves. Non-event Reserves are Spinning Reserves that include
Regulating Reserves (fast) and Load Following Reserves (slower) that are used to correct
imbalances during normal conditions. Event-based (Contingency) reserves are generally
divided into three groups – Primary Reserve, Secondary Reserve and Tertiary Reserve.
Figure 3: Primary Reserve and Secondary Reserve (AGC)
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
Service / Purpose Control Requirement Response (OC 5.4) Current practice / compliance
Primary Reserve: Automatic Reach max value FGMO tests listed in the PPAs
Post-event frequency (Power Plant): Under within 10 seconds; are inadequate. The plants that
containment FGMO3, the turbine sustainable for 30 do have FGMO active have a
speed controller seconds very wide dead-band (49.5Hz-
responds to 50.5Hz) due to the excessive
instantaneous active frequency excursions.
power imbalances for Compliance monitoring by SO
frequency excursions has revealed frequency
outside the dead- response is not being provided.
band. (Annex 5)
Secondary Reserve: Automatic Response time of 5 AGC is unavailable due to
A) Post-event (System Operator): seconds; reach max inadequate SCADA connectivity.
frequency SCADA signal known value within 30 As a result, Secondary Reserve
restoration to 50 Hz; as Automatic seconds; sustainable continues to be dispatched
and Generation Control for 30 minutes manually.
B) Regulating Reserve (AGC).
under normal
conditions
Tertiary Reserve: Manual Depends on power Manual dispatch. Include both
Replaces Secondary (System Operator) plant’s ramp rate & spinning and non-spinning
Reserve start time. reserves.
35. The current modus operandi of System Operation is as follows:
Timeframe Purpose Modus Operandi
Day-Ahead Indicative Power plant and transmission network availabilities, generation costs
Operating (merit order), DISCO demands, etc. are fed into NCP unit commitment
Schedule (IOS) software. Tarbela, Mangla and Ghazi Barotha HPPs are optimized to ensure
full energy utilization over the coming twenty-four hours.
Real-Time: Load- Dispatcher faces many challenges in minimizing deviations from IOS:
normal Following / 1. DISCO day-ahead demand forecasts are completely inaccurate.
conditions Regulation 2. HVAC/HVDC corridor capacity constraints and SCS tripping
requirement.
3. Thermal constraints, low power factor and low voltages. Forced
outages of power plants and transmission lines creates new
constraints.
4. IRSA makes ad hoc intraday changes to Tarbela & Mangla indents.
5. Wind power has a large forecast error.
6. During peak demand when Tarbela, Ghazi Barotha & RLNG plants are
fully utilized, fast responding upward regulation is exhausted.
Therefore, Load Management has to be recalculated in response to
the frequency deviations.
Real-Time: Frequency On a generator tripping event, the frequency drop is contained by
contingency Containment Automatic Under Frequency Load Shedding (AUFLS) which starts at 49.4 Hz
& Restoration and continues in eleven stages until 48.5 Hz for a total 25% of system load,
Rate-of-Change-of-Frequency (RoCoF)-based Load Shedding.
Frequency Restoration comprises of power plant redispatch and manual
Load Shedding by Regional Control Centre (RCC) North.
3 Free Governor Mode of Operation (FGMO)
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
36. Operating Reserves have historically not featured in system operation. Although the
generation adequacy problem has now largely been addressed, (the occasional fuel
shortages aside), neither Primary Reserve nor Secondary Reserve is currently available.
Dispatch commands are relayed manually via telephone. As a result, the system frequency
varies from 49.5 Hz to 50.5 Hz during normal operating conditions.
37. The generation stack (ca. 40,000 MW) is skewed towards baseload thermal generation,
hydropower which is seasonal, and variable renewable energy (VRE). There is a notable
scarcity of Regulation / Load-Following generators. Generators that could be used for
Regulation do not have an open cycle tariff. This creates major problems in system operation.
a) Summer demand of 20,000 MW less 10,000 MW baseload = 10,000 MW that can be
attributed to cooling demand which is weather driven.
b) Approx. 2000 MW of variable and intermittent wind and solar power generation
further complicates operations planning and real-time system operation.
c) Increasingly occurrences of freak weather which drops system demand by as much
as 40% as cooling demand recedes.
6th June 2023: System generation was 18,000 MW at 15:30 and expected to climb to 20,000
high winds, hail MW at 19:30. However, as windstorms gathered in SEPCO, MEPCO, FESCO and
LESCO, system demand fell abruptly, and generation was reduced to under
15,000 MW.
10th June 2023: System generation dropped from 21,263 MW at 14:45 to less than 12,500 MW
high winds by 18:45 – a drop of more than 40% in three and a half hours! LESCO’s load
reduced from 4,350 MW to 1,630 MW and GEPCO reduced from 1,850 MW to
630 MW.
Figure 4: hailstorm in T.M.Khan on 30th May 2023
38. Since it is not possible to operate a power system without Load-Following, baseload thermal
generators are utilized for Load-Following. This leads to increased wear and tear as baseload
generators are not designed to be ramped up and down multiple times a day to follow the
daily load pattern. A complaint from Lucky coal power plant is attached as Annex 6. NEPRA in
fact considers not using a thermal generator at full capacity as “inefficient” use of generation
that incurs Part-Load Adjustment Costs (PLAC). Alternatively, the System Operator could
increase the number of start-ups and shutdowns. However, this would lead to even further
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
plant degradation and even higher costs as the cost of a start-up for a single 660 MW coal-
fired generator can range from USD 80,000 to USD 220,000 depending on its idle time.
39. IPPs and GENCOs equipped with FGMO are for the most part either unwillingness or wary of
providing the requisite Primary Reserve due to the wide variation in the system frequency
and the inadequate coverage of FGMO tests in the approved technical schedules of PPAs4.
Furthermore, Primary Reserve cannot be sustained without replacement by Secondary
Reserve. AGC connectivity for all power plants will take at least one year after the completion
of the SCADA-3 project.
40. Power System Stabilizers (PSS) have been installed at all major power plants, but they have
not been tuned for inter-area oscillations. Without a wide-area monitoring system (WAMS)
based on synchronized phasor measurements, it is not possible to tune the PSS to damp
inter-area oscillations or even to know when oscillations occur other than direct observation
in the system frequency. By then it may be too late if the oscillation is undamped. Physical
tests at certain participating generators would also be required.
41. The majority of wind power plants (WPPs) do not have binding forecasts in their energy
purchase agreements (EPAs). Only the most recently commissioned 12 WPPs have binding
forecasts and forecast error penalties (on an annual basis). These EPAs place the wind risk on
the seller. The forecast is to be provided four hours ahead and updated at the top of each
hour. The remaining 24 WPPs either have no binding forecast or no forecast at all. In terms of
real-time forecast error, NPCC is almost in the dark as it receives real-time data from only 4
WPPs. As a result, it is next to impossible to track the real-time wind power generation or the
forecast error four hours prior to dispatch.
42. Given the current operating limitations described in paras 34-41, the addition of further VRE
generation without improving VRE forecasting and real-time forecast error, especially wind
power in the Vulnerable Area in the south, will further reduce power system security.
43. The System Operator proposes the following solution for improving system security and
reliability:
a) VRE: Grid Station-wise aggregated forecasts and real-time forecast error to be
provided by the wind farms. A trial has started this month.
b) DISCOs: A Deviation Settlement Mechanism (DSM5) like the one implemented in
India to improve the load forecasts submitted by DISCOs.
c) Primary Reserve: Battery Energy Storage System (BESS6) for fast frequency response.
Simulation studies to determine the exact quantum will be conducted once the CESI
study is completed. At least a 500 MW BESS is required in the south.
4 In some cases, the Technical Schedules are still unapproved.
5 T. Bharath Kumar, Anoop Singh: “Ancillary services in the Indian power sector – A look at recent developments and
prospects”, Energy Policy, Volume 149: “The DSM is one of the regulatory mechanisms to achieve the grid stability,
reliability and security by imposing penalties and incentives for over drawl/injection and under drawl/injection from the
schedule. The DSM has achieved the grid discipline in terms of consumption as per schedule across the distribution
companies. The deviation charges are primarily linked with the volume of deviation and corresponding frequency during
such drawl/injection scenarios.”
6 A 20 MW pilot project at 220kV Jhimpir-1 grid station is scheduled for completion in April 2024 but will likely be delayed.
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SYSTEM NEEDS ASSESSMENT – JUNE 2023
44. The immediate System Need is Primary Reserve (frequency bias) and regulation of interface
flows on the stability-constrained 500kV AC Corridor (tie-line bias). Unlike a power plant
which takes a few seconds to provide Primary Reserve, a BESS can provide full power output
near instantaneously (100-200 milliseconds). The BESS would be configured to operate in the
Tolerance Frequency Band whereas the generators on FGMO would be configured to operate
in the Frequency Sensitive Band with a slight overlap. This would allay many of the concerns
of the power plants as the excursions outside the Frequency Sensitive Band would be greatly
reduced.
45. Large-scale introduction of solar power in MEPCO region at 220kV and especially at 500kV
would also benefit from BESS support. In addition to Primary Reserve, the MEPCO-located
BESS would also provide short-circuit power and smoothen out the variability of solar power
during cloudy spells for regulation of interface flows on the 500kV AC Corridor.
46. The fact that manual frequency regulation from RLNG-fired CCGTs and hydropower plants is
only available in the north whereas wind power plants, a major source of variability are in
the south, render manual frequency regulation a security risk. This was exemplified by the
blackout of 23rd January 2023. Wind power cannot be balanced by the inflexible coal and
nuclear power plants in the south. When the AC/DC Corridors reach their stability-
constrained Transfer Capacity limits, wind power cannot be balanced from Regulating
Reserves. Only KE’s 900 MW CCGT (Bin Qasim 3) with a ramp rate of 36 MW/min fulfils the
criteria for frequency regulation in the south. However, manual frequency regulation is only
possible for power plants dispatched by NPCC. In a meeting on 5th June 2023, the System
Operator conveyed to KE its obligation to provide Primary Reserve in accordance with its
share of system demand. In case KE is unable to provision adequate Operating Reserves from
its own generation, the System Operator would provision KE’s share and charge KE
accordingly. A joint committee has been created to work out the details.
47. KE is presently discussing a wheeling arrangement for 600 MW from Jamshoro Coal power
plant (J-CPP) Unit-1. In an informal meeting between KE, PPIB and the System Operator in
NPCC on 7th June 2023, the System Operator explained that as J-CPP is connected to the
national grid at 500kV, the power plant would be under the control of the System Operator.
The power plant will likely always be running (when available) due to its critical location in
the AC Corridor which provides power oscillation damping (POD) and improves transient
stability. However, as per OC 5.4, the System Operator will ensure sufficient Primary and
Secondary Reserve is provided from this power plant. Therefore, for a wheeling agreement
of 600 MW at 500kV Kanupp-Karachi-Interchange (KKI), an average dispatch of 450 MW with
50 MW Primary Reserve and 100 MW Secondary Reserve may be considered for pricing
purposes, whereas the over/under from Operating Reserves be proportionally allocated to
CPPA-G/KE consumers as Ancillary Services. The remaining 150 MW “firm capacity” may be
purchased at the basket price.
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